Selections from

Presentation of

Specifically and Generally Characterized Phenomena

by

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The definition of a specifically characterized phenomenon is: a functioning thing which is established as its own uncommon mode of subsistence without being merely imputed by thought. An illustration is, for example, a pot which is an appearing object of valid direct cognition.

According to Sautrāntika, specifically characterized phenomena—are--impermanent phenomena--are their own mode of subsistence. In other words, the mode of subsistence of a pot is a pot.

Such are called specifically characterized phenomena because when they appear to the direct perceiver which directly perceives them they have characteristics which appear without depending on the appearance of any other phenomenon.

This means that a specifically characterized phenomenon's own characteristics appear to direct perception. There is no need for the direct perception of such phenomena to depend on some other thing appearing. These phenomena appear from their own side without being imputed by thought. This is very different from the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika system which asserts that all phenomena are just imputed by thought. In Sautrāntika, only permanent phenomena—not impermanent or specifically characterized phe-
nomena—are considered to be merely imputed by thought.

This etymology of a specifically charac-
terized phenomenon as one that appears to direct perception without depending on some other phenomenon appearing does not apply to all specifically characterized phenomena. For, persons are specifically characterized phenomena but appear to direct perception in dependence on the living body appearing. When you see someone's hand or face, this functions as seeing the person. This is what it means to see the person. (If one sees a corpse, however, this does not function as seeing the person, for the corpse is not a living body.¹)

If the phrase "appears without depending on the appearance of any other phenomena" is understood to mean "appears without depending on the appearance of any other phenomenon which is a generally characterized phenomenon, then persons would also be included in this etymology.

The person is an imputedly existent (prajñāpti-sat, btags yod) specifically characterized phenomenon that must be known in dependence on knowing some phenomenon other than itself. Strictly speaking, this etymology applies
only to instances of specifically characterized phenomena which are substantially existent, but not to persons which are imputedly existent. There is no difference between a specifically characterized phenomenon (rang mtshan) and an objective specifically characterized phenomenon (don rang mtshan). The term "objective specifically characterized phenomenon" signifies an actual object or a genuine object.

This is not to say that generally characterized phenomena are not genuine; it would be inappropriate to say that uncaused space, for example, is an artificial or non-genuine phenomenon. It is not false; it just does not exist by way of its own nature.

A direct perceiver which explicitly comprehends such [specifically characterized phenomena] is asserted in Sautrāntika to be an unmistakable consciousness which is not contaminated by any of the four causes of error. Furthermore, specifically characterized phenomena are established in the face of an unmistakable direct perceiver which is an ultimate mind; therefore, they are ultimately established (paramārthasiddhi, don dam par grub pa). Because [specifically characterized phenomena] are true in the face of these [ultimate minds], they are also ultimate truths. In this system the mode of subsistence of a specifically characterized phenomenon is established as its mode of subsistence. Therefore, when a
direct perceiver comprehends [a specifically characterized phenomenon], it also comprehends the mode of subsistence of that object. Đzong-ka-śa's Illumination of (Chandrakīrti's) "Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way'" says:

In Sautrāntika, to posit [something] as an object of comprehension through the force of valid cognition [i.e., through the force of its being validly cognized] means that the mode of subsistence of that object of comprehension is realized by valid cognition.

Therefore, this is [the meaning of] the statement that what the Proponents of True Existence assert as the meaning-isolate (don ldog) of [being] specifically characterized, the Prāsaṅgikas assert to be the object of refutation by a reasoning consciousness analyzing the ultimate.

In other words, that which the Sautrāntikas posit as the very meaning of being specifically characterized is targeted as the principal thing to be refuted in Prāsaṅgika.

Therefore, the meaning-isolate of [being] a specifically characterized phenomenon means [to be] a [functioning] thing which is true in the face of a non-mistaken direct perceiver— an ultimate mind. An illustration-isolate [i.e., an instance of] a specifically characterized phenomenon is a [functioning] thing which is unmixed in place, time, and nature.
Non-mixture of place means that the pot in a certain location is only in that location and not another. Or, to put it another way, that John's house and Bill's house are not each other. Non-mixture of time means that the table of yesterday does not exist today. Non-mixture of nature means that the factor of being a tree which is related with a specific tree is not the factor of being a tree which is related with another tree.

In the Prāsaṅgika system, whatever is a meaning-isolate of [being] a specifically characterized phenomenon is necessarily not asserted. For, these are phenomena that are untrue in the face of a Buddha's exalted knower. Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika is unique in asserting that functioning things are not specifically characterized, for they do not have their own nature. The Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas and below disagree, saying that something merely imputed by thought cannot perform functions.

In the Prāsaṅgika system, the very meaning of being a specifically characterized phenomenon is necessarily not accepted, for according to that system everything is just imputed by thought.
Question: What is the meaning of being unmixed in place, time, and nature?

Answer: First it is important to understand [how conceptual thought operates] because [the mode of apprehension of direct perception] is opposite to the mode of apprehension of thought which apprehends [phenomena] as mixed in place, time, and nature. Therefore, this will be discussed here briefly. For example, a person who does not know the convention "pot" would, on seeing a golden bulbous thing to the east, ask, "What is this?" whereupon someone tells him, "This is a pot." At this time, induced by the expression "pot" there is generated in the continuum of the one who hears this a thought consciousness which thinks, "That golden bulbous thing is a pot." Because the golden bulbous thing appears as a pot in the perspective of the mode of apprehension of this conceptual consciousness, it also appears as opposite from non-pot [to that consciousness]. This very appearance as opposite from non-pot is the meaning of the term pot. However, because that thought consciousness perceives [it] within mistaking [the meaning-of-the-term] to be a specifically characterized pot, it is said that "the appearance [i.e., the actual pot] and the imputation [the appearance as opposite from non-pot] appear to be mixed as one for this thought consciousness."

Here, "appearance" refers to the specifically characterized object [the actual pot], and "imputation" refers
to the meaning of the term pot [the image of pot—an appearance as opposite from non-pot]. Therefore, that thought consciousness perceives the meaning-of-the-term itself which is an appearance of golden pot as opposite from non-pot, and for this reason a specifically characterized pot does not actually appear—only a meaning-of-the-term is taken as the appearing object.

Due to this, when this person sees a copper bulbous thing in the west a thought consciousness thinking, "This is a pot," is generated without any [further need] for relying on an appellation [supplied by an informant]. In terms of the appearance to this thought consciousness, all the factors of being a pot which were earlier perceived in the golden pot in the east also appear to exist in the copper pot in the west. This is the way in which place appears mixed to thought.

It is not that all the factors of a particular pot are, for thought, mixed with all the factors of another pot. Otherwise it would absurdly follow that the golden pot appeared red like the copper one. Thus, the mixture of place is that the pots in the east and west are mixed together in appearing as pot. This one appearance as pot seems to exist equally in the east and west. [The image of pot appearing to thought is of a single pot.]
The eye consciousness does not see pots this way. For, when after seeing a gold pot the eye consciousness sees a copper pot, the gold pot has already ceased, and thus even though both copper and golden pots appear as pots to the eye consciousness they are not mixed in place, time, and nature. Similarly, when having seen a golden pot in the morning, one sees a copper pot in the afternoon, all the factors [of being a pot] of the golden pot that were seen in the morning appear [to a thought consciousness apprehending pot] also to exist in the copper pot seen in the afternoon. This is how time appears to be mixed [to thought].

The innate apprehension of permanence is the misconception of earlier and later appearing to be mixed. Thus, it seems that the person you saw yesterday is the same as the one that appears today. In this way one conceives of phenomena as permanent or non-disintegrating. Direct perception does not see specifically characterized phenomena this way, it sees them as momentarily disintegrating. However, unless one has already cognized impermanence directly, one cannot ascertain this correct direct perception.

Moreover, these two—the factor of being a pot in the
golden pot and the factor of being a pot in the copper pot—appear to be one [to a thought consciousness apprehending pot]. This is how nature appears to be mixed [to thought].

Thought cannot distinguish between the factor of the copper pot appearing as a pot and the factor of the golden pot appearing as a pot. However, these are in fact different, and they appear as different to direct perception.

This thought consciousness [apprehending pot to which place, time, and nature appear as mixed] also perceives all the factors of being a pot in all manifestations of pot as one. "Manifestations of pot" is to be understood as "instances of pot."

Although both copper and golden pots are one entity with pot, golden and copper pots themselves are different substantial entities. Therefore, thought is mistaken in seeing these as one, for the pot which is a copper pot and the pot which is a golden pot are different substantial entities.

