WHY DID DHARMAKĪRTI WRITE THE COMMENTARY?

Jam-yang-shay-pa’s
Decisive Analysis of Dharmakīrti’s
“Commentary on Valid Cognition”
Introduction 1

Hiroshi Nemoto

Edited by Jeffrey Hopkins

UMA INSTITUTE
FOR TIBETAN STUDIES
Why did Dharmakīrti Write the Commentary?
Why did Dharmakīrti Write the Commentary?

Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Decisive Analysis of Dharmakīrti’s “Commentary on Valid Cognition”: Introduction 1

Hiroshi Nemoto

Edited by Jeffrey Hopkins

UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies
uma-tibet.org
Expanding Wisdom and Compassion
UMA Great Books Translation Project

Supported by generous grants from
the Yeshe Khorlo Foundation
the Pierre and Pamela Omidyar Fund
the Silicon Valley Community Foundation
and a bequest from Daniel E. Perdue

Translating texts from the heritage of Tibetan and Inner Asian Buddhist systems, the project focuses on the study and contemplation of Great Indian Books and Tibetan commentaries from the Go-mang College syllabus as well as a related theme on the fundamental innate mind of clear light in Tantric traditions. A feature of the Project is the usage of consistent vocabulary and format throughout the translations.

Publications are available online without cost under a Creative Commons License with the understanding that downloaded material must be distributed for free: http://uma-tibet.org. UMA stands for Union of the Modern and the Ancient (gsar rnying zung 'jug khang). The UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies is a non-profit 501(c)3 organization.

UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies
7330 Harris Mountain Lane
Dyke, VA 22935-1008
USA

Version: June, 2018

Library of Congress Control Number:

Nemoto, Hiroshi (1978-)
Why did dharmakīrti write the commentary?: jam-yang-shay-pa’s decisive analysis of dharmakīrti’s “commentary on valid cognition”: introduction 1/ by Hiroshi Nemoto.
Includes bibliographical references.

1. 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa ngag dbang brtson grus, 1648-1722. Tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi mtia’ dpyod thar lam rab gsal tshad ma’i ’od brgya ’bar ba. 2. Dge-lugs-pa (Sect)--Doctrines. 3. Dharmakīrti. 4. Wisdom—Religious aspects--Buddhism.
## Contents

**Introduction** ...................................................................................................... 7  
1. The meaning of the title ............................................................................. 9  
2. The purpose and so forth of the *Commentary on Valid Cognition*...... 10  
3. Editions consulted .................................................................................... 11

**Technical Notes** .............................................................................................. 13

**Jam-yang-shay-pa’s *Decisive Analysis of (Dharmakīrti’s) “Commentary on Valid Cognition”*** ................................................................. 15  
1. The meaning of the beginning section {2 parts} ...................................... 27  
   A. The meaning of the title ................................................................. 27  
      1. **Decisive Analysis of the four properties—the purpose and so forth—**  
         of this [*Commentary on Valid Cognition*] {2 parts}.............. 27  
         a. Refutation [of others’ mistakes] ............................................ 28  
         b. Our own system {5 parts} ...................................................... 89  
            1) The body of the treatise .................................................. 89  
            2) The subject matter of the treatise ................................. 89  
               [A) Eight categories of logic] ......................................... 95  
               [B) The sequence of direct perception and inference] .... 103  
               [C) The structure of the chapters] ................................. 111  
            3) The purpose of the treatise ............................................ 115  
            4) The essential purpose of the treatise ............................. 125  
            5) The relationship ............................................................. 127

**Abbreviations** ................................................................................................. 129

**Bibliography of Works Cited** ...................................................................... 131  
1. Sūtras ...................................................................................................... 131  
2. Works in Sanskrit and Tibetan ................................................................. 131  
3. Other Works ............................................................................................ 140
Introduction

The text translated here is the first part of the Decisive Analysis of the Commentary on Valid Cognition (hereafter “Decisive Analysis”) by Jamyang-shay-pa-ngag-wang-tson-dru (1648–1721). The Decisive Analysis is a large commentary on Dharmakīrti’s (ca. 600–660) Commentary on Valid Cognition, a masterpiece of Buddhist logic and epistemology. Up to the present day, the Decisive Analysis has been used as a textbook at Drepung Gomang, Labrang Tashi-khyil, and other allied institutes of the Ge-lug-pa sect.

Jamyang-shay-pa composed the first chapter of his Decisive Analysis at the age of fifty-three in Iron Dragon year, which corresponds to 1700 CE, at the request of De-si Sang-gyay-gya-tshod (1653–1705). According to his biography, Jamyang-shay-pa was asked by De-si to make a teaching manual for the first chapter of the Commentary on Valid Cognition in accordance with the tenets of Dharmottara’s Correct Commentary. Since De-si deemed that there were considerable disagreements between Dharmottara and Khay-drub Ge-leg-pal-sang (1385–1438), the latter of whom De-si deeply disliked, he expected that Jamyang-shay-pa would refute Khay-drub-je’s explanation of Dharmakīrti’s theory in favor of Dharmottara’s. To De-si’s disappointment, however, Jamyang-shay-pa never criticized Khay-drub-je. Jamyang-shay-pa instead quoted many passages from Khay-drub-je’s commentary on the Commentary on Valid Cognition to justify his own opinion, for Jamyang-shay-pa highly evaluated Khay-drub-je as a matchless scholar among the disciples of Tsong-kha-pa (1357–1419). As a result, Jamyang-shay-pa’s Decisive Analysis on the first chapter was far from contenting De-si. It was probably for this reason that

---

a 'jam dbyangs bzhad pa ngag dbang brtson 'grus.
b pramāṇavārttika (tshad ma rnam 'grel).
c lcags 'brug gi lo.
d sde srid sangs rgyas rgya mtsho.
e This is reported in Jamyang-shay-pa’s biography written by Kön-chog-jig-may-wang-po (1728–1791), Kun mkhyen 'jam dbyangs bzhad pa'i rnam thar (Lanzhou: Kun su'u mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1987), 85–86.
f 'thad ldan. This is a commentary on Dharmakīrti’s Ascertainment of Valid Cognition (pramāṇaviṇīcaya, tshad ma rnam nges) titled Commentarial Explanation of (Dharmakīrti’s) “Ascertainment of Valid Cognition” (pramāṇaviṇīcayatākā, tshad ma rnam par nges pa'i 'grel bshad / 'thad ldan / 'thad ldan che ba [Greater Logicality]).
g mkhas grub dge legs dpal bzang.
h tsong kha pa.
Jam-yang-shay-pa did not, or could not complete the remaining three chapters at that time. It was only after he returned to Amdo Province that he set about composing the second and third chapters. His biography tells us that he composed the second chapter at the age of sixty-five in Water Dragon year, which corresponds to 1712 CE. We may therefore assume that the (unfinished) third chapter was written not earlier than that year.

While the first chapter of the Decisive Analysis contains a detailed analysis of each topic concerning the theory of inference, the other three chapters are unfinished. The second chapter presents several important observations on the definition of valid cognition, the existence of transmigration, and so forth; the third chapter is only a sketch and does not provide a full discussion of Dharmakīrti’s theory of direct perception; and the fourth chapter was not written at all.

Now, let us look at the contents of the first chapter of the Decisive Analysis. The first chapter, which consists of 306 folios in the Labrang edition, comprises a detailed exegesis of Dharmakīrti’s theory of “inference for oneself.” This is one of the most extensive Tibetan commentaries ever written on the first chapter of the Commentary on Valid Cognition. The structure of the Decisive Analysis basically coincides with that of the Commentary on Valid Cognition. The following list shows the main topics that are discussed in the first chapter of the Decisive Analysis.

- the meaning of the title
- an analysis of the purpose, and so forth, of the Commentary on Valid Cognition
- explanation of the opening stanzas of the treatise
- the meaning of the term pākṣa (phyogs)
- the definition of a proper sign
- an analysis of eighteen theses
- the definition of a quasi-sign
- the definition and classification of a proper effect sign
- the definition and classification of a proper nature sign

---

*a chu 'brug gi lo.*

*b I have not found information as to the year of composition of the third chapter.*

c *rang don rjes dpag.*

d *rtags yang dag.*

e *dam bca' bco brgyad.*

f *rtags ltar snang.*

g *'bras rtags yang dag.*

h *rang bzhin gyi rtags yang dag.*
• the definition and classification of a proper nonobservation sign
• the definition of the three modes
• valid cognition ascertaining the invariable relationship between the sign and the property to be established
• discussion of a proper sign based on belief.

It is to be noted is that Dharmakīrti’s theory of anyāpohā (gzhon sel) is not treated in the Decisive Analysis although it is an important topic in the Commentary on Valid Cognition. It is clear from this that Jam-yang-shay-pa’s main concern here is to examine the theory of inference itself, and not other related issues that are discussed within the framework of that theory.

The present volume covers the first two topics enumerated above. Let us summarize the main points of each topic.

1. THE MEANING OF THE TITLE

The title of Dharmakīrti’s text is “Pramāṇavārttika,” which is translated here as “Commentary on Valid Cognition” for the sake of conciseness. As regards the meaning of the word pramāṇa (“valid cognition”) in the title, Jam-yang-shay-pa criticizes opinions of others like Jayanta, and establishes his own idea of how to explain the meaning of the word. Jam-yang-shay-pa considers that pramāṇa here refers to the treatises that discuss valid cognition, and not valid cognition itself. Therefore, he says that the word is used only in its metaphorical sense of “valid cognition.”

Thus, according to Jam-yang-shay-pa, “Pramāṇavārttika” stands for “a commentary on the treatises of valid cognition.” What then are the treatises of valid cognition? The most relevant treatise is, of course, Dignāga’s (ca. 480–540) Compilation of Valid Cognition, which is a compilation of Dignāga’s own Gate of Reasoning. Another explanation is that the treatises commented on by Dharmakīrti are the Buddha’s scriptures, specifically, those included in the third turning of the wheel of doctrine. Following this explanation, Jam-yang-shay-pa suggests that the Commentary on Valid Cognition is also intended as a commentary on the Buddha’s words that reveal the nature of valid cognition.

