TRANSLATIONS

GUNG-TANG'S

EXPLANATION OF THE DIFFICULT TOPICS

OF AFFLICTED MENTALITY

AND

MIND-BASIS-OF-ALL

and

ǲZONG-KA-ǲA'S

ROOT VERSES

ON

MENTALITY AND BASIS-OF-ALL
Translator's Preface

THE TEXT

Two translations are presented here: a translation of the section on mind-basis-of-all from Gung-tang Gön-chok-ḍen-Bay-drön-may's (Gung-thang dKon-mchog-bstan-pa'i-sgron-me) Explanation of the Difficult Topics of "Mentality and Basis-of-All" (Yid dang kun gzhi'i dka' gnas rnam par bshad pa mkhas pa'i 'jug ngog)\(^1\) written in 1798 and, as an appendix, a translation of Đzong-ka-Ba Lo-sang-drak-Ba's (Tsong-kha-pa bLo-bzang-grags-pa) Root Verses on Mentality and Basis-of-All (Yid dang kun gzhi'i rtsa ba)\(^2\) written in 1378.

Gung-tang's work is sixty-four folios long (that is, one hundred and twenty-eight pages) in the edition used for this translation, and seventy-one folios in the other extant edition. (A representative Tibetan folio\(^3\) is nine centimeters high by fifty centimeters wide, with six to eight long lines of printing.) Of the sixty-four folios, the first forty-eight have been translated here. The remainder are a presentation and critical analysis of positions on afflicted mentality.

The terms "mentality" (Sanskrit manas, Tibetan vid) and "basis-of-all" (Sanskrit ālāya, Tibetan kun gzhi) in the titles refer in this context (the presentation of the
doctrines of Chittamātra or Mind-Only philosophy) to afflicted mentality (klistamanas; Tibetan: nyon mongs can kyi vid) and mind-basis-of-all (ālayavijñāna; Tibetan: kun gzhi rnam par shes pa). The titles have been translated using the more complete terminology in all instances other than the literal translations just given.

The terms "basis-of-all" and "mind-basis-of-all" are used interchangeably throughout. For the sake of clarity, the Tibetan word vid has sometimes been translated "afflicted mentality" where circumstances warrant it. However, since vid or mentality can also be unafflicted (as in the case of the mentality of the highest stages of the Mahāyāna path), 4 "afflicted mentality" and "mentality" are not interchangeable. Also, as previously discussed, vid is used in other Buddhist philosophies as a term for consciousness in general, not just one type of it. 5

Gung-tang’s text contains both systematic presentations of the topics of mind-basis-of-all and afflicted mentality and critical examinations of points raised by Dzong-ka-Ba and by writers such as 5ak-tsang (sTag-tshang She-rab-rin-chen, b. 1405), the 6a-γya-Ba Sanskritist and translator. Insofar as Gung-tang is presenting, interpreting, and defending the explanations and analyses of Dzong-ka-Ba’s seminal Ocean of the Good Explanations: An Extensive Commentary on the Difficult Topics of Afflicted Mentality
and Mind-Basis-of-All (abbreviated as Difficult Topics, ŠD, Tibetan:  Yöd dang kun gzhi'i dka' ba'i gnas rgya cher 'grel pa legs par bshad pa'i rgya mtsho), Gung-tang may be said to have written a commentary on Ðzong-ka-Đa's work. The phrase "Mentality and Basis-of-All" in the title of Gung-tang's work is a reference to Ðzong-ka-Đa's text.

Gung-tang's work is used as the textbook (Tibetan: yig cha) for the study of the Chittamātra presentation of mind-basis-of-all in Go-mang (sGo mang) College of Dre-Đung ('Bras spungs) Monastery, formerly located in the vicinity of Hlasa (Lha sa), Tibet, and now near Mundgod in Karnataka State of southwest India. It is also used as a textbook in affiliated colleges such as Go-mang Đa-Đhi-kyil (sGo mang bkra shis 'khyil), formerly in the Amdo province of Tibet, now located in the vicinity of Dehra Dun in northern India. Following the abbreviated nomenclature in use at Go-mang College, reference will be made to Gung-tang's text under the name Textbook on Basis-of-All (Tibetan: Kun gzhi yig cha) or, when the context permits, Textbook.
ESTABLISHING THE TEXT

Two editions of Gung-tang's Textbook are known to the present translator. One is found in the Hlasa edition of his collected writings recently reprinted (1972) by Ngawang Gelek in New Delhi (the "Hlasa edition"), the other is that in actual use at Go-mang College—a lithograph printing made at Buxa, India in 1965 (the "Buxa edition"). The Hlasa edition has been taken as the primary text used for this translation; since it is available in libraries in the United States through the Library of Congress PL 480 acquisition program, it is the most accessible to Western scholars. The Buxa edition, on the other hand, is difficult to obtain outside of Go-mang College.

The two editions vary only slightly and most variations are without significance. The Hlasa edition, for example, almost always reads 'ang for the Buxa's yang—'ang and yang being acceptable variant spellings of the most frequently used Tibetan conjunction. In other cases words are mis-spelled in one edition but are correctly printed in the other. Only instances of significant variance have been noted; they are indicated in notes to the translated text.

Where feasible, Gung-tang's quotations of Tibetan and Indian works have been read against the originals and significant variants noted. Because of its accessibility to scholars, and in spite of its many errors, the Peking
edition of the Tibetan Translation of Buddha's Word (bKa' 'gyur) and Translation of the Teachings (bsTan 'gyur) reprinted in Japan has been used, for the most part, as a standard reference base for canonical texts. In some cases separately printed editions of texts have been used as bases for citation.

In the cases of Gung-tang's quotation of passages from indigenous Tibetan works, the quoted material has been read against the published version of these works. Some of Gung-tang's Tibetan sources—e.g., Ren-da-wa's (Red-mda'-ba, 1319-1412) Commentary on (Asaṅga's) "Compendium of Higher Knowledge" (Kun btus ṭikka)—could not be located and so material drawn from them could not be validated.

Where Gung-tang misquotes a passage or incorrectly identifies its source, this has been noted and, if there is a significant difference in meaning, this has been discussed in an annotation.

The main criteria for reconciling variant readings have been a respecting of internal logical consistency and, where there is no logical guide, a consensus of readings. An example of the use of logical coherence as a determinant can be seen on p.239 of the translation: the Hlasa edition reads min ("is not") where the Buxa edition reads yin ("is"). The opinion of both Tibetan scholars with whom the translator studied the Hlasa text
was that the min had to be corrected to yin. Their opinions were based on the need to eliminate what would otherwise be a contradiction within Gung-tang's argument, a purely doctrinal consideration and not a linguistic one, since Gung-tang's argument at that point revolves around a subtle and unconventional use of terminology.

THE TRANSLATION

The translation of Gung-tang's text is based on the oral explanations of three contemporary Tibetan scholars: Lati Rinbochay of Gan-den Shar-dzay College (dGa’ ldan shar rtse), Denma Lochö Rinbochay of Dre-bung Lo-sel-ling (sBras spung bLo gsal gling), and Losang Denba of Dre-bung Go-mang. The translator has, in addition, received teaching on Dzong-ka-Bras's Difficult Topics from Abbot-Emeritus Yeshay Tupden of Dre-bung Lo-sel-ling and discussed portions of Gung-tang's text with the late Geshay Gendun Lodrö, formerly of Dre-bung Go-mang and the University of Hamburg.

Gung-tang's text is by no means an elementary treatment of the subject. In an effort to make his ideas more accessible to the reader, the translator has interpolated annotations into the body of the translation (indented ten spaces from the left margin). These annotations fall into
three main categories: those based on the oral explanations of the Tibetan scholars just mentioned, those based on Indian and Tibetan works of Buddhist doctrine, and those which are based on the translator's general knowledge of Buddhism and Buddhist doctrine or are cases merely of restating or unpacking Gung-tang's arguments.

The choice of whose oral explanations to use, among the five scholars mentioned above, was based on a juggling of many criteria, the most important being:

(1) authority—favoring Geshay Gendun Lodrö and Losang Denba because they presented the oral tradition of exposition of Gung-tang's own college, Dre-Եོོ་Gong Go-mang, where Gung-tang's *Textbook* is part of the curriculum,

(2) clarity—the use of a particularly clear or definitive explanation,

(3) comprehensiveness—the use of a particular explanation because it speaks to a particular point at some length, drawing out implications and explaining the issues involved,

(4) breadth of perspective—the use of an explanation which contextualizes the issue at hand, relating it to wider areas of Buddhist philosophy.

The oral explanations used in the annotations have been paraphrased rather than translated word for word.
Many of the annotations were drawn not from this contemporary oral tradition of exposition, but from Indian and Tibetan texts. The hierarchy of preference involved in choosing appropriate texts was as follows:

(1) elsewhere in Gung-tang's Textbook on Afflicted Mentality and Mind-Basis-of-All,

(2) elsewhere in Gung-tang's corpus of writings,

(3) Gung-tang's predecessors at Go-mang College who published on Chittamātra doctrine and mind-basis-of-all—his teacher Čöön-chok-jik-may-wang-boo (dKon-mchog-'jigs-med-dbang-po, 1728-1791) and his teacher's previous incarnation, Jam-yang-shay-boo ('Jam-dbyang-bzhad-pa, 1648-1721),

(4) the exposition of Chittamātrin hermeneutics by Gung-tang's student Döön-drup-gyel-tsen (Don-grub-rgyal-mtshan),

(5) the relevant writings of Dzong-ka-boo,

(6) the texts Gung-tang uses as his main sources, e.g., Asaṅga's Compendium of the Mahāyāna (Mahāyānasamgraha),

(7) other Indian and Tibetan works.
FORMAT

The annotations have been placed as a running commentary in the body of the translation. They are not set off vertically, but are indented ten spaces from the left margin, in the following manner.

The annotations are indented ten spaces.

In order to promote clarity, individual words and phrases of the translated text are underlined where they occur in an annotation discussing them.

Material quoted by Gung-tang from other works is indented three spaces from the left margin and also set off vertically thus:

Material quoted by Gung-tang in the translated text is indented three spaces and set off vertically three spaces before and after.

The pagination of the Hlasa edition of Gung-tang's text is indicated at the upper left corner of each page. Following the convention generally accepted by Tibetanists, the front side of a folio is called the "a" side and the reverse, the "b" side (viz., 8a and 8b).

Any material which is not an annotation and is not set off by brackets is a translation of Gung-tang's text, with the following exceptions. Tibetan writers usually do not indicate an author's name when quoting or citing
a work; these have been added by the translator. The chapter and section headings have been added for the sake of clarity and easy access to the text. The formal sections of the critical examinations (the "Refutations") -- the "Statement of Opinion" and "Response" -- have been so marked off by the translator. A literal reading of the Tibetan would be, "Someone might say," indicating the statement of opinion. The Tibetan zer na, "might say," or an equivalent construction, occurs at the end of the stated opinion, serving to define the boundary between the opinion and Gung-tang's response.
A FORD FOR THE WISE:
AN EXPLANATION OF THE DIFFICULT TOPICS
OF AFFLICTED MENTALITY

AND

MIND-BASIS-OF-ALL

by

Gung-tang Göń-chok-đen-Đay-drön-may

SECTION ONE:
MIND-BASIS-OF-ALL
CONTENTS
----------

GUNG-TANG'S
EXPLANATION OF MENTALITY
AND MIND-BASIS-OF-ALL

Salutation and Expression of Worship......................201

Introduction..................................................207

PART ONE:
BASIS OF ALL
AND AFFLICTED MENTALITY
IN MAHYANA TENET SYSTEMS

1 Enumerations of Consciousnesses.........................215

2 Critical Analysis of Positions on the Assertions
of Greater and Lesser Numbers of Consciousnesses.......225

3 Basis-of-All in Mādhyamika.................................239

4 The Interpretations of Chandrakīrti
and Bhāvaviveka...............................................264

5 Refutations of Đak-tsang's
 Assertions on Basis-of-All....................................281

PART TWO:
THE MIND-BASIS-OF-ALL
ACCORDING TO THE MIND-ONLY SYSTEM

6 Nature and Definition of the Basis-of-All.............320

7 Objects and Functions of the Basis-of-All.............354

8 Latencies..................................................380

9 Terminology...............................................395

10 Proofs for the Basis-of-All.............................421
PART THREE:
CRITICAL ANALYSIS
OF POSITIONS ON THE MIND-BASIS-OF-ALL

11 Basis-of-All and Tathāgata Essence.......................467
12 Basis-of-All as Mind..................................489
13 Basis-of-All as Experiencer.............................513
14 Shared Objects of Perception..........................530
15 Discrimination in the Basis-of-All......................549
16 Basis-of-All as the Self.................................561
17 Nature and Objects of the Basis-of-All.................582

PART FOUR:
CRITICAL ANALYSIS
OF POSITIONS ON THE LATENCIES

18 Infusion of Latencies in the Basis-of-All..............596
19 Critique of Interpretations of the Latencies........620
20 Relationship of the Latencies
and the Basis-of-All....................................640
21 External Seeds and Internal Seeds......................686

PART FIVE:
CRITICAL ANALYSIS
OF POSITIONS ON PROOFS FOR THE BASIS-OF-ALL

22 On Proving the Existence
of a Basis-of-All through Scripture......................705
23 Critique of Interpretations
of the First and Second Reasonings....................720
24 Critique of Interpretations of the Third,
Fifth, and Sixth Reasonings............................733
CONTENTS: GUNG-TANG TRANSLATION

25 Critique of Interpretations of the Seventh Reasoning..................750
26 Cessation of the Mind-Basis-of-All.........................757
PART ONE:

BASIS-OF-ALL
AND AFFLICTED MENTALITY
IN THE MAHĀYĀNA TENET SYSTEMS
Salutation and Expression of Worship

Namo Mañjughoṣhāya.

Homage to Mañjughoṣha.

Mañjughoṣha, or Mañjushrī, is the Buddha embodying the wisdom aspect of enlightenment. The author of this book is said to have acquired wisdom through relying on Mañjushrī; he thus became known as Gung-tang Jam-ŋay-yang, the Mañjushrī of Gung-tang.²

When the ship of intellect, [fitted out] with sails of faith,
Meets with the wind of the fragrance of his compassion
It is taken to the far shore of the sea of tenets;
May the smooth voiced Lama long sustain [me]!

The smooth voiced Lama, or Mañjughoṣha Lama, may be taken either to be Mañjushrī himself³ or to be Jam-ŋyang-shay-ba ('Jam-dbyangs-bzhad-pa)⁴ whose name means he upon whom Mañjughoṣha smiled.

Jam-ŋyang-shay-ba (1648-1721) was the writer of Go-mang College's "new" textbooks and is thus the intellectual and spiritual ancestor of the
EXPRESSION OF WORSHIP

author, Gung-tang Jam-Ｂay-Ｙang. Jam-Ｙang-shay-
Ｂa's recognized incarnation, Gön-chok-jik-may-
Ｗang-Ｂo (dKon-mchog-'jigs-med-dbang-po, 1728-
1791) was Gung-tang's own main teacher, thus
making Jam-Ｙang-shay-Ｂa his spiritual grandfather.

I bow to the feet of Jik-may-Ｗang-Ｂo
Who reigns in the kingdom of Lo-sang-drak-Ｂa of blazing
fame,
Who plays simultaneously in the great rolling waves
Of profound [emptiness] and vast [Bodhisattva deeds],
The stream of the Blessed [Buddha's] compassion,
source of help and happiness.

Jik-may-Ｗang-Ｂo is Gön-chok-jik-may-Ｗang-Ｂo,
Gung-tang's teacher. Lo-sang-drak-Ｂa (bLo-bzang-
grags-pa) is the formal name of Đzong-ka-Ｂa
(Tsong-kha-pa, 1357-1419), the founder of the
Ge-luk (dGe-lugs) Order and the author of the
Commentary on the Difficult Topics of "Afflicted
Mentality and Mind-Basis-of-All", "Đzong-ka-Ｂa"
being a nickname meaning man from Đzong-ka, a
reference to Lo-sang-drak-Ｂa's birth on the
marches of northeastern Tibet.5

Buddha's teachings are traditionally
divided into two main streams, those on the
ultimate nature of phenomena, emptiness, and its realization—the profound—and those on the altruistic activities which complement this realization—the vast. Both streams of teachings were taught by Buddha out of compassion for sentient beings.

[He is] the friend who with unimpeded effort and discernment sends forth,
Spreading it to the ends of the gem-bearing earth,
The Ganges of the sacred word of invincible [Maitreyya],

Gung-tang's teacher is here compared to Jahnu, an ancient Indian sage who is reputed to have swallowed the Ganges River. The Ganges was brought down to earth from the heavens by the yogi Bhagīratha, who inadvertently caused it to wash over Jahnu's sacrificial ground. Jahnu then swallowed its waters but, upon being supplicated by Bhagīratha, sent them forth again from his ears.⁶

Allusion is made in the first line to Asaṅga, whose name means unimpeded, and in the third line to Asaṅga's teacher Maitreya, also known as Ajita, the invincible. Invincible might also refer by extension to Asaṅga who spent years in retreat.
zealously practicing to achieve a meeting with Maitreya. 7

Seeing that the face itself of mind is the creator
Of all the infinite and varied rainbow
Of environments and beings in cyclic existence and nirvāṇa,
Realizing that realm which eradicates all elaboration:
[These] are the true meaning of the myriad texts on knowledge.

Environments and beings are, respectively, the external physical worlds and the sentient beings inhabiting them. Since an individual's environment depends on his past actions (karma), there are other environments than just that experienced by those whose past actions have resulted in human rebirth.

Elaborations are the afflictions of attachment, aversion, misconception of a self, and the like, as well as their effects, the mental and physical aggregates which constitute rebirths as a human, animal, and so on.

The texts on knowledge are the scriptures and treatises which teach Chittamātra (Mind-Only) Buddhism. Knowledge (vijñapti) is a term usually meaning consciousness or cognizer that is applied by Chittamātrins to all dependent phenomena, that is, all impermanent phenomena. This is a case of
a term usually denoting an agent (the mind) being used for the objects of that agent. Fifteen knowledges are discussed in Asaṅga's *Compendium of the Mahāyāna* (*Mahāyānasamgraha*); they include both the physical and the mental, objects and subjects, and environments and beings.⁸

The Chittamātrins hold that a phenomenon and the mind apprehending that phenomenon are not separate entities, for they both arise from a latency with the mind-basis-of-all. Thus, from their point of view the mind-basis-of-all is the creator of all environments and beings.

Although only Chittamātrins and one other Buddhist tenet system, the Yogāchāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas, assert the non-duality of apprehending subject and apprehended object, all Buddhist philosophies hold that environments and beings are created by individuals' past actions. Since actions are in essence a fulfilled intention to act through body, speech, or mind and since intention is a mental factor, from this point of view the mind can be seen to be the creator of all environments and beings. Buddha says in the *Collection of Related Teachings* (*Samyuttanikāya*):
The world is led by mind
And drawn by mind.
All phenomena are controlled
By one phenomenon, mind.  

Also, the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika scholar-yogi Chandrakīrti says in his Supplement to (Nāgār-juna's) "Middle Way" (6.89a-c):

Buddha teaches that the complex worlds
of sentient beings
And environment worlds are established
only by mind;
All migrating beings are born from actions.  

Therefore, it is fitting that one of discernment
Who has ascertained that the basis for all happiness
and suffering
Is only his own mind
And who takes up all the scriptures as the means for
taming it
Rely on this system.
Introduction

The Master Asaṅga who attained the third Bodhisattva ground is the great opener of the way for the path of Yogic Practice (Yogācāra), one of the two great chariots who clarified the teaching of the Mahāyāna in the three worlds as had been prophesied in many scriptures such as the Sūtra on the Descent to Laṅkā (Laṅkāvatārasūtra), the Mañjushrī Root Tantra (Mañjuśrīmūlatantra), and so forth.

Great chariot refers either to the person who originally and clearly defines a tenet system through writings that are widespread or to that tenet system. Here, the two great chariots who clarified the teaching of the two Mahāyāna tenet systems are Nāgārjuna, opener of the way for the Mādhyamika (and for the Mahāyāna in general), and Asaṅga, opener of the way for the Chittamātra.

Buddha Shākyamuni is held to have taught four systems of tenets during his lifetime in India: the Hīnayāna systems of Vaibhāšika and Sautrāntika and the Mahāyāna systems of Chittamātra and Mādhyamika. Since the two Mahāyāna systems did not flourish, it was necessary for Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga to again open up the ways,
the paths originally laid down by Buddha, so that these great chariots could again go forth and spread in the three worlds—the Nāga realms below the ground, the human realms on the ground, and the gods' realms above the ground.¹

Buddha prophesied the advent of Asaṅga in the Mañjuśrī Root Tantra:

A monk named Asaṅga
Will be expert in the meaning of the treatises
And will in many ways discriminate
The sūtras of definite and interpretable import.
By disposition a teacher of worldly knowledge,
He will have a nature of explaining the texts.
The achievement of the knowledge for that
Will come through the power of the mantra
Of she called Lady Messenger of Sāla;²
Through its power good mind will arise.
In order that the teaching might long remain
He will condense the essential meaning of the sūtras.
He will live one hundred and fifty years
And, his body disintegrating, will go to a country of the gods.
Having long experienced bliss travelling in cyclic existence,
This great being will finally attain enlightenment. 3

Following Asaṅga, the Knowledge School propounds that all phenomena are of just the nature of the internal, mind. Knowledge School (Vijñaptika), Mind-Only (Cittamātra), and Yogic Practice School (Yogācāra) are synonyms. Although Asaṅga opened up the way for this philosophy, the school later split into two, one following him, the other following Dharmakīrti (seventh century A.D.). Both assert the non-existence of external objects; however, only Asaṅga and his followers assert a presentation of eight consciousnesses including a mind-basis-of-all and an afflicted mentality.

To be of the nature of mind does not mean to be mind. Perceiving subject and perceived object are said not to be separate entities due to invariably being observed together as simultaneous phenomena.

Those who wish to know the final presentation of tenets of the Knowledge School should ascertain the topics mentioned in the Descent to Laṅkā Sūtra:

All the Mahāyāna is subsumed
In the topics of the five phenomena,
The natures, the eight consciousnesses,
And the two selflessnesses.\textsuperscript{4}

Here it is taught that [the bases, paths and fruits of the Mahāyāna are]\textsuperscript{5} subsumed in (1) five phenomena--name, reason, thought, suchness, and exalted wisdom of reality, (2) the three natures or characteristics, (3) the eight consciousnesses, basis-of-all and so forth, and (4) the two selflessnesses.

The three natures are the imaginary (parikalpita), the dependent (paratantra), and the thoroughly established (parinīshippana).

Imaginaries include static phenomena--those phenomena not produced from causes and conditions--and non-existents which are merely imputed to exist by conceptual consciousnesses. An instance of the latter would be an object which is imputed to exist as a separate entity from the mind perceiving it.

Dependent phenomena include all impermanent phenomena, that is, all phenomena produced from causes and conditions, be they forms such as rocks and trees, or a Buddha's exalted wisdom.

Thoroughly established phenomena are selflessnesses, for example, the emptiness, or absence, in the mental and physical aggregates
(which are dependent phenomena) of a self of persons— an absence of an imaginary self which is substantially existent in the sense of being self-sufficient. ⁶

As for the five phenomena, Maitreya's Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes (Madhyāntavibhāga) says that names are included within imaginaries, reasons and thought within dependent phenomena, and suchness and exalted wisdom of reality within thoroughly established phenomena. ⁷

Names are verbalizations, designations made to phenomena. Although these names are dependent phenomena, their bases of designation do not naturally exist as bases of designation of names. This superimposed factor is an imaginary. ⁸

Reasons are external dependent arisings such as sprouts and pots, the apprehended factors in a perceptual situation. They are the bases for naming and thus are called reasons.

Thoughts are the internal dependent-arisings, the minds and mental factors which are the apprehending factors in perceptual situations. (Note that the term "thought" [vikalpa] has a different meaning for Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, Sthiramati, and the like than it does for Dharmakīrti.)
Suchnesses are the selflessnesses which are the objects of Superiors' nonconceptual exalted wisdom.

Exalted wisdoms of reality are uncontaminated minds and mental factors realizing selflessnesses. They are included within thoroughly established phenomena only in the sense of being the so-called unmistakably thoroughly established phenomena and are not actual thoroughly established phenomena.  

The eight consciousnesses are the five sense consciousnesses—those of eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body—the mental consciousness, the afflicted mentality, and the mind-basis-of-all. All eight are dependent phenomena.

The two selflessnesses are the selflessness of persons—the nonexistence of a self which is substantially existent in the sense of being self-sufficient—and the selflessnesses of phenomena—the emptiness of phenomena naturally existing as bases of naming or determination by a thought consciousness apprehending them.  

In Asaṅga's *Compendium of the Mahāyāna* (*Mahāyānasamgraha*) there is an inclusion into ten main subjects, the basis-of-all being mentioned first as the "basis of objects of
knowledge\textsuperscript{11} since it is like a foundation for the remaining [nine subjects]:

Basis and characteristics of objects of knowledge, engaging in these [objects of knowledge],
The causes and effects of that [engagement], the varieties of [cultivation] of those [causes and effects],
The three trainings and their fruits--abandonment\textsuperscript{12}
And exalted wisdom:\textsuperscript{13} [the teachings] of the Mah\text{	ext{\v{y}}\text{\text{\v{a}}}n\text{\text{\v{a}}}}n excel.\textsuperscript{14}

Asa\text{\text{\v{a}}}ga is here listing ten topics which Buddha taught in the Mah\text{	ext{\v{y}}\text{\text{\v{a}}}n\text{\text{\v{a}}}}n and which serve to distinguish the Mah\text{	ext{\v{y}}\text{\text{\v{a}}}n\text{\text{\v{a}}}}n from the Hin\text{\text{\v{a}}}n\text{\text{\v{a}}}:\textsuperscript{15}

1. [Buddha's] teaching that the mind-basis--of all is the basis of objects of knowledge,
2. [Buddha's] teaching that the three natures--dependent, imputed, and thoroughly established--are the characteristics of objects of knowledge,
3. [Buddha's] teaching that [through realizing] knowledge-only [the Bodhisattva] enters into [i.e., realizes] the characteristics of objects of knowledge,\textsuperscript{16}
4. [Buddha's] teaching that the six perfections are the causes and effects of entering through that [i.e., realizing knowledge-only],
(5) [Buddha's] teaching that the ten Bodhisattva grounds are the varieties of cultivation of the causes and effects of that [realization of knowledge-only],

(6) [Buddha's] teaching of the Bodhisattva vow as the extraordinary ethics,

(7) [Buddha's] teaching of the meditative stabilizations such as the Heroic Journey and Sky Treasury as the extraordinary contemplation,

(8) [Buddha's] teaching of nonconceptual exalted wisdom as the extraordinary wisdom,

(9) [Buddha's] teaching that the non-abiding nirvana is the abandonment [which is] the result of those [three learnings--in extraordinary ethics, contemplation, and wisdom],

(10) [Buddha's] teaching that the three Bodies of a Buddha--the Nature, Complete Enjoyment and Emanation Bodies--are the exalted wisdom [which is] the result of that.

Therefore, with respect to ascertaining the presentation of the basis-of-all there are two sections: (1) a general exposition of the assertions of greater and lesser numbers of consciousnesses and (2) a detailed explanation of the presentation of basis-of-all and afflicted mentality.
Chapter One
Enumerations of Consciousnesses

The general exposition of the assertions of greater and lesser numbers of consciousnesses has two parts: the general meaning and an analysis of positions.

GENERAL MEANING OF THE ASSERTIONS OF GREATER AND LESSER NUMBERS OF CONSCIOUSNEESSES

In general there exist many assertions on number of consciousnesses. For, there are those who propound a single consciousness, those who assert two, mind of reality and mind associated [with mental factors], those who propound six consciousnesses, those who assert seven, the six consciousnesses which engage [objects] and the afflicted mentality, those who assert on the present occasion [of Chittamatra tenets] eight consciousness collections, and Master Samyaksatya's explanation that there are nine. As Jam-ṣyang-shay-ṣa's Great Exposition of Tenets says:

Among the Proponents of True Existence there are six: those who assert a single consciousness, those who assert two, those who assert six, those who assert seven, those who assert eight, and those who assert nine.
Proponents of True Existence are all the proponents of Buddhist tenets other than Madhyamikas—Vaibhāshikas, Sautrāntikas and Chittamātrins.² Madhyamikas, on the whole, hold that there are six consciousnesses—five sense consciousnesses and a mental consciousness.

Gung-tang discusses the assertions enumerating one, two, and nine consciousnesses below. As for the others, Jam- yab-shay-ba quotes the Kāshmirī Lakṣmi's Commentary on the Five Stages (of the Guhyasamāja Tantra) reporting that among Yogāchārins there are four parties: proponents of just one consciousness—the basis-of-all, proponents of seven consciousnesses—the five sense consciousnesses, the mental consciousness, and the afflicted mentality, proponents of six consciousnesses, and proponents of eight consciousnesses.³

The five sense consciousnesses and the sixth or mental consciousness are called consciousnesses which engage objects (pravṛttivijñāna) because they are consciousnesses individually cognizing objects.⁴ As regards the first [the assertion of a single consciousness], Jam- yab-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets
explains that there are two different systems within this category:

Among those who assert a single consciousness there are two: those who assert it to be the basis-of-all and those who assert it to be the mental consciousness.\(^5\)

There is a Hīnayānīst who asserts that there is but one consciousness, the mental consciousness. The assertion of a sole consciousness which is the mind-basis-of-all is by a Chittamātrin.\(^6\)

Ḍzong-ka-ba, following Asaṅga, mentions only the former assertion. The assertion of a single basis-of-all as one possible Chittamātra position is reported by Jam-yang-shay-ṣa.\(^7\)

The asserter in Ḍzong-ka-ba's Root Verses on Afflicted Mentality and Mind-Basis-of-All who asserts a single [consciousness] is Bodhisattva. His mode of assertion is as Ḍzong-ka-ba teaches in the Root Verses:

When the single mental consciousness moves individually To [its] supports, the six sense powers, There is merely a designation of individual names.\(^8\)

This is taught in the Foe-Destroyer Dharmatrāta's Collections of Aphorisms (Udānavarga), in the "Collection on Brahmins", through the example of a single monkey looking out through
the individual openings of a house, "Bodyless, the inner
dweller/ Ranges far but moves alone."\(^9\)

[Buddha] said in the Sūtra of the Teaching of the
Twelve Sources, "The six consciousness collections are
the mind-source."\(^1\) There the example is used of the
burning of a single lamp inside [a house] whose light
issues from individual openings.

The mind-source is the twelfth of the twelve
sources (āyatana). There are six external
sources--the objects of the eye, ear, nose,
tongue, body, and mental consciousnesses--
and six internal sources--the eye, ear, nose,
tongue, body, and mental sense powers. The
last is the mind-source, being the medium due
to which a mental consciousness apprehends an
object. It is the immediately preceding moment
of any one of the six consciousnesses.\(^1\)

Based on these passages, there is an assertion that there
exist no separate sense consciousnesses or mental factors
which are not merely imputed to individual states of
the [single] mind.

The assertion of two [consciousnesses] is spoken of
by Yün-ts'ê\(^1\) in his Great Commentary on the Sūtra
Unravelling the Thought:
The Master Bodhiruci, in dependence on the Treatise on the Establishment of Knowledge-Only (Vijñaptimitra-tasiddhiśāstra), posits two types of mind. The first of these is the mind of reality; it is the nature of suchness. Even though just this nature of suchness is called mind, it has no objects of observation.

The second he explains as the mind of similar association—it is in similar association with mental factors such as faith, attachment, and so on.

Bodhiruci (Tibetan: Bo-dhe-le'u-ji), an Indian who arrived in China in 508 A.D., translated the Sūtra on the Descent to Laṅkā, the Sūtra Unravelling the Thought, and Vasubandhu's Explanation of the "Sūtra on the Ten Bodhisattva Grounds" (Daśabhūmīvyākhyāna). Chinese scholars who took the latter as their main subject of study were known as the Ti-lun school. One of the central concerns of this school was whether the mind-basis-of-all is identical with suchness and thus pure, or distinct from it and thus defiled. This may be to what Yüan-ts'ē alludes when he asserts Bodhiruci to be a proponent of a two consciousness system.

The mode of asserting nine [consciousnesses] is also spoken of there [in Yüan-ts'ē's commentary]: 
The Master Samyaksatya, in dependence on the treatise called *Treasury of Ascertainments* posited\(^{18}\) the meaning of nine consciousnesses . . .

The seventh is the appropriating consciousness. It apprehends\(^{19}\) the eighth [consciousness] as I and mine; it possesses the obstructions of only the afflictions. It does not [involve] conception [of a self] of phenomena; it definitely does not achieve Buddhahood.

The eighth is the mind-basis-of-all; it is of three types. The first\(^{20}\) is the essential basis-of-all; it has the function of achieving Buddhahood. The second is the fruiotional basis-of-all; it observes the eighteen constituents . . .

The third is the thoroughly afflicted basis-of-all. Observing the object Suchness, four types of pride arise. It conceives [a self] of phenomena, it does not conceive [a self] of persons.

The ninth [consciousness] is the stainless consciousness; it is the nature of suchness . . .\(^{21}\)

The meaning of these passages is as was said by Düzongka-Śa in the *Root Verses on Afflicted Mentality and Mind-Basis-of-All*:

Asserting the seventh\(^{22}\) as the appropriating consciousness,
An explanation of three bases-of-all,
And the ninth as stainless consciousness
Is the system of Samyaksatya.\textsuperscript{23}

The Indian scholar Yang-dak-den-\pada (Tibetan: Yang-dag-bden-pa), whose name, translated back into Sanskrit, would be Samyaksatya, is mentioned in two connections in Tibetan literature on Mind-Only, as the propounder of a system of nine consciousnesses and as a Chittamātrin who preceded Asaṅga. His works are unknown in Tibetan translation.

Given that the source for his propounding nine consciousnesses is the Tibetan translation of the Korean Yūan-ts'ê's Chieh-shen-mi-ching-su,\textsuperscript{24} an extensive commentary on the Sūtra Unravelling the Thought, the assumption may be made that Samyaksatya was an Indian whose views were well known in the Chinese Yogāchāra tradition. On this basis he could tentatively be identified as Paramārtha, one of the great translators of Indian Chittamātra texts into Chinese. Paramārtha was renowned in China for having held the existence of nine consciousnesses. His set of nine corresponds with the nine reported by Yūan-ts'ê here as the system
of Samyaksatya. Yang-dak-den-ba—"correct truth"—could be seen as a free rendition of Paramārtha, "ultimate object."

The identification of Paramārtha with the Samyaksatya to whom our text refers falls apart if Samyaksatya is held, as the Tibetan historian Tāranātha (b. 1575) does, to have lived prior to Asaṅga. Paramārtha arrived in China in 546 A.D., whereas Asaṅga lived during the fourth century.

It is unlikely, however, that the pre-Asaṅga Samyaksatya asserted nine consciousnesses. For, if he did and this assertion was of enough renown to be reported in China more than two hundred years after Asaṅga, surely Asaṅga himself would have reported and refuted it, yet he does not.

According to Jam-yang-shay-ba's commentator Nga-wang-bel-den (Ngag-dbang-dpal-mdan, b. 1797), the nine consciousnesses described here correspond with the eight consciousness system as follows. The seventh or appropriating consciousness (ādānavijñāna) is similar to the afflicted mentality. The essential basis-of-all is like the mind which can achieve Buddhahood. The fruitional basis-of-all is the mind-basis-of-all
as it is known in the eight consciousness system. The thoroughly afflicted basis-of-all is like the mind which conceives a self of phenomena. 29

As for the ninth consciousness, Yūan-ts'ê says that this stainless consciousness (amala-vijñāna) is both suchness and the mind realizing it. 30

The mode of positing eight collections of consciousness will come later. The remaining [assertions of six and of seven consciousnesses] are easy to understand; therefore, I will not write about them.

Consciousnesses are called collections of consciousness because there are many instances of each. For example, there are eye consciousnesses apprehending pots, eye consciousnesses apprehending blue, eye consciousnesses apprehending yellow, and so forth.

Among the four Buddhist schools of tenets, almost all Vaibhāshikas, Sautrāntikas, and Mādhyamikas assert only six consciousnesses—the five sense consciousnesses and a sixth or mental consciousness. Chittamātrins who follow Dharmakīrti—known as Chittamātrins Following Reasoning—also assert only these six consciousnesses.
Thus the only major school asserting an enumeration other than six are the Chittamātrins following Asaṅga—the Chittamātrins Following Scripture—and they, for the most part, assert eight consciousnesses. 31
Chapter Two
Critical Analysis of Positions on the Assertions of Greater and Lesser Numbers of Consciousnesses

FIRST REPUTATION (4a.1)

Statement of Opinion. It is said that although there exist many higher and lower schools of tenets in which six collections of consciousness are asserted, those three which assert eight, nine, and one are only Chittamātrin.

Rebuttal. It follows that this is not correct, because the single proponent Bodhisattva is a Hīnayāna sectarian. This in turn follows because (1) he is not a Mādhyamika and (2) he is not a Chittamātrin.

There are only two Mahāyāna tenet systems, Chittamātra and Mādhyamika. Therefore, a Buddhist philosopher who is not a proponent of one of these two would have to be a proponent of one of the two Hīnayāna systems, Vaibhāṣhika or Sautrāntika.²

The first of these two reasons, namely that single proponent Bodhisattva is not a Mādhyamika, is established because Jam-yang-shay-ba says in his Great Exposition of Tenets, "Among the proponents of true existence [there are six]: those who assert a single consciousness . . ."³ and because of the explanation below that this [single propo-
nent Bodhisattva] is an instance of that [proponent of
ture existence who asserts a single consciousness.]  
Gung-tang's teacher, Ğon-chok-jik-may-wang-bo,
defines a Mādhymika as "a person propounding
Buddhist tenets who asserts that there are no
truly existent phenomena, not even particles."  
The second reason, namely that single proponent Bodhi-
sattva is not a Chittamātrin, is established because
this [single proponent Bodhisattva] existed previous
to Asaṅga's Compendium of the Mahāyāna (Mahāyānasamgraha)
and the like.

Gung-tang thus holds that prior to Asaṅga--
the opener of the way for the chariot of Chitta-
mātra--there were no Chittamātrins. This point
is in dispute, some, such as Tāranātha, holding
that there were such early Chittamātrins.  

Chittamātrins themselves claim that Buddha
Shākyamuni was a Chittamātrin and taught other
philosophical views in order to lead beings to
the correct Mind-Only view. Gung-tang, being
a follower of Dzong-ka-ba, is a Prāsaṅgika-
Mādhyamika and holds the correlative view
that Buddha taught Prāsaṅgika not as a doctrine
requiring interpretation but as his own final
thought.
4a.3 POSITIONS ON CONSCIOUSNESSES

[This in turn follows] because Asaṅga in his Compendium of the Mahāyāna states at length the assertion, the source and so forth [for this position] which takes as example [the mental factor] intention's receiving the name bodily action when it operates bodily and verbal action when it operates verbally. Asaṅga says:

There is one who thinks that it is the mental consciousness itself which receives such and such a name when it arises through such and such a [sense power] support—just as intention is called bodily and verbal action.⁸

Actions (karma) are considered at least by Sautrāntikas and Chittamātrins to be species of the mental factor intention (cetanā). Asaṅga defines intention as "mental action, a conditioning of the mind; it acts to cause the mind to enter into virtue, non-virtue, or neutrality."⁹ Mental actions are intention itself; physical and verbal actions are called intended actions, for they are caused by the mental factor intention.¹⁰

Although it is explained that in general there are two [systems of] propounding a single [consciousness, one asserting only a mind-basis-of-all, the other asserting
only a single mental consciousness], this [single pro-
ponent Bodhisattva] is one who does not assert a basis-
of-all. For, Asvabhāva teaches in his Connected Expla-
nation of (Asaṅga's) "Compendium of the Mahāyāna" (Mahā-
yānasamgrahopanibandhana) at the point of discussing the
assertion of this [single proponent Bodhisattva].¹¹

For him there does not exist another consciousness,
such as the so-called mind-basis-of-all, which is
not the mental consciousness.¹²

There exist, however, reasons why [Asaṅga] does not
explicitly refute [this position] in the Compendium of
the Mahāyāna, those reasons being (1) that the passages
proving eight [consciousness] collections serve as
implicit refutations of this and (2) that the following
passage in Asaṅga's Compendium of Ascertainment (Viniś-
cayasamgrahāṇī) serves as a common refutation of both
former positions:

Whatever nonassertions of mental factors there are are
incorrect. Why? Because the five would not be cor-
rect; because states of that would be fallacious;
because there would not exist different activities;
because of being in contradiction with scripture.¹³
A former position (pūrvapakṣa) is usually an opponent's position in debate.

Here the two former positions being refuted are the two positions asserting the existence of only one consciousness: the assertion of a single mental consciousness and the assertion of a single mind-basis-of-all.\textsuperscript{14} Since Asaṅga is presenting a refutation of those who hold that mind is substantially existent whereas its accompanying mental factors are not,\textsuperscript{15} these reasonings can also be said to refute the position of asserting only a single consciousness without asserting substantially existent mental factors.\textsuperscript{16}

Moreover there exists a way in which this [passage from the Compendium of Ascertainment] refutes [both former positions], for [they are] refuted [there] by [reasonings] such as the following. (1) If there were no mental factors, the five aggregates of feeling and so forth would not be feasible.

The five aggregates (skandha) are forms, feelings, discriminations, compositional factors, and consciousnesses. Mental factors—feelings, discriminations, and a large proportion of compositional factors—and conscious-
nesses are cognitive. If there were but a single consciousness and all other cognitive phenomena were designations for states of this single consciousness, the presentation of five aggregates in scripture and exegesis would be incorrect. 17

(2) The so-called imputation [of various names] to the individual states of that [single consciousness] would retain the same fault in that except for [being] mere imputations, they would be unable [to perform] the actual functions of mental factors and sense consciousnesses.

The term substantially established (dravyasiddha) or substantially existent (dravyasat) is used in different contexts with different meanings. Here, both Gung-tang and Jam-yang-shay-'ba posit a substantial existence which refers to impermanent phenomena, things able to perform functions. The opposite of substantial existence, imputed existence, refers in this case to designated or imputed phenomena such as the various states of the hypothetical single consciousness—mental factors and sense consciousnesses—are held to be. 18

This argument differs from the first argument in that here the appeal is to reason
rather than to canonical works held as authoritative by all Buddhists.

(3) If [they] were able to perform the functions of [mental factors and sense consciousnesses], then feelings and the like and sense consciousnesses and the like would be substantially established entities, and in such a case propounding a single mind would be senseless.

Asaṅga's third argument is that if mental factors (or, in this case, consciousnesses and mental factors other than the one consciousness) did not exist apart from the substantially existent consciousness(es), then these mental factors would not have different activities.

Gung-tang interprets this as being indicative of the implied counter-entailment of the second argument. The entailment in the second argument is: whatever is a mere imputation (that is, not substantially existent) is necessarily unable to perform a function. Concomitant with every entailment is a counter-entailment, in this case: whatever is able to perform a function is necessarily substantially existent.

(4) If a single mind were asserted there would arise the fault of contradiction with many scriptural passages such as the teaching, "Mind is possessed of desire."
Other teachings are the presentation of attachment and so forth as fetters of the mind, cases of speaking of simultaneously arisen mental factors such as feelings, discriminations, and intentions, and the presentations of a mixture of feeling, desire, intention, and consciousness. ¹⁹

SECOND REFUTATION (4b.5)

Statement of Opinion. It follows that this proponent of a single [consciousness] is a proponent of Mahāyāna tenets because the asserter of a lesser number [of consciousnesses] to which Dzong-ka-Ba refers in his Commentary on the Difficult Topics of Afflicted Mentality and Mind-Basis-of-All is the proponent of a single [consciousness] when he says:

I will state the Mahāyāna Masters' assertions of greater and lesser numbers of consciousnesses according to the explanation of the Chinese Master Yüan-ts'ē. ²²

Rebuttal. It follows that this is incorrect, because although Dzong-ka-Ba states the explanation of the Chinese Great Commentary on the Sūtra Unravelling the Thought with respect to assertions of six, two and nine [consciousnesses], on the occasion of [his discussion of] the propo-
nent of a single [consciousness] no part [of Yüan-ts'ê's commentary] is explained.

THIRD REFUTATION (5a.1)

Statement of Opinion. Only Hīnayāna sectarians are proponents of a single consciousness.

Rebuttal. It follows that this is extremely incorrect, because (1) among the proponents of a single consciousness there exists a proponent of a single consciousness which is the basis-of-all and (2) there does not exist a Hearer sectarian who asserts a basis-of-all.

The first reason—that among the proponents of a single consciousness there exists a proponent of a basis-of-all—has already been proven (see above, pp.216-217).

If [you say that] the second reason, namely that there does not exist a Hearer sectarian who asserts a basis-of-all, is not established, then it [absurdly] follows that the subject [a Hearer sectarian who asserts a basis-of-all] holds that all environments and beings arise from the maturation of latencies which are with the basis-of-all because there exists a reason for accepting a basis-of-all.

The state of opinion does not admit the second reason, holding instead that there does not exist a Hearer sectarian who asserts a
basis-of-all. Gung-tang then states an absurdity that follows as a consequence of this position: the Hearer who asserts a mind-basis-of-all must hold that all environments and beings arise from the maturation of latencies with the basis-of-all. This consequence follows because those who assert the existence of a basis-of-all have a reason for so asserting, namely that although external objects do not exist, consciousnesses and their objects arise due to the maturation of latencies which are held by the basis-of-all.

Latencies (vāsanā) are potencies or seeds deposited with the eighth consciousness, the mind-basis-of-all, by the five sense consciousnesses, the mental consciousness, and the afflicted mentality. They are specific potencies for the creation of either a subsequent consciousness of similar type or a particular effect such as a fruition.23 The mind-basis-of-all of a subsequent rebirth is a fruition; environmental phenomena are empowered effects.

Chittamātra is distinctive in asserting that because objects such as forms and so forth occur as single substantial entities with the
consciousnesses apprehending them they are not external objects. That they occur as a single entity with their perceivers is due to both the object and the perceiving subject arising from the activation, or awakening, of a latency.  

The other Buddhist systems assert that although phenomena arise due to latencies, they do not exist as external objects. For them, the object is one of the causes of the consciousness apprehending it and is, therefore, a different entity. For the Chittamātrins subject and object are simultaneous; observation of this invariable simultaneity leads to realization of the non-duality of subject and object.

That there is a reason for asserting a basis-of-all necessarily entails that [whoever asserts a basis-of-all] holds that all environments and beings arise from the maturation of latencies which are with the basis-of-all because Đzong-ka-ñe in his *Essence of the Good Explanations* (*Legs-bshad-snying-po*) teaches:

Again, due to the essential of asserting external [objects the Prāśangikas] do not posit a basis-of-all. For if one did assert [a basis-of-all] one would have to assert [the non-existence of external objects] as is shown in Maitreya's *Differentiation of the Middle*
and the Extremes (Madhyāntavibhāga):

Consciousnesses which perceive objects,
The sentient, self, and knowledges arise;\(^{25}\)
They have no [external] objects.
Because there are no [apprehended objects]
There are no [apprehending minds].\(^{26}\)

A student of Gung-tang's, Dön-drup-gyel-tsen
(Don-grub-rgyal-mtshan), comments on this
passage as follows:

Texts such as Maitreya's Differentiation of
the Middle and the Extremes (Madhyāntavibhāga)
which teach the existence of a basis-of-all
teach the non-existence of external objects.
The purpose of asserting a basis-of-all is
to prove that although there exist no external
objects, cognizers perceiving external objects
arise through the activation of latencies with
the basis-of-all for the perception of exter-
nal objects. If external objects exist, then
cognizers perceiving external objects arise
from those same external objects as their
own effects.\(^{27}\)
Thus, Dzong-ka-βa's saying that the assertion of external objects necessarily entails not asserting a basis-of-all carries with it the counter-entailment that the assertion of a basis-of-all necessarily entails the non-assertion of external objects. This is Gung-tang's argument.

The consciousnesses to which the quotation from Maitreya's Middle and Extremes refers are

(1) the mind-basis-of-all perceiving the five objects—forms, sounds, odors, tastes, and tangible objects—and the sense powers (the sentient), (2) the afflicted mentality perceiving the existent self—the basis-of-all—and (3) the six engaging consciousnesses which perceive knowledges—the impermanent phenomena that are their respective objects. Because these perceived objects do not exist externally to the minds perceiving them, there is no duality of apprehended object and apprehending subject.  

If above you accept that a Hearer sectarian who asserts a basis-of-all asserts that all environments and beings arise from the maturation of latencies which are with the basis-of-all, it follows that [this Hearer sectarian] accepts that all phenomena are of only the nature of an internal mind because of what you have accepted.
If you accept this [namely that a Hearer sectarian who asserts a basis-of-all accepts that all phenomena are of only the nature of the mind], then it follows that [this Hearer sectarian] is not a Hearer sectarian because of not asserting external objects. There is pervasion [i.e., whoever does not assert external objects is necessarily not a Hearer sectarian] because propounding objects but not asserting external objects is a joke and because the definition of a Hearer sectarian is a person propounding Buddhist tenets who accepts external objects, adhering to their true existence.

**Propounding objects** means asserting truly existent external objects. Nga-wang-sel-den explains that proponents of Buddhist tenets may be divided by way of whether they accept or reject truly existent phenomena into, respectively, Proponents of True Existence and Proponents of Entitylessness. The latter are the Madhyamikas, while the former--the Proponents of True Existence--may be further divided into Proponents of Objects and Proponents of Mind-Only (Chittamātrins). The Proponents of Objects--Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas--assert truly existent external objects; the Proponents of Mind-Only assert that mind is truly existent but objects external to those minds are not.²⁹
Chapter Three
The Basis-of-All in Mādhyamika

FIRST REFUTATION (5a.5)

Statement of Opinion. Among Mādhyamikas [literally, "middle-way-ists"] there does not exist an assertion of more than six collections of consciousness.

Response. It follows that this is not right because on this occasion [of Chittamātra] whoever is a Mādhyamika must be a Chittamātrin.

All Buddhist schools of tenets teach a middle way (madhyama) avoiding the two extremes of permanence and annihilation or existence and non-existence. In the case of the Chittamātrins, the wrong views of these two extremes are (1) the misconception that dependent phenomena, for example, minds, and thoroughly established phenomena, for example, selflessnesses, do not naturally or truly exist and (2) the misconception that dependent phenomena do naturally exist as they are mistakenly imagined to exist.²

Like all Buddhist philosophers, Chittamātrins hold that their middle way is the only correct way to avoid falling to one of the
extremes. They say that the so-called Mādhyāmikas, more accurately called Niḥsvabhāvavādins (Proponents of Entitylessness), fall to an extreme of non-existence by devaluing dependent phenomena and thoroughly established phenomena when they say that all phenomena do not truly exist.  

Even if one considers [Mādhyāmikas] to be Proponents of Entitylessness, it follows that [the non-existence among Mādhyāmikas of an assertion of more than six consciousnesses] is not correct, because [Mādhyāmikas] such as the Master Abhayākaragupta at the time of composing his Ornament for the Thought of the Sagacious Buddha (Muni-matālamkāra) asserted eight collections of consciousness. This is clear in the Ornament for the Thought of the Sagacious Buddha.

Abhayākaragupta (12th century) is a Yogāchāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyāmika⁴—a Svātantrika who asserts, conventionally, a knowledge-only empty of external objects in accord with the Yogāchāra doctrine.⁵

Although this school of Mādhyāmika, first clearly set forth by Shāntarakṣita (8th century) is called Yogāchāra-Svātantrika, it differs markedly from Yogāchāra in that for it (1) nei-
ther dependent phenomena such as consciousnesses nor thoroughly established phenomena, such as emptinesses of duality of subject and object, exist truly even conventionally and (2) there are no consciousnesses, no mind-basis-of-all and afflicted mentality, separate from the six consciousnesses. 6

Thus, Yogāchāra-Svātantrikas are not "Yogāchāra-Mādhyamikas" who assert both Yogāchāra and Mādhyamika. Rather, they are Mādhyamikas—and therefore rejectors of true existence—who admit, conventionally but not ultimately, emptiness of external objects.

Nga-ḥang-ḥel-den rejects Gung-tang's and, by implication, Đzong-ka-ḥa's interpretation that Abhayākara's Ornament for the Thought presents an assertion of a mind-basis-of-all. Nga-ḥang-ḥel-den says that although Abhayākara presents an explanation of eight consciousnesses, it is not his own position, for he also refutes the non-existence of external objects in accordance with Chandrakīrti's reasonings. Further, he explains that, according to Abhayākara, the main passage presenting mind-basis-of-all in the Sūtra Unravelling the Thought was taught for
the sake of guiding trainees (and not as a passage of definitive meaning). He explains that, according to Abhayākara, "afflicted mentality" and "mind-basis-of-all" are merely designations for the sixth or mental consciousness when it is mistakenly superimposing a self and insofar as it is the basis for the depositing of latencies for birth, death, and so forth. Nonetheless, [Abhayākaragupta] did not assert a basis-of-all in the latter part of his life. Therefore Ďzong-ka-Ęa says in his commentary, Illumination of the Thought (dGongs-pa-rab-gsal):

It is clear that Shāntarakṣita as well did not assert a mind-basis-of-all; Abhayākaragupta is like him.

Ďzong-ka-Ęa's teaching in his Stages of Mantra (sNgags-rim) that [Abhayākaragupta] asserted a basis-of-all is based on the earlier part of his life. For, Ďzong-ka-Ęa teaches in the Lamp Illuminating (Naṅgārjuna's) "Five Stages" (Rim-ṅga-gsal-sgron), "I said different things due to his composition in earlier and later [parts of life]."
SECOND REFUTATION (5b.3)

Statement of Opinion About That. It follows that proponents of Entitylessness do for the most part accept a basis-of-all, because (1) [a basis-of-all] is accepted by Nāgārjuna, and by Ārya Vimuktiśena, and Haribhadra, and so on and (2) [a basis-of-all] is accepted by Chandra-kīrti.

Nāgārjuna (born ca. 150 A.D.) is the opener of the way of the Mādhyamika system. Ārya Vimuktiśena (ca. 400 A.D.) and Haribhadra (9th century) are both of that branch of Mādhyamika first clearly set forth by Shāntarakṣitita and known as Yogācāra-Svātantrika. Yogācāra-Svātantrikas reject true existence of any phenomenon while holding conventionally that there are no external objects and that phenomena are naturally existent.9

The first reason, that Nāgārjuna, Ārya Vimuktiśena, and Haribhadra accept a basis-of-all, is established because Nāgārjuna says in his Commentary on "The Mind of Enlightenment" (Bodhicittavīvarana):

Just as on an ocean,10 wood
Though without mind moves about,
In like manner mind-basis-of-all
Moves about in dependence on the body.11
Also, Ārya Vimuktiṣena says in the Lamp for the Twenty-five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra (Pañcavimśati-sāhasrikāloka), "[Phenomena] are subsumed in ten objects of knowledge--mind-basis-of-all and so forth." Again, the master Haribhadra teaches in his Commentary on the Difficult Points of the [Sūtra on the Perfection of Wisdom called] "Verse Collections of Jewels" (Sāmacayagāthāpañjikā), "The latencies of all phenomena depend on the mind-basis-of-all."

The second reason, namely that Chandrakīrti accepts a basis-of-all, is established because Chandrakīrti says in the Supplement to the Middle Way (Madhyamakāvatāra):

A basis-of-all exists, the person exists
And only these aggregates exist--these teachings
Are for those who will not realize
Such an extremely profound meaning.12

[Chandrakīrti's composition of this passage necessarily entails that he accepts a mind-basis-of-all] because if it is mere existence which is negated by that [passage] without distinguishing among the basis-of-all, the person, the aggregates and so forth, then it would be necessary to assert that the teachings of the existence of the two, the person and the aggregates, are not literal, and, therefore, that these two do not exist.
Mere existence here means any kind of existence whatsoever. Denying or negating this of something means that it exists in no way whatsoever.

Gung-tang will argue below that Chandrakīrti's thought is that whereas a basis-of-all does not exist in any manner, the existence denied to the person and the aggregates is inherent, or natural existence. Rejecting inherent existence does not imply a rejection of existence in its other forms. According to Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikas such as Chandrakīrti (7th century) non-inherently existent phenomena do conventionally, or imputedly exist.

However, if it is inherent existence [which is negated] not only would negation of the inherent existence of the basis-of-all not refute the basis-of-all, [the basis-of-all] would, in fact, be understood to exist conventionally.

Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikas assert that no phenomenon inherently, truly, or naturally exists but that this does not mean that phenomena do not exist at all. Phenomena do conventionally exist as imputations and dependent arisings.

Response. These claims are refuted in the order of their statement as follows.
CONCERNING NĀGĀRJUNA

It follows that the first, the passage from Nāgārjuna's Commentary on "The Mind of Enlightenment", does not describe the basis-of-all because the teaching there under the name "basis-of-all" refers to the mental consciousness. This reason follows because (1) [the basis-of-all] is explained in a passage in that same [treatise] which says, "At that time it grasps an existence,"\textsuperscript{13} as the mind which makes the connection to a new life and (2) it is taught again and again in other texts of the Superior father Nāgārjuna and his spiritual son Āryadeva\textsuperscript{14} on the Guhvasamāja Tantra (Guhvasamājatantra) that both the death mind and the birth mind are the mental consciousness.

In the course of living one lifetime and going to the next a sentient being is said to go through four "existences" or states of being: (1) birth existence, (2) prior existence, (3) death existence, and (4) intermediate existence. Birth existence is the mind at the instant of making the connection between lives; it is that mind which is the appropriator of the aggregates of a new life. Prior existence is the remainder of the life up until the time of death. Death existence is the mind during the last period of death, just before it separates from the body. Intermediate existence is the state
between the death mind of one lifetime and the birth mind of the next.  

Dzong-ka-ba contextualizes the quotation from Nāgārjuna's Commentary as a response to those who think that without a truly existent mind there could be no transmigration from life to life. Just as wood bobbing about on water has no mind but appears to move purposefully, so this basis-of-all appears to truly exist but does not. Chittamātrins who assert a mind-basis-of-all invariably assert a truly existent mind-basis-of-all; thus, the "mind-basis-of-all" of Nāgārjuna's stanzas is not the one asserted by Chittamātrins.

Gung-tang makes the point that Nāgārjuna's explanation of the "mind-basis-of-all" as that which grasps an existence--i.e., that which connects to a new life--means that it is the birth mind. Since the birth mind is explained in other commentaries by Nāgārjuna on the same text, the Guhyasamāja Tantra, to be the mental consciousness, so it must be taken here. Again, if one thinks that [what Nāgārjuna said in his Commentary] does not have to be in accord with [what he explained in his other commentaries on the Guhyasamāja
[Commentary on "The Mind of Enlightenment" comments on the meaning of the stanza on the mind of enlightenment spoken by Vairochana in the second chapter of the Guhyasamāja Root Tantra. Hence the name [Commentary on "The Mind of Enlightenment" is given; it is a secondary text of the Guhyasamāja.

Moreover, it follows that it is not correct that the [Commentary on "The Mind of Enlightenment" teaches a basis-of-all; for it is explained there that external objects exist. [This reason follows] because it says in that [Commentary on "The Mind of Enlightenment"]:]

A knower cognizes an object of knowledge;
Without objects of knowledge,
knowers would not exist...\(^{17}\)

Heeding Nāgārjuna's argument that whereas a mind-basis-of-all appears to truly exist it does not, someone might think that it would still be suitable to posit, as a separate entity from the first six consciousnesses, a non-truly existent mind-basis-of-all which was a support for all pure and afflictive phenomena. However, even the illusion-like existence of such a basis-of-all would entail that external objects
did not exist, that forms, sounds, and so forth would be perceived merely due to latencies having matured on this basis-of-all. Thus, Chandrakīrīti establishes that without an external object there can be no internal consciousness.\(^1\)\(^8\)

This instruction concerning the equal existence or non-existence of objects and minds appears literally in Chandrakīrīti's *Supplement to the Middle Way* (*Madhyamakāvatāra*):

> If [external] materiality does not exist, do not hold the existence of minds.
> Again, if minds exist, do not hold the non-existence of [external] materiality.\(^1\)\(^9\)

[This is] from Kay-drup's (*mKhas-grub*) *Thousand Doses Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate: A Treatise Thoroughly Clarifying the Nature of Profound Emptiness* (*sTong-thun-skal-bzang-mig-'byed*).

**CONCERNING ĀRYA VIMUKTISENA AND HARIBHADRA**

It follows that neither Ārya Vimuktisena nor Haribhadra accept a basis-of-all because if they did accept it they would have to posit that it is an illustration of the person, and they do not so posit.

> For Buddhist philosophers a person (*pudgala*), in the broadest sense, is "a being which is imputed to one or any of the five aggregates."
Person, self (atman), and I (aham) are mutually inclusive. All Buddhist tenet systems agree that this person is an imputed phenomenon, but there is disagreement on what this means.

According to Gung-tang most Vaibhāshikas and Sautrāntikas say the person is the mere collection of the aggregates. Chittamātrins say that this imputed person has to be findable among the mental and physical aggregates which are its bases of designation, and that the illustration of the person is the mind-basis-of-all. Svātantrika-Mādhymikas say that the person both has to be posited by appearing to a faultless mind which is unmistaken about it and has to be established from the side of the basis of designation. The Prāsaṅgika-Mādhymikas say that the person is a mere imputation which does not exist from its own side and cannot be found if sought. 21

Those who posit a mind-basis-of-all must then assert this as the illustration of the person because it is the basis for bondage and liberation. It is the basis for bondage in cyclic existence, for birth and death, by being the appropriator of a new physical life support at the moment of birth-existence (in
Western terms, the moment of conception). It is the basis both for liberation and bondage by being the basis in which latencies are infused and carried from life to life, providing a continuity between virtuous actions and pleasant effects, and non-virtuous actions and unpleasant effects.

This reason follows because Haribhadra says in his Lamp for (Maitreya's) "Ornament for the Realizations" (Abhisamayālamkārāloka), "Just due to continuity the so-called 'person' is one." Also, Ćūn-chok-jik-may-wang-bo teaches in his Lamp for the Scriptures and Reasonings of the Mādhyamika (dbU-ma-lung-rigs-sgron-me):

Both Ārya Vimuktisena and Haribhadra assert the continuum of the mental consciousness aggregate as an illustration of the self.22

Consciousnesses, being impermanent phenomena depending on causes and conditions, are momentary. They arise and cease moment by moment, each moment of consciousness being one cause of the immediately succeeding moment. A continuum is the designation made to such a stream of moments of consciousness.

For Haribhadra and other Yogāchāra-Svātantrikas the person is a designation made to the
continuum of the mental consciousness. The moments of consciousness which make up the continuum are called the consciousness which is the illustration of that person. 23

And Gyal-tsap teaches in his Ornament for the Essence of (Haribhadra's) Commentaries (rNam-bshad-snying-po-rgyan):

In the Master Haribhadra's Great Commentary [i.e., his Lamp for (Maitreyanātha's) "Ornament for the Realizations"] . . . there does not exist even a partial explanation of a basis-of-all which is a different entity from the six consciousness collections.

Therefore, it is not necessary that all cases of the designation of the term "basis-of-all" refer to an actual basis-of-all. For the foremost Kay-drup (Mkhas-grub) says in his Explanation of the Hevajra Tantra (brTags-gnyis-rnam-bshad): 24

Although it is indeed the case that the designations "basis-of-all" and "afflicted mentality" are mentioned in many tantras and books of the great adepts, there exist many applications of the designation "basis-of-all" to the nature of phenomena (dharma) and "afflicted mentality" to the energy winds (vāyu); thus one should not be confused by mere words.
The nature of phenomena (dharmatā) is a synonym of emptiness and selflessness. "Basis-of-all" refers especially to that which is the basis-of-all leading to Buddhahood, the Buddha essence (tathāgatagarbha). For Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikas the Buddha essence is the emptiness or lack of true existence of the mind.25

The energy winds (vāyu, prāṇa) are the physical basis for the various minds; they are metaphorically called the mounts of minds. They are sometimes called "afflicted mentality" because just as this mentality causes an individual to move about in cyclic existence through its mistakenly taking the mind-basis-of-all as a self and generating afflictions, so the energy winds move minds to external phenomena.26
CONCERNING CHANDRAKĪRTI

Further, it follows that it is unnecessary to explain the meaning of the passage from Chandramīrti's Supplement to the Middle Way (Madhyamakāvatāra) as you did. For, there are many systems of tenets in which a basis-of-all is asserted and many in which one is not asserted; this [passage in Chandramīrti] moreover, is an occasion on which he disputes [the assertion of a basis-of-all]. Therefore, when it is explained that the teaching of [the existence of a basis-of-all] is not literal, one understands that the basis-of-all is completely non-existent. However, because there is no proponent of tenets who does not assert a person and aggregates, even if the literality of [the teachings of the existence of the person and the aggregates] is rejected, one understands that they do not exist inherently; for there is no qualm that they would be utterly non-existent.

