


*The Difference Between
Realizing and Not Realizing*
Jam-yang-shay-pa's
*Presentation of
Awareness and Knowledge, 1*



Elizabeth Napper

Edited by Jeffrey Hopkins

UMA INSTITUTE
FOR TIBETAN STUDIES

Presentation of Awareness and Knowledge

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Education in Compassion and Wisdom

UMA Great Books Translation Project

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Translating texts from the heritage of Tibetan and Inner Asian Buddhist systems, the project focuses on Great Indian Books and Tibetan commentaries from the Go-mang College syllabus as well as a related theme on the fundamental innate mind of clear light in Tantric traditions. A feature of the Project is the usage of consistent vocabulary and format throughout the translations.

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Preface

JAM-YANG-SHAY-PA

Jam-yang-shay-pa Ngag-wang-tsön-drü^a was born in the northeastern Am-do Province of Tibet in the Earth-Mouse year of 1648 east of the Blue Lake.^b At the age of five he was blessed by the Fifth Dalai Lama, from whom he later received monastic vows. Having studied the alphabet at age seven with his uncle, who was a monk, he mastered reading and writing and six years later became a novice monk, excelling among his fellow students by his ability quickly to understand texts and disputations. He went to Lhasa at age twenty-one to further his studies at the Gomang College of Dre-pung Monastic University. Arriving in Lhasa in 1668, he offered a presentation scarf to an image of Mañjuśrī in the Jo-khang Temple, where the statue reportedly favored the young scholar with a smile, due to which he became known as Jam-yang-shay-pa, “Smiled Upon by Mañjuśrī.” Six years later he received full ordination and at twenty-nine entered Gyumay Tantric College. From age thirty-three he spent two years in meditative retreat in a cave near Dre-pung.

At the age of thirty-eight in 1685 he published the first of his major works, *Decisive Analysis of (Tsong-kha-pa’s) “Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive”*: *Storehouse of White Lapis-Lazuli of Scripture and Reasoning Free from Mistake, Fulfilling the Hopes of the Fortunate*, commonly called *Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive*. In 1688 he published another of his great expositions, the *Treatise on the Presentations of the Concentrative and Formless Absorptions: Adornment Beautifying the Subduer’s Teaching, Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning, Delighting the Fortunate*, commonly called *Great Exposition of the Concentrative and Formless Absorptions*. He published the *Root Text of Tenets: Lion’s Roar* in 1689, and published the *Great Exposition of Tenets*—its prose auto-commentary—ten years later in 1699, and between those two, in 1695, he published the *Decisive Analysis of (Chandrakīrti’s) “Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle’”*: *Treasury of Scripture and Reasoning, Thoroughly Illuminating the Profound Meaning*

^a *jam dbyangs bzhad pa ngag dbang brtson grus*, 1648-1722. For a longer biography of Jam-yang-shay-pa see Derek F. Maher, “Knowledge and Authority in Tibetan Middle Way Schools of Buddhism: A Study of the Gelukba (*dge lugs pa*) Epistemology of Jamyang Shayba (*jam dbyangs bzhad pa*) In Its Historical Context” (Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, 2003), 169-196.

^b For an account of Jam-yang-shay-pa’s life see:

<http://treasuryoflives.org/biographies/view/Jamyang-Zhepai-Dorje/6646>.

[of Emptiness], *Entrance for the Fortunate* also called the *Great Exposition of the Middle*.

At age fifty-three in 1700 he became abbot of Go-mang College and in 1709 at sixty-two returned to Am-do Province where he founded a highly influential monastery at Tra-shi-khyil^a in 1710. Seven years later he founded a tantric college at the same place. He wrote prolifically on the full range of topics of a typical Tibetan polymath and, having received honors from the central Tibetan government and from the Chinese Emperor, died at the age of seventy-three or -four in 1721/2.^b

Partly because of the close connection between Go-mang College and the Mongolian peoples stretching from the Caspian Sea through Siberia, who were predominantly Ge-lug-pa by this time, Jam-yang-shay-pa's influence on the Ge-lug-pa order has been considerable. His life manifests a pattern typical of many influential Tibetan religious figures—child prodigy, learned scholar, disseminator of the religion, politician, priest to political personages, monastery leader, yogi, magician, popular teacher, and prolific writer.

EDITIONS CONSULTED

Two main editions of Jam-yang-shay-pa's *Beautiful Golden Garland of Eloquence Illuminating a Little the Presentation of Awareness and Knowledge* were consulted:

1. *blo rigs kyi rnam bzhag nyung gsal legs bshad gser gyi phreng mdzes*. Published at Go-mang College, date unknown. Interlinear reference in the Tibetan text “[G###a/b].” Abbreviated reference such as in footnotes: “1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa,” so named because of being acquired by Jeffrey Hopkins in Lhasa, Tibet, at Go-mang College in 1987. This version was likely originally printed at Go-mang College, Lhasa, Tibet, during Jam-yang-shay-pa residence at Go-mang College. (To be made available at UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, uma-tibet.org.)
2. *blo rig gi rnam bzhag nyung gsal legs bshad gser gyi 'phreng mdzes*, TBRC W22186-I1KG10682: 303-374, which is a PDF of: *bla brang bkra shis 'khyil, bla brang brka shis 'khyil dgon*, publishing date unknown. Interlinear reference in the Tibetan text “[L###a/b].” Abbreviated reference such as in footnotes: “2011 TBRC *bla brang*,” so named because of being acquired by E. Gene Smith for the Tibetan

^a *bkra shis 'khyil*.

^b See Maher, “Knowledge and Authority in Tibetan Middle Way Schools of Buddhism,” 164.

Buddhist Resource Center at the request of the UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies in 2011. This edition, which is a revision of the above edition, was published in La-brang-tra-shi-khyil monastery founded by Jam-yang-shay-pa after his return to Am-do. In general, it is the preferred edition, though not always. This edition has spawned other editions such as:

blo rig gi rnam bzhag nyung gsal legs bshad gser gyi 'phreng mdzes. In the *Collected Works of 'Jam-dbyaṅs-bḥad-pa'i-rdo-rje*: Reproduced from prints from La-brang-tra-shi-khyil blocks, 15 vols, Gedan Sungrab Minyam Gyunphel Series. New Delhi, India: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1973. Tibetan digital reprint edition: In *gsung 'bum ('jam dbyangs bzhad pa'i rdo rje)* TBRC W21503-04 14: 301-372 (PDF of New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1973). Abbreviated reference: “1973 Ngawang Gelek *bla brang*.”

The digital Tibetan text of Jam-yang-shay-pa's *Presentation of Awareness and Knowledge* provided in this book was supplied by the Drepung Gomang Library of Go-mang College in Mundgod, Karnataka State, India, which was likely based on the 1995 Mundgod codex. It has been edited in accordance with the “2011 TBRC *bla brang*” and the “1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa” editions.

TECHNICAL NOTES

It is important to recognize that:

- translations and editions of texts are given in the Bibliography;
- the names of Indian Buddhist schools of thought are translated into English in a wish to increase accessibility for non-specialists;
- for the names of Indian scholars and systems used in the body of the text, *ch*, *sh*, and *ṣh* are used instead of the more usual *c*, *ś*, and *ṣ* for the sake of easy pronunciation by non-specialists; however, *cch* is used for *cch*, not *chchh*. Within parentheses the usual transliteration system for Sanskrit is used;
- transliteration of Tibetan is done in accordance with a system devised by Turrell Wylie; see “A Standard System of Tibetan Transcription,” *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 22 (1959): 261-267;
- the names of Tibetan authors and orders are given in “essay phonetics” for the sake of easy pronunciation; the system is aimed at internet

searchability;

- titles of added subsections are given in square brackets;
- definitions are in bold type.

Jam-yang-shay-pa's
*PRESENTATION OF
AWARENESS AND
KNOWLEDGE:*
Realizing and Nonrealizing
Awarenesses

Key to the colorization: In situations of debate the Tibetan text and the translation are highlighted in three colors: black, blue, and red. Blue print presents what Jam-yang-shay-pa considers to be right positions, while red print represents what Jam-yang-shay-pa considers to be wrong positions. Words in black are other information or function structurally. In the Tibetan, a turquoise background indicates material added in place of ellipses, and a magenta highlight sets off ellipsis indicators when the elided part has been filled in.

Jam-yang-shay-pa's
*Beautiful Golden Garland of Eloquence
 Illuminating a Little the Presentation of
 Awareness and Knowledge*

༄༅། ། ལྷོ་རིག་^aགི་རྣམ་བཞག་ཉུང་གསལ་ལེགས་བཤད་གསེར་
 གྱི་སྤང་མངོས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་བཞུགས་སོ། །

Namo śrīmañjughoṣāya svarasvastyai ca mahādhīme prayaccha.

ན་མོ་སྤྱི་མཚུ་གྲོ་ལ་སྤྱི་ཅ་མ་དུ་རྣམ་མེད་པ་ཚོ།

Having bowed down to the Victors increasing all the abundances
 of cyclic existence and peace,
 And to the treasures of awareness, the gentle voiced (*'jam
 dbyangs*) father and mother [Mañjushrī and Svarasvatī],
 I will shine forth (*bzhad*) a hundred thousand understandings
 clearing away the darkness
 Of the imputations by other schools and of the guesses^b of chil-
 dren about awareness.

མྱིད་ཞིའི་སྤུན་ཚོགས་ཀུན་བསྐྱེད་རྒྱལ་རྣམས་དང་། །
 ལྷོ་གཏེར་འཇམ་དབྱེངས་ཡབ་ཡུམ་ལ་བཏུད་དེ། །
 ལྷོ་ལ་གཞན་སྤེའི་བརྟགས་དང་བྱིས་རྣམས་ཀྱི། །
 འོལ་ཚོད་སྤུན་བསལ་ལྷོ་གྲོས་འབྲུམ་བཞད་བྱ། །

Concerning this, here the explanation of the presentation of Awareness and Knowledge has two parts: the presentation of object-possessing aware-
 nesses and the presentation of objects.

དེ་ལ་འདིར་ལྷོ་རིག་^cགི་རྣམ་བཞག་བཤད་པ་ལ། ཡུལ་ཅན་ལྷོ་

^a 2011 TBRC *bla brang* title page reads *blo rigs*; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa title page reads *blo rigs*.
^b 'ol tshod.
^c 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 1a.2, reads *blo rigs*; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 1a.2, reads *blo rigs*.

དང་། ཡུལ་གྱི་རྣམ་བཞག་བཤད་པ་གཉིས།

Presentation of Object-Possessing Awarenesses

དང་པོ་[ཡུལ་ཅན་སློབ་རྣམ་བཞག་]ལ།

This section has two parts: stating the scriptural passage and explaining its meaning.

ལྷང་འགོད་པ་དང་། དེའི་དོན་བཤད་པ་གཉིས།

I. STATING THE SCRIPTURAL PASSAGE

དང་པོ་[ལྷང་འགོད་པ་]ནི།

With regard to explaining the meaning of awareness in our own schools, the [second] chapter, Establishment of Valid Cognition in Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Valid Cognition"* says:^a

Wisdom and so forth, without [following]
The development and diminishment of the body
Develop and diminish due to the features
Of activities of awarenesses.