---

a ma dmigs pa'i rtags yang dag.
b tshul gsum.
c yid ches kyi rtags yang dag.
d pramāṇasamuccaya (tshad ma kun btus).
e nyāyamukha (rigs sgo).
2. THE PURPOSE AND SO FORTH OF THE

**COMMENTARY ON VALID COGNITION**

Before examining the contents of the text, Jam-yang-shay-pa analyzes the overall idea of the *Commentary on Valid Cognition* in terms of the four categories: the subject matter, purpose, essential purpose, and relationship or connection of the subject matter to the purpose, as well as of the purpose of the essential purpose.

The subject matter of the text is the entire doctrine of the Buddha. Jam-yang-shay-pa says that in Dharmakīrti’s second chapter the Buddha’s doctrine is elaborated in terms the path to liberation and omniscience, and in the third chapter it is discussed in terms of the interpretable and definitive. Furthermore, he says that the first chapter is what explains reasons that serve as a means of determining such topics by oneself, and that the fourth chapter is one that explains the proper way to teach these things to others.

The purpose of the text is to make each reader comprehend the flawlessness of the Buddha, his doctrine (chos, dharma)—which consists of scripture and realization—and the spiritual community (dge 'dun, saṅgha) or practitioners who achieve what is taught by the Buddha, thereby leading the reader to achieve goodness. Jam-yang-shay-pa holds that the intended readers are not necessarily Buddhists, in addition to those that are Hearers, Solitary Realizers, or the followers of Great Vehicle. He considers that the text must be studied by those who lack a lineage and merely pursue worldly pleasures, and even by those who have entered exceedingly wrong paths such as the Lokāyata, that is, those who have diverged far from the correct view.

The essential purpose of the text is to cause readers gradually attain the supreme valid cognition (namely, omniscience) and attain the supreme state of a Buddha. This implies that, according to Jam-yang-shay-pa’s understanding, the *Commentary on Valid Cognition* is not merely a treatise of secular science but rather one which serves as a means of achieving a religious purpose.

---

*a* brjod bya.

*b* dgos pa.

*c* nying dgos.

*d* 'brel ba.

*e* nyan thos.

*f* rang sangs rgyas.

*g* theg chen.

*h* rigs chad.
The relationship/connection of the text is stated in terms of causal relationship. Its essential purpose is causally related to its purpose; and the purpose causally relates to hearing the contents of this treatise.

3. EDITIONS CONSULTED

Two basic editions of Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Decisive Analysis of the “Commentary on Valid Cognition” Fully Revealing the Path of Liberation: Hundreds of Blazing Lights of Valid Cognition” were consulted:

1. tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi mtha’ dpyod thar lam rab gsal tshad ma’i ’od brgya ’bar ba. Published at Go-mang College in Tibet, date unknown. Abbreviated reference: “2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa,” so named because of being acquired in Lhasa, Tibet, at Go-mang College in 2015 by Jongbok Yi for the UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies.

2. tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi mtha’ dpyod thar lam rab gsal tshad ma’i ’od brgya ’bar ba, BDRC W22186.1, which is a PDF of: bla brang bkra shis ’khyil, bla brang brka shis ’khyil dgon, publishing date unknown. Abbreviated reference: “2011 BDRC bla brang.”

The digital Tibetan text of Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Decisive Analysis of the “Commentary on Valid Cognition” provided in this book was supplied by the Drepung Gomang Library of Go-mang College in Mundgod, Karnataka State, India, which was likely based on both of the above editions. It has been edited primarily in accordance with the “2011 BDRC bla brang.”
Technical Notes

It is important to recognize that:

- translations and editions of texts are given in the Bibliography;
- the names of Indian Buddhist schools of thought are translated into English in a wish to increase accessibility for non-specialists;
- for the names of Indian scholars and systems used in the body of the text, ch, sh, and ṣh are used instead of the more usual c, ś, and ș for the sake of easy pronunciation by non-specialists; however, cch is used for cch, not chchh. Within parentheses the usual transliteration system for Sanskrit is used;
- transliteration of Tibetan is done in accordance with a system devised by Turrell Wylie; see “A Standard System of Tibetan Transcription,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 22 (1959): 261-267;
- the names of Tibetan authors and orders are given in “essay phonetics” for the sake of easy pronunciation; the system is aimed at internet searchability;
- titles of added subsections are given in square brackets;
- definitions are in bold type.
Jam-yang-shay-pa’s

DECISIVE ANALYSIS OF
(DHARMAKĪRTI’S)
“COMMENTARY ON
VALID COGNITION”

Key to the colorization: In situations of debate the Tibetan text and the translation are highlighted in three colors: black, blue, and red. Blue print represents what Jam-yang-shay-pa considers to be right positions, while red print represents what Jam-yang-shay-pa considers to be wrong positions. Words in black are other information or function structurally. In the Tibetan, a turquoise background indicates material added in place of ellipses, and a magenta highlight sets off ellipsis indicators when the elided part has been filled in.
From Jam-yang-shay-pa’s
Decisive Analysis of the “Commentary on Valid Cognition” Fully Revealing the Path of Liberation:
Hundreds of Blazing Lights of Valid Cognition

Decisive Analysis of the First Chapter: Necklace of Those with Clear Mind and Entrance for the Fortunate

[Expression of worship]

Namo guru ca nāthāmaṇḍjughoṣau ca svarasvastyai (Homage to Guru, Protector Maṇjughoṣha, and Sarasvatī.)

I always bow down to the feet of and go for refuge in the Foremost Venerable Guru [Maṇjughoṣha], the Foremost father [Tsong-kha-pa], and his spiritual sons.

Glory to the Buddha who—by seeing all phenomena just as they are and by accomplishing pure perfection abundantly—was born to be an authoritative being.

Who—having actualized the untainted body of attributes out of empathy for migrants as if each of them were his only child—teaches the three vehicles and the coarse and subtle

---

a This should be emended to read: Namo gurave ca nāṭha-maṇḍjughoṣāya ca svarasvastyai ca.
b Also known as Svarasvati.
c tshad mar gyur pa: literally, “one who has become a means of valid cognition.”
d chos sku.
e ’gro.
four truths,
Who—having overcome the faults of attachment and so forth,
the manifest, their seeds, and predisposing latencies—has
firmly realized suchness, thereby entirely going to bliss,
And who—protecting [beings] from the abyss of cyclic existence
and from the abyss of peace [for oneself alone] by teaching in
accordance with the fact—always resides at the top of all reli-
gious assemblies.

O you two—[white and yellow] Mañjughoṣhas—embodied as
Victors’ youthful children, but fathers of all Victors,
Raising swords of intense wisdom cutting through all wrong
views,
Staying in the lotus-lake at my heart
Please bestow on me today the wisdom to know all the knowa-
ble.

---

a 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (1b.3) reads *ston*; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (1b.3) reads *son*.
b 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (1b.3) reads *skyob*; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (1b.3) reads *skyobs*. 
O Sarasvati, please decorate my mind
With hundreds of colors of insights
Like the Sindhu River decorated by a slender girl’s wine
And like a *kumuda* lotus decorated by moonlight ("rays of ambrosia").

All Victors smiled and laughed as they observed here
That the world was illuminated by the elegant explanations of the great masters,
Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, skilled in dispelling all the darkness of mistaken, though very clever conceptions of faulty adversaries,
And that thereby their fame spread throughout the threefold world.

I bow down to Tsong-kha-pa, unmatched leader yet openly revealing the three secrecies in conformity with migrators’ minds (blo),
By nature unchangeably wise, righteous, and good (bzang) yet entirely destroying the troops of demons,
Endowed with the eight qualities of mastery of blazing renown

---

\[a\] 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (2a.3) reads *brgal*; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (1b.7) reads *rgal*.
\[b\] Three secrecies of body, speech, and mind in accordance with the dispositions, thoughts, and tendencies of high, middle, and low trainees, called “secret” because no sentient being’s thought can encompass them.
\[c\] *dbang phyug bgrya rdo*.
(grags pa), teacher of the three levels,\(^a\)
And like all actual Victors, gloriously at the top of whole assembly of the learned and adept.

O spiritual sons of the Omniscient One, you two [Gyal-tshab-je and Khay-drub-je] are the sun and moon over the earth,
The crown ornaments of learned scholars whose minds shine
With a large collection of objects of knowledge, subtle and minute,
Just as the surface of the sky\(^b\) shines with constellations.

O Father King of Victors [the Dalai Lama] and his spiritual son [the Paṇchen Lama], together with their incarnations,
Omniscient protectors of three realms of the world,
Endowed with the good qualities equal to those of the entirety of mundane existence and peace\(^c\) collected together;

\(^a\) Above, on, and below the ground; or the Desire, Form, and Formless Realms.
\(^b\) kun gsal ngos.
\(^c\) srid zhi'i yon tan.
Just like the sun ("the ruler of twelve months") unmatched and shining in this world.

I bow down from my heart to feet of the Lord of Speech, The Omniscient Lo-sang-gya-tsho\(^a\) [the Fifth Dalai Lama] Whose glorious and beauteous aspects of three secrecies are not characterized Even if the entirety of all the good qualities of purification and release are collected together.

The glorious guru, chief of Vajradharas [the fifth Paṇchen Lama Lo-sang-ye-shay] Is laudable in spreading the teaching of the Second Victor, Lo-sang (blo bzang) [Tsong-kha-pa], and in being intent On the dance of the pristine wisdom of Limitless Illumination\(^b\) [Amitābha].

---

\(^a\) blo bzang rgya mtso.  
\(^b\) snang mtha’/snang ba mtha’ yas, another name for Amitābha.
I bow down to the feet of Lokeshvara [the Bodhisattva Avalokiteshvara]
Holding a white lotus in hand, who acting like a human,
Spreads the second Victor’s teaching, the sole supreme essence
Of the Buddha’s teaching, bringing help and happiness throughout the three realms of world.