It follows, again, that it is not necessary to explain the meaning of the passage from Chandramīrti's Supplement as you did because the underlying thought [of Buddha's teaching that the aggregates and so forth exist] is interpreted to be that the aggregates and so forth are merely conventionally existent, whereas Chandramīrti speaks of the basis-of-all in his Commentary on the "Supplement" in terms of another meaning [of the word ālayavijñāna}
(mind-basis-of-all)] without taking it in that way [as conventionally existent]:

One should understand that it is just emptiness which is indicated by the term ālayavijñāna, for [emptiness] abides as the nature of all things.\textsuperscript{27}

Jam-āyang-shay-ba explains that because the nature of all things which makes enlightenment possible is emptiness—referring specifically to the Tathāgata essence, the emptiness of the mind—this emptiness is known as ālayavijñāna. In this case, he says, vijñāna does not mean consciousness or mind, but that which is to be taken well to mind. Thus, the emptiness of the mind, the Tathāgata essence, is the basis of all and is to be taken well to mind.\textsuperscript{28}

[Further] it [absurdly] follows, according to you, that the illustrious Chandrakīrti asserts inherently existent actions and effects. For, the meaning of the passage [in Chandrakīrti's Supplement] which says "Therefore, although a basis-of-all does not exist, there is potential for [the arising of an effect from an action]" may not [according to you] be explained as "although in general a basis-of-all does not exist." Rather, it must be explained as "although ultimately a basis-of-all does
not exist, [ultimately] actions and effects exist." The entailment is parallel [to a former entailment]. The three circles!

According to the theory advanced by Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, and their commentators--the theory followed by Tibetan scholars--a logical proposition must operate in three modes to be correct. These three modes are:

(1) the "property of the subject" (paksādharma)--the reason must exist as a predicate of the subject,

(2) the positive entailment (anvayavyāpti)--the reason must necessarily entail that which is being proven or clarified,

(3) the counter-entailment (vyatirekavyāpti)--the negative of that being proven or clarified must necessarily entail the negative of the reason. 29

For example, if one considers the proposition, "The subject; a sound, is impermanent because of being caused," the three modes are:

(1) being caused exists as a predicate of sound--that is, sound is caused,

(2) being caused necessarily entails being impermanent--whatever is caused is necessar-
ily impermanent,
(3) not being impermanent necessarily entails not being caused—whatever is not impermanent is necessarily not caused.

Returning to Gung-tang's argument, we find not instances of correct propositions but rather a series of absurdities stated as consequences of the opponent's opinion. Stated in standard form, Gung-tang is saying "It absurdly follows with respect to the subject, Chandrakīrti, that he asserts inherently existent actions and effects because the passage in his Supplement ("Therefore, although a basis-of-all does not exist, there is potential [for the arising of an effect from an action]) must be interpreted as meaning that although ultimately a basis-of-all does not exist, ultimately actions and effects do exist."

The entailment here is the following: the reason—that Chandrakīrti must be interpreted to be saying that although ultimately a basis-of-all does not exist, ultimately actions and effects do exist—necessarily entails that Chandrakīrti asserts inherently existing actions and effects. For the Prāsaṅgikas, ultimate existence and inher-
ent existence are mutually inclusive. This entailment is parallel to the opponent's originally asserted entailment that since it is not the mere existence of a basis-of-all, person, and aggregates that Chandrakīrti is negating, but rather the inherent or ultimate existence, it necessarily follows that all three, without differentiation, do conventionally exist and that Chandrakīrti asserts a conventionally existent basis-of-all.

Thus, Gung-tang adduces the three circles, having trapped his opponent in an absurdity that cannot be accepted. The three circles are:

(1) the opponent's being forced to accept the reason—that Chandrakīrti must be interpreted to be saying that although ultimately a basis-of-all does not exist, ultimately actions and effects do exist,

(2) the opponent's acceptance that this reason necessarily entails Chandrakīrti's asserting inherently existent actions and effects,

(3) the opponent's desire not to accept this entailed consequence but to continue to hold its opposite—that Chandrakīrti does not assert inherently existing actions and effects.
In Chandrakīrti's system the potential for the arising of an effect of actions is in the cessation of the action itself. Prāsaṅgikas hold that this cessation is impermanent, that a continuum of cessations, themselves arising and ceasing every moment, connects an action with its future effect.31

It follows, therefore, that Prāsaṅgikas [such as Chandrakīrti] do not accept a basis-of-all because they accept external objects. That Prāsaṅgikas accept external objects necessarily entails that they do not accept a basis-of-all; for, Ózong-ka-Śa teaches in his Essence of the Good Explanations, "If a basis-of-all is posited, one must teach that [phenomena are] empty of being external objects."32

The counter-entailment that is invariably concomitant with this statement is that if one teaches that phenomena are not empty of being external objects (i.e., that external objects exist), then one must not posit a basis-of-all.

The previous reason [namely that Prāsaṅgikas accept external objects] is established. For, it is established (1) by the previously quoted explanation of the equal existence or non-existence33 of objects and minds (see above, p. 249) and (2) by [Chandrakīrti's saying in his Supplement, 6.37cd]:
"Just as from empty reflections and the like/ There arise knowers [which have] their aspects . . ."\textsuperscript{34}

The previously quoted explanation cited as the first reason here is this passage from Chandrakīrti's Supplement:

If [external] forms do not inherently exist, do not hold the existence of minds.
Again, if minds exist, do not hold the non-existence of [external] forms.\textsuperscript{35}

Ḍzung-ka-Ḍa explains this as follows:

If, when analyzing phenomena with a reasoning searching for the object of imputation, you consider that external forms do not exist, you must also realize that, since there is then no logical proof for the existence of both external and internal, internal minds do not exist. Moreover, when you consider that minds exist, you must then realize that forms also [exist]. For, both are renowned in the world.\textsuperscript{36}

This reason follows [i.e., these two passages establish the Prāsaṅgika assertion of external objects] because these [passages] explain that visible form and the eye conscious-
ness apprehending it are cause and effect. This reason necessarily entails that these two passages establish the assertion of external objects because whatever are cause and effect are necessarily not a single substantial entity.

Two types of relations are admitted in the Ge-luk presentation of Buddhist philosophy, those of singleness of entity and causality. The two are contraries since singleness of entity entails simultaneity of the two phenomena involved and causality entails a sequence over time.

Substantial entities (dravya) are those entities which are impermanent phenomena. All causes and effects are necessarily impermanent. In general, following the Sautrāntika presentation which is basic to the Ge-luk philosophical lexicon, for two things to be a single substantial entity means for them to appear to an unmistak taken cognizer, i.e., a direct perceiver, and to appear without individuality to that cognizer. According to Chittamātrins, however, for two phenomena to be a single substantial entity means for them to be produced by the cause of a single latency. 37 An example of this relation-
ship would be that of the two, a visible form and an eye consciousness apprehending it. Chittamātrins hold that a subject and its object are one substantial entity and not cause and effect.

It follows, therefore, that it is incorrect to claim as a profound quintessential instruction revolving around personal experience that in the Prāsaṅgika system the non-existence of external objects is propounded.

It may be the case that Gung-tang is referring to the Śa-gya-ba scholar Ďak-tsang (sTag-tshang, b. 1405) who holds that Prāsaṅgikas present explanations of mind-only without refuting them. 38

For, the basis for the error in that [claim] is in not knowing how to posit external objects from the point of view of the mere appearance of objects but thinking that if [external objects] exist they must exist like the external objects which are imputed by Hīnayāna sectarians to exist able to stand by themselves.

Gung-tang explains elsewhere that Hīnayāna philosophers hold a pot, for instance, to be an external object from the viewpoint of its existing able to stand by itself as a basis for determination by thought, within being a composite
of minute particles. This is what Vasubandhu rejected when he changed his allegiance from Sautrāntika to Chittamātra. It is, however, not the way in which the Prāsaṅgikas accept the existence of external objects.39 For them phenomena are mere imputations by thought, where the term "mere" refutes any existence of an object from its own side. An external object is a mere appearance, for instance, an appearance of a visible form to a sense consciousness.\textsuperscript{40}

Sautrāntikas hold that external objects are composites of minute particles which if analyzed and sought can be found. Prāsaṅgikas posit external objects within the context of mere appearances for minds which do not examine or analyze them.\textsuperscript{41}

Therefore, Kay-drup's Thousand Doses Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate (sTong-thun-skal-bzang-mig-'byed) says:

Both Sautrāntikas and Prāsaṅgikas are alike in their mere assertion of external objects; the ways in which they assert [them], however, are completely different.\textsuperscript{42}

When one understands this, it is definitely a profound quintessential instruction.
Chapter Four
The Interpretations of Chandrakīrti and Bhāvaviveka

FIRST REFUTATION (7b.2)

Statement of Opinion. The two, Chandrakīrti and Bhāvaviveka, accord in the manner in which they interpret the underlying thought of the sūtra passages which teach the existence of a basis-of-all.

Bhāvaviveka (6th century) and Chandrakīrti (7th century) are the founders of the two branches of Mādhyamika—Śvetāntrika and Prāsaṅgika, respectively. Since Bhāvaviveka preceded Chandrakīrti in refuting key Chittamātra tenets such as the mind-basis-of-all, it might be felt that the two agree in their rejection of the sūtras which are the source for the assertion of the mind-basis-of-all.

Response. It follows that this is not correct, because Bhāvaviveka does not hold such sūtras to be sūtras whose meaning requires interpretation. This reason in turn follows because Bhāvaviveka holds that there are no such sūtras at all. This reason in turn follows because Gön-chok-jik-may-wang-Bo says in the Lamp for the Scriptures and Reasonings of Mādhyamika:
Chandrakīrti explains that even though these sūtras teach such [a basis-of-all], the underlying thought is emptiness. Bhāvaviveka . . . explains that these sūtras do not teach a basis-of-all, but rather allude to the fact that the states of a single consciousness act as the basis of cyclic existence and nirvana. 3

One can speak of a general or "mere" consciousness which pervades all past, present, and future consciousnesses in an individual's continuum. It accumulates the actions which cause birth in cyclic existence; it abandons the obstructions and so forth and thus is conducive to nirvāṇa. Thus, cyclic existence and nirvāṇa are designations for states of this general consciousness. 4

The reasoning of this quote entails that Bhāvaviveka holds that sūtras teaching a basis-of-all do not exist, for [Bhāvaviveka] asserts that none of the uncommon Chittamātra tenets are even the ordinary meaning of sūtra but rather that they are inventions of Asaṅga. For, Bhāvaviveka holds that there does not exist a sūtra which teaches the non-existence of external objects, this being the reason [why there are no sūtras teaching a mind-basis-of-all]. He holds that there does not exist a sūtra which teaches the true existence of the dependent and the thor-
oughly established and the non-true existence of imaginary phenomena.

The uncommon Chittamātra tenets are those it does not share with the other Mahāyāna tenet systems:

(1) the assertion of three natures according to the Sūtra Unravelling the Thought wherein imaginaries are non-truly existent, but dependent and thoroughly established phenomena are truly existent,

(2) the existence of eight consciousnesses including a mind-basis-of-all and an afflicted intellect,

(3) the non-existence of external objects,

(4) the existence of three final vehicles, that is, the possibility of attaining final enlightenment as a Hearer Foe Destroyer (arhat), a Solitary Realizer Foe Destroyer, or a Buddha.⁵

The ordinary meaning of a sūtra is its literal reference. Bhāvaviveka claims that not only is the existence of a basis-of-all, for instance, not the main reference of those scriptural passages Chittamātrins adduce to establish it, the existence of a basis-of-all is not even the literal meaning of those passages.⁶
Since Asaṅga is not setting out to found his own system but rather to explain Buddha's philosophy as set forth in the *Sūtra Unravelling the Thought*, to say that Chittamātra tenets are his own invention is not an accolade.

The first reason, that Bhāvaviveka holds that there does not exist a sūtra which teaches the non-existence of external objects is established because even Chandrakīrti asserts that the passage in the *Sūtra on the Ten Grounds* (*Daśabhūmika*) which says, "These three realms are mind-only," does not refute external objects.

The source of the term chittamātra (mind-only) is the scriptural passage in which Buddha says, "These three realms are mind-only." The three realms making up cyclic existence are the Desire Realm, Form Realm, and Formless Realm.

Chittamātrins accept this passage as a sūtra of definite import establishing the non-existence of external objects. Mādhyamikas also accept the literality of this sūtra but read its meaning in a different way. They deny that "mind-only" refutes external objects. Thus, not all scriptural passages of definite meaning for Chittamātrins are for Mādhyamikas passages whose literal meaning must be interpreted. Bhāvaviveka and Chandra-
kīrti accord on the literal acceptability of this passage.

In the Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) "Middle Way" Chandrakīrti explains this passage within the context of its setting in the Sūtra on the Ten Grounds. He shows that, in fact, Buddha was specifically refuting the mistaken notion that there is a creator, such as a permanent self, apart from the mind. Conventionally speaking, only the mind is the basis of the twelve links of dependent-arising that culminate in birth and death in the three realms of cyclic existence.12

Further, Bhāvaviveka holds that even the passage in the Descent to Laṅkā Sūtra (Laṅkāvatāra) which says, "External appearances are not existent . . .," does not refute external objects. For, Žong-ka-ba says in his Essence of the Good Explanations:

[Bhāvaviveka] holds that the following passage [from the Descent to Laṅkā Sūtra] does not refute the external:

External appearances are not existent;
Mind appears variously
In the likeness of bodies, enjoyments and places,
Thus13 I speak of mind-only.14
Therefore, it would seem that [Bhāvaviveka] holds the refutation of external [objects] to be the meaning of no sūtra\textsuperscript{15} whatsoever. This should be examined.\textsuperscript{16}

In the sūtra passage bodies are the physical sources of perception—the eye and so forth. Enjoyments are the five objects—forms, sounds, odors, tastes, and tangible objects. Places are the world of the environment.\textsuperscript{17}

As Bhāvaviveka interprets the meaning of this passage, it would have to be translated:

External appearances are not existent;
Mind perceives variously
The likenesses of bodies, enjoyments and places.
Thus, I speak of mind-only.

To him, external appearances not existing means that there is no cognizer which perceives without being produced in the aspect (ākāra) of an object; mind-only means that cognizers are produced in the aspects of their objects, the aspect being like a shadow cast by the object.\textsuperscript{18}

Ęzong-ka-Ęa says that whether or not Bhāvaviveka really asserts that no sūtra refutes external objects should be examined. Gung-tang
In order to classify a particular scriptural passage as one whose meaning requires interpretation (neyārtha) three things must be demonstrated: Buddha's underlying thought in teaching it (dgongs gzhi), Buddha's purpose in teaching it (dgos pa), and the damage to its explicit teaching (dngos la gnod byed) by reasoned argument. According to the Prāsaṅgika view, the underlying thought here is that all phenomena are established through their mental
images. The purpose is to overcome physical attachment, that is, attachment to forms and so forth.\textsuperscript{22} Its literal meaning—the non-existence of external objects—is damaged or refuted by the argument that if objects do not exist, neither do minds (Supplement 6.92a, see p.249). Chandrakīrti adduces the following passage from the same sūtra to demonstrate a scriptural refutation of the literal acceptance of this teaching:

\begin{quote}
Just as a physician gives medicines
To a patient for his illness,
So the Buddhas teach
Mind-only to sentient beings.\textsuperscript{23}
\end{quote}

Buddha taught Mind-Only not because it was his own system but for the sake of followers who would be aided by this teaching.\textsuperscript{24} He taught the non-inherent existence of external objects of knowledge as a means for later realizing the emptiness of all phenomena. For some trainees it is easier to realize the non-inherent existence of minds when the non-inherent existence of objects has first been realized.\textsuperscript{25}
The second [reason, that Bhāvaviveka holds that there exists no sūtra which teaches the true existence of the dependent and the thoroughly established and the lack of true existence of imaginary phenomena] is established because Ďzung-ka-Ďa teaches in his Essence of the Good Explanations:

Bhāvaviveka says that the Yogāchārin interpretation of the meaning of the teaching of the three characteristics in the Sūtra Unravelling the Thought (Samdhinirmocana-sūtra) is not the meaning of the sūtra. He introduced an explanation of it as Madhyamika.26

In the Sūtra Unravelling the Thought Buddha says that he taught that all phenomena are without entityness on account of the threefold entitylessness of phenomena—imaginary characteristics being entityless in nature, dependent characteristics being entityless in production, and thoroughly established characteristics being ultimately entityless. Imaginary characteristics are posited nominally and conceptually, without abiding naturally; thus, they are entityless in nature. Dependent characteristics arise due to causes and conditions which are other than themselves and do not arise by their own power;
they are, therefore, entityless in production. Thoroughly established characteristics—entitylessness—are ultimates but are without an ultimate entity insofar as they are not the self which is the entity negated in entitylessness.\textsuperscript{27}

Bhāvaviveka says this is not the meaning of the sūtra, that these negations must be qualified. Imaginaries are ultimately entityless in nature; dependent characteristics are ultimately entityless in production; and thoroughly established characteristics are ultimately entityless.\textsuperscript{28} Unlike Chittamātra, the Svātṛ Nikāya system of Bhāvaviveka affirms natural existence conventionally for all existents but denies it ultimately. Chittamātra differentiates among existents, holding that some—imaginaries—do not naturally exist and others—dependent phenomena and thoroughly established phenomena—do naturally exist. For the Chittamātrins natural existence (\textit{svalaksanāsiddhi}) and true existence (\textit{satyasiddhi}) are mutually inclusive. Svātṛ Nikāya deny only true existence both conventionally and ultimately in all phenomena.\textsuperscript{29}
Also, Jam-\(^{-}\)yang-shay-\(^{-}\)a teaches in his Root Verses for the Great Exposition of Tenets:

Because they are refuting an agent [other than mind], Non-existence of apprehended objects is not the import of the Sūtras.\(^{30}\)

According to Bhāvaviveka's Sautrāntika-Svātantrya system the term "mind-only" in both sūtra passages--the Descent to Lāṅkā and the Ten Grounds--merely refutes the existence, outside of the mind, of an agent which accumulates actions or of an enjoyer experiencing the fruition of actions. Therefore, the non-existence of an external apprehended object is not the import of these sūtra passages.\(^{31}\)

SECOND REPUTATION

Statement of Opinion. The meaning [of Bhāvaveka's not accepting the refutation of external objects as the meaning of any sūtra]\(^{32}\) is that this [non-existence of external objects] is neither the final nor the main meaning of Buddha's thought.

Response. This is the talk of a fool because there is no question\(^{33}\) of whether [Bhāvaviveka] accepts the non-exis-
tence of external objects as the final meaning which is the underlying thought of sūtra and thus the foremost Đzong-ka- بدا is not saying that it is necessary to examine this.

For Bhāvaviveka the teaching of the non-existence of external objects is not a meaning taught in sūtras. Therefore, it is not even the literal or ordinary meaning of the sūtras in question, let alone their final or main meaning.

Also, if it were as you say, the meaning of the passage from Kay-drup's Thousand Doses (quoted above, p.270) would be that Chandrakīrti says that although the teaching of mind-only in the Descent to Lankā Sūtra is the final meaning of Buddha's thought, it cannot be asserted. Thereby he would be involved in an action of abandoning the Doctrine. For, if it were not taken thus, one would be unable to explain a difference between the assertions of Chandrakīrti and Bhāvaviveka.

Following the explanation of Kay-drup given above (p.270), the Lankā passage is said by Bhāvaviveka not to be a refutation of external objects but is said by Chandrakīrti to refute external objects and teach mind-only, a teaching which, for Chandrakīrti, cannot be accepted literally and must be interpreted to demonstrate
Buddha's underlying thought.

According to the stater of opinion being refuted here, Bhāvaviveka denies only that mind-only is the final meaning of this sūtra—the implication being that he asserts mind-only to be the ordinary meaning. Thus, in order to preserve the explanation that Bhāvaviveka and Chandrakīrti differ in interpreting this sūtra, one must assume that Chandrakīrti would then be asserting not that mind-only is the ordinary—secondary—meaning of the sūtra but that it is the final—main—meaning. He would then be saying that although mind-only is Buddha's own thought, it cannot be accepted, and thus he would be deprecating or abandoning Buddha's Doctrine.

Likewise, with respect to [Bhāvaviveka's] saying that [the positing of] the three characteristics according to [the Chittamātra] system is not the meaning of sūtra, there is the following. If this means that it is not the main [meaning], then the following differentiations, by Dzong-ka-śa and Jam-yang-shay-śa, [of Shāntarakshita's from Bhāvaviveka's system] would be senseless. Dzong-ka-śa's Essence of the Good Explanations says, on the occasion of [explaining the assertions of] Shāntarakshita and so on, "... positing [the three characteristics] as the meaning
of Sūtra within differentiating the components [main and ordinary meanings].” Jam-ṣyang-shay-ba's Root Verses for the Great Exposition of Tenets says:

The meaning of Sūtras such as the Heavily Adorned (Ghanavyūha), the Unravelling the Thought and the Descent to Laṅkā

Has two components, the main and the ordinary,

[which are] respectively the systems of the Madhyamika and Chittamātra. Both quoted passages refer to the Yogāchāra-Svātantrika explanations in Kamalashīla's Illumination of the Middle Way (Madhyamanakālōka) of the teaching of the three natures seen in sūtras such as the Unravelling the Thought. Kamalashīla (8th century) was the main disciple of Shāntarakshita.

According to Shāntarakshita and his followers, sūtras such as the Heavily Adorned, Unravelling the Thought, and Descent to Laṅkā have two components, that is, there are two ways to read the meaning expressed in them: (1) as an explanation of the entitylessness or non-true existence of all phenomena for those trainees--the main trainees--who are able to realize the
non-true existence of all phenomena and (2) as a presentation of the non-existence of external objects, with mind being truly existent, for those trainees—ordinary or secondary trainees—who are for the time being unable to realize completely non-true existence and must be led there in stages. According to the Yogāchāra-Svātantrika interpretation the first way to read the meaning is that asserted by Mādhyamikas, the second that asserted by Chittamātrins. 37

For, even Shāntarakshita does not accept [the Chittamātra position on the three characteristics] as the main meaning of the teaching and [according to you] even Bhāvaviveka accepts [the Chittamātra position] as the ordinary meaning of the teaching. [You] have accepted this reason.

The opinion being criticized here is the assertion that when Bhāvaviveka says that the Chittamātrin presentation of the three characteristics is not the meaning of sūtra, he is merely saying that it is not the main meaning of the teaching. This implies that for him it is the ordinary meaning of the teaching, making his position indistinguishable from Shāntarakshita’s. In fact, Bhāvaviveka holds that the uncommon Chittamātrin assertions—those on the three
characteristics, the non-existence of external objects, and so on—are in no way the meaning of any sūtra passage.

That being the case, [Bhāvaviveka] explains\textsuperscript{38} that since there exists no sūtra with regards to which these—the Chittamātra positions on the three natures and the non-existence of external objects—are taken to be the ordinary meaning of the teaching, [the Chittamātra assertions] are only figments of Asaṅga's mind. For [Bhāvaviveka] explains that since all topics requiring interpretation which are taught in sūtra have the sole purpose of guiding disciples and since the explanation [that all phenomena are] mind-only denies [the evidence of] direct perception, [the explanation of mind-only] merely leads disciples down the wrong path and otherwise has no purpose.

It appears that [Bhāvaviveka] adduces faults [with respect to Chittamātra assertions] the like of which he does not adduce even on the occasion of refuting Vaibhāṣikas, Sautrāntikas, and the like. He says in his \textit{Lamp for Nāgārjuna's \textquoteleft\textquoteleft Wisdom\textquoteright\textquoteright} (Prajñāpradīpa):

\begin{quote}
Taking up in the beginning [the tenets of] Knowledge-Only and then later giving them up\textsuperscript{39} is like first anointing oneself with mud and then bathing; better to keep one's distance from the beginning.\textsuperscript{40}
\end{quote}
Further, he says in his *Blaze of Reasoning* (Tarkajvalā):

The masters Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, and so forth otherwise interpret the significance of the Mahāyāna. Shameless, unembarrassed, not understanding the meaning, still they pride themselves on being wise, claiming that they do understand.

Although there are many amusements for children such as whether or not [Bhāvaviveka] accepts four tenet systems, I will nevertheless not write of them.
Chapter Five
Refutation of Đak-tsang's Assertions on Basis-of-All

Statement of Opinion. Đak-tsang the Translator (sTag-tshang-lo-tsā-ba) says that there are no Chittamātrins who do not assert a basis-of-all.

Šhay-rap-rin-chen (Shes-rab-rin-chen, b. 1405), known as Đak-tsang the Translator, was a scholar of the Ša-γya (Sa skya) Order born toward the end of Đzong-ka-ba's lifetime. He is renowned for his criticism of Đzong-ka-ba's presentation of Buddhist philosophy. Jam-γyang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets is in large part concerned with refuting these criticisms and justifying Đzong-ka-ba's system.

Đak-tsang here refuses to distinguish between the Chittamātrins following Asaṅga (the Followers of Scripture) and those following Dharmakīrti (the Followers of Reasoning) in terms of whether they do or do not accept an eight consciousness system including a mind-basis-of-all.

He says in his Establishing Freedom from the Extremes Upon Understanding All Schools of Tenets (Grub-mtha'-kun-shes):
Although it is renowned here in snowy Tibet
That among Chittamātrins there are both those who accept
a basis-of-all and those who do not,
[The basis-of-all] is clearly described by the
two brothers [Asaṅga and Vasubandhu],
And despite no clear mention by certain followers,
Still there are none who mention scripture or
reasoning\(^1\) which refute [a mind-basis-of-all]:
Thus it is difficult to be a valid Chittamātrin
and not accept a basis-of-all.\(^2\)

Those renowned to accept a basis-of-all are
Asaṅga and his younger brother Vasubandhu; the
certain followers of Asaṅga who do not explicitly
teach a mind-basis-of-all are Dignāga, Dharmakīrti,
and so forth.\(^3\)

Although Dignāga (5th century) and Dharmakīrti (7th century) are Chittamātrins Following
Reasoning and are not included among followers
of Asaṅga's Five Treatises on the Levels, they
may be considered followers of Asaṅga in that
they follow his lead in rejecting external
objects.\(^4\) Dignāga, additionally, is held by
Tibetan historians to be a direct disciple of
Vasubandhu.\(^5\)
In his commentary on this, Đak-tsang espouses the following. If a basis-of-all did not exist, a basis for presenting all of cyclic existence and nirvāṇa would not exist.

Đak-tsang's *Ocean of Good Explanations*, a commentary on his own *Understanding All Tenets*, says:

Without a stable continuum of awareness [such as the mind-basis-of-all] cyclic existence and nirvāṇa would not exist. For, cyclic existence is set up through actions and afflictions and nirvāṇa is set up through cultivation of the path. When the six consciousnesses are produced as virtue, sin ceases, and vice versa. If that which ceases were to deposit a latency or a seed on the other manifest one, virtue and sin would not be separate.

If the sin (i.e., the non-virtuous mind) were, when ceasing, to deposit a latency with a virtuous mind in order to insure its later continuation or its fruition, non-virtue would be both dependent on virtue and coexistent with it (see pp. 150ff.). For, during the period of infusion of the latency the two would be present together.
Since the mental consciousness does not have a thoroughly enduring continuum and [thus] is not suitable as a basis for latencies, there would be no basis for infusion [of those latencies].

As the Ocean of Good Explanations says:

Because the six consciousnesses are discontinuous during mindless states, the latencies established by thoroughly afflicting and purifying phenomena would also not continue and, therefore, subsequent [fruitions] would be causeless.8

Mindless states are such states as fainting, dreamless sleep, meditative absorption of cessation, and so on.

Further, if one explains that the sūtras renowned as the five Chittamātrin sūtras, the Descent to Lāṅkā, the Unraveling the Thought, and so forth are sūtras whose meaning requires interpretation, one cannot be a full-fledged Chittamātrin.

According to Ḍak-tsang the sūtras renowned as the five Chittamātrin sūtras are the Descent to Lāṅkā and the Sūtra on the Heavily Adorned teaching the Mind-Only presentation of bases (i.e., phenomena), the Sūtra Unravelling the Thought and the
Sūtra on the Ten Grounds teaching the paths, and the Sūtra on the Buddha's Ground (Buddhabhūmisūtra) teaching the fruits. However, he also cites a variant list teaching the special Chittamātra tenets: the Sūtra Unravelling the Thought for its exposition of the three natures and hermeneutics, the Laṅkā, Ten Grounds, and the Questions of Kāshyapa Sūtra (Kaśyapapariprc̣cāsūtra) for the teachings of mind-only, and the Heavily Adorned, Laṅkā, and Unravelling the Thought for their presentation of mind-basis-of-all.¹⁰

[Moreover, if there were no basis-of-all] there would be no suitable base for the achievement of the path of mantra.¹¹ Also, the phrase "Except for the basis-of-all, there is no arising of another [consciousness of similar type]" actually occurs [in Dharmakīrti's Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compendium on Prime Cognition" (Pramāṇavarttika)].¹² Furthermore, not only actual Chittamātrins but those who are compatible as well, Shāntarakshita, Ārya Vimuktisena, and Haribhadra, also speak at length [of a basis-of-all].

The Yogāchāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas—Shāntarakshita and so forth—accord in part in their terminology with actual Yogāchārins.¹³

Dak-tsang also says the following:
The widespread lack of clarity [as regards the existence of a basis-of-all] in Dignāga's Compendium on Prime Cognition (Pramāṇasamuccaya) and in Dharmakīrti's seven treatises is because explanations relating to [a basis-of-all] have little relevance there.\textsuperscript{14}

Dharmakīrti's seven treatises on prime cognition are:

(1) Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compendium of Prime Cognition" (Pramāṇavarttika),
(2) Ascertainment of Valid Cognition (Pramāṇavinścaya),
(3) Drop of Reasoning (Nyāyabindu),
(4) Drop of Reasons (Hetubindu),
(5) Analysis of Relations (Sambandharpārīkṣa),
(6) Proof of Other Continuums (Sāmtānāntara-siddhi),
(7) Reasoning for Debate (Vādanyaya).

The first three are his major works, the remainder are ancillary.\textsuperscript{15}

\textbf{Response.} All these "proofs" are merely facsimiles of reasonings.

(1) It follows according to you that it is not correct that explanations relating to [a basis-of-all would have] little relevance in the context of Dharmakīrti's seven treatises.
The referent of "you" throughout this section (pp.286ff.) is Dak-tsang.

For, [according to you] all presentations of cyclic existence and nirvāṇa [in the Chittamātra system] must be made within the context of a basis-of-all, and it is not the case that these [seven treatises of Dharmakīrti] are treatises which investigate the teeth of crows rather than teaching about afflicted phenomena and the stages of purification. Moreover, [explanations relating to a basis-of-all would have] great relevance to [the explanations of] the non-existence of external objects and the presentation of the subtle verbal conventions of this system of [Dignāga and Dharmakīrti].

Those who assert a mind-basis-of-all explain that the non-existence of external objects is due to phenomena arising from the maturation of latencies that are with the basis-of-all. Similarly, the presentation of subtle verbal conventions here would be the presentation of cyclic existence and nirvāṇa, even in the face of the non-existence of external objects, by means of their establishment due to the activation of latencies with the mind-basis-of-all.16

Also, the fact that Dharmakīrti teaches the features of the different types of minds such as the divisions and
so forth of direct prime cognizers and facsimiles of direct cognizers but does not connect them with the basis-of-all is itself a correct sign that he does not accept that [basis-of-all]. 17

(2) It follows also that it is not the case that [as you claim (see pp. 283-84)] the mental consciousness does not have a stable continuum [in Dharmakīrti's system] because [it] is referred to as a stable support in the second chapter of Dharmakīrti's Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compendium on Prime Cognition" (Pramāṇavarttika) in the context of proving omniscience: 18

If [mind] the support were not stable
[Its] qualities would not increase;
Hence, such a nature is not the case. 19

Dharmakīrti is seeking to establish the possibility of limitlessly improving the mind and attaining omniscience. Unlike physical exercise, he says, the improvement of the positive qualities of the mind does not rely on constantly renewed exertion but can continue without again working to achieve what has already been achieved and can proceed without limit. 20 The qualities that could not increase if this were not so are
great compassion, wisdom, and so forth. They can increase because from time without beginning until Buddhahood each sentient being has a stable support for them in the factor of clarity and awareness of the mental consciousness.21

(3) It follows also that it is not the case that [as you have claimed (see p. 284)] the consciousnesses engaging [objects] are not suitable as bases for latencies. For [Dignāga] explains that there exist with preceding [eye consciousnesses] apprehending blue the potencies or latencies for generating later [consciousnesses] as ones having the aspect of the objects [of the former consciousnesses. This latency] is the observed-object-condition of the subsequent [consciousness]. As Dignāga says in his Examination of Observed Objects (Ālambanaparīkṣa):

Because potencies establish [later minds in the aspect of the object] they are serially22 [the observed-object-conditions of the later minds].23

Buddhist philosophers of the tenet systems studied in Tibet in general assert that a particular consciousness is produced from three conditions: the observed-object-condition (ālambana-pratyaya), the empowering condition (adhipati-pratyaya), and the immediately preceding condition (samanantara-
pratyaya). Chittamātrins add a fourth, the cooperative condition (sahakāri-pratyaya) or aggregation of the other three conditions and the mental impulse which is the wish to have a particular cognition.\textsuperscript{24} For all except the Chittamātrins, the observed-object-condition of an eye consciousness perceiving blue is the external object blue, the empowering condition is the eye sense power, and the immediately preceding condition is an immediately preceding moment of consciousness. These three are simultaneous and immediately precede the eye consciousness perceiving blue.

Chittamātrins assert that blue and the eye consciousness perceiving it are not cause and effect but are simultaneous. They say that one can speak of the object blue as an appearing observed-object-condition or an imputed one, the actual one being a potency for the generation of an eye consciousness in the aspect of that object.\textsuperscript{25}

Moreover, [the latencies] exist infused with [the consciousnesses]; it is not the case that they adjoin it but are not connected.
Notwithstanding Gung-tang's statement here, it is said that an eye consciousness is not a basis for the infusion of latencies but rather a basis for holding latencies. The basis for the infusion of latencies is that consciousness which is the illustration of the person; in systems such as Dignāga's this is the sixth or mental consciousness, whereas in Asaṅga's it is the mind-basis-of-all. 26

Further, in his Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Examination of Observed Objects" Gung-tang indicates that both that potency which is the observed-object-condition and that potency which is the empowering condition are deposited with the mental consciousness as opposed to the sense consciousnesses. 27 This explanation would seem to be at odds with the statement in the present text that observed-object-conditions are potencies existing with a preceding consciousness apprehending blue, unless this consciousness is a mental consciousness.

[It further follows that it is not the case that the engaging consciousnesses are not suitable as bases for latencies] because of the presentation of the sense powers in this [Chittāmatra] system, a presentation not
shared with other systems. Dignāga's *Examination of Observed Objects* says:

The sense power acting in cooperation [with the object] is an entity
Having the capacity\textsuperscript{28} [to produce a consciousness] and is also a sense power.\textsuperscript{29}

This is set forth, as an opponent's position, in Chandra-kīrti's *Supplement to the Middle Way* (6.62cd):

That potency which is the support of the [eye] consciousness
[The world] understands\textsuperscript{30} as the material sense power of the eye.\textsuperscript{31}

In Dignāga's system the empowering condition of an eye consciousness, the eye sense power, is that potency which is with the mental consciousness specifically for the production of an eye consciousness. Although the non-Chittamātrin systems imagine it to be physical, it is merely a potency.\textsuperscript{32}

Not only that, there are numerous reasonings [in the texts of the Chittamātrins Following Reasoning] which do not accord with the system in which a basis of all is asserted. For instance, Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on*
(Dignāga's) "Compendium on Prime Cognition" teaches a reasoning refuting simultaneity of cause and effect:

[The cause being at that time] non-existent, previous
to the cause] there is no [causal] potency,
Later [at a time simultaneous with the effect]
there is no application [of help to the effect];
Thus all causes exist previous [to their effects].

This reasoning demonstrates that if the object of the infusion [i.e., the latency] and the infuser [which establishes the latency there] exist together, then
(1) the establisher of [the latency] does not exist previous to that latency and (2) once the latency already exists [it] will not need to be established.

Dzong-ka-Ba's Root Verses on Afflicted Mentality and Basis-of-all defines the latencies infused in the basis-of-all as follows:

The supported, the seed basis-of-all,
Is the potencies deposited
By the infusers in the basis of infusion
When they are approaching cessation.

When it is about to cease, an infusing consciousness deposits a seed or potency with the basis of infusion--the mind-basis-of-all.
Further, the reasoning [through which Dharmakīrti] refutes the principal [posited by] the Sāmkhyas [demonstrates] that if all seeds always exist in the basis-of-all then it follows that all types of environments and beings will always arise.

The Sāmkhyas are one of the six main non-Buddhist philosophies of India. They assert twenty-five categories of phenomena of which the first, the person or self, is neither cause nor effect and the second--the principal (pradhāna) or nature (prakṛti)--is the cause of the remaining twenty-three. Thus, because the Chittamātrin mind-basis-of-all is that which has all seeds (sarvabājaka) it is like the principal in being the locus of the potencies for the arising of all phenomenal transformations.

(4) You have said (see p.284) that if one explains the sūtras which are the primary sources for Chittamātra--the Descent to Laṅkā Sūtra, the Sūtra Unravelling the Thought and the like--to be Sūtras whose meaning requires interpretation, then one is not suitable to be a Chittamātrin. This is itself a fallacy. There are passages in those [Sūtras] such as those differentiating between the three characteristics in regards to true existence or its lack which are the main [passages] marking out [these
Sūtras] as the wheel of the doctrine of good discrimination. Thus, if one explains these to be passages whose meaning requires interpretation, one is not suitable to be a Chittamātrin.

The Sūtra Unravelling the Thought divides Buddha's sūtras concerned with the correct view of reality into three categories referred to as "wheels of doctrine." The first wheel—the wheel of doctrine of the four truths—comprises the teaching of the Hinayāna tenets, the second—the wheel of the doctrine of non-contradiction—the tenets of the Proponents of Entitylessness (or Mādhyamikas), and the third—the wheel of the doctrine of good discrimination—the tenets of Chittamātra.

Whereas in the second turning of the wheel of doctrine Buddha taught, in the sūtras on the perfection of wisdom (prajñāpāramitā), that all phenomena lack true existence, in the third wheel he taught that only some—imaginaries—lack true existence while dependent phenomena and thoroughly established phenomena do truly exist. The teaching of the third wheel, taught mainly in the Sūtra Unravelling the Thought, is called the doctrine of good discrimination.
because of this differentiation of what does and what does not truly exist.\textsuperscript{39}

However, one does not become a non-Chittamātrin through explaining a few topics in each to require interpretation--[for example, passages] such as [that in the Sūtra Unravelling the Thought], "The [mind-basis-of-all is] the appropriating consciousness, profound and subtle . . ."\textsuperscript{40}

Jam-\textambox{\textit{-\textit{yang}}-\textambox{\textit{-\textit{shay}}}-\textambox{\textit{-ba}} lists four types of sūtras that Chittamātrins--meaning Followers of Scripture, Asaṅga's followers--accept as definitive but that Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikas, following Chandrakīrti, classify as requiring interpretation:

1. the teaching of the three natures according to the Sūtra Unravelling the Thought,
2. the teaching of a mind-basis-of-all,
3. the teaching of the non-existence of external objects,
4. the teaching of three final vehicles.\textsuperscript{41}

It is clear that Gung-tang does not regard the acceptance of the definitiveness of the second and fourth as obligatory for all Chittamātrins. The Chittamātrins Following Reasoning reject the mind-basis-of-all and assert a six consciousness system; they refute three final vehicles and
assert a single final vehicle.

As for the third, the teaching of the non-existence of external objects, all Ge-luk philosophers are in accord on the centrality of this doctrine in Chittamātra. Gung-tang’s teacher, Gön-chok-jik-may-wang-бо, defines a Chittamātrin as "a person propounding Buddhist tenets who asserts the true existence of dependent phenomena but does not assert external objects." 42

If, for you, this reason is not established [that is, if you hold that it is not allowable to explain some passages to require interpretation] then it follows that [for you] even the master Dharmakīrti accepts the existence of those whose lineage is completely severed, the existence of three final vehicles and so forth. For, the following is said in sūtras which are root texts of Chittamātra:

Even all the Buddhas with their efforts cannot establish one who journeys alone to peace in the essence of enlightenment, causing him to attain highest enlightenment. 43

And:

One who is depraved has the quality of not passing beyond misery. 44
If Dharmakīrti and the Chittamātrins Following Reasoning had to accept all tenets presented in sūtras such as the Laṅkā and the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought; they would absurdly have to propound three final vehicles (instead of one) and the existence of a class of beings who have no hope of attaining any form of enlightenment, those whose lineage or whose roots of virtue are completely severed. These two assertions are, in fact, held only by Chittamātrins Following Scripture. 45

The first of the two quoted passages is from the Sūtra Unravelling the Thought; in a literal reading it establishes the existence of persons of Hearer (Shrāvaka) lineage who will remain in their Hīnayāna Vehicle and attain final enlightenment as Pāla Destroyers (Arhat) without entering the Mahāyāna and reaching the essence of enlightenment as a Buddha. 46

The second passage is probably from the Sūtra on the Descent to Laṅkā; it is at least compatible with it. The Laṅkā speaks of two kinds of beings whose lineage is severed (icchantika): one is the Bodhisattva who voluntarily remains in cyclic existence for the sake of suffering sentient beings, the other is the
being who has lost his collection of merit.\textsuperscript{47}
This latter, one who is depraved, is someone who holds a wrong view such as that denying the cause and effect of actions.\textsuperscript{48} Such a person, according to a literal reading, never will pass beyond the misery of cyclic existence to nirvāṇa.

Also, Maitreya explains in his \textit{Ornament for the Mahāyāna Sūtras} (Mahāyānasūtrālāṃkāra) that the teaching of a single final vehicle is one whose meaning requires interpretation. For a meaning to require interpretation is for that meaning to be literally unacceptable; it is not merely a case of discussion being required to arrive at clarity. Thus, in saying that the teaching of a single vehicle requires interpretation, Maitreya is saying that it is an unacceptable view. He holds that there are three final vehicles.

Although Maitreya's works are included in the collection of exegetical works and are not Buddha's words, they have a quasi-canonical status. Hence, Gung-tang adduces one of Maitreya's Chittamātrin works as an example of a position that Dharmakīrti would absurdly have to accept if all Chittamātrins were obliged to accept all passages in Chittamātrin sūtras.
Maitreya says:

Because of the sameness of qualities, selflessness,
And liberation, and due to different lineages,
[Because of attaining two thought, due to emanations,
And to being final, (Buddha spoke of) a single vehicle.

In order to lead some
And to maintain others
The completely enlightened Buddhas set forth
A single vehicle to the indefinite.)

Buddha said in some sūtras that there is only a
single final vehicle, not three vehicles which
are each a means to a final enlightenment.
Maitreya—Asaṅga's principal teacher—presents
here the thought underlying Buddha's presentation
of a single final vehicle and the thought or
consideration involved in that presentation.
According to his Ornament for the Mahāyāna Sūtras
and to the Chittamātrins Following Scripture,
the teaching of a single final vehicle is one
requiring interpretation; the definitive teaching
is that of three final vehicles.

Seven thoughts underlying the teaching of
a single vehicle (ekayāna) are mentioned here.
In brief they are—following the explanation of
Sthiramati (5th century) — the lack of difference between Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and Buddhas (1) from the viewpoint of their elements of superior qualities (dharma-dhatu), or emptiness, (2) from the viewpoint of being persons who are selfless, and (3) from the viewpoint of their liberation. "Vehicle" (yana) in these three cases means, respectively, that to be travelled (i.e., cognized), the traveller, and the destination. (4) Some Hearers, those indefinite in their lineage, can enter the Mahayana and attain the same fruit of Buddhahood as do those of Bodhisattva lineage. Thus, persons of different lineages can travel the same way. Here, the vehicle is the means of travelling. (5) There are two similar thoughts attained at the time of enlightenment, one by Buddhas and one by Hearers who have at some time practiced Bodhisattva activities but given them up. (6) Hearers attain final nirvana through their own vehicle, and similarly, Buddhas—-for the sake of guiding some trainees—-send forth emanations and pretend to attain a final nirvana as a Hearer. (7) The Mahayana—-the vehicle of the Bodhisattvas—-and Buddhahood are said to be final in that they
are unexcelled and incomparable: the one is the best of causes, the other the best of effects.

Maitreya is saying that the term "single vehicle" in sūtras refers, according to context, to one or another of these seven underlying thoughts. Buddha's thought in using this terminology was to lead Hearers of indefinite lineage to the Mahāyāna and to maintain Bodhisattvas of indefinite lineage in their lineage.

Gung-tang has quoted, as a fundamental text of Chittamātrins, Maitreya's refutation of a single vehicle. He now spells out how the refutation of a single vehicle and the assertion of the existence of those whose lineage is completely severed are contradictory with Dharmakīrti's thought.

You have accepted the reason [i.e., that sūtras which are the root texts of Chittamātra set forth the existence of three final vehicles and of those whose lineage is severed]. You are [forced to] accept the entailment [that given this reason, even Dharmakīrti must assert those whose lineage is completely severed and that there are three final vehicles]. If you accept [the absurd consequence, namely that even Dharmakīrti accepts the existence of those whose lineage is completely severed and of three final vehicles]
... you then erase all the scripture and reasoning in Dharma-
kīrti's *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compendium on Prime Cognition*" which through myriad reasons conclusively prove the existence of a Buddha lineage in all sentient beings and the fact that there is a single final vehicle, reasonings such as [the one beginning with a statement of the opponent's reasons why the obstructions to enlightenment could not be abandoned] (*Commentary* 1.145c-147b):

[One might imagine this:
"Faults are irremovable"
Because of being permanent, because there are no means,
Or, alternatively, because the means are not known."
[(Faults are removable)
Because (they) are caused and because through cultivating
The antidotes of those (causes) they are removed;
Knowledge of (the antidotes) is established
By knowledge of the nature of the causes.]52

Dharmakīrti seeks to establish that there is no reason that the mental faults obstructing a sentient being from attaining a Buddha's liberation and omniscience cannot be cleared away. These faults are not permanent and thus indestructible, nor is it the case that there are no means to destroy them. Further, the means are known, and there are those who are motivated...
by loving kindness to instruct those interested in them.\textsuperscript{53}

Your alternative is to cast out the glorious Dharmakīrti from the ranks of Chittamātrins.

Gung-tang offers Ṛak-tsang two absurd alternatives arising from his assertion that all full-fledged Chittamātrins must accept as definitive all passages from those sūtras renowned as the five Chittamātrin sūtras. Either the Chittamātrin philosopher must accept, without qualification, all tenets propounded in those sūtras, even those contradicting his own system, or he must no longer be considered a Chittamātrin.

There are, however, many scholars such as Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, and the like—the Chittamātrins Following Reasoning—who, while they are Chittamātrins, do not accept all that is taught in sūtra passages accepted by the other Chittamātrins, those Following Scripture, as of definitive import.

In addition to that, at certain points in the \textit{Descent to Laṅkā Sūtra} and the \textit{Sūtra on the Heavily Adorned}, the teaching of a basis-of-all is explained to have an underlying thought and is said to require interpretation.

The word sūtra is used in Tibetan Buddhist hermeneutics in the sense not of an entire
canonical work, but of a passage in a canonical work. Although the Descent to Laṅkā and Heavily Adorned as complete works are considered by Chittamātrins to be Chittamātrin sūtras, not all passages in them need be sūtra passages of definitive meaning for Chittamātrins.

Gung-tang is seeking to establish that it is untenable to hold that all Chittamātrins must accept as definitive all passages from the five Chittamātrin sūtras. He has already shown how Dharmakīrti and the Chittamātrins Following Reasoning cannot accept sūtra passages presenting mind-basis-of-all and three final vehicles. Now he is taking the case to Asaṅga and the Chittamātrins Following Scripture.

He alludes to two sūtra passages from works included among the five Chittamātrin sūtras, both of which treat the teaching of the mind-basis-of-all as one whose meaning requires interpretation. The Heavily Adorned says:

The Tathāgatas teach the Tathāgata essence
Under the name "basis-of-all."
Although this essence is proclaimed to be
a basis-of-all,
Those of weak mind do not understand.\textsuperscript{54}
Also, the Laṅkā says, "The Tathāgata essence is proclaimed as mind-basis-of-all." These sūtra passages both indicate that the teaching of the existence of a mind-basis-of-all is not literally acceptable and must be interpreted. "Basis-of-all," they say, does not refer to a separate consciousness which is the basis of cyclic existence and nirvāṇa, but is merely a name for the Tathāgata essence, that phenomenon in a sentient being's continuum which is the seed of Buddhahood.

It is not logically consistent to accept these sūtra passages as definitive if one has already accepted those passages teaching the existence of an eighth consciousness as of definitive meaning. Thus, Dak-tsang's assertion that a Chittamātrin must accept what is contained in the five Chittamātrin sūtras as definitive leads to internal contradiction.

Further, among those five [Chittamātrin Sūtras] there exist explanations such as the one in the Sūtra on the Ten Grounds in which all phenomena are stated to lack true existence from the point of view of the ten samenesses of phenomena. The second of the ten samenesses is the sameness of all phenomena in lacking natural existence.
(sarvadharma-alakṣana-samata). Since Chitta-
mātrins hold that only imaginary natures lack
natural existence and that other phenomena are
naturally or truly existent, even the Followers
of Scripture have to assert this passage—along
with the two just quoted from the Laṅkā and the
Heavily Adorned—as passages requiring inter-
pretation. Thus, setting aside Dharmakīrti for the
moment, even Aṣaṅga and his followers assert
some sūtra passages from among those renowned
as the five Chittamātrin sūtras to be ones whose
meaning require interpretation and, according
to Ķak-tsang, must, therefore, not be full-fledged
Chittamātrins.57

Accept, therefore, all these assembled contradictions and
keep [Dharmakīrti] in the ranks of actual Chittamātrins!

(5) You have said (see p. 285) it follows that [con-
sciousnesses other than the basis-of-all] are not suitable
bases for the achievement of [the path of] mantra. This
recitation of profundity is a confusion of fish and turnips
and is, therefore, inappropriate.

The presentation of mind-basis-of-all in the
Chittamātra texts of Aṣaṅga, Vasubandhu, and
their commentators is part of the philosophy
of the Perfection Vehicle (Pāramitāyāna) of
the Mahāyāna. The presentation of a subtle mind which is the basis for achieving the paths and fruits of the practice of tantra is part of the Secret Mantra Vehicle (Guhyamantrayāna) of the Mahāyāna. It is said to be unsuitable to mix or confuse these presentations.58

The danger of error from mixing or confusing Sūtra and Tantra Mahāyāna presentations of the term "basis-of-all" is made clear by Đozong-ka-Da in his Lamp Illuminating the Five Stages, Quintessential Instructions on the "Guhyasamāja Tantra"59 and by Kay-drup in his commentary on the Hevajra Tantra.60 Sometimes a term such as "mind-basis-of-all" is used with completely different referents in Sūtra and Tantra, and it seems that sometimes scholars may have confused—as Đak-tsang has here—those variant uses of terminology.

Thus, Gung-tang chides Đak-tsang for confusing fish and turnips, mixing up things which appear similar to the untrained eye but which are thoroughly different. Đak-tsang's point appears to be an essential one but, according to Gung-tang, is no more than a recitation of an apparent profundity.
[If by "basis for the achievement of the path of mantra"] you mean the very subtle fundamental mind which is said to be generated in the entity of innate great bliss and put in meditative equipoise on the object, emptiness, [then this basis cannot be the mind-basis-of-all. For,] the basis-of-all does not cease until attainment of the heights of the Mahāyāna path of meditation; and the basis-of-all which is asserted by Asaṅga and his brother Vasubandhu is unable to ascertain its own object at all—Vasubandhu's Thirty Stanzas (Trimśikā) speaks of the entity of [the basis-of-all] as "Although unknowing, a knower." Hence, for the basis-of-all in the system of the father Dignāga and son Dharmakīrti, as you interpret it, to cognize emptiness is remarkable!

Dak-tsang's argument that all Chittamātrins assert a basis-of-all is based on one line in Dharmakīrti's Commentary and on Dak-tsang's own assessment that the existence of a basis-of-all is not refuted by Chittamātrins Following Reasoning. Therefore, the basis-of-all he holds Dignāga and Dharmakīrti to assert would have to accord with Asaṅga's and Vasubandhu's descriptions of it.

Vasubandhu characterizes the basis-of-all as "Although unknowing, a knower," which is to
say that it is a cognizer to which an object appears but is not ascertained. It is sometimes said to be a stupid consciousness. Because such a basis-of-all is continuously manifest until the heights of the Mahayana path of meditation, specifically until the eighth Bodhisattva ground, there is no possibility of using it to realize emptiness.\textsuperscript{62}

The basis for the achievement of the path of mantra, however, must be able to cognize emptiness. Thus, if the mind-basis-of-all as presented by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu were the basis for practicing mantra, such practice would be impossible until the cessation of the "unknowing" basis-of-all at the time of attaining the eighth Bodhisattva ground.

(6) The mere passage "Except for the basis-of-all, there is no arising of another [consciousness of similar type]" does occur [in Dharmakīrti's Commentary on (Dignaga's) "Compendium on Prime Cognition"]; however, its meaning can be explained to be that more than one mind of similar type does not function simultaneously unless one posits the hypothetical basis-of-all.

Buddha said in sūtra, "The continuums of consciousness of sentient beings are individual"
and "The occurrence together of two minds is not a possibility; there is no opportunity."\textsuperscript{64}

This is taken to mean not that no more than one consciousness can simultaneously arise, but that although a single consciousness of each type may occur together, no more than one consciousness of similar type may occur simultaneously.\textsuperscript{65}

An eye consciousness apprehending blue and one apprehending yellow are of similar type in both being eye consciousnesses. An eye consciousness and an ear consciousness, however, are not of similar type. Likewise, two mental consciousnesses are of similar type.\textsuperscript{66}

If, in the six consciousness system of Dharmakīrti, one were to posit as an hypothesis, merely for the sake of argument, a mind-basis-of-all, it would have to be one of those six consciousnesses. Since it is definitely not a sense consciousness, it would have to be a species of mental consciousness, and, thus, there would be more than one consciousness of similar type.\textsuperscript{67}

Although Gyel-tsap (in his commentary on Dharmakīrti's \textit{Commentary}) and Gung-tang differ
in explaining the meaning of this line, they agree that it is not a case of Dharmakīrti's asserting a mind-basis-of-all. One isolated reference to something is not enough evidence to judge that a writer asserts that phenomenon. In another way, [this passage] is compatible with the language of "Vishālamati's Chapter."

"Vishālamati's Chapter" is the fifth chapter of the Sūtra Unravelling the Thought. Gung-tang is probably referring to the following passage:

Vishālamati, relying and resting on this appropriating consciousness [the mind-basis-of-all], there arise the six collections of consciousness—the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mental consciousnesses. In that regard, the eye consciousness arises in dependence on the eye together with consciousness and a visible form. Operating cooperatively with the ear, nose, tongue, or body consciousness, at the same time and with the same object a conceptual mental consciousness also arises... If it arises together with the eye consciousness, then a single conceptual mental consciousness having the same object as the eye consciousness arises. If
it arises together with two collections of consciousness, with three, four, or with all five consciousnesses... just one conceptual consciousness arises.69

Gung-tang may be referring to the statement here that just one conceptual consciousness arises at one time, no matter how many sense consciousnesses are operative. The connection between this sūtra passage and the main argument, however, is obscure.

However, if a basis-of-all is asserted it is necessary to assert an afflicted mentality as well. One must then assert in general that more than one consciousness of similar type are manifest simultaneously and in particular that the two, an inferential consciousness cognizing selflessness and a conceptual consciousness apprehending a self, are manifest simultaneously.

The Chittamātrins Following Scripture assert that if one posits a mind-basis-of-all, one necessarily posits an afflicted mentality. For, if one posits a basis-of-all there must be a reason for positing something as a basis-of-all. Dzong-ka-ṣa, following Asaṅga's Compendium of the Mahāyāna, says that the fruitional basis-of-all— that factor of the basis-of-all
which is the basis for infusion of latencies—is called "basis-of-all" because of being the object or base which is perceived as a self by the afflicted mentality.\(^{70}\)

Nonetheless, it is not the general case that all who posit a basis-of-all must posit an afflicted mentality. There is the case of the proponent of a single consciousness who holds this consciousness to be the mind-basis-of-all. He is a Chittamātrin because of positing a basis-of-all, but he is not a Follower of Scripture since he is not a holder of the Chittamātrin chariot-way, that is, he is not a follower of Chittamātra tenets as first set forth by Asaṅga. Although in general Chittamātrins are divided into Followers of Scripture and Followers of Reasoning, there are Chittamātrins who are neither.\(^{71}\)

This aside, in Asaṅga and Vasubandhu's system of Chittamātra, positing a basis-of-all entails positing an afflicted mentality. It, therefore, follows that it would be possible in the continuum of an ordinary being (prthagjana)—a person who has not yet attained the path of seeing (darsanamārga) and thus
not yet directly cognized selflessness— for a consciousness apprehending a self— the afflicted mentality— and an inferential consciousness cognizing selflessness to be present in manifest form simultaneously. For, the afflicted mentality is uninterruptedly manifest in the mental continuums of ordinary beings.72

Gung-tang here seems to be demonstrating, by implication, a weakness in the Chittamātra system. For a non-delusive realization of emptiness and its inimical opposite, the conception of a self, to be present together is, indeed, strange.

Therefore, [Dak-tsang] you have to consider well how you would interpret the hundreds of responses [to any system that propounds two simultaneous consciousnesses of similar type] mentioned in Dharmakīrti's Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compendium on Prime Cognition" in such passages as:

It would be definite that from these [former consciousnesses]
Will arise] consciousnesses of similar type,
For, it is thus: it is correctly understood73
That conceptual [consciousnesses] arise serially.74
Gung-tang's quotation of Dharmakīrti here is not taken from the Tibetan canonical translation of the Commentary, but rather is given as quoted in the canonical translation of a work of Shāntarakṣhita. This is evident from Jam-ñana-shay-ba's quotation of the same passage where the source is cited.  

These same lines are translated differently into Tibetan by Subhūtishrīshānti and Ge-way-Lo-drö (dGe-ba'i-blo-gros) in their translation of Dharmakīrti's Commentary. This translation corresponds more accurately with the extant Sanskrit text of this passage (Pramāṇavarttika 2.502c-503b). This version reads:

It would be that these [former consciousnesses] Definitely have the ability [to produce consciousnesses] of similar type, For it is thus: it is correctly understood That conceptual [consciousnesses] arise serially.  

Gung-tang's refutation of Ṛak-tṣang throughout this section (pp.286-318) follows Jam-ñana-shay-ba's lead. Gung-tang develops the refutation to a greater degree than does Jam-ñana-shay-
The, here adducing many contradictions accruing to Dak-tsang's position that a single mention in the Commentary is sufficient to say Dharmakirti asserts a mind-basis-of-all.

And (Commentary 2.178b), "Two simultaneous thought consciousnesses are not seen." 78

If there is more than one sense consciousness of dissimilar type operating at one time—for example, an eye consciousness apprehending a visible form and an ear consciousness apprehending a sound—one will be either a prime or subsequent cooc:izer and will understand its object non-delusively whereas the other will be a case of perception without ascertainment and will not be able to induce an ascertaining conceptual consciousness. Thus, only one conceptual consciousness can occur at any given time. 79 For, only one conceptual consciousness can be induced at a time.

(7) It is the reasoning of an idiot to say (see p.285) that Shantaraksita, Arya Vimuktisena, Haribhadra and the like, who are compatible [with Chittamatra] accept a basis-of-all. I have already briefly refuted this above (see pp.242 and 249-53), and I will, therefore, not elaborate. Since I have already roughly discussed their assertions
on greater and lesser numbers of consciousnesses, those of discernment should, taking this as their basis, examine in detail the assertions of the individual scholars.
PART TWO

THE MIND-BASIS-OF-ALL

ACCORDING TO THE MIND-ONLY SYSTEM
Chapter Six
Nature and Definition of the Basis-of-All

The second main topic, a detailed explanation of the presentation of the basis-of-all and afflicted mentality has two sections: explanations of the basis-of-all and of the afflicted mentality. The explanation of the basis-of-all also has two parts: a general explanation and a critical analysis of positions on the basis-of-all.

GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE BASIS-OF-ALL
Asaṅga extensively presents the basis-of-all through a division into eleven topics: (1) nature, (2) definition, (3) observed objects, (4) aspect, (5) accompaniers, (6) operation, (7) time of cessation, (8) divisions, (9) synonyms, (10) etymology, and (11) validating proofs. As Asaṅga says in his Treatises on the Levels:

[The mind-basis-of-all] is to be known through nature, Definition, observed objects, aspect,
And through surrounders, operation, and time of cessation,
Divisions, synonyms, etymology, and validation.
Nature of the Basis-of-All (11b.4)

The entity [of the basis-of-all is neutral, undefiled mind]. Among the five basic categories it is in the category of a main mind base.

In the general Ge-luk presentation of philosophy, whatever exists is necessarily either static--uncaused and unchanging--or impermanent--caused and, by its very nature, constantly disintegrating and re-arising.

Whatever is impermanent is either a form (rūpa: visible forms, sounds, odors, etc.), a consciousness (jñāna), or a compositional factor not in similar association with consciousness (viprayuktasamkāra). Consciousnesses may be further divided into minds (citta) and mental factors (caittta). ¹

Within these divisions, the basis-of-all is a mind.

From another point of view, that of the presentation of ethics, existents are necessarily either virtuous (kuśala), non-virtuous (akuśala), or neutral (avyākṛta) -- that is, neither virtuous nor non-virtuous. Within this framework, the mind-basis-of-all is neutral.
The five basic categories are the fundamental breakdown of bases (vastu), i.e., existents, originally presented in the Vaibhāšika system and subsequently carried over to other systems. They are (1) appearing forms, (2) main minds, (3) accompanying mental factors, (4) compositional factors, and (5) uncaused (asamskṛta) or static phenomena. In this frame of reference, the mind-basis-of-all is a main mind.

Further, because everyone--those whose roots of virtue are severed, those of the upper realms, and so forth--has [a basis-of-all], it is neutral.

Sentient beings each have their own individual mind-basis-of-all.

If bases-of-all were, in general, virtuous, then those persons whose roots of virtue are severed and who have only non-virtuous minds would absurdly have a manifest virtuous mind; for, the mind-basis-of-all is a stable consciousness that in ordinary beings endures throughout life without discontinuity. The simultaneous presence of manifest virtuous and non-virtuous minds is an absurdity because virtuous and non-virtuous phenomena are mutual contradictories.
which can never occur together in an individual's mental continuum.

If the mind-basis-of-all were non-virtuous, then those of the upper realms--the Form and Formless Realms--would absurdly have a non-virtuous mind, whereas there are no non-virtuous minds except in the Desire Realm. (The Desire Realm [kāmadhatu] includes hell-beings, hungry ghosts [preta], animals, humans, demigods, and six types of gods.)

Even given that the mind-basis-of-all is not, in general, virtuous or non-virtuous, it might be thought that a mind-basis-of-all which is the fruition of a virtuous cause is virtuous and that one which is the fruition of a non-virtuous cause is non-virtuous. Since the mind-basis-of-all endures throughout life without discontinuity, it would be impossible for non-virtuous minds to arise or cease in the presence of a virtuous basis-of-all--that is, when a sentient being has been born in a pleasant migration (a fruition of a virtuous action). Dzong-ka-ba says:

If it were the case [that a virtuous phenomenon itself were the fruition of a virtuous action
and a non-virtuous phenomenon were the fruition of a non-virtuous action] there would be the fault that there would be no cessation of the thoroughly afflicted. For, it is thus: a fruition [the mind-basis-of-all] operates without discontinuity in all lifetimes as long as there is life. Thus, if the fruition were virtuous, there would be no discontinuity in the operation of virtue, even for a moment; hence, there would be no opportunity for the production of thoroughly afflicted phenomena. Because of the absence of production, there would be no cessation for which that [production] is the precursor.  

Likewise, it would be impossible to produce a virtuous mind in an unpleasant migration such as an animal rebirth (a fruition of non-virtue).  

 sıkṣa says:

If the fruition were non-virtuous, there would be no opportunity for the production of an antidote to the continuous non-virtuous mind. Hence, there would be no cessation of non-virtue because of the non-existence of that [antidote].
Thus, the basis-of-all must be neutral. Among the two, defiled and undefiled, it is ascertained to be undefiled and neutral, for this [basis-of-all] is fruitional.

There are two bases-of-all: that which is the support, the fruitional basis-of-all, and the supported or seed basis-of-all. The seed basis-of-all--the latencies deposited with the basis-of-all by other minds--is merely imputedly existent (prajñaptisat), being a designation for the dormant potencies of the substantially existent (dravyasat) fruitional basis-of-all.