རང་སྤེའི་སློབ་དོན་འཆད་པར། རྣམ་འགྲེལ་ཚད་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་
ལེན་ལས། ལུས་ཀྱི་སྤུལ་བྱུང་འགྲིབ་མེད་པར། ། སློ་ཡི་བྱེད་པའི་
བྱུང་པར་གྱིས། ། ཤེས་རབ་ལ་སོགས་སྤུལ་བྱུང་དང་། ། འགྲིབ་པ་
དག་ཏུ་གྱུར་^[L2a]པ་ཡིན། ། ཞེས་བྱུང་།

II. EXPLAINING THE MEANING OF THE SCRIPTURAL PASSAGE

གཉིས་པ་[ལྷང་དེའི་དོན་བཤད་པ་]ལ།

This section has three parts: definitions, synonyms, and divisions.

^a Dharmakīrti, *tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi tshig le 'ur byas pa (pramāṇavārttikakārikā)*, II.73, in *bstan 'gyur (sde dge)*, 4210, TBRC W23703.174:189-304 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 110a.6-7.

མཚན་ཉིད། རྣམ་གྲངས། དབྱེ་བ་གསུམ་ལས།

A. DEFINITIONS

དང་པོ་[མཚན་ཉིད་]ནི།

Knower is the definition of awareness. Illustrations are wisdom and valid cognition, for instance. It follows with respect to the subjects, those two [wisdom and valid cognition], that the meaning of knower exists because that which perceives an object when it dawns (*yul 'char ba dang snang ba*) is the meaning of knowing that object.

རིག་པ་^aདེ་སྣོད་མཚན་ཉིད། མཚན་གཞི་ནི། ཤེས་རབ་དང་ཚད་
མ་ལྟ་བུ། དེ་གཉིས་ཚེས་ཅན། རིག་པའི་^bདོན་ཡོད་དེ། ཡུལ་^[G2a]
འཆར་བ་དང་སྣང་བ་དེ་ཡུལ་དེ་རིག་པའི་དོན་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

B. SYNONYMS

གཉིས་པ་[རྣམ་གྲངས་]ནི།

Synonyms exist because awareness (*blo*), consciousness (*shes pa*), knower (*rig pa*), and illuminator (*gsal ba*) are equivalent.

A definition of consciousness exists because **luminous non-materiality** (*gsal ba'i bem min*) is that. Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on Dignāga's "Compilation of Valid cognition"* says: ^c

Therefore according to us an awareness (*blo*) itself

Is a luminous entity (*gsal ba'i ngo bo*) [and hence the entity of the object] is intensely illuminated (*rab gsal*).

རྣམ་གྲངས་ཡོད་དེ། སྣོད་དང་ཤེས་པ་དང་རིག་པ་དང་གསལ་བ་
རྣམས་དོན་གཅིག་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཤེས་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ།

^a Correcting *rigs pa* in 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 1a.5, to *rig pa* in accordance with 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 1b.1.

^b Correcting *rigs pa* in 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 1a.5, to *rig pa* in accordance with 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 1b.2. In subsequent uses of the term, the 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa text read *rig na* as does the 2011 TBRC *bla brang* text.

^c *tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi tshig le 'ur byas pa*, 136b.6-7.

གསལ་བའི་བཅའ་མེན་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། རྣམ་འགྲེལ་ལས།
 དེའི་ཕྱིར་ངེད་ཀྱི་སློབ་པ་ཉིད། ། གསལ་བའི་ངོ་བོ་རབ་གསལ་
 ཞིང་། ། ཞེས་བྱུང་།

Moreover, let us speak more extensively [about these]. **Its being a knower that perceives its object** is the definition of its being an awareness. Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on Dignāga's "Compilation of Valid cognition"* says:^a

When it is asserted thus that [the aspect of a former] awareness
 (*blo*) [is transferred to a later] awareness,

The [later] awareness is [itself] established as a knower (*rig pa*).

ཡང་རྒྱལ་པར་བརྗོད་ན་རང་ཡུལ་སྤང་བའི་རིག་པ་ཡིན་པ་དེ།
 རང་སློབ་ཡིན་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད། ^[L2b] རྣམ་འགྲེལ་ལས། དེ་ལྟར་སློབ་པ་
 སློབ་འདོད་ན། ། སློབ་ནི་རང་ཉིད་རིག་པར་གྲུབ། ། ཅེས་སོ། །

Its being non-matter that illuminates its object is the definition of its being a consciousness because Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on Dignāga's "Compilation of Valid Cognition"* says:^b

Because [an awareness] is itself intensely luminous,

The entity of the object is intensely illuminated.

and the *Autocommentary to (Shāntarakṣita's) Ornament for the Middle* says,^c "Since a consciousness is luminous, [the luminous] is not illuminated."

རང་ཡུལ་གསལ་བའི་བཅའ་མེན་ཡིན་པ་དེ། རང་ཤེས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་
 མཚན་ཉིད། རྣམ་འགྲེལ་ལས། རང་ཉིད་རབ་ཏུ་གསལ་ཕྱིར་དོན། །
 དེ་ཡི་ངོ་བོ་རབ་གསལ་ཡིན། ། ཞེས་དང་། དབུ་མ་རྒྱན་རང་།

^a *tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi tshig le 'ur byas pa*. 136b.6.

^b *tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi tshig le 'ur byas pa*, 136b.7.

^c Shāntarakṣita, *dbu ma rgyan gyi 'grel pa (madhyamakālamkāravṛtti)*, in *bstan 'gyur (sde dge*, 3885), TBRC W23703.107:114-169 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyal-wae sunggrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 61a.6.

འགྲེལ་ལས། ཤེས་པ་ནི་གསལ་བ་ཡིན་ན་^aགསལ་བར་མ་གྱུར་ཏེ།
 ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ།

“Non-matter” (*bem min*) is an oppositional term (*'gal zla'i tshig*) because Shāntideva’s *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* says,^b “Consciousness is the opposite, non-matter,” and Shāntarakṣhita’s *Ornament for the Middle* says:^c

^a This reads *gsal ba ni* in Shāntarakṣita, Kamalashīla, and Masamichi Ichigō, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra of Śāntarakṣita: with His Own Commentary or Vṛtti and with the Subcommentary or Pañjikā of Kamalaśīla*, trans. Masamichi Ichigō (Kyoto: Kyoto Sangyu University, 1985), 78.

^b Lo-sang-gya-tsho corrects the reading to: “Consciousness is the opposite of matter” (*shes pa bem pa'i log pa ste*) but declares that even this corrected line is not found in Shāntideva’s *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds*. However, as Jongbok Yi points out, there is a somewhat similar line in the Chapter on Patience in Shāntideva’s *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds*:

Because mentalism [that is, mind] is not physical

It cannot be overcome by anyone in any way.

Due to adherence to the body

The body is harmed by sufferings.

ཡིད་ནི་ལྷས་ཅན་མ་ཡིན་པས། །སྲས་ཀྱང་གང་དུའང་གཞོན་མི་རུས། །

ལྷས་ལ་མངོན་པར་ཞེན་པས་ན། །ལྷས་ནི་སྲུག་བཟུལ་དག་གིས་གཞོད། །

Shāntideva, *byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa (bodhisattvacaryāvatāra)*, in *bstan 'gyur (sde dge, 3871)*, TBRC W23703.105: 84-578 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 16b.3-4.

^c Stanza 16, in Shāntarakṣita, Kamalashīla, and Masamichi Ichigō, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra of Śāntarakṣita: with His Own Commentary or Vṛtti and with the Subcommentary or Pañjikā of Kamalaśīla*, trans. Masamichi Ichigō (Kyoto: Kyoto Sangyu University, 1985), 70-71, Shāntarakṣhita’s root text reads:

རྣམ་ཤེས་བཅས་པའི་རང་བཞིན་ལས།།

བརྗོག་པ་རབ་ཏུ་སྐྱེ་བ་སྟེ།།

བཅས་མེན་རང་བཞིན་གང་ཡིན་པ།།

དེ་འདྲིའི་བདག་ཉིད་ཤེས་པ་ཡིན།།

Shāntarakṣhita’s autocommentary (*dbu ma rgyan gyi 'grel pa*, 60b.2-4.) reads:

དེ་ལ་རེ་ཞིག་གཉིས་གྱི་ཚུལ་རྣམ་པ་མེད་པའི་རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པའི་ཚུགས་ནི། རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ་ལུལ་གྱི་སྣང་བ་དང་མ་ཟུང་བ། བདག་ཅམ་རིག་པ་ཅམ་ལ་གཞོལ་བ་ཁོ་ནར་ཟད་པས། བདག་དང་མ་དང་པའི་དོན་ཚུང་བའི་བདག་ཉིད་དུ་མི་རུང་ངོ་། ། འདི་རང་རིག་པའི་རང་བཞིན་དུ་རྣམ་པར་གཞུག་པ་ནི་རང་བཞིན་གྱི་གསལ་བའི་བདག་ཉིད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། ། ཤིང་རྟ་ལ་སོགས་པ་ལ་རིག་པ་མེད་པའི་རང་བཞིན་ལས་

A consciousness is generated
Opposite from a nature of matter.

བཅའ་མིན་ཞེས་པ་འགལ་སྐྱེའི་ཚིག་ཡིན་ཏེ། སྡོང་^[G2b]འཇུག་ལས།
ཤེས་པ་བཅའ་མིན་ལོག་པ་སྟེ། ། ཞེས་དང་། དབུ་མ་རྒྱན་ལས། རྣམ་
ཤེས་བཅའ་པོའི་རང་བཞིན་ལས། ། ལྷོག་པར་^aརབ་དུ་སྐྱེ་བ་སྟེ། །
ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །

1. Here someone says:^b The definition of a knower (*rig pa*) is **an awareness to which the aspect of an object dawns** (*yul gyi nam pa shar ba'i blo*) and says that **the aspect of an object does not dawn to a self-knower.**

འདིར་ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། རིག་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡུལ་གྱི་རྣམ་པ་ཤར་
བའི་སྐྱོ་ཞེས་ཟེར་བ་དང་། རང་རིག་ལ་ཡུལ་གྱི་རྣམ་པ་མི་འཆར་
ཟེར་བ་

Our response: These are internally contradictory.