O supreme spiritual friends, kings of doctrine, you disseminate and propagate
The second Buddha Mañjunātha’s explanations, practices, and teachings
Throughout the earth via wisdom, empathy, and power,
Manifestations of Mañjushrī embodied by means of great magical emanation.

I bow down to the beneficent, matchless spiritual friends, the fourfold Mañjunātha and so forth,
Holding the modes of doctrine of Sūtra and Tantra like Ananda,
Endowed with perfect aspiration very high like [Meru] the Lord of Mountains,
Combining learnedness, discipline, and goodness.

\(^{a} 2011 \text{BDRC bla brang (2b.5) reads chos kyi; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (2a.6) reads gtsug na.} \)
[Pledge to complete the composition]

Just as the Ruler of Humans [the Fifth Dalai Lama], omniscient seer of the five sciences,\(^a\)
In a transmission of a series of a day-making lineage of holy lives
Of divine offspring—Suchandra,\(^b\) Aniruddha,\(^c\) Asaṅga, Devaputra,\(^d\) and so forth
Commanded [me] to place authoritative Indian texts as the foundation,

\[\text{I will explain here the intended meaning of the } \text{Aphorisms [Dignāga’s Compilation] and [Dharmakīrti’s] Seven Treatises As very clearly as the drawings on the silk cloth of the King of the East, } \text{Dong Jun,} \text{ By means of hundreds of scriptures and reasonings endowed with the light of millions of suns}\]

\(^a\) Internal science, logic, grammar, medicine, and mechanical arts.
\(^b\) zla bzang.
\(^c\) ma ’gags.
\(^d\) lha sras.
\(^e\) 2011 BDRC bla brang (2b.6) lacks the first two lines which appear in an extra errata line in 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (2a.8).
\(^f\) Correcting mig in 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (2a.8) to mi in accordance with 2011 BDRC bla brang (2b.7).
\(^g\) stong khun (= tün kus).
As if Dignāga and Dharmakīrti came [here to teach their treatises].

May the intelligent who desire a clear and unconfused explanation—with reasoning by the force of actualities—

Of the mode of progress to liberation and omniscience,
The meaning of the entirety of the Sūtras and Tantras,
The supreme ford to all scholars and practitioners, listen to this.

Since I do not make myself a laughingstock for having the wish to save others
From the mud of reification while I myself am bound by hundreds of fetters of doubts
Like a madman trying to tame an elephant,
May you take delight in this system of the great scholars of India ("the land of Superiors").

---

\(^{\text{a}}\) dngos stobs rigs pa.
\(^{\text{b}}\) 2011 BDRC bla brang (3a.3) reads sgrog; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (2b.2) reads sgrags.
Concerning this, here regarding the explanation of the contents of Dhar- 
makīrti’s *Commentary on Valid Cognition*, there are three parts: the mean-
ing of the beginning section, the meaning of the main text, and the meaning 
of the ending section.
I. THE MEANING OF THE BEGINNING SECTION {2 parts}

This has two parts: the meaning of the title and the translator’s homage.

A. THE MEANING OF THE TITLE

The title reads:

In the language of India: pramāṇavārttītakārikā (pra mā na bār ti kā kā ri ka), Commentary on Valid Cognition.

In the language of Tibet: tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi tshig le'ur byas pa.

1. Decisive Analysis of the four properties—the purpose and so forth—of this [Commentary on Valid Cognition] {2 parts}

This has two parts: refutation [of others’ mistakes] and our own system.

a 2011 BDRC bla brang (3a.4) reads byung; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (2b.4) reads gsungs.
a. Refutation [of others’ mistakes]

I. As regards the topic, the purpose of the treatise and so forth

Jayanta’s Commentary on (Prajñākaragupta’s) “Ornament” says:

[The term] pramāṇa (“means of valid cognition”) in the title Pramāṇavārttika (Commentary on Valid Cognition) is to be taken as high sayings in general, and what is to be commented on by [Dharmakīrti’s] Commentary is the thought of [Buddha’s] high sayings in general, but it is not that it comments on the meaning of Dignāga’s Compilation of Valid Cognition. Furthermore, since [Dharmakīrti’s Commentary] does not contain the words “I will explain the text of the Compilation,” it is not logically feasible to assert that he composed [the Commentary] for the sake of refusing accusations against the master Dignāga.

---

a These are the treatise’s subject matter, purpose, essential purpose, and the relationship among these, commonly called “the four, the purpose and so forth” (dgos sogs bzhi) even though the four begin with the subject matter (brjod bya).
b rgyan gyi ‘grel bshad rgyal ba can.
c 2011 BDRC bla brang, 3a.5; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 2b.4; 2007 Taipei codex reprint, 3.10. This is paraphrase; the actual text follows.
d tshad ma.
e gsung rab spyi.
f rnam ’grel.
g dgongs pa.
h tshad ma kun btus.
i brnyas pa spangs pa’i phyir.
Jayanta’s Commentary [on (Prajñākaragupta’s) “Ornament”] says:\(^a\)

It is unreasonable to assert that [Dharmakīrti] composed the Commentary on Valid Cognition as a commentary on that text [that is, Dignāga’s Compilation of Valid Cognition] out of compassion, desiring to help people who are mistaken into committing the unseemly act\(^b\) of accusing the master [Dignāga]. There is no valid argument to [justify] this [opinion], since the words “I will explain his [Dignāga’s] text” do not exist in [Dharmakīrti’s] text.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that to explain the meaning of “valid cognition” (pramāṇa) and “person who is a means of valid cognition”\(^d\) in Dignāga’s Sūtra\(^c\) [that is, his Compilation of Valid Cognition].\(^f\)

---

\(^a\) Jayanta’s Commentary on (Prajñākaragupta’s) “Ornament,” sde dge, tshad ma, de, 2a.4-5.

\(^b\) kha na ma tho ba.

\(^c\) 2011 BDRC bla brang (3b.1) reads thugs rjes; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (2b.6) reads thig pas.

\(^d\) tshad ma'i skyes bu.

\(^e\) tshad ma mdo.

\(^f\) Dignāga’s Compilation of Valid Cognition, Peking, gtan tshigs rig pa, ce, 1b.2-4. The
I bow down to the Buddha who has become a means of valid cognition (pramāṇabhūta), and who takes up the task of saving transmigrants.

this passage in the second chapter of this [Commentary on Valid Cognition by Dharmakīrti].

Valid cognition is non-contradictory knowledge....The Supramundane Victor possessing this is a means of valid cognition. does not occur because [according to you] your thesis is logically feasible. If you [incorrectly] accept [that this passage explaining the meaning of Dignāga’s Compilation of Valid Cognition does not occur in Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid Cognition”], it very absurdly follows that this text [Dharmakīrti’s Commentary] does not explain the evidential reason why, in Dignāga’s Compilation, the Supramundane Victor is said to be a means of valid cognition! For, you have [incorrectly] accepted [that this passage explaining the meaning of Dignāga’s Compilation of Valid Cognition does not occur in Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid Cognition”]. If you [incorrectly] accept [that this text (that is, Dharmakīrti’s Commentary) does not explain the evidential reason why, in the Compilation, the Supramundane Victor is said to be a means of valid cognition], it very absurdly follows that you do not know how to explain these passages!

Note that Tibetan version of this stanza reads de ldan for tadvat in accordance with Prajñākaragupta’s commentary, which takes -vat not as the comparative suffix but as the possessive suffix (Ornament, 32.5: tadvān iti kṛtvā; cf. Tillemans 1993: 7; Franco 1997: 17).
Furthermore, as regards [Jayanta’s] statement that [Dharmakīrti’s Commentary] does not contain the words, “I [Dharmakīrti] will explain his [Dignāga’s] text,” it [absurdly] follows that it is not that this statement in the second chapter [of Dharmakīrti’s Commentary]:

[Dignāga] says “bhūtā (become)” in order to refute [the assertion that the Buddha’s being a means of valid cognition is] what is not produced.

is commentary on the word bhūta in [the compound] pramāṇa-bhūta in

---

*Dharmaṇī’s Commentary on Valid Cognition, II.7bc. The Sanskrit is found in Miyasaka (4.3-4): abhūtāvinvṛttaye/ bhūtātīrth[f...]. Jam-yang-shay-pa’s reading of this stanza differs slightly from the canonical translations of the text, which are found in Miyasaka (5.1-2): ma skyes pa ni bzlog don du// gyur pa nyid gsungs de yi phyir//; Jam-yang-shay-pa’s citation reads: ma skyes pa ni bzlog don du// gyur pa zhes ni brjod pa yin//.*
Dignāga’s Compilation because [according to you] your thesis is logically feasible. If you [incorrectly] accept [that it is not] that this statement in the second chapter is commentary on the word bhūta in (the compound) pramāṇa-bhūta in Dignāga’s Compilation, it [absurdly] follows that [Dharmakīrti] does not explain that [Dignāga] in his Compilation uses the word bhūta for the sake of denying the existence of a means of valid cognition that would be permanent because you [incorrectly] have accepted [that it is not] that this statement in the second chapter is commentary on the word bhūta in (the compound) pramāṇa-bhūta in Dignāga’s Compilation. If you [incorrectly] accept [that (Dharmakīrti) does not explain that (Dignāga) in his Compilation uses the word bhūta for the sake of denying the existence of a means of valid cognition that would be permanent], it very absurdly follows that you do not know how to explain the way that [Dharmakīrti] says in the passage above, “[Dignāga] says [bhūta]”!

Furthermore, it [absurdly] follows that it is not that [Dharmakīrti], in the Commentary, explains extensively the meaning of each the three:

\[ \text{rtag pa’i tshad ma.} \]
“Teacher,” “Sugata,” and “Protector,” upon associating his commentary with the root text, Dignāga’s Compilation, where it says, “I bow down to the Teacher, Sugata, and Protector,” because [according to you] your thesis [that it is unreasonable to assert that it is logically feasible that (Dharmakīrti) composed the Commentary on Valid Cognition as a commentary on Dignāga’s Compilation of Valid Cognition out of compassion, desiring to help people who are mistaken into committing the unseemly act of accusing the master (Dignāga)].