In brief, how thought apprehends former and latter as one is this: For example, recognizing "This is Devadatta [whom I saw] earlier" is a sign of apprehending earlier and later as mixed.
The factors which are the minute particles and moments of a pot do not actually appear to the thought consciousness apprehending pot but the [mental generic image which is a] meaning-of-the-term (śabdartha) of the gross object which is a collection of the particles of pot and of the continuum of former and later moments of pot appears as pot. For example, when crossing a river, a man's shoe is carried away by water. Then, even though a long time passes, that man points a finger at the river and says, "This is the water which carried away my shoe." In fact, the continuum of water that carried away the shoe has passed, but such is said due to thought's adhering to the appearance of the meaning-of-the-term or generic [image] of the former and later [parts] of the water's continuum as one.

Such a meaning-of-the-term does not appear to a sense consciousness, but the minute particles which are factors undifferentiable as separate substantial entities from that specifically characterized phenomenon as well as the object's impermanence, momentariness, and so forth appear as they are [to that sense-consciousness, i.e., they appear correctly]. This is because when the eye consciousness views the river, except for the presently appearing minute water particles, their momentariness, and impermanence appearing as they are [to the eye consciousness], the minute water particles which flowed earlier and those which will flow later do not at all appear.
Objection: Are the particles of a pot not minute and thus beyond notice of an ordinary being? Is the impermanence of a pot not a subtle impermanence [and thus realizable only by a Superior]?

Answer: Although those [particles and impermanence] are very subtle, by the reason of being one substantial entity which is of undifferentiable establishment and abiding with pot, they do appear [to the sense consciousness of an ordinary being].

It is explained that because the sense consciousness apprehending a pot is a complete engager, when the pot appears everything that is one substantial entity of establishment and abiding with the pot must appear. Furthermore, although the individual minute particles of a pot do not appear [as isolated particles] to that sense consciousness, there is no contradiction in numerous particles which are many particles collected as a cohesive unit appearing. For example, in order for a fist to appear it is necessary for a collection of five fingers to appear....

That the two, a pot and the impermanence of the pot, have one substantial entity in the sense of an undifferentiability of establishment and abiding means the following. [The impermanence of the pot] is of simultaneous production, abiding, and ceasing with pot; also, that which is pot's substantial entity is also the substantial entity of
pot's impermanence, and that which is the substantial entity of pot's impermanence is pot's substantial entity. From that point of view, it cannot happen that one appears to a direct perceiver and the other does not. For this reason, pot also appears as impermanent to the sense consciousness apprehending it.

The table and the impermanence of the table are not different substantial factors, they are indivisible. Similarly, the legs of the table are one substantial entity with the table. You cannot separate out the parts of a table or the impermanence of a table from the table. When you see one you see the other. Subtle impermanence appears to the ordinary eye consciousness, but it is not ascertained. Nevertheless, when you look at the coarse table you see its subtle impermanence [though without noticing it]. Pot and golden pot are one substantial entity of establishment and abiding, but not one substantial entity of establishment and abiding in terms of place, time, and nature. If they were, then whenever a pot appeared there would have to be an appearance of golden pot, but this does not occur because a silver or clay pot can appear without golden pot appearing.
Objection: Just as a sense direct perceiver apprehending a sound realizes the sound directly, so it would absurdly induce ascertainment of the impermanence of sound. If this were so, signs [i.e., logical reasons] which prove sound to be impermanent and inferences [of such] would be senseless.

Response: There is no fallacy. Although a sense direct perceiver apprehending a sound directly perceives those features which are undifferentiable as separate substantial factors from sound, with regard to inducing ascertainment in accordance with what is seen it is not able to induce ascertainment with respect to some factors due to internal conditions—thick predispositions for adhering to permanence—and external conditions—perceiving the connection to later moments of similar type [that is, the continuity of the object]. Also, when such unfavorable conditions do not exist, the sense consciousness apprehending pot can induce ascertainment with respect to the impermanence of some of its appearing objects....

GENERALLY CHARACTERIZED PHENOMENA

With respect to the second, the explanation of generally characterized phenomena, the definition of a generally characterized phenomenon is: that which is merely imputed by thought without being an entity whose mode of subsistence is established from its own side.

Here, to be established from an object's
own side means that the object is capable of performing a function. Therefore, only those phenomena which are not imputed by thought—specifically characterized phenomena—are said by the author to have a mode of subsistence that exists from its own side.

An illustration is an object that appears to a thought consciousness apprehending places, times, and natures, as mixed, such as the appearance as opposite from not being a pot to the thought consciousness apprehending pot.

The subject [an appearance as the opposite from not being a pot] is called a generally characterized phenomenon because it has a character which is realized by way of a generality, it being impossible [for a thought consciousness apprehending pot] to realize pot by way of its own entity. Here, "generality" refers to the meaning-of-the-term of a gold pot, for instance.

**Question:** To what does meaning-of-the-term refer?

**Answer:** It refers to the appearance of a gold pot as opposite from not being a pot to the thought consciousness apprehending pot.

The subject [the appearance as opposite from not being a pot] is called a "generality" (1) because of being a generality [which applies to] all manifestations of pot, (2) because gold pot, copper pot, and so forth are also instances of it, and (3) because gold and copper pots and
so forth also appear as pots to a thought consciousness apprehending pot.

With respect to this, it is necessary to know how a thought consciousness perceives and how a term expresses [its objects]; therefore, these will be explained.

Gyel-tsap's Explanation of (Dharmakīrti's)
"Commentary on (Dignāga's) 'Compendium on Valid Cognition!'" says that there are two ways in which a silver and a golden pot can appear to thought in relation to pot: either like the stars and the sky--that is, as different--or like milk and water--that is, undifferentiable.

To the thought which thinks "gold and silver pots" these pots seem to be instances of the generality pot, and the generality and instances seem different for thought, just as the stars and sky are different. This is a mistaken appearance because a generality and its instances are not different [entities]. A gold pot or a silver pot is one entity with the self-isolate of pot (bum pa'i rang ldog). The thought consciousness that perceives a gold or a silver pot as a different entity [from pot] as if the instance--silver pot--were not one entity with the generality--is mistaken.
The thought consciousness to which there is an appearance of gold and silver pots as a single entity, like milk and water, is also mistaken. They appear as one in the sense that their natures appear mixed for the thought consciousnesses apprehending just pot, whereas their natures are not mixed in fact.

1. The mode of perception by thought

For example, one sees with one's eye consciousness a gold pot inside a temple; then, when one goes to another place, the shape, color, and so forth of that former gold pot appear distinctly to the mind. The mind to which such appears is a thought consciousness and is not a direct perceiver. The appearance which appears to that thought consciousness is the meaning-generality of the gold pot and is not the actual golden pot. If it were the actual gold pot, then even if that gold pot were smashed with a hammer and had been changed into another form, it would have to appear just as it is [as a lump and not as a gold pot] whereas it does not appear so.

In another way, if that appearance to thought were the actual pot, the appearance would be able to perform functions such as holding water. If this were the case, since wherever a thought consciousness apprehending pot exists, a pot would have to exist, no one would be bereft
of a pot. Therefore, this thought consciousness is mistaken with respect to [its] appearing object because this appearance of gold pot as a pot to it appears as a pot whereas it is not a pot.

The meaning-generality which is an appearance as opposite from non-pot to the thought consciousness apprehending pot is both a generality and a generally characterized phenomenon. All generalities are not necessarily generally characterized phenomena; for example, pot is a generality that is concomitant with all instances of pot, but pot is a specifically characterized phenomenon. The appearance as opposite from non-pot, however, is a generally characterized phenomenon because it is permanent, and it is a generality because it has the nature (rang bzhin) of the external pot and the nature of the internal consciousness—the thought apprehending that meaning-generality.

[However, a correct conceptual thought] is not mistaken with regard to its referent object because in the mode of apprehension of that thought consciousness there exists the conception [rightly] thinking, "A golden pot is a pot," but there does not exist a conception [wrongly] thinking, "That appearance is a pot." For example, when someone looks
in a mirror wanting to realize whether or not there is
glime on his face, just that image in the mirror appears as
his face and in dependence on this fact [the condition of]
his face is understood, but there is [usually] no
conception [wrongly] thinking "That image itself is my face."
In just the same way, the thought consciousness apprehending
pot conceives of pot by way of the appearance of an image of
pot, but does not conceive the image of pot to be a pot.