ནང་འགལ་ལ།

བསྐྱོག་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། དེ་ནི་རང་གི་ངོ་བོ་རིག་པར་བྱ་བའི་ཕྱིར་སྐྱོན་པོ་ལ་སོགས་པ་བཞིན་དུ་རིག་པར་བྱེད་
པ་གཞན་ལ་མི་བསྐྱོས་པས་ཏེ། རིག་པ་མེད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ཞེས་ བྱ་བའི་དོན་འདི་ནི་རང་རིག་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་
བར་བརྗོད་དོ།

Kamalashīla's commentary (*dbu ma rgyan gyi dka' 'grel, madhyamakālamkārapañjikā*), in *bstan 'gyur (sde dge, 3886)*, W23703.107:169-268 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 94b.2-3] reads:

མཚུངས་པ་ཉིད་དུ་བསྐྱབ་པའི་ཕྱིར། རྣམ་ཤེས་བཅས་པོའི་རང་བཞིན་ལས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ལ་སོགས་པ་སྐྱོས་
ཏེ། མདོར་བསྐྱས་པའི་དོན་ནི་རང་རིག་པའི་=ལས་ནི་ཤིང་རྟ་དང་ཅིག་པ་ལ་སོགས་པ་བཅས་པོའི་རང་
བཞིན་དག་ལས་ལོག་པ་ལོན་ཡིན་སྟེ། གསལ་བ་གཞན་ལ་མི་བསྐྱོས་པ་ཉིད་དུ་ཐ་སྐད་གྱི་ལམ་ལ་འཇུག་
པ་ཡིན་ཅོ། ལྷག་མ་ནི་གོ་སྟོན།

Footnote provided by Jongbok Yi.
^a 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 2b.3 reads **ldog pa rab tu skye ba**; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 2b.1 reads **bzlog par rab tu skye ba**.
^b 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 2b.3; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 2b.1.

2. *Someone says*:^a It follows that the subject, a self-knower, is an awareness to which its object appears (*rang yul snang ba 'i blo*) because of being a knower. It follows [that a self-knower is a knower] because of being a self-knower. You have accepted the reason [which is that a self-knower is a self-knower]. If you accept [that a self-knower is an awareness to which its object appears (*rang yul snang ba 'i blo*)], it follows that the aspect of its object dawns (*rang yul gyi rnam pa shar ba*) because its object appears (*rang yul snang ba*).

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། རང་རིག་ཚེས་ཅན། རང་ཡུལ་སྣང་བའི་སྣོ་ཡིན་
 བར་ཐལ། རིག་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། [རང་རིག་ཚེས་ཅན། རིག་པ་ཡིན་
 བ་]དེར་ཐལ། རང་རིག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། [རང་རིག་རང་རིག་པ་ཡིན་
 བ་]རྟོགས་ཁས། [རང་རིག་རང་ཡུལ་སྣང་བའི་སྣོ་ཡིན་བར་]འདོད་ན། རང་
 ཡུལ་གྱི་རྣམ་པ་ཤར་བར་ཐལ། རང་ཡུལ་སྣང་བའི་ཕྱིར་ན་

Our response: [That its object appears] does not entail [that the aspect of its object dawns].

[རང་ཡུལ་སྣང་བ་ཡིན་ན་རང་ཡུལ་གྱི་རྣམ་པ་ཤར་བས་]མ་བྱུང།

The opponent's rejoinder: It follows [that that its object appears] entails [that the aspect of its object dawns] because the aspect of its object appears (*rang yul gyi rnam pa snang ba*). It follows [that the aspect of its object appears] because its object appears (*rang yul snang ba*).

[རང་ཡུལ་སྣང་བ་ཡིན་ན་རང་ཡུལ་གྱི་རྣམ་པ་ཤར་བས་]བྱུང་བར་ཐལ། རང་
 ཡུལ་གྱི་རྣམ་པ་སྣང་བའི་ཕྱིར། [རང་ཡུལ་གྱི་རྣམ་པ་སྣང་བ་]དེར་ཐལ།
 རང་ཡུལ་སྣང་བའི་ཕྱིར་ན་

Our response: Again, [that its object appears] does not entail [that the aspect of its object appears]. You cannot accept any of those three [namely, that (1) the definition of a knower (*rig pa*) is an awareness to which the aspect of an object dawns (*yul gyi rnam pa shar ba 'i blo*); (2) to a self-knower the aspect of its object dawns (*rang yul gyi rnam pa shar ba*); and (3) to a self-knower the aspect of its object appears (*rang yul gyi rnam pa snang ba*)] because a representation-aspect of the object (*yul gyi 'dra*

^a 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 2b.4; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 2b.2.

rnam)^a does not dawn (*ma shar ba*) [to a self-knower]. It follows [that a representation-aspect of the object does not dawn] because [a self-knower] is an awareness for which the dualistic appearance of object and subject has disappeared (*yul yul can gyi gnyis snang nub pa 'i blo*). It follows [that (a self-knower) is an awareness for which the dualistic appearance of object and subject has disappeared] because of being a self-knower. [Whatever is a self-knower] necessarily is [an awareness for which the dualistic appearance of object and subject has disappeared] because Shāntarakṣhita's *Ornament for the Middle* says, "Its self-knower does not have a nature of object and agent."^b

ཡང་[རང་ཡུལ་སྣང་བ་ཡིན་ན་རང་ཡུལ་གྱི་རྣམ་པ་ཤར་བས་]མ་བྱུང། [(1) རིག་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡུལ་གྱི་རྣམ་པ་ཤར་བའི་སློ་ཡིན་པ། (2) (རང་རིག་ལ་)རང་ཡུལ་གྱི་རྣམ་པ་ཤར་བ། (3) (རང་རིག་ལ་)རང་ཡུལ་གྱི་རྣམ་པ་སྣང་བ་]དེ་གསུམ་ལ་
འདོད་མི་རུས་ཏེ། [རང་རིག་ལ་]ཡུལ་གྱི་འདྲ་རྣམ་མ་ཤར་བའི་ཕྱིར།
[(རང་རིག་ལ་)རང་ཡུལ་གྱི་འདྲ་རྣམ་མ་ཤར་བ་]དེར་ཐལ། ཡུལ་ཡུལ་ཅན་གྱི་གཉིས་སྣང་རུབ་པའི་སློ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། [ཡུལ་ཡུལ་ཅན་གྱི་གཉིས་སྣང་རུབ་པའི་སློ་ཡིན་པ་]དེར་ཐལ། རང་རིག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། [རང་རིག་ཡིན་ན་ཡུལ་ཡུལ་ཅན་གྱི་གཉིས་སྣང་རུབ་པའི་སློ་ཡིན་པས་]བྱུང་སྟེ། དབྱུ་མ་
[L3a]རྒྱན་ལས། དེ་ཡི་རང་གི་རིག་པ་ནི། །བྱ་དང་བྱེད་པའི་དངོས་པོར་མིན། །ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

3. *About this formulation someone says:*^c It follows that **even its aspect does not dawn to that [self-knower]** because **it is an aspectless consciousness (*rnam med kyi shes pa*)**. It follows [that **a self-knower is an aspectless consciousness**] because Shāntarakṣhita's *Autocommentary to the "Ornament for the Middle"* says:^d

It is not feasible to posit an aspect for self-knowers in the manner in which it is expressed for consciousnesses having aspects.

^a Or "likeness-aspect of the object."

^b *dbu ma rgyan gyi 'grel pa*, 60b.4.

^c 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 3a.1; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 2b.5.

^d *dbu ma rgyan gyi 'grel pa*, 60b.5.

བྱས་པ་ལ་ཁོ་ན་རེ། [རང་རིག་]དེ་ལ་རང་གི་ཡང་རྣམ་པ་མ་ཤར་
 བར་ཐལ། རྣམ་མེད་གྱི་ཤེས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། [རང་རིག་རྣམ་མེད་གྱི་
 ཤེས་པ་ཡིན་པ་]དེར་ཐལ། རྒྱན་རང་འགྲེལ་ལས། རྣམ་པ་དང་བཅས་
 པའི་ཤེས་པའི་ཚུལ་ལས་བརྗོད་པ་ལྟ་བུར། རང་རིག་པ་ལ་ནི་དེ་
 ལྟ་བུའི་^a[G3a] རྣམ་པར་བཞག་པ་མི་འཐད་དེ། ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་
 ཕྱིར་ན་

Our response: [That Shāntarakṣita's *Autocommentary to the "Ornament for the Middle"* says this] does not entail [that a self-knower is an aspect-less consciousness] because the meaning [of that passage] is that [self-knowers] do not have the dualistic appearance of object and subject. Otherwise, it [absurdly] follows that [a self-knower] is not a consciousness having an aspect (*rnam can gyi shes pa ma yin pa*) because [according to you] neither the aspect of itself nor its object appears. You [incorrectly] have accepted the reason [which is that neither the aspect of itself nor its object appears].

[དེ་རྒྱན་རང་འགྲེལ་ལས་ཞེས་གསུངས་ན་(རང་རིག་)རྣམ་མེད་གྱི་ཤེས་པ་ཡིན་
 པས་]མ་བྱུང་སྟེ། [རང་རིག་]ཡུལ་ཡུལ་ཅན་གྱི་གཉིས་སྣང་མེད་པའི་
 དོན་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། གཞན་དུ་ན་[རང་རིག་]རྣམ་ཅན་^bགྱི་ཤེས་པ་
 མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། རང་ངམ་ཡུལ་གང་གི་ཡང་རྣམ་པ་མི་སྣང་
 པའི་ཕྱིར། [རང་ངམ་ཡུལ་གང་གི་ཡང་རྣམ་པ་མི་སྣང་བ་] ཉམས་ལས།

If you [incorrectly] accept [that a self-knower is not a consciousness having an aspect], it [very absurdly] follows that [a self-knower] is not even that which has the aspect of the apprehender (*'dzin rnam yang ma yin pa*) because you [incorrectly] have accepted [that a self-knower is not a consciousness having an aspect]. You cannot accept [that a self-knower is not even that which has the aspect of the apprehender] because with respect to a sense consciousness perceiving blue [there exist] (1) that which has the

^a 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 3a.2, reads *de lta bu'i*; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 2b.6, reads *de lta*.

^b 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 3a.3, reads *rnam can*; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 3a.1, reads *rnam bcas*.

aspect of the apprehended (*gzung rnam*) such as the aspect of blue and is an other-knowing consciousness and (2) the mere-experiencer, the self-knower, that which has the aspect of the apprehender (*'dzin rnam*), because Gen-dun-drub's *Ornament for Reasoning*^a says:

Since in the likes of a sense consciousness perceiving blue there exist (1) a factor to which the aspect of the object dawns (*yul gyi rnam pa shar ba'i cha*) and (2) a factor of mere experience (*myong tsam gyi cha*), the first is that which was the aspect of the apprehended (*gzung rnam*) and the second is a self-knowing direct perception (*rang rig mngon sum*).

There are many such distinctions.

[(རང་རིག་)རྣམ་ཅན་གྱི་ཤེས་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་]འདོད་ན།^b [(རང་
 རིག་)འཛིན་རྣམ་ཡང་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ་ལོ། [(རང་རིག་)རྣམ་ཅན་གྱི་
 ཤེས་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་]འདོད་པའི་ཕྱིར། [(རང་རིག་)འཛིན་རྣམ་ཡང་མ་ཡིན་
 པར་]འདོད་མི་རུས་ཏེ། རྩོད་སྤང་དབང་ཤེས་གྱི་(1) རྩོན་པོའི་རྣམ་
 པ་ལྟ་བུ་གཟུང་རྣམ་དང་གཞན་རིག་གི་ཤེས་པ་དང་། (2) རྩོད་
 ཅོམ་རང་རིག་དང་འཛིན་རྣམ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། རིགས་རྒྱན་
^cལས། རྩོད་སྤང་དབང་ཤེས་ལྟ་བུ་ལ་ཡུལ་གྱི་རྣམ་པ་ཤར་བའི་ཆ་
 དང་། རྩོད་ཅོམ་གྱི་ཆ་གཉིས་ཡོད་པས་དང་པོ་གཟུང་རྣམ་དང་།
 གཉིས་པ་ནི་རང་རིག་མངོན་སུམ་མོ། ། ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར་
 རོ། ། དེ་སོགས་ཞིབ་ཆ་མང་།

^a *ishad ma rigs rgyan*, in *gsung 'bum (dge 'dun grub pa)*, TBRC W759.4:101-524 (Gangtok: Dodrup Lama Sangye, 1978-1981), 37b.4.