If you [incorrectly] accept [that it is not that (Dharmakīrti), in the Commentary, explains extensively the meaning of each the three—“Teacher,” “Sugata,” and “Protector”—upon associating his commentary with the root text, Dignāga’s Compilation, where it says, “I bow down to the Teacher, Sugata, and Protector,”] then because you have [incorrectly] accepted this, it [absurdly] follows that it is not reasonable that [Dharmakīrti] explains [their meaning] by relating [Dignāga’s Compilation and his Commentary in the following ways]:

1. With regard to explaining the meaning of “Teacher,” [Dharmakīrti] says in the second chapter [of the Commentary]:

   Since [Buddha] has familiarized for a long time
   With the means [of eliminating suffering]
   Manifoldly in various aspects,
   It has become evident to him
   What the defects [in objects of abandonment] are

---

a Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on Valid Cognition, II.136c. The Sanskrit is found in Miyasaka (20.30): bahuśo bahudhopāyaṃ kālena bahunāśya ca/ gacchanty abhyasyatas tatra guṇadosāḥ prakāśatām/. 
And what the good qualities [of antidotes] are.

and:

[We] consider this familiarization with the means itself  
To be the teaching [of the Teacher] because [it is done] for that  
purpose.

2. With regard to explaining the meaning of Sugata that very text [Dharmakīrti’s Commentary] gives a brief explanation:

Being a Sugata consists in the triply qualified abandonment of  
the cause [of suffering].

and then having taken the meaning of su in Sugata (bder gshegs) as  
“properly” (legs pa) and the meaning of gata as “abandoned” (spangs pa)  
or “previously occurred” (song ba), takes [Sugata] as “one who has abandoned [the cause of suffering] properly” or “one who [learned] proper techniques preliminarily”, and also having taken the meaning of su as

---

\[\text{(1) Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on Valid Cognition, II.138cd. The Sanskrit is found in } \text{Miyasaka (22.2): upāyābhyaśa evāyām tādārthāyāc chāsānaṃ matām//.}
\]
\[\text{(2) Four lines between these are:}
\]
\[\text{b 2011 BDRC bla brang (4a.2) reads ces; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (3a.6) reads zhes.}
\]
\[\text{(c) Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on Valid Cognition, II.139c. The Sanskrit is found in } \text{Miyasaka (22.5): hetoḥ prahāṇaṁ triguṇaṁ sugatavatvam [...]//.}
\]
\[\text{(d) legs par spangs pa.}
\]
\[\text{(e) thabs legs pa sngon du song ba.}
\]
“entirely” (šhin tu) and the meaning of gata as “realized” (rtogs pa), takes [Sugata as] one who has reached irreversibility, whereby [the cause of suffering] is abandoned entirely, or properly. To explain [su] that very text [Dharmakīrti’s Commentary] says:

Because of not being a base of suffering, properly

and so forth, and to explain the meaning of gata, that very text says:

Because [gata is derived from the verb root] gam, which means “to realize.”

Because of not being a base of suffering, properly

and so forth, and to explain the meaning of gata, that very text says:

Because [gata is derived from the verb root] gam, which means “to realize.”
Furthermore:

1. to explain the inferential sign having three modes\(^{a}\) stated in Dignāga’s *Compilation*:\(^{b}\)
   
   [Inference for oneself consists in] seeing an object from a sign having the three modes.

   it [absurdly] follows that it is not that that very text [Dharmakīrti’s *Commentary*] says:\(^{c}\)

   A [valid] reason\(^{d}\) is a property of the subject. It is pervaded by a factor of the [subject].

2. and to explain the way “ascertainment”\(^{e}\) is used in specifying the individual three modes stated in Dignāga’s *Compilation*:\(^{f}\)

   [The three modes of a proper sign consists in its] presence in the object of inference

   As well as in that which is similar to it, and its absence in their absence.

---

\(^{a}\) *tsul gsum pa’i rtags.*


\(^{c}\) Dharmakīrti’s *Commentary on Valid Cognition, I.1ab*. The Sanskrit is found in Miyasaka (114.5): pakṣadharmas tadamśena vyāpto hetus [...]/. 

\(^{d}\) *gtan tshigs.*

\(^{e}\) *nges pa*. Dharmakīrti holds that Dignāga implicitly speaks of an ascertainment.

\(^{f}\) Dignāga’s *Compilation of Valid Cognition, Peking, gtan tshigs rig pa, ce*, 4b.2-3. The Sanskrit is found in Kitagawa (1973: 96): anumeyevyāto saṁbhāvo nāstītāsat/.
Refutation of Others’ Mistakes on the Meaning of the Title 37

it [absurdly] follows it is not that the [first] chapter “Inference for One-

self” [of Dharmakīrti’s Commentary] says:

He [Dignāga] made expression of ascertainment
Even with regard to [each of] the three modes of a [valid] reason
In order to exclude [invalid reasons] that are unestablished,
Or lead to contradictions, or are deviating.

because [according to you] your thesis [that the words “I (Dharmakīrti) will explain his (the master Dignāga’s) text” do not exist in (Dharmakīrti’s) text] is logically feasible.

If you [incorrectly] accept this, it very absurdly follows that you do not know how to explain the meaning of the two [words] “he” (de yis) and “made [expression]” (mdzad pa)!  

Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on Valid Cognition, I.15. The Sanskrit is found in Miyasaka (116.9-10): hetos triṣv api rūpeṣu niścayas tena varṇitah/ asiddhavi-paritārhavyābhidārṣirviṣpakṣutah/.
Similarly, broadly apply this to other topics, such as “eliminative engagement”\(^a\) and so forth, in the first chapter, and to the [third] chapter “Direct Perception” and the fourth chapter [“Inference for Others”].

2. \textit{About this formulation, the master Jayanta says:}\(^b\) Well then, it follows that it is not that in Dharmakīrti’s 

\begin{itemize}
  \item the meaning of the six contradictions with scriptures;\(^c\)
  \begin{itemize}
    \item He [Dignāga] made expression of ascertainment
    \item Even with regard to [each of] the three modes of a
    \item valid reason
    \item In order to exclude [invalid reasons] that are unestablished,
    \item Or lead to contradictions, or are deviating.\(^d\)
  \end{itemize}

and so forth,

  \item and the assertion that direct perception is devoid of conception\(^e\)
\end{itemize}

are expoundable as being on the thought of earlier masters in the past because [according to you] this is a commentary explaining Dignāga’s thought.

\(^{a}\) sel’jug.

\(^{b}\) 2011 BDRC bla brang, 4b.2; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 3b.6.

\(^{c}\) lung’gal drug.

\(^{d}\) Dharmakīrti’s \textit{Commentary on Valid Cognition}, I.15. Cited above, 37.

\(^{e}\) mngon sum rtog bral.
You have come to accept the sign [which is that this is a commentary explaining Dignāga’s thought. That whatever is a commentary explaining Dignāga’s thought] entails [that it is not that in Dharmakīrti’s Commentary the meaning of the six contradictions with scriptures and the assertion that direct perception is devoid of conception are expoundable as being on the thought of earlier masters in the past] because [according to you] it expounds commentary on Dignāga’s thought alone.

However, you cannot accept [that it is not that in Dharmakīrti’s Commentary the meaning of the six contradictions with scriptures and the assertion that direct perception is devoid of conception are expoundable as being on the thought of earlier masters in the past] because Dignāga restates the oral tradition from the Supramundane Victor to earlier masters that was stated by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu and also merely repeated by Dharmakīrti’s Commentary, like, for example, the [half-]brothers [Asaṅga and Vasubandhu] again and again making statements as when Asaṅga in the section on the five branches of science\(^a\) in his Treatises on the Grounds\(^b\) says:\(^c\)

---

\(^a\) rgya pa′i gnas lnga: internal science, logic, grammar, medicine, and mechanical arts.

\(^b\) sa sde.

\(^c\) I have not found this stanza in the Treatises on the Grounds, but similar passages can be found in Asaṅga’s works. See, for example, Asaṅga’s Summary of Manifest Knowledge, sde dge, sems tsam, ri, 118a.6-7: smra ba rnam par nges pa gang zhe na/ smra ba dang/ smra ba′i zhal che ba dang/ smra ba′i gzhis dang/ smra ba′i rgyan dang/ smra ba chad pas bcad pa dang/ smra ba las ’byung ba dang/ smra ba la gcyes spras byed pa′i chos rnam sro/. The Sanskrit is found in P. Pradhan, Abhidharma Samuccaya of Asanga (Santiniketan:
because Jayanta’s Commentary [on (Prajñākaragupta’s) “Ornament”] says:

This is not an explanation by him [Dharmakīrti] of his [Dignāga’s] system; instead, the master Dignāga also repeats here [in his text the Compilation of Valid Cognition] what has been said before in order to expound on such topics as [the nature of direct perception that is free from conception and so forth, which are traditionally

Visva Bharati Studies 12. 1950), 104.8-9: vādaviṃścayāḥ katamah/ sāmkṣepataḥ saptavi- dhah/ vādah vādādhikaranam vādādhiśṭānam vādālambkārāh vādaniṣṭharam bāde bahukarā dharmās ca//. See also Asaṅga’s Compendium of Ascertainments, sde dge, sems tsam, zhi, 189a.5-6: gtan tshigs kyi rigs pa rnam pa bdun ni ’di lta ste/ smra ba dang/ smra ba'i zhal ce ba dang/ smra ba'i gzhi dang/ smra ba'i rgyan dang/smrava chad pas bcd pa dang/ smrava la'byung ba dang/ smrava ba gches spras la dgos pa'i chos rnam so//.

a 2011 BDRC bla brang (4a.4) reads gyix; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (4a.1) reads gyi.
b 2011 BDRC bla brang (4a.5) reads de yi; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (4a.2) reads de'i.
c Jayanta’s Commentary on (Prajñākaragupta’s) “Ornament,” sde dge, tshad ma, de, 3a.7-3b.1.
discussed by earlier masters, and that the author of the *Commentary* [Dharmakīrti] also repeats [what has been discussed by earlier masters] in order to expound on [those topics] in exactly the same way. Therefore, it is not that [Dharmakīrti’s *Commentary*] is dependent on the explanation of his [Dignāga’s] text.

and so forth,

and also the same text [Jayanta’s commentary] says:

[Dharmakīrti] did so [that is, referred to passages from Dignāga’s *Compilation of Valid Cognition*] for the sake of ease in exposition, but not for the sake of expounding on his text.