Thus, in terms of what is to be understood from this,
the thought consciousness apprehending pot does not
explicitly apprehend pot but explicitly apprehends pots's
meaning-generality. Also, the term expressing pot does not
explicitly express pot; it explicitly expresses pot's
term-generality. However, in dependence on these [one
can] undeniably get at the specifically characterized pot,
due to which it is necessary to assert that the thought
consciousness apprehending pot explicitly realizes pot and
that the term expressing pot explicitly expresses pot. If it
were not so, one would have to assert that whatever is a
specifically characterized phenomenon is only an implicit
object of a thought consciousness and is only something
implicitly indicated by a treatise.

In the view of Jang-tsay College, once the
term "pot" explicitly expresses the meaning-
generality which is an appearance as opposite
from non-pot, then it must also express pot
because it expresses them as mixed together. Thus, both pot and the meaning-genericity of pot are explicit objects of expression of the term "pot." The thought consciousness apprehending pot, therefore, explicitly understands or realizes pot. However, the word "pot" does not explicitly express the specifically characterized pot.

If on hearing the words "impermanent sound" one did not explicitly understand impermanent sound, then the inference realizing impermanent sound would also not understand this explicitly. For, in that case the inferential consciousness would explicitly understand the meaning-genericity but not impermanent sound itself. The specifically characterized impermanent sound, however, is not an explicit object of expression of the term "impermanent sound" because in order to express specifically characterized sound the words would have to express a sound which was not mixed with the meaning-genericity of impermanent sound. It is the impermanent sound-isolate that is the explicit object of expression of the term "impermanent sound."

The final reason why a thought consciousness apprehending pot explicitly realizes pot is this: When a direct perceiver
apprehending pot is first produced, it establishes a predisposition for conceiving pot, and when that predisposition is later activated, it produces a thought consciousness apprehending gold pot and so forth as pot. Because that thought consciousness— in dependence on the appearance of gold pot as opposite from not being a pot— has the fruit of getting at a specifically characterized pot, factually concordant thought consciousnesses for the most part ultimately derive from [and end up at] direct perception. For, even a thought consciousness which apprehends space derives from a direct perceiver which apprehends an obstructive tangible object.

**Objection:** It follows that whatever is a thought consciousness is not necessarily mistaken with respect to its appearing object because (1) the thought consciousness apprehending object of knowledge perceives the meaning-generality of object of knowledge as an object of knowledge and (2) the meaning-generality of object of knowledge is an object of knowledge.

**Answer:** There is no entailment because merely by this it cannot be proven that such a thought consciousness is non-mistaken with respect to its appearing object. This is because when the meaning-generality of an object appears to a thought consciousness, the [following] appearances occur:
1) just that meaning-generality appears as if it were the entity of that object

2) the meaning-generality appears as if it is one with that object

3) the meaning-generality appears as if it is opposite from not being that object.

The three appearances of the meaning-generality are really three different ways of describing the same appearance.

The meaning-generality which is the appearing object of a thought consciousness apprehending object of knowledge is itself an object of knowledge; therefore, this thought consciousness, unlike most conceptual consciousnesses, is not mistaken with respect to its appearing object in all three ways mentioned above. Thus, the first type of error listed does not apply to the meaning-generality which is an appearance as opposite from not being an object knowledge, for it both appears to be and is the entity of an object of knowledge. However, the meaning-generality of object of knowledge is not the self-isolate of object of knowledge; it is an illustration-isolate or an instance of object of knowledge. Therefore, the thought consciousness
which apprehends this meaning-generality as if it were one with object of knowledge is mistaken.

Also, since the meaning-generality of object of knowledge appears to be one with object of knowledge, that thought consciousness is mistaken with respect to the appearing object....Therefore, whatever is a thought consciousness does not necessarily mistake a meaning-generality as that actual object [though most do], but does necessarily mistake the meaning-generality as one with that object. If it is taken this way, it appears to be good.

**Objection:** With regard to the two, the inferential consciousness which realizes sound as impermanent and the superimposing consciousness which apprehends sound as permanent, it follows that a difference of incontrovertability and controvertability does not exist because they do not differ with respect to being mistaken consciousnesses.

**Answer:** Though these two are similar in being mistaken consciousnesses, through an inferential consciousness one is able to get at the object of operation whereas through a superimposing consciousness one cannot get at the object of operation. For example, the apprehension of a jewel's light as a jewel and the apprehension of a butter lamp's light as a jewel are both similar in being
mistaken, but through the jewel's light one can get at a jewel but through the butter lamp's light one cannot. ... A thought consciousness realizing pot, for example, does realize the specifically characterized pot. For, if it did not realize such, it would not realize pot. However, thought does not realize pot ultimately, nor do terms express it ultimately. To realize pot or any other specifically characterized phenomenon ultimately means to realize it unmixed with any meaning-generality. Thus, although a pot is an object of thought and expression, it is not so ultimately. Both direct perception and thought realize specifically characterized phenomena such as pots, but direct perception realizes them ultimately—unmixed with a meaning-generality—whereas thought does not.

The way in which terms and thought consciousnesses operate by means of elimination should be known well because Kay-drup's Great Commentary on (Dharmakīrti's) "Commentary on (Dignāga's) 'Compendium on Valid Cognition'" says:

The explicit object of expression of the term expressing pot is not substantially established, but it is not necessary that whatever is explicitly expressed
by that not be substantially established. [Pot is explicitly expressed but is not the explicit object of expression.] This mode is to be understood as an uncommon feature of the Seven Treatises on Valid Cognition.

"Uncommon feature" means that it does not appear in any other text except the Seven Treatises.

A direct perceiver apprehending a pot is a complete engager. Hence, it comprehends [a pot] not from the viewpoint of merely eliminating non-pot, but by way of a pot's aspect being cast just as it is. Because a thought consciousness apprehending pot is a partial [or eliminative] engager, it does not comprehend [pot] by way of pot's aspect being cast just as it is; rather, it comprehends a mere mental imputation, which is an elimination of non-pot, through the mere appearance as opposite from non-pot.

When direct perception sees a pot, the entire collection of factors that are one substantial entity of establishment and abiding with that pot appear—its productness, impermanence, and so forth. Because the complete collection appears to it, a direct perceiver is known as a mind of complete engagement.

By contrast, the thought consciousness apprehending a pot is a mind of eliminative
or partial engagement. It is eliminative because it eliminates some qualities or factors related with the pot and engages with others. It does not realize all the factors of being a product, impermanence, and so forth, which are one substantial entity of establishment and abiding with the pot.

For that thought consciousness, pot has become an object of explicit ascertainment, but has not become the appearing object, and a meaning-genericity of pot has become the appearing object but not the object of ascertainment. Thus thought, having mixed the two—the appearance [the actual pot] and the imputation [a mental image of pot] as one—takes an imputed phenomenon as an appearing object. ...

2. The mode of expression by terms (182.2)

The term expressing pot is the three—name, convention, and appellation of pot. Therefore, the three are not mutually exclusive. However, for a special purpose these are explained as separate from the viewpoint of their isolates. What is the purpose? The subject, the term expressing "pot," is called a "name" because of directing or leading the mind to the meaning, the bulbous thing.

The term expressing "pot" is called a "convention" because of being for the purpose of knowing that the bulbous thing, through being able to perform the function of holding
water, is needed for pouring water and is not needed in holding up rafters. [The term pot not only directs the mind to the object but also conveys usages of the object.]

The subject [the term expressing "pot"] is called an appellation because of being affixed by [the original namer's] wish for the sake of [another] knowing to use the convention that a bulbous thing is a pot.

Thus, depending on [originally] connecting the appellation "pot" to the bulbous thing there arises the knowledge of how to use the convention, thinking, "This bulbous thing is a pot," and that is called ascertainment of the relationship between pot's name and the meaning. Therefore, whatever is a thought consciousness connecting a name [with a meaning] must have the nature of mixing the two as one--the name previously affixed at the time of [the original] terminological connection and the meaning subsequently seen at the time of [using] the convention.

In general, understanding meaning depends on appellations and any appellation is suitable to be applied to any object. For example, when "Kali" is expressed, those of central India [Magadha] understood it as expressing time, but those of South India understood is as expressing "insanity." However, later, when those [from the South] perceived the Maghadis using it to express time, the former understanding disappeared, and they understood it as
expressing time. Therefore, expressive terms are used merely through acceptance.

Thus, the term "pot" is known as a term of the prevailing wish. For, the initial affixer of the appellation affixed the appellation "pot" to the bulbous thing arbitrarily through the power of his wish, and, in dependence on that, "pot" prevails as the actual name of the bulbous thing.