Fruitions (vipāka), phenomena included within a person's psychophysical continuum which are results of virtuous or non-virtuous phenomena, are themselves neither virtuous nor non-virtuous. Being neutral they are either defiled (nivṛta, āvṛta) or undefiled (anivṛta); Sthiramati's Explanation of (Vasubandhu's) "Thirty Stanzas" says, "Phenomena are of four types: virtuous, non-virtuous, defiled neutral, and undefiled neutral." To be undefiled does not mean to be unobstructed with regard to attaining liberation. The mind-basis-of-all is not defiled but is
obstructed with regard to liberation. If this were not the case, the mind-basis-of-all would not cease at the vajra-like meditative stabilization, just prior to the attainment of liberation, whereas it does. Nor is it the case that neutral phenomena are necessarily undefiled: an illustration of a defiled neutral phenomenon is the afflicted mentality.\textsuperscript{12}

Sthiramati identifies undefiled here as a term denoting a mind not associated with afflic- tive obstructions: "It is undefiled because of not being defiled by the adventitious secondary afflictions of the level of mentality."\textsuperscript{13} Jam-\text{\-}yang-shay-\text{\-}ba takes this to mean that the mind-basis-of-all is not in similar association with any afflic tive obstructions\textsuperscript{14}---afflic tive obstructions being, for Chittamātrins, the conceptions of the existence of a coarse or subtle self of persons, along with their seeds, as well as the six main afflictions and twenty secondary afflictions.\textsuperscript{15}

Vasubandhu's \textit{Thirty Stanzas} says, "It is undefiled and neutral."\textsuperscript{16} Dzong-ka-\text{\-}ba says in his \textit{Root Verses on Afflicted Mentality and Mind-Basis-of-All}:
Because it is the basis of infusion of latencies,
And because it operates in a single continuum
With manifest virtue and non-virtue,
It is established as undefiled and neutral.\(^{17}\)

Dzong-ka-ṃa presents two criteria here. The
second, that the basis-of-all must not be incompat-
ible in nature with either virtuous or non-
virtuous phenomena and is, therefore, necessarily
neutral and undefiled, has been explained.

The first criterion, that the basis-of-all
is necessarily neutral and undefiled because it
is the basis in which other minds infuse or
deposit latencies, is established by two reasons:
(1) if it were defiled or non-virtuous, it could
not be the basis in which latencies are infused
by uncontaminated virtuous minds—the "paths" which
are the destroyers of defiling obstructions—or
by contaminated virtuous minds; and (2) if it
were virtuous it could not serve as the basis for
the infusion of latencies by non-virtuous minds.\(^{18}\)

Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Higher Knowledge* (*Abhidharmakośa*
2.57ab) says, "Fruitions are phenomena which are neutral"\(^{19}\)
and (2.30ab) "When [a mind is] defiled, there are eighteen
[mental factors]."\(^{21}\)
Vasubandhu, describing the Vaibhāshika presentation of cause and effect, characterizes fruitions as effects having three qualities:\textsuperscript{22}

(1) being neutral,
(2) being included within an individual's psycho-physical continuum,
(3) being caused either by non-virtuous or by contaminated virtuous phenomena.

Discussing the Vaibhāshika presentation of the mental factors in similar association with different types of minds, he specifies eighteen in similar association with defiled minds:\textsuperscript{23}

(1-10) the ten mental factors of the level of all minds (cittamahābhūmika), so-called because they are universally present with minds--feeling, intention, discrimination, aspiration, contact, intelligence, mindfulness, mental engagement, belief, and stabilization;\textsuperscript{24}

(11-16) the six mental factors of the level of all afflictions (kleśamahābhūmika), so-called because they are universally present with afflicted minds--non-conscientiousness, laziness, faithlessness, lethargy, and excitement;\textsuperscript{25}

(17-18) two of the eight indeterminate (aniyata) mental factors--investigation and analysis.\textsuperscript{26}
Since the mind-basis-of-all is accompanied only by the five omnipresent mental factors—feeling, discrimination, intention, mental engagement, and contact (included, in the Vaibhāṣhika presentation, among the ten universally present mental factors)—it cannot be a defiled mind.\textsuperscript{27}

As regards the latter two passages [those from the Treasury of Higher Knowledge] one has to distinguish between the higher and lower tenet systems.

The lower systems of Higher Knowledge are those of the Vaibhāṣhikas and Sautrāntikas presented by Vasubandhu in the Treasury of Higher Knowledge (Abhidharmakośa) and in his own commentary on that text. The higher systems are those of the Mahāyāna as presented, for instance, by Asaṅga in the Compendium of Higher Knowledge (Abhidharma-samuccaya). There are major differences between the system presented in Vasubandhu's Treasury and that presented by Chittamātrins such as Asaṅga.

For Chittamātrins fruitions are not necessarily neutral phenomena. There are virtuous fruitions such as birth in the assembly of a Buddha's Body of Complete Enjoyment (Sambhogakāya). This is described in Asaṅga's Compendium of the Mahāyāna as the fruition of the nonconceptual exalted
wisdom of meditative equipoise on the path of seeing.\textsuperscript{28} However, those fruitions which arise from actions projecting birth in cyclic existence are necessarily neutral phenomena. Thus, the mind-basis-of-all is necessarily neutral even here.\textsuperscript{29}

Moreover, Chittamātrins posit only five mental factors that necessarily accompany all minds, the so-called omnipresent (sarvatragā) mental factors: feeling, discrimination, intention, mental engagement, and contact.\textsuperscript{30} The remaining five of the Vaibhāṣikas' universally present mental factors--aspiration, belief, mindfulness, stabilization, and intelligence--are grouped by Chittamātrins as the five determining (niyata) mental factors.\textsuperscript{31} These five are in similar association only with virtuous minds and so cannot accompany a defiled mind.\textsuperscript{32}

The position enunciated above--that there are fruitions other than the basis-of-all, and among them virtuous fruitions--is that held at Go-mang College. Še-ra-jay College holds the position that in Asaṅga's presentation of Chitta-mātra the only fruition is the fruitional basis-of-all. Although there are phenomena such as
Bodhisattva Superiors' mental bodies and the features of a Buddha's body and speech that are held to be fruitions, they are only imputed as such and are not actual fruitions. Nor is it correct, says the Še-ra-jay textbook writer Če'u-tsong (Ke'u-tshang bLo-bzang-'jam-dbyangs-smon-lam), to assert a distinction between main and secondary fruitions.33 Če'u-tsong's justification for his position is the following from Dzong-ka-Ba's Difficult Topics:

**Question:** Why is only the consciousness which is a support called "fruition?" Is it not the case that the five sense powers—the eyes and so forth—are fruitions?

**Answer:** There is no fallacy, for it is as follows. A fruition must have three qualifications:

1. it must be undefiled and neutral,
2. it must operate continuously throughout the lifetime,
3. it must be an effect projected either by prior virtue or non-virtue.

Nothing can be this other than the basis-of-all and its accompanying [mental factors]...
Furthermore, Asaṅga's *Compendium of the Mahāyāna* says, "Discontinuity in the fruitional consciousness does not occur except when making the connection to a new life." Because the fruition must operate as long as there is life, it must occur until death; because the eyes and so forth are seen to cease before death, these are not full-fledged fruitions.

Asaṅga's *Compendium of Higher Knowledge* says, "What is a fruition? It is the mind-basis-of-all along with its associated [mental factors]." Therefore, only the consciousness which is a support is a fruition.\(^{34}\)

**Definition or Demarcation of the Basis-of-All (11b.6)**

The definition of a basis-of-all is: a neutral and undefiled main mind which has a thoroughly enduring continuum and is [thus] the basis of infusion of the latencies, with qualification. When debating, the definition of a basis-of-all is: that mind which is the basis of infusion of the latencies, with qualification. The qualification eliminates the fruitional consciousness which exists on the pure grounds and so forth.

Gung-tang gives two definitions for the mind-basis-of-all: the first defines its parameters
for the sake of clear understanding, the second gives only the bare minimum necessary to differentiate it from other phenomena. The brevity of the second definition makes it easier to defend when debating than the longer, more meaningful definition. The criterion is to avoid giving the opponent something with which to find fault—the fewer words, the fewer points of attack.\textsuperscript{35}

The purpose of stating "with qualification" is to eliminate that the fruitional consciousness which exists in the pure grounds and so forth is a mind-basis-of-all.\textsuperscript{36} The pure grounds are the eighth, ninth, and tenth Bodhisattva grounds, the highest levels of the Mahāyāna path of meditation. The tenth ground immediately precedes Buddhahood. Gung-tang adds "and so forth" to include Hinayāna Foe Destroyers.\textsuperscript{37}

A Buddha has neither latencies nor a basis for their infusion. All eight of his consciousnesses have been transformed into exalted wisdoms. A Bodhisattva on the pure grounds has infusing consciousnesses and a basis of infusion, but—according to Gung-tang—no basis-of-all. Such a Bodhisattva has, instead, a fruitional consciousness which serves as the basis of infusion.\textsuperscript{38}
Hearer and Solitary Realizer Foe Destroyers who dwell in the nirvāṇa with remainder— that is, who have not yet died and thus still have psycho-physical aggregates projected by previous lives' actions and afflictions— have no basis-of-all, but do still have a fruitional consciousness. Further, like pure ground Bodhisattvas, they have, in place of the afflicted mentality, an unafflicted "seventh mentality" (Tibetan: bdun vid). Foe Destroyers in the remainderless nirvāṇa have no aggregates and, therefore, no latencies or basis for their infusion.

The afflicted mentality ceases simultaneously with attainment of the eighth Bodhisattva ground or— for those on a Hinayāna path— with the state of Foe Destroyer.\(^39\) Without the afflicted mentality there is no reason for designating the eighth or fruitional consciousness a "mind-basis-of-all." For, the fruitional consciousness is called "basis-of-all" insofar as it is the basis or object perceived by the afflicted mentality as a self and, therefore, the \textit{basis} with respect to which the afflicted mentality causes all types of sentient beings to conceive a self.\(^40\)
Bodhisattvas on the pure grounds and Poe
Destroyers both have fruitional consciousnesses
but neither have any consciousness which they
perceive as a self. It is, therefore, necessary
to add the proviso "with qualification" to the
definition in order to indicate that the fruitional
consciousness, which fulfills all other criteria of the definition, is not a basis-of-all.\(^{41}\)

There is debate among the colleges about
whether the non-existence of afflictions and
afflicted mentality in a certain individual is
a sufficient criterion for positing the non-existence of a mind-basis-of-all in that individual.
Go-mang and Še-ra-jay agree in general that the
basis of infusion of the latencies is called
"mind-basis-of-all" until the afflicted mentality
ceases and after that is termed "fruitional con-
sciousness."\(^{42}\) Lö-śel-Ţing--the sister college
of Go-mang College at Dre-ţung Monastery--disagrees and posits as one of the defining characteristics of the mind-basis-of-all that it
"remain in the type of [that which] the afflicted
mentality uses as a self."\(^{43}\) The qualification
"remain in the type" allows the fruitional
consciousness to be called a basis-of-all even
in the cases of pure ground Bodhisattvas and Foe Destroyers. They say the substantial entity (dravya) of the basis-of-all is the basis for that etymology of "basis-of-all" which revolves around being the object perceived by the afflicted intellect. The "type basis-of-all" (Tibetan: rigs kyi kun gzhi), however, is a general basis-of-all which survives after the afflicted mentality has ceased. At Go-mang they allow that the continuum of substantial entity of the basis-of-all remains after the afflicted mentality ceases but they say that it is not a basis-of-all.

When this topic is elaborated somewhat the following four are discussed: the basis in which there is infusion, the phenomena which cause infusion in it, the manner in which it is infused, and the nature of the latencies which are infused.

The Basis of Infusion. Asaṅga's Compendium of the Mahāyāna says:

In what is enduring, neutral, infusable
And related with the infusors
Are latencies infused, and not elsewhere.
Theke likewise says in the Root Verses on Afflicted Mentality and Mind-Basis-of-All:

[A basis of infusion] has five features:
Enduring, neutral, infusible,
It is related with the infusors,
And is invariably a support.⁴⁶

ENDURING
For example, in the case of the infusion of the scent of a jasmine blossom, something enduring like wood can be a basis [of such an infusion], whereas something unenduring like sound cannot. Similarly, [a basis of infusion of latencies must be enduring].

Without a continuously operative basis for the infusion of latencies, those latencies which have been deposited or infused would be lost when their substrate ceases, even if this cessation is only temporary. Thus, there would be no subsequent arising of consciousnesses not present when the basis of infusion is not present, and there would be no way for karmic actions to bring forth subsequent effects.

The sense powers and sense consciousnesses are not enduring because they do not operate when one has been born in the Formless Realm.
The continuum of the basis of infusion holding the latencies must endure not only throughout a single lifetime but throughout all rebirths in cyclic existence. Thus, it must exist in the Desire, Form, and Formless Realms. Since beings in the Formless Realm have only four aggregates—the physical aggregate not occurring there—neither the five sense powers nor the consciousnesses depending on them can operate there. Thus, they cannot be the basis of infusion.

The sixth or mental consciousness is as Vasubandhu's Thirty Stanzas says:

The mental consciousness always occurs—
Except with discriminationless gods,\(^47\)
The two meditative absorptions,
Mindless sleep and fainting.\(^48\)

In general the mental consciousness is always present; however, there are certain exceptions, the so-called five mindless states. They are called "mindless" (acittā) because during them the consciousnesses engaging objects—the five sense consciousnesses and the mental consciousness—are not present.\(^49\) While the basis-of-all
and afflicted mentality may or may not be present during those states, a fruitional consciousness bearing the latencies is always present.

There is a type of rebirth among the gods of the Fourth Concentration of the Form Realm called discriminationless (āsamjñika). Beings are born there through having practiced in a former life the meditative absorption of non-discrimination. They have no clear discrimination during the length of their lives as gods save when they are born and when they are about to die. 50

The two meditative absorptions are those of non-discrimination and cessation. 51 They are not types of mind such as are other meditative states, for instance, yogic direct perceivers; rather, they are designations for the non-operation of consciousnesses due to the generation of a basis temporarily inhibiting their arising. 52 These states are mindless only insofar as the meditative absorption of non-discrimination is a state without the six engaging consciousnesses and the meditative absorption of cessation is a
state without those six and also without the afflicted mentality.\textsuperscript{53}

Mindless sleep is deep dreamless sleep.\textsuperscript{54}

Mindless fainting is a case of a cessation of consciousness arising from an accident or physiological imbalance.\textsuperscript{55}

The afflicted mentality is, as [the Thirty Stanzas] says, "Neither existent during supramundane paths/ Nor in the meditative absorption of cessation."\textsuperscript{56}

The afflicted mentality is continuously present in an individual's continuum until that individual has attained direct perception of selflessness (that is, the path of seeing—the first of the Superiors' supramundane paths). After that, it is present except when supramundane paths are manifestly present or during absorption in cessation; at those times it temporarily ceases. It completely ceases with attainment of the eighth Bodhisattva ground or the position of Foe Destroyer.\textsuperscript{57}

Supramundane paths are wisdom consciousnesses in the continuums of Superiors directly cognizing selflessness. Direct perception of selflessness is an antidote to the conception of a self; the two cannot co-exist at the same time in the same
psychophysical continuum. Since the afflicted mentality is a type of conception of a self, supramundane paths inhibit the occurrence of the afflicted mentality.\textsuperscript{58}

The meditative absorption of cessation is a case of the cessation of all mental activity except for the mind-basis-of-all.

Because\textsuperscript{59} in these situations there are no [sense powers, sense consciousnesses, mental consciousness, or afflicted mentality, respectively] they cannot be bases of infusion. The basis-of-all, however, has a continuum which endures as long as there are infusers; therefore, it can be [the basis of infusion].

None of the eight consciousnesses--except for the mind-basis-of-all--is continually operative as a basis for the infusion of latencies at all the times when there are infusing consciousnesses depositing latencies.

This is the case even given that the basis-of-all ceases with the attainment of the position of Foe Destroyer. Ðzong-ka-êa says:

\textbf{Question:} That being the case, even the basis-of-all cannot be the basis of infusion.

For, as Vasubandhu's \textit{Thirty Stanzas} says, it
is discontinuous: "[The mind-basis-of-all] ceases with the state of Foe Destroyer."\(^6^0\)

**Answer:** There is no fallacy. [The basis-of-all] is sufficient because it is continuous as long as there exist infusers.\(^6^1\)

To be continuous is expressed in Tibetan as "continuum not broken." In dependence on this statement by Đzong-ka-ṭa, Gung-tang says that the basis-of-all has a continuum which endures as long as there are infusers.

Ge'u-tsaṅ speaks with the same voice when he says that the basis-of-all is a suitable basis of infusion "because [its] continuum operates as long as there are infusers and because even in the continuum of a Foe Destroyer the continuum [or continuation] of the basis-of-all--the fruitional consciousness--exists."\(^6^2\)

For both Ge'u-tsang and Gung-tang, there is a continuation of the substantial entity of the basis-of-all which, although it is not designated "basis-of-all," is still the same continuum of basis of infusion.
NEUTRAL

Other scents are not infused in things which have strong scents such as garlic and sandalwood, but are in things which have neutral scents such as sesame. Likewise, if [a mind-basis-of-all] were either virtuous or non-virtuous, then--since it would be of one type--it could not hold the latencies of the other. Also, [if the basis of infusion were either virtuous or non-virtuous, then the other] could not become manifest along with it.

A basis of infusion is neutral, which is to say that it is neither virtuous nor non-virtuous, but compatible with either.

Although latencies themselves are neutral phenomena,\textsuperscript{63} latencies of virtue cannot be infused in a non-virtuous basis of infusion because the infusing virtuous consciousness and the basis in which it infuses a latency are simultaneous,\textsuperscript{64} and virtue and non-virtue are incompatible. The same holds for latencies from non-virtuous infusers in a virtuous basis of infusion.

INFUSABLE

[A basis of infusion] is infusable or\textsuperscript{65} suitable for infusion. Because uncaused phenomena cannot be altered by conditions, the capacity to infuse does not affect them.\textsuperscript{66}
Phenomena are necessarily either caused or uncaused. To be uncaused means to be unchanging, unalterable, and static. Illustrations of uncaused phenomena are selflessnesses and the uncaused space (a mere lack of impediment).

Nor is it the case that external things are suitable for infusion; for Vasubandhu's *Commentary on (Asaṅga's) "Compendium of the Mahāyāna"* (*Mahāyānasamgrahabhāṣya*) says:

What is not infusable is as follows. There is no infusing of stones, silver, gold, and the like. That which holds infusion is said to be infused by an infuser; that is, that which is suitable to be infused [is said to be infused].

The meaning of suitability of infusing that which holds infusion is that [the basis of infusion] at first holds the latency of an action and then connects it to a later entity of fruition [where it is] experienced. The ripening must be in that [basis of infusion].

A karmic action—a virtuous or non-virtuous infusing mind—deposits a latency or trace of itself in something suitable to be a basis of infusion. In order to be capable of infusion, this basis must be able to hold infusion—to
retain those latencies which are infused in it—
and to serve as the medium connecting the cause—
the action—to its effect. The latency, meeting
with the proper circumstances, is activated and
said to ripen as a fruition.

A latency is infused (or deposited), pre-
served, and ripens all in a single continuum.
This continuous basis of infusion—the mind-
basis-of-all—is that which connects an indivi-
dual's actions with their effects.

The mind-basis-of-all is also the I or ego
which is the experiencer of these fruitions. In
Chittamātra a phenomenon must be findable if
sought under analysis; seeking the ego which is
the experiencer of the fruitions of a previous
action yields only the mind-basis-of-all of the
continuum of that person who committed the action
in question.68

It is said in a sūtra:

The fruition of actions which have been committed and
amassed is not a ripening in the realm of external
earth... .

In another way, the meaning of the passage (quoted
on p.344) from the Commentary on (Asaṅga's) "Compendium
of the Mahāyāna" is the following. Although the scent of a flower infuses the penetrable such as sesame and the like, it does not infuse the impenetrable such as stone and the like. Similarly, caused phenomena can be the basis of infusion of latencies but uncaused phenomena cannot.

This system [of Chittamātrins Following Scripture] asserts that the naturally abiding lineage is a caused phenomenon. On account of that, the lineages are truly existent, and based on this it becomes necessary to pro-pound three final vehicles.

Gung-tang here gives a capsule discussion of a topic whose only seeming connection with the main subject is that both the basis of infusion and the naturally abiding lineage are caused phenomena.

In general there are two types of lineage (gotra): naturally abiding lineage (prakṛtisthagotra) and developed lineage (paripustagotra). According to Chittamātrins, both are caused phenomena (samskrta): the former being the undeveloped potential (or latency) for achieving uncontaminated exalted wisdom, whereas the latter is that latency when it is being developed.⁶⁹ (Mādhyamikas hold that naturally abiding lineage
is the emptiness of the mind and, therefore, uncaused.)

Now, caused phenomena are, for Chittamātrins, truly existent. Thus, someone of Hearer lineage would be truly established in that lineage and, therefore, truly established in its effect of Hearer Foe Destroyer when it is attained. Since the same holds for Solitary Realizers and Bodhisattvas, the assertion of truly existent lineages—says Gung-tang—necessarily entails the assertion of three final vehicles. The implication is that one whose lineage is truly existent perforce will achieve enlightenment in that lineage.

Gung-tang's reasoning here is untenable with regard to Chittamātrins as a whole and is dubious even with regards to Followers of Scripture. Chittamātrins Following Reasoning, although they do assert that naturally abiding lineages are caused phenomena, reject the doctrine of three final vehicles and assert instead that all sentient beings eventually reach enlightenment as Buddhas by means of a single vehicle. This being the case, Gung-tang's entailment does not hold for Chittamātrins in
general: the assertion of truly existent lineages does not necessarily entail the pro-
pounding of three final vehicles.\textsuperscript{71}

Moreover, it would seem that this entail-
ment does not hold even for Chittamātrins Following Scripture, for even according to them there are sentient beings of Hearer lineage who attain the position of Hearer Foe Destroyer and then go on to become Buddhas by means of the Bodhisattva vehicle.\textsuperscript{72}

RELATED WITH THE INFUSORS

Just as the scent of a flower does not infuse things in a different place or of a different time, [a basis of infusion] cannot be in another's continuum. Hence, the object of infusion and the infusers are related together in a single [person's] continuum.

Ḍzong-ka-ṭa says:

Infuser and basis of infusion must have a relationship in which arising and cessation are simultaneous. This demonstrates that [two] phenomena which are in different continuums or which are not simultaneous cannot be infusible [--basis of infusion--] and infuser.\textsuperscript{73}
INvariably a Support

Because its accompaniers, [the five omnipresent mental factors] contact and so forth, are supported on something else [that is, the mind-basis-of-all], they cannot be bases of infusion. However, it is said that the basis-of-all exists by its own power as a basis for the latencies. Although this feature is not clear in Asaṅga's Compendium of the Mahāyāna, Dzong-ka-ba has stated the thought of The Secret Meaning Unveiled, Condensed Explanation (of the First Chapter of Asaṅga's "Compendium of the Mahāyāna") (Vvrtqūdārthapindavyākhyā). 74

Ghung-tang identifies the source of Dzong'ka-ba's explanation of the fifth feature required in a basis of infusion as the Secret Meaning Unveiled (cited henceforth as Secret Meaning), the name of whose author has been lost to history. 75

The Secret Meaning is a commentary on the chapter of Asaṅga's Compendium of the Mahāyāna (Mahāyāna-saṅgraha) concerned with the mind-basis-of-all. Apart from the Secret Meaning there are, extant in Tibetan translation, two other Indian commentaries on the Compendium of the Mahāyāna: Vasubandhu's Commentary on (Asaṅga's) "Compendium of the Mahāyāna" (Mahāyānasaṅgrahabhāṣya) 76 and Asvabhāva's (ca. 450-530) Connected Explanation
of (Asaṅga's) "Compendium of the Mahayana"
(Mahāyānasaṃgrahopanibandhana). Asaṅga's work and these three commentaries are among the most frequently cited sources for the Ge-luk presentation of mind-basis-of-all.

[The Phenomena which Infuse.] If the basis of infusion is like that, of what sort are the infusers?

Since something acting on itself is a contradiction, the basis of all cannot be [an infuser. The basis of infusion, the mind-basis-of-all] is infused by other consciousnesses--the seven collections of consciousness. The seven collections of consciousness are the six engaging consciousnesses and the afflicted mentality.

The Mode of Infusion. Once sesame and a flower are put together, even if the flower is removed its scent remains in the sesame. Similarly, the two, the object of infusion and the infuser, are grouped together in one continuum. Even when the infuser itself subsequently ceases, its latency remains with the basis of infusion. As Ðzong-ka-Đa's Root Verses says:

[Latencies are] the potencies deposited
By the infusers in the basis of infusion
When [those infusers] approach cessation.
Asaṅga's *Compendium of the Mahāyāna* says:

Flowers infuse sesame. Although the flower and the sesame arise and cease together [the sesame serves as the means for the arising of a further scent of that (flower)].

The relationship between infusing consciousness and mind-basis-of-all does not strictly fit into the twofold division of relationships into causal relationships (*tadutpattisaṃbandha*) and relationships of single entity (*tādāmyasaṃbandha*). Although the infusing consciousnesses are in a causal relationship with the mind-basis-of-all in terms of their own arising, they are not prior causes of that basis in which they infuse latencies, nor are they prior causes of those latencies.

However, according to Ėn'u-tsang, it is clear that Chittamātrins Following Scripture assert a type of causation in which cause and effect are simultaneous. He quotes Asaṅga's *Compendium of the Mahayana*:

How, then, are the mind-basis-of-all and thoroughly afflicted phenomena simultaneously causes of each other? One should see it as
similar to, for example, the arising of the flame of a butter lamp and the burning of the wick—they are reciprocal and simultaneous. Or, it can be seen as like the simultaneous mutual dependence of [a tripod of] tent poles due to which they do not fall down. 83

Dzong-ka-Ba, although he does not refer to this passage, does say that the teaching, in the Compendium of the Mahāyāna, of the mutual interdependence of the consciousnesses engaging objects and the mind-basis-of-all can be interpreted from the viewpoints of both simultaneous and non-simultaneous causality. 84

The non-simultaneous causality (here the term causality is used in its usual sense of an antecedent phenomenon contributing to the arising of a subsequent one) can only be taken as an infuser creating a fruitional mind-basis-of-all in a later lifetime through depositing a latency for the creation of that basis-of-all.

The simultaneous causality is a case of reciprocal dependence, where the infusers nurture old seeds already infused in the mind-
basis-of-all, acting as the empowering conditions (adhipatipratyaya) of these latencies, and act as causal conditions (hetupratyaya) of the seeds newly infused. 85 The latencies that are with the mind-basis-of-all act as causes of the infusing consciousnesses by maintaining their individual continuities. 86
Chapter Seven
Objects and Functions of the Basis-of-All

OBSERVED OBJECTS OF THE BASIS-OF-ALL

Dzong-ka-ba’s Root Verses says:

[That basis-of-all which is a support,
Although unknowing, is a knower]
Of sense objects, the sentient, and latencies.¹

In this passage two [observed objects] are set forth:
the external, the five sense objects—-the knowledge which
is the environment—and the internal, the sense powers
and so forth which are perceived as sentient.

The basis-of-all which is a support is the frui-
tional, substantially existent basis-of-all.
Dzong-ka-ba speaks of three observed objects
(alambana) with respect to it:²

(1) the five sense objects (artha)—forms,
sounds, odors, tastes, and tangible objects,
(2) the five sense powers (indriya)— the
eye, ear, nose, tongue, and bodily sense
powers,
(3) the latencies (vāsanā) of involvement in
an imagined self and imagined phenomena.
Of these three, the first two are actually observed objects of the basis-of-all, whereas the third is merely called an object without being one.

The five sense objects are external insofar as they are not necessarily involved in the psychophysical continuum of any person. The five sense powers are internal because they are included within individuals' continuums. In this case, they must be within the continuum to which the basis-of-all observing them belongs.\(^3\)

Gung-tang identifies Dzong-ka-\(\tilde{b}\)a's "the sentient" as the sense powers and so forth, but the reference of the "and so forth" is ambiguous. It may refer to the observed objects of a mind-basis-of-all of the Formless Realm—the aggregates of feeling, discrimination, compositional factors, and consciousness. There are no sense powers or sense objects in the Formless Realm since both are physical. It more likely refers to the physical supports of the sense powers, the eyes and so on.\(^4\) Both of these possibilities are identified in Sthiramati's Commentary on (Vasubandhu's)
"Thirty Stanzas" as observed objects of the mind-basis-of-all.\(^5\)

Maitreya's Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes speaks of (1) a consciousness—the basis-of-all—which perceives sense objects and the sentient [sense powers], (2) a consciousness—the afflicted mentality—which perceives a self [within observing the basis-of-all], and (3) consciousnesses—the engaging consciousnesses—which perceive the knowledges, "Consciousnesses which perceive sense objects, / The sentient, self, and knowledges arise."\(^6\) Similarly, here [in Ďzung-ka-Ђa's text] the sense powers and so forth which are conjoined with mind are indicated by the term "the sentient".

Chittamātrins Following Scripture give the name "knowledge" (vijñāpti) to dependent phenomena. Asaṅga enumerates fifteen in his Compendium of the Mahāyāna, among which are distributed forms, consciousnesses, and non-associated compositional factors, the objects of the five sense consciousnesses and the mental consciousness.\(^7\) A dependent phenomenon is called a knowledge not because it is a cognitive entity but because although it appears to exist as an object external to the consciousness apprehending it, it and that consciousness are a single entity.\(^8\)
If the observed objects of the basis-of-all are divided by way of terminological expression, three are set forth, the latencies [being the third].

To discuss how a phenomenon is divided by way of terminological expression is to present the different phenomena which are designated with the name given to that phenomenon, without regard to whether or not they actually are that phenomenon.

The five sense objects, five sense powers, and the latencies are all called observed objects of the mind-basis-of-all, but only the first two actually are. The problem with the latencies being actual objects observed by the fruitional basis-of-all is that they are designations for the possession by the basis-of-all of states of potential, and are not separate substantial entities. If they were actual observed objects of the mind-basis-of-all, the mind-basis-of-all would then have to perceive itself, and this is inadmissible.

The latencies, however, are not actual observed objects. Ðzong-ka-Ña's Root Verses explains that it is on account of the latencies that the perceptions of environments and beings arise: the "abodes," supports
of the sense powers, the "sense objects" or the five sense objects, and the "bodies" or the sense powers and so forth. Hence, the latencies are merely imputed as observed objects. Ďzong-ka-ActivityCreated says:

Because the perception of abodes,
Sense objects, and bodies is due to seeds,
[Seeds] are held to be observed objects.¹¹

Ďzong-ka-ActivityCreated says:

Although it is not the case that the seeds become objects through appearing [to the basis-of-all], they are posited as observed objects because it is due to them that the fruitional basis-of-all comes to perceive environments and beings: abodes (the supports of the sense powers), bodies (the sense powers), and the five sense objects. It is like, for example, the assertion of an object as an observed object [of a consciousness] because even though that [object] does not appear, it is due to it that the consciousness arises in its aspect.¹²

Ge'u-tsang explains this example as the well known one of that facsimile of direct perception
in which trees being observed from a boat moving on a river are seen to move. This consciousness arises in dependence on the trees and, although moving trees do not appear to the consciousness, they are said to be its observed object. 13

The fruitional basis-of-all thus has as observed objects the following:

(1) the five sense objects—any physical phenomenon in the environment appearing to it,
(2) the five physical sense powers in its own continuum,
(3) the gross physical bases of those sense powers—the eyes and so on,
(4) the non-physical aggregates (in the case of a basis-of-all of the Formless Realm),
(5) the latencies—designated observed objects but, in fact, not objects appearing to the basis-of-all.

Aspect of the Basis-of-All

The aspect [of the mind-basis-of-all] is non-determining and unclear. Thus, although these environments and beings appear [to the basis-of-all, it] is unable to induce ascertainment of them.
The environments and beings which are the observed objects of the mind-basis-of-all appear to it but are not clearly perceived in the sense of being ascertained by the basis-of-all. Thus, the aspect of the basis-of-all, the way in which it engages its objects, is unclear or non-determining: when a sound appears to it, it cannot determine that its object is a sound, nor can it induce later ascertainment of the sound.\textsuperscript{14}

Because the mind-basis-of-all is a cognitive phenomenon, its nature is to be clear and knowing.\textsuperscript{15} Moreover, because it is a direct perceiver—that is, because it perceives its objects without the mediation of an abstract mental image as do conceptual cognizers—the mind-basis-of-all is a mind to which objects clearly appear. Nonetheless, from the viewpoint of its non-determinative way of knowing its objects, it is unclear. Among the seven types of cognitive phenomena presented in Ge-luk literature on mind and epistemology, the mind-basis-of-all is a mind to which an object appears, but which cannot ascertain or induce later ascertainment of that object (Tibetan: \textit{snang la ma nges pa'i blo}).\textsuperscript{16}
Both Vasubandhu's *Thirty Stanzas* (*Trimśiṇa*) and Ēzong-ka-ba's *Root Verses* say [that the mind-basis-of-all] "Although unknowing, is a knower."\(^{17}\)

The basis-of-all is a knower in that it is a cognition and, therefore, an object appears to it. It is unknowing because it is unable to induce ascertainment of that object.\(^{18}\) It is a mind which does not realize its object—it does not eliminate superimpositions with regards to its object.\(^{19}\)

Vinītadeva's *Explanation of (Sthiramati's) 'Commentary on (Vasubandhu's) 'Thirty Stanzas'"* says:

That [mind-basis-of-all] is [and has] a thoroughly unclear observed object and has a thoroughly unclear aspect.\(^{20}\)

Also:

A mind-basis-of-all does not know, through an individual knowledge of its own,\(^{21}\) that "This is this."\(^{22}\)

The observed object of the mind-basis-of-all is unclear because of being indeterminate.

The aspect—the way in which it engages objects—
is unclear because the mind-basis-of-all does not determine its object.

The mind-basis-of-all is not a consciousness which is able to think of its object in a determinative manner, "This is this," because it is not a conceptual consciousness.

Accompaniers of the Basis-of-All
The accompaniers [of the mind-basis-of-all] are definitely just the five omnipresent mental factors.

The five omnipresent mental factors are those five which according to Vasubandhu's Thirty Stanzas invariably accompany all main minds: feeling (vedanā), discrimination (samjñā), attention (cetanā), mental engagement (manaskāra), and contact (sparśa).

Among them, the [mental factor] feeling is neutral only.

Neutral (upekṣa) here does not mean that which is neither virtuous nor non-virtuous; rather, it is that feeling which is neither pleasure nor pain—the absence of both.

The following passage occurs in Œzong-ka-Œa's Root Verses:
Its accompaniers] are fixed at five:
contact and so forth.
The [accompanying] feeling is the middle one.\textsuperscript{24}

Because [the basis-of-all] is undefiled and neutral there is little question that other [mental factors would accompany it].

There are fifty-one mental factors in all: five omnipresent, five determining objects, eleven virtuous, six root afflictions, twenty secondary afflictions, and four variable.\textsuperscript{25}

The five mental factors determining objects are: aspiration (chanda), belief (adhimoksa), mindfulness (smrti), stabilization (samādhi), and wisdom (prajñā). They accompany only virtuous minds;\textsuperscript{26} thus, since the mind-basis-of-all is neutral, they are not accompaniers of it.

The virtuous and afflicted mental factors are not accompaniers of the basis-of-all for the same reason.

There is, however, a slight basis for an examination into the variable [mental factors].

The four variable mental factors are sleep (mīḍḍha), contrition (kaukṛtya), investigation (vitarka), and analysis (vicāra).\textsuperscript{27}
Any mental factor that accompanies the basis-of-all must consistently accompany it in any meditative stabilization or rebirth. Investigation and analysis, however, are present only in the Desire Realm and the first of the four levels of the Form Realm, the first concentration. Furthermore, sleep exists only in minds belonging to the Desire Realm. Thus, these three mental factors cannot follow the mind-basis-of-all to the higher levels of the Form Realm or to the Formless Realm.

Contrition is not an accompanier of the basis-of-all because it ascertains its object; for, contrition is an attitude which determines that some action of body, speech, or mind ought not to have been done and is contrite about it.

Thus, why Gung-tang feels there is a "slight basis for an examination into the variable [mental factors]" is unclear.

**Operation of the Basis-of-All**

Asaṅga discusses [the operation of the basis-of-all] under five headings in the *Compendium of Ascertainties*: (1) its operation in the context of the objects which it observes;
(2) its operation in the context of the accompaniers with which it is in similar association; (3) its operation in the context of the engaging consciousnesses and the like and it acting as causes of each other; (4) the number of collections of consciousness in conjunction with which it operates; and (5) its own actual operation. The *Compendium of Ascertainments* says:

Observed objects, associates,
The one being a cause for the other,
Conjunctions, and operation of the entity.  

The first four are explained either above or below [in this book].

The objects and accompaniers of the basis-of-all have already been discussed in general (pp. 354ff.). The mutual interaction between the basis-of-all and the engaging consciousnesses will be discussed later (pp. 596-619), as will the number of consciousnesses in conjunction with which a basis-of-all operates (pp. 441-9, 456-9, 726-45, 750-57).

Gung-tang, in quoting this summary verse from Asaṅga's *Compendium of Ascertainments* (*Viniścayasaṃgrahani*), takes a different tack from Đzong-ka-ba's presentation of mind-basis-of-all. Đzong-ka-ba relies mainly on Asaṅga's
Compendium of the Mahāyāna, Vasubandhu's Thirty Stanzas, and the Indian commentaries on these works, although his presentation of proofs for the existence of the basis-of-all is indirectly based on that in the Compendium of Ascertainments. In the generation just prior to Đzong-ka-Băa, however, the influential philosopher and historian Bu-don (Bu-ston, 1290-1364) based his presentation of the operation and cessation of the mind-basis-of-all on this summary verse and Asaṅga's exposition of it.

Whereas Bu-don follows Asaṅga's exposition, in the Compendium of Ascertainments, of the operation of the basis-of-all through four topics—the fourth being the entities which arise in conjunction with it—Gung-tang gives this verse a novel interpretation, dividing the last topic into two topics: phenomena arising in conjunction with the mind-basis-of-all and entity of the mind-basis-of-all.

The fifth [the operation of the entity of the basis-of-all], taken from the point of view of continuity, is that it operates beginninglessly.

Cyclic existence (samsāra) is said to have no beginning. This means that individual sentient
beings are each products of beginningless continuums of rebirth. Since the mind-basis-of-all is the illustration of the ego which takes rebirth in life after life, it continuously exists from time without beginning.

The operation [of the basis-of-all] as a linking of former and later lives is discussed in Vasubandhu's Thirty Stanzas:

Once the previous fruition is exhausted
The latencies of actions, along with the latencies$^{36}$
Of the dual apprehension [of subject and object],
Produce thus another fruition.$^{37}$

The previous fruition is the frutional basis-of-all of a previous lifetime. When it has fulfilled its time as appropriator of that lifetime and is exhausted, that lifetime ends and another frutional basis-of-all is produced. This new basis-of-all is created by a latency; its creation is assisted by latencies which have been established by the wrong conception of subject and object as a duality. In Chittamātra, this misconception is the final root of cyclic existence.

The latencies established by actions are, in a former life, nurtured by the latencies established by perception of a duality of apprehended object and apprehending subject.
Out of this is created the fruitional basis-of-all of this life. When this [fruitional basis-of-all] is exhausted, [latencies having been] nurtured as before, further fruitional bases-of-all arise.

Hence, [the basis-of-all] is not permanent as is the self of other [i.e., non-Buddhist] sects, nor is the substratum [connecting] an action with its effect annihilated. For, Sthiramati's commentary [on this verse in his Explanations of (Vasubandhu's) "Thirty Stanzas"] says:

That being the case, not just the latencies of actions but the latencies of actions conjoined with the latencies of the dual apprehension [of subject and object] produce a fruition.\(^{38}\)

Sthiramati also says:

The line, "Once the previous fruition is exhausted" eliminates the extreme of permanence. The line, "Produce [thus] another fruition" eliminates the extreme of annihilation.\(^{39}\)

Buddhist philosophers all seek to present a middle way avoiding the two extremes. The extreme of permanence, in the sense of a static, unchanging self, is courted by Chittamātrins when they assert a mind-basis-of-all. However,
the basis-of-all is a phenomenon which is produced by causes--latencies, which are themselves created by actions and erroneous conceptions of subject-object duality--and which ceases when the impelling force from these latencies is exhausted. Thus, it is not permanent in the sense of the independent, static self asserted by non-Buddhist Indian philosophies such as Saṃkhya and Vedānta.

The extreme of annihilation--that of the non-existence of any unifying and connecting factor by which an individual can be said to experience the fruits of his own actions--is avoided through the assertion that a fruitional consciousness is always present during life and is followed, without interruption, by the new fruitional consciousness belonging to the next lifetime.

Point of Cessation of a Basis-of-All

[A basis-of-all] ceases with attainment of [the position of] Hinayāna Poe Destroyer or Mahāyāna eighth ground.

Dzong-ka-Ba's Root Verses says:
Therefore, [a Bodhisattva] who has attained power
And a [Hīnayānīst] Foe Destroyer have no basis-of-all
Because of not having the two reasons for positing
[something a "basis-of-all"]. 40

Vasubandhu's Thirty Stanzas says, "When one is a Destroyer
[the basis-of-all] ceases." 41

A Bodhisattva, when he attains the eighth
ground, attains ten powers; thus, he is called
a Bodhisattva who has attained power. The ten
powers are: 42

(1) power over lifespan,
(2) power over contemplation,
(3) power over adornment,
(4) power over actions,
(5) power over birth,
(6) power over imagination,
(7) power over aspirational prayer,
(8) power over magical emanation,
(9) power over doctrine,
(10) power over exalted wisdom.

A Bodhisattva who has attained the eighth ground
no longer takes rebirth due to actions and
afflictions. However, he does make a pretense
of embodiment in order to complete the collections
of merit and exalted wisdom. 43
Because Bodhisattvas of the eighth ground and above, as well as Hearer and Solitary Realizer Foe Destroyers, have destroyed the foe which is the afflictions, there is no reason for calling any phenomenon within their continuums a basis-of-all. The two reasons for positing something a "basis-of-all" are the following. (1) The frutional basis-of-all is called a basis-of-all because of being the basis which the afflicted mentality treats in all sentient beings as a self. It is a basis-of-all in the sense of being such a basis or object of the afflicted mentality in all sentient beings. (2) The seed basis-of-all is called a basis-of-all because of being the cause of thoroughly afflicted phenomena, and because of being the medium connecting these phenomena with their causes.

Thus, because both criteria for using the term "basis-of-all" specify the presence of afflictive phenomena and because pure ground Bodhisattvas and Foe Destroyers have no afflictions, Šōzōn-ka-bā says they have no bases-of-all. This, nonetheless, does not contradict a previous passage in Šōzōn-ka-bā's Root Verses which says, "It operates
without discontinuity until remainderless/ Nirvāṇa or
the vajra-like [meditative stabilization]."47 This
[passage] refers to the fruitional consciousness.

According to Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophers
there are two types of Hīnayāna Foe Destroyers:
those in a nirvāṇa with remainder of psychophysical aggregates (sopadhiśesanirvāṇa) and
those who have attained a remainderless nirvāṇa
(nirupadhiśesanirvāṇa). The former are Foe Destro-
ers who still possess body and mind impelled by
actions and afflictions from previous lives;
the latter—according to Chittamātrins Following
Scripture—are Foe Destroyers who have died and
given up psychophysical aggregates.48 A fru-
itional consciousness which is the continuation
of substantial entity of the mind-basis-of-all
is operative in a Foe Destroyer who is in a
nirvāṇa with remainder of aggregates. It
ceases with the death of the Foe Destroyer and
his attainment of remainderless nirvāṇa.

Similarly, this fruitional consciousness—
which is not a "basis-of-all" because neither
of the two criteria for using the term apply
to it—operates in practitioners of the Mahāyāna
paths through the eighth, ninth, and tenth
Bodhisattva grounds. It operates until the last period of the tenth ground, the vajra-like meditative stabilization (vajropamasamādhi), and ceases with the immediately subsequent attainment of Buddhahood. This is the position of Go-mang College.

Lo-sel-Ileng College holds a different position. Following Pan-chen Sö-nam-drak-Ṭa, they say that there does exist a basis-of-all in Foe Destroyers with remainder of aggregates and in pure ground (eighth, ninth, and tenth ground) Bodhisattvas. What has ceased is the basis-of-all which is treated as a self by the afflicted mentality. The basis-of-all operating at that time is the type basis-of-all (Tibetan: rigs kyi kun gzhi), the basis of the etymology of "basis-of-all." Whereas Go-mang scholars must explain the seeming contradiction raised by Đzong-ka-Ṭa's saying that the basis-of-all "operates without discontinuity until remainderless nirvāṇa," Lo-sel-Ileng scholars have to deal with the passage in Đzong-ka-Ṭa's Difficult Topics which is the source for the Go-mang position:
Therefore [a Mahāyānist] who has attained power
And a [Hīnayānist] Poe Destroyer have no
basis-of-all
Because of not having the two reasons for
positing [something a "basis-of-all"].\textsuperscript{53}

In order to prove that there is more than one
valid usage for the term "basis-of-all" and,
therefore, that those who "have no basis-of-all"
do not necessarily have no basis-of-all in any
sense, the Lo-śel-īing textbook on mind-basis-
of-all adduces ǖzong-ka-ābā's own commentary on
this verse:

Saying, when presenting eight consciousnesses,
that the mind-basis-of-all is the eighth is
in consideration of the type [of consciousness]
and not the substantial entity.\textsuperscript{54}

The context of this passage, however, strongly
suggests that ǖzong-ka-ābā intends that a con-
sciousness of the type of the mind-basis-of-all
is not necessarily a basis-of-all; for, whereas
the fruitional consciousness is of the type of
the basis-of-all, it is not necessarily a basis-
of-all.
Dzong-ka-śa says:

*Question*: Given that there is no mind-basis-of-all in the continuum of [a Bodhisattva] who has attained power or in the continuum of a Foe Destroyer, ought one to assert eight consciousnesses in their continuums, or not? If one is so to assert, there would then [absurdly] be a mind-basis-of-all in their continuums; for, otherwise, there would exist a consciousness not included in the eight collections of consciousness. If one is not so to assert, one loses [the existence of] a fruition operating up until the vajra-like [meditative stabilization] or the remainderless [nirvāṇa].

*Answer*: There is no fallacy. Although whatever is a mind-basis-of-all is necessarily a fruition, whatever is a frutional consciousness is not necessarily a basis-of-all. For, although [Bodhisattvas] who have attained power and Foe Destroyers have a frutional consciousness, they have no [consciousness which has] the meaning of a basis-of-all. Thus, the two faults [mentioned above] do not occur.
Saying, when presenting eight consciousnesses, that the mind-basis-of-all is the eighth is in consideration of the type [of consciousness] and not substantial entity. 55

Đöng-ka-ṣa reiterates this position when discussing the absence of an afflicted mentality in pure ground Bodhisattvas and Foe Destroyers:

Although there exists, in [Bodhisattvas] who have attained power and in Foe Destroyers, the mentality's substantial entity of clarity and awareness, it is not called an afflicted mentality [but, rather, is called the seventh mentality]. Although there exists in them a fruitional consciousness, it is not called "basis-of-all." This is because the meanings of [afflicted mentality and basis-of-all] are incomplete [in these cases]. 56

Although the actual basis-of-all ceases with [attainment of] the eighth ground, an abandonment of the contaminated factor of the continuum [of substantial entity of the basis-of-all] is posited after transformation into uncontaminated, mirror-like wisdom [at Buddhahood].
The continuum of substantial entity of the mind-basis-of-all is the fruitional consciousness. It is contaminated (sāsrava) because even though the afflictions have been abandoned, there are still propensities in it for the erroneous conception of a self of phenomena. Only a Buddha has abandoned the conception of a self of phenomena and its latencies.

A Buddha has no latencies and no basis of infusion for latencies. At the end of the continuum of sentient being, i.e., during the vajra-like meditative stabilization immediately preceding the attainment of Buddhahood, the seeds of uncontaminated wisdom simultaneously blossom to their fullest potential and serve as the cause for the subsequent continuous operation of a Buddha's omniscient consciousnesses. Thus, a Buddha's consciousnesses do not operate in dependence on the continual activation of fresh latencies.

There is a transformation of the eight consciousnesses into four exalted wisdoms simultaneous with the abandonment of all obstructions to omniscience without remainder and attainment of Buddhahood: the eighth or
fruitional consciousness becomes the mirror-like wisdom (ādarśajñāna), the seventh mentality becomes the wisdom of equality (samatājñāna), the mental consciousness becomes the wisdom of analysis (pratyaveksajñāna), and the sense consciousnesses become the wisdom of achievement of activities (krtyānusthānjñāna). 60

For, Asaṅga's Compendium of Ascertainments says, "It is said that a mind-basis-of-all is abandoned as soon as it is transformed." 61

It is difficult to hold that the mind-basis-of-all is an object of abandonment, in spite of the fact that it is said to be abandoned. Its contaminated component--the latencies of the obstructions to omniscience--are an object of abandonment, but not the mind-basis-of-all or its continuation, the fruitional consciousness.

The situation is similar to that of inferential cognition (anumāna). Although inferential cognition is used in the Ge-luk practice of meditation as a precursor and aid to the development of a non-conceptual cognition--direct prime cognition (pratyakṣaprāmaṇa)--its nature of being an incontrovertible cognition, which it shares with direct prime cognition, is not
an object of abandonment. In the same way, although one component of the fruitional consciousness is to be abandoned, there is also a component that becomes the mirror-like wisdom.\footnote{62}


Chandragomin is reported by the historian Tāranātha to have carried on a seven year long debate with the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika patriarch Chandrakīrti in which Chandragomin took the position of ASAṅga and defended Chittamātra.\footnote{63}
Chapter Eight
Latencies

DIVISIONS OF THE BASIS-OF-ALL

If [the basis-of-all] is divided by way of terminological expression, two are set forth: that which is the support, or the fruitional basis-of-all, and what is supported on that—the seed basis-of-all.

Ḍzong-ka-bṣa makes this differentiation of bases-of-all in his Root Verses:

From among the two definitions—[those of basis-of-all and afflicted mentality]—the definition

Of the basis-of-all is asserted to have two aspects

Due to its division into support and that supported.¹

The fruitional factor of the basis-of-all is a support in the sense of being the base in which the seed factor, the latencies, are infused.

One of the synonyms for the fruitional basis-of-all is "that having all the seeds."²
For Chittamātrins Following Scripture, seed (bīja), latency (vāsanā), and potency (śakti, samartha) are synonyms.
The former is the actual basis-of-all; the latter and the latencies which are with the basis-of-all are synonyms.

In this system, two phenomena are called basis-of-all, but only one of those two is an actual basis-of-all—the fruitional basis-of-all.³

The seed basis-of-all is called a basis-of-all because thoroughly afflicted phenomena are on some occasions its causes and on other occasions its effects, making it the basis for all these phenomena.⁴ Thoroughly afflicted phenomena include the afflictions, actions, and rebirths.⁵

As regards [the seed basis-of-all], entity and divisions [are explained].

Entity of the Seed Basis-of-All. The entity is discussed in the following passage of Ădzong-ka-Ăa's Root Verses:

The supported—the seed basis-of-all--
Is the potencies which have been deposited
By the infusers in the basis of infusion
When [those infusers] approach cessation.⁶
Any one of the seven collections [of consciousness] which are infusers deposits a particular potency with the mind-basis-of-all. This potency is suitable for the creation of either a subsequent [consciousness] of the same type or a particular effect such as a fruition.

The Ge-luk presentation of causality, based on Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Higher Knowledge* (2.55-56), admits five types of effects: fruitional effects (*vipākaphala*), empowered effects (*adhipatiphala*), causally concordant effects (*nīsyandaphala*), personally made effects (*puruṣakāraphala*), and separative effects (*visamśogaphala*). Separative effects are, in fact, not effects at all, but are uncaused phenomena--true cessations (i.e., cessations of obstructions in the mind).

Potencies are infused in the mind-basis-of-all by seven consciousnesses: the five sense consciousnesses, the mental consciousness, and the afflicted mentality. A potency can be conducive to the production of a fruitional effect (for instance, a future basis-of-all), an empowered effect (for instance, the environment in which a sentient being lives), or a causally concordant effect (in this case, the renewed production of a particular consciousness after
its continuum has been interrupted). 9 Personally made effects and empowered effects are the same. 10

Divisions of the Seed Basis-of-All. There are divisions [of seeds] into six, into three, and into two groups of four.

Ḍzong-ka-pañ presents these four ways of classifying latencies in the Difficult Topics; 11 his source is Asaṅga's Compendium of the Mahāyāna. There, the division into six is made in the context of presenting seeds; the divisions into three and four, however, are given as divisions of the mind-basis-of-all. 12

Asaṅga's use of the term "basis-of-all" for the latencies suggests itself as the reason Ḍzong-ka-pañ speaks of a twofold (support and supported) basis-of-all. However, the latencies are not a substantially existent basis-of-all, but are merely designations for states of potential in the actual basis-of-all.

The division into six is from Asaṅga's Compendium of the Mahāyāna:

These—the external, the internal,
The two which are urmanifest,
The conventional, and the ultimate--
Are asserted to be the six types of seeds.¹³

The root division is into two, external seeds such as rice and the internal seeds located in a basis-of-all. Because these two do not manifest either as virtuous or non-virtuous phenomena, but are neutral, there is again a count of two: the unmanifest external and the unmanifest internal.

Asaṅga's intent here is not to differentiate between types of latencies but to eliminate confusion concerning the use of the term "seed" (bīja) for the latencies with the mind-basis-of-all.

Both external seeds such as rice and barley and internal seeds (the potencies with the basis-of-all) are causes because of directly and indirectly producing effects. A grain of rice directly produces a shoot of rice and indirectly acts as a cause for the stem and other parts of the mature plant. An internal seed directly produces a sentient being's psychophysical aggregates; it indirectly acts as their cause until the sentient being's death.¹⁴ The two differ in that, like all phenomena of cyclic existence and nirvāṇa, external seeds owe their existence to internal seeds.
Both external and internal seeds are neutral phenomena insofar as they are neither virtuous nor non-virtuous in themselves. Here, in an uncommon use of the word, this neutrality is called unmanifest. There are no "manifest" seeds in this sense of the term. The internal seeds, however, since they are conduits linking consciousnesses with their effects, may give rise to either virtuous or non-virtuous effects.\textsuperscript{15}

[Further, external and internal seeds] are, respectively, conventional and ultimate. [External seeds are conventional] because of being just the measure of what appears for an external, conventional consciousness. [Internal seeds are ultimate] because of being final seeds which can bear internal analysis. Thus there is again a count of two.

External seeds are conventional (samvrta) in the sense of being objects of the sense consciousnesses; their existence and characteristics are established without examination or analysis, through public consensus.\textsuperscript{16} Internal seeds are ultimates (paramāarthika) which are not known by sense consciousnesses but are established by reasoned analysis. They are termed ultimates because all phenomena arise in dependence on them.\textsuperscript{17}
Care must be taken to distinguish this use of conventional and ultimate from that in the terms "conventional truth" (samvṛttisatya) and "ultimate truth" (paramārthasatya). Only emptinesses (thoroughly established phenomena) are ultimate truths, whereas both internal and external seeds are impermanent and, therefore, dependent phenomena which are necessarily conventional truths.18 As the term is used here, ultimacy seems to refer to a causal primacy which is known through an analytical mental consciousness and not uncritically perceived by sense consciousnesses obscured with respect to the true nature of things.

It is merely the isolate factors which are divided into six; [all] are included in the two former categories [of external and internal seeds].

To say that the isolate factors are divided into six is to say that external and internal seeds may be thought of in terms of these six categories. The isolate factors are what appear to a thought or conceptual consciousness; they are different aspects of what are, for direct perception, merely two kinds of things.
The division into three is set forth in Ðzong-ka- belly's Root Verses:

Alternatively, there are three latencies:

[those] of verbalization,
The false view of self, and the causal branches
of existence.¹⁹

This is the most common way of classifying
latencies.²⁰

The latencies of verbalization serve as the causes for
applying designations to phenomena, "This is such and
such."

According to Ðzong-ka-ba, latencies of verbaliza-
tion (abhilāpavāsanā) are seeds which produce
verbalizing mental consciousnesses—conscious-
nesses designating terms such as "eye," "form,"
and so forth.²¹ Such consciousnesses are concep-tual mental consciousnesses, as opposed to
direct perception.²²

Asaṅga, in the Compendium of the Mahāyāna,
identifies these latencies as those—among the
three types of latencies indicated here—from
which arise the first nine of the "knowledges"
(vijñapti), a Chittamātrin term for dependent
phenomena. (As Jam-ţyang-shay-ba points out,
however, all existents are included within the first nine knowledges.) \(^{23}\) Latencies of verbalization are the seeds for: \(^{24}\)

1. knowledge of the body (the five sense powers),
2. knowledge of the embodied (the afflicted mentality),
3. knowledge of the enjoyer (the mind constituent, i.e., the mental consciousness),
4. knowledge of what is used by those (the six object constituents),
5. knowledge making use of those (the six consciousness constituents),
6. knowledge of time (the continuity of cyclic existence),
7. knowledge of enumeration (numbering),
8. knowledge of location (the environment world),
9. knowledge of conventions (the four conventions: the seen \([\text{dr̥sta}]\), the heard \([\text{śruta}]\), the known \([\text{vijñāta}]\), and the understood \([\text{mata}]\)). \(^{25}\)

In Đōng-ka-Đā's interpretation, calling the latencies of verbalization the seeds of the mental consciousness is from the viewpoint of the pre-
dominant effects of those latencies. All nine of these knowledges arise from the latencies of verbalization, and not from the other two types of latencies, and they are all phenomena which are objects of verbalization by mental consciousnesses. 26

These nine knowledges include the five sense consciousnesses, the mental consciousness, the afflicted mentality, and all of their objects. The nine are not mutually exclusive. The latencies of the false view of self generate the constant thought, "I."

The tenth and eleventh of the fifteen knowledges—the perceptions of self and other—arise from the latencies of the false view of a self (ātmadrṣṭivāsana). 27

The latencies of the causal branches of existence are the creators of birth and death in the migrations. The twelfth through fifteenth of the knowledges arise from the latencies of the causal branches of existence (bhavaṅgavāsana): 28

(12) knowledge of pleasant migrations (humans and gods),

(13) knowledge of unpleasant migrations (animals, hungry ghosts, hell-beings),
(14) knowledge of death,
(15) knowledge of birth.

These latencies produce fruitions (vipāka). 29

[These three] are deposited, respectively, by the mental consciousness, the afflicted mentality, and virtuous and non-virtuous actions.

Latencies of verbalization are deposited only by the mental consciousness and its accompaniers. 30
Latencies of the false view of a self are deposited by the afflicted mentality and its accompaniers. 31
Latencies of the causal branches of existence are deposited by either virtuous or non-virtuous actions. 32

[Dzong-ka-ba] explains that they are also called latencies of elaboration, latencies of the false view of the transitory collection as real I and mine, and latencies of dreams, 33 respectively.

Latencies of verbalization are called latencies of elaboration because they are the seeds for the mental consciousness' moving out to various objects. 34 Latencies of the false view of self are called latencies of the false view of the transitory collection as real I and mine because of being the seeds of the afflicted mentality. 35

The afflicted mentality perceives the mind-basis-
of-all (one of the psychophysical aggregates which are collections of transitory phenomena) as a substantial self.

Gung-tang's source for calling the latencies of the causal branches of existence latencies of dream is unclear, although the reference is doubtless to the dream-like nature of cyclic existence.\textsuperscript{36} \v{D}zong-ka-\textasciitilde{6}a calls them latencies of fruition in that their maturation is in the entities of fruition.\textsuperscript{37}

Bu-\textasciitilde{d}on lists, without attribution, the following synonyms: for the first type, latencies of dualistic conception, of elaboration, and concordant with cause; for the second, latencies of the false view of the transitory collection; for the third, latencies of action and of fruition.\textsuperscript{38}

The first of the two groups of four are [two terms for] latencies which create environments and [two terms for latencies which create] beings. These two are called, respectively, the latencies [creating] what is shared and [those creating] what is unshared, or the latencies [for the arising] of the unfeeling and [those for the arising] of what has feeling.\textsuperscript{39}
Latencies creating what is shared are types that participate in creating a public environment shared by many beings. This communality is a quality of the effect, not the consciousness depositing the latency. They are called latencies for the unfeeling because the external environment which is their effect is not conjoined with consciousness.

The latencies creating what is unshared result in creation of an individual's body and mind. Since these phenomena are conjoined with mind in that they are bases for pleasure and pain, the latencies producing them are said to be latencies for the feeling.

The second group of four are called the latencies of the assumption of bad situations, the latencies of the thoroughly purified, latencies which have been used, and latencies which have not been used. These four are [respectively] seeds of the thoroughly afflicted, of the completely purified, of actions when their projected effect has taken place, and the latencies of verbalization.

Đông-ka-ba's second group of four is presented in the Compendium of the Mahāyāna as two groups of two. This two-fold grouping is followed by Bu-don as well.
However they are grouped, the latencies of the assumption of bad situations are seeds for the creation of thoroughly afflicted phenomena, and the latencies of the thoroughly purified are seeds for the creation of purified phenomena. 46

Latencies which have been used are latencies which have given rise to the effect projected by the virtuous and non-virtuous minds which deposited them. 47 Although they no longer have any potency, they are still called latencies. 48 It appears, then, that latencies which have been used are not latencies. What Asaṅga means by calling them latencies is not at all clear.

The first of these are easy to understand. The meaning of [the fourth, the latencies] which have not been used should be taken to be the following. They are the latencies of verbalization which, beginninglessly, occur innately. Because they are experienced as long as the factor of the mistaken appearance of duality has not been eliminated by its antidote, they are inexhaustible.

Latencies are not unchanging entities resting passive in the mind-basis-of-all but are nurtured and developed by other latencies, for instance, by those deposited by the misconception of a duality of subject and object. 49 The latencies
of verbalization, as a class, remain productive until dualistic appearance has been eradicated at Buddhahood. Thus, they are called latencies which have not been used.

It is incorrect to apply the former reasoning and assert that [the latencies which have not been used] are latencies of actions whose projected effects have not arisen. 50 For, Dzong-ka-BA's Commentary on the Difficult Topics says:

The seeds which have not been used are the latencies of verbalization because they have arisen beginning-lessly. 51
Chapter Nine
Terminology

The two, the synonyms and etymology [of "basis-of-all"] are easy to understand when they are explained in one place.

[The mind-basis-of-all] is spoken of in the Mahāyāna canon as: (1) the basis of objects of knowledge because of being the basis of the three natures—the objects of knowledge, (2) that which has all the seeds because of serving as the support for all seeds, and (3) the appropriating consciousness because of appropriating a fruitional body.

Basis of Objects of Knowledge. Asaṅga's Compendium of the Mahāyāna begins with a discussion of the mind-basis-of-all as the basis of objects of knowledge (see above, pp.212-214). Asaṅga's scriptural source is the Sūtra on Higher Knowledge (Abhidharmasūtra, quoted by Gung-tang below, p. 421), "It is the source (dhātu) without beginning/ The basis of all phenomena."
Vasubandhu, discussing this quote, glosses "source" as cause.² Asvabhāva agrees that source means cause or seed, and adds that because another word meaning cause would be redundant, the term "basis" (samaśraya) in this passage definitely means support.³ Sthiramati, in his commentary on Vasubandhu's Thirty Stanzas, identifies the mind-basis-of-all as the support or locus (sthāna) of the seeds of all thoroughly afflicted phenomena and asserts that basis-of-all and support are synonymous.⁴

How, then, is the mind-basis-of-all the source or basis of all objects of knowledge in terms of being the basis of the three natures? The three natures are imaginaries, dependent phenomena, and thoroughly established phenomena; they encompass permanent (uncaused) as well as caused, impermanent phenomena. Hence, the basis-of-all cannot be their basis in a strictly causal sense. The basis-of-all is, in fact, the cause only of dependent phenomena, and this by means of the seeds infused in it. It is only because imaginaries and thoroughly established phenomena occur only in dependence on dependent phenomena that the mind-basis-of-all may be said to be their source.
In ontological terms, imaginaries such as a rabbit's horns or a self-sufficient person (a self of persons) are imputed in reliance on certain dependent phenomena. Similarly, thoroughly established phenomena—emptiness or selflessness—are qualities of the dependent phenomena which are their bases. (One always speaks of something's emptiness.) Since dependent phenomena occur due to the maturation of latencies in the mind-basis-of-all, they and their dependents—imaginaries and thoroughly established phenomena—rely for their existence on the basis-of-all.5

Considered epistemologically, the dependence of the three natures on the mind-basis-of-all rests on the fact that the existence of all phenomena—existent imaginaries, dependent phenomena, and thoroughly established phenomena—is certified by prime cognition (prāmaṇa) and the imputation of non-existent imaginaries involves the thought consciousnesses apprehending them. Both prime cognition and thought consciousnesses are dependent phenomena, and, thus, their existence depends on the activation of latencies in the mind-basis-of-all. Since without these
cognitions there is no certification of their objects, all phenomena are based on the mind-basis-of-all.  

That Which Has All the Seeds. The source for this designation is, again, the Sūtra on Higher Knowledge as quoted in the Compendium of the Mahāyāna, "The consciousness which has all seeds/ Of all phenomena is the basis-of-all." Vasubandhu, in his Thirty Stanzas, also characterizes the basis-of-all in this way, "There, the consciousness called basis-of-all/ [Is] the fruition having all the seeds."  