There is entailment; for, this latter passage asserts that it is for the sake of ease in exposition that [Dharmakīrti] cited the master Dignāga’s statements concerning [the definition of] a property of the subject and so forth and did not cite other sūtras and treatises.

---

a 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (4a.6) reads *brgyud*; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (4a.3) reads *rgyud*.

b Jayanta’s *Commentary on (Prajñākārāgupta’s) Ornament*, sde dge, tshad ma, de, 3b.3.
Our response: As regards the root consequence [which is that]:

it follows that it is not that in Dharmakīrti’s Commentary:

- the meaning of the six contradictions with scriptures;
  He (Dignāga) made expression of ascertainment
  Even with regard to (each of) the three modes of a
  (valid) reason
  In order to exclude (invalid reasons) that are unestablished,
  Or lead to contradictions, or are deviating.⁹
  and so forth,

- and the assertion that direct perception is devoid of conception⁰
  are expoundable as being on the thought of earlier masters in the past
  because (according to you) this is a commentary explaining Dignāga’s
  thought.]

it follows [that whatever is a commentary explaining Dignāga’s thought] does not entail [that it is not that in Dharmakīrti’s Commentary the meaning of the six contradictions with scriptures and the assertion that direct perception is devoid of conception are expoundable as being on the thought of earlier masters in the past] because there is no contradiction in the three, this text [Dharmakīrti’s Commentary]:

1. explicitly commenting on the thought of Dignāga’s Aphorisms on Valid Cognition [his Compilation of Valid Cognition].
2. and 3. and commenting on the word [of the Buddha] and on the assertions of earlier masters [such as Asaṅga and so forth].

If [you say that the reason] is not established, it [absurdly] follows that the subject, Dignāga’s Autocommentary on the “Compilation of Valid Cognition”

---

⁰ mngon sum rtog bral.
tion,” is [not commenting on the word (of the Buddha) and on the assertions of earlier masters] because [of commenting on the thought of Dignāga’s Aphorisms on Valid Cognition]. You have asserted the three spheres\(^a\) [that is, the reason (rtags khas langs pa), the opposite of “thesis” of the consequence (bsal ba’i bzlog phyogs khas langs pa), and the entailment between them (khyab pa khas langs pa)].

Similarly, flinging [unwanted consequences] with respect to Vasubandhu’s Autocommentary on the Treasury of Manifest Knowledge, its subcommentaries,\(^b\) and so forth. And it appears that this has refuted well Tibetans’ assertion that [Dharmakīrti’s Commentary] is a commentary solely on Dignāga’s Compilation of Valid Cognition. Look at those [works composed by Tibetans] for expansion.

\(^{a}\) ’khor gsum khas.
\(^{b}\) mngon pa mdzod kyi rang ’grel dang ’grel bshad.
3. Also, someone asserts: [Dharmakīrti’s Commentary] chiefly describes the eight categories of logic as its own system; therefore, it is a text common to Insiders and Outsiders [Buddhists and non-Buddhists].

Our response: Well then, it [absurdly] follows [that (Dharmakīrti’s Commentary) chiefly describes the four quasi-categories of logic as its own system] because [according to you] it chiefly describes each of the eight categories as its own system. You have asserted the reason. You have come to assert the three spheres [of self-contradiction].

If you [incorrectly] accept [that (Dharmakīrti’s Commentary) chiefly describes the four quasi-categories of logic as its own system], it [absurdly] follows that [Dharmakīrti’s Commentary] chiefly describes even the following as its own system:

• signs endowed with [only] one mode;

---

a 2011 BDRC bla brang, 5a.5; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 3b.1.
b rtog ge’i tshig don bryad.
c phyi nang thun mong gi gzhung.
d 2011 BDRC bla brang (5a.5) reads pas; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (4b.1) reads pa.
e Quasi-direct perception, quasi-inference, quasi-proof-statement, and quasi-refutation.
f ‘khor gsum song.
g Ngag-wang-pal-dan briefly describes the Kṣhapanas’ (that is, Jaina’s) assertion on one mode:

That which is the three modes is not feasible as the definition of a proper reason
• inferential signs endowed with six modes [as postulated by Īsh-vara

casesen];
• Śāṅkhyas’ three valid cognitions: the two, direct perception and infe-

tence, and valid cognition arisen from sound, which is neither of those
two;a
• Naiyāyikas’ four valid cognitions: direct perception, inference, anal-

gogy, and arisen from sound;c
• Mīmāṃsakas’ six valid cognitions: direct perception, inference, anal-

gogy, arisen from sound, understanding through import, and nonexist-
cents;

because:
• it is not necessary to have the forward- and counter-entailments
• and the presence of the reason in the subject also is included in the one mode that
has the name “otherwise infeasible.”

Inferential valid cognition depends on one mode.

See Jeffrey Hopkins with William Magee, Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Presenta-
tion of Tenets: Lion’s Roar Eradicating Error, Precious Lamp Illuminating the Genuine Path to Omnis-

a sgra byung tshad ma.
b dpe; comprehension through analogy. In the Great Exposition of Tenets Jam-yang-shay-pa illustrates this with:

To someone who has first seen an ox, someone else says, “A gayal is like that,”
and later when a gayal is seen, its neck is seen to be without a dew-lap and to be
roundish, and its limbs are seen to be mostly similar [to an ox’s limbs] and that
is a direct perception.

c sgra byung.
d don gyis go.
• Chārakas\textsuperscript{a} five valid cognitions: reasoning, non-apprehension, common knowledge,\textsuperscript{b} renown,\textsuperscript{c} and conjecture\textsuperscript{d} because [according to you] it chiefly describes the four quasi-categories as its own system. You have asserted the reason.

It [absurdly] follows that on this occasion chiefly denying them means that it chiefly explains them because you have [incorrectly] accepted [that Dharmakīrti’s Commentary chiefly describes the four quasi-categories as its own system. You have asserted] the three spheres of self-contradiction.

\textsuperscript{a} cāraka. Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-pa’s) “Great Exposition of Tenets”: Freeing the Knots of the Difficult Points, Precious Jewel of Clear Awareness gives the Tibetan as sman dpyad pa.
\textsuperscript{b} srid pa.
\textsuperscript{c} zhes grags.
\textsuperscript{d} snyams sens.
\textsuperscript{e} 2011 BDRC bla brang (5b.1) reads gyi; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (4b.3) reads gvi.
\textsuperscript{f} 2011 BDRC bla brang (5b.1) reads ces; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (4b.3) reads zhes.
\textsuperscript{g} 2011 BDRC bla brang (5b.2) reads snyams; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (4b.4) reads nyams.
If you [incorrectly] accept [that on this occasion chiefly denying them means that it chiefly explains them], it [absurdly] follows that the two, the One Hundred Thousand Stanzas [Mother Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra] and the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought, are sūtras that chiefly explain the self of phenomena because those two chiefly deny the self of phenomena.

You have asserted the entailment [which is that if the two, the One Hundred Thousand Stanzas (Mother Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra) and the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought, chiefly deny the self of phenomena, those two necessarily are sūtras that chiefly explain the self of phenomena. You have asserted the three spheres of self-contradiction. If you [incorrectly] accept [that the two, the One Hundred Thousand Stanza (Mother Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra) and the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought, are sūtras that chiefly explain the self of phenomena], it [absurdly] follows that both of them extensively do not chiefly explain the selflessness of phenomena, and it very absurdly follows that the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought is also of interpretable meaning!

---

a ’bum pa.
b dgongs ’grel.
c chos bdag.
d ’bum pa.
4. Also, someone says: \(b\) The assertion that “valid cognition” in the title *Commentary on Valid Cognition* is [Dignāga’s] *Compilation of Valid Cognition* and is an imputed valid cognition and the assertion that blue, yellow, and so forth are the consciousnesses [apprehending them] are contradictory.

**Our response:** It [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, object of knowledge, blue is the direct perception apprehending blue because [according to you] it [blue] is the consciousness apprehending blue, and a common locus of blue and a conceptual consciousness apprehending blue does not exist. You have asserted the first reason [which is that blue is the consciousness apprehending blue].

The second [reason which is that a common locus of blue and a conceptual consciousness apprehending blue does not exist] is established because an appearance as blue to a conceptual consciousness apprehending blue is not

---

\(a\) 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (5b.4) reads *ka’i*; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (4b.6) reads *kas.*

\(b\) 2011 BDRC *bla brang*, 5b.4; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 4b.6.

\(c\) tshad ma btags pa ba, that is, a valid cognition in a metaphorical sense.

\(d\) sngon ’dzin rtog pa.
the apprehended-aspect\textsuperscript{a} of a conceptual consciousness apprehending blue.

If you say [that the reason which is that an appearance as blue to a conceptual consciousness apprehending blue is not the apprehended-aspect of a conceptual consciousness apprehending blue] is not established, it follows [that an appearance as blue to a conceptual consciousness apprehending blue is not the apprehended-aspect of a conceptual consciousness apprehending blue] because an appearance as object of knowledge to the conceptual consciousness apprehending object of knowledge is not the apprehended-aspect of a conceptual consciousness apprehending object of knowledge.