One's own wish or intention has great power with respect to words and is thus like a king (rgyal po) of words. Hence the name "pot" arises due to the force of someone's own thought or wish ('dod pa). Just as a king is powerful, so whatever conversation one makes is under the power of the mind; the choice of words is arbitrary.

Later, although others designate names, these are unable to become renowned as its actual name. Thus, the term "pot" is renowned as the actual name of these bulbous things on account of being the appellation originally affixed through [someone's] wish to express it. On account of its not being able to be renowned as the actual name of something else, the term "pot" becomes definite as the actual name of these bulbous things and is not the actual name of something else.

However, the term "pot" is not unsuitable to be
affixed to other than bulbous things because even if one affixes the name "pot" to woolen cloth, after some time due to the power of conditioning even the meaning-genericity of pot could appear for woolen cloth. Therefore, "pot" is not objectively established by the power of the fact with bulbous things.

In brief, any appearing object of thought is suitable to be expressed by any expressive term. Therefore, correct signs of renown are established effortlessly.

In general, appellation (samketa, brda) and convention (vyavahāra, tha snyad) are synonymous. Conventions are of three types—mental conventions such as thinking "pot," verbal conventions such as expressing "pot," and physical conventions such as making a sign with the hand, etc. [to indicate] a pot.

With respect to the mode of affixing the conventions of generality and common locus: the Śāmkhyas assert a general principal (śāmānya-pradhāna), which is said to be a partless permanent thing, as the generality of the manifestations. Although the manifestations are different states, they are one nature within the general principal. Therefore, the two, generality and manifestation, are asserted to be one substantial entity. However, the Vaisheshikas assert these two as different substantial entities.
The Sāmkhyas assert that even though the various instances or manifestations themselves are different entities, the generality is one entity with each of these. Moreover, the instances are only different entities adventitiously or temporarily; they are capable of dissolving back into the generality. The Vaiśeṣhikas, on the other hand, consider instance and generality to be different substantial entities. (In their view, whatever can appear to the mind as a distinct feature is a different substantial entity.)

In the Buddhist view, generality and instance are neither one substantial entity nor different substantial entities because they are not substantially established. A phenomenon's being a generality or instance is merely imputed by thought.

In our own system, these two—generality and instance—are neither one substantial entity nor different substantial entities, because of not being [functioning] things.

Although a generality which is a [functioning] thing, such as opposite from not being a pot, exists, the generality through which all [its] manifestations are understood—[it being] the generality to which the term is [originally] affixed—is mainly an appearing object of a
thought consciousness. Furthermore, when the appellation is [originally] connected [to the object for someone else 'as in] "This golden bulbous thing is a pot," one is affixing the appellation "pot" to the appearance as opposite from not being a pot to the thought consciousness apprehending pot. Thus, at that time there can be produced in the continuum of the hearer an appearance which characterizes the golden bulbous thing as a pot.

Because that appearance is called pot's mark [i.e., the mark of being a pot], from the viewpoint of taking to mind—in dependence on that mark—the connection of the name and that which has the name, "This golden bulbous thing is pot," there arises the knowledge of how to use the convention that the golden bulbous thing is a pot. This is said to be a realization of [what] pot [is].

You can apply the name "pot" in a general way, without meaning any specific type of pot such as golden, silver, or clay. For example, you can say "hand" without meaning either the left or right one.

The referent object of the name "pot" (sgrai zhen yul) is not the meaning-genericity but the actual impermanent pot. The explicit object of expression of the term (dngos kyi brjod bya) is the meaning-genericity which is an
appearance as opposite from non-pot.

Therefore, this is the meaning of the Vaibhāšika assertion that the term operates with respect to the name, the name operates with respect to the mark, and from the mark one understands the meaning.

In brief, the term "pot" explicitly expresses the term-generality of pot without being able to explicitly express the specifically characterized pot. Through this expression of the term-generality, the name of pot is expressed; therefore, in dependence on this name, the thing is characterized as being a pot, whereby one realizes [what a ] pot [is].

Why is it that the term expressing "pot" is unable explicitly to express the specifically characterized pot? "The specifically characterized pot" is the present color, shape, and so forth of the pot as they appear to a direct perceiver apprehending a pot. Because the color and shape which existed previously [at the time of direct perception] have ceased at the time of expressing the term later, how could [terms] express them just as they are? If they did have this capacity, then because when a pot appears to a direct perceiver apprehending a pot, the impermanence of the pot also appears, this [impermanence] would also be expressed by that [term "pot "]. If this were so, then the term "pot" would be a complete engager.
The Śāmkhyas assert expressive terms to be complete engagers; therefore, [according to them], the term "pot" also expresses impermanent pot and, similarly, because product and impermanent thing are one substantial entity, the term "product" also expresses impermanent thing.

In general, impermanent thing is not positable separate from the substantial entity of product and product is not positable separate from the substantial entity of impermanent thing. Therefore, both we [Buddhists] and others assert that those two are one substantial entity. About this a Śāmkhya says: When you prove to me that sound is impermanent, [in the syllogism: The subject, sound, is impermanent because of being a product] is the "product" which is stated as the reason the product which is of the [same] substantial entity as impermanence? Or is product merely imputed by thought? If it is the latter, that reason would be a reason which is not established. If the former, then since when [you] state, "The subject, sound, is impermanent because of being a product," the phrase "because of being a product" also expresses impermanence, one segment of the thesis [the thesis being, "A product is impermanent"] would be stated as the reason [and this is unsuitable because a reason must have three different elements, subject, predicate, and reason or sign].

The Śāmkhyas hold sound to be permanent.

For the Buddhist, sound, like all products, is
impermanent. Why is being a product a sign of or reason for being impermanent? Because products are made by causes and conditions and nothing produced in dependence on causes and conditions can be permanent.

To be impermanent means to disintegrate from one moment to the next. How do products disintegrate from one moment to another? Why do they lack the power to sustain themselves for a second moment? Consider a house, for example. It has no power to sustain itself; it did not even come into existence under its own power but was made by causes and conditions. From its very first moment, it is entirely dependent on causes and conditions. Thus, it cannot abide permanently. Being powerless in this way, it has no ability to prevent its own disintegration. However long a house may last—a year, five years, a hundred years—this comes about through the power of causes and conditions, not through its own power. Therefore, as the power of these causes is extinguished, the house itself disintegrates from one moment to the next.

An example of a permanent phenomenon is uncaused space. It was not made by causes and conditions. It is a mere absence of obstructive
contact; it does not disintegrate or change, it never becomes hot or cold. The atmosphere changes temperature, but not the mere absence of obstructive contact. [A particular uncaused space is not eternal however, For example, the space inside a cup comes into existence when the cup is produced and goes out of existence when the cup is destroyed.]

The Buddhist position does not accept either of the two consequences offered by the Sāmkhyas. The thesis here is, "sound is impermanent." There are two names to this, "sound" and "impermanent." Once there are two names, there should be two objects. However, the Sāmkhyas here argue that if the Buddhists consider product to be of the substantial entity of impermanent thing, then at the time of realizing sound to be a product, one must also realize the product which is of the substantial entity of impermanent thing. At the time of realizing the product which is of the substantial entity of impermanent thing, one realizes the substantial entity of impermanent thing and thus the nature of impermanence. This is the Sāmkhya position, but the Buddhists do not agree.
[Buddhist:] This qualm arises through the force of your assertion that permanent sound is a complete engager. Therefore, in our own system, because terms and thoughts are partial engagers, [this doubt of the Sāmkhyas] must be answered from the viewpoint of establishing well how to posit a presentation of [impermanence and product as] one entity but different isolates by reason of terms and thought consciousnesses being eliminative [or partial] engagers. Therefore, this is the mode of that [presentation]: For example, the term "product" expresses a product by way of excluding non-product. The thought consciousness that apprehends this perceives [it] in the manner of opposite from non-product; therefore, having excluded opposite from non-product, it perceives product. Thus, both terms and thoughts are said to engage [their objects] through exclusion [i.e., to be eliminative or partial engagers].

When it is proved that sound is impermanent, it is not also established that sound is able to perform a function, that it is a cause, or an effect, or anything else. Only the fact of its being impermanent is established by the syllogism, "The subject, sound, is impermanent because of being a product." Thus, the thought consciousness that realizes sound to be impermanent is a mind of
eliminative or partial engagement; it engages only the factor of sound being a product, not any of the other factors of function and so forth. Although sound, impermanence, and product are one entity, they are different isolates. Thus, the term that expresses sound and the thought that realizes it are eliminative engagers.