Gung-tang explains having all seeds as being the support for all seeds: the mind-basis-of-all is the basis of infusion for the internal seeds, that is, the latencies, and it is the support for all external seeds in that, being dependent phenomena, they are caused by it (see below, p. 686).

Appropriating Consciousness. The physical support of a new lifetime is appropriated not by something material but by consciousness.
(ādānavijñāna) is the mind-basis-of-all. The *Compendium of the Mahāyāna* quotes the Sūtra Unravelling the Thought, "The appropriating consciousness, profound and subtle/ Carries all seeds, like a current of water."\(^{10}\)

Gung-tang's allusion to a *fruitional body* as that which is appropriated is illustrative of the Go-mang College assertion that the mind-basis-of-all is not the only fruition in Asaṅga's Chittamātra philosophy (see above, pp.329-330).

[The mind-basis-of-all is also spoken of in] the Hīnayāna canon.

There are two principal Hīnayāna tenet systems, Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika. Over the course of the centuries immediately following Buddha's teaching in India, the Hīnayāna schools broke apart several times on doctrinal issues, eventually encompassing eighteen subschools.\(^{11}\)

The four passages cited by Gung-tang here are each from a scripture accepted as valid by one or another of these Hīnayāna subschools to establish their doctrine. They use terminology which, according to Chittamātrins Following Scripture, refers to the mind-basis-of-all. The basis-of-all is not, however, presented explicitly
or fully in them. The first three are adduced by Asaṅga in the *Compendium of the Mahāyāna* in a section presented verbatim by Đzong-ka-ba.\textsuperscript{12} The last, the Saṁmitīya assertion of a fruitional consciousness, is found neither in the *Compendium of the Mahāyāna* nor in its commentaries by Vasubandhu and Asvabhāva. Gung-tang's source would appear to be the anonymous commentary on the *Compendium*, *The Secret Meaning Unveiled*.\textsuperscript{13} Đzong-ka-ba does not refer to this passage as a Hīnayāna reference to mind-basis-of-all.

A scripture of the Mahāsaṃghikas mentions [a consciousness which is] a root consciousness that is so called because of being the root of afflicted phenomena.

The Mahāsaṃghika assertion of a root consciousness (*mūlavijñāna*) is explained by Asaṅga's commentators as being that of a consciousness which is the cause of the other consciousnesses and without which they cannot come into existence.\textsuperscript{14} Gung-tang's calling this the root of afflicted phenomena may be a confusion of this topic with Asaṅga's presentation, followed by Đzong-ka-ba, of the meaning of the term ālaya (*basis-of-all*) as that serving as the cause of all afflicted phenomena.\textsuperscript{15}
A scripture of the Mahāsākas mentions an aggregate of the duration of cyclic existence which is so called because of operating until liberation from cyclic existence.

According to Asvabhāva, three types of aggregates (skandha) are mentioned in this scripture of the Mahāsākas: those that arise and disintegrate every moment, those that last throughout a single lifetime, and that which endures up through the vajra-like meditative stabilization preceding nirvāṇa. The only phenomenon that is able to endure until nirvāṇa is the mind-basis-of-all, and, thus, it is being indicated here under a different name.  

Asaṅga and his commentators allude here to the argument that none of the psychophysical aggregates except for the basis-of-all are continually present throughout all states of cyclic existence, even when form or consciousness is absent, such as in the Formless Realm and the meditative state of non-discrimination (see above, pp. 337–342).  

A scripture of the Sthaviras mentions a consciousness which, because of serving as the cause of existence, is the source of existence.
Asaṅga quotes a stanza from a scripture of the Ārya Sthaviras which says, following Asvabhāva's explanation, that there are seven "engagers," or consciousnesses: the five sense consciousnesses, a thought consciousness, and the causal branch of existence (Sanskrit: bhavaṅga).\(^{18}\) Asvabhāva says that such a consciousness is also spoken of in a scripture of the Vibhajyavādins.\(^{19}\) Vasubandhu, in the *Treatise Establishing Actions* (*Karmasiddhiprakarana*), identifies this as an assertion of the Tāmrashatīyas.\(^{20}\)

The Theravadins (*Thera* is Pali for the Sanskrit *Sthavira*) assert a causal branch of existence (Pali: bhavanga) consciousness, but it is by no means a basis-of-all, lacking, as it does, the requisite of enduring without discontinuity in all states of cyclic existence. The Theravadin causal branch of existence consciousness exists only in the interstices between moments of perception of objects.\(^{21}\)

A scripture of the Sammitīyas mentions a fruitional consciousness which is so called because of being a fruition of contaminated actions.
The Secret Meaning says:

The Sammitīyas, having presented six consciousnesses—the eye [consciousness] and so on—present a fruitional consciousness. . . Because [it] is of another type than the six consciousnesses, [it] is the mind-basis-of-all. 22

As before, Gung-tang's etymology may be a case of confusing contexts. Here, his explanation of the fruitional consciousness (vipākavijñāna) as the fruition of contaminated actions may be a confusion with Sthiramati's explanation of the mind-basis-of-all as a fruitional consciousness "because of being the fruition of a virtuous or non-virtuous action in any realm, migration, rebirth, or lineage." 23 This would indicate a fruition in cyclic existence, making the cause either contaminated virtue or non-virtue. 24 In general, the position of Gung-tang's college is that in Asaṅga's Chittamātra, the cause of a fruition need not be contaminated, for it can give rise to a fruition which is an uncontaminated virtue (see above, p. 329).
[Texts] common to both vehicles mention [a consciousness which is] a mind-basis-of-all because of serving as the basis for all of cyclic existence and nirvāṇa. Although [the names of consciousnesses] indicated in these texts are synonyms, there is no certainty that they are strictly mutually inclusive.

Phenomena whose designations are synonyms (nāmaparyāya) are not necessarily mutually inclusive (ekārtha). For two phenomena to be mutually inclusive, whatever is the one must necessarily be the other and vice versa. This is not necessarily the case with synonyms, as the term is used here.\(^{25}\)

Mind-basis-of-all and fruitional consciousness, according to Gung-tang, are synonymous but not mutually inclusive: although whatever is a mind-basis-of-all is necessarily a fruitional consciousness, whatever is a fruitional consciousness is not necessarily a mind-basis-of-all. An example of a fruitional consciousness which is not a basis-of-all is the fruitional consciousness in the continuum of an eighth ground Bodhisattva.\(^{26}\)

One might think that it is not correct that the designation "basis-of-all" is mentioned [in texts] common to both vehicles because of what Asaṅga's Compendium of
the Mahāyāna says:

Why is it not taught in the Hearer's vehicle (i.e., the Hīnayāna) that this mind is a "mind-basis-of-all" or an "appropriating consciousness"? Because [the mind-basis-of-all] is included within subtle objects of knowledge.

The mind-basis-of-all is not an object within the province of those for whom the Hīnayāna scriptures were specifically taught.

Further, the Compendium of the Mahāyāna says:

This teaching [of ten topics] in this way is not seen elsewhere; since they are seen to be the cause of highest enlightenment, that which excels through teaching these ten topics, the Mahāyāna, is held to be Buddha's word.

The ten topics which are the ways in which the Mahāyāna is superior to the Hīnayāna are detailed above (p. 213-214).

There is no fault such that [the term "basis-of-all" is not mentioned in the Hīnayāna]. For, Dzong-ka-Ba's Root Verses says:
[The mind-basis-of-all] is also taught

In the sacred books of the Hīnayāna

Under its synonyms basis-of-all, root consciousness,

Causal branch of [cyclic] existence, and

aggregate for the duration.\(^{36}\)

Further, the following occurs in the Increasing by One Scripture (Ekottarikāgama), "Beings delight in the basis-of-all, arise from the basis-of-all. . ."\(^{37}\)

The passage from the Increasing by One Scripture is quoted in full in Asaṅga's Compendium of the Mahāyāna and in Āzong-ka-śa's Difficult Topics:

All those who have been born delight in the basis-of-all, rejoice in the basis-of-all, arise from the basis-of-all, take pleasure in the basis-of-all. When, in order to eradicate the basis-of-all, the doctrine is taught to them, they desire to hear it. They focus their hearing, set their minds to understanding all, and practice the doctrine which accords with [this] doctrine. When the Tathāgatas [Buddhas] come into the world, this amazing doctrine also comes into the world.\(^{38}\)
The referent of "basis-of-all" in this passage is variously explained by Hīnayāna interpreters as the five psychophysical aggregates, the feeling of pleasure, and the false view of the transitory aggregates as real I and mine. Ｄzung-ka-Ｂa, following Asaṅga's Compendium of the Mahāyāna, disputes the validity of these interpretations in terms of their lack of universality for "all those who have been born" (see below, pp. 715-719).³⁹

Although Asaṅga, and following him, Ｄzung-ka-Ｂa, present this passage as a Hīnayāna scriptural passage, Gung-tang claims the contrary.⁴⁰ If this were a Hīnayāna sūtra passage, he says, it would absurdly follow that there would be Hīnayānists who were specifically and explicitly taught a basis-of-all. They would then have to accept the non-existence of external objects, something no Hīnayānist does (see below, pp.705ff.).

Therefore, the meaning of the passages from the Compendium of the Mahāyāna is that the nature, demarcation, operation, cessation, and so forth of the basis-of-all are not discussed in the Hīnayāna canon as they are in the Mahāyāna. However, [the meaning of these passages] is not that the
mere designation ["basis-of-all"] does not exist [in the Hīnayāna canon]. For, Asaṅga's Compendium of the Mahāyāna says [as just quoted above], "This teaching [of the ten topics] in this way. . . ."41

The teaching of the first of the ten topics—the mind-basis-of-all, or basis of objects of knowledge—is peculiar to the Mahāyāna when done in this way, in the manner in which it is presented by Chittamātrins and in the Chittamātrin sūtras.

Also, Đzong-ka-Ba's Commentary on the Difficult Topics of Afflicted Mentality and Basis-of-All says:

In the Mahāyāna, the terms "mind-basis-of-all," "appropriating consciousness," "basis of objects of knowledge," and the like are taught fully and directly. There is no such teaching in the Hearer's vehicle.42

Furthermore, there is a way to interpret the compass of the word "fully" [in the above passage].

To teach the basis-of-all fully is to explain its nature, demarcation, operation, cessation, and so forth. Đzong-ka-Ba implies that this is not done in the Hīnayāna.43

In addition, in this system44 the word "mind" is asserted to be a synonym of basis-of-all from the viewpoint of its
main usage. For, although the three—mind, mentality, and consciousness—are, in general, synonyms, if one explains them etymologically [they are no longer synonyms].

The Treasury of Higher Knowledge, presenting the assertions of the Vaibhāshikas, says, "Mind, mentality, and consciousness are mutually inclusive." The same statement is seen in Buddhaghosa's compendium of Theravāda higher knowledge, the Path of Purification (Visuddhi-magga). These are both systems asserting six consciousnesses.

Among Chittamātrins Following Scripture, there are both proponents of this conservative position and proponents of a more radical assertion that the three terms necessarily have different referents. Thus, in Vasubandhu's Commentary on the "Twenty Stanzas" (Vimśatikā-vrtti) we read, "Mind, mentality, consciousness, and knowledge are synonymous." Asaṅga, on the other hand, says, "Some think that mind, mentality, and consciousness are only mutually inclusive. . . This is incorrect." Explained etymologically one must say that a basis-of-all is a mind because of being the basis for the accumulated latencies, that an afflicted mentality is a mentality
because through the force of beginningless habituation it constantly thinks of an I, and that the consciousnesses engaging [objects] are consciousnesses because they\textsuperscript{49} individually know the six objects—forms, [sounds, odors, tastes, tangible objects, and phenomena].

Here, contextual etymologies (\textit{nirukti}) of the Sanskrit terms \textit{citta} (mind), \textit{manas} (mentality), and \textit{vijñ\=ana} (consciousness) are given. The technique is to establish a term in a particular meaning through explaining, within a particular context, the way in which it relates to its verbal root or is built from its parts.

In the case of \textit{citta} (mind), the term is explained as solely referring to the mind-basis-of-all because of being from the root \textit{ci} meaning to accumulate, specifically, to accumulate latencies (see below, p.414).\textsuperscript{50} \textit{Manas} (mentality) refers to the afflicted mentality because of being a case of thinking (\textit{manyati, manana})\textsuperscript{51} of a self.\textsuperscript{52} \textit{Vijñ\=ana} (consciousness) refers to the five sense consciousnesses and the mental consciousness because those consciousnesses individually know (\textit{prativijñ\=apti}) objects.\textsuperscript{53}
Vasubandhu's Thirty Stanzas says:

These transformations are of three types:
Fruition, thinking of an I,
And knowledge of objects.  

Vasubandhu speaks of consciousnesses as transformations (parināma), a way of indicating that they are dependent-arisings (pratītyasamutpāda). The doctrine of consciousnesses as transformations with multiple components (bhāga) is one that, notwithstanding its importance in the Chinese exposition of Yogāchāra, is not treated in Ge-luk literature on mind-basis-of-all.

Here, fruition (vipāka) is the mind-basis-of-all, thinking of an I (manana) is the afflicted mentality, and knowledge of objects (visāyavijñāpti) is the set of the five sense consciousnesses and the mental consciousness.

Sthiramati's Commentary on (Vasubandhu's) "Thirty Stanzas" says:

Fruition is the establishment, through the maturation of latencies, of effects just as [they were] projected.

The afflicted mentality is called that thinking of an I because of having the nature of constantly thinking of an I.
The six consciousnesses of eye, [ear, nose, tongue, body, and the mental consciousness] are called knowledges of objects because of perceiving the objects—forms, [sounds, odors, tastes, tangible objects, and phenomena]—individually.

Therefore, calling the basis-of-all "fruition" does not refer to former actions' fruitions ripening with [a basis-of-all] but, rather, to the fact that the potencies which are the latencies repeatedly accumulated within [a basis-of-all] will later ripen.

In Ge-luk philosophy, the term "fruition" (Tibetan: rnam smin) often means frutional effect. Here, however, it refers to the process of fruition, that is, the mind-basis-of-all acting as a support for the maturing of latencies into their effects. Nor is it the case, according to Gung-tang, that here "fruition" refers to the fact that the mind-basis-of-all itself is a fruition (see above, pp. 325ff.).

Although Vasubandhu uses the term "fruition" elsewhere in his Thirty Stanzas as a term for the mind-basis-of-all, and Sthiramati, in his commentary on that passage, asserts that "except for the mind-basis-of-all, there is no other fruition," Gung-tang's position that frutional
is here the maturing of latencies and not fruitional effect remains viable. Where the mind-basis-of-all is called a fruition, the term is used to designate what type of effect it is. In the present case, Gung-tang, and Sthiramati, are speaking of fruition as the process of ripening or maturation of the latencies to the point where they serve as direct causes for the phenomena of cyclic existence and nirvāṇa which are their effects.

These effects, although they are the outcome of a process of fruition, are not necessarily fruitional effects: the designation "fruitional effect" is given in consideration not of the effect's relationship with the latency producing it but, rather, its relationship with the infusing consciousness which deposited the latency producing it. Thus, the mind-basis-of-all is a fruitional effect in that it is the fruit of a fruitional cause; it is called fruition insofar as in it latencies come to fruition. ⁶²

The Sūtra Unravelling the Thought says:

[The basis-of-all] is called the appropriating consciousness; for it assumes, ⁶³ it appropriates a body. . .
[The basis-of-all] is also called the mind; for it is the collection [or] amassing of forms, sounds, odors, tastes, tangible objects, and phenomena.\textsuperscript{64}

The mind-basis-of-all is the collection of forms because in it are accumulated latencies for the creation of forms.\textsuperscript{65}

\textit{Ren-da-wa's} \textit{(Red-mdal'-ba) Commentary on} \textit{(Asaṅga's) "Compendium of Higher Knowledge" (Kun-btus-tīkka)} says, "The basis-of-all is known as just mind because of having the nature of an accumulation of latencies." Further, it is for that reason [i.e., it is because the basis-of-all is called "fruition" in consideration of the fruition of accumulated latencies] that \textit{Vasubandhu's Thirty Stanzas} says, "There, the consciousness called basis-of-all/ Is the fruition having all the seeds."\textsuperscript{66} \textit{Viniṭadēva's Commentary on (Vasubandhu's) "Thirty Stanzas" (Trimśikātīkā)} says:

The fruition of virtue and non-virtue occurs due to the mind-basis-of-all. Therefore, [the mind-basis-of-all] is called "fruition."\textsuperscript{67}

The manner in which [mind-basis-of-all] is called "mind" due to accumulating latencies is as follows. The Sanskrit original of "mind" (Tibetan: \textit{sems}) is \textit{cita} [sic].
The Sanskrit original of the Tibetan *sems* is *citta*, a noun formed from the root *cit*, to perceive or know. The traditional Buddhist etymology accepted by Vaibhāshikas, Sautrāntikas, and Chittamātrins, however, derives the noun from the verbal root *ci*, to accumulate. Thus, we read in Vasubandhu's Commentary on "The Treasury of Higher Knowledge", "Because it accumulates, 'mind.'" Gung-tang correctly gives *cita* as a noun constructed from the verb *ci*, but incorrectly identifies it as the Sanskrit of the Tibetan *sems*, which is properly *citta*.

Interestingly, the Tibetan translation of Vasubandhu's etymology reads "because it differentiates, 'mind.'" The translators have taken the Sanskrit *cinoti* as a conjugation of the verb *ci* meaning to observe or investigate. This *ci* is held by the British Sanskritist Sir Monier Monier-Williams to be etymologically a different verb that that *ci* meaning to accumulate.

There thus appear to be two traditions of presenting an etymology of *citta* in Buddhist philosophy, one taking the term from *ci* (to accumulate) and the other from *ci* (to investigate). In Mind-Only, it is a question of the first.
[In order to form cita] take the root from the Sūtra of Roots (Kalāpadhātusūtra) where it says, "Ciṅ [means] to accumulate." Because it is an indicatory letter, erase the ū. Because of being intransitive and so forth, the affix kta is added. K being for the sake of pronunciation, it is erased. The first person singular, si, is added. [The i is then erased.] It is said, "S and r [become] visarga (ह)." The s having become a visarga, citah is formed.

Similarly, with [the term] "mentality" (Tibetan: yid) one takes the root [from the Sūtra of Roots where it says] "Mnā [means] to habituate." Adding the affix tip [a verb] is formed. Hence, manati comes to have the meaning of constantly habituating.

Among Western Sanskritists, the term manas (mentality) is held to derive from the verb man (to think, perceive, etc.). This accords with Vasubandhu's Commentary on "The Treasury of Higher Knowledge" which derives the term as follows, "Because it thinks, 'mentality.'" Asaṅga's Compendium of Higher Knowledge agrees with Gung-tang's meaning (to habituate) but also uses a man-derived term, saying, "What is mentality? It is that which has the nature of constantly thinking of the mind-basis-of-all..."
The American Sanskritist William Dwight Whitney reports a verbal root mnā meaning to note, but says that it occurs only with the prefix ā. Both Whitney and Monier-Williams agree, however, that manati, the conjugated verb put forward by Gung-tang, is properly a conjugation of mnā and not of man, insofar as man, being conjugated in either class four or eight, must appear as either manyate or manute, whereas mnā, being in the first conjugation class, properly might appear as manati.

"Consciousness" (Tibetan: rnam par shes pa) is as follows. [It is] formed from the root [described as follows in the Sūtra of Roots], "Vid [means] to know." The Sanskrit original of the Tibetan translation term rnam par shes pa (consciousness) is vijñāna, where the vi is a prefix and jñāna a noun derived from the verb jñā, to know. Vasubandhu says, "Because it is conscious, 'consciousness.'" Yashomitra, expanding on this, says, "It is conscious of an observed object, hence, 'consciousness.'" Along the same lines, Asaṅga speaks of the six consciousnesses as individual knowledges, and Sthiramati speaks of "knowledge of an object."
Although Gung-tang's choice of the very vid is valid insofar as it does mean to know, it is not related to vijñāna, the term in question. By means of prepositional affixes [it can come to have different meanings], vivedaḥ referring to revealing and praviditah referring to bringing about individual knowledge.

Vi-veda and pra-vidita are two prefixed nouns derived from the verb vid. Gung-tang probably cites them because of the proximity of their Tibetan translations (rnam par rig par byed pa and so sor rig par byed pa, respectively) to the etymologies of vijñāna by Sthiramati and Asaṅga (rnam par rig pa and so sor rig pa, respectively). Nonetheless, these two etymologies are cases of glossing vijñāna as vijñapti (knowledge), a term derived from jñā and not from vid.

The explanation of the three—mind, mentality, and consciousness—separately in connection with their contextual etymologies is also the thought of sūtra. The Descent to Laṅkā Sūtra says:

Mind is the mind-basis-of-all.
Mentality is the apprehension of an I.
That which is aware of objects
Is held to be an engaging consciousness.
Also, The Secret Meaning Unveiled, Condensed Explanation (of the First Chapter of Asaṅga's "Compendium of the Mahāyāna") (Vivṛtagnudhārthapindavyākhyā) says:

Mind is [so called] because of accumulating. Mentality is [so called] because of realizing. Consciousness is [so called] because of being conscious.88

The Secret Meaning says:

In the Mahāyāna, the terms "mind," "mentality," and "consciousness" are sometimes applied to [all] eight collections of consciousness. Sometimes, however, the term "mind" [refers] mainly just to the mind-basis-of-all, the term "mentality" to the afflicted mentality, and the term "consciousness" to the six consciousnesses. In the Hīnayāna, all three of these terms refer mainly just to the six consciousnesses.

Their contextual etymologies express a difference [between them] in the following ways. Mind is [so called] because of accumulating. Mentality is [so called] because of realizing. Consciousness is [so called] because of being conscious.89
The etymology of mentality from realizing is not consonant with the use of the term "realize" in Ge-luk epistemology. For Ge-luk-âs, it refers to non-delusive or incontrovertible (avisamvadin) understanding, whereas the afflicted mentality is always in error and never non-delusive.

It is possible that the text (rtogs pas na yid do)\textsuperscript{90} is in error, and that rtogs pa should be corrected to read rtog pa--conceiving--which would accord with one of the main uses of the term "mentality" in all schools of Buddhist philosophy.\textsuperscript{91}
Chapter Ten
Proofs for the Basis-of-All

As regards the proofs for the existence of the basis-of-all, there are two sections: proof through scripture and proof through reasoning.

SCRIPTURAL PROOFS FOR THE BASIS-OF-ALL

The Sūtra on Higher Knowledge says:

It is the source without beginning,
The basis of all phenomena;
Because it exists, all migrations
And even nirvāṇa may be attained.¹

The mind-basis-of-all is the basis or locus for the latencies which are predispositions for the creation of both thoroughly afflicted phenomena—migrations, or rebirths in cyclic existence—and completely purified phenomena, from study and contemplation up through realization of the highest reaches of the path and nirvāṇa.²

This sūtra presents the main reason for positing a basis-of-all, that without a continuously enduring basis for the infusion of
latencies, there would be no connection between a sentient being's present cognitions and intended actions (karma) and that being's future cognitions and experiences. Given that rebirth in cyclic existence is beginningless and, unless consciously brought to a halt, endless, there must be a mechanism whereby the pleasant and unpleasant consequences of good and bad actions are specific to the sentient being who committed the action. The alternative is meaninglessness.

This passage from the Sūtra on Higher Knowledge is quoted for a different purpose by Asaṅga in his commentary on Maitreya's Sublime Science (Uttaratantra, also known as the Ratnagotravibhāga), a Mādhyamika work. There it is used not to establish the existence of a mind-basis-of-all (Mādhyamikas do not assert a basis-of-all), but to substantiate the Mādhyamika assertion of a naturally abiding lineage, the Buddha essence (or Buddha nature).

The Sūtra Unravelling the Thought says:

The appropriating consciousness, profound and subtle, Carries all seeds, like a current of water. It would be unsuitable were it thought to be a self; Hence, I have not taught it to children.
Asaṅga quotes this passage in the *Compendium of the Mahāyāna* to support the designation of the mind-basis-of-all as the appropriating consciousness (ādānavijñāna, see above, p. 399).

It is said to be profound because of being difficult to fathom with worldly scholarship and subtle because of being difficult for Hearers (Hīnayānists) to understand.\(^5\) In essence, the mind-basis-of-all is not an object of ordinary experience, but one that can only be known by way of inference through belief (āptānumāna) in reliance on scripture.\(^6\) (See also below, pp. 693-703).

The current of water metaphor is used to illustrate the unbroken continuity of the mind-basis-of-all from moment to moment.\(^7\) Because the mind-basis-of-all in a sentient being's continuum continues as long as that being continues to be reborn in cyclic existence, those of Hearer's Lineage, called here children, might think it a self and, in so doing, prevent themselves from attaining the fruit of their lineage—the position of Hearer Foe Destroyer.\(^8\)
The Descent to Laṅkā Sūtra says:

Just so, the river of the basis-of-all,
Agitated by the winds of various objects,
Moves on, dancing with the waves
Of the various consciousnesses.

The Sūtra on the Heavily Adorned (Ghanavyūha) says,
"Just so, the mind-basis-of-all/ Dwells together with seven consciousnesses." Further, there are the Hīnayāna scriptures mentioned above (pp.399-406).

REASONINGS PROVING THE BASIS-OF-ALL

Although there are many different reasonings [proving the existence of the basis-of-all] taught in texts such as Vasubandhu's Treatise on the Five Aggregates (Pañcaskandha-prakarana) and in the first part of the commentaries on the levels, the chief of these are included in eight main reasonings and discussed in Asaṅga's Compendium of Ascertainty:

Appropriation [of a body], a first [consciousness],
Clarity [of thought], seeds, actions,
Bodily feeling, mindless meditative equipoise,
And death would not be feasible.
Dzong-ka-ða reports that there are "limitless reasonings in the texts of the School of Yogic Practice (i.e., Mind-Only) which establish [the existence of a mind-basis-of-all]."¹⁴ There are three in Asaṅga's Compendium of the Mahāyāna demonstrating the impossibility of thoroughly afflicted phenomena (afflictions, actions, and rebirths) without a mind-basis-of-all and two demonstrating that neither worldly nor supra-mundane purified phenomena would be possible. There are five in Vasubandhu's Treatise on the Five Aggregates, and both scriptural and reasoned proofs in a text called Commentary on the Beginnings of the Levels. Further, several of the reasonings from the Compendium of the Mahāyāna are adduced in Vasubandhu's Commentary on the "Sūtra on Dependent Arising" (Pratītyasamutpāda-sūtratīkā). All of these, Dzong-ka-ða says, are included within the eight reasonings presented in Asaṅga's Compendium of Ascertainments.¹⁵

Although Dzong-ka-ða bases his presentation of the proofs for the existence of a mind-basis-of-all on these eight reasons, his main source is not the Compendium of Ascertainments but, rather, Jinaputra's exposition of them in the
Commentary on (Asaṅga's) "Compendium of Higher Knowledge" (Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya).  

Jinaputra introduces the eight reasonings as follows:

One should understand the existence of the mind-basis-of-all to be proven in these eight ways: if there were no mind-basis-of-all,

1. the appropriation of a body would be impossible,
2. a first occurrence [of consciousness] would be impossible [given the presence of causes for all six engaging consciousnesses],
3. the occurrence of a clear [mental consciousness] would be impossible,
4. seeds [i.e., latencies] would be impossible,
5. actions would be impossible,
6. bodily experience would be impossible,
7. mindless meditative equipoise would be impossible, and
8. consciousness at death would be impossible.
Among these, three are reasonings which eliminate an objection advanced by opponents: the three which conclude that a first [consciousness] would be unfeasible, that clarity [of thought] would be unfeasible, and that four [simultaneous] actions would be unfeasible.¹⁸ These eliminate the main argument refuting the basis-of-all, the argument that [the existence of the basis-of-all] would be in contradiction with the following scriptural passage, "The continuums of consciousness of sentient beings are individual."

An opponent of Asaṅga's Chittamātra, seeking to find fault with the assertion of a mind-basis-of-all, adduces what is for him (the opponent) an absurd consequence: if there were a mind-basis-of-all, two consciousnesses would then occur simultaneously because the mind-basis-of-all is continuously operative and the six engaging consciousnesses also occur from time to time.¹⁹

As Gung-tang has already explained (p.310). above), this is just what Chittamātrins Following Scripture assert.²⁰ They interpret the doctrine of the individuality of a sentient being's continuum of consciousness to mean that no more than one consciousness of similar type may occur at one time (see p.311).²¹
The other five reasonings are actual reasons proving the existence of a basis-of-all.

The first, fourth, sixth, seventh, and eighth reasons explicitly seek to prove the existence of a mind-basis-of-all by adducing faults that would occur were there no mind-basis-of-all. 22

First Reasoning. If there were no basis-of-all, there would have to be no appropriator of the body [of a new lifetime] because the mental consciousness cannot be the appropriator of the body.

As outlined by Asaṅga, this argument establishes that none of the consciousnesses engaging objects (pravṛttivijñāna, the five sense consciousnesses and the mental consciousness) are capable of being the consciousness which "appropriates" (upādāna) a new body at the beginning of a new life. 23

This point is argued within the context of the Buddhist doctrine that although there is no transmigrating self in the sense of an eternal, changeless self or a self-sufficient self, there is a migrator which is born and dies, passing on to a new rebirth, appropriating, at that time, a new body. (See below, pp. 561-568.)
For Chittamātrins Following Scripture, the consciousness appropriating the body is the mind-basis-of-all. Because a new basis-of-all is created at every rebirth through the maturation of a latency and because it constantly undergoes change due to the infusion of new latencies and the nurturing and maturation of old ones, it is not the static, unchanging self (ātman) advocated by non-Buddhist Indian philosophies. Because it operates continuously from the time of conception until death and passes on its potencies to a new basis-of-all, it is a unifying element which acts as a medium connecting the past and the future.\(^24\)

Gung-tang cuts to the pith of the argument when he says that the mental consciousness cannot be the appropriator of the body. The mental consciousness' lack of ability to play this role will be demonstrated below. The unsuitability of the sense consciousnesses and the afflicted mentality, however, needs little proof. If there were no mind-basis-of-all, there would necessarily be no afflicted mentality,\(^25\) for the afflicted mentality perceives only the mind-basis-of-all; without its observed object, it would not exist. These Buddhist philosophers accept no conscious-
nesses without objects. Thus, the appropriator of the body at the beginning of a new lifetime would have to be one of the sense consciousnesses or the mental consciousness. No Buddhist philosophy, however, posits a transmigrating sense consciousness. Sense consciousnesses depend on physical sense powers, and these do not exist in all states of cyclic existence; specifically, they do not exist in the Formless Realm.

This in turn follows because of the five reasons stated [by Asaṅga and Ďzong-ka-ba] in the proof of this. Asaṅga's five reasons, as restated by Jinaputra (with almost no variation from the original exposition in Asaṅga's Compendium of Ascertainment) are as follows (they will be explained in more detail below):

**First Reason.** The mind-basis-of-all arises from the cause of a previous conditioning [action]. The engaging consciousnesses—the eye [consciousness], etc.—arise from causes which are present conditions. As [Buddha] says throughout [sūtra], "Consciousnesses arise on account of sense powers, objects, and mental impulses."
Second Reason. [Among] the six collections of consciousness are observed virtuous and non-virtuous [consciousnesses. The appropriation of a body is a fruition and, therefore, neutral.]

Third Reason. Among the six collections of consciousness are observed no varieties which are neutral [consciousnesses] included within fruations. [Thus, none of these can appropriate the body.]

Fourth Reason. The six collections of consciousness occur fixed in their individual places. The place in which a certain consciousness occurs will be conjoined (upâta) with that [consciousness], the remaining [parts of the body] will not be conjoined and are not feasible [as places for conjunction with that consciousness]. It is also not feasible for what is conjoined [to conjoin], because of not being consciousness.

Fifth Reason. There would be the fault of repeatedly assuming [or appropriating] the body [if the eye consciousness, or one of the other engaging consciousnesses were the appropriator]; for, the eye consciousness some-
times occurs and sometimes does not, and the remaining [engaging consciousnesses] are similar.27

It is interesting to note that, of these five reasons, Gung-tang states only the first, fourth, and fifth, although he does allude to the other two with the term "and so forth."28 His avoidance of these two reasons is probably not arbitrary, for they are predicated on an assertion he does not accept, that only the mind-basis-of-all is a fully qualified fruition—an undefiled neutral phenomena that is impelled by a fruitional cause and which operates continuously throughout life (see above, p. 330).29

The second reason advanced by Asaṅga disqualifies the sense consciousnesses and the mental consciousness from being fruitions which are present at the first moment of a new life—a necessity for the consciousness appropriating the body—because they are seen to be sometimes virtuous and sometimes non-virtuous. Fruitions are, according to Ăţong-ka-Ęa (and, in fact, all Buddhists), invariably neutral.30

The third reason tackles the objection that notwithstanding the existence of virtuous and
non-virtuous instances of the six engaging consciousnesses, there are also neutral instances which may be fruitions. To this the reply is given that fruitions must be continuously operative throughout life, and neither the sense consciousnesses nor the mental consciousness are that (see above, pp. 337-340). 31

Thus, although Asaṅga speaks elsewhere of fruitions other than the mind-basis-of-all (see above, p. 329), here, at least, he will allow no consciousnesses other than the mind-basis-of-all as fruitions. 32 Gung-tang is not willing to accept this; he asserts that birth in the company of a Complete Enjoyment Body is a fruition. He might well argue that the context of the present argument indicates that Asaṅga is speaking not of fruitions in general but of fruitions which are cases of rebirth in cyclic existence, such rebirth being the powerless assumption of a new body due to previous actions and afflictions.

Gung-tang now presents the first, fourth, and fifth of the reasons advanced by Asaṅga and 5zong-ka-5a to demonstrate the impossibility of appropriation of a body at the beginning of a new life if there were no mind-basis-of-all.
(1) An engaging consciousness must be newly established through the assemblage of three [causes]: an object, a sense power, and a mental impulse. Hence, at the time immediately after making the connection to a new lifetime the engaging consciousnesses themselves have not been produced.

The engaging consciousnesses are the five sense consciousnesses and the mental consciousness. The sense powers (indriya) which are supports of the five sense consciousnesses are imperceptible physical phenomena located in the eyes, ears, and so forth. It is unclear whether, in Chittamātra, these qualify as actual causes of consciousness (see below, p. 445). The mental sense power is, in this system, the afflicted mentality. Mental impulses (manaskāra) are cases of willing to perceive a particular object or class of object, for example the will to perceive a form. They are conceptual consciousnesses and thus species of mental consciousness.

As constructed by Žong-ka-ṣa, this first reason revolves around the fact that whereas the mind-basis-of-all is produced from a cause in a previous lifetime—an action (karma) which is a frutional cause—the engaging conscious-
nesses are produced from three causes, all of which would have to exist either at the same time as these consciousnesses or just prior to them. It is because the mind-basis-of-all is a fruition of an action that it is able to appropriate a suitable body. The engaging consciousnesses have no such direct connection with actions, but arise in the context of causes in the present. They arise, moreover, only after a body has been appropriated and are not, therefore, consciousnesses which appropriate a body.

Gung-tang's presentation of this argument places emphasis on the non-existence of the engaging consciousnesses at the time when a new body is appropriated. Certainly the five sense consciousnesses are absent—with no body, there are no sense powers, and sense powers are necessary supports for the sense consciousnesses.

The absence of a mental consciousness at the time of assuming a body is the subject of one of the arguments proving the existence of a mind-basis-of-all in the Compendium of the Mahā-yāna. Asaṅga's reasoning there explicitly concerns the birth state (upapattibhava) immedi-
ately following the connection to a new life (pratisamādhibandha). 39 If, he says, the birth state were a mental consciousness, it would then, absurdly, be possible for two mental consciousnesses to simultaneously occur (at some later time): one being this body-appropriating mental consciousness which is fruiotional and, therefore, continuously operative throughout life, the other a mental consciousness supported on that and associated with virtue, non-virtue, and so forth. 40

If, moreover, the birth state mental consciousness were a continuation of the immediately preceding consciousness which made the connection to the new life, it would have to be afflicted. The connecting consciousness, the last moment of the intermediate state (antarbhava), is always afflicted and has as its observed object the birth state. The consciousness appropriating the body, on the other hand, is a neutral fruiotional consciousness with indeterminate (i.e., unascertained) objects. 41

Finally, a consciousness having all the seeds or latencies must always be present; otherwise there is no way to posit a connection
between past actions and future results. For those who assert that a mental consciousness appropriates the body, the mind having all the seeds must either be that mental consciousness or another consciousness supported on it. If it is the former, it is merely the mind-basis-of-all under another name. If it is the latter, then the consciousness having all the seeds, which should be fundamental and causally prior, becomes contingent and an effect, and this is absurd.\footnote{42} (See also p. 454 below.)

(2) If [an engaging consciousness] were the appropriator of a body, it would also have to conjoin [the body]. However, since [the engaging consciousnesses are each] located in separate parts of the body, those parts which are not conjoined with them would [absurdly] not be included within the continuum.

This is the fourth reason advanced by Asaṅga in support of the first reasoning establishing a basis-of-all.

A phenomenon is included within a sentient being's psychophysical continuum (samtāna) if it is conjoined (upāṭta) with the appropriating consciousness.\footnote{43} Since the engaging consciousnesses are located with their respective sense
powers, they do not conjoin the entire body.\textsuperscript{44} The eye sense consciousness resides in the eyes, the ear sense consciousness in the ears, and so forth.\textsuperscript{45} Some even say that because the six engaging consciousnesses are not stable—they are sometimes present and sometimes not—they do not conjoin even their own locations.\textsuperscript{46} Following Asaṅga, however, Dzong-ka-Ba has it that the engaging consciousnesses do conjoin their specific places.\textsuperscript{47} If one of the engaging consciousnesses were the appropriator of the body, whatever part of the body was not pervaded by that consciousness would be like a corpse.\textsuperscript{48} (Thus, in Buddhist philosophy, to be dead means to be devoid of consciousness.)

Although the body sense power pervades the entire body, not all parts of it are always the seat of body consciousness. Thus, the body consciousness is not suitable to be appropriator of the body because the parts not conjoined with it would be as if dead.\textsuperscript{49} Moreover, the body consciousness is not present during the mindless states of meditative absorption and the like.

The mental consciousness is located throughout the body, but does not conjoin it and act as
its basis (see below, p. 441 and p. 464).

Thus, it is not feasible for it to be appropriator of the body.\textsuperscript{50}

(3) [If an engaging consciousness were the appropriator of a body] one would have to assert that a body was appropriated when the engaging consciousnesses were newly produced at the end of each state of unconsciousness. Hence, it would [absurdly] follow that within one lifetime the body is repeatedly abandoned and appropriated.

This is the fifth reason advanced by Asaṅga in support of the first reasoning establishing a mind-basis-of-all.

There are many occasions when engaging consciousnesses temporarily cease—the meditative equpoises of cessation and non-discrimination, dreamless sleep, fainting, and so on (see above, p. 338). If one of the engaging consciousnesses were the appropriator of the body, it would absurdly have to newly appropriate a body each time it arose after a temporary cessation.

There are scholars who assert that if [these opposing reasonings] were the case, one would have to assert that the location of the mental consciousness was only the heart and that there would be no virtue and so forth in mindless states. This should be examined.
It is unclear to whom Gung-tang refers when he speaks of the scholar(s) holding this opinion. He appears to be saying that it is possible, given the arguments presented above, to have the opinion that the mental consciousness must be located in only a specific part of the body, namely the heart. In fact, there is such an assertion, reported by Yashomitra in his Explanation of (Vasubandhu's) "Treasury of Higher Knowledge" as a tenet of Tamraparnīyas (the Singhalese Sthaviras, or Theravadins). They hold that there exists a "heart basis" (hrdayavastu, Pali: hadaya-vatthu) which is the support of the mental consciousness. The heart basis is also mentioned by the Theravadin scholar Buddhaghosa in his Path of Purification (Visuddhimagga). Gung-tang later quotes the Secret Meaning on this topic:

According to the Sthaviras, everything about the five [sense] consciousnesses is as explained by the Vaibhāshikas. The simultaneous support of the mental consciousness is either one, two, three, four, or up to nine cavities in the heart.
According to Ëzong-ka-ëa, the assertion of a specific location of the mental consciousness is rejected by Chittamâtrins Following Scripture: "Although the mental consciousness is not located in a part of the body, it is not located like the basis-of-all throughout the body." This may be interpreted to mean that whereas the mental consciousness does pervade the body, it does not pervade it in the sense of conjoining it and serving as its support, as does the mind-basis-of-all.

Gung-tang also speaks here of the claim that if there were no mental consciousness in mindless states, there would be no manifest virtue in those states. This follows because neither of the consciousnesses present in the mindless states—the mind-basis-of-all and the afflicted mentality—can be virtuous.

Second Reasoning. Others adduce the fault that if there were a mind-basis-of-all, it would then follow that there would be many consciousnesses manifest simultaneously. Such a production [of consciousnesses], however, is just [what those who assert a basis-of-all] assert.
The main argument used to refute a mind-basis-of-all is that the existence of the mind-basis-of-all would contradict certain passages in scripture, namely, "The continuums of consciousness of sentient beings are individual" and "The occurrence together of two minds is not a possibility; there is no opportunity." These are taken to mean, by the opponents of Asaṅga's Chittamātra, that two or more consciousnesses cannot occur simultaneously (see above, p. 310 and p. 427). To this Asaṅga replies with the second reasoning, that many consciousnesses necessarily do occur simultaneously on many occasions. This is the substance of the second, third, and fifth reasonings set forth in the Compendium of Ascertainties to establish the existence of a mind-basis-of-all.

[This follows] because if, for example, the six objects--forms and so forth--are equally near and the six sense powers are equally existent, then--when the six mental impulses, the wish to see forms and so forth, are equally proximate--all six consciousnesses must immediately be produced.
The objects (vīśaya) of the eye consciousness are visible forms (color and shape), those of the ear consciousness are sounds, of the nose consciousness odors, of the tongue consciousness tastes, of the body consciousness tangible objects, and of the mental consciousness phenomena.

Mental impulses (manaskāra) are conceptual mental consciousnesses which are the will to see, to hear, to smell, to taste, to touch, or to be conscious of an object. Because these six types of mental impulse are conceptual and, therefore, all consciousnesses of similar type, only one of them can occur at any given time.\(^{58}\)

To say that they are equally proximate means then that any one of the six might arise, without any one being closer to arising than any other (see below, pp. 727-28).\(^ {59}\)

It appears to be the case that the mental impulse to perceive an object is not a necessary condition for the arising of a consciousness perceiving that object.\(^ {60}\) If this were the case, there would never be an eye consciousness and an ear consciousness simultaneously operative, for the two mental impulses leading to
those two consciousnesses cannot occur simultaneously. As Gung-tang says later in this book, a mental impulse, when it is present, acts to inhibit the causes for the production of consciousnesses other than the one to which it leads (see below, p.727). 61

This in turn follows because the four conditions are complete: (1) there is a causal condition, the basis-of-all; (2) any consciousness which has ceased in the immediately preceding [moment] is acceptable to be taken as an immediately preceding condition; and (3), (4) the observed-object-conditions and empowering conditions are assembled.

Because a consciousness is produced when four conditions are present and because the conditions for the arising of all six engaging consciousnesses are often present, there are limitless instances of situations in which more than one consciousness is manifest in a single sentient being's continuum.

The mind-basis-of-all is the common causal condition (hetupratyaya) for all objects, sense powers, and consciousnesses. 62 Any of the six engaging consciousnesses which has just ceased may be the immediately preceding condition (samanantarapratyaya) of any of the conscious-
nesses. An immediately preceding condition is one which, by means of the cessation of its own manifest existence, provides an immediately subsequent consciousness with the opportunity to arise.\(^\text{63}\)

In the Chittamātra system, the object of a consciousness is not its actual observed-object-condition (ālambanapratyaya), although it is permissible to call it an imputed or appearing one.\(^\text{64}\) The actual observed-object-condition is a potency for the production of a consciousness in the aspect of its object.\(^\text{65}\) This potency is the latency from which arise both a consciousness in the aspect of an object and that object.\(^\text{66}\) It is because both subject and object arise from a single latency that they are one entity and that there exist no objects external to the consciousness apprehending them.

The five sense powers and the afflicted mentality are, in this system, the supports of the five sense consciousnesses and the mental consciousness, respectively.\(^\text{67}\) These supports and those consciousnesses exist at the same time, without the sense powers being, as in
other Buddhist systems, the empowering conditions (*adhipatipratyaya*) of consciousnesses. Here an empowering condition is another aspect of the latency which creates a consciousness and its object, that aspect which empowers the consciousness to apprehend the object.\textsuperscript{68}

If [for you] this reason does not necessarily entail [that all six consciousnesses must immediately be produced], then it [absurdly] follows that among those [six consciousnesses] not even one is produced first. For, while there is no difference [among the six] as regards completeness of the conditions [for their production], there is no reason why one should be produced and another not.

It is from this entailment that Asaṅga's second reasoning is designated one demonstrating "the impossibility of a first occurrence [of consciousness]" (*ādipravṛttīasambhava*).

Without a specific mental impulse, there is no reason why one of the engaging consciousnesses should be produced and another not. Because this opponent of the mind-basis-of-all cannot accept more than one consciousness at a time, he must deny the possibility of the simultaneous occurrence of six consciousnesses. This leaves him with the unwanted consequence
that no consciousness at all will arise; for, without a specific mental impulse, it is equally suitable for all six to occur or not to occur.

"Vishālamati's Chapter" [the fifth chapter of the Sūtra Unravelling the Thought] says:

If the causes for the occurrence of one wave are near, then one wave occurs. . .

Abiding in dependence on the mind-basis-of-all, if the conditions for the occurrence of the eye consciousness alone are near then the eye consciousness alone arises. If the conditions for the occurrence of two, or of three, or of five consciousnesses are near, then two, three, or five will occur. 69

**Third Reasoning.** This again is a reasoning directed at the same opponent's position.

The opponent's position is again that a mind-basis-of-all does not exist because if it did, more than one consciousness would occur simultaneously in a single sentient being's continuum.

It follows that there is simultaneous production of many consciousnesses because it is established through experience that the following two exist: a clear mental consciousness which engages a form at the time the form
is seen and an unclear consciousness remembering the past [form].

Upon introspection one can observe that at the same time as one has an eye consciousness apprehending something blue there may also be a conceptual mental consciousness which, observing that same object, thinks it attractive or unattractive, as the case may be.\textsuperscript{70} If there is a later memory (a mental consciousness) of the blue previously experienced by the eye sense consciousness, it is obvious that there is a difference in the clarity of the two mental consciousnesses.\textsuperscript{71} Both are conceptual--knowing their objects via an abstract mental image--and thus not consciousnesses to which an object appears clearly;\textsuperscript{72} within that, however, the "movement" (pracāra) of one simultaneous with the sense consciousness is said to be clearer than that of the other.\textsuperscript{73}

This reason necessarily entails [the simultaneous production of many consciousnesses] because if many consciousnesses did not exist simultaneously, there would necessarily be no clear mental consciousness at the time an eye consciousness is manifest.
Thus, the designation for this reasoning is "the impossibility of a clear occurrence [of a conceptual consciousness]" (spastapraavrttvasambhava).

If more than one consciousness at a time were impossible, there could be no cases of concurrent conceptual and sense consciousnesses.

Fourth Reasoning. [The mind-basis-of-all exists] because if it did not, there would be no seeds of virtue and so forth in the continuums of sentient beings.

The mind-basis-of-all is above all a support or basis for the infusion of latencies by virtuous, non-virtuous, and neutral consciousnesses. The centrality to Buddhism of the doctrine of karma--the invariable relationship between intended actions and their effects--demands a mechanism by which this relationship may be maintained. Chittamātrins Following Scripture posit an infusion of latent predispositions in a continuous consciousness, the mind-basis-of-all, which maintains these latencies as states of potential for the creation of effects consonant with the original
actions. All Buddhist philosophies must posit some means by which a state of potential to produce an effect can be sustained and then, when the proper circumstances occur, allowed to flower into an experience.

This in turn follows because (1) there would be no basis-of-all as a support [for the infusion of the seeds] and (2) the engaging consciousnesses cannot be [such supports].

If the mind-basis-of-all did not exist, some other phenomenon in the psychophysical continuum of a sentient being would have to serve as the support, repository, or basis for the infusion of latencies by the five sense consciousnesses, the mental consciousness, and the afflicted mentality. 74

The qualities a phenomenon must have if it is to be a basis for the infusion of latencies have already been discussed: it must be enduring, neutral, infusable, related with the infusers, and invariably a support (see above, pp.336-350). The engaging consciousnesses are infusable insofar as they are the same psychophysical continuum, and invariably supports since they are not mental factors but are main minds; however,
they are not always neutral and they are not enduring in the sense of being continuously operative.

This [latter] follows because [engaging consciousnesses] cannot be the supports of one another; for, there arise non-virtuous engaging consciousnesses after virtuous ones and there is alternate arising of [engaging consciousnesses belonging to] higher and lower realms and of supramundane and mundane [engaging consciousnesses].

Latencies are infused by consciousnesses at the time they approach cessation. A consciousness and the basis in which it deposits a latency arise and cease simultaneously. The engaging consciousnesses, on the other hand, arise serially in many mutually incompatible forms--virtuous and non-virtuous minds, minds belonging to different levels of cyclic existence (the higher and lower realms), and, within the virtuous, mundane and supramundane minds. If one engaging consciousness were to infuse latencies in another, there would have to be instances of two mutually incompatible consciousnesses occurring simultaneously, and this is an impossibility.
Also, if [seeds] were infused in the engaging consciousnesses, since the engaging consciousnesses do not exist during [mindless states such as] fainting and so forth, the continuum of the latencies would be broken and actions done would be lost.

Vasubandhu speaks of five mindless states (acittaka) in the Thirty Stanzas: rebirth as a discriminationless god, the two meditative equipoises of cessation and non-discrimination, sleep (that is, dreamless sleep), and fainting. Neither the mental consciousness nor the five sense consciousnesses are operative in these states. If one or another of these consciousnesses were the medium by which latencies were to be preserved until the proper time for their fruition, the latencies would all be lost or destroyed with every mindless interval, and there would be no relationship between intended actions and later experience, and no means by which a mind could again arise.

The problem of personal continuity in mindless states and of the means by which the six consciousnesses again arise after their temporary absence has received a good deal of attention in Buddhist philosophy. The rubric
under which this topic is treated is that of the meditative equipoise of cessation (nirodhasamāpatti). The impossibility of positing a meditative equipoise of cessation without positing a mind-basis-of-all is discussed at length in the Compendium of the Mahāyana.

One might maintain that although at those times [of mindless states] the engaging consciousnesses are not manifest, they exist in the manner of seeds. However, this is not the case because the previous fault remains. For, because a seed cannot be the support of a seed, those [engaging consciousnesses existing in the manner of seeds] would need a basis of infusion as well.

Even if the six engaging consciousnesses, or that one of them which, hypothetically, holds the latencies, continued in a non-manifest latent manner during mindless states, this would not remove the previous fault of there being no basis for the preservation of latencies. This seed state of the engaging consciousness would still require a support which is not itself merely a seed or potency. Latencies do not exist as separate substantial entities from their basis of infusion, but are merely designa-
tions for states of potential in a substantially existent basis (see below, pp. 640ff.).

Or, one might maintain that although at that time [of mindless states] there is a manifest engaging consciousness, unlike the usual ones it cannot distinguish its objects of observation in detail, and, hence, is very subtle. This also is incorrect because when [a consciousness with] such an entity, observed object, and aspect serves as the support of all seeds, although you may call it a mental consciousness, you have in fact not passed beyond the basis-of-all.

The undetermining or unclear aspect of the mind-basis-of-all and its correspondingly indeterminate objects have been discussed (see above, pp. 359ff.).

Asaṅga, in the Compendium of the Mahāyāna, employs an argument similar to the one enunciated here to demonstrate that the mental consciousness cannot be the consciousness of the birth state, a consciousness which must be neutral and non-ascertaining. Such a consciousness is not the mental consciousness at all, since the engaging consciousnesses are said to determine or ascertain the natures
of their objects. It is, therefore, merely the mind-basis-of-all under another name.

For, Asaṅga’s Compendium of the Mahāyāna says:

If that which coalesces is that which has all the seeds, then "mental consciousness" has been put as a synonym for just the mind-basis-of-all.

Asaṅga is arguing here that the mental consciousness is not the consciousness which coalesces (sāmūrchipavijñāna), the consciousness which mixes with the male and female regenerative fluids in the womb and thus is reborn in a new life. If it were, he says, this mental consciousness would have to be either that having all the seeds—the basis of infusion of the latencies—or there would have to be another mental consciousness carrying the latencies which is dependent on that birth-taking consciousness. The latter contradicts the nature of the consciousness which has all the seeds, for it is by definition a causal and prior consciousness. If, on the other hand, the coalescing consciousness were that having all the seeds, then it is not different from the mind-basis-of-all. (See above, p. 437.)
If there were no seeds, there would be no phenomena of the afflicted class or of the purified class. Hence, this fourth reasoning is the main reasoning in this system.

**Fifth Reasoning.** If, again, many consciousnesses did not occur simultaneously, there could be no actions. For example, when one goes down a road there is perception of the external world—the knowledge of environment, perception of the internal, or sentient beings—the knowledge of basis, perception of self—the knowledge thinking "I," and perception of individual [objects such as] forms and so forth—the knowledge of objects.

Here action (karma) refers not to the intended actions which are the subject of the well-known doctrine of karma, but to four of the dependent phenomena or knowledges (viññapti). Dzong-ka-ba asserts that they are here called actions (Tibetan: las) because of being perceived as I or mine and thus being either agents of actions or their objects.\(^{87}\)

The four knowledges mentioned by Asaṅga at the point of presenting this reasoning in the *Compendium of Ascertainments* are at variance with the terminology he uses in the list...
of fifteen given in the Compendium of the Mahāyāna (see above, pp. 388ff.). The four given here and in the Compendium of Assertions are:

1. knowledge of environment (bhājanavijñapti),
2. knowledge of basis (āśrayavijñapti),
3. knowledge thinking "I" (ahamitivijñapti),
4. knowledge of objects (visayavijñapti).

The first, knowledge of environment, corresponds to the knowledge of location which is the eighth in the Compendium of the Mahāyāna list.

Knowledge of basis, following Bzong-ka-itably's identification of it as the six sources which are the substance of the person (i.e., the six sense powers) along with their supports, corresponds to the first, third, and fifth of the fifteen: the knowledges of body, enjoyer, and user. Knowledge thinging "I" corresponds to the tenth knowledge, knowledge perceiving self. Finally, knowledge of objects corresponds to the fourth of the fifteen, knowledge of what is used.

Without the appearance of [a place] where there is going, of a goer, and of the activity of going there would be no commission of the actions, or activities, of coming,
going, and the like. It is unreasonable that instead of these appearing to separate consciousnesses, there are, rather, many different modes of appearance of the separate sources [forms, etc.] to a single consciousness.

The term perception (Sanskrit: abhāsa, avabhāsa; Tibetan: snang ba) is an ambiguous one in Buddhist epistemology; it can mean either perception by a subject or the appearance of an object to a subject. Therefore, Gung-tang glosses the concept of perception of the knowledges as an appearance to consciousness of these knowledges. (The knowledges are so called not because they are perceiving subjects but because they are one entity with the consciousness perceiving them.)

The bundling of the ideas of perception and appearance into a single term emphasizes the importance of mind in Buddhist philosophy. Although this is seen most prominently in the Chittamātra assertion of unity of subject and object as a single substantial entity, all Buddhist philosophers hold, to some extent, that what appears to consciousness depends on consciousness. Only the Chittamātrins and Yogachāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyaṃikas, however, assert that an object of consciousness is
inextricably bound together with the very consciousness perceiving it.

This, again, has been an argument paving the way for proof of the existence of a mind-basis-of-all by way of refuting the principal argument against it, that an individual cannot have more than one consciousness at any given time.

Sixth Reasoning. If there were no basis-of-all, benefit or harm to the body at a time that [a consciousness] such as a virtuous mind were manifest would not produce bodily feeling to experience it. This is because since the mental consciousness is aimed at a virtuous observed object, that [bodily feeling] is not created in the mind.

Feeling—the mental factor which is the experience of pleasure, pain, or a neutrality which is neither—requires a mental support. This is not a case of its being necessarily in similar association (samprayukta) with a main mind, but of needing a cause for its production. (See below, pp. 745ff.)

Also, since [according to you] there is no basis-of-all, there is no cause of providing, that is, raising, a support for that [experiencing].
This is not to say that the feeling of pleasure or pain which is the object experienced by a body consciousness is known by the mind-basis-of-all (see below, p. 746). Rather, the mind-basis-of-all is able to provide a support for the body consciousness at a time when, for example, the eye consciousness is absorbed in an attractive form. It does this through being conjoined with the body sense power.\textsuperscript{97}

For, \textit{Bzong-ka-Ba's Ocean of Good Explanations}, Commentary on "The Difficult Topics of Afflicted Mentality and Basis-of-All" says:

There is no support which causes production [of feeling] in the body by means of providing a support for that experiencing.\textsuperscript{98}

\textbf{Seventh Reasoning}. The seventh reasoning is that there could be no mindless meditative absorptions [without a mind-basis-of-all].

The two mindless meditative absorptions are those of cessation and non-discrimination.\textsuperscript{99}

Since consciousness leaves the physical support of a person who has entered into [either of] the two mindless meditative absorptions, [his body] would become a corpse; for, (1) engaging consciousnesses which are in
a mutually supportive relationship with that [body] do not exist at that time and (2) a basis-of-all was not posited.

Consciousness and body are supports of each other. Within a single lifetime, the body at an earlier period acts as a cause of consciousness at a later period, and an earlier consciousness acts as a cause of the body at a later period. 100

Should this be accepted, there would be contradiction with the passage of the Sūtra of the Bestower of Doctrine (Dharmadattāsūtra) which says:

[His body] lacks not warmth, nor the life faculty; hence, his consciousness has not separated from the body.

Asaṅga quotes this in the context of speaking of a person entered into the meditative absorption of non-discrimination. 101

Also, the two meditative equipoises would not exist because there would be no person who had entered into them.

Without a mind-basis-of-all, there would be no suitable illustrative instances (Tibetan: mtshan gshi) of the person at that time, for
no other consciousnesses are present. As Gung-tang says immediately below, the person is what migrates from life to life in the three realms of cyclic existence. (Not all persons, of course, are migrators--examples of this being Buddhas and Foe Destroyers--but when there is rebirth due to contaminated actions and afflictions, it is the person that takes rebirth. In this system, the person is the mind-basis-of-all.)

Uncontaminated meditative equipoise would likewise be inadmissible because there would be no person abiding in it. It follows that the reason is so because the mental consciousness, being uncontaminated, would not be admissible as a migrator in any of the three realms; there is no illustrative instance of the person other than that [in the event that a mind-basis-of-all is not posited].

The migrating person must be contaminated.

A migrator (Tibetan: 'gro ba) may be defined as "the appropriator of the [psychophysical] aggregates of the birth state which are impelled by former intended actions and afflictions."102

The reasoning here is that an uncontaminated meditative equipoise--for instance, an uninter-
rupted path of a path of seeing—would not exist; for, without a mind-basis-of-all, there would be no person engaged in that meditative equipoise. For, there are no sense consciousnesses during meditative equipoise and the equipoise itself, a mental consciousness, is uncontaminated. Thus, while the person on an uninterrupted path is a migrator in cyclic existence, the uninterrupted path cannot be the illustrative instance of that migrating person. 103

Asaṅga's *Compendium of the Mahāyāna* says:

When a supramundane mind is made manifest there, those which are other than it, or not it—mundane minds—become non-existent. Therefore, 104 that migrator would cease [if there were no basis-of-all]. 105

**Eighth Reasoning.** If there were no basis-of-all, gradual death and withdrawal of warmth would not be feasible.

For some individuals, bodily warmth withdraws at death from the feet up, for others, from the head down. 106

For, as [Sthiramati's] *Detailed Explanation of (Vasubandhu's) Treatise on the Five Aggregates* (Pañcaskandhaprakarana-vāibhāṣya) says, "The mind-basis-of-all pervades the whole
body." The whole body is conjoined with the basis-of-all. When the projection [of the basis-of-all of this life by an action done in a previous one] is exhausted, [the basis-of-all] withdraws from those parts of the body which can no longer support [it], and, due to this, warmth also gradually withdraws.

This follows because (1) the sense powers are supported on only certain parts\textsuperscript{107} of the body and (2) although the mental consciousness is dissimilar in that respect, it does not have the ability, as does the basis-of-all, to pervade and conjoin all parts [of the body].

The mental consciousness pervades (Tibetan: khyab pa) the body but does not conjoin (Tibetan: zin pa) it.\textsuperscript{108}

The latter reason follows because there are many [instances of] withdrawal of warmth while the mental consciousness exists clearly. Asaṅga's Compendium of Ascertainments\textsuperscript{109} says:

It is not the case that there never arises a mental consciousness when the death consciousness causes warmth to diminish and leaves\textsuperscript{110} the upper and lower body.\textsuperscript{111}

Also, Ḍzong-ka-ḥa's Difficult Topics says, "The mental consciousness does not abide in a part of the body."\textsuperscript{112}
This refutes the assertion that [the mental consciousness] abides only in the heart.\textsuperscript{113}
PART THREE

CRITICAL ANALYSIS
OF POSITIONS
ON THE MIND-BASIS-OF-ALL
Chapter Eleven  
*Basis-of-All and Buddha Essence*

**Statement of Opinion.** According to the teachings of Ša-sang Ma-ti Pan-chen (Sa-bzang Ma-ti Pan-chen) there are two bases-of-all: a conventional, consciousness [basis-of-all] and an ultimate, wisdom [basis-of-all]. However, he holds that there is a very great difference between [the two] since [according to him] the assertion that they are mutually inclusive is a case of not knowing the distinction between the two truths.

Ma-ti Pan-chen of Ša-sang Monastery was one of Dzong-ka-Ba's early teachers, instructing the nineteen year old student in Sanskrit.¹

Although part of the presentation of mind-basis-of-all in Ma-ti Pan-chen's commentary on Asaṅga's *Compendium of Higher Knowledge* is being criticized here, it should be noted that Dzong-ka-Ba studied neither higher knowledge nor Asaṅga's text with him. Dzong-ka-Ba received teaching on the *Compendium of Higher Knowledge* and, most likely, on the mind-basis-of-all, from Ren-da-wa subsequent to his study with Ma-ti Pan-chen. Just after this study
of higher knowledge he composed the Commentary on the Difficult Topics of Afflicted Mentality and Mind-Basis-of-All.²

Sa-sang Ma-ti Pan-chen was a disciple of Dol-bu-ta Shay-rap-gyel-tsen (Dol-bu-pa Shes-rab-rgyal-mtshan, 1292-1361), the great master of the Jo-nang-ta (Jo-nang-pa) doctrine.³ Ma-ti Pan-chen's doctrine of two bases-of-all (for which, see Gung-tang's presentation immediately below) is founded on the presentation of ultimate truth in Dol-bu-ta's Ocean of Definite Meaning, the core exposition of the Jo-nang-ta theory of emptiness-of-another (Tibetan: gzhan stong).⁴

The Ge-luk-ta presentation of the Madhyamika view, based on the works of Chandrakīrti, is one of self-emptiness (Tibetan: rang stong), which is to say, the lack of true or inherent existence as the nature itself of a conventional phenomenon. This lack, a mere absence of superimposed factors, is the ultimate truth. The doctrine of emptiness-of-another, on the other hand, is one of the non-existence of alien conventional factors in an object which is, in itself, an ultimate. The Jo-nang-tas thus make a radical separation between conven-
tional and ultimate, not unlike that made by non-Buddhist Indian philosophies such as Śāmkhya.

The emptiness-of-another theory is said by its critics to be a mistaken application to sūtra system philosophy of the tantric doctrine of empty form (Tibetan: stong gzugs), form empty of materiality, set forth in the Kālachakra Tantra. 6

Ma-ti Pan-chen's Commentary on (Asaṅga's) "Compendium of Higher Knowledge" says: 7

Knowledge of the thought of the great systems requires knowledge of distinctions such as conventional and ultimate, substratum of [final] nature and [final] nature, and consciousness and wisdom. 9 In particular, one must know the distinction between the two truths concerning mind and basis-of-all. . .

With regards to the basis-of-all, there are two factors: 10 (1) the factor which is conventional, the substratum of [final] nature, and consciousness—one of the eight collections of consciousnesses—and (2) the factor which is ultimate, [final] nature, and wisdom—the Buddha essence. As the Sūtra on the Heavily Adorned (Ghanavyūha) says:
The basis of all the various grounds is the Buddha essence; virtuous
Is this essence that the Tathāgatas teach
By means of the term "basis-of-all."
Although the essence is shown to be a basis-of-all
Those of weak intellect do not understand.

The Buddha essence (tathāgatagarbha, sugatagarbha, or buddhagarbha) is taught in the Buddha Essence Sūtra (Tathāgatagarbhasūtra) to be a permanent body existing in each sentient being, a body adorned with a Buddha's marks and possessing a Buddha's powers.