If you say [that the reason which is that an appearance as object of knowledge to the conceptual consciousness apprehending object of knowledge is not the apprehended-aspect of a conceptual consciousness apprehending object of knowledge] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, an appearance as object of knowledge to the conceptual consciousness apprehending object of knowledge, it is not the apprehended-aspect of the conceptual consciousness apprehending the knowable, because it is permanent. You have asserted the three spheres of self-contradiction.

\textsuperscript{a} \textit{gzung rnam}; this term means “that which has the aspect of the apprehended aspect,” namely, the subject, which in this case is a conceptual consciousness apprehending blue.

\textsuperscript{b} Correcting \textit{rnams} in 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (5a.1) to \textit{rnam} in accordance with 2011 BDRC \textit{bla brang} (5b.6).
It follows [that an appearance as object of knowledge to the conceptual consciousness apprehending object of knowledge is permanent] because a common locus of it [an appearance as object of knowledge to the conceptual consciousness apprehending object of knowledge] and a permanent [phenomenon] exists. It follows [that a common locus of an appearance as object of knowledge to the conceptual consciousness apprehending object of knowledge and a permanent (phenomenon) exists] because object of knowledge is a common locus of it [that is, a common locus of an appearance as object of knowledge to the conceptual consciousness apprehending object of knowledge] and a permanent (phenomenon).

If you [incorrectly] accept the root [consequence that blue is the direct perception apprehending blue], it [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, object of knowledge, the Compilation of Valid Cognition is the direct perception apprehending it because of that with regard to blue [that is, because (according to you) blue is the direct perception apprehending blue]. If you [incorrectly] accept [that the Compilation of Valid Cognition is the direct perception apprehending it], it [absurdly] follows that the Compilation of Valid Cognition is a valid cognition because you have [incorrectly] accepted [that the Compilation of Valid Cognition is the direct perception apprehending it]. You have accepted the three spheres.

\[ Correcting \textit{rnams} in 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (5a.2) to \textit{rnam} in accordance with 2011 BDRC \textit{bla brang} (6a.1). \]
Also, make arguments such as: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, the Compilation of Valid Cognition, is both direct perception and inference because of being the apprehended-aspect of both direct perception and inference apprehending it, and so forth.

5. Also, a certain charioteer of epistemology of snowy Tibet seemingly propounds: The Commentary on Valid Cognition is an imputed valid cognition, and it [the Commentary on Valid Cognition] is its author’s motivational consciousness.

---

a Correcting *rnams* in 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (5a.4) to *rnam* in accordance with 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (6a.3).
b Pioneering scholar.
c *bod gangs can gyi tshad ma'i shing rta ba kha cig.*
d 2011 BDRC *bla brang*, 6a.3; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 5a.5.
e *kun slong gi shes pa.*
Our response: If so, those are internally contradictory. It [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, object of knowledge, the Eight Thousand Stanza [Perfection of Wisdom] Sūtra\(^a\) is the exalted-knower-of-all-aspects [of the Buddha] because it is its author’s mental motivation. You have [incorrectly] accepted [that it is its author’s mental motivation]. If you [incorrectly] accept [that the Eight Thousand Stanza (Perfection of Wisdom) Sūtra is the exalted-knower-of-all-aspects (of the Buddha)], it [absurdly] follows that the Commentary of Valid Cognition is a valid cognition because [according to you] the Eight Thousand Stanza [Perfection of Wisdom] Sūtra is a valid cognition knowing all phenomena. You have explicitly [asserted] the sign [which is that the Eight Thousand Stanza (Perfection of Wisdom) Sūtra is a valid cognition knowing all phenomena] and the absurd clarification [that is, the absurd consequence which is that the Commentary of Valid Cognition is a valid cognition].\(^b\)

\(\text{དེ་བར་ན་ནང་འགལ་ཏེ། ཤེས་ཆོས་ཅན། མདོ་བོད་ོང་པ་}
\(\text{དེ་ནམ་མཁྱེན་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། མདོ་བོད་ོང་པ་དེ་ནམ་}
\(\text{མཁྱེན་ཡིན་པར་འདོད་ན། གཉེན་མ་ནམ་འགྲེལ་}
\(\text{ཚད་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། མདོ་བོད་ོང་པ་ཆོས་}
\(\text{ཐམས་ཅད་མཁྱེན་པའི་ཚད་མ་ཡིན་པའི་སྨིན་}
\(\text{གཉེན་པོ་སྲུ་མ་ཆོས་གསལ་དངོས་}^{c}\)

6. Also, someone says: \(^d\) [Dignāga’s] Compilation of Valid Cognition in the [mental] continuum of a person who is mentally repeating the Compilation of Valid Cognition is a consciousness.

Our response: Well then, it follows that with respect to the subject, such a person, he/she is not a person mentally reciting the Compilation of Valid Cognition.

---

\(\text{a \textit{mdo brgyad stong ba.}}\)

\(\text{b \textit{rtags gsal dngos.}}\)

\(\text{c Correcting \textit{kun slong gi cha she pa} in 2011 BDRC \textit{bla brang} (6a.4) to \textit{kun slong gi she pa} in accordance with 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (5a.6).}\)

\(\text{d 2011 BDRC \textit{bla brang}, 6a.5; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 5a.7.}\)
Cognition because the Compilation of Valid Cognition that is the object he/she is mentally repeating is not the Compilation of Valid Cognition. You have come to assert the sign [which is that the Compilation of Valid Cognition that is the object he/she is mentally repeating is not the Compilation of Valid Cognition].

It [absurdly] follows [that the Compilation of Valid Cognition that is the object he/she is mentally repeating is not the Compilation of Valid Cognition] because [according to you] the Compilation of Valid Cognition that is his/her mental object is not expressive sound. You have accepted the sign [which is that the Compilation of Valid Cognition that is his/her mental object is not expressive sound], because [according to you] it [the Compilation of Valid Cognition] is a consciousness.

7. About this formulation, someone says: It follows that the Compilation of Valid Cognition that is the object of mental repetition of the Compilation of Valid Cognition is that person’s speech because the Compilation of Valid Cognition in the continuum of a person who is mentally repeating the Compilation of Valid Cognition is that person’s speech.

---

a 2011 BDRC bla brang (6a.6) reads kyis; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (5b.1) reads kyi.
b brjod byed kyi sgra.
c 2011 BDRC bla brang (6b.1) reads rtags khax; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (5b.1) reads rtags grub ste.
d 2011 BDRC bla brang, 6b.1; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 5b.2.
Our response: [That the Compilation of Valid Cognition in the continuum of a person who is mentally repeating the Compilation of Valid Cognition is that person’s speech] does not entail [that the Compilation of Valid Cognition that is the object of mental repetition of the Compilation of Valid Cognition is that person’s speech].a The sign [which is that the Compilation of Valid Cognition in the continuum of a person who is mentally repeating the Compilation of Valid Cognition is that person’s speech] follows because such a Compilation of Valid Cognition is speech in the continuum of that person.

It follows [that such a Compilation of Valid Cognition is speech in the continuum of that person] because such a Compilation of Valid Cognition is words of speech and is not speech in another’s continuum. The second [part of the sign which is that such a Compilation of Valid Cognition is not speech in another’s continuum] is easy [to establish]. The first [part of the sign which is that such a Compilation of Valid Cognition is words of speech] is established because of being a treatise composed by speech, because of being a Compilation of Valid Cognition.

---

a The Compilation of Valid Cognition that is the object of mental repetition of the Compilation of Valid Cognition is Dignāga’s speech.
If you [incorrectly] accept the root [consequence which is that the Compilation of Valid Cognition that is the object of mental repetition of the Compilation of Valid Cognition is that person’s speech], it [absurdly] follows that whatever is the speech that is the object of mental repetition by that person necessarily is not speech in another’s continuum because you have [incorrectly] accepted [that the Compilation of Valid Cognition that is the object of mental repetition of the Compilation of Valid Cognition is that person’s speech].

If you [incorrectly] accept [that whatever is the speech that is the object of mental repetition by that person necessarily is not speech in another’s continuum], it [absurdly] follows that there is no way for that person to perform mental repetition regarding the exalted body, speech, and mind of Lamas, Buddhas, and Bodhisattvas because you have [incorrectly] accepted [that whatever is speech that is the object of mental repetition by that person necessarily is not speech in another’s continuum].

\[\text{ bla brang (6b.3) reads } \text{brtsam}; 2015 \text{ Old Go-mang Lhasa (5b.3) reads } \text{brtsom.}\]

The Compilation of Valid Cognition that is the object of mental repetition of the Compilation of Valid Cognition is speech in Dignāga’s continuum.
Furthermore, fling consequences such as: It [absurdly] follows that with regard to meditation upon names, words, and syllables by that person, the two—meditation on expressive sound and meditation on the form [that is, shape] of letters—do not exist, and so forth.

8. About this formulation, a certain linguist says: Well then, it follows that the explanation in Anubhūti’s Sarasvatī’s Śūtra on Grammar: That in which a vowel has fallen away is a consonant.

is not logically feasible because among consonants an expressive sound without an infused vowel does not exist.

Our response: [That among consonants an expressive sound without an

---

a ming.
b tshig, which includes phrases.
c yi ge.
d sgra’i gzugs.
e 2011 BDRC bla brang (6b.4) reads des; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (5b.5) reads de’i.
f 2011 BDRC bla brang, 6b.5; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 5b.5.
g dbyangs can ma; Anubhūti’s Sarasvatī’s Śūtra on Grammar, sde dge, sgra mdo, se, 1b.4.
h 2011 BDRC bla brang (6b.6) reads zhig; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (5b.6) reads gcig.
infused vowel does not exist] does not entail [that this explanation in Sar-
avati’s Sūtra is not logically feasible] because the names, words, and syll-
ables of the systems of manifest knowledge and grammar are not the same. Otherwise, it [absurdly] follows that non-manifest sounda as [postu-
tulated by] the Sāṃkhyas exists because you have [incorrectly] accepted this.

