

Unique Tenets of the Middle Way Consequence School

by Daniel Cozort

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Note on Conventions

It is my hope that this book will be of some use to anyone interested in Buddhist philosophy. For specialists in Tibetan and Sanskrit, I have included key terms and book titles upon their first occurrence; noted emendations in the Tibetan texts; whenever possible, located and reproduced in the notes passages from Sanskrit texts that are cited in the translated texts; constructed three glossaries of technical terms; and have attempted to include in the bibliography all translations and critical editions of cited texts.

For others, I have followed several procedures in the main text as part of an effort to bring Tibetan Buddhism out of the arcane and make it accessible to other scholars of Buddhism, other scholars of religion and philosophy, and others who are simply interested in Buddhism, philosophy, or Tibetica:

1. Sanskrit and Tibetan words have been limited to parenthetical citation with two exceptions: a few Sanskrit terms are treated as English words and therefore are neither translated nor italicized, and proper names are not translated. The Sanskrit terms treated as English words are: abhidharma, Arhat, Bodhisattva, Buddha, dharma, karma, maṇḍala, nirvāṇa, saṃsāra, sūtra, tantra, vajra, yogi, Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna. Parenthetical citation and citation in the notes follow the Wylie transliteration system with the exception that I have not capitalized any letters.¹

¹Wylie 261-67. (See bibliography for complete references.)