Product and impermanent thing are different isolates because the manner of their appearance to thought is different. Product is realized through excluding non-product and impermanence is realized through excluding permanence. But there are not two different entities of which it can be said, "This is the product, that the impermanence."

A thought consciousness is a partial engager because it separates out or isolates factors contained within the same substantial entity and focuses on only one of them. Impermanence is not realized by a thought consciousness realizing product and product is not realized by a thought consciousness realizing impermanence.

Product and impermanent thing appear differently to thought, but not to direct perception. For example, both product and
impermanent thing appear to the ear consciousness that hears a sound. Direct perceivers are complete engagers that operate with respect to all the factors which are one substantial entity of production and abiding with their appearing object. However, direct perceivers are also involved in exclusion. For example, the direct perceiver realizing product does eliminate non-product. However, it is not sufficient merely to exclude "non-product" for a consciousness to be considered a partial engager. A consciousness which is a partial engager excludes all that is one substantial entity of establishment and abiding with its appearing object except for the factor being realized.

Therefore, although the term "product" expresses opposite from non-product, it does not express opposite from non-impermanent thing. Also, although the term "impermanent thing" expresses opposite from non-impermanent thing, it does not express opposite from non-product. For this reason, on the basis of how they are expressed, opposite from non-product and opposite from non-impermanent thing are established as different. This, therefore, is the significance of saying that the two, product and impermanent thing, are different isolates.
Thus, product and impermanent thing are said to be different isolates on the basis of how they are expressed or perceived by thought, not on the basis of how they are observed in direct perception. However, although there is no difference in the way that these appear to direct perception, the way in which direct perception realizes them is slightly different. Our own direct perception can realize that things are products, but subtle impermanence is difficult to realize. We can see with our own eyes that sprouts, for example, are produced in dependence on certain causes and conditions, but we do not directly ascertain the subtle impermanence of sprouts. Thus, the mode of realization of these is different.

However, that which is the entity of product is also the entity of impermanent thing and that which is the entity of impermanent thing is also the entity of product. For this reason, the two--product and impermanent thing--are a single entity. Yet, the term "product" does not explicitly express impermanence and the term "impermanence" also does not explicitly express product.

When we study, it is necessary to explain separately impermanence, product, the ability to
perform a function and so forth. This is a sign that [the terms expressing them] are partial engagers. For, they are all one entity, and if the term were a complete engager it would be necessary to explain only one of them and all would be understood.

Also, the thought consciousness which is induced by such a term [as "product" or "impermanence"] takes one as its object and does not explicitly apprehend the other. Therefore, when expressing "product" others understand only product, they do not understand impermanence. For this reason, the two--product and impermanent thing--are one entity but different isolates. It is difficult for the Sāmkhyas to posit such a mode.

Therefore, at the time of stating, "The subject, sound, is an impermanent thing because of being a product," the product which comes to be the reason and the impermanent thing which comes to be the predicate of the probandum are one entity, but the term which expresses the reason--product--does not express the predicate of the probandum--impermanent thing. Hence, there is no fault of the [unwanted] consequence that one portion of the thesis is stated as the sign [of a sound being an impermanent thing].

Similarly, the positing of [something as] a common locus [of two or more things] is in the eliminative
perspective of terms and thought. The reason is as follows: When, for example, a person wishing to speak of a flower as being both an utable and blue, says, "This flower is a blue utable," then, even though in relation to this one flower there are not two different substantial entities—the blue which is not utable and utable which is not blue—with respect to the realization of the term "blue utable," the blue and the utable come out serially. In the same way, a thought consciousness to which the two, utable and blue, appear to be different, is generated in the continuum of the hearer. In dependence on this appearance, the single flower itself is understood to be a common locus of utable and blue.

In the same way a table, for example, is a common locus of product and impermanent thing, but this does not mean that a term expressing the one expresses the other, or that a thought consciousness realizing one realizes the other, because terms and thoughts are partial engagers, expressing or realizing only part of the factors in a single entity or common locus. By contrast, when direct perception sees a table, all the factors of impermanence, product, and so forth appear. Thus, direct perceivers are complete engagers.
When one just says "upāla" no appearance of blue is generated in the mind of the listener. The reason for understanding such is that at the time [of hearing the words "blue upāla"] a composite of the two—opposite from non-upāla and opposite from non-blue—appear to the thought consciousness in the continuum of the listener. Therefore, except for positing a common locus in dependence on the appearance of a composite of two isolates to thought, the upāla and the blue do not exist as different substantial entities with that single flower.

In brief, all the conventions of [a syllogism such as the] probandum [thesis], probans [reason], predicate, and subject, are used based on their appearance to thought. Otherwise, if they were taken as specifically characterized phenomena, [it would be extremely absurd]. For, when impermanent thing is established with respect to sound, then when sound is first ascertained, there is an appearance for thought of sound as if it did not exist previously and is newly established. Following that, when the two, product and impermanent thing, are ascertained serially as with sound, at that time product and impermanent thing like a [potted] juniper depending on a metal trough or a white woolen cloth becoming red, there is first an appearance of [sound as a] product and, following that, [as an] impermanent thing—as if a new
establishment of what did not exist previously. [However],
this seriality of former and later [appearances of
establishment of sound as product and impermanent thing]
is not feasible with respect to specifically characterized
phenomena. For, from the mere production of a sound, it is
already simultaneously produced as an entity of product
and impermanent thing.

In brief, the meaning of direct perceivers' being
complete engagers and conceptual consciousnesses'
partial engagers is this: When, for example, blue is
perceived by a direct perceiver apprehending blue, the
features which are one entity with blue appear in the
manner of being included in or established as objects of
that [direct perceiver], and from this point of view, the
specifically characterized blue appears. [By contrast,]
when blue is perceived by a thought consciousness
apprehending blue, those features do not appear in the
sense that those features are eliminated or excluded as its
object, and there is an appearance of a phenomenon that is
a superimposition by thought which is an elimination of
non-blue.

Furthermore, because terms have no conceived objects,
there are indeed no conceived objects of expression. 4
However, if it is said that since the thought consciousness
which wishes to express a term expresses it upon thinking,
[I] will speak of "pot," and putting pot as the referent object. The reason why the listener understands pot unmistakably derives from this and thus [since] terms do have conceived objects of expression, there is something [meaningful] to be understood.

Also, opposite from non-pot is pot's objective specifically characterized exclusion; for this reason, opposite from non-pot is a functioning thing.

**Opponent:** [With regard to this,] it follows that this is not correct, because opposite from not being a pot is permanent.

**Response:** The reason—that opposite from not being a pot is permanent—is not established.

**Opponent:** It follows with respect to the subject, a pot, that opposite from not being it is permanent because being it is permanent.

**Response:** The reason—that being pot is permanent—is not established.

**Opponent:** It follows with respect to the subject, a pot, that being it is permanent, because being it exists.

Although this is an off-shoot of a reasoning in the Seven Treatises [on Valid Cognition], if one takes opposite from non-pot as being a functioning thing, I think it accords with the great texts.

Someone [else] says: Your saying that the term which
expresses "product" expresses as [or in the manner of] opposite from non-product is not correct because if it were correct it would [absurdly] follow that the subject, the term expressing "product" explicitly expresses opposite from non-product because of explicitly expressing [product] as opposite from non-product. If you accept this, it [absurdly] follows that the subject, the thought consciousness which explicitly apprehends product, explicitly apprehends opposite from non-product because (1) such is expressed by the term which expresses product and (2) both terms and thought consciousnesses have the same [mode of] operation.

**Answer:** It is true that such is expressed by the term which expresses product and both terms and thought consciousnesses have the same [mode of] operation, but this does not entail that the thought consciousness which explicitly apprehends product explicitly apprehends opposite from non-product.

According to Đen-dar-hla-ram-ṣa, the term "product" explicitly expresses both product and opposite from non-product and upon hearing the term "product" one explicitly understands both product and opposite from non-product.

Jang-tsay college has a different assertion here: Once the term "product" explicitly
expresses product, it implicitly expresses opposite from non-product. Similarly, the thought consciousness realizing product explicitly realizes product and implicitly realizes opposite from non-product.

For example, if I say "I am a human" you explicitly understand that I am a human being, and implicitly understand that I am opposite from not being a human. It is not necessary to explain separately that I am opposite from not being a human.

If one accepted that the thought consciousness which explicitly apprehends product explicitly apprehends opposite from non-product, it would [absurdly] follow that the subject, opposite from non-product, is one with product because of being the explicit object of the thought consciousness which explicitly apprehends product.