Therefore, as stated in Anubhūti’s Sarasvati’s Sūtra on Grammar:pd

That which is devoid of a vowel should be connected with the
subsequent [items having a vowel].

the explanation above is given mainly in terms of the formation of the
writing of the forms of syllables.e

a mngon par mi gsal ba’i sgra.
b 2011 BDRC bla brang (6b.6) reads zhig; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (5b.6) reads gcig.
c 2011 BDRC bla brang (6b.6) reads zhig; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (5b.7) reads gcig.
d Anubhūti’s Sarasvati’s Sūtra on Grammar, sde dge, sgra mdo, se, 2a.2. Jam-yang-shay-
pa’s reading of this sūtra differs slightly from the translation in sde dge, sgra mdo, se, 2a.2: dbhyangs kis rgyal pa pha rol tu yang dag par sbyar ro/; Jam-yang-shayпа’s citation reads: dbhyangs kis rgyal pa pha rol tu drangs.
e yi ge’i gzugs bri sgrub.
9. About this formulation, someone says: It follows that such a Compilation of Valid Cognition that is the object of mental repetition is sound (sgra) because you have accepted [that such a Compilation of Valid Cognition is speech (ngag) in the continuum of that person]. If you accept [that such a Compilation of Valid Cognition that is the object of mental repetition is sound (sgra)], it follows that such a person is [currently] reciting in speech the Compilation of Valid Cognition because you have accepted [that such a Compilation of Valid Cognition that is the object of mental repetition is sound].

Our response: [That such a Compilation of Valid Cognition that is the object of mental repetition is sound] does not entail [such a person is (currently) reciting in speech the Compilation of Valid Cognition].

Well then, it [absurdly] follows that there is no way for such a person to perform mental repetition regarding what oneself and others told last year because [according to you] whatever is speech that is an object of mental repetition of that [person] must necessarily be this [person’s] own utterance on this occasion. You have asserted the three spheres [that is, the sign (rtags khas langs pa), the opposite of “thesis” of the consequence (bsal ba’i bzlog phyogs khas langs pa), and the entailment between them (khyab pa khas langs pa)].

---

\(^a\) 2011 BDRC \textit{bla brang}, 7a.1; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 5b.7.
This also refutes well that there exists a common locus of the *Compilation of Valid Cognition* and consciousness [that is to say, something that is the *Compilation of Valid Cognition* and consciousness].

10. *Also, someone says:*\(^b\) It follows that on this occasion of the Sūtra School the *Compilation of Valid Cognition* is a nonassociated compositional factor\(^c\) because Vasubandhu’s *Treasury of Manifest Knowledge* says,\(^d\) “[A bundle of doctrine] is included among forms or compositional factors.”

Our response: [That Vasubandhu’s *Treasury of Manifest Knowledge* says, “(A bundle of doctrine) is included among forms or compositional factors,”] does not entail [that on this occasion of the Sūtra School the *Compilation of Valid Cognition* is a nonassociated compositional factor] because [the passage quoted above] means that:

- Proponents of the Great Exposition assert that the entity of a bundle

---

\(^a\) 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (7a.3) reads ‘di’i; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (6a.2) reads de’i.

\(^b\) 2011 BDRC *bla brang*, 7a.3; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 6a.3.

\(^c\) ldan min ‘du byed.

of doctrine\textsuperscript{a} is form since it is sound, which has a natures of names, words, and syllables,

- but Proponents of Sūtra assert that it is a nonassociated [compositional factor, which is a nominal, imputed existence] since [it has only a secondary existence deriving from] the imputation of “aggregate” to a collection-generality,\textsuperscript{b} a composite of names, words, and syllables.

Therefore, “name-generality” (ming spyi) is not, for instance, generality of names,\textsuperscript{d} or meaning-generality of name,\textsuperscript{e} [or anything like those]; instead, it is a collection-generality of names (ming gi tshogs spyi). Hence, nowadays, it appears that grammarians are translating this as “public property” (spyi bungs),\textsuperscript{f} but if [the meanings of] meaning-generality (don spyi), sound-generality (sgra spyi), collection-generality (tshogs spyi), and type-generality (type spyi) are not individually known, then you will not understand anything more than mere term-generalities on the occasion of the debate about the existence or nonexistence of an ox-generality\textsuperscript{h} and the explanation that a forest and so forth do not substantially existent due to being a generality.\textsuperscript{i} Hence, do not make guesses!

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{a} chos phung gi ngo bo, or “entity of a pile of doctrine.”
  \item \textsuperscript{b} tshogs spyi.
  \item \textsuperscript{c} 2011 BDRC bla brang (7a.4) reads bas; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (6a.4) reads ba’i.
  \item \textsuperscript{d} ming gi spyi.
  \item \textsuperscript{e} ming gi don spyi; that is, a generic image of name.
  \item \textsuperscript{f} spyi bungs su bsgyur.
  \item \textsuperscript{g} Or, term-generality.
  \item \textsuperscript{h} ba spyi. As in, for instance, the contradictory consequence flung by a Buddhist at a Vaiśeṣhika according to Jam-yang-shay-pa (Hopkins, Meditation on Emptiness, 449):

    It follows that the subject, the ox-generality that is a permanent thing (ba spyi rtag dogos), does not pervade its many particular instances because of being a partless unity.
  \item \textsuperscript{i} That is, a collection-generality.
\end{itemize}
11. Also regarding the purpose [of the treatise], Tibetan elders versed or not versed in scripture who assert that all conceptuality is demonic say:

Dharmakīrti’s Seven Treatises, such as the Commentary [on Valid Cognition] and so forth, are not needed for those seeking liberation because since they are treatises on logic, they are outside the scriptural collections of Inner [Buddhist] Knowledge.

Our response: Well then, it [absurdly] follows that whatever is logic must be logic merely posited by conceptual imputation by Outer [non-Buddhist]

---

\(\text{L7b}\) reads \(\text{ol}\).

\(\text{L7b}\) reads \(\text{sde snod}\).

\(\text{mdo sde}\).
If you [incorrectly] accept [that whatever is logic must be logic merely posited by conceptual imputation by Outer (non-Buddhist) teachers such as Dvaipāyana (alias Vyāsa) and so forth], it [absurdly] follows that the subject, each of the three analytical awarenesses [engaged in] hearing, thinking, and meditation that are means of ascertaining the mode of subsistence, emptiness, [attained] at or before the supreme mundane qualities level of the Great Vehicle path of preparationd in those who previously did not have Lesser Vehicle realization, is logic by mere conceptual imputation by Outer [non-Buddhist] teachers because of being logic.

---

a gling skyes.
b 2011 BDRC bla brang (7b.2) reads rtog pas; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (6a.7) reads rtogs.
c 2011 BDRC bla brang (7b.3) reads rig; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (6b.1) reads rigs.
d theg chen gi shyor lam chos mchog.
It follows [that each of the three analytical awarenesses (engaged in) hearing, thinking, and meditation that are means of ascertaining the mode of subsistence, emptiness, (attained) at or before the supreme mundane qualities level of the Great Vehicle path of preparation in those who previously did not have Lesser Vehicle realization are logic] because of being analytical awarenesses of suchness in the continuum of childish, that is, common beings. You have asserted the three spheres [that is, the reason (rtags khas langs pa), the opposite of “thesis” of the consequence (bsal ba’i bzlog phyogs khas langs pa), and the entailment between them (khyab pa khas langs pa)]. It is easy [to establish] the reason.

a 2011 BDRC bla brang (7b.4) reads pas; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (6b.2) reads pa’i.
b 2011 BDRC bla brang (7b.4) reads that; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (6b.2) reads that lo.
because Maitreya’s *Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras* says:\(^a\)

> It is asserted that logic is dependent on [scriptures],
> Indefinite, not covering over [all objects],
> Conventional, wearying, and
> The support of childish beings.

and in its commentary, Vasubandhu says:\(^c\)

> Logic, which is [doctrinal] support for those who do not realize suchness, is indeed dependent on certain scriptures.

and so forth,

and Sthiramati, in his *Explanation of (Vasubandhu’s) “Commentary on the*
‘Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes’ describes logic as three-fold by saying: a

Logicians are [classified into three types:] those who are capable of conceptual thought, those who are capable of elimination, and those who make erroneous treatises in dependence upon the teachings of the One-Gone-Thus.

and concerning the mention of “reasoner” c in Dignāga’s Autocommentary on the “Examination of Objects of Observation,” d Vinītadeva says in his Explanatory Commentary: e

As for those who prefer the convention “reasoner,” f reasoner (gtan tshigs pa) is a synonym of logician (rtog ge pa).


b rtog ge ba dag.

c gtan tshigs pa dag.

d Dignāga’s Autocommentary on the “Explanations of Objects of Observation,” sde dge, tshad ma, ce, 87a.3-4. Jam-yang-shay-pa’s citation considerably differs from the sde dge edition, which reads: gtan tshigs yod pa dang med pa dag ni [...] Jam-yang-shay-pa’s citation reads: gtan tshigs pa dag ni [...].

e Vinītadeva’s Explanation of (Dignāga’s) “Autocommentary on the ‘Explanations of Objects of Observation,’” sde dge, tshad ma, zhe, 184b.3-4.

f Jam-yang-shay-pa’s citation reads: gang dag gtan tshigs kyi tha snyad ’dod pa de dag ni; sde dge edition reads: gang dag gtan tshigs kyi tha snyad ’dogs pa de dag ni, which means “those who use a logical terminology.”
If you [incorrectly] accept [that each of the three analytical awarenesses (engaged in) hearing, thinking, and meditation that are means of ascertaining the mode of subsistence, emptiness, (attained) at or before the supreme mundane qualities level of the Great Vehicle path of preparation in those who previously did not have Lesser Vehicle realization are logic by mere conceptual imputation by Outer [non-Buddhist] teachers], it absurdly follows that Other-Schools’ Dvaipāyana and so forth have the capability of teaching the presentation of hearing, thinking, and meditating on the profound reality of emptiness of duality! Because [according to you] those are posited by their own wish. You have asserted the three spheres [that is, the reason (rtags khas langs pa), the opposite of “thesis” of the consequence (bsal ba’i bzlog phyogs khas langs pa), and the entailment between them (khyab pa khas langs pa)].