Both Chittamātrins and Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikas, in reliance on the Descent to Laṅkā Sūtra, assert this teaching to be one requiring interpretation. Chittamātrins say this teaching refers to the mind-basis-of-all; Prāsaṅgikas, however, hold it to refer to the final nature of the mind.

Prāsaṅgikas, in fact, say that both the teachings of mind-basis-of-all and of Buddha essence are to be interpreted, both referring to the emptiness of the mind. They base this interpretation on the just quoted passage from the Sūtra on the Heavily Adorned.
Further [Ma-ti Pan-chen says]:

The Supramundane Victor taught in the Sūtra on Higher Knowledge (Abhidharmasūtra):

It is the source without beginning,
The basis of all phenomena;
Because it exists, all migrations
And even nirvāṇa may be attained.

This passage may be explained as referring to both [the conventional and ultimate bases-of-all] in accordance with the endowment of those being trained. As it is said:

Even when taught in one passage
[It is] understood individually
in many ways.

Hence, the same Superior [Asaṅga] explains [this passage from the Sūtra on Higher Knowledge] in his Compendium of the Mahāyāna taking it as a proof for the basis-of-all but in his Commentary on (Maitreya's) "Sublime Science" (Mahāyānottaratantrasāstravyākhyā) in connection with [other] sūtras takes it as a proof that the basis-of-all is the Tathāgata essence.
This passage from the Śūtra on Higher Knowledge is quoted by Asaṅga in the Compendium of the Mahāyāna and by Sthiramati in his Commentary on (Vasubandhu's) "Thirty Stanzas" in order to justify the assertion of a mind-basis-of-all. The Chittamātrin interpretation of this passage advanced there has already been examined (see above, pp. 395, 421).

In Asaṅga's commentary on Maitreya's Sublime Science, a work written from the viewpoint of Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika, this passage is adduced to support the assertion of a Buddha essence. Asaṅga interprets the various characteristics mentioned--source, basis of all phenomena, etc.--in dependence on passages from other sūtras. Obermiller identifies these as being from the Lion's Roar of Queen Shrīmālā Śūtra (Śrīmālādevīsimhanādasūtra), one of the main scriptural sources on Buddha essence. According to Asaṅga (as Mādhyamika) the Buddha essence is indifferentiable from suchness, which is to say, emptiness.
Further [Ma-ti Pan-chen says]:

Some explain these two topics—[basis-of-all and Buddha essence]—to be mutually inclusive. [Such a presentation is a case of not differentiating between the two truths. As it is said:

Those who do not understand
The distinction between the two truths
Do not see that the profundity
In Buddha's teaching is just that [distinction].

For, the basis-of-all which is not beyond being conventional, consciousness, and the nature has the characteristics of being impermanent, suffering, empty, and selfless. The basis-of-all whose nature is ultimate, non-dual wisdom is the final culmination, the perfection of purity, self, bliss, and permanence. Hence, the two] differ greatly, like [darkness and light, poison and ambrosia, or] husk and kernel.

**Response.** It [absurdly] follows in this case that Chittamatrins take both the basis-of-all and the Buddha essence as topics taught in that sūtra passage and thus accept both. For, once [the basis-of-all] is divided [as you do] by way of the two truths, those two are posited individually.
[Ma-ti Pan-chen] has accepted this reason.

This reason necessarily entails [that Chittamātrins take both the basis-of-all and the Buddha essence as topics taught in that sūtra passage and accept both] because any proponent of tenets must assert that since the two truths of his own system do not negate each other, they are non-contradictory and validly founded.

When Gung-tang says that the two truths are non-contradictory, he is not saying that there is a common locus of an ultimate truth and a conventional truth. For Ge-luk-Ｂas, whatever is an ultimate truth is necessarily not a conventional truth, and vice-versa. However, in contrast with other presentations of the two truths in Tibetan Buddhism--such as that advanced by  Yöng-ma-Ｂa philosophers--ultimate and conventional are compatible and do not harm or contradict each other.

Mind-basis-of-all and Buddha essence, on the other hand, do contradict each other and thus are not suitable to be posited together in one system. A mind-basis-of-all must be truly existent, for it is the cause of cyclic existence and nirvāṇa and, in Chittamātra, cause and effect must truly exist. Chittamātrins do
not assert production from conventionalities as do Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikas. The Prāsaṅgika assertion of Buddha essence as emptiness of the mind, however, entails asserting the non-true existence of any mind. Thus, asserting that mind-basis-of-all and Buddha essence are the two truths in Asaṅga's Chittamātra system implies the absurdity that these Chittamātrins both accept and reject true existence of the mind.

For, Kay-drup's Thousand Doses says:

There is no proponent of tenets who says that "The contradictions in my presentation of the two truths which other proponents speak of do exist; I myself assert that there exist contradictions in my own presentation of the two truths; the conventional is negated by a valid cognizer analyzing the ultimate." Further, you [Ma-ti Pan-chen] have posited the two bases-of-all as the chief among phenomena [or substrata of the final nature] and their [final] natures—those which are discriminated in Maitreya's Discrimination of Phenomena and the Nature of Phenomena (Dharmadharmaṭāvibhaṅga), "One which, when understood, something is abandoned/ And another which is to be made manifest."
Gung-tang must be quoting this passage to establish that the two truths of a single tenet system are non-contradictory and validly founded. How this passage entails that is unclear.

If you accept the thesis [that Chittamātrins take both the basis-of-all and the Buddha essence as topics taught in that sūtra and accept both], then it follows that the Buddha essence as it is explained in Maitreya's Sublime Science (Uttaratantra) and in [Asaṅga's] commentary thereon would be asserted in this [Chittamātra] system; for, [according to you] they accept that [Buddha essence] as an ultimate truth.

Ma-ti Pan-chhen contends that the Chittamātrins followers of Asaṅga assert that the Sūtra on Higher Knowledge passage (above, p. 471) teaches both mind-basis-of-all and Buddha essence—the former being conventional truth and the latter the ultimate truth. This entails that these Chittamātrins assert a Buddha essence as presented in the Sublime Science and in Asaṅga's commentary on it, for it is in this literature that a Buddha essence which is an ultimate truth is described as the basis of all phenomena.
If you accept this consequence, it then follows that Chittamātrins assert by way of three reasonings that the Buddha essence pervades all sentient beings; for, Asaṅga explains in his commentary on Maitreya's Sublime Science that [the passage in the Sublime Science establishing the existence of a Buddha essence in all, beginning] "Because a perfect Buddha's body is pervasive..." and the previously quoted passage from the Sūtra on Higher Knowledge have the same meaning.

The passage from Maitreya's Sublime Science reads:

Because a perfect Buddha's body is pervasive,
Because suchness is without differentiation,
And because a [Buddha] lineage exists,
all embodied
Are always in possession of a Buddha essence. 31

[However] the consequence [that Chittamātrins Following Scripture assert that the Buddha essence pervades all sentient beings] is untenable because in this context [i.e., in the context of the tenets of the Chittamātrins Following Scripture] there are asserted to be three final vehicles [to three different enlightenments].

If all sentient beings have a Buddha essence, then all sentient beings will individually eventually attain Buddhahood. However, this
contradicts the tenet of the Chittamātrins. Following Scripture that not all beings will attain Buddhahood, that some are naturally predisposed to attain enlightenment as a Hearer Foe Destroyer or a Solitary Realizer Foe Destroyer, and some rare depraved beings are without any potential for enlightenment at all. (See above, pp. 300ff.)

Moreover, it [absurdly] follows that [Chittamātrins] would posit the nature of a sentient being's mind as the lineage because Maitreya's Sublime Science and the Heap of Jewels Sūtra (Ratnakūta) explain that the nature of phenomena is the element [of Buddhahood] and the Buddha essence; the root of your assertion that [the Buddha essence] is an ultimate truth comes down to that.

The nature (dharma) of a sentient being's mind cannot here be the lineage, the seed for the attainment of Buddhahood, because in this system not all sentient beings become Buddhas, some becoming enlightened as Hīnayāna Foe Destroyers and some never reaching enlightenment.

The Sublime Science says that the Buddha essence is this nature of phenomena, that is, ultimate truth. Gung-tang explains that Ma-ti
Pan-chen's presentation of Buddha essence as the ultimate basis-of-all rests on this. Maitreya's *Sublime Science* says:

Impure, [both] impure and pure,
[And very pure are respectively
Called the element of a sentient being,
Bodhisattva, and Buddha].

The *Heap of Jewels Sūtra* says:

Because of always being the suchness of phenomena it is the one taste of phenomena; lineage is, hence, eternal.

Ḍzong-ka-Ba would agree that the uncontaminated lineage—in this system, a potency or latency with the mind-basis-of-all—is established naturally and beginninglessly. However, since it is caused it is impermanent and not eternal, that is to say, it is not static and uncaused as is the emptiness of the mind.

Mādhyamikas, on the other hand, posit the emptiness of the mind as the naturally abiding potential for enlightenment because it is due to the fact that the mind, and its attendant afflictions and obstructions lack inherent
existence that the mind can be purified and transformed.

This consequence [that Chittamātrins posit the nature of a sentient being's mind as the enlightenment lineage] is untenable because Asaṅga's *Levels of the Bodhisattvas* (*Bodhisattvabhūmi*) says:

The naturally abiding lineage is that attribute of Bodhisattvas' six sources [i.e., of his eye sense power and so forth] . . . That lineage is also called "seed." 35

The naturally abiding lineage is the seed or latency from which develops uncontaminated wisdom.

Asaṅga's *Levels of the Hearers* (*Śrāvakabhūmi*) explains [lineage] to be a seed in which four attributes are complete and which is with the mind, "That [lineage] is different from the body; it is conjoined with the six sources. . ." 36

The four qualities of lineage according to Asaṅga's *Levels of Hearers* are:

(1) being different from the physical body,

(2) being conjoined with the six sources,

(3) being naturally acquired (and not developed through religious practice),
(4) being present continuously and beginninglessly.\textsuperscript{37}

Further, [Chittamātrins do not posit the nature of a sentient being's mind to be lineage] because Ārya Vimuktitśena's Lamp for the Twenty-five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra (Pañcavimśatisāhasrikāloka) argues against the Chittamātrins, "In regards to their naturally abiding lineage, [Chittamātrins] must state the meaning of naturally abiding."

The sixth century Svātantrika master Ārya Vimuktitśena asks: if the naturally abiding lineage is a seed—that is, a caused phenomenon—and not an uncaused phenomenon such as emptiness, how can it be called "naturally abiding"?

The answer lies in the passage Gung-tang has just quoted from Asaṅga's Levels of the Bodhisattvas:

The naturally abiding lineage is that attribute of a Bodhisattva's six sources which has come in succession from one [lifetime] to another, is beginningless, and is naturally acquired.\textsuperscript{38}

That it is beginningless means that, unlike other latencies, it is not infused into the
mind-basis-of-all by an infusing consciousness. 39 This seems to indicate it to be a natural quality of those mind-bases-of-all in which it is present.

When the potency of the naturally abiding lineage is strengthened through religious activities such as hearing, thinking, and meditating, it becomes the developing lineage. This then serves as the cause of supramundane, uncontaminated minds. 40

It also follows that these explanations in sūtra and by the Superior [Asaṅga] cannot be sources for you [in your assertion of two bases-of-all, one conventional and one ultimate] because (1) although [phenomena] are explained in sūtra both to exist truly and to lack true existence, this is from the point of view of the individual disciples and (2) the teachings of the Superior [Asaṅga] must be applied to individual situations without confusing [the one Chittamātra and the other Mādhyamika]. Ma-ti Paṇ-chen adduced (see above, pp. 469-471) as sources for his assertion of two bases-of-all—conventional and ultimate—passages from the Sūtra on the Heavily Adorned and the Sūtra on Higher Knowledge, and from Asaṅga's Mādhyamika commentary on the Sublime Science and his Chitta-
mātrin work, Compendium of the Mahāyāna. In so doing, Gung-tang says here, he is confusing contradictory assertions: one of a mind-basis-of-all and the other of a Buddha essence which is the ultimate reality of the mind. The literal meanings of those sūtras and Asaṅga's interpretations of them are intended for different types of religious practitioners, not for a single practitioner. The Chittamātrins' assertion of the existence of a mind-basis-of-all is an assertion of a truly existent mind; the Mādhyamika assertion that the Buddha essence, or basis for attaining Buddhahood, is the emptiness, or non-true existence of the mind is an assertion that minds do not truly exist. The two positions are incompatible in a single individual's philosophical view.

This latter point follows because (1) although [the Superior Asaṅga] in his commentary on Maitreya's Sublime Science speaks of a Buddha essence, he does not discuss the basis-of-all even slightly, and (2) although in his Compendium of the Mahāyāna he does not speak of a Buddha essence, he does speak of a basis-of-all. He does not otherwise join [these teachings of Buddha essence and
basis-of-all] into a single system through bringing them together in one place.

Not only that, the necessity of teaching [the Buddha essence and basis-of-all] individually, according to the endowments of trainees, contradicts your own words. For, [the term] ultimate in the explanation of the Buddha essence as ultimate must refer to the ultimate of the Chittamātrin's own system and, hence, there would not be the slightest difference between trainees who are the objects of the teaching of that [Buddha essence] and those who are the objects of teaching of the basis-of-all.

Ma-ti Pan-chen explained that the passage from the Sūtra on Higher Knowledge (above, p.471) teaches both conventional and ultimate bases-of-all, teaching one to one type of practitioner and one to another, according to their disparate understandings. However, once the Buddha essence is explained to be an ultimate basis-of-all asserted by Chittamātrins, it must be the case that its ultimacy is of that sort asserted by Chittamātrins. Thus, both those who are the special practitioners for whom the teaching of a mind-basis-of-all is intended and those for whom the teaching of a Buddha essence is intended would necessarily be
Chittamātrins. Therefore, they would be the same type of practitioner.

Thus, Ma-ti Pan-chen's citing the hermeneutic principle of differentiating teachings by way of their intended practitioners is inappropriate in light of his assertion that the two bases-of-all are the ultimate and conventional truths of one philosophical system.

Moreover, one who propounds [a basis-of-all which is both] an ultimate and a wisdom consciousness is in the company of those many who propound, in dependence on the literal language of a few passages such as one in Dharmottara's *The Correct* ("Thad ldan), that the nature of phenomena, for Chittamātrins, is mind. The nature of phenomena (dharmata) is the thoroughly established nature (parinispanna) of phenomena—a non-affirming negative which is their neither being external objects nor inherently existing as bases of the affixing of designation.

Although the mind's being, by nature, clear and illuminating (prabhāsvara) and free from defilement is accepted by all Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophers, and the designations
"reality" and "suchness" are used for this, these are only conventional or imputed uses of the terms. The actual suchness or ultimate reality of a mind is, in Chittamātra, the absence of its being a different entity from its objects.

In particular it seems that the [bad] odor of this is exuded in a passage in the Jo-nang-ḥa [Dol-bu-ḥa's] Ocean of Definite Meaning (Nges don rgya mtsho):

The pure, wisdom basis-of-all is an emptiness-of-another—it is empty of all phenomena of cyclic existence; it is permanent, enduring, immutable, and eternal.

However, since I have already refuted this in my Annotations for [ṭṣong-kha-ḥa's] "Essence of the Good Explanations" and in my Explanation of the Four Truths, I will not discuss it here.

Jo-nang-ḥas assert that the teachings in sūtra of a Buddha essence which is uncontaminated wisdom and of a thoroughly established nature which is permanent, enduring, immutable, eternal, and possessed of the signs and marks of a Buddha are both teachings of definite import referring to the same phenomenon. This, says Gung-tang in his Annotations for
(Dzong-ka-śa's) "Essence of the Good Explanations" is the basis of their error. 44

They mistakenly assert an ultimate which is an emptiness-of-another—being empty of all conventional phenomena, or phenomena of cyclic existence. Their sources for this doctrine are ten sūtras, including the Buddha Essence Sūtra (Tathāgatagarbha), Lions Roar of Queen Shrimala (Śrīmālādevīśimhaṇāda), and Heap of Jewels (Ratnakūṭa) sūtras. 45

Even in this [Chittamātra] system, the nature of phenomena must be a non-affirming negative which is a mere elimination of an object of negation.

It is certainly the case that in Mādhyamika the nature of phenomena, or emptiness, is a negative phenomenon—a mere absence which, when its object of negation is negated, does not imply another positive phenomenon. This is also the case in Asaṅga's Chittamātra—ultimate truth, or emptiness, is not a positive phenomenon (which is to say, not a phenomenon cognized upon explicitly negating its own object of negation). The ultimate basis-of-all theorized by the Jo-nang-śas is, on the other hand, such a positive phenomenon.
This is established by many texts: the *Sūtra Unravelling the Thought* says, "The non-existence of a self in phenomena is just that non-existence of an essence by way of that very essence." Asaṅga's *Compendium of the Mahāyāna* states:

What is the thoroughly established characteristic? It is just that utter non-existence of a character of externality in dependent phenomena.
Chapter Twelve
Basis-of-All as Perceiver

FIRST REFUTATION (22b.2)

Statement of Opinion. [Chittamātrins] assert that the entity of a basis-of-all is conceptual consciousness.

In Buddhist epistemology all minds are either conceptual (kalpanā) or nonconceptual. Nonconceptual minds know their objects directly, without the mediation of abstract images, although sometimes they are mistaken or wrong about their objects, or are unable to ascertain them. All nonconceptual minds, nonetheless, are minds whose objects appear clearly to them.

Conceptual or thought consciousnesses, on the other hand, know their objects through the mediation of abstract images, called meaning-generalities (arthasāmāṇya) and term-generalities (śabdāsāmāṇya). Because of this, it is said that objects to do not appear clearly to a conceptual consciousness.1

Response. It follows that this is incorrect because [the basis-of-all] is a nonconceptual mind. This follows because [the basis-of-all] is a mind which has clear
appearance [of objects]. This reason in turn follows because [the basis-of-all] is a mind whose object appears without ascertainment, a mind to which an object clearly appears but which is unable to induce ascertainment of that object. Vasubandhu's Thirty Stanzas says, "Although unknowing, [the basis-of-all] is a knower."

Dzong-ka-Śa's Difficult Topics says:

Although these environments and beings appear, [the basis-of-all] neither ascertains them itself nor is able to induce ascertainment later.

Dzong-ka-Śa posits this appearance without ascertainment as the aspect of the mind-basis-of-all (see above, p.361). Environments and beings are the observed objects of a basis-of-all; they are the sense powers, the supports of those sense powers, and the five sense objects (see above, p.360).

Gung-tang argues here that because the basis-of-all is a mind which clearly perceives an object but which is unable to ascertain that object, it must, therefore, be a type of direct perception. For, clear perceivers are necessarily direct perceivers. Because it is a direct perceiver, it is necessarily non-
conceptual, for direct perception and conceptual cognition are mutually exclusive.\textsuperscript{5}

SECOND REFUTATION (22b.4)

Statement of Opinion About That. It follows that it is incorrect that objects appear clearly to a basis-of-all because, as regards the mode of appearance of objects, [a basis-of-all] is even less clear than a conceptual consciousness. For, it is said in Kay-drup's Dispelling Mental Darkness Concerning (Dharmakīrti's) Seven Treatises on Prime Cognition (sDe-bdun-yid-kyi-mun-sel):

The aspect [of a mind-basis-of-all] is very unclear. It must be asserted to be even less clear than a conceptual mental consciousness.

Response. That reason, although correct in itself, does not entail [the basis-of-all being even less clear than a conceptual consciousness as regards the mode of appearance of objects]. For, the meaning of that passage is not that objects do not appear clearly to a basis-of-all but rather that it is difficult for [a basis-of-all] to appear to another [consciousness] due to the fact that it is itself of a very subtle nature.\textsuperscript{6}
The stater of the above opinion has misconstrued the meaning of Kay-drup's statement, thinking that the lack of clarity spoken of there refers to the lack of a clear appearance of an object to consciousness. Now, it is true that thought, or conceptual cognition, is said to be unclear because the objects about which it makes determinations do not clearly or directly appear to it, appearing only by way of an abstract image. Nonetheless, here Kay-drup refers to the difficulty of perceiving or knowing a thought consciousness or a mind-basis-of-all as object.

Bhāvaviveka's Blaze of Reasoning (Tarkajvala) speaks of this at the point of stating Chittamātra assertions:

Because it is not an object of worldly scholars saying, "It is of this" or "Is is in this," its aspect is to be thoroughly unknown.
THIRD REFUTATION (23a.1)

Statement of Opinion. It follows that this [passage from Bhāvaviveka] does not apply [here] because if it did, it would be senseless [for Kay-drup] to say that [the basis-of-all is "even less clear] than a conceptual mental consciousness."

Response. There is no fault, for it is more difficult for a conceptual mental consciousness to appear [to another consciousness] than for a sense direct perceiver and it is even more difficult for this [mind-basis-of-all] to appear [to another consciousness] than for that [conceptual mental consciousness].

It follows, therefore, that it is incorrect to explain, as someone did, the meaning of [Vasubandhu's saying in his Thirty Stanzas that the basis-of-all is] "unknowing" to be merely the inability [of the basis-of-all] to ascertain its own object. For, both the inability of the basis-of-all to ascertain its own object and the difficulty of the basis-of-all to be ascertained by another [consciousness] should be explained as the meaning of that passage. For, in Vīṇātadeva's Commentary on (Vasubandhu's) "Thirty Stanzas" (Trīṃśikāṭikā) [this passage] is discussed in accordance with Sthiramati's statement of the two explanations in his Commentary on (Vasubandhu's) "Thirty Stanzas" (Trīṃśīkaḥbhāṣya).
Vinītadeva says (see above, p. 361), explaining Vasubandhu's characterization of the mind-basis-of-all as an unknowing knower:

That [mind-basis-of-all] is a thoroughly unclear object of observation and has a thoroughly unclear aspect. 7

Sthiramati says:

Because [the basis-of-all] is not a knower in the form of an experience of something [in the sense of] "It is this," it is therefore called an unknowing appropriator. 8

And:

Because it is not possible to know that [basis-of-all in the sense of] "It is this," it is hence called "unknowing" [or "unknown"]. 9

FOURTH REFUTATION (23a.5)

Statement of Opinion. All three—sense powers, sense objects, and latencies—appear clearly to a basis-of-all. Sense powers, sense objects, and latencies are the observed objects of the mind-basis-of-all, although the latencies are only
imputed and not actual objects. (See above, pp. 357-359).

Response. It follows that although the two—the sense powers and sense objects—do appear, latencies do not appear to that [basis-of-all], because saying that the latencies are observed objects of that [basis-of-all] is just in reference to the appearance of objects due to latencies. This reason follows because Ыzong-ka-беа says in his Difficult Topics:

Although it is not the case that the seeds become objects through appearing [to the basis-of-all], they are posited as observed objects because it is due to them that the fruitional basis-of-all comes to perceive environments and beings: abodes (the supports of the sense powers), bodies (the sense powers), and the five sense objects. 10

FIFTH REFUTATION (23а.6)

Statement of Opinion About That. It then follows that there are no appearing objects for a basis-of-all of the Formless Realm because (1) there are neither sense powers nor sense objects which are [appearing objects of a basis-of-all of the Formless Realm] and (2) there are no latencies [which are appearing objects of a basis-
of-all of the Formless Realm. You, Gung-tang] have
[yourself] accepted the latter reason.

The first reason follows [i.e., it follows that
there are neither sense powers nor sense objects which
are appearing objects of a Formless Realm basis-of-all]
because there are neither sense powers nor sense objects
in that realm and [its] levels and [sense powers and
sense objects] of other levels do not serve as objects
[of a basis-of-all of the Formless Realm].

In the Formless Realm there is no form and,
hence, there are neither sense powers nor sense
objects. For, the sense objects—visible forms,
sounds, odors, tastes, and tangible objects—
are coarse form and the sense powers are subtle
form.

Gung-tang, and Go-mang College, assert that
since the latencies with a basis-of-all cannot
actually appear to that basis-of-all, its
actual observed object must be something else.
In the Desire and Form Realms one can posit
an observation of sense powers and sense objects;
however, in the Formless Realm an actual observed
object of a mind-basis-of-all must also be
formless (see below, pp. 507-512).
Lo-sel-teng College holds, in opposition to Go-mang, that latencies are observed objects of the basis-of-all in which they are infused.\footnote{11} Thus, although neither of the other objects of a mind-basis-of-all (sense powers and sense objects) appear to it in the Formless Realm, they could appear (Tibetan: snang rung) if the appropriate conditions arose; for, the latencies for their arising do still exist with the basis-of-all. This possibility of appearance avoids, they say, the fault of a Formless Realm basis-of-all having no observed objects.\footnote{12}

Se-ra Jay College agrees that because a Formless Realm mind-basis-of-all holds latencies through which sense powers and objects can appear, these latencies may be presented as observed objects of that mind-basis-of-all.\footnote{13}

[Although these reasons are asserted to be correct] it is not possible to accept the consequence [that there are no appearing objects for a basis-of-all of the Formless Realm] because it is said:

All consciousnesses have appearing objects;
Determined objects are peculiar to conceptuality.\footnote{14}
These lines are almost exactly the same as the last two lines of the following passage from Ṣyang-ǰen-ga-way-īc-drö's (dbYangs-can-dga'-ba'i-blo-gros, eighteenth century, also known as A-kya-Yongs-'dzin) Summary Verses on Awareness and Knowledge:

There are four objects: appearing, apprehended, determined, and engagement;
Appearing object and apprehended object are mutually inclusive.
Except for perceptions which do not rely on external objects
Such as that of falling hairs [in someone with cataracts],
There are appearing objects for all consciousnesses.
Determined objects are peculiar to conceptuality.15
SIXTH REPUTATION (23b.2)

Statement of Opinion About That. It follows that (1) [the assertion that all consciousnesses have appearing objects] is an explanation of [Chittamātrins] Following Reasoning and (2) on this occasion [of the tenets of Chittamātrins Following Scripture], whatever is a consciousness need not have its own appearing object.

The position of Gung-tang and Go-mang College is that all consciousnesses, with the exception of some nonconceptual wrong consciousnesses (such as the eye consciousness which mistakenly perceives falling hairs), have appearing objects.

For, Ōdong-ka-ba's Difficult Topics says:

All consciousnesses need not depend on existent observed objects. As Asaṅga's Compendium of the Mahāyāna says:

The past and so forth and, likewise, dreams as well as the two types of images are not existent objects of observation;

hence, it is [nonetheless] suitable to observe them.

... [The basis-of-all] operates through the force of actions [done in the past]. It does not have an appearing observed object.
Gung-tang has misquoted the last line of this passage. It should read, "[The mind-basis-of-all] does not [operate] in reliance on appearing observed objects."\(^{19}\)

Dzong-ka-ba's discussion of the observed objects of a Formless Realm basis-of-all, given in full, is as follows: \(^{20}\)

**Question:** Given that it is the case [that form is inhibited from appearing to the mind-basis-of-all of someone in one of the formless meditative equipoises], a Formless [Realm] basis-of-all would have no observed object. For, environments and beings possessing form would not [then] appear and there is no sense in positing latencies as observed objects. If this is accepted, one would [absurdly] be asserting a consciousness lacking an observed object.

**Answer:** There is no fault. All consciousnesses need not depend on existent observed objects. As Asaṅga's *Compendium of the Mahāyāna* says:

```
The past and so forth and, likewise, dreams
As well as the two types of images
```
BASIS-OF-ALL AS PERCEIVER

Are not existent objects of observation; Hence, it is [nonetheless] suitable to observe them.

In particular, a basis-of-all is impelled by a former virtuous or non-virtuous action as the basis of a pleasant or unpleasant migration and does not cease for a moment until death. Hence, it operates through the force of actions [done in the past] and not in reliance on an appearing observed object.

That being the case, since there are no sense powers or sense objects in the Formless [Realm], from among the three observed objects [of a mind-basis-of-all], latencies are the observed object. Although latencies actually do not have the meaning of being observed objects, since it is by their power that abodes, sense objects, and bodies can appear (Tibetan: \textit{snang rung}) [when conditions are appropriate], these [latencies] come [to be called] observed objects.

The material elided in Gung-tang's quotation of this passage (especially the last paragraph)
is something that Gung-tang would find difficult
to explain in light of his position that laten-
cies are in no way observed objects of a
mind-basis-of-all.

Response. Although this reason is correct, the consequence
[that for Chittamatrin following Asaṅga, whatever is a
consciousness need not have its own appearing object]
does not follow from it, for the meaning [of the passage
from the Compendium of the Mahāyāna] is that there need
not exist an external thing among the observed objects
of a consciousness.

Asaṅga's Compendium of the Mahāyāna presents
a scriptural passage setting forth four reasons
by which one can infer that there are no
external objects. The four reasons are as
follows.

First Reason. The same phenomenon is seen as
different objects by different beings' minds
due to the maturation of different former
actions (karma). A river, for example, is
seen as pus and blood by a hungry ghost (preta),
as a dwelling by a fish, as clear and refresh-
ing and a place to wash and drink by a human,
and as space by a yogi in the meditative absorp-
tion of limitless space. Since the river
cannot be all these contradictory things at once, it does not exist as an object separate from the consciousness apprehending it.

**Second Reason.** There are seen to be knowledges without observed objects: for instance, knowledges of the past or future, dreams, and perception of images. The **two types of images** spoken of in the verse are those perceived by one in meditative absorption and those seen in a mirror.\(^{23}\) A yogi in meditative stabilization on unpleasantness, for example, sees skeletons or corruption everywhere, but such unpleasantness does not exist apart from his mind. Similarly, the face one sees in a mirror is not an actual face behind the glass but appears only by way of the mirror.\(^{24}\)

Go-mang scholars such as Gung-tang and Nga-wang-Gei-den interpret the literal assertion here of non-existence of observed objects to be a non-existence of external objects, not ruling out the existence of internal appearing objects.\(^{25}\) Ge'u-tsang also qualifies the non-existence of external objects here; he says it indicates that those consciousnesses (of past, future, and so on) do not depend on appearing objects
which are impermanent functioning things. The Lo-sel-ling textbook agrees that these consciousnesses do not have specifically characterized (svalaksana)—i.e., impermanent—appearing objects.

Third Reason. If phenomena did exist as they appear, i.e., as external objects, no effort would be necessary to realize this reality of phenomena and thereby achieve liberation. However, such effort is required; for, phenomena do not exist as external objects.

Fourth Reason. Hearer, Solitary Realizer, and Bodhisattva yogis who have attained single-pointedness of mind can cause, for example, earth to appear as water through the force of their meditative conviction. Yogis, moreover, who have unified calm abiding (samatha) and special insight (vipaśyanā) can, with effort, perceive phenomena such as subtle impermanence in the instant they occur. And, for those who have attained nonconceptual wisdom, no external objects appear. Hence, external objects do not exist.
If this were not the case there would arise this fault: it would follow that there would be no appearing objects for the dream consciousnesses and so forth which are posited as concordant examples of [consciousnesses not having external objects].

This would follow because, not having objects, they would have no appearing objects. The Lo-șel-İing textbook seems to indicate that among the consciousnesses stated as examples in the Compendium of the Mahāyāna, those which are conceptual are seen to have no impermanent appearing objects and those which are nonconceptual to have no impermanent objects of engagement. Any phenomenon appearing to a mind-basis-of-all, however, is necessarily impermanent—i.e., not a phenomenon imputed by a conceptual consciousness.

Ordinary knowledge of past and future is conceptual, its appearing object is an internal mental image. Such a mental image is not specifically characterized—not an impermanent functioning thing—but, rather, a superimposition of abstraction. Similarly, the perception of an image in a mirror, being a visual cognition, is necessarily nonconceptual. It would
be an instance of a nonconceptual wrong consciousness, one to which a non-existent (the face in back of the mirror) clearly appears. Thus, its object of engagement is not a functioning thing.

Concerning the nature of dream consciousnesses and imaginative meditative stabilizations such as that on unpleasantness, there is controversy. Nevertheless, dream consciousnesses—no matter whether they are conceptual or nonconceptual—are wrong consciousnesses and, as such, their objects of engagement are non-existent. And meditative stabilization on unpleasantness, whether it be a wrong consciousness or not, is also a taking of a non-existent to mind. Thus, both may be posited as minds whose observed objects do not exist.

Also, if [a consciousness] had none of the four objects, (1) it could not be a consciousness, for the definition of mind [a synonym of consciousness] is knowledge of an an object, and (2) it would not even be a subject.

The commonly accepted definition of a subject (visayin) is: a functioning thing having some kind of object. Thus, an objectless consciousness would be neither a subject nor a conscious-
ness. For, in the Ge-luk-ṭa presentation of sūtra system Buddhist epistemology, consciousness is always consciousness of something; it always has an object.

It follows, moreover, that it is not correct [that there are no appearing objects for a basis-of-all of the Formless Realm] because (1) even though there exists an observed object which is something that appears to that [basis-of-all of the Formless Realm], (2) it is not necessary that any of the three—sense powers, sense objects, or latencies—appear. The first [part of that reason] is established because Sthiramati's Commentary on (Vasubandhu's) "Thirty Stanzas" says, "There can be no consciousness which is without an observed object and without an aspect." 31 Vinītadeva's Commentary on (Vasubandhu's) "Thirty Stanzas" says, "I also do not assert a mind-basis-of-all which has no observed object or aspect." 32

Gung-tang's assumption is that an observed object of a consciousness is necessarily an observed object which appears (Tibetan: snang rgyu'i āmigs pa) to that consciousness.

The second [part of the reason—that it is not necessary for any of the three, sense powers, sense objects, or latencies, to appear to a basis-of-all of
the Formless Realm] is established because those aggregates which are the basis of name in the Formless [Realm] are posited as observed objects of a basis-of-all.

The aggregates which are the basis of name (Tibetan: ming gzhi) of a Formless Realm person are feelings, discriminations, compositional factors, and consciousnesses (i.e., the aggregates with the exception of forms).

This follows because Vasubandhu's Thirty Stanzas says, "... That [basis-of-all] is a knowledge/ Of appropriations and abodes." \[33\]

Appropriations (upādāna) are the aggregates appropriated by a mind-basis-of-all, the basis-of-all being the appropriating consciousness (see above, p.398 ). According to the Go-mang College, the appropriated aggregates are necessarily observed objects of the appropriating basis-of-all, but whatever is an observed object of a basis-of-all is not necessarily one of its appropriations. For Go-mang, the sense objects included among the observed objects of a mind-basis-of-all need not have been appropriated by that basis-of-all, that is, they need not be included in its continuum. \[34\]
Abodes (avasthāna) are the sense powers and their supports, the body.\(^{35}\)

[In this verse] the observed objects of the basis-of-all are divided into two: the internal appropriations and the abode [or] external environment; latencies, sense powers, and name are posited as the former.

Here name (nāma) are the non-form aggregates referred to above as basis of name.

For, Sthiramati's Commentary on (Vasubandhu's) "Thirty Stanzas" says:

The observed objects of that [basis-of-all]--the latencies, the forms which are the sense powers with their abodes, and name--are very subtle.\(^{36}\)

This entails [that the four mental aggregates, the basis of name, are posited as observed objects of a Formless Realm basis-of-all] because "name" in that [passage from Sthiramati's Commentary on (Vasubandhu's) "Thirty Stanzas"] must apply to the Formless [Realm]. For in that same text (the Sthiramati Commentary) it says:

In the Formless Realm there is no manifestation of fruitions as form. Hence, the basis of name is the only appropriation [there].\(^{37}\)
Moreover, it follows that such is correct because the meaning of positing body, sense powers, and so forth as observed objects of the basis-of-all is by reason of their being the aggregates which are what is appropriated and the basis-of-all being the person which is the appropriator. That [case] is similar to this.

It follows that the aggregates of name are the observed objects of a Formless Realm mind-basis-of-all because just as form aggregates, such as the sense powers, appropriated by a mind-basis-of-all are observed objects of Desire and Form Realm bases-of-all, so the non-form aggregates of feeling and so forth appropriated by a Formless Realm basis-of-all are its observed objects.

The Lo-sel-İing textbook quotes and refutes Gung-tang on this point.\(^{38}\) Lo-sel-İing holds that the \textit{appropriations} mentioned by Vasubandhu are latencies, specifically the latencies for the manifestation of form.\(^{39}\)

Further, although [objects such as] sufferings in the hells are not actually experienced by the basis-of-all, the basis-of-all is called the experiencer of fruitions because of the fact that the feeling which does experience these [sufferings] appears to the basis-of-all.
A hell-being's basis-of-all, like any basis-of-all, is accompanied by neutral feeling. It cannot itself experience suffering; for, if it did, that feeling would arise in the aspect of suffering and would no longer be neutral.

As Gung-tang will explain below, the mind-basis-of-all is not actually an experiencer of fruitions such as pleasure and suffering (see pp. 513ff.); it is, however, the I which is the only illustration of an experiencer of suffering and so forth. Gung-tang's point here is that this I can be said to be an experiencer of suffering not by way of the feeling accompanying it experiencing suffering but due to the fact that there is an appearance to it of the feeling of suffering accompanying other consciousnesses in its continuum.

Since the feeling of suffering is one of the aggregates of name, this appearance entails that mental aggregates do appear, as Gung-tang contends, to the mind-basis-of-all.

When Prāsaṅgikas appraise this, they adduce this contradiction (Supplement 6.137a), "It is not correct for [an agent], the appropriator [or, the self], and [its object], the appropriation [or, the aggregates of
body and mind], to be a single thing. "However, because this is not the occasion [for discussing the Prāsaṅgika view] I will not elaborate.

In the system of the Chittamātrins Following Scripture, the appropriator of the aggregates is the mind-basis-of-all (see above, p.398). However, the mind-basis-of-all is one of the phenomena making up the consciousness aggregates—one of the appropriations. Thus, it would seem that the mind-basis-of-all is appropriating itself, whereas agent (appropriator) and object (appropriated aggregates) cannot be the same. 41
Chapter Thirteen
Basis-of-All as Experiencer

FIRST REFUTATION (24b.1)

Statement of Opinion. It follows that a hell-being's basis-of-all experiences suffering because that [basis-of-all] is the experiencer of fruitions such as pleasure and suffering. This reason in turn follows because that [basis-of-all] is the I which is the experiencer of fruitions.

Response. [Although it is true that the basis-of-all is the I which is the experiencer of fruitions such as pleasure and suffering] this does not necessarily entail [that it is the experiencer of such fruitions].

The mind-basis-of-all is the I which is the experiencer of pleasure and pain. However, it is not the experiencer of pleasure and pain, nor can it be said that it experiences them.¹ To be an I which is an experiencer does not necessarily entail being a common locus of I and experiencer.²

There are two egos or persons (pudgala) experiencing fruitions: a substantially existent one—the mind-basis-of-all, and an imputedly
existent one—the non-associated compositional factor called the "person." As Gung-tang states below, in the Chittamātra system a designated or imputed object (which may be either substantially or imputedly existent), when sought under analysis, must be findable among its bases of designation. Of these two egos, the one that is found under analysis is the mind-basis-of-all. The other, the imputedly existent person, is a designation given to one or another of the five aggregates which are its bases of designation.

Thus, the mind-basis-of-all is the I experiencing fruitions: for, when the ego is sought, the mind-basis-of-all is found. However, the I experiencing fruitions is not the mind-basis-of-all; for the ego is an imputation, whereas the mind-basis-of-all is substantially existent, and these two are contradictory. Put another way, if the I experiencing fruitions were the mind-basis-of-all it would then be substantially existent. This is because whatever is a mind-basis-of-all is necessarily substantially existent. The mind-basis-of-all, however, is the I experiencing
fruitions because whatever is an I experiencing fruitions need not necessarily be imputedly existent—despite the fact that an I is imputedly existent.

This line of reasoning highlights the difference, in Buddhist logic, between "x is y" and "Being x necessarily entails being y" (or, "whatever is x is necessarily y"). The former indicates that y is a quality of the phenomenon x whereas the latter means that y is a quality of all illustrations or instances of the phenomenon x. Although a certain x may be y, all phenomena which are that x need not necessarily be y. The paradigmatic example of this in the Ge-luk-5a presentation of phenomena is that object of knowledge is permanent but whatever is an object of knowledge is not necessarily permanent.

In the case in question, the ego or person is itself imputedly existent. However, if something which is that person is sought, that is, if an illustration of the person is sought, one finds a substantially existent phenomenon (the mind-basis-of-all) which is that phenomenon among the person's bases of designation which is it.
That reason [i.e., the basis-of-all is the I which is the experiencer of fruition] is established because [the basis-of-all] is the I which is an illustration of an experiencer of fruition.

To be an illustration (Tibetan: mtshan gzhi) of something is to be an instance of that thing. The only illustration of the person is the mind-basis-of-all; thus, the mind-basis-of-all must be the I or person, and it must be the I experiencing pleasure or pain if it is the illustration of that I.\(^5\)

The bases of designation (Tibetan: gdags gzhi) of the person—the five psychophysical aggregates—are, however, not the person.\(^6\)

This reason in turn follows because if one searches\(^7\) for the object which is designated as such an experiencer of fruition, [the basis-of-all] is found. This in turn follows because it exists in its own right.

Gung-tang's argument is that existing in its own right (svarūpasiddha) entails being findable when sought under analysis. This illuminates the assertion made by Gung-tang's teacher Gön-chok-jik-may- wang-šo that in the Mind-Only school all phenomena exist in their own right.\(^8\)

Existence in its own right does not, then, imply
existence from an object's own side, as a phenomenon external to the consciousness perceiving it. Rather, it means that an object is analytically findable.

It [absurdly] follows for you [who hold that a basis-of-all experiences suffering] that the basis-of-all in the continuum of King Ajātashatru is the killer of his own father, because that [basis-of-all] is an I which is an illustration of the King Ajātashatru who is the killer\(^9\) of his own father. That this reason entails that the King's basis-of-all is the killer is in conformity [with your own line of reasoning].

Gung-tang's first move in the present rebuttal was to reject the opponent's entailment in the following way: "Although the basis-of-all is the I which is the experiencer of fruitions, this does not entail that it is the experiencer of fruitions."

He now restates the entailment, as it was set forth by the opponent, casting it in a form which he feels cannot be accepted by the opponent. Instead of being an experiencer, the mind-basis-of-all is now said to be a patricide.

Ajātashatru was the son of Bimbisara, king of the north Indian state of Magadha.\(^{10}\) Ajāta-
shatru, a cohort of Buddha Shākyamuni's evil cousin Devadatta, envied his father the kingship and sent assassins to kill him. Although they were unsuccessful, Bimbisara prudently abdicated. His son thereupon sent the assassins out again, this time—at the behest of Devadatta—to kill Buddha. Again they failed, succumbing to Buddha's charisma and becoming his disciples. Although Bimbisara had abdicated to avoid the threat posed by his son, Ajātashatru did not allow him to live his life out in peace but, instead, imprisoned him and left him to starve to death.

Gung-tang's point is that if one searches for the I which is the killer Ajātashatru, one finds only Ajātashatru's mind-basis-of-all. Thus, this mind-basis-of-all is the I which is the illustration of the killer Ajātashatru. To be the I which is the illustration of an experiencer or a killer is not the same as being an illustration of an experiencer or killer. Ajātashatru's mind-basis-of-all is the former but not the latter.¹¹

Ajātashatru's mind-basis-of-all is not Ajātashatru, nor is it a patricide.¹² A mind-
basis-of-all cannot kill, nor can it order killing. However, the I which is the killer or the one who orders the killing is the mind-basis-of-all. 13

If one accepts [that a hell-being's basis-of-all experiences suffering] then it [absurdly] follows that the subject, a hell-being's basis-of-all, experiences suffering by way of the feeling which is an accompanier of it because of being a mind which experiences suffering.

The reason—that a hell-being's basis-of-all is a mind which experiences suffering—is accepted by Gung-tang's opponent as an entailment of his assertion that the mind-basis-of-all is an experiencer of fruitions. This reason is not accepted by Gung-tang.

It follows that whatever is a mind which experiences suffering necessarily experiences suffering by way of its accompanying feeling because Maitreya's Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes says, "A consciousness sees the object,/ The mental factors [see] its features." 14

Feeling is one of the five mental factors invariably present in all perceptual situations (see above, p.362). A consciousness or main mind such as the mind-basis-of-all (see above, p.322) perceives the mere entity of the object
being apprehended. Its accompanying mental factors perceive the features of an object.

If you accept [the consequence—a hell-being's basis-of-all experiences suffering by way of its accompanying feeling—] then it [absurdly] follows, because of accepting this, that there exists feeling which is in similar association with that subject [a hell-being's basis-of-all] and which experiences suffering.

If you accept this consequence, it [absurdly] follows that the subject [the feeling accompanying a hell-being's basis-of-all] is the feeling of suffering because of being feeling which is an experience of pain. Being feeling which is an experience of pain necessarily entails being the feeling of suffering because feeling which is an experience of pain is the definition of the feeling of suffering.

However, one cannot accept [that the feeling accompanying a hell being's basis-of-all is the feeling of suffering] because it is the neutral feeling. [This reason in turn follows] because it is the feeling which is an accompanier of a basis-of-all. Being the feeling which is an accompanier of a basis-of-all necessarily entails being neutral feeling because Đzong-ka-Bṣa's Root Text says, "The [accompanying] feeling is the middle one."
SECOND REFUTATION (25a.1)

Statement of Opinion. With respect to what has been said, it follows that there does exist an experience of suffering by the feeling accompanying a basis-of-all because there exists an appearance of suffering to that feeling.

The existence of an appearance of suffering to a feeling necessarily entails that there exists an experience of suffering by it; for, to be experienced by feeling means to appear to feeling.

As Gung-tang will show, the experience of pleasure or pain by a feeling is not a case of an object appearing to that feeling but, rather, is a case of the entity of that feeling itself being pleasure or pain.¹⁶

Response. It follows that whatever is a feeling in the continuum of a Buddha Superior necessarily must simultaneously experience all the sufferings of cyclic existence because with respect to whatever is that [feeling in the continuum of a Buddha Superior] all pleasure, suffering, and neutrality must necessarily appear.

The three spheres!

"The three spheres" (Tibetan: 'khor gsum) is stated in debate to an opponent who has fallen into a logical trap and contradicted himself.
The three spheres are:

(1) acceptance of the reason--here, the necessary acceptance by a Buddhist philosopher that all three types of feelings appear to the feelings accompanying a Buddha's omniscient consciousnesses,

(2) acceptance of the entailment--here, that appearance of all three types of feelings, including all feelings of suffering, to a Buddha's feeling necessarily entails simultaneous experience of all sufferings by that feeling,

(3) acceptance of the opposite of the consequence--here, that no mind or mental factor in the continuum of a Buddha Superior experiences suffering.

A Buddha does not experience suffering, although it appears to him, because the experience of suffering is a fruition of non-virtue, and a Buddha has eliminated non-virtuous activity along with the latencies established by that activity.

Moreover, it follows that the two--an experience by a feeling and an appearance to that feeling--are utterly different because the following two are contra-
dictory: an experience by a feeling which is in similar association with an uninterrupted path for which a mere actual [meditative absorption] of the first concentration serves as its mental basis and an appearance to that feeling.

An uninterrupted path (anataryamārga) is a type of meditative consciousness that is generated during the paths of seeing (darśanamārga) and meditation (bhāvanamārga). It is a yogic direct perceiver (yogipratyaksā) of an ultimate truth and serves as an antidote to the conception of self.

An actual meditative absorption (maulasaṃapatti) of the first concentration (prathama-dhyāna) is a meditative state of one-pointedness of mind which, through investigation (vitarka) and analysis (vicāra), has become separated from the Desire Realm. It is further characterized by the presence of joy (prīti) and bliss (sukha). The Desire Realm (Kāmadhātu) includes ordinary worldly consciousnesses which are afflicted with attachment, aversion, and so forth. After calm abiding (samatha) has been developed, it is possible to achieve four
concentrations, called Form Realm minds, and four absorptions \textit{(samapatti)} of the Formless Realm.\textsuperscript{18}

The \textit{mere} first concentration stipulated here is one having both investigation and analysis. A first concentration without the coarser of these two—investigation—is called a special first concentration.\textsuperscript{19}

Gung-tang posits as his subject here the feeling accompanying an uninterrupted path—that is, a union of calm abiding and special insight observing emptiness—which has been achieved by a meditator already in the meditative absorption of a mere actual first concentration.

This reason in turn follows because that [feeling] is posited to be an experience of bliss since it has been produced as an entity of bliss; however, bliss cannot be its appearing object, for bliss is a conventionality.

The feeling in similar association with a first concentration meditative absorption is necessarily one of mental bliss; for, this is a meditative absorption of joy and bliss.\textsuperscript{20} Bliss, however, is not an ultimate truth; only emptinesses are ultimate truths. (Although a
consciousness in meditative equipoise on emptiness is sometimes called a thoroughly established phenomenon, which would make it an ultimate truth, it is so only metaphorically. A thoroughly established phenomenon must be a final object of awareness by a path of purification removing obstructions.) 21

In the Chittamātra system, only ultimate truths can be objects of an uninterrupted path, whether it be in the continuum of a Hearer, Solitary Realizer, or Bodhisattva. Chittamātrins posit both the selflessness of persons and that of phenomena as ultimate truths. 22 (Svātantrikas, on the other hand, hold that selflessnesses of persons are conventional truths; thus, according to them, the appearing objects of some uninterrupted paths are conventionalities.) 23

Also, even though the nature of phenomena is its appearing object, there is no designation of an experience of the nature of phenomena.

Nature of phenomena (dharmatā), emptiness, ultimate truth, and thoroughly established phenomenon are mutually inclusive.
An ultimate truth is the appearing object of this feeling of bliss which is in similar association with an uninterrupted path because to be in similar association (samprayoga) means to be similar in terms of object of engagement, aspect, time, basis, and substantial entity.\textsuperscript{24} Thus, the object of engagement, or appearing object, of the uninterrupted path and its accompanying mental factors is only an ultimate truth.

There is no designation of feeling as an experiencer of emptiness. Feeling is said to experience pleasure, pain, and neutrality from the point of view of its being pleasure, pain, or neutrality. Realization of emptiness is not such an "experience" in the sense of being emptiness. Realization is a cognitive state and thus a positive phenomenon; emptiness is a non-affirming negation of subject-object duality and thus a mere absence of a hypostatized state of being.

The first part of this reason is established because even the bliss in [the term] "experience of bliss" is a feeling itself; it is not an external phenomenon. The latter part of this reason [i.e., that although the feeling which is in similar association with such an
uninterrupted path has the nature of phenomena as its appearing object, it is not designated an experience of the nature of phenomena] is established because [that feeling] is an uninterrupted path. This reason in turn follows because [that feeling] is a manifest engaging consciousness in the continuum of one who is on an uninterrupted path.

Moreover, if [that feeling] were to experience the nature of phenomena, there would occur the fault that a mere actual [meditative absorption of the first concentration] which realizes contaminated phenomenon to be suffering would experience both bliss and pain.

This feeling would experience bliss because of being the feeling in similar association with an actual first concentration. It would absurdly follow that this same feeling would experience pain because of being a realization of suffering. This follows because that meditative absorption and its accompanying mental factors realize that contaminated phenomena are suffering and--according to Gung-tang's opponent--the realization of an appearing object is the experience of that object. (For, the opponent has claimed that experience by feeling means appearance to feeling.)
THIRD REFUTATION (25a.6)

Statement of Opinion. It follows that what is experienced by feeling serves as the object of that [feeling] because Shantideva's Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds (Bodhicaryavatara) [in refuting the position that existence of memory proves existence of self-knowledge] explains that an apprehender of blue experiences blue: "[There is memory] due to connection with experience [not of the apprehender but] of another [i.e., an object]." 25

Further, it is explained that the definition of feeling is the mental factor of experience, experiencing its own object through its own power.

Response. As regards the former [that is, the quote from Shantideva, the term "experience"] is used in the context of an analysis comparing self experience and experience of another. There, mere appearance 26 is designated as experience.

The latter [the definition of feeling as the mental factor of experience which experiences its own object through its own power] means that [feeling] experiences either comfort, pain, or an intermediate [neutrality] through its own power.

Gung-tang leaves out the phrase "its own object;" he does not characterize comfort, pain, or
neutrality as objects of feeling. They are the natures of various feelings.

For, if one posits the general definition in that way, then one has to say that the definition of a particular feeling such as pleasure is the experience through its own power of the comfort which is its object, and comfort which is an object of the bodily feeling pleasure does not exist.

The bodily feeling pleasure certainly does experience comfort, since comfort is its entity; however, the comfort does not exist apart from it as an object.
Chapter Fourteen
Shared Objects of Perception

FIRST REFINEMENT (25b.3)

Statement of Opinion. Although in general whatever appears to feeling is not necessarily experienced by it, whatever appears to feeling which accompanies a basis-of-all is necessarily experienced by it.

This follows because Êzong-ka-Êa says in his Difficult Topics:

[If (as you absurdly claim) even in the two lower realms (the Desire Realm and the Form Realm) all entities of environments and beings appear to one basis-of-all, then there would (absurdly) arise appearances of hell—burning blazing iron and the like—even to a Form Realm god.] If this is accepted, the [Form Realm gods] would [absurdly] have the pain\(^1\) of suffering because the seeds that are with their bases-of-all for the appearance of full-fledged appearances of the hells would have been activated.\(^2\)

This entails [that whatever appears to a feeling accompanying a basis-of-all is necessarily experienced by that feeling].
The statement of the present opinion claims that what Đzong-ka-ꞌBa says in this passage in the **Difficult Topics** must necessarily lead one to the position that whatever appears to feeling accompanying a mind-basis-of-all must be experienced by that feeling. This follows from Đzong-ka-ꞌBa's line of reasoning in that passage:

1. given that there is an appearance of a hell environment to a basis-of-all, this appearance is due to activation of the latencies or seeds for that appearance;

2. given this appearance, the being to which the unpleasant hell environment appears necessarily has—that is to say, **experiences**—suffering; for, it is incorrect to make a distinction which holds that some seeds merely bring about appearances while others bring about use or enjoyment.³

It is clear, however, from Đzong-ka-ꞌBa's assertion that the feeling accompanying a mind-basis-of-all necessarily is a neutral one, that if a sentient being experiences suffering it is by way of feelings accompanying the sense consciousnesses or the mental consciousness,
and not by way of the feeling with the mind-basis-of-all. Nonetheless, both the objective unpleasant appearance and its subjective correlate of suffering arise only through activation of latencies with the mind-basis-of-all. For, there exists a reason for [Ḍzong-ka-Ṭa's] refuting on this occasion [certain assertions in regards to appearance to a basis-of-all] and proving that to a human's basis-of-all there appear only human environments and beings.

According to the stater of this opinion, the reason Ḍzong-ka-Ṭa refutes the appearance of non-human environments and beings to a human basis-of-all and asserts the appearance only of human environments and beings is that appearance to a mind-basis-of-all entails an experience by the feeling with that basis-of-all, a feeling which can only be neutral.

Gung-tang explains below (pp.536ff.) that, in fact, Ḍzong-ka-Ṭa's reason for so asserting is that a sentient being can only perceive that factor of an object which arises through the activation of a latency with his own mind-basis-of-all. Implicit in this reasoning is the premise that latencies
for the full-fledged appearances of non-human environments are not activated during a being's tenure as a human being.

[The assertions regarding appearance to a basis-of-all which Đōng-kā-ā refutes are the following.] One Ābhidharmika says that all environments and beings up to and including the fourth concentration appear [to a basis-of-all]. Another says that it is [all environments and beings] up to and including the third concentration which appear [to a basis-of-all], the fourth concentration not being part of the formation, destruction, and so forth of an aeon, but being the empowered effect of an action [performed by a person prior to being born there] which is unshared [with any other person]. Then there are some who assert that all environments and beings appear [to a basis-of-all]. When these latter are divided among themselves, there are such assertions as that of the system of appearance in a single aspect, appearance in various aspects, and so on. Those such as the Nepali Jahu whose system is that there is an appearance in a single aspect say that all worlds appear as human worlds to the basis-of-all of a human. Those who hold an appearance in various aspects say that the environments and beings of the six types of migrations appear to a human basis-of-all in accordance
with the way in which they would appear to the individual type of migration.

Dzong-ka-βa speaks of three unproven viewpoints for which there are refutations: ⁴

1. the assertion that all the Desire and Form Realms from the lowest Hell through the Fourth Concentration appear to a single basis-of-all,

2. the assertion that although the Fourth Concentration is created due to actions which bring forth unshared results and thus does not appear, the other environments and beings of the Desire and Form Realms do appear to a single basis-of-all,

3. the assertion that limitless environments and beings appear to a single basis-of-all in an indeterminate manner.

In rejecting these, Dzong-ka-βa argues that if, for example, the hells do appear to a human's mind-basis-of-all, they will either have to appear as they do to a hell being, or in some other way. ⁵ If the former is the case, it will absurdly follow that hells will not appear only through actions previously performed by those who are now hell beings (actions which
caused them to become hell beings). This then contradicts the fundamental Buddhist assertion that all the unpleasant, painful aspects of cyclic existence (seen most clearly in bad migrations such as the hells) are due to an individual's own unwholesome actions. Furthermore, to assert that the hells appear the same way to a hell-being's basis-of-all and to a human's basis-of-all requires one to abandon one of the fundamental reasonings disproving external objects: that the same phenomenon appears radically differently to different types of sentient beings such as humans, animals, hungry ghosts, and hell-beings (see above, pp.502ff.).

If, on the other hand, the hells do not appear to a human basis-of-all as they do to hell-beings, the absurdity arises that these are not full-fledged appearances of hells.

There is some question as to why Dzong-ka-Ba qualifies appearance here as needing to be full-fledged. Perhaps this eliminates problems raised by those cases in which a Buddha is said to show the hells to someone he is teaching. Such an appearance, which arises through a Buddha's powers and is not due to
the trainee's karma, may be what is eliminated by the qualification "full-fledged."

Although there are these many assertions regarding appearances to a basis-of-all, on this occasion [of explaining the assertions of the Chittamātrins following Asaṅga, Đzong-ka-ṣa] refutes them and proves that only human environments and beings appear to a human basis-of-all.

Response. Although there does exist a reason for Đzong-ka-ṣa's refuting these assertions and proving that only human environments and beings appear to a human basis-of-all, this does not necessarily entail [that whatever appears to feeling accompanying a basis-of-all is necessarily experienced by that feeling].

[That there does exist a reason for Đzong-ka-ṣa's refuting certain assertions regarding appearances to a basis-of-all and proving that only human environments and beings appear to a human basis-of-all] is established because it is definite that with respect to observed objects of a basis-of-all there are two factors which arise from the fruitions of latencies [which are established by] actions and which are with that [basis-of-all]: (1) the factor of external objects of use, and (2) the factor of internal appropriations, the users of those [objects of use].
Gung-tang's purpose here is to establish that even the "external" objects of use of a basis-of-all are created through ripening of latencies with that basis-of-all, latencies deposited by former actions. (External here refers to phenomena not included within individuals' psychophysical continua; it does not mean external in the sense of being separate entities from the consciousnesses perceiving them.)

Taken at face value, however, the language of this passage seems more to indicate a lack of a subject-object dichotomy between a basis-of-all and its observed objects. In this reading, the two factors spoken of--object of use and user--are the observed objects and the basis-of-all. Both arise through the ripening, or activation, of a single latency.

It is clear, nonetheless, that Gung-tang is speaking of the two mutually exclusive types of observed objects of a basis-of-all: the external environment and the internal appropriations, or latencies, sense powers, their physical supports, and, in the Formless Realm, the mental aggregates (see above, p.509). For, Gung-tang quotes (p.538) Asaṅga's Compen-
diurnum of Ascertainties in support of this. Asaṅga clearly speaks of two observed objects, by which one can infer that Gung-tang's "two factors" of observed objects are two types of observed objects.

However, given that environments are the spreading outward of the radiance of ripening latencies which are with a basis-of-all, there is no way that [environments] which are established through the actions of other sentient beings, and are not the radiance of ripening latencies with a basis-of-all, become the observed objects of that [basis-of-all].

Thus, the observed objects of a basis-of-all necessarily arise from latencies previously infused in that basis-of-all. They need not, however, be included within the psychophysical continuum of that basis-of-all unless they are sense powers (see below, pp. 582-588) or non-physical aggregates (see above, pp. 507-510).

For, Asaṅga's Compendium of Ascertainties says:

By means of the causes, wick and oil, a burning butter lamp functions internally and externally gives off light. Likewise, with respect to this mode[^7] [of the two types of observed objects of a basis-of-all]--
observed objects which are internal appropriations and external observed objects— one should view this mode of the mind-basis-of-all as similar to [the example of the butter lamp].

[What Asaṅga says here] necessarily entails that [the observed objects of a basis-of-all are of two types and that environments are only the spreading outward of the radiance of the ripening of latencies] because [Asaṅga] explains that just as the light of a butter lamp arises from the lamp, so even the external functioning things which are observed objects of a basis-of-all must be a spreading outward of the radiance of that very basis-of-all.

Asaṅga presents the example of the burning butter lamp to clarify the way in which the external environment— the observed objects of the mind-basis-of-all not included within individuals' continua— are known in dependence on the internal observed objects: latencies, sense powers, and the supports of the sense powers. (Cf. below, pp. 555-560.)
SECOND REFUTATION (26a.6)

Statement of Opinion. Concerning that, it then follows that there does not exist a single functioning thing which is an object of perception shared [with another person] because whatever appears to Devadatta's basis-of-all necessarily does not appear to Yajñadatta's basis-of-all.

This objection follows from Gung-tang's position that external functioning things which are observed objects of a mind-basis-of-all must arise due to the ripening of latencies with that mind-basis-of-all (p.539) and that things which are established through the previous actions of other sentient beings cannot become objects of that mind-basis-of-all (p.538).

This reason follows because whatever [appears to Devadatta's basis-of-all] is necessarily not an empowered effect of an action by Yajñadatta. This reason in turn follows because [what appears to Devadatta's basis-of-all] is an empowered effect of an action by Devadatta.

Response. It is not the case [that whatever is an empowered effect of an action by Devadatta is necessarily not an empowered effect of an action by Yajñadatta] because there exists a common locus of both.
That is, a thing's being an empowered effect (adhipatipāhā) of an action done by one person does not rule out its also being an empowered effect of another person's action. Most things arise due to a conjunction of many causes. This reason follows because even though there do not exist fruitional effects shared [with another person] there do exist shared empowered effects.

No matter whether one holds the position that the basis-of-all is the only fruitional effect in Asaṅga's Chittamātra or the position that phenomena such as sense powers are also fruitions, a fruitional effect is necessarily included within an individual's psychophysical continuum. Empowered effects, although they can also, like fruitions, be effects of actions, are not necessarily included within the psychophysical continuum.

Go-mang College agrees with the stater of opinion that whatever appears to Devadatta's basis-of-all is necessarily an empowered effect created by the activation of a latency in his mind-basis-of-all. This empowered effect is also created by the activation of a latency in Yajñadatta's basis-of-all insofar as Yajñadatta
also uses or perceives it. Nonetheless, a patch of blue seen by Devadatta is not seen by Yajñadatta; for, although there is a common blue, the components which are the objects of use (Tibetan: longs spyad bya'i cha) by Yajñadatta and Devadatta are different. Ġang-ġya puts this succinctly in his book on the tenets of Indian philosophies:

When two [persons]—Devadatta and Yajñadatta—look at a shared object of perception, a pot, the factor which appears to one does not appear to the other. However, there is no contradiction involved in positing the mere pot as a shared object of perception. This is similar, for example, to the time when the two—Devadatta and Yajñadatta—say "sound is impermanent." Although the factor which is expressed by Devadatta is not expressed by Yajñadatta, it is not contradictory to posit the mere words "sound is impermanent" as a shared expression of both of them. The words "sound is impermanent" which are the shared expression of the two of them, however, are not something separate from the words they individually speak.¹¹
This follows because there exists a shared use by many [beings] of a single environmental world.

This is said to be established by direct perception, i.e., to be obvious.\textsuperscript{12}

This necessarily entails [that there exist shared empowered effects] because [an environmental world is an empowered effect and] if its causes were not individually amassed by everyone it would be causeless.

If, for instance, five people use an object which is caused only by an action (\textit{karma}) previously done by one among them, the use by the other four would be causeless.\textsuperscript{13} This is to say that, within the framework of individuals' experience of "retribution" arising only from their own karma, and not from that of others, the use by the other four would be senseless.

Thus, the possibility of such a causeless use or perception leads to many unacceptable consequences, not the least being the invalidation of the doctrine of karma.
THIRD REFUTATION (26b.2)

Statement of Opinion. Concerning what has been said, it follows that shared objects of perception do not exist because if they did exist, it would have to be the case that they would not be established as of the nature of consciousness. This is because Dzong-ka-βa's Difficult Topics says:

[The statement that what appears to a consciousness is the nature of that consciousness and that it is not established as either the same as or different from that consciousness is made when analyzing.] At that time no shared objects are asserted. In the face of non-examination and non-analysis, shared factors which are objects of apprehension are asserted; however, they are not asserted to be of the nature of the consciousnesses [to which they appear].

The context of this passage is Dzong-ka-βa's assertion that the five sense objects which actually appear to a person's basis-of-all are not hidden to that person's sense consciousnesses. There is then an objection that a single object of apprehension would be a factor of an object which is apprehended by two consciousnesses—the mind-basis-of-all and a sense
consciousness in the same psychophysical continuum. Given that, these two consciousnesses would absurdly be a single substantial entity; for, whatever appears to a consciousness is one substantial entity with that consciousness, and the same object appears to both consciousnesses. The objector concludes that shared factors which are objects of apprehension are impossible.