According to Jang-tsay college, it does not follow that whatever is an explicit object of the thought consciousness apprehending product is necessarily one with product. For example, the thought consciousness apprehending product explicitly apprehends the meaning-genericity of product; this meaning-genericity is an explicit object of the thought apprehending product
because it is the appearing object of that thought. For, whatever is an appearing object of a thought consciousness is necessarily an explicit object of that thought consciousness, but is not necessarily an explicit object of comprehension.

However, though it is indeed renowned that terms and thought operate in the same way, this is to be analyzed. For, it would [absurdly] follow that whatever is explicitly expressed by some term would necessarily be explicitly apprehended in the same way by a thought consciousness because [according to you] those two, terms and thought consciousnesses, operate in the same way.

Jang-tsay College would accept this.

If it is accepted that whatever is explicitly expressed by some term is necessarily explicitly apprehended in the same way by a thought consciousness, [such is contradicted by the following]. For, Pan-chen Šö-nam-drak-ṣa says, "The mode of operation of valid cognition and the mode of expression of terms are established as different because, although the phrase stating that "whatever is permanent is not a product" expresses product's absence in the permanent, the valid cognizer which comprehends that whatever is permanent is not a product does not realize that product's absence in the permanent." Also, in the
same vein, the omniscient Jam-yang-shay-ba also says:
"Although the two, terms and thoughts, are similar in
operating eliminatively with respect to their own objects,
the inferential consciousness which realizes permanent
phenomena as empty of [being] products does not realize
product's absence in the permanent. However,
the term which indicates that among the permanent there
are no products indicates product's absence in the permanent.
Such very subtle and intricate reasons should be cherished."

According to Jay-dzun-ba it is like this:
The term expressing product expresses
opposite from non-product implicitly; it does not
express this explicitly. The thought consciousness
apprehending product also implicitly realizes
opposite from non-product. In this way they are
similar. However, Jam-yang-shay-ba says that
thought and terms are not similar.

If this is expressed in a way that is easily understood:
This means that the term expressing that whatever is
permanent is necessarily a product does express that
products are empty of being permanent, but the thought
consciousness which comprehends that whatever is permanent
is necessarily not a product does not comprehend that
products are empty of being permanent. Therefore, it should
be understood how, although the two, terms and thought
consciousnesses, are the same merely in terms of operating by way of exclusions with respect to their own object, there is no definiteness that all that is expressed by a term is apprehended in the same way by a thought consciousness.

When I say that I am not a non-person, I also express that a non-person is not me. However, the valid cognizer which realizes that I am not a non-person does not realize that a non-person is not me.

In stating that permanent phenomena are not products, one also expresses that products are not permanent. However, the thought consciousness which realizes that permanent phenomena are not products does not realize that products are not permanent. This is a very subtle distinction.

APPLICATION OF NAMES

The initial connecting of an appellation (samketa, brda') or name (nāma, ming) to an object occurs when a person who knows, for example, the convention "ox," tells a person who does not know it, "This is an ox." Thus, "connecting an appellation" (brda' sbyar ba) in this context refers to initially connecting a term with an
object; "convention" (vyavahāra, tha snyad) refers to later usage of a term that has been learned. 6

In terms of connecting an appellation [or name] to an ox, the opposite from non-ox is called the generality, and white, black, and so forth oxen are its instances. The two--generality and instances--are one substantial entity, and, furthermore, the generality itself pervades all its instances.

Generality and instances must be one substantial entity or one entity. All instances of ox are pervaded by the generality, that is, by being opposite from non-ox.

With respect to this, although both the inner Buddhists and the outer Sāmkhyas concur in asserting the mere expression "generality," they have discordant identifications of this generality.

Both agree that generalities exist, but they have different explanations of what a generality is and how it relates to its instances.

For, generalities are known to be of two sorts, type generalities (*gotra-sāmānya, rigs spyi) and collection generalities (tshog spyi), and here the Buddhists assert that the type generality--an exclusion which is the opposite from non-ox, an elimination of what is not ox--
is the generality [concomitant with] the instances of ox. The Sāmkhyas, however, say that there is a permanent
generality, a "principal" (pradhāna, gtso bo) that
pervades all instances and that this is the generality of
the instances of ox.

Unlike opposite-from-non-ox, which is an
impermanent phenomenon, an objective specifically
characterized exclusion, and which does not
exist apart from its instances, the Sāmkhya
generality is permanent and does exist apart
from its instances.

Furthermore, the Buddhists and Sāmkhyas concur in
asserting that due to having connected the appellation
"ox" to a white ox, for instance, all the remaining
types of oxen [black, spotted, and so forth] are
understood to be oxen. They also concur in asserting that
the purpose of affixing appellations is in order to
understand a convention [that is, in order to facilitate
later usage], but they disagree on the reasons for [how
affixing the name leads to] understanding such.

The Buddhists say that when, through one's having
initially taken a white ox, for instance, as the basis, the
appellation is affixed, "This is an ox," that
appellation is affixed to the opposite from non-ox
[that is, to the generality] by reason of the fact that
this bulky thing has the nature of being an aggregation of a hump, dewlap, and so forth.

One can distinguish between ox and non-ox by way of the presence and absence of the sign of an aggregation of a hump and dewlap.

According to the Buddhists, the name is initially affixed to the opposite from non-ox. The white ox is only taken as the basis of affixing or connecting the name; the name is not actually applied to it. Because opposite from non-ox is an aggregation of a hump and dewlap, it is suitable to receive the name "ox." Such a name can only properly be applied to what is opposite from non-ox, that is, only to what is ox—not to horse, tiger, or anything else. This opposite from non-ox to which the name is affixed itself pervades, or is concomitant with, all instances of ox. Therefore, once the name has been affixed to this, one can use the convention "ox" for oxen of other colors.

If the name "ox" were initially affixed to the specific white ox, one would not recognize a black animal with hump and dewlap as suitable to be called an ox.

[Thus, affixing the name to the generality, opposite from
non-ox, allows one to recognize all instances of oxen because (1) it is applied to opposite from non-ox and (2) opposite from non-ox is concomitant with all instances of oxen.

According to the Śāmkhyas, the term "ox" is a complete engager [evoking an understanding of everything that is of one substantial entity with ox] and therefore must express everything that is one entity with ox. For this reason it also expresses the generality which is a permanent functioning thing.

According to Śāmkhya, the name "ox" is not an eliminative or partial engager operating through the exclusion of non-ox because it is not established merely through the power of terminology but through the power of the thing—here, the ox—itself; therefore, it is a complete engager. A term of complete engagement must express everything that is of one entity with the object expressed. Since the generality ox is one entity with the individual ox, the term "ox" must express both the general and the specific ox.

Therefore, when someone initially takes a white ox as a basis and affixes the appellation saying, "This is an ox," the appellation is also affixed to the generality which is
a permanent functioning thing. Due to the fact that the
general principal pervades all instances of oxen, later
when one sees a black ox, one understands [what it is] and
thinks "ox" without needing to consider any other reasons.

The Sāmkhyas assert that the general principal is
partless and that it is a permanent functioning thing.
On the basis of this they posit ox and tree generalities
and so forth that are permanent functioning things, but
due to their not knowing how to posit [generality and
instance] as different isolates in connection with how
these are expressed by terms, they have to say that since
the generality which is a permanent functioning thing is
concomitant with its instances, the nature of a mottled ox
itself is the nature of a pale yellow ox and the nature
of a pale yellow ox is the nature of a mottled one.

They are forced to this position because of
their assertion that the ox-generality which
equally pervades yellow and mottled oxen is itself
partless. Thus, argue the Buddhists, its entire
indivisible nature must be present in each of its
instances; consequently, the nature of all
instances must be the same. Therefore, although
the Sāmkhyas do distinguish between generalities
of different types—between an ox generality
and a tree generality, for example—they are
forced to say that the entire partless ox
generality resides in or applies to all instances
of ox. This ox generality itself is a permanent
functioning thing; the oxen which it pervades are
impermanent.

In the Buddhist view, the Sāmkhyas are
credited with understanding how to assert that a
generality and its instances are one entity but not
with understanding that they are different for
thought or, more technically, different isolates.
They do not see that terms such as "generality"
and "instance" are posited by the force of
terminology but consider these as posited by the
force of the thing.

Dharmakīrtī's Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compendium on Valid
Cognition" in many places throughout the text
demonstrates damage to this assertion.