^b 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 3a.3, reads *'dod na*; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 3a.2, reads *'o na*.

^c 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 3a.4, reads *gzung rnam*; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 3a.3, reads *bzung rnam*.

^d Correcting *rig rgyan* in 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 3a.3, to *rigs rgyan* in accordance with 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 3a.4.

^e 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 3a.5, reads *yod pas*; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 3a.4, reads *yod pa'i*.

^f 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 3a.5, reads *gzung rnam*; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 3a.4, reads *bzung rnam*.

4. Also, in the speech of a certain chief logician of Tibet it is said: **That which knows an object** (*yul rig par bya ba*) is the definition of an awareness.

ཡང་བོད་ཀྱི་རྟོག་གཏི་དབང་པོ་ཁ་ཅིག་གི་གསུང་ལས། ཡུལ་རིག་པར་བྱ་བ་སྟོན་མཚན་ཉིད་ཟེར་ན།

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, a person (*skyes bu, puruṣa*), is an awareness because of being that definition [that is, that which knows an object]. The reason [which is that a person knows an object] is easy [to establish].

སྐྱེས་བུ་ཚོས་ཅན། སྟོ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། མཚན་ཉིད་[ཡུལ་རིག་པར་བྱ་བ་]དེའི་ཕྱིར། རྟོགས་[སྐྱེས་བུ་ཡུལ་རིག་པར་བྱ་བ་རྒྱབ་]སྟེ།

C. DIVISIONS

གསུམ་པ་[དབྱེ་བ་]ནི།

There are six divisions [of awarenesses]: division into the two, realizing awarenesses and non-realizing awarenesses; division into the seven awarenesses and knowledges; division into the two, prime [cognitions] and non-prime [consciousnesses]; into the two, conceptual and nonconceptual [consciousnesses], into the two, direct perceptions and subsequent cognitions, and division into the two, minds and mental factors.^a

དབྱེ་ན་^bབྱུག་ཡོད་དེ། རྟོགས་སྟོ་དང་^[L3b]མ་རྟོགས་པའི་སྟོ་^c
གཉིས་སུ་དབྱེ་བ་དང་། སྟོ་རིག་བདུན་དུ་དབྱེ་བ་དང་། ཚད་མ་
དང་ཚད་མིན་གཉིས་སུ་དབྱེ་བ་^dདང་། རྟོག་བཅས་རྟོག་མེད་
གཉིས་སུ་དང་། མངོན་རྗེས་གཉིས་སུ་དང་། སེམས་སེམས་བྱུང་།

^a The first of these six is translated in this book.

^b 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 3a.6, reads *dbye na*; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 3a.5, reads *dbye ba*.

^c Correcting *rtog blo dang ma rtog pa'i blo* in 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 3a.5, to *rtogs blo dang ma rtogs pa'i blo* in accordance with 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 3a.6.

^d 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 3b.1, reads *tshad ma dang tshad min gnyis su dbye ba*; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 3a.5, reads only *tshad ma tshad min gnyis su*.

གཉིས་སྤྱི་དབྱེ་བ་དང་རྒྱལ་ལས།

1. Realizing and non-realizing awarenesses

[G3b] དང་པོ་ [རྟོགས་སློབ་དང་^[L3b]མ་རྟོགས་པའི་སློབ་གཉིས་སུ་དབྱེ་བ་] །ལ།

About realizing awarenesses, Dharmakīrti’s *Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid cognition”* says:^a

Furthermore, [if] whatsoever entity [or aspect]
Is not ascertained by the ascertaining [consciousness],
How could it be the [apprehended] object of that [consciousness]?

རྟོགས་^bཔའི་སློབ་ནི་ཚད་མ་རྣམ་འགྲེལ་ལས། དེས་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་
མ་དེས་ལ། ། དེ་ནི་ཇི་སྟར་དེ་ཡུལ་ཡིན། ། ཞེས་བྱུང་།

a. Realizing awarenesses

With respect to realizing awarenesses there are two, definition and explaining the meaning of the individual divisions.

རྟོགས་^dཔའི་སློབ་ལ་མཚན་ཉིད། དབྱེ་བ། སོ་སོའི་དོན་བཤད་པ་
གཉིས།

^a *tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi tshig le'ur byas pa*, 97a.1, where the full stanza reads:

sgro 'dogs med pa'i yul la ni //
'jug phyir gzhan yang ngo bo gang //
nges pa rnam kyis ma nges pa //
de ni ji ltar de yul yin //

Hiroshi Nemoto identifies the stanza as I.57 and, points out that the citation should begin a half line earlier, which is how it has been translated here.

^b Correcting *rtog* in 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 3b.1, to *rtogs* in accordance with 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 3b.2.

^c Correcting *nges pa rnam kyis* in 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 3b.2, to *nges pa rnam kyis* in accordance with 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 3b.1, and the passage as found in Dharmakīrti’s text. Also, Dharmakīrti’s text as cited above reads *ma nga pa*, whereas both editions of Jam-yang-shay-pa’s text consulted read *ma nges la*.

^d Correcting *rtog* in 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 3b.1, to *rtogs* in accordance with 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 3b.2.

1) DEFINITION OF REALIZING AWARENESS

དང་པོ་[རྟོགས་པའི་སྒོ་མཚན་ཉིད་]ཟེ།^a

That which is able to induce ascertainment with respect to that phenomenon in dependence upon the functioning of this awareness

is the definition of realizing that phenomenon by this awareness,

- because when this awareness ascertains that phenomenon, it eliminates superimpositions that are its opposite (*rang gi bzlog zla'i sgro 'dogs*),
- because, for example, an inferential cognition ascertaining that sound is impermanent eliminates superimpositions apprehending permanence with respect to sound;
- Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Valid cognition"* says:^b

Because ascertaining and superimposing mentalities
Are entities of harmer and harmed.

སྒོ་དེའི་བྱེད་པ་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས་ཚོས་དེ་ལ་ངེས་པ་འབྲེན་ལུས་པ།
 སྒོ་དེས་ཚོས་དེ་རྟོགས་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡིན་ཏེ། སྒོ་དེས་ཚོས་དེ་
 ངེས་པ་ན་རང་གི་བརྗོག་ལྷའི་སྒོ་འདོགས་གཙོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ།
 དཔེར་ན་སྐྱ་མི་རྟག་པར་ངེས་པའི་རྗེས་དཔག་གིས་སྐྱ་ལ་རྟག་
 འཛིན་གྱི་སྒོ་འདོགས་གཙོད་པ་བཞིན་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། རྣམ་
 འགྲེལ་ལས། ངེས་པ་དང་ནི་སྒོ་འདོགས་ཡིད། ། གཙོད་བྱ་གཙོད་
 བྱེད་པོ་པོའི་ཕྱིར། ། ཞེས་གསུངས་སོ། །

2) EXPLAINING THE MEANING OF THE INDIVIDUAL DIVISIONS

གཉིས་པ་[དབྱེ་བ་སོ་སོའི་དོན་བཤད་པ་]ཟེ།

^a 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 3b.1, omits the phrase *dang po ni*.
^b *tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi tshig le 'ur byas pa*, 96b.3-4.

When [realizing awarenesses] are divided, there are two—explicit realizers (*dnegos rtogs*) and implicit realizers (*shugs rtogs*).

[རྫོགས་པའི་སྣོ་]དེ་ལ་དབྱེ་ན། དངོས་རྫོགས་དང་། རྒྱགས་རྫོགས་
གཉིས་ལས།

A) EXPLICIT REALIZERS

དངོས་རྫོགས་

Realization by way of the aspect of that object dawning to this awareness

is the definition of explicit realization of that object by this awareness. Illustrations are, for instance, the realization of blue by a direct perception apprehending blue and the realization that sound [is] a product by an inferential cognition explicitly realizing sound as a product.

སྣོ་དེ་ལ་ཡུལ་དེའི་རྣམ་པ་ཤར་བའི་སྣོ་ནས་རྫོགས་པ་དེ། སྣོ་དེས་
ཡུལ་དེ་དངོས་སུ་རྫོགས་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད། མཚན་གཞི་ནི།^a སྣོ་
འཇིག་དབང་མངོན་གྱིས་སྣོ་པོ་རྫོགས་པ་དང་། སྐྱ་བྱས་པར་
དངོས་སུ་རྫོགས་པའི་རྗེས་དཔག་གིས་སྐྱ་བྱས་པར་རྫོགས་པ་ལྟ་
བུ་ཡིན་ལོ།^b

Whatever is an explicit realization (*dnegos rtogs*) is not necessarily a direct realization (*mngon sum du rtogs pa*) because there exists a conceptual consciousness explicitly realizing sound as impermanent. [That there exists a conceptual consciousness explicitly realizing sound as impermanent] entails [that whatever is an explicit realization is not necessarily a direct realization] because with regard to whatever is a direct realization, the object necessarily appears clearly, because Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Valid cognition"* says:^c

^a 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 3b.5, reads *mshan gzhi ni sngon 'dzin*; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 3b.4, omits *ni* and reads *mshan gzhi sngon 'dzin*.

^b 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 3b.6, reads *lta bu yin no*; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 3b.4, omits *no* and reads *lta bu yin*.

^c *tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi tshig le'ur byas pa*, 130a.1, where the second line reads *de ni rtoḡ med gnyi gar yang*.

Whatever is an awareness possessing clear appearance
Is asserted as nonconceptual with respect to that.

དངོས་སུ་རྟོགས་པ་ལ་མངོན་སུམ་དུ་རྟོགས་པས་མ་བྱུང་སྟེ། རྣམ་མི་
རྟོག་པར་དངོས་སུ་རྟོགས་པའི་རྟོག་པ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར། [རྣམ་མི་རྟོག་
པར་དངོས་སུ་རྟོགས་པའི་རྟོག་པ་ཡོད་ན་དངོས་སུ་རྟོགས་པ་ལ་མངོན་སུམ་དུ་རྟོགས་
པས་མ་བྱུང་བས་]བྱུང་སྟེ། ^[L4a]མངོན་སུམ་དུ་རྟོགས་ན་ཡུལ་དེ་གསལ་
བར་སྣང་བས་བྱུང་བའི་ཕྱིར། རྣམ་འགྲེལ་^aལས། གསལ་བར་སྣང་
བ་ཅན་སྟོགས་། ། དེ་ནི་དེ་ལ་རྟོག་མེད་འདོད། ། ཅེས་གསུངས་
པའི་ཕྱིར།^b

The reason [which is that there exists a conceptual consciousness explicitly realizing sound as impermanent] above at the juncture of [proving] the entailment [that whatever is an explicit realization (*ngos rtogs*) is not necessarily a direct realization (*mngon sum du rtogs pa*)] is established because there exists an inferential cognition explicitly realizing sound as impermanent. [That there exists an inferential cognition explicitly realizing sound as impermanent] entails [that there exists a conceptual consciousness realizing sound as impermanent] because Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Valid cognition"* says:^c

Whatever consciousness apprehends a meaning[-generality] or a sound[-generality]
Is asserted to be a conceptual consciousness with regard to that.

and also the chapter on direct perception in Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Valid cognition"* says:^d

By clearing away the web of conceptuality
It appears just clearly.