The passage quoted by Gung-tang here is Dzong-ka-βa's answer to this objection.

Response. [What Dzong-ka-βa says here] does not necessarily entail that if shared objects of perception exist, they are not established as of the nature of consciousness.

[What Dzong-ka-βa is saying here] is merely an agreement with what [Tibetans] of former times asserted.

Gung-tang is implicitly refuting Dzong-ka-βa here; although he is saying that Dzong-ka-βa is merely reporting a commonly held view, Dzong-ka-βa presents this view without qualification, as if it were his own.19

Chittamātrins, in fact, deny the existence of external objects on all occasions, without asserting that they sometimes exist and sometimes do not.20 It is Mādhyamikas who assert
the conventionalities of the world to be validly established in dependence on conceptual designation within the context of their not being examined. When these conventionalities are examined, however—when they are sought with an ultimate analysis—they cannot be found.\textsuperscript{21}

For most Buddhist philosophies, two functioning things are a single substantial entity if, when they appear to direct perception, they do not appear to be different. For Chittamātrins, however, to be a single substantial entity is to be produced by a single latency.\textsuperscript{22} A visual direct perceiver in an ordinary being perceives an object which appears to be external to it. Such a direct perceiver is mistaken in this way and is not qualified to determine sameness or difference of substantial entity.

Although the blue appearing to Devadatta and Yajñadatta is created jointly by latencies from Devadatta and Yajñadatta, and the blue appearing to Devadatta's visual consciousness and to his mind-basis-of-all is created by separate latencies, there is no fault such that either of these pairs of consciousnesses would be a single substantial entity made of
two consciousnesses and their object. For, the meaning of singleness of substantial entity in this system is that perceiver and perceived are created by a single latency. The blue perceived by Devadatta is not perceived by Yajñadatta, nor is the blue perceived by Devadatta's visual consciousness perceived by Devadatta's mind-basis-of-all. Nonetheless, there is a simple blue which may be posited as a shared object of perception, a shared object which is not itself separate from either of the two mutually exclusive factors which are what are apprehended by the two consciousnesses.

No matter whether in the context of Chittamātra or Mādhyamika [tenets] they make a two-fold division saying that something is one thing when not examining and not analyzing and something else when examining and analyzing. As Ṛk-ṭsang the Translator says in his Understanding All Tenets:

For a conceptual consciousness [observing] these, even external objects exist;
In fact [however] there exist [neither] mind nor mental factors which know [objects that are] other [than themselves].\textsuperscript{23}
Dak-tsong (b. 1405) lived for the most part after Dzong-ka-Ba and is, hence, not a Tibetan of former times. Gung-tang must be assuming that Dak-tsong embodies the earlier, less critical tradition of scholarship.

It is nonetheless the common thought of all the later compositions of the Father [Dzong-ka-Ba] and his [spiritual] sons that although shared objects of perception do exist it is not necessary that external objects exist.

Dzong-ka-Ba's spiritual sons are Gyel-tsap and Kay-drup. It is necessary to keep in mind that Dzong-ka-Ba wrote the Difficult Topics of Afflicted Mentality and Mind-Basis-of-All when he was quite young.
Chapter Fifteen
Discrimination in the Basis-of-All

FIRST REFUTATION (26b.5)

Statement of Opinion. Dzong-ka-Ba's Root Text says, "The basis-of-all is devoid of conception of detail."¹

Conception of detail (vicitrodgrahaṇa) is one of the two types of discrimination (saṃjñā), the other being apprehension of features (nimittodgrahaṇa).² Conception of detail is found only as an associate of conceptual consciousnesses.³ The mental factor discrimination accompanying the mind-basis-of-all, a non-conceptual consciousness, is necessarily an apprehension of features.

It follows that this statement is incorrect because the [mental factor] discrimination accompanying a basis-of-all makes distinctions with regards to its own object, apprehending it by way of distinguishing features, "This is such and such; this is not such and such."

A cognition in the manner of "This is such and so" is a conceptual cognition, an instance of discrimination which conceives details.
For, Chandrakīrti's Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle Way" says, "Discrimination is an apprehension of features."⁴ Again, Sthiramati's Commentary on (Vasubandhu's) "Thirty Stanzas" says:

Discrimination is⁵ the apprehension of the features in an object. The object is the observed object; the features are its particulars—blue, yellow, and so forth—the causes of positing an observed object. Apprehension of those [features] is the conception, "This is just blue; it is not yellow."⁶

The Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika philosopher Chandrakīrti is cited in accompaniment with the Yogācharin Sthiramati to show the universality of this definition of discrimination among Buddhist philosophers. A similar definition may also be seen in Vasubandhu's exposition of Vaibhāṣhika tenets, the Treasury of Knowledge (1.14cd).⁷

Sthiramati's use of the term conception (nirūpana) in his explication of this definition is the key to the position advanced by the stater of this opinion. Gung-tang's defence will imply that, here, "conception" is not used in the strict sense of an apprehension through the mediation of terminological or
conceptual abstractions, but to mean a distinct perception in which the features of an object are not mixed up.⁸

The Sanskrit term used here by Sthiramati, and translated into Tibetan as rtoq pa (conception) is nirūpaṇa, and not kalpa or kalpanā, the more usual Sanskrit originals for rtoq pa. The Great Lexicon (Mahāvyutpatti) gives, as a translation of nirūpaṇa, only nges par rtoq pa (definite understanding) and not rtoq pa.¹⁰

**Response.** [What Chandrakīrṭi and Sthiramati say in these passages] does not entail that the mental factor discrimination accompanying a basis-of-all makes distinctions with regards to its object, apprehending it by way of distinguishing its features, "This is such and such." For, [the quoted passages] demonstrate [indirectly] that the mere individual appearance of the sense powers and the sense objects to a basis-of-all is a function of discrimination. The ascertainment, "This is such and such," however, does not exist even in sense consciousnes

The individual appearance or non-confusion of the observed objects of the mind-basis-of-all is due to the discrimination apprehending features which accompanies it.¹¹ The other
type of discrimination, that conceiving details, is found only with conceptual minds, never with direct cognizers such as the five sense consciousnesses and the mind-basis-of-all.\textsuperscript{12}

\textit{Dzong-ka-ba} refers to the discrimination accompanying a mind-basis-of-all as "the mere delineation of the outlines of the object."\textsuperscript{13}

For, Buddha says in a discourse, "An eye consciousness knows blue, but it does not think, '[This] is blue.'" And Vasubandhu's \textit{Treasury of Knowledge} (1.41d) says:

[A mind arising in similar association with the five (sense) consciousnesses] Is not conceptual\textsuperscript{14} and, hence, not a view.\textsuperscript{15}

Gung-tang quotes this to establish that mental factors in similar association with sense consciousnesses are nonconceptual. Given this, the mental factor of discrimination accompanying a sense consciousness is necessarily the nonconceptual one and not the one that is a \textit{view} or ascertainment, "This is such and such."\textsuperscript{16}
SECOND REPUTATION (27a.3)

Statement of Opinion. It follows that there is an appearance of the type "This is such and such" to that [basis-of-all] because (1) there are appearances in the form of the thoughts "Space is infinite" and "Consciousness is infinite" [respectively] to the bases-of-all of the first two formless [meditative absorptions], and (2) the latter two [formless meditative absorptions] as well have, as [their respective] causes, subtle and extremely subtle observed objects. [This reason follows] because Asaṅga's Compendium of Ascertainties says:

In the infinite-space-source and infinite-consciousness-source of the Formless Realm, [the mind-basis-of-all] possesses, as a cause, an immeasurable object of observation.18

There are four meditative absorptions of the Formless Realm: source of infinite space, source of infinite consciousness, source of nothingness, and source of neither discrimination nor non-discrimination. These four are the causal formlessnesses; the four types of rebirth in actual Formless Realms are the resultant states arising from practice of the four meditative absorptions.
Asañga, in the Compendium of Ascertainments, characterizes the observed objects of a Desire Realm basis-of-all as small and those of a Form Realm basis-of-all as large. Within the Formless Realms and formless meditative absorptions, in the source of infinite space and source of infinite consciousness, the observed objects of the mind-basis-of-all are immeasurable. In the source of nothingness the observed object is subtle, and in the source of neither discrimination nor non-discrimination the object is very subtle.\textsuperscript{19}

\textbf{Response.} [What Asañga says] does not necessarily entail [that there are appearances of the thoughts "Space is infinite" or "Consciousness is infinite" and so on to a basis-of-all of the first two Formless Realms and so forth] because [Asañga is describing] not modes of appearance to a basis-of-all but rather modes of appearance of objects to meditative absorptions included within the basis of name which [itself] is an observed object of a basis-of-all.

The basis of name are the non-physical aggregates which, according to Sthiramati (and Gung-tang), are the observed objects of a mind-basis-of-all in the Formless Realm (see above,
pp. 507-509). The formless meditative absorptions are phenomena included within these non-physical aggregates; they are types of cognitions.\(^{20}\)

It is in dependence on this passage [from the Compendium of Ascertaining] that the Venerable Ren-da-wa in his Exegesis of (Asaṅga's) "Compendium of Knowledge" [incorrectly] speaks of the likes of "Space is infinite" as observed objects [of a basis-of-all in the Formless Realm] and [incorrectly] does not posit the aggregates which are the basis of name as the observed objects.

Ren-da-wa was one of the young Đzong-ka-ba's main teachers. Prior to writing his Difficult Topics, Đzong-ka-ba had studied Mādhyamika and Abhidharma (both Vasubandhu's Treasury of Higher Knowledge and Asaṅga's Compendium of Higher Knowledge) with Ren-da-wa.\(^{21}\)

Nonetheless, the explanations of Sthiramati and Vinītadēva stated above are the thought also of Asaṅga's Compendium of Ascertaining.

Sthiramati and Vinītadēva (p. 507 above) stipulate that a mind-basis-of-all must have an observed object. Sthiramati, moreover (pp. 507-509), holds that the observed objects of a
mind-basis-of-all in the Formless Realm are the basis of name—the four non-physical aggregates. This seems to contradict Asaṅga's statement concerning immeasurable objects such as infinite space and so forth as observed objects of the formless bases-of-all. It also seems to be incompatible with the following passage in his *Compendium of Ascertainments*:

In brief, a mind-basis-of-all operates by way of two types of objects; [it operates] through knowledge of internal appropriations and knowledge of an external environment of indeterminate aspect.

The internal appropriations are (1) the latencies of adherence to an imagined nature, (2) the forms which are the supports of the sense powers, and (3) the sense powers. This, furthermore, is the case in the realms having forms. In the [realm] without forms, latencies are the only appropriations.²²

By this last, Asaṅga must mean that in the Formless Realm latencies are the only appropriations which are observed objects of the mind-basis-of-all.
Gung-tang, when he asserts that the non-physical aggregates are the internal appropriations which are the observed objects of a Formless Realm basis-of-all, follows Sthiramati. Sthiramati's position is an interpretation of Vasubandhu's classification of the observed objects of a mind-basis-of-all into appropriations and abodes (see above, pp. 508-510). Although Asaṅga here makes the same division into internal appropriations and external environments, it seems that for him appropriations do not include the mental aggregates. (Latencies are neither physical nor mental.)

Gung-tang now attempts to establish that although it seems that Asaṅga does not posit mental observed objects of a formless basis-of-all, in fact he does so posit.

For, prior to the [above quoted] Compendium of Ascertainties passage, in a summary passage Asaṅga says:

In this regard, knowledge of the external environment is as follows. A mind-basis-of-all is aware of a continuum of world or environment in dependence on just those observed objects which are the [internal] appropriations.
Gung-tang takes the internal appropriations to be, in the case of the Formless Realm, the formless meditative absorptions--types of mental consciousness. However, it seems clear from the context in the Compendium of Ascertainments, in particular the text immediately preceding the passage just quoted by Gung-tang, that Asaṅga holds the internal appropriations to be only latencies, the sense powers, and their physical supports (see above, p. 556). Because there are neither sense powers nor supports of sense powers in the Formless Realm, since both are physical, Asaṅga must mean that the environmental world is perceived in reliance on latencies, not that it is perceived by the mind-basis-of-all in reliance on appearing to formless meditative absorptions.

[What Asaṅga says here] necessarily entails [(1) that Ren-da-wa is incorrect in saying that "Space is infinite" is an observed object of a basis-of-all, and (2) that Asaṅga's thought coincides with Sthiramati's and Vini-tadeva's] because the explanation that the three realms have observed objects which are small, great, immeasurable, and so forth is a division of observed objects made from the point of view of the external. However,
with respect to their mode of appearance, they are posited as observed objects of a basis-of-all by way of their appearing to [the aggregates which are] the appropriations [of that basis-of-all, its] internal observed objects. This is clearly expressed by this passage [from the Compendium of Ascertainments] when it says, "In dependence on just that observed object which is [its] appropriation."\(^{29}\)

Small, great, immeasurable, subtle, and very subtle phenomena are, according to Gung-tang, posited as observed objects of bases-of-all in the Desire, Form, and Formless Realms because they appear to the mental aggregates of their respective realm; these mental aggregates are the internal observed objects of the mind-basis-of-all.

Infinite space is thus said to be an observed object of the mind-basis-of-all in the continuum of a person in meditative absorption on infinite space because it appears to that meditative absorption. This meditative absorption is itself an observed object of the mind-basis-of-all. This is similar to the five sense objects being posited as observed
objects of a Desire Realm mind-basis-of-all
due to their appearing to the sense consciousness. 30
Chapter Sixteen
Basis-of-All as the Self

FIRST REPUTATION (27b.4)

Statement of Opinion. It follows that among bases-of-all there are those ascertaining their own object because among them there are those realizing emptiness.

In Gung-tang's own philosophy, no basis-of-all ascertains its object; for, all bases-of-all are minds to which objects appear but which do not ascertain those objects (see above, pp. 360 and 361). Thus, no basis-of-all realizes its objects.

It follows [that there are bases-of-all realizing emptiness] because the basis-of-all in the continuum of a Superior is a Superior.

A Superior (ārya) is one who has attained the path of seeing (darśanamārga), that is, one who has realized emptiness directly. If the basis-of-all in the continuum of a Superior were really a Superior, it would then be an entity capable of directly realizing emptiness, whereas it is not. According to Gung-tang,
the mind-basis-of-all in the continuum of a
Superior is not a Superior (see below).
This in turn is because the basis-of-all in the continuum of a being in a pleasant migration is a being in a pleasant migration. This reason necessarily entails [that the basis-of-all in the continuum of a Superior is a Superior] because given that one posits something as a pleasant migrator due to being an illustration of a pleasant migrator, there is also similarity in the former [case].

Gung-tang made it clear earlier (pp. 513ff.) that whereas a mind-basis-of-all may be the I which is the illustration of an experiencer of fruitions and the I which is the illustration of the agent of an action, it is neither an experiencer of fruitions nor an agent of actions (although it is the agent of rebirth). He seems here to be saying that the mind-basis-of-all of a pleasant migration is not only the I found when seeking for the being in a pleasant migration—and thus the I which is the illustration of a being in a pleasant migration—but is that being in a pleasant migration.¹
Response. [These two cases] are very dissimilar, for the following reason. Calling someone such as Śāriputra "I" and "migrator" is [in the case of "I"] from the viewpoint of just the establishment of aggregates which are the fruitions of former [actions, and in the case of "migrator"] a common application [of the term] to all migrators of similar type. Therefore, ["I" and "migrator"] are components of the bases of designation\(^2\) [of other appellations such as "monk" and "Superior"].

In asserting that \textit{I} and migrator are components of the basis of designation, Gung-tang must be referring to the context in which they are bases of designations such as "monk" and "Superior."\(^3\) For, whereas the mind-basis-of-all is a substantially existent person, phenomena such as migrators and beings in pleasant migrations, as well as phenomena such as monks, Superiors, and so forth, are imputedly existent persons.\(^4\) These are all designated to a basis of designation, the psychophysical aggregates.\(^5\) "Monk" and "Superior," on the other hand, are posited in dependence on other features such as vows and the paths of a Superior. [They are both] an I which is a phenomenon designated.
This reason follows because if one asserts that [the basis-of-all in Shāriputra's continuum] is a monk and so on, its abbot and preceptor must also [absurdly] be posited.

Although Shāriputra was a monk, his mind-basis-of-all was not and, hence, had no abbot or preceptor as would a monk. One of my teachers at Gomang College would invariably greet me with the query, "Does a basis-of-all have a mother?" This speaks to the same point, to wit: if a basis-of-all were a human, or were Joe Wilson (both designated phenomena, neither substantially existent), then it would absurdly have a mother.

There is, however, a purpose for positing [the basis-of-all] as the migrator, a purpose established by this passage from Asaṅga's Compendium of the Mahāyāna:

If there were no fruitional consciousness... [a Formless Realm] migrator would cease [when a being there actualizes a supramundane mind].

This is part of Asaṅga's establishment of the existence of the mind-basis-of-all—the fruitional consciousness—through demonstration of the impossibility of the thoroughly
afflicted phenomenon of birth \(\text{jana\-masamkle\-sā} \) without a basis-of-all. (The interested reader is directed to the *Compendium of the Mahāyāna*;\(^9\) Asaṅga's proof is not germane to Gung-tang's present argument.) Gung-tang's point is that the migrator has to be an entity established by previous actions and afflictions, an entity which exists continuously from birth until death. It has already been shown how only the mind-basis-of-all fulfills this criterion of continuous presence (see above, pp. 337ff.).

Moreover, the basis-of-all which is an illustration of a first ground Bodhisattva who is a god would [absurdly] be a god, because according to you the position [that the basis-of-all of a Superior is a Superior] is correct.

Thus, the mind-basis-of-all in the continuum of a human is not a human; it is, however, the I which is the illustration of a human.\(^{10}\)

If you accept this consequence [that a basis-of-all which is an illustration of a first ground Bodhisattva who is a god is a god] then it follows that the basis-of-all which is an illustration of the universal monarch who is an emanation\(^{11}\) of that [Bodhisattva god] is a human because (1) the emanation [i.e., the universal monarch]
is a human, and (2) whatever is an illustration of a human is necessarily a human.

You have accepted the reason. If you accept the consequence [that the basis-of-all which is an illustration of the universal monarch who is an emanation of a Bodhisattva god is a human] then it follows that you are [absurdly] positing individual bases-of-all as illustrations of each of those two because [for you] there are two of those [bases-of-all]--one which is a god and one which is a human.

In fact, the two--the Bodhisattva god and his human emanation--are a single continuum. To be a single continuum means to have a single root consciousness, that is, a single basis-of-all.\(^\text{12}\)

The emanation has consciousness, but it has no mind-basis-of-all. For, a mind-basis-of-all is a fruitional consciousness and an emanation of a Bodhisattva does not arise due to previous karma, as does a fruition, but by the power of a Bodhisattva's wish.\(^\text{13}\)

If you accept [that individual bases-of-all are posited as illustrations of each of them], then it follows [absurdly] that there will also arise one hundred bases-of-all for the one hundred emanations at that time [of
the first Bodhisattva ground]. If you accept this, it follows that during the seven impure Bodhisattva grounds there must be emanated and increased—in accordance with the number of good qualities of each ground—one hundred, one thousand, one hundred thousand, and so forth bases-of-all and afflicted mentalities.

Since emanations have no basis-of-all, they have no afflicted mentality. If, as Gung-tang’s opponent seems to think, every psychophysical aggregation, even an emanation, has to have a mind-basis-of-all and an afflicted mentality, then Bodhisattvas abiding on the grounds (bhūmi) would create hundreds and thousands of them.

A first ground Bodhisattva, as well as being able to send forth a hundred emanations, is said to be able to meet a hundred Buddhas and receive blessings from them, to be able to travel to a hundred Buddha lands and so on—all in hundreds.\textsuperscript{14} A second ground Bodhisattva is able to create a thousand emanations, a third ground Bodhisattva to create one hundred thousand, and so on.\textsuperscript{15}

Moreover, those emanations would [absurdly] not be one continuum because you have accepted that they would have individual root consciousnesses.
The root consciousness (mūlavijñāna, see above, p. 400) is the mind-basis-of-all. An emanator, known technically as a basis of emanation (Tibetan: sprul gzhi), and his or her emanations are all one continuum. Only the basis of emanation is born and dies, even eventually becoming enlightened. Emanations are sentient merely in the sense of having sense and mental consciousnesses, not in the sense of having a mind-basis-of-all.

Given that [as you say] these emanations have individual root consciousnesses, it necessarily follows that they are not one continuum. For, bodies are posited to be of one continuum if, even though they are displayed as various bodies, there is one root consciousness. This reason in turn follows because there exists an identifiable continuum in [the term] "one continuum."

For two or more psychophysical aggregations to be a single continuum means that between them there is a single mind-basis-of-all. The reverse of this is that if two or more psychophysical aggregations each have their own mind-basis-of-all, they must then be separate continua.
SECOND REPUTATION (28a.6)

Statement of Opinion. It follows then [for you] that [a basis-of-all in the continuum of a being in a pleasant migration] is not a being in a pleasant migration because of your assertion [that a basis-of-all in the continuum of a Bodhisattva god is not a god].

Response. There is no similarity [between these two cases] because all emanators of emanations are [beings in] pleasant migrations. This follows because there is a reason for the fact that whoever is a Bodhisattva is necessarily a being in a pleasant migration.

The entailment that being a Bodhisattva necessitates being a person in a pleasant migration is accepted by the Go-mang College master Jam-yang-shay-ba, but not by Lo-sel-ting College's Pan-chen Sö-nam-drak-ba. Lo-sel-ting holds, for example, that a hell-being can generate the altruistic attitude to enlightenment and, thereby, become a Bodhisattva. Go-mang says that as soon as this occurs the person in question becomes a being in a pleasant migration, despite his aggregates remaining those of a bad migration.
THIRD REFUTATION (28b.1)

Statement of Opinion. Whatever is Devadatta's I is necessarily a basis-of-all because whatever [is Devadatta's I] is necessarily the observed object of an afflicted mentality.

Gung-tang defines afflicted mentality as "a thoroughly uncalm mental consciousness qualified by enduring, having the aspect of observing only the frutitional component of the basis-of-all, and always considering it an I."¹⁹ Thus, only the substantially existent mind-basis-of-all is the observed object of the afflicted mentality.

If it were the case, as the stater of the opinion claims, that being Devadatta's I necessarily entails being the observed object of his afflicted mentality, then it would be the case that being Devadatta's I necessarily entails being a basis-of-all. For, being an observed object of an afflicted mentality necessarily entails being a basis-of-all.

This reason follows because whatever [is Devadatta's I] must be the observed object of an innate conception of an I.
Response. Although this last reason [i.e., that Devadatta's I must be the observed object of an innate conception of an I] is correct, it does not necessarily entail [that whatever is Devadatta's I is necessarily an observed object of an afflicted mentality] because saying [that Devadatta's I must be an observed object of an afflicted mentality] is an allusion to the main [of Devadatta's conceptions of I].

Although the afflicted mentality is a consciousness innately conceiving an I—an innate conception of a self of persons—it is not the only innate conception of an I. There are innate conceptions of I both in similar association with the afflicted mentality and not in similar association with it.\(^{20}\)

It would appear from Gung-tang's line of reasoning here that the innate conception of an I in similar association with the mental consciousness does not observe the mind-basis-of-all.

One cannot accept [that whatever is Devadatta's I is necessarily a basis-of-all]\(^{21}\) because Devadatta is not a basis-of-all.
Devadatta is not a mind-basis-of-all because Devadatta is not a consciousness. Devadatta, however, is Devadatta's I; hence, whatever is Devadatta's I is not necessarily a mind-basis-of-all.

FOURTH REFUTATION (28b.2)

Statement of Opinion. Among Devadatta's I's there exist many I's of former and subsequent rebirths.

Statement of Opinion. This is incorrect. Whatever is an I which is the basis for the arising in Devadatta of the thought "I" is necessarily an I of this rebirth.

The fourth and fifth refutations relate to the previous discussion because they are concerned with the nature of the existent self or the ego and with the proper use of designations such as "I." They are not concerned with topics raised in Indian exegesis of mind-basis-of-all, but with points raised in Đzong-ka-ṭa's Prāsaṅgika analysis of Nāgārjuna's Fundamental Treatise Called "Wisdom". This highlights the main thrust of Ge-luk-ṭa philosophical criticism: to present philosophies for the sake
of comparison and contrast with Chandrakīrti's Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika.

Response. It follows that these are both incorrect because (1) since when one says "Devadatta's I" [the I] is qualified as being of this rebirth, it does not exist in former and subsequent rebirths, and (2) the mere I which is the basis of the thought "I" exists at all times.

Gung-tang is distinguishing between two types of existent self or ego: that to which "Devadatta's I" refers and that which when observed gives rise to the thought, "I." To say "Devadatta's I" is to specify the ego of an individual lifetime, that ego rightly qualified by the name Devadatta.

The first reason [i.e., since when one says "Devadatta's I" the I is qualified as being an I of this rebirth, it does not exist in former or subsequent rebirths] is established because Ādzong-ka-Ba's Great Commentary on (Nāgārjuna's) "Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Way Called 'Wisdom'" says:

The selves, in the case of distinguishing Devadatta's individual rebirths, which are the selves apprehended in the thought "I" are each the minor self of an individual rebirth.
A minor self is one belonging to a particular lifetime. Dzong-ka-ba differentiates this from "the mere I, the self abiding beginninglessly which is the basis observed in the conception of an I in which former and future I's are not distinguished." The selves of individual lifetimes are each particular instances of this mere I.

Thus, one can distinguish three selves existing within the context of a mere I: the self which comes to the present life from the past, that which goes from the present to the future, and that of the present lifetime.

The second reason [i.e., the mere I which is the basis of the thought "I" exists at all times] is established because once Devadatta remembers a former birth by means of clairvoyance there exist the arising of the thought "I" and the arising of the false conception of a transitory collection as a real self observing the I [of that lifetime]. Because of this and because of the fact that there exists achievement of virtue out of fear of the I's suffering in a future life, the mere I which is the basis of the thought "I" in which place, time, and particulars are not distinguished exists in both former and subsequent lifetimes.
Devadatta has a sense that those former lifetimes, which he can recall through extrasensory perception (abhiñā), are his former lifetimes; there occurs to him the thought "I" when he remembers events in those lifetimes. Further, when speculating on what future lifetimes will bring, he is motivated to act in order to avoid his own future suffering; there occurs to him the thought, "If I practice no virtue now, I will suffer in future lifetimes."

This I, an ego continuing from time without beginning into the future and which served as the observed object of these various thoughts about the past and the future, is the mere I. It is not an I of this or that lifetime but one in which place (pleasant or unpleasant migration), time (past, present, or future) or particulars within these are not distinguished.

For, Ñaṇḍarkaṇḍa's Great Commentary on (Nāgārjuna's) "Fundamental Treatise" says:

The self that is an observed object, which when observed by the Devadatta of this lifetime produces the thought "I," existed also in former lifetimes.
And:

Although the person of this lifetime does not travel to the next lifetime, the mere I which is the observed object of the thought "I" does go there. The person of this lifetime (e.g., Devadatta's I) is not a traveller in cyclic existence, not a migrator. The migrator is the mere I. One must take care here.

These points must be carefully examined. It is being said that a human of this lifetime does not migrate to a future lifetime. What this means is that the ego of this life does not go on without first casting aside the human body of this lifetime.

FIFTH REFUTATION (29a.2)

Statement of Opinion. It follows that [for Chittamātrins] the I which is the basis of the arising in Devadatta of the thought "I" did not exist in a former life because the [I which is the basis of the thought "I"] and Devadatta are each one entity with the other. This reason follows because there exists the difference that whereas Proponents of True Existence [such as Chittamātrins]
assert that these two are one entity, the Prāsaṅgikas do not. For, Đzong-ka- dbus's Great Commentary on (Naṇājuna's) "Fundamental Treatise" says:

Among the partisans of intrinsic existence [i.e., among those who are not Mādhyamikas], the two, Devadatta and his self, are not asserted to be separate. They are, therefore, asserted as one entity.32

Response. Although [Đzong-ka- dbus does say this] it does not necessarily entail [that there is that difference between Prāsaṅgikas and others] because (1) since the arising in today's human of the thought, "Yesterday I saw a form," is established by experience, the Propo-

nents of True Existence also assert this, and (2) the meaning of that passage [from Đzong-ka- dbus] is that although the Prāsaṅgikas assert that the I which is the basis of imputation of Devadatta exists beginninglessly, others do not.

Neither Prāsaṅgikas nor Proponents of True Existence assert that the I which is the basis of Devadatta's thought "I" and Devadatta are one entity with each other. If they were one entity, then Devadatta and the basis of Devadatta's conception of I when Devadatta thinks,
"Yesterday I saw something," would be one entity. However, the one is, in fact, the cause of the other and thus they must be different entities.\(^{33}\)

Prāsaṅgikas say that the mere I which is Devadatta's basis of designation exists beginninglessly. The other Buddhist philosophers say that if the basis of designation of the imputedly existent I is sought it will be found among the aggregates of this lifetime. Devadatta and his aggregates, for non-Prāsaṅgikas, are contemporaneous.\(^{34}\)

For, [Dzong-ka-ba] says in that same work [the Great Commentary]:

One should understand that the human who imputes the designation ["I"] is one factor of the self which is the basis of the imputed designation ["I"], without holding that the two are coextensive.\(^{35}\)

The human who imputes the designation "I" exists only in this lifetime, whereas the self which is the basis of designation exists in the present, the past, and the future.\(^{36}\)
There exists a reason for [saying that the human who imputes the designation and the self which is the basis of the imputed designation are not coextensive but that the former is a part of the latter]. The designation "I" applies commonly to both former and future rebirths, and in the Prāsaṅgika system it is possible to posit an I merely by way of that designation. Hence, there exists a shared I which is merely a verbal imputation [but] which is the basis of designation of both [the former and future rebirths]. However, the I which is the basis of designation of the former [rebirth] need not be the I which is the basis of designation of the future [rebirth].

The shared I is the mere I.

For example, since the two—golden pot and copper pot—are instances of pot, there must exist a pot which is the generality of those two. However, the generality of the golden pot is not also the generality of the brass pot. That pot which is the generality of those two must be posited within the context of merely the term "pot" without there being anything to be shown in a separate place from those two.

The Proponents of True Existence assert that when the meaning of the designation Devadatta is sought, it must be found [either] among the bases of designation or their collection. Hence, there is no way for it to
be concomitant with the collection [of aggregates] of another rebirth. Due to this fact a common basis of designation also is not possible.

It would seem from this that discussions of the mere I and of the mind-basis-of-all are incompatible. The mere I is a mere imputation which is a shared I applying to all rebirths. For Chittamātrins, the meaning of the designation Devadatta is some one among or the collection of the unimputed, substantially existent psychophysical aggregates. The mind-basis-of-all is the I which is Devadatta's basis of designation.

Since this appears as the secret words in a very difficult reasoning, I have explained it thoroughly. Although I have not elaborated on such things as the existence or non-existence of the occurrence [of an I which is] the basis of designation of common being and Superior, modern-day proponents of reasoning will understand.

Designation as a Superior or a common being is based on whether or not a person has or has not directly realized ultimate truths and, thereby, attained the path of seeing (darsanamarga). Since a Superior and his basis of designation
exist simultaneously, as do a common being and his basis of designation, and since the two--having attained the path of seeing and having not attained it--are contraries, there can be no common basis of designation of Superior and common being.
Chapter Seventeen
Nature and Objects of the Basis-of-All

FIRST REFUTATION (29b.4)

Statement of Opinion. Among the sense powers which are the observed objects of a basis-of-all there exist sense powers in the continua of others because [Sthiramati] says in his Commentary on (Vasubandhu's) "Thirty Stanzas", "'The sentient' are what appear as the five sense powers in the continua of self and others."

It is not Vasubandhu but rather Maitreya, in the Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes, who includes the sentient as a class of objects of the mind-basis-of-all (see above, pp.355-356): "Consciousnesses which perceive sense objects,/ The sentient, self, and knowledges arise." ¹ Among the eight consciousnesses it is the mind-basis-of-all whose perceived objects are the sense objects and the sentient. ² Ȟjong-ka-ṣa, setting forth the observed objects of the basis-of-all, quotes Maitreya and explains that the sentient are "the five sense powers, those of eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body." ³ Thus, the qualm
arises that perhaps sense powers in other sentient beings' continua might be the objects of one's own mind-basis-of-all. Gung-tang's reply will echo an argument given by Đzong-ka-Ｂa at another point in the Difficult Topics. ⁴

Although Gung-tang has identified the textual source for the meaning of the term "sentient" as the Commentary on (Vasubandhu's) "Thirty Stanzas", this passage does not appear there. Vasubandhu's own term for that group of observed objects which includes the sense powers is "abode" (see above, p.509 ). ⁵

Nor does one find the quoted passage in Sthiramati's Explanation of (Vasubandhu's) "Commentary on (Maitreya's) 'Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes'" as included in the Tibetan canon, although there is in this text a passage identical in meaning and quite close in wording. ⁶ It seems that Gung-tang has taken this quotation from Đzong-ka-Ｂa, and not directly from an Indian text. ⁷

In this refutation Gung-tang is, in fact, merely paraphrasing and clarifying Đzong-ka-Ｂa's presentation and rebuttal of this position. ⁸
Dzong-ka-Bea there states the opinion to be refuted as follows:

Is it not then the case that [my assertion that the actual observed objects of a mind-basis-of-all are one's own sense powers and sense objects] is harmed by the statement in the commentary on [the term] the sentient, "The sentient are what appear as the five sense powers in the continua of self and others"? 9

Dzong-ka-Bea's (and Gung-tang's) phrasing of the textual source for this opinion is closest to that found in the Tibetan translation of a Chinese work, Yuen-tsê's Great Commentary on the Sutra Unravelling the Thought. The relevant passage is Yuen-tsê's quotation of the description of the objects of a basis-of-all found in Sthiramati's Explanation of (Vasubandhu's) "Commentary on (Maitreya's) 'Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes'." 10 Since this Chinese work, in Tibetan translation, was used by Dzong-ka-Bea in writing the Difficult Topics, 11 it is a reasonable hypothesis that this is the source for his quotation of a "commentary on [the term]
the sentient." It would appear, then, that Gung-tang is correct in his citation of Sthiramati, but in error when he identifies the quoted text as Sthiramati's commentary on Vasubandhu's Thirty Stanzas. The quoted passage seems to be from Sthiramati's commentary on the Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes as cited in Chinese translation by Yüan-tsê and then translated back into Tibetan.

**Response.** Although [Sthiramati says this] it does not necessarily entail [that among the observed objects of a basis-of-all there exist sense powers in the continua of others] because [Sthiramati speaks] from the viewpoint of [the objects of] just a general basis-of-all and the viewpoint that positing [self and other] is within the context of particular persons.

To posit something about a general basis-of-all is to make a statement true of bases-of-all in general but not necessarily applicable to particular bases-of-all. To speak of *self* and *other* as exclusive of each other is to make statements about particular persons distinguishing them from other persons, "self" merely referring to the person who is the main subject of the statement.
This reason in turn follows because if Yajñadatta's sense powers were to appear to Devadatta's basis-of-all, the two would be of one continuum.

To be one continuum means to have one root consciousness (i.e., one basis-of-all). A person's sense powers, moreover, are subtle forms which are fruitional effects, not empowered effects which may be commonly perceived by more than one person.\textsuperscript{12}

At any rate, the observed objects of Devadatta's basis-of-all appear to it due to ripening of latencies that are with his basis-of-all. Thus, the gross form of Devadatta's body—his torso, limbs, head, hair, etc.—can appear to Yajñadatta's mind-basis-of-all; however, that factor of it which is an unshared empowered effect projected by Devadatta's past karma does not appear to Yajñadatta.\textsuperscript{13}

The appearance, on the other hand, of others' minds to extrasensory perception is a yogic power and\textsuperscript{14} does not make [the yogi and the mind which is his observed object] one continuum. The way in which they do not become one continuum may be understood from such [texts] as Dharmakīrti's \textit{Proof of Others' Continua} (S\textit{a}m\textit{tānāntarasiddhi}).\textsuperscript{15}
There are two ways in which another's mind can be known, through inference (anumāṇa) and through extrasensory perception of others' minds (cetāhpāryāyābhijñā). One knows inferentially that other persons have minds, says Dharmakīrti, in dependence on observing revelatory or communicative forms of body and speech; such revelatory forms must be preceded and ordered by a mind.¹⁶ This is not a case of direct perception but of the arising of an abstract image in the cognizing mind. Hence, there is no possibility of cognizer and cognized being a single continuum.¹⁷

Extrasensory cognition of others' minds, however, is a direct cognition. Thus, the question arises of how it can be both a direct cognizer and a different entity from the mind which it perceives, given that subject and object are not separate substantial entities.¹⁸ In answer to this, Dharmakīrti affirms that extrasensory perception of another's mind is a direct perceiver because, despite the fact that it is not a case of a naked apprehension of another's mind, there is a clear appearance, consonant with the facts, of the features of
that mind. The clear appearance is developed through the force of meditation in which the appearance of the yogi's own mind is generated in exact similarity with the aspect of the other mind.\textsuperscript{19}

SECOND REFUTATION (30a.1)

Statement of Opinion. It follows that the basis-of-all is defiled (Tibetan: \textit{sgrib pa}) and neutral because of being a common locus of obstructions (Tibetan: \textit{sgrib pa}) to omniscience and neutrality.

Gung-tang has established that the mind-basis-of-all is neutral, that is, neither virtuous nor non-virtuous (see above, p.322 and p.343). He asserts, in accordance with the presentations of Vasubandhu and Sthiramati, however, that the mind-basis-of-all is undefiled (see above, p.325). By this it is meant that it is a mind not in similar association with afflictive obstructions.

In the Chittamātra system, the obstructions to omniscience are the conceptions of a self of phenomena--the conceptions of a difference of entity of subject and object--along with their latencies.\textsuperscript{20}
This reason in turn follows because [the basis-of-all] is a phenomenon which is abandoned simultaneously with the attainment of omniscience.

Response. This is not correct for two reasons. (1) Just as an action which is included within the subtle origins [of suffering] is posited as an uncontaminated action even though it is both contaminated and an action, so it is acceptable to posit something as undefiled and neutral even though it is both defiled and neutral. (2) Nonetheless, the basis-of-all is not defiled.

Hearer and Solitary Realizer Foe Destroyers have a body whose nature is not physical but mental. This body is said to be the result of an uncontaminated action, an action which is without the contaminant of the afflictions. Nonetheless, since the mental body is conceptual it is contaminated with that conceptuality.21

The first reason [that it is acceptable to posit something as undefiled and neutral even though it is both defiled and neutral] is established because there exists no explanation in any of the upper or lower Higher Knowledges (Abhidharma) of defiled and neutral in connection with obstructions to omniscience. Vasubandhu's Treasury of Higher Knowledge does speak of [both defiled neutral and undefiled neutral]; however,
when one applies reasoning, nothing else—for instance, the number and operation of mental factors accompanying [the basis-of-all]—is in accord.

Any mind defiled by being in similar association with afflictions is accompanied not merely by the five omnipresent mental factors, as is the mind-basis-of-all, but also by afflicting mental factors (see above, pp. 327, 328-9, 363). Thus, from the viewpoint of its accompaniers, the mind-basis-of-all cannot be defiled.

The second reason [i.e., the basis-of-all not being defiled] is established because the basis-of-all which is said to be an object of abandonment is the frutional factor and the mode of abandonment is an abandonment of the contaminated factors—the conceptual entity and so forth—and not a breaking of the continuation [of the basis-of-all].

It is not clear to what Gung-tang refers here, since the basis-of-all does not have a conceptual entity. Perhaps this is a reference to mental phenomena such as great compassion, certainly not an object of abandonment by a Buddhist, but, insofar as it is a conceptual mind, something abandoned with attainment of Buddhahood. 22 Similarly, the contaminated factors of the
mind-basis-of-all, for example, those latencies with it conducive to the arising of contamination, are abandoned without abandonment of the basis-of-all per se or its continuation.23 This in turn follows because not only does that [basis-of-all] not hinder production of either path or fruit, but also it is the bearer of the latencies of the path and becomes the mirror-like exalted wisdom at the time of the final [attainment of Buddhahood].

This in turn follows because the Sūtra Unravelling the Thought speaks of the manner in which other [consciousnesses]24 arise from the basis-of-all:

[Vishalamati], the appropriating consciousness--[the mind-basis-of-all]--is [like a river or] like a mirror. Occurring in dependence on it, [if the conditions for the arising one time of one eye consciousness are present, just one eye consciousness would arise one time. If the conditions for the arising one time of up to all five collections of consciousness are present, all five collections of consciousness would arise one time.]25

And Maitreya's Ornament for the Mahāyāna Sūtras (Mahāyāna-sūtrālāṃkāra) speaks of the manner in which the other exalted wisdoms arise from the mirror-[like] wisdom, "The mirror-
[like] exalted wisdom does not fluctuate;/ Three [other] exalted wisdsoms are dependent upon it."26 Through connecting these two teachings one can prove that the teaching of a transformed basis-of-all is the actual temporal continuation of the substantial entity [of the basis-of-all].

The mirror-like wisdom is the later continuation of the substantial entity of the mind-basis-of-all; the mind-basis-of-all is the earlier continuation of the substantial entity of mirror-like wisdom.27 Only the frutional factor of the mind-basis-of-all is an object of abandonment.

THIRD REFUTATION (30b.1)

Statement of Opinion. The following two passages [from Dzong-ka-Ba’s Root Verses] are contradictory:

[Directly, its own sense powers and objects (appear to it).]

Indirectly, whatever is able to appear as an object To its six collections [of consciousness] Is [also]28 posited as an object of the basis-of-all.29

And:
An object of the sixth [or mental consciousness] other than a sense power or a sense object does not become an object of a basis-of-all.

It might seem as if Đzong-ka-βa is saying in the first verse that any object of the five sense consciousnesses and the sixth or mental consciousness can serve as an object of the mind-basis-of-all in their continuum and, in the second verse, that the objects of the mental consciousness are not objects of the mind-basis-of-all. Were this the case, the two verses would be contradictory.

Response. It follows that [these two passages] are not contradictory because [the meaning of being an object of the sixth consciousness is different in each]. The meaning of the former passage is that all objects which appear to the six fruitional sense powers and are produced as empowered effects of actions are posited as objects of a basis-of-all.

By qualifying "whatever is able to appear as an object of its six consciousnesses" (in the first quoted verse) with the proviso that these must be empowered effects, Gung-tang eliminated unproduced (asamskṛta) phenomena.
Unproduced, or permanent, phenomena are objects special to the mental consciousness.

Lo-sel-Ing College takes this exclusion one step further and holds that only sense objects included within the psychophysical aggregates in the continuum of a mind-basis-of-all can appear to that basis-of-all, despite the fact that sense objects not so included can appear to sense consciousnesses in its continuum. 31

The meaning of the latter is that non-products such as the twelve divisions of scripture, the past and the future--objects of the sixth [or mental consciousness]--are not posited as objects of a basis-of-all.

The twelve divisions of scripture, the past, and the future are all permanent phenomena. They are objects only of conceptual mental consciousnesses, never of nonconceptual minds such as the basis-of-all.
PART FOUR

CRITICAL ANALYSIS
OF POSITIONS
ON THE LATENCIES
Chapter Eighteen
Infusion of Latencies in the Basis-of-All

FIRST REFUTATION (30b.4)

Statement of Opinion. Infusers of latencies are necessarily either virtuous or non-virtuous.

The infusers of latencies are the phenomena depositing latencies with a mind-basis-of-all: the five sense consciousnesses, the mental consciousness, and the afflicted mentality (see above, p.350).

Only minds are infusers. In the case of physical and verbal actions (karma), the infuser is the mind motivating the action.¹

Response. It then [absurdly] follows that the subject, an afflicted mentality, is either virtuous or non-virtuous because of being an infuser of latencies. This reason is established because [an afflicted mentality] is an infuser of latencies of the false view of self.

The afflicted mentality is a defiled and neutral mind.² Within the three-fold division of latencies into latencies of verbalization, latencies of the false view of self, and latencies which are the causes of cyclic
existence, the afflicted mentality deposits latencies of the false view of self (see above, pp.389-390). The afflicted mentality is a type of the false view of self, and the latencies it lays down are ones producing causally concordant effects.

Moreover, there do exist neutral phenomena among infusers of latencies because whereas the two, virtuous and non-virtuous [minds], infuse latencies for both causally concordant and fruitional [effects], neutral [minds] infuse [latencies] solely for the causally concordant. For, Sthiramati's Commentary on (Vasubandhu's) "Thirty Stanzas" says:

Virtuous and non-virtuous [minds] generate latencies for fruitional [effects] and latencies for causally concordant [effects] in a mind-basis-of-all. Neutral [minds] and the afflicted mentality generate just latencies for the causally concordant.
SECOND REFUTATION (31a.1)

Statement of Opinion. Ša-sang Ma-ti Pan-chen's Commentary on (Asaṅga's) "Compendium of Higher Knowledge" says:

Because the reasons are complete, it is correct\(^6\) that the five omnipresent [mental factors] accompanying a basis-of-all\(^7\) also infuse\(^8\) latencies [creating] causally concordant [effects].

Ma-ti Pan-chen (see above p.467) here reiterates a position held by Bu-don (1290-1364). Bu-don's argument is as follows:

Opinion. The [mental factors] feeling and so forth accompanying a basis-of-all do not infuse [latencies]. Since they are fruitions and unclear, they arise and abide by the force of karmic projection.

Reply. This assertion is incorrect; for, if there were no seeds, it would not be feasible for [anything] to occur through the force of [karmic] projection. Because the reasons for infusion are complete, these also infuse latencies of the causally concordant.\(^9\)
Bu-ān implies that, notwithstanding the lack of need for re-establishment of a mind-basis-of-all or its accompaniers during an individual's lifetime, the mental factors in similar association with a basis-of-all do infuse latencies for the creation of mental factors concordant with their causes.

**Response.** This is incorrect because those [mental factors surrounding a basis-of-all] are awarenesses whose observed objects and aspects are very unclear.

The mind-basis-of-all is a mind whose aspect is unclear. It is a mind to which objects appear but which cannot ascertain them or induce later ascertainment of them (see above, p.359 ). The mental factors accompanying a basis-of-all are in similar association with it, having five modes of similarity, one of which is similarity of aspect. Thus, these mental factors are also unclear.

Given that [the mental factors accompanying a basis-of-all] are awarenesses whose observed objects and aspects are very unclear, this necessarily entails that it is incorrect that they infuse latencies for causally concordant [effects] because not only [do such mental factors not infuse latencies, even main minds] whose observed
objects and aspects are unclear—such as an ear consciousness apprehending a sound when [the eye consciousness is] engrossed in seeing a pleasant form—are also unable to infuse latencies. This reason in turn follows because there exists a reason that [an ear consciousness apprehending a sound] is unable to later generate the memory, "I heard such a sound."

The ear consciousness which occurs at a time when the eye consciousness in that person's continuum is engrossed in an attractive sound is an illustration of a mind to which an object appears but is not ascertained.

Gung-tang and Ren-da-wa imply here that memory functions on account of latencies deposited by attentive sense and mental consciousnesses. This topic, however, is not discussed at any length in presentations of mind-basis-of-all.

For, Ren-da-wa's Commentary on (Asaṅga's) "Compendium of Higher Knowledge" says:

The mental factors in similar association with that [basis-of-all] also do not infuse because they—like the basis-of-all—are [awarenesses] whose aspects and objects are very unclear.
31a.4 INFUSION OF LATENCIES

Ren-da-wa further says:

It is seen that [some minds are] not able to deposit latencies; for, on occasions such as when the mind is distracted or directed to an internal observed object, [although] the eye sees a form and [the ear hears a sound] ... there does not exist [a later] generation of memory, "I saw [such and such]; I heard [such and such]."

Ḍzong-ka-ḥa takes this as his own system in the Difficult Topics.

Ḍzong-ka-ḥa says:

**Question:** Do [the mental factors accompanying the mind-basis-of-all]—contact and so forth—infuse, in a basis-of-all, seeds for their own creation, or do they not? If they do, there would [absurdly] be infusers which are other than the seven collections of consciousness [thereby contradicting your own previous assertion]. If they do not, these [mental factors] would [absurdly] be causeless.

**Answer:** It is said [both] that they must infuse [latencies] because [otherwise they] would be causeless and again that because
they are very unclear neutral phenomena, they do not infuse. Nonetheless, despite the fact that both [positions] are set forth, the second is better; for, [we] assert that [a mind-basis-of-all and its accompanying mental factors] function through being projected until death due to being fruitions of former actions.

Otherwise [i.e., if the position that they do not infuse latencies was not accepted], even the basis-of-all itself would have to infuse [latencies] and, hence, there would occur the fault of not finding a basis of infusion. [For, a basis-of-all cannot act on itself by infusing latencies in itself.]

It is also established through reasoning as follows. The purpose of [an awareness's] depositing latencies is that even though [that awareness] itself has ceased, it has infused a latency with the basis-of-all; in so doing it acts as the cause which nurtures a potency of the basis-of-all.

The term nurture (Tibetan: gso ba) is usually used not for the activity of depositing (Tibetan:
'jog pa) latencies but for the activity of maintaining and developing latencies already deposited (see below, p. 607). Here, however, Gung-tang seems to be using "nurture" to explain the depositing or infusing activity of an infuser."

That same latency which is with that [basis-of-all] is later activated and there arises a subsequent [awareness] of similar type [to the former awareness] in the manner of an effect of the basis-of-all. Thus there is a connection [of infusing awareness and basis-of-all] as each other's cause and effect.

The infusing awareness is a cause of the basis-of-all (that is to say, the latencies or seed basis-of-all) at the time of infusing a latency. When a latency producing causally concordant effects is activated, the basis-of-all becomes a cause of the subsequent effect moment of the awareness.

Although all awarenesses—like any phenomena of cyclic existence and nirvana—are effects of the seed basis-of-all, not all awarenesses are infusers of latencies. Examples of non-infusing minds are the mind-basis-of-all and
other awarenesses to which objects appear
without ascertainment.

Since those mental factors [accompanying the basis-of-all]
arise and cease at the same time as the basis-of-all,
there is no qualm [that they would infuse latencies] in
this way.

Gung-tang appears on the surface to be saying
that those mental factors which are simultane-
ously existent with the mind-basis-of-all
cannot be causes or effects of it, since they
are simultaneous with it. Bzong-ka-Ba has
shown, however, that this particular causality--
that between infuser and latency--is a case of
the simultaneous causality of reciprocal
dependence (see above, p.352).

On a grosser level, the mind-basis-of-all
and its accompanying mental factors arise and
cease at the same time in that a mind-basis-of-
all is always accompanied by the five omnipre-
sent mental factors and it arises at birth and
ceases only at death. Thus there is no need
for these mental factors to deposit causally
concordant latencies in order to assure their
continued existence after a hiatus.
[This is established scripturally by the following
passages.] The *Sūtra on Higher Knowledge* says:

All phenomena connect to consciousness;
Likewise that [consciousness connects] to them.
[Phenomena and consciousness] always connect mutually
As entities\(^{14}\) of cause and entities\(^{15}\) of effect.\(^{16}\)

Vasubandhu's *Commentary on (Asaṅga's) "Compendium of the Mahāyāna"* says:

When the mind-basis-of-all is the cause, those
[consciousnesses] are the effect; when they are the
causes, the mind-basis-of-all is the effect.\(^{17}\)

The mind-basis-of-all, within the context of
being the seeds infused by the seven infusing
consciousnesses, is an effect; at that time
the consciousnesses are its causes. From the
viewpoint of being the seeds for the creation
of the seven consciousnesses at a later time,
it is their cause.

Ḍjong-ka-Ba's *Root Verses* says:

[The seeds] are [called] basis-of-all
because [they] connect
All thoroughly afflicted phenomena
To entities of causes or effects.\(^{18}\)
This is also the key reasoning for allaying the qualm [that the basis-of-all is a permanent creator or emanator]. The Sūtra Unravelling the Thought says, "[It would be unsuitable] were it thought to be a self;/ [Hence, I have not taught it to children]."\(^\text{19}\) According to this passage there is a great danger in teaching about the basis-of-all. It might be mistaken as being like a lord, exercising power over the aggregates and so forth, or as being like the permanent, self-arisen Ṣīhvara who creates all environments and beings, or as being like [the Śāmkhya's] nature (prakṛti) which is the root of the emanation of all transformations.

The perniciousness of this mistake lies in the fact that conceiving the mind-basis-of-all to be permanent, causeless, and autonomous is the coarse conception of a self of persons in this system.\(^\text{20}\)

Śāmkhyas assert a fundamental entity called the nature (prakṛti) which, although itself uncaused, is the cause of all "transformations"—i.e., all phenomena of cyclic existence.\(^\text{21}\)

[The basis-of-all being connected to all as cause and effect] is the essential reasoning which allays that qualm, for whereas the Ṣīhvara and so forth asserted by other systems are themselves causeless, not relying on anything,
and themselves create of their own volition all effects, a basis-of-all is asserted to produce [its effects] in dependence on seeds which were previously deposited with it by actions. When [this seed] is nurtured by attachment and so forth, an effect which accords with it is produced.

Here the term nurture (Tibetan: gso ba) is used in the sense of causing to increase or develop.

THIRD REFUTATION (31b.6)

Statement of Opinion. It follows that it is not correct to posit a basis of infusion and infusers for latencies because latencies themselves do not need to rely on something else as an infuser.

Concerning latencies and infusers, see above pp.350-353.

This reason in turn follows because those [latencies] abide intrinsically and beginninglessly. For, the Explanation of the Secret Meaning says:

How is it that latencies abide intrinsically? . . .

One knows that the ability to hold fragrance exists only intrinsically in sesame and the like.
An objector to the opinion that latencies abide only intrinsically and are not newly infused asks how, given the evidence of everyday experience, latencies can naturally exist in the phenomena they infuse. The response to this is that it is obvious that even when strongly scented things such as garlic or unscented things such as stones are brought together with a strongly scented flower, they cannot hold the fragrance of the flower. However, things such as sesame have naturally or intrinsically an ability to hold the fragrance of a flower.

Response. Although the Explanation of the Secret Meaning does say that, it does not necessarily entail that latencies abide intrinsically and beginninglessly. This is because although the author of the Explanation of the Secret Meaning asserts that latencies only abide intrinsically, the foremost [Đzong-ka-βa] does not take this as his own system. This in turn follows because there are three modes of assertion concerning infusion of the latencies, only the first of which is asserted by the author of the Explanation of the Secret Meaning. The three are:

(1) the assertion that there is nurturing merely of old latencies which exist intrinsically [with the
basis-of-all),

(2) the assertion that there is only depositing of new latencies,

(3) the assertion that there exists depositing of new as well as nurturing of old latencies.

The first of these is asserted by the author of the Explanation of the Secret Meaning. There are different assertions on who holds the latter two systems.

The first reason is established [i.e., it is established that there are three modes of assertion concerning the infusion of latencies but only the first is that of the author of the Explanation of the Secret Meaning] because Đzong-ka-egra's Difficult Topics says:

The Explanation of the Secret Meaning sets forth three systems and extensively [presents] their adducing of each other's faults and avoidance of contradictions [in their own systems]. Although [there] the first system is asserted to be the correct position, I here hold the third position.

Bu-đon as well holds the third position to be the best.

Concerning the first system, the Explanation of the Secret Meaning says:
Latencies abide intrinsically without relying on infusers. Since [non-virtuous minds] such as attachment and so forth arise and cease together [with the latencies], they do nothing but nurture [those latencies]; they do not produce [latencies].

Ren-da-wa also teaches that this master's own system is just this. However, it appears that there is a considerable basis for examination here, since Jam-\(\tilde{y}ang\)-shay-\(\tilde{b}\)a says in the Great Exposition of Tenets:

Because the third [system] was not refuted [by the author of the Explanation of the Secret Meaning]

I think that he also asserted it.

Jam-\(\tilde{y}ang\)-shay-\(\tilde{b}\)a quotes, elliptically, the passage in the Secret Meaning presenting the three opinions on latencies and the passages where that commentator criticizes these opinions. Through this, Jam-\(\tilde{y}ang\)-shay-\(\tilde{b}\)a demonstrates that whereas the author of the Secret Meaning criticizes the first and second position, he does not criticize the third position: that there are both intrinsically abiding and newly infused latencies.
The second reason is established [i.e., it is established that there are different assertions on who holds the second and third systems of infusion of latencies, the second being that there is only depositing of new latencies and the third that there is both depositing of new as well as nurturing of intrinsically abiding latencies] because Jam-ŋyang-shay-ba teaches in the Great Exposition of Tenets:

The omniscient Bu-don asserts that the first system is Sthiramati's, the second reverend Paramārtha's, and the third Paramasena's and Nandasena's. The translators Bang and Sa-sang Ma-ti Pan-chen\textsuperscript{31} teach that the first is asserted by Chandrapāla, Paramārtha, and so forth, [the second by Nanda and Paramasena],\textsuperscript{32} and the third by Dharmapāla and so forth. Nonetheless, I have not seen an elaboration of scripture or reasoning [proving this].\textsuperscript{33}

Bu-don, Bang, and Ma-ti Pan-chen are all Tibetan scholars of Buddhist philosophy. The Chinese scholar and translator, Hsüan-tsang, in his seventh century commentary on Vasubandhu's Thirty Stanzas, advances the position attributed by Jam-ŋyang-shay-ba to Bang and Ma-ti Pan-chen.\textsuperscript{34} Although Paramārtha (sixth century)
predates Hsüan-tsang (596-644 A.D.), his position is not recorded by Hsüan-tsang in this commentary, a compendium of Indian Yogāchāra views. That Sthiramati does assert in that manner [i.e., as Jam-yang-shay-ka says, the first system] is proven by Vinītadeva's Explanation of (Sthiramati's) "Commentary on (Vasubandhu's) 'Thirty Stanzas'" where it says, "The commentator posits the intermediate position." This is because in [Vinītadeva's Explanation] the latencies' existing from the beginning is set forth as the second system.

Vinītadeva's presentation is as follows:  

The three accounts made by Yogāchārins are as follows:

(1) Some say that previously non-existent latencies are produced.

(2) Others say that latencies have always existed, with the thoroughly afflictive phenomena merely serving to develop them. Having been developed, they are able to create their effects.

(3) Still others think that previously existent latencies are developed and previously non-existent ones are produced as well.
Thus the *intermediate position* in this presentation is that latencies only abide intrinsically.

In his own system the foremost [Dzong-ka-Bâ] must take the third presentation as correct because (1) the first presentation is incorrect, and (2) the second presentation is also incorrect. The first of these two reasons is established because if latencies only abided intrinsically [three absurdities would follow]:

(1) Since there would be no connection of the basis-of-all and thoroughly afflicted phenomena as each other's cause and effect, there would be contradiction with Asaṅga's *Compendium of the Mahāyāna* and [latencies abiding intrinsically in a basis-of-all] would be like the Śāmkhya's principal.

Asaṅga says that the consciousnesses engaging objects and the seed basis-of-all are reciprocally cause and effect (see above, p. 351).

Moreover, the misapprehension that the mind-basis-of-all is a cause of all other phenomena, but is itself causeless is just the mistake Buddha warns against in the *Sūtra Unravelling the Thought*, "It would be unsuitable were it thought to be a self./ Hence, I have not taught it to children."37
Samkhya, one of the six orthodox Indian philosophical systems, asserts just such an entity, called principal (pradhāna) or fundamental nature (prakṛti). Among all phenomena, it alone is held to be a cause but not an effect of anything else. Just as the principal emanates all transformations but is not itself a transformation, so an intrinsically existent seed basis-of-all would produce all impermanent phenomena but would not itself be a product of anything.

(2) It would follow that newly making exertion to cultivate the path would be senseless.

The purpose of cultivating the five paths leading to enlightenment is to destroy obstructions to liberation and to omniscience, together with their seeds, and develop the qualities of an enlightened being. Although the seed producing uncontaminated wisdom—the antidote to the obstructions—is an intrinsically abiding latency, cultivation of the path does deposit many other, non-intrinsic seeds. Moreover, if latencies were all intrinsically abiding, cultivation of the paths would be unable to
act as an antidote to the then naturally existing seeds of non-virtue.  

(3) Even at the lowest level, things such as the infusion of a flower's scent in sesame would be impossible.  

[The above three absurdities would follow if latencies only abided intrinsically] because in order for a potency to occur in something, the potency would have had to exist from the beginning in that. This reason in turn follows because the new infusion of a previously non-existent potency [would] be impossible.  

The second reason is established [i.e., the second presentation—that latencies are only newly deposited in a basis-of-all—is incorrect] because the following faults would occur if latencies were only newly deposited. Since the potency which creates a basis-of-all would have to be newly deposited, either there would be a beginning of cyclic existence or such potencies would be completely non-existent.  

Ḍzung-ka-śa examines the problem of whether or not latencies depend on infusers within two frames of reference.  

If dependence on infusers means newly depositing and lack of dependence means intrinsic abiding, then the seed of uncontaminated wisdom abides intrinsically,
whereas the seeds giving rise to causally concordant effects and those giving rise to fruitions (such as the mind-basis-of-all) are newly deposited respectively by (1) virtuous, non-virtuous, and neutral engaging consciousnesses, and (2) manifest virtuous or non-virtuous consciousnesses impelling fruitions.

If, on the other hand, a latency's dependence on or independence of an infuser is taken to refer to that latency having a beginning or not, examination of these three classes of latencies yields a different result. Much as before, lineage (gotra)--the seed of the uncontaminated--neither has a beginning nor relies on a depositor. The other two classes, however, each include seeds which have and do not have beginnings.

The seeds of the causally concordant--seeds bringing forth subsequent moments of types similar to their infusing consciousnesses--all rely on infusing consciousnesses. These infusers, in turn, arise from previously deposited seeds of the causally concordant. Such a continuum of causation has no beginning. If, however, specific seeds of the causally
concordant were beginningless, currently existent virtuous and non-virtuous minds would absurdly not deposit such seeds. Similarly, if seeds of fruitions were newly deposited and had a beginning, cyclic existence would have a beginning. For, their effects—the fruitional consciousnesses—are what travels in cyclic existence. Specific seeds of fruitions, however, do have a beginning; otherwise wholesome and unwholesome actions would not infuse latencies giving rise to fruitions.

Further, since the potency for the creation of uncontaminated wisdom would also have to be newly deposited, it would then follow that the first moment of uncontaminated [wisdom] would be causeless. For, [whereas the potency creating it] would have to be deposited by [a consciousness] of similar type [with it], a Superior's path has not yet arisen [in the continuum of one] on or below the level of highest worldly phenomena.

The first moment of uncontaminated wisdom in a sentient being's continuum is the first moment of his path of seeing. This is the first of the Superior's paths.

The level of highest worldly phenomena (laukikāgradharma) is the highest level of the
path of preparation (prayogamārga); it immediately precedes the path of seeing and is the most advanced path reached by an ordinary being.

That this is so follows because the potency able to create uncontaminated wisdom is called "naturally abiding lineage" by reason of its beginningless existence. This reason is established because when a person who does abide in a lineage properly hears [the doctrine] and contemplates [its meaning], a realization which is a path is produced, and in the case of one whose lineage is severed, a path [consciousness] is not produced even though he strives [in hearing and contemplation]. This is due to the fact that [one whose lineage is severed] has from the beginning been without a potency suitable for the arising of that [path]. For example, a healthy barley seed has from the beginning a potency for generating a sprout, and thus when it is combined with water and manure, a sprout is produced; however, a burnt seed, even if it is combined with [such] conditions, does not produce [a sprout].

It is therefore necessary to assert both intrinsically abiding [latencies]--such as the seeds of uncontaminated [wisdom]--and newly deposited [latencies]--such as the seeds of causally concordant and fruitional [effects]. For, the assertion of each position by itself has already been refuted.
In this regard there is the following in reverend Ren-da-wa's Commentary on (Asaṅga's) "Compendium of Higher Knowledge":

It is my understanding that examination of whether the latencies are intrinsically abiding or newly produced is an examination of what is not a place [for examination].

This passage makes the same point as his teaching that [a basis-of-all and the latencies with it] are neither the same substantial entity nor different substantial entities; I will explain this later.

Latencies are not substantially existent; they are imputations made to states of potency of the fruitional basis-of-all. Thus, the two are neither the same nor different substantial entities (see below, pp.640-685).

Ren-da-wa's point is unclear. In general, an examination of whether latencies are intrinsically abiding or newly produced is an appropriate inquiry. It may be that the topic is so complex, involving differences between classes of latencies, that a blanket statement, "Latencies are (or are not) intrinsically abiding," is inappropriate (see above, 615-17).
Chapter Nineteen
Critique of Interpretations of the Latencies

The following discussions are concerned with the entity of the latencies infused [in the basis-of-all].

FIRST REFUTATION (33b.1)

Statement of Opinion. The latencies of virtue are virtuous, and the latencies of non-virtue are non-virtuous.

It might seem as if latencies deposited by virtuous minds would be virtuous, and those deposited by non-virtuous minds non-virtuous. In particular, the latencies established by virtuous minds which will later create minds of similar type might seem necessarily to be virtuous in order to justify the continuity of similarity.