Further, the Hearer schools [Vaibhāshika and
Sautrāntika] assert partless particles and the Sāmkhyas
assert a partless general principal; although the
name is the same, the meanings [of "partless"] differ.
For, the [Vaibhāshika and Sautrāntika] assertion that
minute particles are partless means that [such a particle]
does not have many parts which are itself and which are
of its own essential nature. The[Sāmkhya's] meaning of
the principal's being partless is that it does not have many isolate factors that are concomitant with its many instances.

In the Hearer schools it is not contradictory for a minute particle, even thought partless, to be a generality. For [such a partless particle] is the generality of minute particles in the east, west, and so forth.

**Question:** Although these three—a sandalwood tree, an aloewood tree, and a pot equally are different entities, an awareness of same type is generated with respect to sandalwood and aloewood but an awareness of same type is not generated with respect to sandalwood and a pot? Why is this?

**Answer:** The Sāmkhyas say that this [awareness that sandalwood tree and aloewood tree are the same type in the sense of both being trees] occurs due to the tree general principal, the reason being that the tree general principal is concomitant with these two—sandalwood and aloewood—-but is not concomitant with a pot.

**Question:** Since this demonstrates a reasoning proving the existence of a [partless] principal, what is it?

**Answer:** With respect to the subjects, the manifestations of tree such as sandalwood and aloewood, and
the manifestations of pot such as gold pot and copper pot, there must be some cause for understanding these individually as a single type [that is, the former as trees and the latter as pots] without confusing them for, if there were not, such an understanding would not occur. Thereby it is proven that a cause exists which is the agent of various individual effects; and it would not be suitable for this cause to be other than the general principal.

**Question:** What is the nature of this general principal?

**Answer:** It is a non-manifest functioning thing [that cannot appear to anyone's awareness] which includes the natures of all instances into one. Because the [formerly non-manifest] instances are made manifest by it, they are called manifestations.

For example, the Sāmkhyas say that when the seed of an oak tree exists, a non-manifest oak exists right with it. As the seedling grows, the oak tree becomes manifest. Because this tree is said to be pervaded by the oak-tree general principal, it is a manifestation or instance of that generality.

Our own [Buddhist system] having refuted this [Sāmkhya assertion] of a general principal, says that opposite from
non-tree, an exclusion [or negative phenomenon] itself is common to sandalwood and aloewood but not to oxen. However, sameness of type cannot be posited merely due to that. If it could, then it would follow that the two, a human and an ox, would be one type because the exclusion opposite-from-non-sentient-being is concomitant with both.

Persons and oxen are not one type even though both are instances of opposite-from-non-sentient-being. However, from one point of view it can be said that all impermanent phenomena are of the same type in that they are all products. Similarly, all existing phenomena are one type in the sense that the exclusion, opposite-from-non-object-of-knowledge, is common to all. However, this does not prove that they are one type in general.

Therefore, the final reason for positing [certain phenomena as] the same type is: two phenomena are posited as one type [if] those trained in terminology naturally generate a mental conception of them as similar due to merely seeing them by way of turning the mind [to them]. Therefore, it follows that the subjects, a white ox and a black, are the same type because they appear to be similar to the innate minds of those trained in terminology upon merely seeing them. It follows that the
subjects—the two, a white ox and a pot—are not the same type because they do not appear to be similar to the innate minds of such persons.

There is a reason for the appearance of such similarity and dissimilarity. It is due to the internal conditions of a predominant familiarization [or conditioning] with predispositions from beginningless time for calling both white and black oxen a single type, "ox," and there are no predominant predispositions of expression for conceiving that the two, a white ox and a pot, are a single type of this sort.

[The appearance of similarity of type also occurs] because of external conditions. Both white and black oxen equally possess a hump, dewlap, and so forth whereas the two, a white ox and a pot, do not equally possess such features. Beyond that, from the viewpoint that both the white and black oxen are equal in being the opposite of non-ox, these two are also one type of isolate. Therefore, an awareness of sameness of type is generated with respect to the two of them. For example, although the colors of human beings are many [white, black, yellow, and so forth] the black color of their shadows is the same, and from this viewpoint the shadows appear to be a single type.

Therefore, from between the two kinds of sameness of type (1) being the same type of isolate [that is, being
the same opposite from non-] and (2) being the same substantial type, the two--gold pot and copper: pot--are an example of the first. Because these two are the same in being opposite from non-pot, they are said to be one type of isolate. [An example] of the second kind [of sameness of type] is two different kernels of barley that are produced from a single barley kernel. Because these two are the same in having been produced from a single barley kernel which is their substantial cause, they are one substantial type (rdzas rigs gcig), but they are not one substantial entity (rdzas gcig), for if one is negated the other is not necessarily negated.

With that as an illustration, if one wishes to analyze [the term] "substance" (dravya, rdzas), it undoubtedly is understood differently by (1) the Vaiśeshikas when they speak of a substance that acts as a basis for qualities that are factually different [from itself]; (2) the Sāmkhyas and so forth when they speak of the non-manifest general principal as substantially existent in the sense of being self-sufficient; (3) the poets when they speak of an epithet which expresses the nature of a substance; (4) followers of Collected Topics on Valid Cognition when they speak of substantial phenomena and reverse phenomena; (5) the Vaibhāṣikas when they speak of the three uncaused [phenomena] as
substantial and of the sameness of substance of the vows of male and female clergy; (6) the Sautrāntikas when they speak of that which is able to perform the function of holding up rafters as having all three qualities and being substantially existent; (7) the Chittamātrins when they speak of the single substantial entity of the two—the blue and the eye consciousness perceiving blue; and (8) the Mādhyamikas when they speak of not asserting substantial establishment. Since I am of dull faculties, I am not competent to state these just as they are. However, you who have great wisdom, please decide it.

Thus, when having taken a white ox as the basis, the appellation is affixed, "This bulky thing is an ox," due to the essential of the appellation "ox" being affixed by reason of this bulky thing's being an aggregation of a hump and so forth, then because black oxen also are aggregations of a hump and so forth, all oxen are of one type.

All oxen, regardless of color, can be designated "ox" because they are all aggregations of hump, dewlap, and so forth. They are the same type. Thus, a person who knows terminology, without needing to rely on any other reason, generates a similar type of mind with respect to any color oxen.
Question: When, taking a white ox as the base, the appellation "ox" is applied, what is the object of engagement of that appellation?

Answer: At that time the white ox itself is the base of affixing the appellation ox, but it is not the object of engagement. For, if it were the object of engagement of the term "ox," it would have to be the object of the mode of apprehension ("dzin stangs kyi yul) of the thought consciousness which apprehends ox, in which case it would also be the referent object (*adhyayasāvishaya, zhen yul) of that term.

The questioner is wondering whether the white ox present at the time of initially learning the name is the object of engagement of the term "ox." It is not. The white ox is just the basis of affixing the term, the place of apprehending ("dzin sa) the actual referent object of expression of the term ox—the opposite from non-ox or ox itself. However, the white ox is not the referent object of the expression; it is merely the base which serves as a specific example of what is referred to by the term "ox." When one initially learns the name ox, one thinks, "This is an ox," not "This is a white ox."
It would be unsuitable if, at the time of learning the name, the instructor said, "This is a white ox." For, later when one saw a black ox, one would incorrectly call it a "white ox." For, the name is affixed by reason of the object's being a bulky thing which is an aggregation of hump and dewlap, and not due to the feature of its having the color white. Therefore, later when one sees an ox of a different color, one can recognize it as suitable to be called an ox because of its shape.

Therefore, the actual objects of engagement of the appellation "ox" are the two, ox and opposite from non-ox. For, Kay-drup's Clearing Away Mental Darkness with Respect to the Seven Treatises says:

When the appellation "ox" is [initially] connected [to an object] with a white ox taken as the basis, there are two main objects of that appellation: ox [a positive phenomenon] and opposite from non-ox, an exclusion (apoha, sel ba) [or negative phenomenon]. The meaning-of-the-term ["ox"]--the appearance of white ox as opposite from non-ox--is also a mere object of the appellation.

You cannot make a terminological connection without having some base. The base in this
case is the white ox, but the name is not intended to express merely a white ox. Rather, opposite from non-ox is the main object; this appears in dependence on the specific white ox. The white ox is part of the process of connecting the name, but the purpose of this process is not to cause ascertainment only of that particular white ox. For, the white ox is an object of lesser pervasion than the main object—the opposite from non-ox—which is concomitant with or applies to all instances of oxen.