གོང་གི་[རྣམ་མི་རྟོག་པར་དངོས་སུ་རྟོགས་པའི་རྟོག་པ་ཡོད་ན་དངོས་སུ་རྟོགས་པ་ལ་

^a Correcting *rnam 'gral* in 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 4a.1, to *rnam 'grel* in accordance with 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 3b.5.

^b 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 4a.1, reads *ces gsungs pa'i phyir/*; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 3b.6, reads *ces byung /*.

^c *tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi tshig le'ur byas pa*. 129b.1.

^d *tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi tshig le'ur byas pa*, 129a.4-5.

མངོན་སུམ་དུ་རྟོགས་པས་]མ་བྱུང་མཚམས་ཀྱི་[སྐྱེ་མི་རྟག་པར་དངོས་སུ་རྟོགས་
 པའི་རྟོག་པ་ཡོད་པ་]རྟོགས་སྐྱབ་སྟེ། [སྐྱེ་མི་རྟག་པ་]དེ་དངོས་སུ་རྟོགས་
 ་པའི་རྗེས་དབག་ཡོད་པའི་སྤྱིར། [(སྐྱེ་མི་རྟག་པ་)དེ་དངོས་སུ་རྟོགས་པའི་
 རྗེས་དབག་ཡོད་ན་སྐྱེ་མི་རྟག་པར་དངོས་སུ་རྟོགས་པའི་རྟོག་པ་ཡོད་པས་]བྱུང་སྟེ།
 རྣམ་འགྲེལ་ལས། ཤེས་གང་གང་ལ་སྐྱེ་དོན་འཛིན། །དེ་ནི་དེ་ལ་
 རྟོག་པ་ཡིན། །ཞེས་དང་། མངོན་སུམ་ལེན་ལས་ཀྱང་། རྟོག་པའི་
 རྩ་བ་རྣམ་བསལ་བས། །གསལ་བ་ཉིད་དུ་སྣང་བ་ཡིན། །ཞེས་
 གསུངས་པའི་སྤྱིར།^b

B) THE MANNER OF EXPLICIT REALIZATION AND IMPLICIT REALIZATION

དངོས་རྟོགས་ཤུགས་རྟོགས་ཀྱི་ཚུལ་ལ་ཡང་།

This has two parts—the manner of explicit realization and implicit realization by valid cognitions and by non-prime consciousnesses.

ཚད་མ་དང་ཚད་མིན་གྱིས་དངོས་རྟོགས་དང་ཤུགས་རྟོགས་ཀྱི་
 ཚུལ་གཉིས་ཡོད།

1' The manner of explicit and implicit realization by valid cognitions

ཚད་མས་དངོས་དང་ཤུགས་ལ་^dརྟོགས་^[G4a]ཚུལ་ལ་

^a Correcting *de rtogs pa'i rjes dpag* in 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 4a.2, to *de dngos su rtogs pa'i rjes dpag* in accordance with 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 3b.6.

^b Correcting reads *ces byung* / in 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 3b.7, to *ces gsungs pa'i phyir* / in accordance with 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 4a.3.

^c 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 4a.3, reads *dngos rtogs dang shugs rtogs kyi tshul gnyis yod* /; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 3b.7, reads *dngos rtogs shugs rtogs kyi tshul gnyis yod* /.

^d 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 4a.4, reads *dngos dang shugs la*; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 3b.7, reads *dngos su dang shugs la*.

Moreover, regarding the manner of explicit and implicit realization by valid cognitions, there are three because there are the three—(1) in general the mode of explicit and implicit realization by valid cognitions, (2) the mode of explicit and implicit realization by direct valid cognitions, and (3) the mode of explicit and implicit realization by inferential valid cognitions.

ཡང་གསུམ་ཡོད་དེ། སྤྱིར་ཚད་མས་དངོས་སུ་དང་ཤུགས་ལ་
 རྟོགས་ཚུལ་དང་། མངོན་སུམ་ཚད་མས་དངོས་སུ་དང་ཤུགས་ལ་
 རྟོགས་ཚུལ། རྗེས་དཔག་ཚད་མས་དངོས་སུ་དང་ཤུགས་ལ་ རྟོགས་
 ཚུལ་གསུམ་ཡོད་པའི་བྱིས།

a' In general the mode of explicit and implicit realization by valid cognitions

དང་པོ་[སྤྱིར་ཚད་མས་དངོས་སུ་དང་ཤུགས་ལ་རྟོགས་ཚུལ་]

[In general the mode of explicit and implicit realization by valid cognitions] exists because:

- a. inducing ascertainment by its own force—without relying on another subsequent awareness—through the force of (1) this valid cognition's mentally turning toward that object and (2) the aspect [of that object] dawning [to it]

is the meaning of explicit realization of that object by this valid cognition;
and

- b. despite not presently mentally turning to that object, merely by later mentally turning toward that object this valid cognition induces ascertainment of it—without relying on another valid cognition—through the force of its explicitly comprehending its [present] object of comprehension and due to having finished eliminating superimpositions with respect to its [present] object at this time in accordance with the context^a

is the meaning of implicit realization of that object by this valid cognition. Distinctions are also needed with respect to these.

^a For instance, if you look inside a room and see that it is empty of any furnishings, at a later time, if asked if there is a chair in the room, you know by implicit realization that there is no chair there.

[སྤྱིར་ཚད་མས་དངོས་སུ་དང་ཤུགས་ལ་རྟོགས་ཚུལ་]ཡོད་དེ། ཚད་མ་དེ་ཡུལ་
 དེ་ལ་སློ་ཁ་སྤྱོད་གས་ཤིང་རྣམ་པ་ཤར་བའི་སྟོབས་ཀྱིས་རྗེས་སུ་སློ་
 གཞན་ལ་སྟོས་མེད་དུ་ངེས་པ་རང་སྟོབས་ཀྱིས་འདྲེན་པ་ནི། ཚད་
 མ་དེས་ཡུལ་དེ་དངོས་སུ་རྟོགས་པའི་དོན་ཡིན།^a ཡུལ་དེ་ལ་ད་ལྟ་
 སློ་ཁ་མ་སྤྱོད་གས་ཀྱང་། ཚད་མ་དེས་རང་གི་གཞུང་བྱ་དངོས་སུ་
 འཇལ་སྟོབས་ཀྱིས་ཡུལ་དེ་ལ་སྐྱབས་དང་མཐུན་པར་སློ་འདོགས་
 བཅད་ཚར་བས་ཕྱིས་སློ་ཁ་སྤྱོད་གས་^[L4b]ཙམ་གྱིས་ཚད་མ་གཞན་ལ་
 སྟོས་མེད་དུ་ངེས་པ་འདྲེན་པ་དེ། ཚད་མ་དེས་ཡུལ་དེ་ཤུགས་
 རྟོགས་ཀྱི་དོན་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། འདི་ལ་འང་ཞིབ་ཆ་དགོས་སོ། །

b' The mode of explicit and implicit realization by direct valid cognitions

གཉིས་པ་[མདོན་སུམ་ཚད་མས་དངོས་སུ་དང་ཤུགས་ལ་རྟོགས་ཚུལ་]ནི།

The two meanings of explicit realization and implicit realization by direct valid cognitions, exist because:

- a. **that which eliminates superimpositions with respect to an object of comprehension upon the aspect of its object of comprehension actually dawning to that direct perception**

is the definition of explicit realization of an object of comprehension by a direct valid cognition. An illustration, for example, is the elimination of superimpositions with respect to blue upon the aspect of blue clearly dawning to a direct valid cognition apprehending blue, and

- b. **that which eliminates superimpositions also with respect to another phenomenon—whose aspect does not dawn to it—through the force of having explicitly eliminated superimpositions with respect to its [present] object of comprehension by way of the aspect of that [present] object of comprehension**

^a Correcting *don yir* in 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 4a.6 to *don yin* / in accordance with 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 4a.2.

explicitly having dawned [to it]

is the definition of implicit realization of another phenomenon by that direct valid cognition. An illustration, for example, is that which through the force of having induced ascertainment—upon the explicit dawning of the aspect of a place that is devoid of a pot—has eliminated superimpositions with respect to the existence of a pot and comes to ascertain the nonexistence of pot by mentally merely turning toward it even though the aspect of the nonexistence of pot in that place did not dawn [to it].

མངོན་སྲུང་ཚད་མས་དངོས་རྟོགས་དང་ཤུགས་རྟོགས་ཀྱི་དོན་
གཉིས་ཡོད་དེ། མངོན་སྲུང་དེ་ལ་^aརང་གི་གཞལ་བྱ་དེའི་རྣམ་པ་
དངོས་སྲུ་ཤར་ནས་གཞལ་བྱ་དེ་ལ་སློ་འདོགས་གཅོད་པ་ནི།
མངོན་སྲུང་གི་ཚད་མས་གཞལ་བྱ་དེ་དངོས་སྲུ་རྟོགས་པའི་མཚན་
ཉིད། མཚན་གཞི་ནི། དཔེར་ན།^b སློན་འཛིན་མངོན་སྲུང་ཚད་མ་
ལ་^c སློན་པོའི་རྣམ་པ་གསལ་བར་ཤར་ནས་སློན་པོ་ལ་སློ་
འདོགས་གཅོད་པ་ལྟ་བུ་དང་།^d མངོན་སྲུང་གི་ཚད་མ་དེས་རང་
གི་གཞལ་བྱ་དེའི་རྣམ་པ་དངོས་སྲུ་ཤར་ནས་དངོས་སྲུ་གཞལ་བྱ་
དེ་ལ་སློ་འདོགས་བཅད་སྟོབས་ཀྱིས་རང་ལ་རྣམ་པ་མ་ཤར་བའི་
ཚོས་གཞན་ལའང་སློ་འདོགས་གཅོད་པ་དེ། ཚོས་གཞན་དེ་མངོན་
སྲུང་གི་ཚད་མ་དེས་ཤུགས་ལ་རྟོགས་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད། མཚན་
གཞི་དཔེར་ན་བྱམ་པས་དག་པའི་ས་སྟོགས་ཀྱི་རྣམ་པ་དངོས་སྲུ་
ཤར་ནས་ངེས་པ་དྲངས་སྟོབས་ཀྱིས་དེའི་བྱམ་མེད་ཀྱི་རྣམ་པ་མ་

^a 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 4b.2, reads *mngon sum de la*; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 4a.4, reads *mngon sum des*.