Response. This is incorrect, for both are undefiled and neutral. This reason in turn follows because Đzong-ka-Ča's Root Text says:

Whether depositors are virtuous, [non-virtuous, or neutral]
The latencies deposited [in a basis-of-all] are neutral.¹
SECOND REFUTATION (33b.2)

Statement of Opinion. It follows that it is not correct to assert that latencies are just neutral because [if they were] the following four faults would arise.

धोङ-का-भा, in the Difficult Topics, states four objections to the doctrine that all latencies are neutral in order later to refute them.² Gung-tang here recasts them in his own words:

(1) Were it the case [that latencies were just neutral] there would be a contradiction with the passage in Asaṅga's Compendium of Higher Knowledge which describes subsequently related virtue. Asaṅga says, "What is subsequently related virtue? It is the latencies of these [virtuous minds]."³ Asaṅga enumerates thirteen different ways a phenomenon may be virtuous (kusala). Examination shows his list to be a terminological division, since not all the thirteen are actually virtuous phenomena; subsequently related virtues, for example, are latencies deposited by virtuous minds. The thirteen are:⁴

(1) natural (svabhāvataḥ) virtue,
(2) virtue through association (sambandhataḥ),
(3) virtue through subsequent relation (anubandhataḥ),
(4) virtue through outcome (utthānataḥ),
(5) ultimate (paramārthataḥ) virtue,
(6) virtue through attaining birth (upapattilābhataḥ),
(7) virtue through application (prayogataḥ),
(8) virtue through veneration (puraskārataḥ);
(9) virtue through assistance (anugrahataḥ),
(10) received (parigrahataḥ) virtue,
(11) antidotal (pratipaksataḥ) virtue,
(12) virtue through pacification (upaśamataḥ),
(13) causally concordant (nisyandataḥ) virtue.

In addition to subsequently related virtues, there are also subsequently related non-virtues, and subsequently related forms; all three are latencies.⁵

(2) [Were it the case that latencies were just neutral] a latency [established by] a projecting action would then be unable to serve as a fruitional cause [due to being neither virtue nor non-virtue] and thus the arrangement of actions and their effects would be destroyed.

A fruitional cause—the cause of a fruition (vipāka)—is said to be necessarily either virtuous or non-virtuous, and not neutral (see above, p.330, on fruitions).⁶ Fruitions
are one main type of karmic results; without them the doctrine of ethically active actions (karma) necessarily giving rise to later effects would be destroyed.

(3) Given that an equalizing cause of a virtue must be a virtue and that there exist no virtuous [phenomena] among latencies, it follows that in mindless states there would be no causes of [effects] of similar type for either virtue or non-virtue and, hence, it would be impossible for virtuous minds and so forth to arise later.

An equalizing cause (sabhāgahetu) is a cause which generates an effect which is of similar type with it. It is one of two types of causes which create causally concordant effects.

Since during mindless states there are neither virtuous nor non-virtuous minds, and since the latencies those deposit are said to be neutral, a subsequently occurring virtuous mind would either not exist or, if it did exist, would not arise from an equalizing cause.

(4) There would be contradiction with the assertion that the entity of the vow of individual emancipation is a continuous attitude of abandonment together with the
seeds [of that mind] and the teaching that virtue occurs continuously once a vow is acquired and until it deteriorates.

A vow of individual emancipation (pratimokṣa-samvara) is, for Chittamātrins, an attitude of abandonment (viraticitta)—an attitude in which ill conduct has been abandoned—along with its latencies.10 If the latencies of this mind of abandonment are neutral, how can there be said to be continuously occurring virtue at times when the sense and mental consciousnesses are not operative?

Response. It follows that the first argument is incorrect because if [Asaṅga's] presentation of [the latencies of virtue] as subsequently related virtue established them as virtue, faults such as the following would occur:

(1) it would follow that since even in the Formless Realm there exist latencies for the production of form, latencies which are spoken of as subsequently related form, there would exist form there [in the Formless Realm], and

(2) it would follow that there would exist non-virtue even in the upper realms.

Gung-tang here restates and, in some cases, expands on Dzong-ka-Ba's responses to the four faults held by the opponent to follow from a
doctrine of neutral latencies. 5zong-ka-5a's arguments are given in commentary to his root verse, "[Latencies] are [by some] asserted to be full-fledged/ Virtue and non-virtue, but without proof." 11

The argument in response to the contention that the latencies of virtue are subsequently related virtues and, hence, virtuous is that the cases of subsequently related form and subsequently related non-virtue must be similar: the seeds of forms and the seeds of non-virtues must be, respectively, forms and non-virtues. Although these seeds exist in all beings until liberation, there are many times when there can be neither form nor non-virtue. There is, for example, no non-virtue in the upper realms—the Form and Formless Realms—and there is no form in the Formless Realm.

It follows that the second argument is incorrect because whereas the latencies of projecting actions are causes which produce [fruitional effects], they are not causes which project fruitional effects and they need not be either virtuous or non-virtuous.
Projecting actions (āksepakakarma) infuse latencies in the mind-basis-of-all. They are the causes which project or impel fruitions. Although the latencies they deposit are causes producing (janakahetu) fruitions, they do not project those fruitions.

Thus, when it is said that the cause of a fruition must be either virtuous or non-virtuous—that is, clearly biased one way or the other, and not just neutral—this refers to the projecting cause of the fruition and not its more immediate producing cause.¹²

This reason follows because they are like the case of the eye sense power which is a projected effect. Although they arise continuously, earlier eye sense powers producing later ones, the earlier do not become the projectors of the later.

The sense powers and the mind-basis-of-all are projected effects—fruitions projected by virtuous or non-virtuous actions done in a former life. Being fruitions, they arise continuously, present from birth to death (see above, p.331). Although each moment of these sense powers and each moment of the mind-basis-of-all acts as a cause of the immediately following moment,
the earlier moments are not fruitional causes in the sense of being projectors of fruitions. They are mere producers (janaka) of phenomena which have already been projected by true fruitional causes.

There is, furthermore, no fault such that if it were the case [that all latencies were neutral] one could not establish a presentation of the effects of actions because of the following. In general, the way in which those of other schools [i.e., non-Buddhists] argue that [the Buddhist presentation of] actions and their effects is incorrect is set forth in Nāgārjuna's Fundamental Text Called Wisdom:

If an action were to remain

Until when it matures, it would be permanent.

But if it were to cease, then since it would have ceased

How can an effect come about?

Ḍzong-ka-ṭa explains this verse in the Ocean of Reasoning:

The argument arises that, with regards to this presentation of many actions (karma), if an action were to remain without disintegrating until the time of bringing forth a
fruitation, it would be permanent. For, (1) it would be free from disintegrating for that long, (2) it would be an unproduced phenomenon, and (3) unproduced phenomena do not bring forth fruitions. If [on the other hand] actions cease as soon as they arise, how will they produce effects?—They will not, for what has ceased does not exist.  

In order to eliminate the faults [adduced] in that [passage], certain Vaibhāshikas assert [phenomena called] possessors and some assert non-dissipations which are like guarantors for loans.

The Kashmiri Vaibhāshikas whose tenets Vasubandhu reports in the Treasury of Higher Knowledge assert non-associated compositional factors called possessors (prāpti) and dispossessors (aprāpti) in order to preserve the doctrine of karma. The Śammitīyas assert a non-associated compositional factor called non-dissipation (aviprāṇaśa). The Mahāsāṃghikas admit a similar theory, referring to non-dissipation as accumulation (upacaya). The other tenet systems for the most part dispose of this fault by asserting a continuum of consciousness; Prāsaṅgikas
assert that the state of having ceased is a functioning thing.

The Sautrāntikas, the Chittamātrins following Dharmakīrti, and the Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas assert that consciousness is always manifestly present. Actions infuse potencies (sakti) in this mental continuum (cittasamātana) which exist there until bringing forth fruition.21

The Prāsaṅgikas, on the other hand, unlike Sautrāntikas, Chittamātrins, and Svātantrikas, assert that the state of having ceased is a functioning thing—a phenomenon which has the ability to produce an effect.22 The cessation of an action, because it lacks inherent existence, is able in this way to bring forth an effect.23

The way in which Chittamātrins eliminate these faults is in the context of [asserting] a basis-of-all. They assert that an action's projecting a fruition is analogous to shooting an arrow. Once the bow is pulled back an arrow's length and [the arrow] is shot, it is by the force of this [effort] that [the arrow] travels without interruption until it strikes the target; no effort at shooting is needed in later moments. Similarly, an action initially projects [a fruition] and thereupon a latency is infused in the basis-of-all. Thereby, although
there is no subsequent projecting [cause] in that continuum, the projected effect is brought about by the latency due to the non-deterioration of the potency of the former [action]. Asaṅga's *Compendium of the Mahāyāna* says:

[External and internal seeds
Are held to be producers and projectors]
Because of projecting the unsown and the dead,
Like an arrow not dropping\(^24\) between [bow and target].\(^25\)

External seeds (barley seeds, etc) and internal seeds (the latencies with the mind-basis-of-all) are both producers and projectors of effects.\(^26\)
A barley seed directly produces a seedling and indirectly projects the stem, leaves, and so forth of the mature plant. A latency with the basis-of-all directly produces "name and form" (*nāma-rūpa*)--i.e., the beginning of the psycho-physical aggregates of a new lifetime; it indirectly projects the remainder of the continuum of that mind and body up through death (see above, p. 384).\(^27\)

The unsown and the dead are examples of phenomena whose nature involves projected causality. Seeds not yet planted in the
ground would not be able to be kept in storage and then later used if their potency to produce a new shoot were not a case of projection. Likewise, without non-immediate causation of the psychophysical continuum, a body would disintegrate once the mind-basis-of-all left it at death and would not undergo the various stages of putrifaction. A seed's potency to produce a new plant is established at the time of its own production, a production long past when it is stored. When it is planted, this projected ability becomes manifest. Likewise, mind and body are not newly produced by latencies with the basis-of-all in every moment of their existence. They are directly produced at conception and produced only indirectly in later moments by that same original producer, then long past.

It follows that the third argument is incorrect. The third argument is that if latencies giving rise to virtue were not themselves virtuous, there would be no latencies which were causes producing virtues as concordant effects, that is, effects concordant with their virtuous
causes. Thus, there would be no virtuous phenomena during mindless states and no possibility of a continuation of virtue after a mindless state. Gung-tang, following Đzong-ka-Ba, holds this to be incorrect, asserting that an effect's being concordant with the depo- sitor of the latencies producing it constitutes the complete meaning of being a causally concordant effect. ²⁹

For, when a virtuous mind is produced immediately subsequent to a state without mind, although the actual producer is a neutral latency, the depo- sitor of that latency is virtuous. Therefore that later virtuous mind is posited as arising from [a cause] of similar type, an equalizing cause.

This is similar, for instance, to the non-confusion of effects which is posited in the case of the green shoot which is produced from planting a barley seed. Although that shoot is not similar to the barley, when later [its] fruit has matured [that fruit] is of the same shape as the seed.

In this regard, Asaṅga's Compendium of the Mahāyāna says:
The question might arise, "How can latencies which do not differ and are not variegated be causes for phenomena which differ and are variegated?" This is like cotton which when treated with the juices of fruit pits does not appear variegated, but when then put into a vessel of dye displays many different varieties of color.\textsuperscript{30}

Vasubandhu's \textbf{Commentary} [on this text] says:

At the time of the latency there is no variety but at the time of the effect the causal entities of the phenomena of different types are seen. It is like a garment which has been dyed.\textsuperscript{31}

\textit{Asaṅga and his commentator Vasubandhu teach [the neutrality of latencies] taking as an example the case of a white cotton cloth. When the juices of fruit pits or lemon juice of various strengths are infused in it, it does not, at that time, appear in various hues. When it is later put into a vessel of dye, however, various good and bad hues arise due to the potency of the various juices of the fruit pits.}

As with fruitions, the case of causally concordant effects shows latencies to be \textit{neutral} phenomena—phenomena which bring nothing to a causal situation themselves. Latencies are
merely transmitters of the causal potential of their depositors, serving to connect the infusing consciousnesses with their effects. As Đzong-ka-Ｂa says:

[The seeds] are [called] basis-of-all because
[They] connect all thoroughly afflicted phenomena
To entities of causes and effects. 32

It follows that the fourth argument is incorrect.
The fourth argument is that if latencies were neutral, one who has a vow of individual emancipation could not be said to have continuous virtue during mindless states. Đzong-ka-Ｂa and Gung-tang hold this to be a misunderstanding of what it means to have a vow. 33

For, the meaning of the description of the vow of individual emancipation as being an attitude abandoning [misconduct] together with the seeds [of that attitude] is as follows. It is on account of the non-deterioration of the force of the attitude of abandonment that mindfulness and introspection arise when minor and root infractions begin to occur; thus, one is able to stop them and as long as one guards [against infractions] the fruition [of the vow] increases. It does not mean that
[the vow] exists as virtue throughout.

If this were not the case, there would be an absurdity on the order of the simultaneous occurrence of light and darkness because the two, virtue and non-virtue, would have to operate simultaneously in one continuum.

This is true given that everyone does some non-virtue sometime.

Vasubandhu's Treatise on the Establishment of Actions (Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa) says:\(^{34}\)

[Once bodily action is merely the mental factor intention] then, given that this intention does not exist when the mind is distracted\(^{35}\) or when there is no mind, how do the two, vows and non-vows, exist? Both vows and non-vows exist due to the latencies of particular intentions\(^{36}\) not having been destroyed.

Actions (karma) are threefold: bodily, vocal, and mental. Bodily and vocal actions are, in reality, not physical but are rather those particular intentions (cetanā) which set the body into motion and give rise to speech.\(^{37}\)

The particular intentions due to the existence of which one can posit the existence of vows or non-vows are, according to Vasubandhu, those which give rise to the non-revelatory
forms, vows and non-vows. While Gung-tang's argument is well served by Vasubandhu's reasoning, it is not at all clear that Vasubandhu is here presenting a system in which vows are asserted to be cognitive phenomena (i.e., attitudes of abandonment). Dzong-ka-BA does not refer to this text when he discusses this issue.

Asvabhāva's Connected Explanation of (Asaṅga)'s "Compendium of the Mahayana" says:

It is because of a particular nature of a potency. . .

A potency, further, ought not to be said to be either the same as or different from the possessor of [that] potency.

Gung-tang appears not to have quoted Asvabhāva accurately; for, one can read in the Connected Explanation:

Latencies abide in the mind-basis-of-all in a transcending difference and non-difference; for, [they have] the nature of [being] particular potencies. A "latency" is a particular potency; a potency ought not to be said to be the same as or different from the possessor of [that] potency.
INTERPRETATIONS OF LATENCIES

Notwithstanding the differences, Gung-tang's version preserves the meaning of the original. His purpose in quoting this passage is perhaps to point out that the latency of a vow cannot be said to differ from the mental phenomenon in which it is infused.

Dzong-ka-巴's Commentary on the Difficult Topics says:

Where there exists a continuum of ethics, the potency of a vow, one is able merely by that to posit the existence of a previously assumed vow. ..

Because in both commentaries [the term "unmanifest"] is interpreted as neutral, [latencies] are established as neutral.44

The Compendium of the Mahāyāna, in dividing latencies into six categories, includes a pair called "the two which are unmanifest" (see above, p.383 ). There, the two are external and internal seeds. Unmanifest, whether it is explained to mean unmanifest as either thoroughly afflictive or thoroughly purifying, or unmanifest as either virtue or non-virtue, is interpreted as neutral.45
This has, nevertheless, been enough elaboration on such topics as whether or not a vow in such situations is virtuous or not.

Such situations are mindless states and distracted states—states in which there can be no manifest attitude of abandonment.

Further, one could elaborate on the problem—given that virtue and non-virtue do not occur simultaneously—whether when one person instigates another to homicide there arises or does not arise a defeat in that person if the other person commits the actual act of homicide while he himself remains in a virtuous mind.

There are four "defeats" (parājīka) which a monk is not to commit: sexual intercourse, theft, taking human life, and falsely claiming paranormal powers. They are the worst of the offenses against vows and result in being expelled from the monastic community.

Since causing someone to murder has the same force as murdering someone oneself, the defeat should arise in the instigator once the act is committed, whether or not his mind is in a virtuous state at that time. Although Gung-tang offers this problem up for discussion in the debating courtyard, it would seem—
least to the present writer—to be further
evidence for his position that the existence
or non-existence of a vow at a latent, unmani-
fest level is an adequate criterion for the
existence or non-existence of that restraint.
The instigator of the homicide would then have
amassed the latency for homicide, a latency
which "nurtures" his vow and its latency in
such a way as to destroy it.
Chapter Twenty
Relationship of the Latencies and the Basis-of-All

FIRST REFUTATION (35a.6)

Statement of Opinion. The explanation that latencies are neutral [does not refer to all latencies]. Among the latencies of, for instance, anger, there is one which is a latency that is a continuation of that [anger] in the nature of a seed; this is included among the obstructions to liberation. There is a second which is the latency deposited by that [anger]; this is included among the obstructions to omniscience. The explanation that latencies are neutral refers to the latter.

This position is akin to the one held by Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikas. Unlike Chittamātrins and Sautrāntikas, they distinguish seeds (bīja) and latencies (vāsanā). Jang-gya explains the Prāsaṅgika assertion:

The obstructions to omniscience (jñeyāvaraṇa) are asserted in this [Prāsaṅgika] system to be the latencies [left by] afflictions [such as anger]. Among the two latencies—the seed [form] of afflictions, which have been
posited as latencies, and the latencies
which are not a seed [form] of afflictions--
the latter are what are posited as obstructions to omniscience. . . The latencies of
afflictions are the main obstructions to
omniscience; their effects, the factors of
a mistaken appearance of duality are also
included among [obstructions to omniscience].

For Prāsaṅgikas, the main afflictive obstruction
is the conception of true or inherent existence
along with its seeds; however, the other afflictions are induced by this misconception, and
thus they and their seeds are also included
among the afflictive obstructions.

Response. This is pointless talk, for if that were the
case, none of the rebuttals [just adduced] would relate
to the arguments [they refute].

Gung-tang has just answered arguments supporting
the claim that not all latencies are neutral
(pp.620-639 ). His rebuttals are rooted in
two main assertions: (1) latencies must be neutral, for they must co-exist with both virtue
and non-virtue, and (2) latencies are merely
messengers connecting causes to effects and
their nature has nothing to do with the nature of the effect they bring about.

The opinion being refuted at the present time is that some latencies are merely seed forms of afflictions, that is, non-manifest continuations of afflictions. If such existed, they would have to be non-virtuous.

Moreover, propounding such is a case of mistakenly thinking that the basis-of-all and the so-called latencies would each exist separately as individual substantial entities. That this is so follows because the latencies are here being mistaken to be like various produce sown in a field: the produce are of different color and shape from each other and separable and demonstrable as different entities from the field. The latencies are mistaken [by the stater of opinion] to be, like the produce, of varying types from each other—virtuous, non-virtuous, and neutral—and in not being of the entity of their basis of infusion but having entities positable when separated from that [basis of infusion].

In fact, the latencies are a single substantial entity with the basis-of-all in which they exist. No latency can be posited which is not the entity of a mind-basis-of-all.
Further, if latencies did abide in that way they would be substantially existent phenomena in the sense of being self-sufficiently apprehensible.

Ge-luk-bas speak of four different uses of the term "substantially existent" (dravyasat); these will be examined below (see p.678-9). Substantial existence in the sense of being self-sufficiently apprehensible (Tibetan: rang skya 'dzin thub pa'i rdzas yod) is a distinctive term of Go-mang College. Jam-yang-shay-5a distinguishes between substantial existence in the sense of being self-sufficient (Tibetan: rang skya thub pa'i rdzas yod) and substantial existence in the sense of being self-sufficiently apprehensible. The former is non-existent—there is, for example, no self-sufficient person—whereas there are many examples of the latter: all cognitive phenomena and all external forms, sounds, odors, tastes, and tangible objects.

The point around which discussion in this chapter revolves is the distinction between substantial entity (dravya), which here just means functioning thing, and substantially existent (dravyasat). Gung-tang does not
clarify this distinction until rather late in the discussion (see below, p.677).

However, they do not so abide, it being said that latencies are imputedly existent because "a latency deposited by that" is a mere designation for the basis-of-all itself coming to have the potency of bringing forth a particular fruition.

Latencies do not abide as phenomena which are substantially existent in the sense of being self-sufficiently apprehensible. For, such a phenomenon would be one "whose own ascertainment by prime cognition need not rely on ascertainment by prime cognition of another phenomenon which is not its entity." Latencies, although they are substantial entities, are imputedly existent in the sense of not being sufficient for their own apprehension. There is no ascertainment of a latency without the prior appearance and ascertainment of a mind-basis-of-all.

This is, for example, like the case of a knife which when ground becomes able to cut that which is to be cut and is then merely designated "sharp"; there exists no sharpness apart from the knife.

It is also for this reason that in previously cited passages—Asvabhāva's Connected Explanation of (Asaṅga's)
"Compendium of the Mahāyāna" (see p. 636) and the venerable Ren-da-wa's teaching of the inappropriateness of inquiry into the mode of infusion of old and new latencies (see p. 619)—there are rejections of an analysis of temporal sequence which is made within an assumption that the two—infused and infuser—have a substantially existent difference.

Therefore, Ňgong-ka-ĺa's saying "A latency, furthermore, is neither a single/ Nor a different substantial entity from [its] support" means that "latency" is a designation for that factor of the basis of infusion which has been made potent by an infuser. Hence, if latencies were substantially established, [their] relationship of dependence [with the basis-of-all] would also be substantially established. If that [relationship] were substantially established, [the latencies and their basis of infusion] could not avoid either being substantially one or substantially plural, neither of which is acceptable. This accords with Asaṅga's Compendium of the Mahāyāna: "The mind-basis-of-all is a particular power for the arising of [a phenomenon]."

That [the basis-of-all and the latencies can be neither substantially one nor substantially plural] follows because (1) those two [the latencies and the basis-of-all] do not have a relationship of substantially
established unity, and (2) they do not have a relationship of substantially established plurality.

If one says that the first of these reasons is not established, then it [absurdly] follows that the subject, the two—the basis-of-all and the latencies [which are with it]—are an indivisible unity from every viewpoint because of abiding as¹³ a unity within a substantially established relationship. Abiding as a unity within a substantially established relationship entails being an indivisible unity from every viewpoint because it is asserted that although [two phenomena] can abide as a single entity and be different isolates in a merely imputedly existent relationship, in a substantially established relationship whatever is one entity must be a single isolate.

An isolate (Tibetan: ldog pa or rang ldog) of a phenomenon is the opposite of what is not one with that phenomenon. The isolate of tree, for instance, is the opposite of not being one with tree. That not one with tree includes all that is not one with tree—minds, people, colors, leaves, branches, roots, even oak tree, and so on and so forth—all other phenomena in the universe. What remains when all these phenomena not one with tree are negated is tree's isolate.
The only phenomenon that is tree's isolate is tree itself, i.e., being tree's isolate necessarily entails being tree. Pine, or even large tree, are not tree's isolate; only tree itself is tree's isolate.

Since conceptual consciousnesses operate by this double or reflexive negation process of isolation, to speak of two phenomena being a single or different isolates is to speak of how they appear to a conceptual consciousness. Although a latency is merely a designation for a state of potency of a mind-basis-of-all, conceptual minds can conceive of the latency and the basis-of-all distinctly. Thus, the latencies and the mind-basis-of-all cannot have a relationship which requires them to be a single isolate.

This is so because of being like, for example, the explanation of single entity and different isolate by the Prāsaṅgikas and others. They assert that although [two phenomena] can be conventionally the same entity but different isolates, whatever is ultimately one entity must be asserted as the same isolate, since [their] mode of appearance to the mind to which [they] appear as [one entity] would have to be [their] final mode of subsistence.
Gung-tang claims an analogy between the Chittamātrin dichotomy of imputed (prajñāptī) and substantial (dravyata) existence—in the epistemic sense of being self-sufficiently apprehensible phenomena or not—and the Prāsaṅga-Mādhyamika dichotomy of conventional (samvrtya) and ultimate (paramārthata). It is important to note that there is an important difference, however, between the Chittamātrin substantial and the Prāsaṅgika ultimate. Something which for Prāsaṅgikas is ultimately the case is necessarily something that is not ultimately existent, but merely imputedly or conventionally existent, whereas for Chittamātrins whatever is substantially the case is substantially existent.

Gung-tang's argument is as follows. He says above (p. 645) that if both latencies and the mind-basis-of-all were substantially existent, then their relationship of dependency would necessarily also be substantially existent. Given such a substantially existent relationship (and Gung-tang does not present reasons establishing this), the two must be either substantially the same or substantially different. Here he argues that if they are substan-
tially the same, they must be one in all respects—including being a single isolate, i.e., not even differentiable in the imagination. Of course, they are differentiable for thought, and thus cannot be one in all ways.

If [however] one accepts [the consequence that the two, the basis-of-all and the latencies that are with it, were an indivisible unity from every part] it would then [absurdly] follow that the latencies on the basis-of-all would have observed objects and subjective aspects and that the latencies of virtue and non-virtue which are the impellers of [birth in] the five migrations would be co-extensive with each other, as would the latencies for [births in] the individual realms. For they—individually—would be one isolate with the fundamental basis-of-all. The reason entails [the above absurd consequences] because Dzong-ka-Ba's Root Text says:¹⁴

They are not one [entity] because the seeds then would Have observed object and aspect and the seeds Of the five migrations would be mixed, And because the realms also would be mixed.

Gung-tang will demonstrate below (p.461) that when Dzong-ka-Ba says the latencies and the mind-basis-of-all are not one sub-
stantial entity, he means that they are not a substantially existent unity. The two are, in fact, a single substantial entity but, within that, are different isolates.

If latencies were one in all respects with the basis-of-all in which they are infused, then whatever was true of that mind-basis-of-all would also absurdly be true of them—they would, for example, be minds and, hence, would have objects and aspect. Moreover, they would be an undifferentiable unity within which there could be no separation of latencies in terms of their effects. This would entail the invalidation of the karma theory, for the various seeds giving rise to rebirth as a hell-being, hungry ghost, animal, human, or god, or—speaking in another way—to rebirth in the Desire, Form, or Formless Realms, would no longer be separate and distinct. There would no longer be a mechanism connecting virtue to pleasant experience and non-virtue to suffering.

If one says that the second part of the original reason is not established [i.e., if one says that the latencies and the basis-of-all have a relationship of substantially established plurality] then it would
[absurdly] follow that the subjects, those two [the latencies and the basis-of-all] would be unrelated others because of being substantially established as different. Being substantially established as different necessarily entails being unrelatively other because although in general phenomena which are merely different and even phenomena which are different entities like causes and effects need not be unrelatively other, phenomena which are substantially established as different must be [unrelated others].

Two substantially existent phenomena can have no relationship of dependence. Given that they exist, they are either one or different. If they are one and substantially existent, then they are in all respects one. If they are different and substantially existent, then they are in all respects different, that is, they are unrelated others. In either case, neither depends on the other.

This argument highlights the difference between substantial entity (dravya) and substantial existence (dravyasat). A cause and its effect are necessarily different phenomena and, because they are impermanent, necessarily substantial entities. However, as will be
seen below (p. 677), this causal or ontological substantiality does not necessarily entail the cognitive substantiality of being substantially existent in the sense of being self-sufficiently apprehensible.

This reason follows because if the factor of difference of those two is substantially established, they must be unmixedly different in every aspect. For, Vasubandhu's *Commentary on* (Asaṅga's) "Compendium of the Mahāyāna" says, "If [they were] different, [they] would be different in every respect." 15 Moreover, it appears that [this reasoning] accords in type with the reasoning presented in Chandrakīrti's *Supplement to* (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise" in which whatever is essentially different cannot abide in one continuum. 16 Chandrakīrti says, "That whatever are diverse by way of their own character belong\(^{17}\) to a single continuum is not feasible." 18 If, however, one accepts the above [consequence that the latencies and the basis-of-all are unrelated others] then it would follow with respect to the subject, the latencies in the continuum of a common being, that they would be a mind-basis-of-all because of being a phenomenon included in the continuum of a short-sighted one which is neither a form, a non-associated compositional factor, nor one of the seven collections of consciousness.
Short-sighted one (Tibetan: tshur mthong) and common being (prthagjana) are synonyms referring to those who have not yet attained paths of seeing and become Superiors. There seems no reason for restricting the argument to latencies in the continuum of such a being other than the fact that not all Superiors have mind-bases-of-all (see above pp. 369–379).

The only phenomena included in a person's continuum are forms, consciousnesses, and non-associated compositional factors. If the latencies are held to be substantial existents different from the mind-basis-of-all, they must themselves (seemingly as a group) be a second mind-basis-of-all. For, (1) since they exist in the Formless Realm they are not form, (2) since they are substantially existent they are necessarily not non-associated compositional factors (which are all imputed existents), and (3) since they exist in mindless states when there are no sense or mental consciousnesses and in supramundane states when there is no afflicted mentality, they are not included in the seven collections of consciousness.¹⁹
For, Đzong-ka-βa's *Difficult Topics* says:\(^{20}\)

[If the latencies were different substantial entities from the basis-of-all, they would] be neither form, nor non-associated compositional factors, nor any of the seven collections of consciousness because of being substantially established, existing in the Formless Realm [and occurring when the seven collections of consciousness do not exist].

Đzong-ka-βa here adduces an absurd consequence following from the opinion that the latencies are substantially existent. His own assertion is that latencies are non-associated compositional factors—phenomena which are neither form nor consciousness but are imputed states of potency in a mind-basis-of-all:\(^{21}\)

Therefore, these infused seeds are one class [of phenomena] in the aggregate of compositional factors, the non-associated compositional factor called possession (*prāpti*). For, they are composed products but are not forms, minds, or mental factors.

The "substantially established"\(^{22}\) of this passage must refer to "non-associated [compositional factors]". It
is, therefore, senseless to take the non-difference here, as some do, to be merely non-difference of substantial entity. If that were the case, Đzong-ka-βa would have had to have said that [the latencies] would [absurdly] not be non-associated [compositional factors] because of being different substantial entities [from the mind-basis-of-all].

Đzong-ka-βa speaks of the latencies and the mind-basis-of-all as being neither a single nor different substantial entities. He says further that if the two were different substantial entities, the latencies could not be non-associated compositional factors because of being substantially existent.

Non-associated compositional factors are substantial entities in that they are impermanent phenomena; however, they are not substantially established, for they are not self-sufficiently apprehensible. Difference of substantial entity does not entail substantial existence; only a substantially existent difference of two substantial entities can entail the substantial existence of the two phenomena.

Moreover, it is clear that Đzong-ka-βa asserts the latencies to be non-associated
compositional factors and thus imputedly existent. From this it follows that arguing that latencies are not non-associated compositional factors because of being substantially existent is a case of adducing an absurdity entailed by the position being refuted. Hence, the position being refuted is that latencies are substantially existent. If this is to follow from the incorrect position as Đong-ka-śa states it—the assertion that mind-basis-of-all and latencies are different substantial entities—the interpreter of Đong-ka-śa's thought must conclude that the position he actually refutes is not an assertion of difference of substantial entity but, rather, the assertion of a substantially existent difference between the two.

If, on the other hand, Đong-ka-śa were refuting merely non-difference of substantial entity, there is no necessity that the latencies be substantially existent. He would only have been able to argue, as Gung-tang says, that the latencies could not be non-associated compositional factors because of being different substantial entities from the basis-of-all.
However, this cannot be the case; for, the entailment between the reason and the unwanted conclusion in this reasoning will not bear examination.

The faulty entailment is this: being different substantial entities necessarily entails not being non-associated compositional factors. This entailment, technically the forward entailment (anvayavyāpti), is concomitant in its truth or falsity with the truth or falsity of another entailment, the reverse entailment (vyatirekavyāpti) of that consequence: being non-associated compositional factors necessarily entails being different substantial entities. If either of these entailments is the case, the other must be the case; if, on the other hand, either is not the case, the other is also proven false.

The reverse entailment, when tested with two substantial entities which are non-associated compositional factors—the imputed persons, horse and ox—can be seen to be false because they are different substantial entities.
If would then be the case that even the two, a horse and an ox, would not be different substantial entities [because of being non-associated compositional factors]. Horse and ox are imputed existents; they are persons imputed to one or another or the collection of their five psychophysical aggregates. They are neither form nor consciousness and are thus included among non-associated compositional factors. Any functioning thing—i.e., any impermanent phenomenon—which is not a form, a mind, or a mental factor, is necessarily a non-associated compositional factor.  

Using the faulty entailment outlined above, Gung-tang arrives at the absurd conclusion that a horse and an ox are not different substantial entities. For, according to the reverse entailment, whatever are non-associated compositional factors are necessarily not different substantial entities.

On the face of it, it might seem acceptable for horse and ox not to be different substantial entities, since they are not substantially existent in the first place. However, this is not acceptable and the reason why is an outcome of the quintessential point that any functioning
thing is a substantial entity (dravya), whereas not all functioning things are substantially existent (dravyasat) in the sense of being self-sufficiently apprehensible (see below, p.677). None of the non-associated compositional factors are substantially existent in this way. Thus, once horse and ox are functioning things—even if they are imputedly existent functioning things—they are substantial entities. Once this is the case, if they were not different substantial entities it would absurdly follow that they would not be different. It would absurdly follow that whenever a horse was present, an ox would necessarily be present.

Hence, taking [non-difference] as substantially established non-difference—as I did before—is the unblemished thought of the text.

If however, one accepts the above [consequence, that a latency in the continuum of a common being is a mind-basis-of-all] it would then absurdly follow that this common being would have different continua because there would exist two bases-of-all in his continuum. This is so because the fruitional and seed factors would individually be bases of all. You have accepted this reason;
it entails that there would exist two basis-of-all in the continuum of a common being because Đzong-ka-Ba's Root Text says:\textsuperscript{26}

They are not separate [substantial entities]

because [then]

There would be\textsuperscript{27} two bases-of-all in a single support.\textsuperscript{28}

SECOND REFUTATION (37a.4)

Statement of Opinion About That. Even according to you one being would have many continua because there exist seven collections of consciousness in that being's continuum as well as many minds and mental factors.

Response. [It is true that there exist seven collections of consciousness as well as many minds and mental factors in a common being's continuum, however] this does not entail [that a being would have many continua] for two reasons. First, since the seven collections of consciousness must operate in dependence on the basis-of-all and the mental factors must operate in dependence on minds, these [many continua] are not self-sufficient continua. Secondly, if there were two bases-of-all, there would be
a plurality of continua because [each] would have to be a
stable and autonomous consciousness which has no need to
rely on the other.

THIRD REFUTATION (37a.6)

Statement of Opinion. It follows that your speaking of
substantially established unity and difference is a twisted
interpretation because except for saying "neither the same
nor different substantial entities," there occurs not a bit
of [talk about] substantial establishment anywhere in Ðzong-
ka-âa's Root Text or Difficult Topics.

Response. It follows that this is very incorrect because
Ðzong-ka-âa cites quite a few passages in the Difficult
Topics [which speak of substantially existent unity or
difference]. He cites Asânga's Compendium of the Mahâyâna
where it says, "[The mind-basis-of-all] is neither substan-
tially different from those [latencies] which dwell in it
nor is it not different." 29

To be substantially different means to have a
substantially existent difference.

Passages are cited from both the Explanation of the Secret
Meaning and Asvabhâva's Connected Explanation in which
[the words] "also not substantially different" occur. 30

Further, Ðzong-ka-âa quotes from Vasubandhu's Commentary
on (Asaṅga's) "Compendium of the Mahāyāna", "The seeds are imputed existents; they are not substantially existent."

It is clear that Gung-tang is making a reference to Vasubandhu's commentary on the *Compendium of the Mahāyāna*. His words are "a scriptural passage from Vasubandhu's commentary" in the context of a string of citations all of which are of the *Compendium of the Mahāyāna* and its commentaries as quoted in Dzong-ka-śa's *Difficult Topics*.

Gung-tang seems to have either misread Dzong-ka-śa or to have been a victim of scribal error. For, Dzong-ka-śa's text says:

Moreover, in his *Explanation of (Vasubandhu's) Commentary* (*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*) on the second chapter of [Vasubandhu's] *Treasury of Higher Knowledge*, [Yashomitra] interprets the master Vasubandhu's own system as follows: "[The terms] 'seed,' 'potency,' and 'latency' are mutually inclusive. Seeds are imputed existents, not substantial existents."

Hence, the thought of [the two] brother[s] is the same.
By this latter Đzong-ka-∅a means that Vasubandhu's thought—as presented by his commentator Yashomitra—is the same as that of his brother Asaṅga as seen in the Compendium of the Mahāyāna.

Notwithstanding Gung-tang's error of attribution, his case—that Đzong-ka-∅a does explicitly use the term "substantial existence" in this context—is well served by citation of that passage from the Difficult Topics.

There are also passages such as the following in which [Đzong-ka-∅a] says, "[Asvabhāva] asserts that the potencies are imputedly existent and that which possesses the potencies is substantially existent." 33

Further, it is quite clear that Đzong-ka-∅a refutes that the former [i.e., the latencies] are substantially established because his Root Text says, explaining in condensed form the meaning of the proofs [that the basis-of-all and latencies are neither one nor different], "For, they merely abide as imputed existents." 34

[That Đzong-ka-∅a is denying substantially existent unity or difference of the basis-of-all and the latencies] may additionally be known through [his] proofs by example and scriptural citation. His Difficult Topics says that [the mode of proving this] accords with a mode of proof in Śa-gya Pandita's Treasury of Valid Reasonings, a
reasoning which refutes substantially established relationship. Đzong-ka-ba says: 35

There is a likeness between [the reasoning concerning whether the basis-of-all and the latencies with it are the same or different substantial entities] and the following reasoning which is discussed by the Lord of Doctrine [Sa-ge Pandita]: 36

If that thing which is the opposite of non-tree Were a pine, then the others would not be trees; If the others were trees, the pine would not be [a tree] 38

Because its nature would not be other.

Is that functioning thing which is the opposite of not being tree the same substantial entity as a pine or a different one? If it were the first [i.e., the same], then the instances of trees which are other than pines would not be trees. If it were the second [i.e., different], then a pine would not be a tree because of not being opposite from non-tree. If one asserted that [something] other than pine were the same substantial entity as tree, then the pine would not be a tree because the substantial entities [of something other than pine and tree] would abide mixed with each other.
That this reasoning refutes substantially established relationship follows because, first, Sa-gya Pandita's Commentary on the Treasury of Valid Reasonings says, as a transition to that [previously quoted stanza]:

The fourth [topic], an examination of whether exclusions are established as functioning things or not and an elimination of errors concerning this is as follows. . . Those asserting that isolates and generalities are functioning things are asserting from the depths of their hearts just what Dharmakīrti refutes.

Further, Dharmakīrti's Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compendium of Prime Cognition" says:

That [appearance as opposite from non-tree]
As imputed by that [thought conceiving a tree-generality]
Does not exist as an ultimate object
[Because of being neither one substantial entity nor different
From the specifically characterized instances].
[It is not one substantial entity with its instances
Because] the instances, [different substantial entities,]
Are not concomitant [with each other].
[It is not a different substantial entity from its instances
Because a generality which is] a separate [substantial entity]
Concomitant [with those instances] does not
Appear [to an unmistaken mind].\(^{39}\)

With regards to the relationship in which the two, tree and pine, are established as generality and instance, [Dharmakīrti] adduces such absurd consequences as the following. If there exists [a relationship of being] a single substantial entity, there would have to be a mixture in all respects and hence whatever was necessarily a tree would also be necessarily a pine. The two--pine and cedar--would then be mixed with each other. Alternatively, just as there exist instances which are separate substantial entities, there would have to exist tree-generalities which were also separate substantial entities. However, there exist no such different substantial entities which appear to an unmistaken mind. If there did, the simple tree would not be a generality of anything, and it would therefore follow that the pine would not be a tree.

Dharmakīrti's mode of adducing these absurdities and that in Ša-ṇya Pāṇḍita's Treasury of Valid Reasonings are in accordance. That this is so follows for two reasons:
(1) The meaning of the [above quoted] passage from Đzong-ka-ṇa's Difficult Topics is that the faults presented [by Ša-ṇya Pāṇḍita] with respect to a substantially
established relationship of generality and instance also pertain to a substantially established relationship of dependence. This reason has already been proven.

(2) This [that the faults pertaining to a substantially established relationship of generality and instance also apply to a substantially established relationship of dependence] is the exalted thought of Dharmakīrti.

This second reason is established because Dharmakīrti teaches in his *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compendium of Prime Cognition"* that [the relationship of dependence] is similar to the case of the factor of the relationship of action and agent being an imputed existent which must be posited merely in the context of appearances to mistaken, conceptual minds:

Presentations of subject and attribute
And all difference and non-difference
Are [made] without analyzing the meaning of reality
But as they are renowned in the world.
In reliance on just such [appearances to conceptuality]
All posittings of proofs
Of probandum are done by the wise
For the sake of engaging in the ultimate goal.

Śel-den-chö-jay explains this as follows:
The purpose for having made conventional presentations of generalities, common loci, and so forth as they are known to thought, without being established in the mode of abiding of things, is as follows. Presentations of sound, product, impermanence, and so forth in which attribute and subject are differentiated, and presentations of common loci of what are different and of generalities of what are not different are made in dependence on how they are known to worldly thought without analysis concerning whether they are objects which are the mode of abiding of things or the reality of things. The presentation of all proofs and probanda depending in only that way on appearance to thought are made by the wise for the sake of engaging in temporary and ultimate goals.  

[That there is this similarity between the two relationships] follows because the reason for [Dharmakīrti's] saying this is the following. Since imputed existents can be posited by the force of a mistaken thought consciousness, once they are imputed existents, [phenomena] such as generality and instance and support and supported appear as suitable to
be blended but in fact need not be blended. This, however, is not the case for substantial existents.

If substantial existents appear blended they must, in their very nature, be blended. For, they do not appear to thought consciousnesses, which are imaginative; rather, they appear to direct perceivers and thus must exist as they appear.

It must be kept in mind that these arguments are being advanced by Dharmakīrti, the patriarch of the epistemologist Chittamātrins, a school which does not assert a mind-basis-of-all. They are said to define single substantial entity as thing(s) not appearing separately to a direct perceiver. Asaṅga's Chittamātrins define single substantial entity as thing(s) produced by a producer which is a single latency (see below, p.682). 45

A matter which needs to be explored is the extent to which Gung-tang and other Ge-luk-ṣa expositors of Asaṅga's Chittamātra maintain the distinction between the Chittamātra systems of Asaṅga and Dharmakīrti.

For, Gyal-tsap says in his Commentary on (Sa-ṣya Pandita's) "Treasury of Valid Reasonings":
If the appearance as opposite from non-tree were a functioning thing, then the mind to which that appears would be unmistaken. If that were the case, since the object of apprehension of an unmistaken, non-conceptual mind appears devoid of part and whole—-that is, the whole does not appear—-one would then have to assert that the part concomitant with a pine would also be concomitant with a spruce.

[Kay-drup's] Great Commentary on (Dharmakīrti's) "Commentary on (Dignāga's) 'Compendium of Prime Cognition'" says:

That appearance [as opposite from non-tree] does not exist as an ultimate object. If it did exist ultimately, then the awareness of a generality apprehending it would be unmistaken with regard to its appearing object. If that were the case, then—-since the instances of tree appear blended as to their nature to that cognizer of the tree-generality—-the instances of tree would have to be blended in their natures.

[That same text says]:

If an appearance of a tree to a mind apprehending the tree-generality were a functioning thing, then that conceptual mind [to which there is] an appearance of that would be unmistaken with regard to its appearing
object. If that were the case, then the appearance itself would be a tree because (1) of being an appearance of a tree to that [mind], and (2) that [mind] is unmistaken with regard to its appearing object.

Hence, there is a great similarity between the manner in which these [passages] adduce the faults of instances being blended with each other or there existing a generality which is a separate substantial entity, on the one hand, and the manner of adducing, on the other hand, the contradictions that the latencies in a basis-of-all would be intermingled or that there would exist a basis-of-all which is a separate substantial entity. For, Đzong-ka-śa's Difficult Topics says:

Therefore, as long as one asserts that a generality not included among [its] instances is established as a substantial entity, one is unable to remove the fault of examining whether they are one substantial entity or different substantial entities.

I have explained this difficult essential nakedly.
FOURTH REFUTATION (39a.2)

Statement of Opinion. Śa-sang Ma-ti Pañ-chen says that [the basis-of-all and the latencies in it] are said to be inexpressible as the same isolate and inexpressible as different substantial entities, taking this to be the meaning of Asvabhāva's Connected Explanation.

Ma-ti Pañ-chen's Commentary on (Asaṅga's) "Compendium of Higher Knowledge" says:

The Superior [Asvabhāva] says that [the mind-basis-of-all and its latencies] are inexpressible as same or different. His Connected Explanation presents this using the example of the Sautrāntika assertion that the mind apprehending an object's aspect and the aspect are neither the same nor different. It is said that, likewise, the latencies of the mind-basis-of-all are not expressible as the same isolate and not expressible as different substantial entities.

For Asvabhāva's assertion on this lack of sameness or difference see above, p.636.

Response. This is incorrect because if that were the case, since the assertions of both Vaibhāshikas and Sautrāntikas are also presented [along with the Chittamātrin position]
in the Explanation of the Secret Meaning, its author would then be asserting both of these. Also, Œzong-ka-ṣa says in the Difficult Topics:

The assertion that [the basis-of-all and the latencies with it] are different isolates within being a single substantial entity is a misappropriation of the doctrinal vocabulary of other major texts and hence does not appear as the vocabulary of [Indian Chittamātrins following Asaṅga]. 53

Asvabhāva said that the mind-basis-of-all and its latencies are not to be conceived to be either the same or different. Œa-sang Ma-ti Pān-chen says that the two are neither the same isolate nor different substantial entities. Œzong-ka-ṣa, reporting this position, restates it as a case of two phenomena which are different isolates within being a single substantial entity. He says, without refuting this position, that it is couched in technical language not used in Asaṅga's Chittamātra.

Gung-tang makes it clear below that a mind-basis-of-all and the latencies with it are different isolates within being a single substantial entity. Thus, he does not refute this
position but merely the appropriateness of the use of such vocabulary to accurately present the thought of Asaṅga and his followers.

FIFTH REFUTATION (39a.4)

Statement of Opinion About That. It follows with respect to the two—the basis-of-all and the latencies which are with it—that they are not a case of different isolates within being a single substantial entity because of this [just quoted] passage\(^{54}\) from Đzong-ka-şā’s Difficult Topics. Response. Đzong-ka-şā’s statement does not entail that the two are not a case of being different isolates within being a single substantial entity because what Đzong-ka-şā is saying is that the meaning in this context of "[A latency is] neither a single/ Nor a different substantial entity [from its support]\(^{55}\) does not refer to that.

It cannot be asserted [that these two—the basis-of-all and the latencies that are with it—are not a case of being different isolates within being a single substantial entity] because they are composed products and are different isolates within being a single entity.

Gung-tang here clarifies the context of Đzong-ka-şā’s statement that using the terminology "different isolates within being a single
substantial entity" is a misappropriation of another field's technical language. He says that łożong-ka-la is specifically speaking of the explanation of his own root text, not denying the correctness of this position in general.

SIXTH REFUTATION (39a.5)

Statement of Opinion. It follows that the subject, these two [the basis-of-all and the latencies which are with it], are not a single substantial entity because of being neither a single nor different substantial entities. This reason in turn follows because [these two] are not substantial existents.

A mind-basis-of-all and its latencies are a single substantial entity. The fault in this opinion lies in the entailment: "not being substantial existents necessarily entails being neither a single substantial entity nor different substantial entities." As Gung-tang will show, the word "substantial" is used with different meanings in the terms "substantial entity" and "substantial existent."
It is the case that not being substantial existents necessarily entails being neither a single nor different substantial entities because (1) being either single or different necessarily entails existence, and (2) when a general entailment is established the particular entailment also must be established.

This reason is correct: the general entailment--being either the same or different entails existence--is the case. Concomitant with this is the reverse entailment, "not existing entails being neither the same nor different."

However, the entailment, "not being substantially existent entails being neither the same nor different substantial entities," is not a particular of that general reverse entailment. As Gung-tang will demonstrate, the correct particularization is "not being substantially existent necessarily entails being neither the same nor different substantial existents."
Alternatively, one could say, "not being substantial entities necessarily entails being neither the same nor different substantial entities."
Response. It follows that this is not correct because the substantial in "substantial existent" and the substantial in "single or different substantial entity" are dissimilar. This reason follows because the former [i.e., the substantial in "substantial existent"] refers to substantial in the sense of being self-sufficiently apprehensible and the latter [i.e., the substantial in "single or different substantial entity"] refers to substantial in the sense of being able to perform a function.

Thus, there are three possible permutations (koti) of the categories (a) substantial entity (dravya) and (b) substantially existent (dravyasat) in the sense of being self-sufficiently apprehensible:

(1) there exist phenomena which are both, for instance, a mind-basis-of-all, or an eye consciousness, or a tree;

(2) there exist phenomena which are substantial entities but are not substantially existent in this sense, for instance, a latency or an imputed person;

(3) there exist phenomena which are neither, for instance, the non-product space.

There are no instances of phenomena which are substantially existent in this sense but are not substantial entities; for, being substantially
existent in the sense of being self-sufficiently apprehensible necessarily entails being a substantial entity (i.e., being impermanent). 56

In general, there are four ways to use the term "substantial existent." Jang-geya outlines them in the context of presenting Chittamātra tenets:

In general, the designations "substantial" and "imputed" occur frequently in the great texts. Calling just what exists in general a substantial existent is like the statement, "Whatever it is, if it exists, everything is just substantially existent." Imputed existents which are the opposite of this are, for example, the two selves [the self of persons and the self of phenomena]. Although they are conceived by imagination to exist, they are not existents.

Substantial existents in the sense of being able to perform a function are functioning things [i.e., impermanent phenomena]. The imputed existents which are the opposite of this are generally characterized [i.e., permanent] phenomena.
Substantial existents in the sense of being enduring and unchanging are the non-product space, analytic cessations, and non-analytic cessations. The imputed existents which are the opposite of this are impermanent phenomena.

Substantial existents in the sense of being self-sufficient are the forms which are the apprehended objects of sense consciousnesses and consciousnesses which can stand by themselves. [Jam-ŋang-shay-ŋa and Gung-tang call these substantial existents in the sense of being self-sufficiently apprehensible.] The imputed existents which are the opposite of this are non-associated compositional factors and imaginary phenomena.\(^{57}\)

Jam-ŋang-shay-ŋa holds that "the substantial existence in the sense of being self-sufficient [mentioned] here and the substantial existence in the sense of being self-sufficient [which is the object of negation] in the context of the selflessness of persons are not synonyms."\(^{58}\) The latter is a case of "a self-sufficient [person] which, like a lord, without relying
on the aggregates which are its vassals, dominates [or controls] them." Jang-γya refutes this Go-mang assertion that whereas there are functioning things which are substantially existent in the sense of being self-sufficiently apprehensible, there are no phenomena anywhere which are substantially existent in the sense of being self-sufficient.

Gung-tang quotes Jang-γya's refutation later, in conjunction with a lengthy examination of the unacceptable consequences that would arise if one could not distinguish two forms of self-sufficiency as Jam-γyang-shay-βa does, and concludes that Jang-γya was not revealing his own opinion but merely reporting someone else's views.

According to the author of the Collected Topics used at Go-mang College, the definition of a substantial existent in the sense of being self-sufficiently apprehensible is "a phenomenon whose ascertainment by prime cognition need not rely on ascertainment by prime cognition of another phenomenon which is not its own entity."

The first reason is established [i.e., it is established that the substantial in "substantial existent" refers to substantial entity in the sense of being self-sufficiently
apprehensible] because Asaṅga's *Compendium of Ascertainties* says:

That, the specific character of which is designated without relying on something else and without depending on something else, should be viewed, in brief, as being substantially existent.

The second reason is established [i.e., it is established that the substantial in "single or different substantial entity" refers to substantial entity in the sense of being able to perform a function] because although Bhāvaviveka's *Blaze of Reasoning* says there are many uses of the term "substantial entity," here it refers to a specific sort of causality. The *Blaze of Reasoning* says, "The character of substantial entity, in general, is possession of activity, [possession of qualities], and being the cause of inherence. . .".

According to Āśīla-den-chō-jay, Bhāvaviveka is defining the Vaisheshika concept of substantial entity (*dravya*) as a phenomenon having three characteristics.

It follows [that here "substantial entity" refers to a specific sort of causality] because the two, a form and the prime cognizer apprehending that form, are explained
to be a single substantial entity due to being produced by a single latency.

This is evidence for the assertion that Asaṅga's Chittamātrins are ontologists as contrasted with Dharmakīrti's epistemologists. The epistemologists define single substantial entity as what does not appear separately to a direct perceiver. In Asaṅga's system, being a single substantial entity is determined by its cause.

Moreover, it absurdly follows that according to you these two [a form and the prime cognizer apprehending that form] are not a single substantial entity because of being imputedly existent. This is so because they are a non-associated compositional factor.

The subject of this consequence, which is not explicitly stated by Gung-tang, is problematic. It may reasonably be taken as either (1) the immediately preceding subject, a form and the prime cognizer apprehending that form, or (2) the main subject of this refutation, a mind-basis-of-all and the latencies with it.

However, whichever of the two it is, the thrust of this consequence is the same. Form and the prime cognizer apprehending it—taken together as an entity—are neither a form nor
a consciousness; since they are impermanent, they must be a non-associated compositional factor. The same applies to a mind-basis-of-all and its latencies. 65

Once the opponent has advanced the opinion (see p.675) that whatever are not substantial existents are necessarily neither a single nor different substantial entities, then any two non-associated compositional factors are necessarily not a single substantial entity nor different substantial entities. For, non-associated compositional factors are not substantially existent.

If you accept [that these two are not one substantial entity], then it absurdly follows that whatever are definitely observed together are necessarily not a single substantial entity because [according to you] even the two--blue and an eye consciousness apprehending that blue--are not a single substantial entity. You have accepted this reason.

This is unacceptable because being definitely observed together is the main reason for generating the prime cognition of non-existence of subject and object as different substantial entities according to the Chittamātra school
of Dharmakīrti. Thus, it is the main reasoning that Chittamātrins Following Reasoning use in developing yogic direct perception of the selflessness of phenomena.66

If you accept the consequence [that whatever are definitely observed together are necessarily not one substantial entity] then it follows that it would be correct to say that blue and the cognition of it are not a single [substantial entity], opposing Dharmakīrti's Ascertainment of Prime Cognition where it says, "Because [their] observation together is definite/ Blue and the cognition of it are not different."

It is said in [Kay-drup's] Great Commentary on (Dharmakīrti's) "Commentary on (Dignāga's) 'Compendium of Prime Cognition'" and in the precious Īaṅg-śga's Presentation of Tenets that the two [blue and the mind apprehending it] being a single substantial entity is presented as the probandum of this logical sign.67 Jam-īaṅg-shay-śa's thought accords [with Kay-drup and Īaṅg-śga] in terms of regarding the necessity of realizing [the two] as a single substantial entity in dependence on that logical mark. Nonetheless, he does say in his textbook on the fifth chapter of Maitreya's Ornament for the Realizations that it would not be suitable to set up an identification68 of [the probandum being that the two, blue and the
mind apprehending it, are a single substantial entity] because the forward pervasion would not be established.

In regards to the present examination of the unity or difference of the latencies and the basis-of-all, the Secret Meaning says that [if the latencies and the mind-basis-of-all were a single substantial entity] the latencies would be undefiled and neutral. The Venerable Ren-da-wa rejects this, noting its contradiction with Asaṅga's Compendium of the Mahāyāna, and his point is very good.

The Secret Meaning says:

If, then, the seeds were not different from the mind-basis-of-all, since the mind-basis-of-all is undefiled and neutral, the seeds would be undefiled and neutral as well. Hence, there would arise only undefiled and neutral phenomena. It is not logical that virtuous and non-virtuous phenomena arise from something undefiled and neutral.69

Gung-tang has already refuted this position (see above, pp. 596-639).

Although there are many such assertions of scholars which ought to be examined, I will not elaborate on them, fearing it would run to too many words.
Chapter Twenty-One
External Seeds and Internal Seeds

FIRST REFUTATION (40a.3)

Statement of Opinion. It follows that the mind-basis-of-all is not that having all the seeds because there exist external seeds which are not located in it.

The mind-basis-of-all is that which has all the seeds because of being the support for all internal and external seeds (see above, p.398).

Response. [Although it is true that there exist external seeds not located in a basis-of-all] this does not necessarily entail that the basis-of-all is not that having all the seeds. For, even external seeds must arise in dependence on the seeds which are with the basis-of-all.

External seeds--the seeds of rice, barley, and so forth--are only conventional seeds, whereas the internal seeds--the latencies with the basis-of-all--are ultimate seeds (see above, p.385).
SECOND REFUTATION (40a.4)

Statement of Opinion About That. It follows that the arising and disintegration of the external world of the environment is not dependent on a basis-of-all because although a person has died and transmigrated [to a new lifetime], the environment created by the force of his actions does not disintegrate.\(^1\) This reason in turn follows because it is established by direct perception that, when a human dies, things such as the house created by the force of his actions need not disintegrate.

Response. [Although it is true that the environment created by the force of a person's actions need not disintegrate upon his death] this does not entail that the arising and disintegration of the external world of the environment is not dependent on a basis-of-all. For, the reason for calling the latencies which create an environment "latencies for [the arising of] the unfeeling" and "latencies [creating] what is shared" is that [an environment] must be created by the general concordant actions of many persons. Hence, when individuals die and transmigrate [to new lifetimes], although the part which is their object of use ceases, the mere generality of the basic environment need not cease.
Gung-tang is not asserting a collective mind-basis-of-all, shared by all beings who together inhabit or perceive an environment. Nor are general concordant actions necessarily actions done together by many beings at some point in the past, actions of which the effects are then experienced communally.

Each individual inhabiting and perceiving an environment contributes to the creation of that environment. The mere generality (Tibetan: spyi 1dog—"generality-isolate") of that environment is something imputed by thought; it is an abstraction which is not directly perceived but which exists as long as there is someone experiencing that environment.

This reason in turn follows because with the exception of, for instance,² the environment of the Fourth Concentration, in the other [levels of cyclic existence] when the potency of the actions of all who have general concordant actions are finished, the environment also ceases and the aeon disintegrates. As for the environment of the Fourth Concentration [such environments] are created through those actions of individuals [which create] what is unshared. Therefore, as Vasubandhu's Treasury of Higher Knowledge says, these are cases of [environments
and beings] ceasing together: "Because [the environment] arises and ceases along with the sentient beings."\(^3\)

It follows [that except for the unshared environments such as the Fourth Concentration, environments cease when the potencies of all who have general concordant actions are finished] because of being like, for instance,\(^4\) the light given off by a hundred lamps. Although when the lamps are lit together the light of each is not separably demonstrable, at the end of their gradual cessation [their] brilliance completely goes away. This similarity follows because if a latency creating the environment of [this world] Jambudvīpa did not exist even with [a specific person such as] Devadatta's basis-of-all, he would be unable to use that [environment]. For, Ďzung-ka-Ĕa's Stages of the Path says:

Those who enjoy the effects [of actions] need not have accumulated all their causes, but they do need to have accumulated one part.
THIRD REFUTATION (40b.4)

Statement of Opinion. There is a reason for setting forth external seeds because such a presentation is for the sake of understanding that internal seeds arise in the manner of external seeds, external seeds being taken as an example of the arising of whatever is planted without intermingling.

There is no intermingling of effects among, say, barley, corn, and wheat seeds; a barley seed will produce a barley shoot and, later, grains of barley, but it will never produce corn or wheat.

Response. It follows that this is not the only reason [for setting forth external seeds] because [external seeds] are presented by way of a comparison with the presentation of internal seeds and whereas there are some cases of the arising [of plants] without planting external seeds of similar type, such is not possible with regards to internal seeds. Hence, internal seeds are said to predominate over external seeds and not to be subject to intermingling. This in turn follows because Asvabhāva's Connected Explanation says that there exist 3 three cases—sesame, lotus root, and Dūrba grass—which, without themselves being planted, arise, respectively, from charcoal, the excrement of oxen, and sheep's wool.
Asvabhāva says:

External seeds are thought of as seeds whether planted or not. For example, charcoal, the excrement of oxen, and sheep's wool are, respectively, [thought of as seeds of] sesame, lotus root, and Dūrba grass. The sesame and so on are not planted in charcoal and so forth, yet [they] arise from them.  

FOURTH REFUTATION (41a.1)

Statement of Opinion. It follows that among seeds there does not exist a single internal seed because among the seeds which create wild rice there does not exist a single internal seed. This reason in turn follows because among the seeds of wild rice there does not exist a single internal seed.

Response. [Although it is true that among the seeds of wild rice there does not exist a single internal seed] this does not entail that among the seeds which create wild rice there does not exist a single internal seed. For, worldly conventions are predominant.
The usual use of the language dictates that seeds of wild rice refer to external seeds but that seeds creating (Tibetan: 'grub byed) wild rice include also those internal seeds or latencies which create wild rice.

FIFTH REFUTATION (41a.2)

Statement of Opinion. It follows that in order to realize that a sprout has arisen\(^7\) from a seed it is necessary to realize the basis-of-all because among the seeds which produce that sprout there is a seed with the basis-of-all.

"Realize" translates the Tibetan rtoqs pa (Sanskrit: adhigama). It means to cognize an object incontrovertibly, to know the object in such a way as to eliminate superimpositions about that object.\(^8\) Such cognition need not be direct perception; inferential cognition is conceptual and thus not direct, yet realizes its object.\(^9\)

Response. [Although it is true that among the seeds which produce a sprout there is a seed with the basis-of-all] this does not entail that in order to realize that a sprout has arisen from a seed it is necessary to realize the basis-of-all.
Many people who do not know of a mind-basis-of-all are able to realize the arising of a sprout.  

For, when one realizes the production of a sprout, one need not realize all the actions and afflictions which are its causes.

SIXTH REFUTATION (41a.3)

Statement of Opinion About That. Well then, it follows that when one realizes that something is produced from a seed with the basis-of-all, one must realize that basis-of-all because [according to you your] proposition is correct.

The stater of opinion is adding what he hopes is an absurd consequence following from a proposition already asserted by Gung-tang. In fact, Gung-tang accepts this and does not admit it to be an absurdity.

The proposition in question is far from clear. Each of my teachers identified a different proposition as the reason for this consequence. In a general sense, Gung-tang has asserted that the basis-of-all is the basis of all cyclic existence and nirvāṇa.
and that all things arise due to maturation of latencies with the basis-of-all. This might be taken to be the proposition in question.

Alternatively, the immediately preceding discussion concerning the realization of a sprout arising from a seed suggests that the realization of the arising of something from a seed with the basis-of-all entails realization of the basis-of-all. For, in this way, the seed is qualified as being a latency with the basis-of-all.

If one accepts [that when realizing something as produced from a seed with the basis-of-all one must realize that basis-of-all], then it follows because of this that when one realizes the eleventh link of dependent arising--birth--as arising from a projecting action's latency which is with the basis-of-all, one must realize a basis-of-all.

The twelve links (āṅga) of dependent arising (pratītyasamutpāda) are:¹²

(1) ignorance,
(2) conditioning action,
(3) consciousness,
(4) name and form,
(5) six sources
(6) contact,
(7) feeling,
(8) attachment,
(9) grasping,
(10) existence,
(11) birth,
(12) aging and death.

Each earlier link gives rise to the link immediately succeeding it.

If this is accepted, it follows that when one realizes that [eleventh link] as arising from the tenth link of dependent arising--existence--one necessarily realizes the basis-of-all because the tenth link of dependent arising--existence--is a latency with the basis-of-all.

Response. [Although it is true that the tenth link of dependent arising--existence--is a latency with the basis-of-all] this does not entail that when one realizes that the eleventh link arises from it, one necessarily realizes the basis-of-all.

This lack of entailment may be clearly seen in the following example. Although one may cut chili peppers on a cutting board, one does not say that one is cutting objects, in spite of the fact that chili peppers are objects of
perception.13 If one then makes a soup of the chilis, one is not then making object soup.

That the tenth link of dependent arising—existence—is a latency with the basis-of-all follows because Vasubandhu's Commentary on the "Sūtra on Dependent Arising" says, "A state of latency receives the name 'existence.'"

One cannot accept the consequence that when the eleventh link of dependent arising—birth—is realized to arise from the tenth—existence—the basis-of-all is necessarily realized because (1) there exist Hīnayānists of definite lineage who realize that [birth arises from existence], (2) there also exist proponents of Hīnayāna tenets who do so, and (3) there exist no [Hīnayānists of definite lineage or proponents of Hīnayāna tenets] who realize a basis-of-all.

Hīnayānists of definite lineage are Buddhists who are on Hearer or Solitary Realizer paths and who never switch to Mahāyāna paths. Proponents of Hīnayāna tenets are mentioned separately because not all such need be on Hīnayāna paths.