This is so; it is like the fact that when the expression "impermanent sound," for example, is stated, sound is the basis of affixing the term "impermanent," but it is not the object of engagement of the term "impermanent" [that is, it is not the referent of the term "impermanent"].

Sound is just the basis of which impermanence is a quality. Thus, when impermanence is expressed in relation to a sound, the impermanence is a quality of sound and shares the same locus with it, but what appears to the mind is impermanence, not sound. This point is addressed in the following debate.

Opponent: When, having taken a white ox as a base, the terminological connection is made, "This is an ox," in
the continuum of the hearer is there or is there not generated a thought consciousness apprehending that the white ox is an ox? If you say that such is generated, then it follows that the subject, the thought consciousness apprehending a white ox as an ox, apprehends a composite meaning of white ox and ox because (1) the thought consciousness apprehending sound as impermanent apprehends an object that is a composite of sound and impermanent and (2) terms and thought consciousnesses operate similarly.

Our own scholars respond: There is no fault here. For, the purpose of proving sound to be impermanent is to prove impermanence in relation to sound; therefore, when the thing being proven by that proof [i.e., that sound is impermanent] is realized, [the realizing consciousness] must engage a composite meaning of the quality [impermanence] and the qualified [sound. However,] the purpose of connecting the appellation ox [is different], for the appellation is [initially] connected for the sake of [later] understanding black oxen and so forth as oxen when one uses the convention [in the future]. Since the terminological connection is not made for the sake of understanding the composite meaning of white ox and opposite from non-ox, there is no fault.

Even though thought consciousnesses and terms are similar in being partial engagers, they
are not similar in all respects. For example, the purpose of stating or proving that "sound is impermanent" is to realize sound as qualified by impermanence; thus, the expression refers to both the base—the sound—and its quality of impermanence. The initial connection of the name "ox," however, is for the sake of understanding what oxen are, not for the sake of understanding a composite of basis and quality, for its main object of engagement is just opposite from non-ox, not white ox.

In brief, it is not suitable that only specifically characterized phenomena and not other-exclusions be explicit objects of terms and thoughts. Therefore, if, at the time of a terminological connection, the appellation were applied only to the specifically characterized phenomenon and not to the exclusion [such as opposite from non-ox], then when the appellation for "ox" is initially connected to a white ox, the terminological connection would be made to just the substantial entity of a white ox. In that case, later when one saw a black ox, it would [absurdly] follow that there would be no way to use the convention, "This is an ox." For, the white ox at the time of previously connecting the appellation is not concomitant with the black ox at
the time of [later using] the convention. This reason follows because the white ox of the time of previously connecting the appellation has ceased and does not exist at the time of [later using] the convention.

The time of connecting the appellation refers to the occasion of initially hearing or identifying, "This is an ox." The time of using the convention refers to when one has understood the name and is using it with respect to various instances of, for example, oxen. In general, "appellation" and "convention" mean the same thing, but the time of connecting the appellation is different from the time of making a terminological connection using the convention.

**Question:** Does this fault not apply to you too?

**Answer:** The fault does not apply [to us] because the terminological connection is made to opposite from non-ox, an exclusion which is a mere elimination of non-ox, due to which it itself has not ceased but exists at the time [of later using the convention].

This is another way of emphasizing that the appellation is connected to a mere elimination, opposite from non-ox, not to the white ox in particular. The mere elimination is common to all manifestations or instances of oxen.
Or, [it could be said that the reason why the above fault
does not apply to us is that] at the time [of later using
the convention], the meaning-of-the-term--the appearance to
thought of white ox as opposite from non-ox--has not
ceased but exists. In this way, Śaṅgya Pandita's
Treasury of Reasoning says:

Because individual specifically characterized phenomena
Are limitless, an appellation cannot be [connected to
each],

Also, at the time of using the convention
It is difficult to find the initial specifically
characterized phenomenon.

This means that if the appellation "ox" did explicitly
express specifically characterized oxen, then since oxen
are limitless, the connection of an appellation to such
[a limitless number of objects] would be impossible.

Even if one allows that it could be possible, then since
the oxen at the time of connecting the appellation would
have become different in place, time, and nature, at the
time of [later using] the convention, it would be
difficult to find the original oxen just as they were.

Furthermore, an opponent says: When the appellation
"ox" is initially connected to a white ox, is the
appellation [also] applied to black ones or not? If the
appellation is [also connected to black and so forth oxen],
then it follows that the subject, the term "ox" is a complete engager [as the Sāmkhyas propound] because it expresses that all manifestations of oxen--black ones and so forth--are oxen. If, however, the appellation is not connected [to black oxen] how is a black ox understood to be an ox at the time of [later using] the convention?

Response: Even though the appellation is not explicitly connected to black oxen at the time of initially connecting the appellation, there is no fault that one could not understand [a black oxen] to be an ox at the time of [later using] the convention. For, when the appellation for ox is initially connected, that terminological connection is made to opposite from non-ox--that is, to the elimination of non-ox. At that time, therefore, a thought consciousness is generated in the continuum of the hearer which apprehends the white ox as being an ox, within thinking, "the convention "ox" is designated to this sort of bulky thing which is an aggregation of hump, dewlap, and so forth," and [as long as] the functioning [i.e., impact] of this thought does not deteriorate, when [the person] sees a black ox he understands [that it is an ox], thinking, "Because this bulky thing is also an aggregation of a hump, dewlap, and so forth, it is an ox."

About this an opponent says: In that case, when it
is stated that "This pot is impermanent," it [absurdly] follows that the appellation is also made of opposite from non-impermanent, because you asserted [the above].

It was presented above that when the appellation "ox" is initially connected to a white ox, the terminological connection is made to opposite from non-ox which, it was also mentioned, is present in all types of oxen.

If you accept this, when the hearer later hears a sound, he would understand that this sound also is impermanent; and that being the case, there would be no point in reasonings and inferences proving that sound is impermanent.

Response: There is no fault of such a consequence. Saying that by connecting the appellation to a generality all its instances can be understood is just a loose explanation; it is not being held that it is necessarily so [in all circumstances]. If there were such binding necessity, even in our own system [there would be the fault of contradicting] that it does indeed happen that even though the appellation "ox" had been earlier connected with respect to a small ox, there are cases when a large ox is seen later on, of being mistaken due to the difference in size such that one
does not understand [the larger ox] to be an ox.

Thus, there is no definiteness or pervasion that a person for whom a small ox has been designated as an ox will later generate a mind that thinks "ox" with respect to a large ox.

There is no denying that such [error] can occur; nevertheless, such a person sees with direct perception a bulky thing which is an aggregation of hump, dewlap, and so forth in connection with the large ox, due to which he has realized the complete meaning-isolate [the mere actual meaning] of ox. Yet, due to merely not knowing how to use the convention "ox" with respect to this [large one], it is purposeful to set out a reason establishing the mere convention ["ox"] for the sake of his understanding [that this bulky thing is called an ox].

The person already knows the aggregation of hump, dewlap, and so forth; what remains is just to learn that this is called an ox. In order to make him understand this, it is necessary to set out a reasoning establishing the name or convention.

Also, a means of establishing the mere [verbal] convention exists for this is to be stated: The subject, this large bulky thing which has a lump of flesh directly
above its two shoulders, is an ox because of having the nature of [being] an aggregation of hump, dewlap, and so forth. When [this is stated], in dependence on the functioning of that syllogism, the person is not caused to realize newly a meaning in addition to the object that he has already seen directly. However, the purpose of stating this [reasoning], called a "proof of mere convention" [and not a combination of convention and meaning] through this syllogism is established when there occurs (1) the mere understanding of how to use the term "ox" in relation to this [large bulky thing] and (2) the mere understanding of how conceptually to newly use the convention in thought, thinking "ox" [in relation to the large bulky thing]. Therefore, this syllogism is stated for the sake of establishing the mere convention "ox" for one who does not understand that a bulky thing which is an aggregation of hump, dewlap, and so forth, is the sign of meaning of an ox.

Through this illustration, the meaning of all reasonings proving mere conventions is to be understood in the same way. Further, there is another reason why once one has ascertained a pot as impermanent one does not later, on hearing a sound, understand sound as impermanent. For, in general, the continuum of a pot exists for years and months due to the prolongation of a continuum of similar
type, but as to a sound, direct perception establishes that there is no continuum lasting that long; therefore, compared to sound it is not easier to realize pot as impermanent. Nevertheless, due to the power of mistaken conceptions that pollute the continuum through [mistaken] tenets, there are persons who have previously ascertained pot as impermanent and for whom it is necessary to later ascertain sound as impermanent.