^b 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 4b.2-3, reads *mtshan gzhi ni | dper na | sngon 'dzin*; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 4a.5, reads *dper na mtshan gzhi sngon 'dzin*.

^c 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 4b.3, reads *sngon 'dzin mngon sum tshad ma la*; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 4a.5, reads *sngon 'dzin mngon sum tshad mas*.

^d 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 4b.3, reads *lta bu yin !*; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 4a.5, reads *lta bu dang*.

^e Correcting *nge pa rang stobs kyis* in 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 4a.7, to *nge pa drang*

ཤར་ཡང་བྱམ་པ་ཡོད་པའི་སྣོ་འདོགས་བཅད་ཅིང་སྣོ་ཁ་ཕྱོགས་
 ཅོམ་གྱིས་བྱམ་མེད་དུ་ངེས་པར་འགྱུར་བ་ལྟ་བུ་ཡིན་པའི་སྤྱིར།

c' The mode of explicit and implicit realization by inferential valid cognitions

གསུམ་པ་[རྗེས་དཔག་ཚད་མས་དངོས་སུ་དང་བྱགས་ལ་རྟོགས་ཚུལ་]ནི།

The two meanings of explicit and implicit realization by inferential valid cognitions, exist because:

- a. **that which eliminates superimpositions with respect to an object of comprehension by way of the meaning-generality of that object of comprehension dawning to this inferential cognition**

is the definition of explicit comprehension by an inferential cognition, an illustration being that which eliminates the superimpositions of apprehending sound as permanent by way of the meaning-generality of impermanent sound explicitly appearing to an inferential cognition realizing sound as impermanent, and

- b. **that which eliminates superimpositions even with respect to another phenomenon—whose meaning-generality does not dawn to that inferential cognition—through the force of having eliminated superimpositions with respect to the meaning-generality of its object of comprehension having dawned to it**

is the definition of realizing another phenomenon by the power of that inferential cognition; an illustration being that which (1) eliminates superimpositions of permanent existence with respect to sound—even though the meaning-generality of the nonexistence of permanent sound does not dawn [to it]—through the force of that inferential cognition having eliminated superimpositions with respect to the meaning-generality of its own [present] object of comprehension that has dawned to it and (2) will ascertain, without relying on another valid cognition, the nonexistence of permanence with respect to sound by merely mentally turning toward it.

[G4b] རྗེས་དཔག་གིས་དངོས་རྟོགས་དང་བྱགས་རྟོགས་ཀྱི་དོན་

གཉིས་ཡོད་དེ། རྗེས་དཔག་དེས་^aརང་གི་གཞུང་བྱ་དེའི་དོན་སྡི་
 ཤར་བའི་སློ་ནས་གཞུང་བྱ་དེ་ལ་སློ་འདོགས་གཅོད་པ་ནི། རྗེས་
 དཔག་དེའི་དངོས་གཞུང་^[L5a]གྱི་མཚན་ཉིད། མཚན་གཞི་ནི།^b སྐྱ་
 མི་རྟག་རྟོགས་གྱི་རྗེས་དཔག་ལ་སྐྱ་མི་རྟག་པའི་དོན་སྡི་དངོས་སུ་
 ཤར་བའི་སློ་ནས་སྐྱ་རྟག་འཛིན་གྱི་སློ་འདོགས་གཅོད་པ་ལྟ་བུ་
 དེ་ལ་རང་གི་གཞུང་བྱ་དེའི་དོན་སྡི་ཤར་བའི་སློ་འདོགས་བཅད་
 ལྟོབས་གྱིས་རྗེས་དཔག་དེ་ལ་དོན་སྡི་མ་ཤར་བའི་ཚོས་གཞན་
 ལའང་^cསློ་འདོགས་གཅོད་པ་དེ། རྗེས་དཔག་དེས་ཤུགས་གྱིས་
 ཚོས་གཞན་དེ་རྟོགས་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད། མཚན་གཞི་ནི།^d སྐྱ་མི་
 རྟག་རྟོགས་གྱི་རྗེས་དཔག་གིས་སྐྱ་རྟག་པ་མེད་པའི་དོན་སྡི་མ་
 ཤར་ཡང་སྐྱ་ལ་རྟག་པར་ཡོད་པའི་སློ་འདོགས་བཅད་ཅིང་། སློ་
 ལ་སྐྱོགས་ཅོམ་གྱིས་ཚད་མ་གཞན་ལ་སྐྱོས་མེད་དུ་སྐྱ་རྟག་པར་
 མེད་པར་ངེས་པ་ལྟ་བུ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

That the meaning-generalty of the phenomenon dawns to that conceptual consciousness is the meaning of the aspect of the phenomenon dawning to that conceptual consciousness.

རྟོག་པ་དེ་ལ་ཚོས་དེའི་དོན་སྡི་ཤར་བ་ནི། རྟོག་པ་དེ་ལ་ཚོས་དེའི་

^a 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 4b.6, reads *rjes dpag de la*; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 4b.1, reads *rjes dpag des*.

^b 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 5a.1, reads *mtshan gzhi ni / sgra mi rtag*; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 4b.1, reads *mtshan gzhi dper na sgra mi rtag*.

^c 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 5a.1, at this juncture has a *shad* and reads *lta bu / de la*. 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 4b.2, has no such spacing, and running all the text together reads *lta bu des*.

^d 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 5a.2, reads *chos gzhan la'ang*; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 4b.3, reads only *chos gzhan la*.

^e 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 5a.2, reads *mtshan nyid/ mtshan gzhi ni*; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 4b.1, reads *mtshan nyid yin/* and does not include *mtshan gzhi ni*.

^f Both 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 5a.3, and 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 4b.3, read *chad ma*.

རྣམ་པ་ཤར་བའི་དོན་ཡིན་ནོ། །

2' The manner of explicit and implicit realization by non-prime consciousnesses

གཉིས་པ་[ཚད་མིན་གྱིས་དངོས་རྟོགས་ཤུགས་རྟོགས་ཀྱི་ཚུལ་]ལ་

This has two parts: definition and divisions.

མཚན་ཉིད་དང་། དབྱེ་བ་གཉིས།

With respect to the first, the two modes of explicit and implicit realization by non-prime cognitions exist because:

- realization of the remainder by way of the aspect dawning although superimpositions are not *newly* eliminated is the meaning of explicit realization
- realization [of the remainder] although the aspect does not dawn is the meaning of implicit realization.

དང་པོ་ནི། ཚད་མིན་གྱིས་དངོས་ཤུགས་ཀྱི་རྟོགས་ཚུལ་གཉིས་
ཡོད་དེ། རྣོ་འདོགས་གསར་དུ་མི་གཙོད་ཀྱང་ལྷག་མ་རྣམ་པ་ཤར་
བའི་རྣོ་ནས་རྟོགས་པ་དེ་^aདངོས་སུ་རྟོགས་པ་དང་། རྣམ་པ་མ་
ཤར་ཀྱང་རྟོགས་པ་^bཤུགས་རྟོགས་ཀྱི་དོན་ཡིན་པའི་བྱིར།

With respect to the second [the divisions of explicit and implicit realization by non-prime consciousnesses], when those are divided, there are the two, correctly assuming consciousnesses, subsequent cognitions, and so forth. These will be explained on the occasion of the division of awarenesses into five.

གཉིས་པ་[ཚད་མིན་གྱིས་དངོས་རྟོགས་ཤུགས་རྟོགས་ཀྱི་དབྱེ་བ་]ནི། དེ་ལ་དབྱེ་
ན། ཡིད་དཔྱོད་དང་བཅད་ཤེས་གཉིས་སོགས་ལོད་དེ། རྣོ་ལྔར་དབྱེ་

^a 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 5a.5, reads *rnam pa shar ba'i sgo nas rtogs pa de*; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 4b.5, reads only *rnam pa shar ba'i sgo nas*.

^b 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 5a.5, reads *rnam pa ma shar kyang rtogs pa*; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 4b.5, reads *rnam pa ma shar kyang de rtogs pa*.

^c Lo-sang-gyal-tshan pointed out that in this situation *sogs* does not have a meaning of

བའི་སྐབས་སུ་འཆད་པར་འགྱུར་རོ།^a

DECISIVE ANALYSIS

མཐའ་དབྱེད་པ་ལ'

5. *Someone says:*^b Whatever is an awareness realizing a phenomenon at its own time necessarily induces ascertainment with respect to that phenomenon at its own time.

ལ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། ལྷོ་དེས་ཚོས་དེ་རང་དུས་སུ་རྟོགས་ན་ཚོས་དེ་ལ'
རང་དུས་སུ་དེས་པ་འདྲེན་པས་^[L5b]བྱུབ་ཟེར་ན།

Our response: It [absurdly] follows with respect to the subject, a sense direct perception apprehending a place devoid of a pot, that it induces ascertainment at its own time with respect to the nonexistence of a pot because it realizes that [nonexistence of a pot], because it realizes that [non-existence of a pot] implicitly. If you [incorrectly] accept [that a sense direct perception apprehending a place devoid of a pot induces ascertainment at its own time with respect to the nonexistence of a pot], it [absurdly] follows that even a sentient being's ascertaining consciousness induces [ascertainment] in this way because of being that [that is, being an ascertaining consciousness] in the continuum of a sentient being.

བྱུང་པས་དག་པའི་ས་ཕྱོགས་འཛིན་པའི་དབང་མངོན་ཚོས་ཅན།
ཁྱེད་ཀྱིས་བྱུང་མེད་ལ་རང་དུས་སུ་དེས་པ་འདྲེན་པར་ཐལ། ཁྱེད་
ཀྱིས་[བྱུང་མེད]དེ་རྟོགས་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། ཁྱེད་ཀྱིས་[བྱུང་མེད]དེ་བྱུགས་
ལ་རྟོགས་པའི་ཕྱིར། [བྱུང་པས་དག་པའི་ས་ཕྱོགས་འཛིན་པའི་དབང་མངོན་
ཁྱེད་ཀྱིས་བྱུང་མེད་ལ་རང་དུས་སུ་དེས་པ་འདྲེན་པར་]འདོད་ན། སེམས་ཅན་

including more items but simply indicates multiplicity. Of the five non-prime awarenesses, only subsequent cognitions and correctly assuming consciousnesses can be said to “realize” their objects.

^a 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 5a.6, reads 'chad par 'gyur ro /; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 4b.6, reads only 'chad par 'gyur /.

^b 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 5a.6; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 4b.6.

གྱི་^aངེས་ཤེས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱང་^bདེ་ལྟར་འདྲེན་པར་ཐལ། ^[G5a]སེམས་ཅན་གྱི་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་[ངེས་ཤེས་]དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

You cannot accept [that even a sentient being’s ascertaining consciousness induces [ascertainment] in this way [that is to say, at its own time] because it induces an ascertaining consciousness without interruption after itself. It follows [that it induces an ascertaining consciousness without interruption after itself] because two different ascertaining consciousnesses at one time in one continuum are not feasible, because Dharmakīrti’s *Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid cognition”* says,^c “Two conceptual consciousnesses are not seen at the same time.”