The first part of this reason is established [i.e., it is established that there exist Hīnayānists of definite lineage who realize that birth arises from existence] because whoever is a Hīnayāna Superior has
necessarily directly realized the twelve links [of dependent arising]. This reason in turn follows because Asaṅga's *Levels of Yogic Practice*\(^{14}\) says, "How many links of dependent arising have Stream Enterers abandoned? A portion of all [of them]." This necessarily entails that whoever is a Hīnayāna Superior has necessarily directly cognized the twelve links because (1) [a Stream Enter, the lowest of the Hīnayāna Superiors,] has eliminated the twelve links of bad migrations, and because (2) without realizing the twelve links there is no way of abandoning cyclic existences included within those twelve links.

The second part of this reason is established [i.e., it is established that there exist proponents of Hīnayāna tenets who realize that birth arises from existence] because there are Bodhisattvas who are Vaibhāshikas.

The two main Hīnayāna schools of tenets are Vaibhāshika and Sautrāntika. Although a common locus of being a Vaibhāshika (a Hīnayānist by tenet) and being a Bodhisattva (a Mahāyānist by path) is certainly logically possible,\(^{15}\) no historical examples come to mind within the context of the Tibetan Buddhist assertion that Buddhas are Mahāyānist by tenet and path. According to Vaibhāshikas, of course, Buddha Shakyamuni was a Vaibhāshika Bodhisattva.
during his tenure of amassing the collections of merit and wisdom prior to his enlightenment. For them, Vaibhāshika tenets are the ultimate philosophical system and are an expression of Buddha's own thought.

That there are Bodhisattvas who are Vaibhāshikas necessarily entails that there exist proponents of Hīnayāna tenets who realize that birth arises from existence] because those [Bodhisattvas who are Vaibhāshikas] cognize the twelve links in both forward and reverse progressions. This reason in turn follows because they realize the two—true sufferings and true sources. For [they] have generated non-artificial awarenesses desiring definitely to emerge from cyclic existence and desiring to attain liberation. Those who have generated these awarenesses have necessarily realized true sufferings and true sources, for Asanga's Actuality of the Levels (Bhumivastu) says, "From the viewpoint of teaching the way of the truths, birth and aging-and-death are classified under true sufferings." Further, Ḍzong-ka-ba's song [the Condensed Stages of the Path] says:

If one does not work at contemplating the dangers of true sufferings,
The seeking of liberation will not properly arise;
likewise, without contemplating
[True] sources--the stages of entering into cyclic existence--
One will not understand how to sever the root of cyclic existence.

The third part of the reason is established [i.e., it is established that there are neither Hinayānists of definite lineage nor proponents of Hinayāna tenets who realize a basis-of-all] because the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought teaches [that the mind-basis-of-all is] "The appropriating consciousness, profound and subtle."¹⁶ This necessarily entails that there are neither Hinayānists of definite lineage nor proponents of Hinayāna tenets who realize a basis-of-all because [this passage] is taken to mean that ordinary worldlings cannot realize the profound and that Hearers and Solitary Realizers are unable to realize the subtle.

Concerning this line from the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought, Asvabhāva says, "[The mind-basis-of-all is] subtle because it is difficult for the mind of a worldly scholar to fathom it. [It is] profound because it is difficult even for Hearers [i.e., Hinayānists] to understand."¹⁷ From the use Gung-tang makes of this statement, it can be seen that he takes the term "difficult" in this passage to mean impossible.
For, Asvabhāva's *Connected Explanation* says:

[The mind-basis-of-all is] subtle because it is difficult for even Hearers to understand. Therefore, [Buddha] did not set forth [a mind-basis-of-all] to Hearers because they are not fit for understanding all subtle phenomena.¹⁸

Moreover, it follows that this is so because whereas (1) liberation can be attained without realizing the basis-of-all, (2) it is not possible to attain omniscience without realizing the basis-of-all.

Liberation from cyclic existence is the goal of Hīnayāṇa paths. Omniscience is attained only by Buddhas and is the goal of the Mahāyāṇa path.

The first reason is established [i.e., liberation can be attained without realizing the basis-of-all] because Asaṅga's *Compendium of the Mahāyāna* says, "Even without [its] being taught, they are established in understanding."¹⁹

With regards to this, Asvabhāva's *Connected Explanation* says:

The passage beginning "Even without [its] being taught" means that even though [Buddha] did not teach a mind-basis-of-all to Hearers, they analyze coarse objects of knowledge, such as forms, as having the nature of
suffering and source, in the aspects of impermanence and so forth [whereby] they abandon the afflictions.  

The second reason is established [i.e., that it is not possible to attain omniscience without cognizing the basis-of-all] because the Compendium of the Mahāyāna says, "Without knowing that [mind-basis-of-all], obtaining the exalted wisdom of omniscience is not easy."  

"Not easy" must be taken to mean impossible. Omniscience is attained through destroying the obstructions to omniscience which, in this system, are conceptions of a difference of entity of subject and object, that is, conceptions of a self of phenomena. The means for this is the direct realization that all phenomena are the nature of the mind, i.e., that all phenomena arise through the maturation of latencies which are with the mind-basis-of-all. Thus, realization of emptiness in this system entails realization of the basis-of-all. Without such a realization the attainment of Buddhahood and omniscience is impossible.
SEVENTH REFUTATION (42a.4)

Statement of Opinion. It follows that the subject, a Stream Enterer definite in his lineage, realizes the third link of dependent arising—consciousness—because he realizes the twelve links. If one accepts that he realizes the third link—consciousness—then it follows that he realizes the basis-of-all because that [third link] is the basis-of-all.

Response. [Although it is true that the third link of dependent arising—consciousness—is the basis-of-all] this does not entail that a Stream Enterer definite in his lineage realizes the basis-of-all.

Realizing the basis-of-all means realizing its nature, subjective aspect, and the like.²³ [In accordance with your reasoning] it [absurdly] follows that [a Stream Enterer definite in his lineage]²⁴ realizes a pot which does not exist as an external object because (1) he has realized a pot, and (2) a pot is that [i.e., a pot which does not exist as an external object]. The entailments are parallel.

The modes of argument here and in the statement of opinion are parallel.
EIGHTH REFUTATION (42a.6)

Statement of Opinion About That. It follows that these [two cases] are not similar because although that pot is a pot which does not exist as an external object, it is suitable to posit that at the time of realizing the pot one realizes merely a general pot which need not be qualified [for one's mind] as [not existing as an external object].

Response. The crows ought not to eat the reply that although the third [link of dependent arising]--consciousness--is the basis-of-all it is suitable to posit that at the time of realizing it one realizes merely a general consciousness which need not be qualified [for one's mind] as being the basis of all environments and beings.

The crows ought not to eat the reply means that it ought to be acceptable to say this. Given that one can realize a pot without realizing its true nature, one can realize the third link of dependent arising--the consciousness given latent potency by an action--without realizing it to be a mind-basis-of-all.
PART FIVE

CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF POSITIONS

ON THE PROOFS FOR THE BASIS-OF-ALL
Chapter Twenty-Two
On Proving the Existence of a Basis-of-all Through Scripture

FIRST REFUTATION (42b.1)

Statement of Opinion. It follows that it is not correct that the basis-of-all is established for members of Hearer schools [i.e., Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas] through the citation of scripture because the mind-basis-of-all is not explicitly taught in scriptures known to the Hīnayāna.

According to Gung-tang's own system (see above pp.395-404 and 421-424), the mind-basis-of-all is established by scriptures from the Mahāyāna canon and the Hīnayāna canon, and by scriptures common to both. Moreover it is, according to Gung-tang, explicitly taught in scriptures known to the Hīnayāna (see above pp. 404ff.).

This reason in turn follows because there does not exist an explicit teaching of a basis-of-all in Hīnayāna scriptures.

Response. [Although it is true that there exists no explicit teaching of a basis-of-all in Hīnayāna scriptures] this does not necessarily entail that there do not exist scriptures known to the Hīnayāna which explicitly teach
a basis-of-all. For, there is a reason for saying
"known [to the Hīnayāna]."

A distinction is made here between "Hīnayāna
scripture" and "scripture known (Tibetan: graṣ
pa) to the Hīnayāna." A Hīnayāna scripture will
be characterized below as one which instructs
those of Hearer lineage, its own intended
disciples.

A text "known to the Hīnayāna" such as this
passage from the Increasing By One Scripture,
is a passage unacceptable to Hīnayānists which,
nonetheless, is located in an otherwise Hīnayāna
śūtra.¹ Thus, the passage is only known to
the Hīnayāna and is not of the Hīnayāna.

This follows because the passage in the Increasing
By One Scripture (Ekottarikagama) beginning "All beings
delight in the basis-of-all"² is not a Hīnayāna scriptural
passage. If it is said that this reason is not established,
then it [absurdly] follows that the subject, [that passage
in the Increasing By One Scripture], is a śūtra passage
which instructs those having the lineage of Hearer schools,
its own intended disciples, because of being a Hīnayāna
śūtra. This, however, cannot be accepted, for there are
no members of Hearer schools who are its intended disciples.
This reason follows because there are no members of Hearer
schools who are objects of the explicit teaching of a basis-of-all.

This passage, "All beings delight in a basis-of-all...", is held by Chittamātrins to teach a mind-basis-of-all explicitly.

This reason in turn follows because there are no members of Hearer schools who are objects of the explicit teaching of the subtle selflessness of phenomena.

Vaibhāshikas and Sautrāntikas accept the existence of external objects; they hold that a cognizing subject and its cognized object are different substantial entities, the latter a cause of the former. Thus, there are no Hearer tenet holders who are objects of the explicit teaching of nonduality of subject and object. Given this, it necessarily follows that there are no Hearer tenet holders who are objects of the explicit teaching of a basis-of-all. For, if there were a Hearer tenet holder who was an object of the explicit teaching of a basis-of-all, he would be an object of the explicit teaching of nonduality. If that were the case, there would be a member of a Hearer school who denied external objects.
Asserting the existence of a basis-of-all necessitates denying external objects because the reason for asserting a basis-of-all is to explain the way in which subjects and their objects arise in dependence on the maturation of a latency (see above, p. 235-237).

[The opponent] might say that [although it is true that there are no members of Hearer schools who are objects of the explicit teaching of the subtle selflessness of phenomena], this does not entail that there are no members of Hearer schools who are the objects of the explicit teaching of a basis-of-all. It then follows [for the opponent] that there are no members of Hearer schools who are the objects of the explicit teaching of the subtle selflessness of phenomena because of [his assertion that there is] no entailment.

Gung-tang's line of argument here is a subtle one. Should the opponent in this debate say "No entailment" (as has been spelt out in the above paragraph), he must perforce assent to the reason of the consequence to which he denies entailment. For, to say "no entailment" means to accept the presence of the reason in the subject but to deny that the predicate of the probandum follows from that reason.
Thus, Gung-tang flings at him the consequence that there are no Hearer sectarians who are objects of the explicit teaching of the subtle selflessness of phenomena. This consequence is acceptable to Gung-tang himself and, on the face of it, acceptable to the opponent. Gung-tang will now demonstrate how, in fact, the opponent cannot accept this consequence and remain consistent with his other assertions.

[He] cannot accept, however, [that there are no members of Hearer schools who are objects of the explicit teaching of the subtle selflessness of phenomena] because, according to him, the intended disciples of the following passage from the Sūtra on Transmigration are [members of Hearer schools] who are objects of the explicit teaching of emptiness. The sūtra says:

Whatsoever phenomena may be
Expressed by whatsoever names,
Those [names] do not exist in them;
This is the nature of phenomena.³

Ḏzong-ka-Bṣa cites this passage in the Essence of the Good Explanations in the context of discussing the non-existence of phenomena being naturally established as bases for conceptual or
terminological determination. This non-existence is another aspect of the subtle selflessness of phenomena in the system of Chittamātrins Following Scripture. Concerning this passage, Dôn-drub-gyel-tsen says:

The selflessness of phenomena is not explicitly taught in the Sūtra on Transmigration; for, [whereas] the two proponents of external objects [i.e., Vaibāshikas and Sautrāntikas] assert that it does not teach selflessness of phenomena, Chittamātrins assert that it does. Yogācharins and Svātantrikas hold that the subtle selflessness of phenomena is not taught in the Hīnayāna scriptural collections.

It [absurdly] follows [that the intended disciples of this passage are Hearer sectarians who are the objects of the explicit teaching of emptiness] because this is a Hīnayāna scriptural passage which explicitly teaches emptiness. This reason follows because of being words in a Hīnayāna sūtra which explicitly indicate [emptiness] and because of being a scriptural passage which is known to the Hīnayānists themselves.
This passage from the Sūtra on Transmigration is not a Hīnayāna text but only one known to Hīnayānists.6

[The opponent] has accepted the entailment [that whatever are words in a Hīnayāna sūtra which explicitly indicate emptiness and are a scriptural passage known to the Hīnayānists themselves are necessarily a Hīnayāna scriptural passage which explicitly indicates emptiness].

However, [he] cannot accept the consequence [that the passage from the Sūtra on Transmigration is a Hīnayāna scriptural passage which explicitly indicates emptiness] because no one except the Prāsaṅgikas asserts that the selflessness of phenomena is explicitly taught in Hīnayāna scriptures. For, Chandrakīrti's Commentary on the "Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way'" says:

There is one who thinks, "If the selflessness of phenomena were taught in the Hearers' vehicle, then the teaching of Mahāyāna would be senseless." His system is to be understood as contradictory to reasoning and scripture.7

This entails that none except the Prāsaṅgikas assert that the selflessness of phenomena is explicitly indicated in Hīnayāna scriptures because, although his8 explicit
ON SCRIPTURAL PROOF

object of refutation is [the Svātantrika] Bhāvaviveka, Chittamātrins and Svātantrikas are similar in asserting such. For Kay-drup's Thousand Doses says:

Chittamātrins and Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas are alike in asserting that the selflessness of phenomena is not taught in the least in the scriptural collections of the Hīnayāna.

SECOND REFUTATION (43a.4)

Statement of Opinion. There exist members of Hīnayāna schools following reasoning who are objects of Mahāyāna scriptures' proofs of the basis-of-all, but not members of Hīnayāna schools following scripture because [members of Hīnayāna schools following scripture] do not accept the Mahāyāna as Buddha's words.

This implies that at least some Hīnayānists following reasoning--i.e., some Sautrāntika followers of Dharmakīrti--accept the Mahāyāna as Buddha's words. Since Gung-tang does not address himself to this issue here, but only uses the statement of this opinion as a foil for the counter-opinion following, it is not clear whether or not he accepts it. He has,
however, already rejected Gak-tsong's claim that Dharmakīrti and his followers assert a mind-basis-of-all (see above pp. 281ff.).

Statement of Counter-Opinion. It follows that there exist [members of Hīnayāna schools following scripture] who are objects of the proof [of a basis-of-all] through scripture because there exist proofs through reasonings taught in scriptural passages and because there exist words of scripture in syllogisms proving a basis-of-all.

Response. [It is true that there exist proofs for the basis-of-all which are reasonings taught in scriptural passages and that there exist words of scripture in syllogisms proving the basis-of-all]; however, this does not entail that there exist Hīnayāna sectarians following scripture who are objects of Mahāyāna scriptures' proofs of the basis-of-all.

Being proven by reasoning taught in a scriptural passage does not constitute being proven by scripture. Citing scripture that proves the existence of the mind-basis-of-all might, in the proper context, be a proof through reasoning.

Gung-tang's point, however, would seem to be that followers of reasoning need not accept all reasoning and, similarly, followers of scripture need not accept all proofs through
citation of scriptural passages. Hence, to say that a philosopher is a Hīnayāna sectarian following reason does not entail that he is open to any reasoning.

It [absurdly] follows for the stater [of the counter-opinion] that if a probandum is proven it is necessarily proven by a scriptural passage devoid [of contradiction as determined by] the three analyses.

It does not seem to the present writer that this absurd consequence strictly follows from the statement of counter-opinion, although it is suggested by it.

A scriptural passage whose lack of contradiction is certified by three analyses is held to be essential in the proof of a very hidden phenomenon. The three analyses are three tests whereby it is determined whether or not the reason is damaged by any of three prime cognitions: direct prime cognition (realizing the manifest), inference through the power of the fact (realizing the slightly hidden), and inference through belief (realizing the very hidden).
For [he claims that if a probandum is proven] it is necessarily proven by a syllogism which is set forth in such a scriptural passage.

If one accepts [that if a probandum is proven it is necessarily proven by a scriptural passage purified through the three analyses], then it [absurdly] follows that whatever is a probandum is necessarily a very hidden phenomenon.

THIRD REFUTATION (43b.1)

_Statement of Opinion_. It follows that the subject, a scriptural passage known to the Hīnayāna which is cited as a proof for the basis-of-all, is a refutation of external objects because of being a proof for the basis-of-all.

Gung-tang accepts this (see above, pp.235-237): the existence of the mind-basis-of-all necessarily entails the non-existence of external objects and, conversely, the existence of external objects necessarily entails the non-existence of a mind-basis-of-all.

If one accepts [that such a scriptural passage is a refutation of external objects], then it [absurdly] follows that it is a refutation of Hearer schools because of
acceptance [that it is a refutation of external objects].

There are no Hearer sectarians who refute external objects.

However, one cannot accept [that it is a refutation of Hearer schools] because those [Hearer schools] assert that scriptural passage to be their own text.

Response. [It is true that those Hearer schools assert such a scriptural passage to be their own text]; however, this does not entail that [such a scriptural passage] is not a refutation of Hearer schools. For, although that [scriptural passage] in fact teaches a basis-of-all, those [Hearer schools] do not accept that it is teaching a basis-of-all.

This implies that the distinction between a "scripture of the Hīnayānists" (or "Hīnayāna scripture") and a "scripture known to Hīnayānists" is an external one imposed by Mahāyāna interpreters of scripture. As will be seen, although Mahāyānists cite the Increasing By One passage, "All beings delight in the basis-of-all," in support of the existence of the mind-basis-of-all and hold it not to be a Hīnayāna text but, rather, only a text known to the Hīnayāna, Hīnayānists themselves do accept it as one of their own.
This reason follows because the basis-of-all in [the scriptural passage] "All beings delight in the basis-of-all" is explained by Vasumitra in terms of the aggregates of appropriation, by Bhadanta Vāmana in terms of the feeling pleasure, and by Ghoshaka in terms of the false view of the transitory collection.

The source for these three interpretations is Asaṅga's *Compendium of the Mahāyāna* which, however, does not attribute them. 13 They are identified with the scholars Bhadanta Vasumitra (Tibetan: bTsun-po dByig-bshes), Bhadanta Vāmana (Tibetan: bTsun-po Mi'u-thung), and Ghoshaka (Tibetan: dByangs sgros) by the author of the *Secret Meaning*. 14 Vasumitra and Ghoshaka are Sarvāstivādin Vaibhāshikas; 15 the identity of Vāmana is uncertain.

For, Ďzong-ka-źa's *Root Text* says:

The basis-of-all spoken of thus is asserted

By three [Hīnayānists]—Vasumitra, Vāmana, and Ghoshaka—

As referring to the aggregates, feeling,

and the false view

Of the disintegrating [aggregates as a real self],

respectively. 16
FOURTH REPUTATION (43b.5)

Statement of Opinion About That. In this regard it follows that it is proper to accept the assertions of these three masters because [Dzong-ka-ṣa's Root Text says]: "These three modes [of interpretation] are certainly not unsuitable."\(^{17}\)

Response. Although what Dzong-ka-ṣa says is true, it does not entail that one can accept the assertions of these three.

Dzong-ka-ṣa's own commentary on this line is that because these masters are Hinayānists, they are not vessels fit to receive the teaching of the mind-basis-of-all and are obscured with respect to it. Thus, although there is only slight impropriety in their interpretations, the Mahāyāna interpretation—asserting the existence of a mind-basis-of-all—is much better.\(^ {18}\)

It is not proper to accept their assertions because Asaṅga's Compendium of the Mahāyāna addsuces the following faults with regards to them:\(^ {19}\)

1. It is incorrect that persons who are tormented with pain and seek death delight in [a basis-of-all which is the mental and physical aggregates];
(2) it is incorrect that those of the fourth concentration and above delight in [a basis-of-all which is the feeling of pleasure];

(3) it is incorrect that those common beings who do perceive the conception of self as a fault delight in [a basis-of-all which is the false view of the transitory collection as a real I and mine].

Beings in the fourth concentration of the Form Realm or above that, in the Formless Realms, have only neutral feeling; pleasure does not occur in those realms.
Chapter Twenty-Three
Critique of Interpretations
of the First and Second Reasonings

FIRST REPUTATION (43b.6)

Asaṅga, in the Compendium of Ascertainments, advances eight reasonings in order to prove the existence of the mind-basis-of-all (see above, pp.424-465). The present refutation concerns the first reasoning: if there were no mind-basis-of-all, the appropriation of a body at the time of bridging the gap to a new lifetime (i.e., the first moment of life, the time of conception) would be impossible. For, there are no sense consciousnesses, mental consciousnesses, or afflicted mentality at that time (see above, pp.428-441).

Statement of Opinion. It follows that it is not the case that if there were no basis-of-all there would have to be no appropriator of a body. For, there exists in the continuum of one who has just bridged the gap [to a new lifetime at the time of conception] an afflicted mind which is a fruition. For, Vasubandhu's Treasury of Higher Knowledge says, "the birth state is afflicted."¹
The opponent holds that at the time of bridging the gap to a new lifetime, there is an afflicted mind (Tibetan: sems). He does not speak of an afflicted mentality (Tibetan: vid), for this does not exist where there is no mind-basis-of-all.

His position is based on the Vaibhāshika tenet, reported by Vasubandhu in the Treasury, that the birth state—the first moment of consciousness of a new lifetime—is a mental consciousness afflicted with all the afflictions belonging to its level in cyclic existence.²

Response. [It is true that Vasubandhu says that the birth state is afflicted]; however, this does not entail that there exists an afflicted fruitional mind in the continuum of one who has just bridged the gap [to a new lifetime], for this [birth state] is designated an affection from the viewpoint of either desire or hatred acting as [its] proximate cause. Furthermore, the context here is that of another system.

Chittamātrins assert that the mind appropriating the body at the first moment in the womb is the mind-basis-of-all which, of course, must be undefiled and is, hence, never afflicted.
They say that although there is, at the end of the intermediate state, a mental consciousness bridging the gap to a new life (pratisamdhicitta) which is afflicted, this mind ceases just prior to the birth state (see above, p. 436).³

Moreover, the context of the Treasury quote cited by the stater of opinion is Vasubandhu's reporting of Vaibhāshika tenets. Since Vaibhāshikas do not assert a mind-basis-of-all, their position on the birth state has little relevance here.

SECOND REFUTATION (44a.2)

Statement of Opinion. It follows that there is no generation of [an altruistic] aspiration [to attain enlightenment] in the continuum of a Bodhisattva who has just bridged the gap [to a new life] because the proposition [that except for the mind-basis-of-all there is no other consciousness at that time] is correct.

The Chittamātrin assertion is that no consciousness exists just after bridging the gap to a new life, i.e., in the birth state, the first moment of the new life—except for the mind-
bution. The basis-of-all cannot be an altruistic aspiration to attain enlightenment (bodhicitta) because, whereas the basis-of-all does not even ascertain its object, an altruistic attitude to enlightenment is conceptual.

Response. Although the assertion of the existence of an altruistic aspiration to enlightenment in the continuum of a Bodhisattva who has just bridged the gap] is widespread, it is obvious that in terms of the explanations throughout the texts [of the Chittamātrins Following Scripture] that there is no such [altruistic aspiration to enlightenment immediately after bridging the gap].

Mādhyamika philosophers assert that in addition to manifestly present minds there are also hidden (Tibetan: skog gyur) minds. Chittamātrin followers of Asaṅga do not seem to make this distinction, saying that a mind is either manifestly present or non-existent, although seeds or latencies of it may exist. Gung-tang expands on this aspect of the role of seeds in the next refutation.
THIRD REFUTATION (44a.3)

Statement of Opinion. Then it follows that the subject, [a Bodhisattva who has just bridged the gap to a new life] is not a Bodhisattva because of being a person who does not possess the generation of an altruistic aspiration to enlightenment in his mental continuum.

Response. It is not the case [that such a Bodhisattva is a person who does not possess an altruistic aspiration to enlightenment in his continuum] because it is allowable to posit that he possesses it due to possessing its\(^5\) seed.

Thus, although the altruistic attitude does not exist in someone who has just been conceived, one can say that such a person possesses it due to his having previously generated it and its not having deteriorated in the interim. Such an altruistic attitude is ready to arise merely upon seeing a person suffering.\(^6\)

FOURTH REFUTATION (44a.4)

Statement of Opinion. In this regard it then [absurdly] follows that he possesses omniscience because of possessing the seed of that omniscience.

Response. These two cases are not similar. For, whereas [the seed of omniscience] is merely the potential for
something which will be attained, the seed of the altruistic aspiration to enlightenment] is the seed of something which has previously been manifestly attained.

This line of reasoning, however, does not necessarily apply to all cases because after one has manifestly attained a vow and then given it up there still exists a seed of that vow.

The seed of omniscience is a latency which is the potential to become omniscient; it is not a latency deposited by a previous generation of omniscience.

The seed of the altruistic aspiration to attain enlightenment and the seed of a vow are each instances of latencies deposited by minds which have been manifestly present. The former, however, is a case of something achieved and not lost or deteriorated and the latter is a case of something whose manifest presence has been generated and then lost.
FIFTH REFUTATION (44a.6)

This concerns the topic of the second reasoning.

The second reasoning advanced in Asaṅga's *Compendium of Ascertainments* to establish the existence of a basis-of-all involves a fallacy pertaining to the objection that there can be no mind-basis-of-all because then there would be more than one consciousness manifestly existing at the same time. The fallacy is this: in the case that all conditions for the arising of six consciousnesses—those conditions being the six objects, six sense powers and six mental impulses—are simultaneously equally proximate, not even one consciousness would arise; for, there would be no reason one should take precedence over another, yet only one would be able to arise, according to the objection.

*Statement of Opinion.* Ša-sang Ma-ti says that the six mental impulses—from the wish to see a visible form through the wish to know a phenomenon—are produced simultaneously.

Ma-ti Pan-chen presents the second reasoning in the following way:
If, in someone's continuum, (1) the mental impulses—the wish to see a visible form, the wish to hear a sound, the wish to smell an odor, the wish to experience a taste, the wish to touch a tangible object, and the wish to know a phenomenon other than a sense object—are complete just as they arose, (2) the sense powers of these [eye, ear, etc.] exist without having deteriorated, and (3) the objects equally appear, then it would be impossible for any one consciousness to occur and others not to. Hence, [they] occur simultaneously. 8

**Response.** It follows that this is incorrect because at that time [when all six objects and all six sense powers are equally existent] there does not exist a particular mental impulse such as the wish to see a form. This reason follows because if such did exist it would prevent the production of sense consciousnesses other [than an eye consciousness]. Further, the meaning of [the six mental impulses] being "balanced" refers in this case to the fact that the mental impulses exist in a manner such that any is suitable to arise, with no difference in proximity.
Mental impulses are conceptual. Thus, even in the present system of asserting simultaneous consciousnesses of dissimilar type, two or more mental impulses cannot simultaneously occur.

This reason in turn follows because Sthiramati's Commentary on (Vasubandhu's) "Thirty Stanzas" only speaks of two conditions [for the production of a consciousness] and does not speak of mental impulses: "When observed-object-conditions are met with, even from one immediately preceding condition there [can] arise two or more consciousnesses."\(^9\)

This passage is relevant here because it implies that the mental impulse is not necessarily manifestly present.

Further, Dzong-ka-Ba's **Difficult Topics** says, "It is not possible for two conceptual minds [such as] the wish to see and the wish to hear to arise simultaneously."\(^{10}\)
SIXTH REFUTATION (44b.3)

Statement of Opinion. It is not correct in this context [of discussing the tenets of the Chittamātrins Following Scripture] to say that the object of a sense consciousness is its observed-object-condition because that [object] is the same essential nature as that [sense consciousness].

An observed-object-condition is a cause and thus must occur prior to the consciousness which is its effect. Therefore, it cannot be the same essential nature as the consciousness perceiving it; for, it is not simultaneous with that consciousness.

Given that an object and the mind perceiving it are asserted to be the same essential nature in the Chittamātra system, an observed object is not an actual observed-object-condition in this system.

Response. [It is true that an object is the same essential nature as the sense consciousness apprehending it]; however, this does not entail that it is incorrect to say that the object of a sense consciousness is its observed-object-condition. For, although [that object] is not its actual observed-object-condition, it is an imputed or appearing observed-object-condition from the viewpoint of [the consciousness'] existence and non-existence unerringly
corresponding to [the existence or non-existence of that object]. For, Dignāga's *Investigation of Objects of Observation* says, "[An object], although one factor, is a condition because of unerring." ¹¹

Gung-tang explains, in his *Ornament for Dignāga's Thought*:

Although [an apprehended object] is one factor of the two [apprehending subject and apprehended object] which are simultaneous and a single essential nature, . . . [the apprehended object] is designated a condition because of the unerring certainty of the corresponding existence or non-existence [of subject and object]. Thus, there is a presentation of an imputed observed-object-condition, an appearing observed-object-condition. ¹²

An example of an actual observed-object-condition in this system is the potency which generates an eye consciousness in the aspect of its object (see above, p.289).
SEVENTH REFUTATION (44b.5)

Statement of Opinion. It follows that the blue which is an object of an eye consciousness apprehending blue is not the same essential nature as that eye consciousness because it is established prior to that [consciousness]. This reason follows because it must be seen by an eye sense power which is the uncommon empowering condition of that [eye consciousness apprehending blue].

Response. It appears that one must take care here no matter with whose system one is dealing, be it Sautrāntika or Chittamātra.

An eye sense power cannot be said to actually see a patch of blue. The blue does appear (Tibetan: shar) to it in the manner of an image, like a moon reflected in clear water; however, it does not appear (Tibetan: snang) to it in the sense of the sense power perceiving it.\(^{13}\)

Be this as it may, both Sautrāntikas and Chittamātrins—that is, both proponents and deniers of external objects—face a similar problem in epistemology. How can the sense power to which blue appears act as the empowering condition of an eye consciousness apprehending blue if that consciousness is to perceive a present and not a past object? Only a conceptual
consciousness can apprehend a past object; direct perceivers such as eye consciousnesses perceive only present objects.

Sautrāntikas solve this problem by asserting that if no time intervenes between the moment an object appears to a sense power and the moment the sense consciousness perceives it, i.e., if they are immediately successive moments, then the sense consciousness is perceiving a present object.\(^{14}\)

Chittamātrins, on the other hand, assert that subject and object are a single substantial entity; thus, the apprehended object cannot appear to a sense power which is not simultaneous with the apprehending subject. For Dignāga at least, the eye sense power is not a subtle part of the eye but is a potency generating an eye consciousness (see above, p.292).\(^{15}\)
Chapter Twenty-Four
Critique of Interpretations
of the Third, Fifth, and Sixth Reasonings

FIRST REFUTATION (44b.6)
This concerns the meaning [of the reasoning that] there could be no clear [mental consciousness].

The third reasoning establishing the existence of the mind-basis-of-all is, like the second reasoning, a refutation of the main argument against a basis-of-all, that no more than one consciousness exists at any given time in one person's continuum. Asaṅga says that if there were not more than one consciousness operative at one time then there could be no clear mental consciousness apprehending a visible form at the same time as a sense consciousness perceives that form. In fact, there is a simultaneous production of many consciousnesses because the following two exist: a clear mental consciousness which engages a visible form at the time the form is seen and an unclear mental consciousness remembering the form when it is in the past. (See above, pp. 447-449.)
First Statement of Opinion. The meaning of this reasoning is that if there were no simultaneous production of many consciousnesses, then the mental consciousness clearly perceiving an object immediately after the passing of a sense consciousness [which clearly perceives that object] and the later arising of an ascertaining consciousness which perceives it without clarity would [absurdly] be contradictory.

Second Statement of Opinion. The meaning of this reasoning is that the [absurd] consequence is adduced that the two—a mental consciousness which clearly perceives a present object and the mental consciousness which perceives a past or a future object—would not be feasible [if there were no simultaneous arising of many consciousnesses].

Response. It follows that the first opinion is not correct. It is laughable to adduce, to one who asserts that many consciousnesses do not arise simultaneously, the consequence that consciousnesses do not arise serially.

Gung-tang has already presented (p. 447-448) the consequence that is actually adduced:

It follows that there is simultaneous production of many consciousnesses because it is established through experience that the following two exist: a clear mental
consciousness which engages a visible form at the time it is seen and an unclear consciousness remembering the past form.\(^2\)

It follows that the second opinion as well is incorrect because [one who asserts that many consciousnesses do not arise simultaneously] must himself assert that two such mental consciousnesses are not manifestly produced at the same time.\(^3\) If he is merely adducing the consequence that they do not arise serially, then [his position] is as senseless as the previous.

This reason follows because at the time when a sense consciousness seeing blue is manifest, that blue which is its object must also appear clearly to the mind and thereby there occurs [at that time] a mental direct perception which realizes it. However, when that sense direct perceiver has passed, that object—the blue—also has already passed and hence an ordinary being must comprehend it by means of a conceptual memory consciousness, without its being an object of a direct perceiver. For, [Asaṅga's] Compendium [of Ascertainments] says:

At the time of the recollection of an experience of a past object, the motion of the mental consciousness is not clear. The mind which moves to a present object, however, is not unclear in that way.
Gung-tang borrows this quotation from Đzong-ka-ba's *Difficult Topics*. He attributes it to the source he abbreviates bsDu-ba (Sanskrit: *samgraha* or *samgrahanī*), which in this context is Asaṅga's *Compendium of Ascertainments* (*Viniścayasamgrahanī*). While this text is the *locus classicus* for the eight reasonings establishing the existence of a mind-basis-of-all, the source quotations Đzong-ka-ba uses to certify his explanations of them are not from Asaṅga but from a later work, Jinaratna's Commentary on (Asaṅga's) "Compendium of Higher Knowledge" (see above, pp.425-426). The present passage, misidentified as being from the *Compendium of Ascertainments* is from Jinaratna's work.⁵

Asaṅga's expression of this point, which Jinaratna, in fact, paraphrases, is this:⁶

When there is a recollection of an object experienced in the past, the engagement (Tibetan: 'jug pa) of the mental consciousness is not clear. However, the engagement of the mental consciousness in a presently occurring object is not in that way unclear.
What this passage says necessarily entails [the reason preceding it] because the "present object" [in the just cited passage] is not to be taken generally as simply the present but rather must be posited within the context of a sense consciousness, as something being experienced by that [sense consciousness]. For, Đzong-ka-ba's Difficult Topics says:

It is unsuitable to say that a mind which has a present object, even though it is not simultaneous with the sense consciousness, is clear and [a mind which has], for instance, a past [object] is unclear.

Further, Ren-da-wa's Explanatory Commentary on (Asaṅga's) "Compendium of Higher Knowledge" says:

If it were the case that two consciousnesses do not occur simultaneously, then a mental consciousness which occurs together with a sense consciousness would be impossible, and hence there could be no mental consciousness which clearly apprehends an object.
SECOND REFUTATION (45b.2)

Statement of Opinion About That. It follows that such a production of mental direct perception is not correct because Vasubandhu's Treasury of Higher Knowledge says, "Any consciousness of the six/ Which has just passed is the mind." 11

Such a production of mental direct perception is one in which it arises simultaneously with sense direct perception cognizing the same object.

And Jam-īyang-shay-Īa's Analysis of Final Positions on Awareness and Knowledge says: 12

Being mental direct perception necessarily entails occurring subsequent to sense direct perception.

Mokshākara-gupta's The Language of Logic (Tarkabhaṣa) says, "Immediately after sense direct perception has passed, mental direct perception arises."

What Jam-īyang-shay-Īa says entails that in the Sautrāntika and Chittamātra systems following reasoning there is no mental direct perception simultaneous with sense direct perception and cognizing the same object. However, the citation from Vasubandhu's Treasury seems irrelevant here. Vasubandhu's own commentary
on these lines indicates that he is speaking of the mind constituent (manodhātu) as being any one of the six consciousnesses which has just ceased.

Response. What Vasubandhu and Jam-ȳang-shay-Ḍa say does not necessarily entail that it is incorrect that mental direct perception arises in that way [i.e., simultaneously with sense direct perception cognizing the same object]. For, although this is Dharmakīrti's own system in his Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compendium of Prime Cognition", [Chittamātrins and Sautrāntikas] Following Scripture need not accept it.

Not only that, one must not mix the assertions of individual scholars since, for instance, the author of the Ornament [i.e., Prajñākaragupta, the author of An Ornament for (Dharmakīrti's) "Commentary"]¹³—a follower of Dharmakīrti's Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compendium of Prime Cognition"—says:

We assert that a case of knowing
Through habituation, "It is this,"
About [an object] abiding in front [of one]
Is mental direct perception
Because of acting directly.
If I were clearly to explain somewhat the way of proof in the former [reasoning—the third reasoning proving the existence of a mind-basis-of-all, presented on pp. 447-449 and 733 above] I would say the following:

It follows with regard to the subject, the person giving answers who is in front of me, that he has directly cognized an ox because extrasensory perception, or a Superior's path, or the like is not needed in order to cognize that directly. If you accept that the subject has directly cognized an ox, then is follows that this subject has directly cognized [an ox] at the time he saw it with his eyes because (1) he has directly cognized that [ox], and (2) the mind which remembers [the ox] at the time it has become hidden is a thought consciousness. That in turn is so because the appearance at that time of a likeness of the ox is an appearance of a generic image.

**Thought, or conceptual consciousness, and direct perception are contraries. Direct perception knows only manifestly present objects, whereas conceptual consciousnesses are able to know objects which are hidden and not manifest.**

If you accept that [the person in front of you has directly cognized an ox at the time he saw it with
his eyes], then it follows with respect to that
subject that there existed a mental direct perception
which directly cognized [an ox] in his continuum
because (1) there is [at that time] such a direct
perception, and (2) there exists no [such] sense
direct perception, (3) no [such] yogic direct percep-
tion, and (4) [no such self-knowing direct perception
because] self-perception is not spoken of in Asaṅga's
Treatises on the Levels\textsuperscript{14} and even if they did exist
they would have to be solely in the aspect of the
apprehender. The first reason is established [i.e.,
it is established that there exists no sense direct
perception perceiving an ox in the continuum of the
subject] because that [ox] is not an object of
apprehension by an eye consciousness.

An ox is the person imputed to the body of an
ox. Since it is a non-associated compositional
factor, it is not a form. Not being a form, it
cannot be a visible form apprehensible by
an eye consciousness. Although the ox's color,
shape, dew-lap, and so on are directly perceiv-
able by an eye consciousness, the ox is apprehended
only by a mental consciousness.
Taking this as an example, it appears difficult to posit a mode of direct cognition of things at a distance such as fire and water without positing that when they are seen by the eyes they are directly cognized by the mind. Fire or water which are far enough away from a perceiving subject not to be touchable can only be directly perceived by the mind. Fire and water are, themselves, not visible forms—not shape or color—and thus not objects of apprehension by an eye consciousness. They are tangible objects, apprehensible only by body or mental consciousnesses.

In this regard, [Jay-āzun-ēa's] Ocean of Play, General Meaning [of the Perfection of Wisdom] takes the non-existence of such mental direct perception as a system according with Dharmakīrti's Commentary on (Dignēga's) "Compendium of Prime Cognition" and says [that there exists] a memory consciousness which recollects blue at the time the eye is seeing blue. This is even more senseless that those [above].
THIRD REFUTATION (46a.5)

This concerns the fifth reasoning proving the existence of a mind-basis-of-all (see above, p.456): it is not the case that because no more than one consciousness occurs at any given time there is no mind-basis-of-all. If many consciousnesses did not occur simultaneously, it would absurdly follow that actions would be impossible, for there would be no simultaneous perception of a goer, the place traversed, the motion, and so forth. For example, when one travels a road, there are perceptions of the external world (the "knowledge of the environment," bhājanavijñānapti), of the internal or sentient beings ("knowledge of basis," āśrayavijñānapti), of oneself ("knowledge thinking 'I'," ahamitivijñānapti), and of individual objects ("knowledge of objects," visayavijñānapti).

Statement of Opinion. All four knowledges [mentioned] in the context of the fifth reasoning [from Asaṅga's Compendium of Ascertainments] are the sixth or mental consciousness.

Response. It follows that this is not correct because what are called "knowledge of the environment" and "knowledge of location" must be related to the basis-of-all in accordance with the above [cited passage (p. 356) from Maitreya's
Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes, 
"Consciousnesses which perceive sense objects, the sentient. . .". For, here "knowledge of the environment" is the perception of general place [and] direction; "knowledge of basis" is the perception of one's own body—the raising and the setting down of the feet and so forth. Also, the knowledge thinking "I" refers to the afflicted mentality and the knowledge of objects refers to the engaging consciousnesses which individually perceive the six objects. This is in Bzong-ka-'Ba's Difficult Topics.

Bzong-ka-'Ba says in the Difficult Topics: 
Knowledge of environment is perception of the stable external world. Knowledge of basis is the perception of the moving world: the six sources (ayatana) and their bases—the substantial entity of sentient beings. Knowledge thinking "I" is the inward-looking constant engagement thinking "I". Knowledge of objects is the perception of visible forms, sounds, and so on.

Therefore, because the perceptions of external and internal, the conception of an I, and the apprehension of any of the
six objects are observed at the same time, many consciousnesses occur simultaneously. For, such actions, which are different entities, are impossible for a single consciousness...

Thus, these four are not feasible for one who does not assert a basis-of-all, but are for one who does. The perception of external and internal—the knowledges perceiving objects and the sentient—are just the basis-of-all. The perception of self—the knowledge of self—is the afflicted mentality. The perception of objects... are the six collections of consciousness.

FOURTH REFUTATION (46b.1)

This concerns the sixth reasoning establishing the existence of the mind-basis-of-all:

If there were no basis-of-all, benefit or harm to the body at a time that [a consciousness] such as a virtuous mind were manifest would not produce bodily feeling to experience it. This is because since the mental consciousness is aimed at a virtuous observed object,
that [bodily feeling] is not created in the mind. Further, if there were no basis-of-all, there would be no cause of providing, that is, raising a support for that [experience].

Statement of Opinion. It follows that it is not the case that bodily feeling would be impossible if there were no basis-of-all because even in the case of the existence of a basis-of-all, bodily feelings of pleasure, pain, and so forth are not experienced by it.

The mind-basis-of-all is necessarily accompanied by neutral feeling. It cannot experience pleasure or pain (see above, pp.513-529).

Response. The fact that a basis-of-all does not experience bodily feelings of pleasure and pain does not entail that it is not the case that bodily feelings would be impossible if there were no basis-of-all. For, that is not the way in which [a basis-of-all] is established by this [reasoning]. This reason follows because the generation of pleasurable and painful feelings through harm or benefit done to the body when the mind is directed elsewhere is on account of the basis-of-all. This in turn follows because although the generation of pleasurable and painful bodily feelings in that case does not rely on mental impulses, there still needs to exist a basis for their production internally.
The mental impulse in this case would be the conceptual wish to experience a tactile sensation. If it were present, this would not be a case of the mind being directed elsewhere. It need not be present because the mind-basis-of-all conjoins all of the body and thereby provides a support for the arising of sensation.

The first part of this reason is established [i.e., it is established that the generation of pleasurable and painful bodily feelings when the mind is turned elsewhere does not depend on mental impulses] because both Vasubandhu's Commentary on the Treasury of Higher Knowledge and Dignāga's Lamp for the Essentials (Marmapradīpa) say, "Mental pleasure and pain are for the most part born from conceptual thought whereas those of the body are not."¹⁹

The referents of conceptual thought here are the mental impulses.

The second part of this reason is established [i.e., there does need to exist, internally, a basis for the generation of bodily feeling in that case] because of the fault that if [the generation of bodily feeling in that case] did not depend on inner mind, then it would follow that even sticking a weapon into a corpse would generate bodily feeling.
Likewise, being roused from sleep and generating sense consciousnesses through help or harm to the body or by the sound of a conch or the like, even though there are no mental impulses at the time of deep sleep, is by reason of there existing a consciousness which is a basis for the generation [of sense consciousnesses] when asleep.

FIFTH REFUTATION (46b.5)

Statement of Opinion. There is no fault [such that if there were no mind-basis-of-all then physical feeling would be impossible]. For, although at that time there is no consciousness, there do exist the seeds of hearing sounds and so forth.

Although at the time of deep sleep there are no sense consciousnesses and no mental consciousness, there are seeds for their subsequent generation.\textsuperscript{20}

Response. It follows that this cannot eliminate that fault because such seeds must depend on a consciousness and, hence, one has not gone beyond a basis-of-all.

Further, the proof [of the existence of a basis-of-all] by the former [argument] is also presented in the context of seeds.
The former argument is the one with which Gung-tang closes the previous refutation: being awakened from deep sleep by physical help or harm and then experiencing pleasure or pain is only possible because the mind-basis-of-all conjoins the entire body and bears seeds for the arising of sense consciousnesses.
Chapter Twenty-Five
Critique of Interpretations of the Seventh Reasoning

FIRST REFUTATION (47a.1)

Statement of Opinion. It follows that there exists no sixth or mental consciousness during sleep because [Asaṅga] adduces the following consequence: If there were no basis-of-all, then [mindless states] would be impossible because there is no mental consciousness during the two meditative absorptions and during sleep and fainting. Furthermore, Vasubandhu's Thirty Stanzas says:

The mental consciousness always occurs
Except with discriminationless [gods],
The two meditative absorptions,
Mindless sleep, and fainting.¹

The fault with this opinion is a misidentification of sleep with deep, i.e., dreamless sleep.

The two meditative absorptions are those of non-discrimination and cessation (see above p. 339). Neither are cognitive states; they are designations for states in which consciousness is inhibited from arising. During neither are there sense or mental consciousnesses.
Response. [It is true that the mental consciousness occurs neither in the two meditative absorptions nor in mindless states of sleep or fainting]; however, this does not necessarily entail that there exists no sixth or mental consciousness during sleep.

One cannot accept that there exists no mental consciousness during sleep because there are cases of a sixth or mental consciousness existing during sleep.

Mental consciousnesses exist during the light sleep in which there are dreams.\(^2\)

This reason follows because there exists at that time a mind in similar association with [the mental factor] sleep. This reason in turn follows because sleep exists at that time and also because a mind and mental factors in similar association are similar in five ways.

Sleep (middha) is a mental factor belonging to the group of the four changeable factors; it may be virtuous, non-virtuous, or neutral.\(^3\) It is a mind which causes the sense consciousnesses to withdraw and be unable to engage their objects.\(^4\)

A mind and its accompanying mental factors are similar in five ways:\(^5\)

(1) they have the same observed object,
(2) they have the same subjective aspect,
(3) they occur at the same time,
(4) they have the same uncommon empowering condition,
(5) they are each single substantial entities.

The meaning of the passage cited above (p. 750) [from Vasubandhu's Thirty Stanzas] is that although it is established by experience that at the time of light sleep there exist consciousnesses dreaming dreams in similar association with sleep, it is established that during deep sleep there is no sleep consciousness because at that time even dreams do not occur. For, Sthiramati's Commentary on (Vasubandhu's) "Thirty Stanzas" says:

Mindless sleep is called "mindless" because there do not arise any mental consciousnesses at all during the period of [the basis]⁶ being overcome by heavy sleep.⁷

Further, there exists a reason for other texts presenting a "drop of deep sleep" and a "drop of dreams" as different states.

Texts on Kalachakra Tantra, speaking of the subtle body in terms of channels, energy winds, and drops, differentiate between a drop of deep sleep and a drop of dreams, the bases of consciousness in which predispositions for
those states are stored.\textsuperscript{8} The reason for this use of terminology is that dreams and deep sleep are different states.

SECOND REFUTATION (47a.6)

\textbf{Statement of Opinion.} It follows that during deep sleep there exists a sleep consciousness because one is sleeping deeply at that time.

\textbf{Response.} Although it is true that one is sleeping deeply at that time, this does not entail that there then exists a sleep consciousness. For, this is similar to the case of fainting due to pain. Although there is actually no pain at the time of fainting due to intense pain, still this is posited as fainting due to pain. Likewise, there need exist no sleep [consciousness] when all coarse and subtle engaging consciousnesses are withdrawn by the force of\textsuperscript{9} sleep, even though this state is posited as deep sleep.
THIRD REFUTATION (47b.2)

Statement of Opinion. Sleep is posited as an accompanier of the basis-of-all.

Response. It [absurdly] follows, because of this assertion, that sleep is necessarily undefiled and neutral. One cannot, however, assert this because there are many virtuous and non-virtuous [instances of sleep]. For, Maitreya's Ornament for Clear Realization says, "He sees all phenomena, even those in dreams/ To be like dreams and so forth."

To see phenomena to be like dreams, magician's illusions, and so forth is a virtuous mind, the subsequently attained wisdom (prsthalaabdhajña). Maitreya means that even the dream world during the dream should be seen to be like a dream.

Also, Đöng-ka-ṣa's Golden Rosary, [commenting on this] says, "The existence of virtuous sleep is not contradictory also for those who abide on the [Bodhisattva] grounds."

Moreover, it follows that [sleep] cannot occur as an accompanier of a basis-of-all because, if it did, it would have to operate beginninglessly without interruption; however, whatever is a basis-of-all does not necessarily have sleep in similar association with it. For, Ren-da-wa's Commentary on (Asaṅga's) "Compendium of Knowledge" says,
"That which remains uninterruptedly in an undefiled and neutral nature is to be understood as a fruition."

The mental factor sleep cannot occur uninterruptedly. There is, for instance, no sleep in the Form and Formless Realms.

This is also the reason for saying that only the five omnipresent [mental factors] occur as accompaniers of a Desire Realm basis-of-all, without an occurrence even of investigation and analysis.

FOURTH REFUTATION (47b.5)

Statement of Opinion. It follows that your assertion, in dependence on the teaching in such Sūtras as the Perfection of Wisdom of "an absorption which is a cessation of discrimination and feeling," that there do not exist consciousnesses engaging [objects] during the meditative absorption of cessation is not correct. For, if it were the case that there are no engaging consciousnesses at that time] then since both feeling and discrimination exist as accompaniers of a basis-of-all, that [basis-of-all] would [also] have to cease.

Response. These two cases are not similar because [the mental factors] such as feeling and discrimination which
are accompaniers of [a basis-of-all] need not cease since they have very subtle observed objects and aspects. The mental factors of feeling and discrimination accompanying the engaging consciousness are coarse, i.e., their observed objects and subjective aspects are very clear. The mind-basis-of-all, however, has unclear object and aspect. Thus, cessation of the coarse engaging consciousnesses does not entail cessation of the mind-basis-of-all or its accompaniers.¹⁰
Chapter Twenty-Six
Cessation of the Mind-Basis-of-All (48a.1)

Statement of Opinion. It [absurdly] follows that it is merely the entity of the basis-of-all which ceases upon [attaining] the eighth Bodhisattva ground or the level of a Hīnayāna Foe Destroyer, whereas the fruitional consciousness ceases at the end of the continuum [of being a sentient being] or upon [attaining] the Hīnayāna remainderless [nirvāṇa]. For, [according to you] your manner of [demonstrating] non-contradiction in the earlier and later parts of [Đzong-ka-Ba's] text is correct.

An earlier verse in Đzong-ka-Ba's Root Text says:

It operates without discontinuity until the remainderless
Nirvāṇa or the vajra-like [meditative stabilization].¹

A later verse seems to contradict it by saying:

Therefore, [a Bodhisattva] who has attained power
And a [Hīnayānist] Foe Destroyer have no basis-of-all
Because of not having the two reasons for positing [something a "basis-of-all"].\(^2\)

Because of the latter verse Gung-tang has asserted (above, pp. 369ff.) that the actual basis-of-all must cease once the afflictions have been destroyed; both reasons for positing a mind to be basis-of-all specify the presence of afflictive phenomena (see p.371). In the case of a Mahāyānist, then, the basis-of-all ceases upon attainment of the eighth ground and in that of a Hīnayānist, it ceases upon attainment of the level of Foe Destroyer.

The former verse, Gung-tang says, refers to the fruitional consciousness, the continuation of substantial entity of the mind-basis-of-all. It and the mind-basis-of-all are the same until the eighth ground or the level of Foe Destroyer with remainder of aggregates (see above, pp.372ff.). On the eighth, ninth, and tenth Bodhisattva grounds—that is, from the eighth ground through the vajra-like meditative stabilization at the end of the continuum of being a sentient being—and until a Foe Destroyer dies and enters the remainderless nirvāṇa, an eighth consciousness
which is a substantial continuation of the mind-basis-of-all continues to operate. It has all the characteristics of a mind-basis-of-all as defined above by Gung-tang (p.332) with the sole exception that it is not suitable to be called "basis-of-all."

If you accept [that the mere entity of the basis-of-all ceases upon attaining the eighth ground or the level of a Hīnayāna Foe Destroyer, whereas the fruitional consciousness ceases at the end of the continuum or at Hīnayāna remainderless nirvāṇa], then it [absurdly] follows, because of your assertion, (1) that the afflicted mentality—which is the reason for positing [the eighth consciousness] as a basis-of-all from the viewpoint of [the basis-of-all being] the basis for the constant connection to an I—is eliminated as soon as the level of Foe Destroyer is attained, and (2) that the latencies of the obstructions—which are the reason for positing something a basis-of-all from the viewpoint of connecting thoroughly afflicted phenomena to the entity of [their] effects—at this time cease without remainder.

If the mere entity of the mind-basis-of-all ceases with attainment of the eighth Bodhisattva ground or the level of Foe Destroyer "because of not having the two reasons for positing
[something a 'basis-of-all']," then it follows that the two reasons for positing the eighth consciousness a basis-of-all have ceased. The two reasons are (1) the presence of an afflicted mentality, a mind conceiving the basis-of-all to be a self, and (2) the presence of the latencies of the obstructions through which all afflictive phenomena are connected with their effects.

If you assert this [i.e., that the latencies of the obstructions cease without remainder as soon as the level of Foe Destroyer is attained] then it [absurdly] follows that all the latencies of the obstructions to omniscience also discontinue at that time.

**Obstructions** include afflictive obstructions (or obstructions to liberation) and obstructions to omniscience. In this system, the afflictive obstructions are "the conceptions of a coarse or subtle self of persons, together with their seeds, as well as the six main afflictions and twenty secondary afflictions."\(^3\) They are the main object of abandonment by Hīnayānists. The obstructions to omniscience are "the conceptions of a self of phenomena, together with their latencies."\(^4\) They are abandoned by Mahāyānists.
If you accept this, then it [absurdly] follows, because of this acceptance, that at that time all the latencies of the obstructions to omniscience have been abandoned [by the path].

Response. [It is true that there is a discontinuation of the latencies of the obstructions to omniscience at the time of having just attained the level of Foe Destroyer]; however, this does not necessarily entail that the latencies of the obstructions to omniscience have been abandoned [by the path] at that time.

As the stater of opinion has argued this, it would appear that Hinayānists who have attained the level of Foe Destroyer with remainder of psychophysical aggregates and Mahāyānists who have attained the eighth ground no longer have obstructions to either liberation or omniscience. By saying "no entailment" here, Gung-tang assents to the proposition.

If this is indeed the case, the problem arises as to what a Bodhisattva does on the eighth, ninth, and tenth grounds in terms of purifying his mind into omniscience. Gung-tang seems to have avoided this problem by speaking only of Foe Destroyers in the remainderless nirvāṇa. This level corresponds, in terms of
the Mahāyāna path, to the state of Buddhahood. Neither Buddhas nor remainderless Foe Destroyers have either a mind-basis-of-all or a fruitional consciousness.

That there is a discontinuation of those latencies at that time is so because Asaṅga's Compendium of Ascertainments says, "There exist neither obstructions nor arrangements of obstructions in the realm of the nirvāṇa in which there is no remainder of psychophysical aggregates."

Arrangements of obstructions are the latencies of obstructions.5

[Despite this being the case] it cannot be asserted that the latencies of the obstructions to omniscience have been abandoned [by the path] when [the level of] Foe Destroyer has just been attained. For, when the obstructions to omniscience have been abandoned, omniscience has necessarily been attained.

Gung-tang distinguishes between abandonment of obstructions by means of path consciousnesses—uninterrupted paths which serve as the actual antidotes to the obstructions—and cessation of the obstructions due to cessation of the basis in which the latencies generating them abide.
For, Ďjong-ka- derp's Difficult Topics says:

Although there is no abandonment without a residue, still there is a cessation which is a discontinuation of the obstructions to omniscience because there is a cessation of the continuum of the five aggregates.⁶

The Secret Meaning speaks of the [cessation of types of latencies] taken as individuals:⁷ the latencies which are the cause of existence cease upon the arising of [their] fruitions, the latencies of the false view of self cease when [their] actual antidotes are produced, and the latencies of verbalization cease upon [attainment of] the remainderless [nirvāṇa] or at the end of the continuum [of sentient being].
ROOT VERSES

ON [AFFLICTED] MENTALITY

AND [MIND—] BASIS—OF—ALL

by

Ḍzong-ka-ba Lo-sang-drak-ba
I prostrate with my head to those scholars of scholars
Who, having realized as they are
the well spoken and the paths to goodness,
The road travelled by the Conquerors
and the Conquerors' Offspring,
Teach them completely, without error or confusion.

-1-
In order that the very difficult topics
of the texts on Knowledge,
The [afflicted] mentality and the [mind-]basis-of-all,
might be clearly set forth
And so that my own memory might be refreshed,
I will present [them] here in dependence
on my Guru's speech.

-2-
Nāgārjuna, prophesied to maintain the supreme vehicle
By [Buddha], the best of proponents,
Extended the supreme vehicle;
After him, Asaṅga, who received prophesy,
Laid down the way [of Knowledge-Only].

-3-
Previously there had been just Mādhyamika.
Basis-of-all and afflicted mentality
Are to be known by way of four topics:
Definition, proofs, and refutations
Of the assertions of nine and a single [consciousness].

From among the two definitions, the definition
Of the basis-of-all is asserted to have two aspects
Due to its division into support and that supported.

With regard to these, that basis-of-all which is a support
Although unknowing, is a knowledge
Of sense objects, the sentient, and latencies;
Neutral, it has just five [accompilners,
The mental factors] contact and so forth.

Because the perception of abodes,
Sense objects, and bodies is due to seeds,
[Seeds] are held to be observed objects.

The five [sense] consciousnesses apprehend
The apprehended-object factors of the basis-of-all;
The sixth [consciousness] assigns designations.
[The basis-of-all] is, therefore, definite in two realms. Were that not the case, it would [absurdly] follow That those in the Formless Realm would not be beyond Discrimination of forms and would be [on] a level having form. For, although there are appearances of forms to consciousnesses, Except for that there are no external [forms].

-9-

Even in the lower [realms], if all environments And beings were to appear To one sentient being's basis-of-all, The hells would appear to Form Realm gods, And the gods' environments and beings would appear To those in the hells, And various super-sensory objects Would appear to common beings. 

-10-

Directly, its own sense powers and objects [appear to it]. Indirectly, whatever is able to appear as an object To its six [consciousness] collections Is also posited as an object of the basis-of-all.
-11-
An object of the sixth [or mental consciousness]
Other than a sense power or a sense object
Does not become an object of a basis-of-all
Because the sixth [consciousness] has imputed objects
And the basis-of-all is devoid of conception of detail.

-12-
Because it is the basis of infusion of latencies
And because it operates in a single continuum
With manifest virtue and nonvirtue,
It is established as undefiled and neutral.

-13-
Because [it is] neutral and unclear
[Its accompaniers] are fixed at five: contact and so forth.

-14-
The [accompanying] feeling is the middle one.

-15-
Because of the use of this as a self
It is [called] a basis-of-all.

-16-
It operates without discontinuity until remainderless
Nirvāṇa or the vajra-like [meditative stabilization].
-17-
That supported, the seed basis-of-all,
Is the potencies which have been deposited
By the infusers in the basis of infusion
When [those infusers] approach cessation.

-18-
A basis of infusion has five features:
Enduring, neutral, infusable,
It is related with the infusers
And is invariably a support.

-19-
The external and the internal,
The two which are unmanifest,
The conventional and the ultimate--
These are asserted as the six types of seeds.

-20-
Alternatively, there are three latencies:
[those of] verbalization,
The false view of self, and the causal branches of existence.

-21-
The seeds for the common and the uncommon,
Or the feeling and unfeeling, are of four types.
Again, four are mentioned:
[Latencies of] the assumption of bad situations,
the thoroughly purified,
And [latencies which] have and have not been used.

A latency, furthermore, is neither a single
Nor a different substantial entity from [its] support.

They are not one [entity] because the seeds [then] would
Have observed objects and aspect and the seeds
Of the five transmigrations would be mixed,
And because the realms also would be mixed.

They are not [separate entities] because [then]
There would be two bases-of-all on a single support.

Therefore, [the seeds] are not expressible
As one or different from [their] support;
For, they merely abide as imputed existents.
-27-
Whether depositors are virtuous, [nonvirtuous or neutral],
The latencies deposited [in a basis-of-all] are neutral.

-28-
They are [by some] asserted to be full-fledged
Virtue and nonvirtue, but without proof.

-29-
There are three assertions on the way latencies
Are deposited: natural abiding,
Generation of the formerly nonexistent, and both of these.

-30-
[The seeds] are [called] basis-of-all
because [they] connect
All thoroughly afflicted phenomena
To entities of causes or effects.

-31-
Therefore, [a Bodhisattva] who has attained power
And a [Hīnayānīst] Foe Destroyer have no basis-of-all
Because of not having the two reasons for positing
[something a "basis-of-all"].
The definition of the afflicted mentality
Is a defiled but neutral false view
Of the fruitional component of the basis-of-all
    as a [self-sufficient] self
[Associated] only with nine [mental factors]:
    contact, attachment, and so forth.

[Meditative equipoise of] cessation [and] meditative
    stabilization [on emptiness] are times
    of temporary cessation;
Final [cessation] is [with attainment of the position
    of Bodhisattva] who has attained mastery
    or [Hīnayāna] Poe Destroyer.

Although the misconception of a person,
The reason for positing [the mentality] as afflicted,
    has ceased [in these two],
The two faults of there being [then]
    no mental consciousness
And having attained [the wisdom of] equality
    are cast far away
Because [they] have the mere type of that
And because [they] have not ceased the potential
to generate the misconception of phenomena.

-35-
One should realize, through believable scripture
And reasoning, that there exist,
Separate from the six consciousnesses,
A mentality and a mind-basis-of-all.

-36-
Although limitless reasonings proving
[the existence of these two]
Are discussed in the texts of the school of Yogic Practice,
They may be included in eight: impossibility
of appropriation,
A first [consciousness], clarity [of thought],
seeds, actions,
Bodily feeling, meditative equipoise, and death.
Hence, these should be set forth.

-37-
The mind-basis-of-all is also taught
in the sacred books of the Hīnayāna
Under its synonyms basis-of-all, root consciousness,
Causal branch of [cyclic] existence,
and aggregate for the duration.
The basis-of-all spoken of thus is asserted
By three [Hinayānists], Vasumitra, Vāmana, and Ghoṣhaka,
As referring to the aggregates, feeling, and the false view
Of the disintegrating [aggregates as a real self],
respectively.

These three modes [of interpretation] are certainly not unsuitable
In the system of the lower vehicle;
Still, Mahāyānists' assertions of the import of these scriptures
To be [the existence of] a mind-basis-of-all
Is very much better; for, the interpretations
Of Vasumitra and the others are fallacious.

If there were no afflicted mentality,
There would be the faults of the nonexistence
Of unmixed ignorance, similarity with the five [Sense consciousnesses], difference
In meditative absorptions, and contextual etymology.
There would be the faults that there would not exist
A conception of an I [in] the continuum
of one born in the Discriminationless.
Possession of a misconception of an I
[Would be] in all ways unfeasible.
Therefore, the existence of an afflicted mentality
should be understood.

-41-

The assertion that the seventh is the appropriating
consciousness,
Of a presentation of three bases-of-all,
And that the ninth is the stainless consciousness
Is the system of Samyaksatya.

-42-

If there were to exist a principal consciousness
Separate from the eight consciousness collections,
It would [absurdly] be a static functioning thing.
Hence, there is no proof for the assertion
of nine consciousness collections.

-43-

It is claimed that all consciousnesses are a single,
mental consciousness
Because one is spoken of in the "Chapter on Brahmins"
And in the Sūtra Teaching the Twelve Sources:
   a single mental consciousness
Merely designated with individual names
When it moves individually to [its] supports,


Dzong-ka-ba's ROOT VERSES

the six sense powers,
And [because] of the explanation that the
six consciousnesses
Are the mind source.

-44-

Because the meaning of [these] scriptural passages
Is that [a consciousness] other [than the sense
consciousnesses] is able [to apprehend phenomena]
And because the sense consciousnesses
would [absurdly] apprehend
Hidden phenomena and past or future phenomena,
The assertion of a single consciousness collection
is a delusion.

-45-

Hence, the eight consciousnesses are established
Through believable scripture and reasoning.
Scholars not discouraged about secret topics
Should, therefore, assert only eight.

-46-

Through the virtue from this clear exposition
Of the difficult topics of [afflicted] mentality
and [mind-]basis-of-all,
Which [I] the mendicant Lo-sang-drak-ba
Composed in reliance on my Guru's speech,
According as it does with the assertion
of the greatest scholars,
May the Subduer [Budha's] teaching spread!

***