[སེམས་ཅན་གྱི་ངེས་ཤེས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱང་(ངེས་པ་རང་དུས་སུ)དེ་ལྟར་འདྲེན་པར་]
 འདོད་མི་རུས་ཏེ། ལྷོད་ཀྱི་བྱེད་པས་རང་གི་རྗེས་སུ་བར་མ་ཚོད་
 པར་ངེས་ཤེས་འདྲེན་པའི་ཕྱིར། [ལྷོད་ཀྱི་བྱེད་པས་རང་གི་རྗེས་སུ་བར་མ་
 ཚོད་པར་ངེས་ཤེས་འདྲེན་པ་]དེར་ཐལ།^d ངེས་ཤེས་མི་འདྲ་བ་གཉིས་
 ཅིག་ཅར་འདྲ་རྒྱུད་གཅིག་ལ་མི་རུང་བའི་ཕྱིར། རྣམ་འགྲེལ་ལས།
 རྟོག་གཉིས་ཅིག་ཅར་མཐོང་བ་མེད། ། ཅེས་གསུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Similarly, it very absurdly follows that an inference realizing the impermanence of sound induces at its own time ascertainment also with respect to the nonexistence of permanent sound because it realizes that [non-existence of permanent sound]. If you [incorrectly] accept [that an inferential cognition realizing the impermanence of sound induces at its own time ascertainment also with respect to the nonexistence of permanent sound], it is as above.

^a Correcting *gyis* in 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 5b.2, and 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 4b.7, to *gyi*.
^b 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 5b.2, reads *sems can gyis nges shes kyis kyang*; 1987 Old Go-mang I hasa. 4b.7. reads *sems can ovis kvanø nges shes*.
^c *tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi tshig le 'ur byas pa*, 125a.6.
^d 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 5b.2, reads *'dren pa 'i phyir / der thal /*; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 5a.1, reads *'dren pa 'i phyir te /*.
^e 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 5b.3, reads *cig car*; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 5a.1, reads *gcig car*. TBRC *bstan 'gyur (tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi tshig le 'ur byas pa*, 125a.6) reads *cig car*.
^f Correcting *cis car* in 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 5b.3, to *cig car* in accordance with the reading in Dharmakīrti’s text; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 5a.2, reads *gcig car*.

དེ་བཞིན་དུ་སྐྱེ་མི་རྟག་རྟོགས་པའི་རྗེས་དཔག་གིས་སྐྱེ་རྟག་མེད་
 ལ་ཡང་རང་དུས་སུ་ངེས་པ་འདྲེན་པར་ཐལ་ལོ། ། དེས་^a[སྐྱེ་རྟག་
 མེད་རྟོགས་ཀྱི་རྗེས་དཔག་]དེ་རྟོགས་པའི་ཕྱིར། [སྐྱེ་མི་རྟག་རྟོགས་པའི་རྗེས་
 དཔག་གིས་སྐྱེ་རྟག་མེད་ལ་ཡང་རང་དུས་སུ་ངེས་པ་འདྲེན་པར་]འདོད་ན་སྐར་
 ལྟར་རོ། །

6. Also, someone says:^b Realization upon the aspect of that object dawning to an awareness is the meaning of its realization of that object.

ཡང་ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། སྣོ་དེ་ལ་ཡུལ་དེའི་རྣམ་པ་ཤར་ནས་རྟོགས་པ་
 བློ། དེས་ཡུལ་དེ་རྟོགས་པའི་དོན་ཡིན་^cཟེར་ན།

Our response: It very absurdly follows that realization by an awareness is necessarily explicit realization by it because you have [incorrectly] accepted [that realization upon the aspect of that object dawning to an awareness is the meaning of its realization of that object]. You cannot accept [that realization by an awareness is necessarily explicit realization by it] because implicit realization by that [awareness] exists.

སྣོ་དེས་རྟོགས་ན་དེའི་དངོས་རྟོགས་^dཀྱིས་ཁྱབ་པར་ཐལ་ལོ། [སྣོ་དེ་
 ལ་ཡུལ་དེའི་རྣམ་པ་ཤར་ནས་རྟོགས་པ་བློ་དེས་ཡུལ་དེ་རྟོགས་པའི་དོན་ཡིན་
 པར་]འདོད་པའི་ཕྱིར། [སྣོ་དེས་རྟོགས་ན་དེའི་དངོས་རྟོགས་ཀྱིས་ཁྱབ་
 པར་]འདོད་མི་བུས་ཏེ། [སྣོ་]དེའི་ཤུགས་རྟོགས་^eཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

^a Correcting *nge*s in 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 5b.4, to *des* in accordance with 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 5a.2.

^b 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 5b.4; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 5a.2.

^c 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 5b.4, reads *rtogs pa'i don yin*; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 5a.3, reads *rtogs pa'i don*.

^d 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 5b.4, reads *de'i dngos rtogs*; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 5a.3, reads only *dngos rtogs*.

^e 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 5b.5, reads *de'i shugs rtogs*; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 5a.3, reads only *shugs rtogs*.

7. *Also, someone says:*^a If an awareness realizes that object, it necessarily eliminates or has eliminated superimpositions with respect to that [object].

ཡང་ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། ལྷོ་དེས་ཡུལ་དེ་རྟོགས་ན་དེ་ལ་སློ་འདོགས་
གཅོད་པའམ་བཅད་པས་བྱུང་བེད་ན།

Our response: It very absurdly follows that the subject, the two subsequent cognitions [conceptual and nonconceptual], eliminate superimpositions with respect to their object of comprehension because of realizing that [object of comprehension]. The reason [which is that the two subsequent cognitions, conceptual and nonconceptual, realize their object of comprehension] is easy [to establish]. If you [incorrectly] accept [that the two subsequent cognitions, conceptual and nonconceptual, eliminate superimpositions with respect to their object of comprehension], it follows that superimpositions with respect to that object are not eliminated by them because [superimpositions with respect to that object] have already been eliminated by an earlier valid cognition.

[རྟོག་པ་དང་རྟོག་མེད་]བཅད་ཤེས་གཉིས་ཚམས་ཅན། རང་གི་གཞལ་
བྱ་ལ་སློ་འདོགས་གཅོད་^bཔར་ཐལ་ལོ། ། [རང་གི་གཞལ་བྱ་]དེ་རྟོགས་
པའི་ཕྱིར། [(རྟོག་པ་དང་རྟོག་མེད་)བཅད་ཤེས་གཉིས། (རང་གི་གཞལ་བྱ་)དེ་
རྟོགས་པ་]རྟོགས་སྒྲ། [(རྟོག་པ་དང་རྟོག་མེད་)བཅད་ཤེས་གཉིས་རང་གི་གཞལ་བྱ་
ལ་སློ་འདོགས་གཅོད་པར་]འདོད་ན། ཡུལ་དེ་ལ་སློ་འདོགས་བྱོད་ཀྱིས་
མི་གཅོད་པར་ཐལ། ཚད་མ་སྲ་མས་བཅད་ཟིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Furthermore, it [absurdly] follows that the subject, a correctly assuming consciousness, [eliminates superimpositions with respect to its object of comprehension] because of realizing its object of realization. You cannot accept [that a correctly assuming consciousness, eliminates superimpositions with respect to its object of comprehension] because it does not eliminate superimpositions by doubt. It follows [that it does not eliminate superimpositions by doubt] because of being a correctly assuming consciousness.

གཞན་ཡང་། ཡིད་^[L6a]དབྱོད་ཚམས་ཅན། [རང་གི་གཞལ་བྱ་ལ་སློ་འདོགས་

^a 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 5b.5; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 5a.3.
^b 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 5b.6, reads *gcod*; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 5a.4, reads *gcad*.

གཙོང་པ་]དེར་ཐལ། རང་གི་རྟོགས་བྱ་རྟོགས་པའི་ཕྱིར། [ཡིད་དཔྱད་
 རང་གི་གཞལ་བྱ་ལ་སློ་འདོགས་གཙོང་པར་]འདོད་མི་རུས་ཏེ། ལྷོད་ཀྱིས་ཐེ་
 ཚོམ་གྱི་སློ་འདོགས་མི་གཙོང་པའི་ཕྱིར།^a [ལྷོད་ཀྱིས་ཐེ་ཚོམ་གྱི་སློ་
 འདོགས་མི་གཙོང་པ་]དེར་ཐལ། ཡིད་དཔྱད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

8. Also, someone says:^b Whatever is a nonmistaken awareness necessarily realizes its object of comprehension.

ཡང་ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། མ་འཇུག་པའི་སློ་ཡིན་ན་རང་གི་གཞལ་བྱ་
 རྟོགས་པས་བྱུང་བ་རེ།

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, respectively the three awarenesses to which an object appears but is not ascertained [—that is, sense, mental, and self-knowing direct perceptions which are such that an object appears but is not ascertained—realize their object of comprehension] because of being [nonmistaken awarenesses]. You cannot accept [that respectively the three awarenesses to which an object appears but is not ascertained—that is, sense, mental, and self-knowing direct perceptions which are such that an object appears but is not ascertained—realize their object of comprehension] because of being that subject [that is, being awarenesses to which an object appears but is not ascertained].^c

སྣང་ལ་མ་ངེས་པའི་མངོན་སུམ་གསུམ་པོ་[སྣང་ལ་མ་ངེས་པའི་དབང་
 མངོན་ཡིད་མངོན་རང་རིག་མངོན་སུམ་]རེ་རེ་ནས་ཚོས་ཅན། [རང་གི་གཞལ་
 བྱ་རྟོགས་པ་]དེར་ཐལ། [མ་འཇུག་པའི་སློ་ཡིན་པ་]དེའི་ཕྱིར། [(སྣང་ལ་མ་
 ངེས་པའི་དབང་མངོན་ཡིད་མངོན་རང་རིག་མངོན་སུམ་)རེ་རེ་ནས་རང་གི་གཞལ་བྱ་
 རྟོགས་པར་]འདོད་མི་རུས་ཏེ། ཚོས་ཅན་[སྣང་ལ་མ་ངེས་པའི་སློ་]དེ་ཡིན་
 པའི་ཕྱིར།

^a 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 5b.6, reads *mi gcod pa'i phyir/ der thal/ yid dpyod*; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 5a.5, reads *mi gcod pa'i phyir te/ yid dpyod*.

^b 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 6a.1; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 5a.6.

^c Once it lacks ascertainment, it does not realize an object of comprehension.

b. Non-realizing awarenesses

གཉིས་པ་མ་རྟོགས་^aཔའི་སྣོ་ལ་

This has three parts: definition, divisions, and explaining the individual meanings.

མཚན་ཉིད། དབྱེ་བ། སོ་སོའི་དོན་བཤད་པ་གསུམ།

1) DEFINITION OF NON-REALIZING AWARENESS

དང་པོ་[མཚན་ཉིད་]ནི།

That which is an awareness unable to induce ascertainment with respect to its object of comprehension

is the definition of its [being] a non-realizing awareness.

རང་གི་གཞལ་བྱ་ལ་ངེས་པ་འདྲེན་མི་རུས་པའི་སྣོ་ཡིན་པ་དེ།
རང་མ་རྟོགས་^bཔའི་སྣོའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

2) DIVISIONS OF NON-REALIZING AWARENESSES

When these are divided, there are three: nonconceivers, wrong conceivers, and doubting consciousnesses.

དེ་ལ་དབྱེ་ན་མ་རྟོག། ལོག་རྟོག། ཐེ་ཚོམ་^[G5b]གསུམ་ཡོད།

A) NON-CONCEIVERS

When the first [nonconceivers] are divided, there are two—awarenesses to which the object appears but is not ascertained and nonconceptual wrong consciousnesses.^c

^a 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 6a.2, reads *ma rtog*; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 5a.7, reads *ma rtog*. In the TBRC version, it may be that the secondary suffix *sa* was originally carved on the block and then later removed.

^b 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 6a.3, reads *ma rtog*; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 5a.7, reads *ma rtog*.

^c In this section of his text, Jam-yang-shay-pa only gives explanation of awarenesses to which the object appears but is not ascertained. He does not address at this juncture the above mentioned topics of wrong conceivers and doubting consciousnesses nor the topic mentioned here of nonconceptual wrong consciousnesses. These are discussed later in the

དང་པོ་[མ་རྟོག་]ལ་དབྱེ་ན། ལྷང་ལ་མ་ངེས་པའི་སློ་དང་། རྟོག་
མེད་ལོག་ཤེས་གཉིས་ཡོད།

That which is a knower that is a common locus of (1) the specifically characterized phenomenon that is its object of operation appears clearly and (2) it also is unable to induce ascertainment with respect to that object of operation, a specifically characterized phenomenon,

is the definition of its being an awareness to which the object appears but is not ascertained.

རང་གི་འཇུག་ཡུལ་དུ་གྱུར་པའི་རང་མཚན་གསལ་བར་ལྷང་བ་
ཡང་ཡིན། འཇུག་ཡུལ་རང་མཚན་ལ་^aངེས་པ་འདྲེན་མི་རུས་པ་
ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པར་གྱུར་པའི་རིག་པ་^bཡིན་པ་དེ།
རང་ཉིད་ལྷང་ལ་མ་ངེས་ཀྱི་སློ་ཡིན་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

When [awarenesses to which the object appears but is not ascertained] are divided, there are three: sense direct perceptions, mental direct perceptions, and self-knowing direct perceptions that are awarenesses to which the object appears but is not ascertained.

[ལྷང་ལ་མ་ངེས་པའི་སློ་]དེ་ལ་དབྱེ་ན། ལྷང་ལ་མ་ངེས་པའི་དབང་
མངོན། ཡིད་མངོན། རང་རིག་མངོན་སྲུང་གསུམ་ཡོད།^c

First, [sense direct perception to which the object appears but is not ascertained]:

དང་པོ་[ལྷང་ལ་མ་ངེས་པའི་དབང་མངོན་]ནི།

text.

^a 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 6a.4, reads *rang mtshan la*; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 5b.1, reads *rang mtshan de la*.

^b 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 6a.4-5, reads *gzhi mthun par gyur pa'i rig pa yin pa de*; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 5b.1-2, misreads *gzhi mthun gya rag pa yin pa da*.

^c 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 6a.5, reads *snang la ma nges pa'i dbang mngon/ yid mngon/ rang rig mngon sum gsum yod/*; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 5b.2, spells this out in fuller form and reads *snang la ma nges kyi dbang mngon/ snang la ma nges pa'i yid mngon/ snang la ma nges pa'i rang rig mngon sum gsum yod/*.

A sense direct perception unable to induce ascertainment even though its object of operation, a specifically characterized phenomenon, appears clearly

is the definition of its being a sense direct perception to which the object appears but is not ascertained.

རང་གི་འཇུག་ཡུལ་རང་མཚན་གསལ་བར་སྒྲུང་ཡང་ངེས་པ་
འདྲེན་མི་རུས་པའི་དབང་མངོན་ཡིན་པ་དེ། རང་ཉིད་སྒྲུང་ལ་མ་
ངེས་ཀྱི་དབང་མངོན་ཡིན་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

When those [sense direct perceptions to which the object appears but is not ascertained] are divided, there are five: sense direct perceptions—apprehending forms, apprehending sounds, apprehending odors, apprehending tastes, and apprehending tangible objects—that are awarenesses to which the object appears but is not ascertained; Dharmakīrti’s *Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid cognition”* says:^a

The consciousness, due to engaging in another object,
Is powerless [and therefore] does not apprehend the other object.

and also the chapter on direct perception in Dharmakīrti’s *Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid Cognition”* says:^b

Though there is simultaneous production of [consciousnesses of]
dissimilar types,
The capacity degenerates
Due to one mind that is very clear;
Hence, other than the basis of all, others are not seen.

རྣམ་འགྲེལ་ལས། རྣམ་ཤེས་དོན་གཞན་ལྷགས་པ་ཡིས། ། རུས་
མེད་དོན་གཞན་མི་འཇིན་ཕྱིར། ། ཞེས་དང་། རྣམ་འགྲེལ་མངོན་
སྲུང་ལེན་ལས། ། གཅིག་ཅར་དེགས་མི་མཐུན་སྟེ་ཡང་། ། ཤིན་ཏུ་

^a *tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi tshig le'ur byas pa*, 111b.6. The passage as found here reads *don gzhan chags pa* rather than *don gzhang zhugs pa* as cited in both versions of the text consulted.

^b *tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi tshig le'ur byas pa*, 138b.1.

^c 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 6b.1, reads *nus med.....zhes dang*; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 5b.4, misreads *nus mad.....zhas dang*, and so forth.

^d 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 6b.1, reads *cig car*; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 5b.4, reads *gcig*

གསལ་བའི་སེམས་གཅིག་གིས། ། རུས་པ་ཉམས་པར་བྱ་བའི་^a
 སྤྱིར། ། ཀུན་གཞི་ལས་གཞན་མཐོང་བ་མེད། ། ཅེས་སོ། །

car. Dharmakīrti's text, as cited above, reads *cig car*. The final line in the passage in Dharmakīrti's text differs from both editions of Jam-yang-shay-pa consulted and reads *gzhang 'byung ba min* rather than *gzhan mthong ba med*.

^a 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 6b.2, reads *bya ba 'i*; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 5b.5, reads *byas pa 'i*.

Abbreviations

“1987 Old Lhasa Go-mang” = *blo rigs kyi rnam bzhag nyung gsal legs bshad gser gyi phreng mdzes*. Named “1987” because of being acquired in Lha-sa, Tibet, at Go-mang College in 1987; published at Go-mang College, date unknown. (Complete edition, to be made available at UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, uma-tibet.org.)

“2011 TBRC *bla brang*” = *blo rigs kyi rnam bzhag nyung gsal legs bshad gser gyi phreng mdzes*. Named because of being acquired by E. Gene Smith for the Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center in 2011; published in La-brang-tra-shi-khyil monastery, date unknown.

“co ne” = *co ne bstan 'gyur*. TBRC W1GS66030. *co ne dgon chen: co ne*, 1926.

“Dharma” = the *sde dge* edition of the Tibetan canon published by Dharma Press: the *Nying-ma Edition of the sDe-dge bKa'-'gyur and bsTan-'gyur*. Oakland, Calif.: Dharma Press, 1980.

“Peking” = *Tibetan Tripiṭaka: Peking Edition kept in the Library of the Otani University, Kyoto*. Edited by Daisetz Teitarō Suzuki. Tokyo, Kyoto, Japan: Tibetan Tripiṭaka Research Foundation, 1955-1961.

“*sde dge*” = *sDe dge Tibetan Tripiṭaka—bsTan ḥgyur preserved at the Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo*. Edited by Z. Yamaguchi, et al. Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1977-1984. The catalogue numbers are from *Complete Catalogue of the Tibetan Buddhist Canons*. Edited by Hukuji Ui. Sendai, Japan: Tohoku University, 1934. And *A Catalogue of the Tohoku University Collection of Tibetan Works on Buddhism*. Edited by Yensho Kanakura. Sendai, Japan: Tohoku University, 1953. TBRC W23703, which is a PDF of: Delhi: Karmapae Chodhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1977.

“TBRC” = Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center (<http://www.tbrc.org>).

Bibliography of Works Cited

Sūtras are listed alphabetically by English title in the first section; the terms “glorious” and “supreme” at the beginning of titles are often dropped in the Bibliography. Indian and Tibetan treatises are listed alphabetically by author in the second section; other works are listed alphabetically by author in the third section. Works mentioned in the first or second sections are not repeated in the third section.

I. SANSKRIT AND TIBETAN WORKS

Dharmakīrti (*chos kyi grags pa*, seventh century)

Auto-Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Valid cognition"

pramāṇavārttikavṛtti

tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi 'grel pa

Tibetan digital reprint edition: In bstan 'gyur (sde dge, 4216), TBRC W23703.174:523-732 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985).

Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Valid cognition"

pramāṇavārttikakārikā

tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi tshig le'ur byas pa

Tibetan digital reprint edition: In bstan 'gyur (sde dge, 4210). TBRC W23703.174:189-304 (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985).

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Autocommentary to the “Ornament for the Middle”

madhyamakālamkāravṛtti

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Elizabeth Napper is Co-Director of the Tibetan Nuns Project, a post she has held for twenty-five years, working to develop opportunities within the Tibetan Buddhist tradition for nuns to receive access to the full education of their various traditions. The first group of twenty nuns to complete the studies and take the required tests for the Geshe degree received that degree in December 2016.

She received a B.A. from University of Wisconsin in Indian Studies and an M.A. and a Ph.D. in Tibetan Buddhist Studies from the University of Virginia, where she also taught for two years as a lecturer. She taught at Stanford University and at the University of Hawaii.

Her published works include *Dependent-Arising and Emptiness and Mind in Tibetan Buddhism*. She was co-editor of *Kindness, Clarity, and Insight* by His Holiness the Dalai Lama and co-author of *Fluent Tibetan: A Proficiency Oriented Learning System, Novice and Intermediate Levels*, 4 volumes. In 2003 she was a recipient of the “Unsung Heroes of Compassion” award given by Tenzin Gyatso, the Fourteenth Dalai Lama of Tibet, and received a Fulbright-Hays Doctoral Dissertation Research Grant and Charlotte W. Newcombe Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship.

This book is a translation of the first two major sections of Jam-yang-shay-pa's *Beautiful Golden Garland of Eloquence Illuminating a Little the Presentation of Awareness and Knowledge*. It is a textbook studied in the Gomang College of Drepung Monastery during the first years of the ongoing course of study of the topic of Logic and Epistemology. Based upon Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Valid Cognition,"* it serves to introduce students to the core vocabulary and systematic layout of the structural psychology behind the movement from wrong ideas to direct perception of reality.

In these sections Jam-yang-shay-pa considers the basic definition of consciousness and then its divisions. On this basis he explains the difference between explicit and implicit realization in the context of direct perception and of inference. The presentation is enhanced by copious citation from Dharmakīrti and sharpened by debates that draw the reader into provocative situations that draw out deeper understanding.



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