[That those are posited by their own wish] entails [that Other-Schools’ Dvaipāyana and so forth have the capability of teaching the presentation of hearing, thinking, and meditating on the profound reality of emptiness of duality] but you cannot accept [that Other-Schools’ Dvaipāyana and so forth have the capability of teaching the presentation of hearing, thinking, and meditating on the profound reality of emptiness of duality] because the meaning of the following passages is established:

---

a gnyis stong gi zab mo’i de nyid.
Maitreya’s *Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras* says:

Therefore, it [that is, the Great Vehicle] is not its object.

and its commentary [by Vasubandhu] says:

Therefore, it [that is, the Great Vehicle] is not an object of logic.

and Dharmakīrti’s *Commentary on Valid Cognition* says:

Since what arises from method and its causes are hidden phenomena,

It is difficult to explain those [four noble truths].

12. Furthermore, someone says: Whoever is a logician (*rtog ge pa*) necessarily is not a yogin (*rnal ’byor pa*), and thinks: Whatever is logic (*rtog* ge) necessarily is not yoga (*rnal ’byor*).

---

a Maitreya’s *Ornament for the Mahāyāna Sūtras, sde dge, sems tsam, phi*, 2b.2. The Sanskrit is found in Lévi (5.11): *tasyāṃ viṣayo na tat*// (1.12d).

b Vasubandhu’s *Commentary on the Ornament for the Mahāyāna Sūtras, sde dge, sems tsam, phi*, 132a.6. The Sanskrit is found in Lévi (5.15-16): *ato na tarkasya tad viṣayah*//.

c Dharmakīrti’s *Commentary on Valid Cognition*, II.132cd. The Sanskrit is found in Miyasaka (114.5): *paroksopayataddhetos tadākhyānam hi duśkaram*//.

d 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (8a.3) reads *ma yin no*; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (7a.1) reads *ma yin*.

e 2011 BDRC *bla brang*, 8a.4; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 7a.2.
Our response: It follows that these assertions, in accordance with those assertions [mentioned] earlier (61) [that Dharmakīrti’s Seven Treatises are not needed for those seeking liberation], are not logically feasible because the term “logic” (rtog ge) is used for both “reason” (gtan tshigs) and “conceptual consciousness” (rtog pa), and also “logicians” (rtog ge pa) have two—those dwelling only on the level of logic (rtog ge’i sa tsam) and those dwelling on the level of meditation (sgom pa’i sa). It follows [that the term “logic” (rtog ge) is used for both “reason” (gtan tshigs) and “conceptual consciousness” (rtog pa), and also “logicians” (rtog ge pa) have two—those dwelling only on the level of logic (rtog ge’i sa tsam) and those dwelling on the level of meditation (sgom pa’i sa)] because Vasubandhu’s Commentary on the Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes says,® “Logicians, that is, those who are engaged in investigation.”

---

® Vasubandhu’s Commentary on the Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes, sde dge, sems tsam, bi, 12b.4. Jam-yang-shay-pa’s citation differs slightly from the sde dge edition, which reads: rtog ge pa spyod yul can dag; Jam-yang-shay-pa’s citation reads: rtog ge dp’yod pa can dag ste. The Sanskrit found in Pandeya (97.17-18) reads: yat satāṃ yuk-tārthapanditānāṃ tārikānāṃ pramanatrayāṃ niśrityopapaṭṭisādhanyaktyā prasiddhāṃ vastū. As noted by Pandeya (97, n. 1), mīmāṃsakānāṃ may be added after tārikānāṃ in accordance with the Tibetan version.

b 2011 BDRC bla brang (8a.4) reads de; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (7a.2) reads dang.

c 2011 BDRC bla brang (8a.5) reads sgom; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (7a.3) reads bsgom.
Refutation of Others’ Mistakes on the Meaning of the Title

[That Vasubandhu’s Commentary on (Maitreya’s) “Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes” says,] “Logicians, that is, those who are engaged in investigation” entails [that the term “logic” (rtog ge) is used for both “reason” (gtan tshigs) and “conceptual consciousness” (rtog pa), and also “logicians” (rtog ge pa) have two—their dwelling only on the level of logic (rtog ge’i sa tsam) and those dwelling on the level of meditation (sgom pa’i sa)] because the [Tibetan] dual particle dag indicates such, and it is reasonable to take “logicians” as a brief indication, and “those who are engaged in investigation” as an extensive explanation, because that very text also says:

Also, because [some logicians] dwell on the level of logic, and [others] dwell on the level of meditation, they are of two aspects; therefore, [Vasubandhu] says “logicians” [in the plural, not in the singular].

---

a Vasubandhu’s Commentary on (Maitreya’s) “Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes,” sde dge, sems tsam, bi, 12b.4. Jam-yang-shay-pa’s citation differs slightly from the sde dge edition, which reads: rtog ge pa spyod yul can dag; Jam-yang-shay-pa’s citation reads: rtog ge dpyod pa can dag ste. The Sanskrit found in Pandeya (97.17-18) reads: yat satāṃ yuktārthaṇḍitānāṃ tārākānāṃ pramanatrāyaṃ niśrityopapatisādhanayuktāt prasiddhāṃ vāstu. As noted by Pandeya (97, n. 1), mīṃsakānāṃ may be added after tārkikānāṁ in accordance with the Tibetan version.

b Not Vasubandhu’s Commentary on (Maitreya’s) “Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes” as Jam-yang-shay-pa’s “that very text” suggests, but actually Sthiramati’s Explanation of (Vasubandhu’s) Commentary on (Maitreya’s) ‘Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes’, sde dge, sems tsam, bi, 251b.2-3. The Sanskrit is found in Pandeya (98.6-7): tārkikā ye mīṃsākāḥ/ pūrvasya vyākhyānāḥ[śayasya paśčān nirdeśoktiḥ]* (*Sanskrit restoration suggested by Pandeya).

c 2011 BDRC bla brang (8a.6) reads pa’i; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (7a.4) reads pas.

d As is indicated two notes above, the quote is found in Sthiramati’s Explanation of
Sthiramati’s Explanation of (Vasubandhu’s) “Commentary on (Maitreyya’s) ‘Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes’” says:

Logicians are those who are engaged in investigation; with the intention of speaking of the former, the latter phrase [alone] is mentioned.

And furthermore, since the word tarka—the [Sanskrit] equivalent for rtog ge (“logic”)—is used for both conceptual consciousness (rtog pa) and reason (gtan tshigs), the assertion that whatever is logic is not necessary for seeking liberation is a spoon removing the eyes of liberation because the four retentions that are [attained at the level of] forbearance of Great Vehicle path of preparation, and moreover the five hundred meditative stabilizations and so forth described on the occasion of the [Great Vehicle] path of preparation all are of the nature of conceptual consciousnesses.

(Vasubandhu’s) “Commentary on (Maitreyya’s) ‘Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes’.”

a Sthiramati’s Explanation of [Vasubandhu’s] Commentary on the Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes, sde dge, sems tsam, bi, 251b.5-6. The Sanskrit is found in Pandeya (98.12-13): te ca tarkabhūmau bhāvanābhūmau ca vyavasthitavād [dvividhāḥ/tasmāi tārākṣā iti ucyanti iti]/* (*Sanskrit restoration suggested by Pandeya).

b thar pa'i mig 'byin pa'i thur ma.

c gzungs bzhis.

d theg chen gyi sbyor lam bzod pa.
13. Furthermore, someone says:\textsuperscript{a} It follows that whoever is a Superior does not depend on even any logic because Maitreya’s Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras says:

[Logic] is asserted as to be depended upon, for childish beings.\textsuperscript{b}

Our response: [That Maitreya’s Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras says, “[Logic] is asserted as to be depended upon, for childish beings;”] does not entail [that whoever is a Superior does not depend on even any logic] because it means that whoever depends [solely] on logic analyzing the ultimate is necessarily a childish being.

If you [incorrectly] accept the root [consequence that whoever is a Superior does not depend on even any logic], it [absurdly] follows that it is

\textsuperscript{a} 2011 BDRC bla brang. 8a.4; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 7b.1.
\textsuperscript{b} That is, “Logic is asserted as a support for childish beings.”
\textsuperscript{c} At the end of this debate in this same statement 2011 BDRC bla brang (9a.3) reads brten; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (7b.7) reads rten, whereas here both read rten.
\textsuperscript{d} The dpe bsdur ma edition lists brten in the snar thang, which accords with Jamyang-shay-pa’s explanation of the meaning below.
\textsuperscript{e} 2011 BDRC bla brang (8b.4) reads ces; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (7b.1) reads zhes.
\textsuperscript{f} 2011 BDRC bla brang (8b.4) reads dpyad; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (7b.1) reads bshad.
\textsuperscript{g} 2011 BDRC bla brang (8b.4) reads brten; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (7b.2) reads rten.
not that even Hearer Superiors, except for some who simultaneously [abandon objects of abandonment],\(^a\) in most cases rely on spiritual instructions of a master even in their final lifetime in mundane existence as is said in sūtra:\(^b\)

The thorough release of Hearers proceeds in accordance with [a master’s] words.

because [according to you] they do not depend on evidential reasons based on believable [that is to say, authoritative] scriptures and so forth. You have come to accept the sign [which is that they do not depend on evidential reasons based on believable (that is to say, authoritative) scriptures and so forth].

If [you correctly say that the reason which is that they do not depend on evidential reasons based on believable (that is to say, authoritative) scriptures and so forth] is not established, it [absurdly] follows that those [Hearer Superiors do not depend on evidential reasons based on believable (that is to say, authoritative) scriptures and so forth] because [according to you] they do not depend on reasoning. It [absurdly] follows [that they do

---

\(^a\) cig car ba.

\(^b\) Questions of King Dharaṇīśvara, ’phags pa gzungs kyi dhang phyug rgyal pos zhus pa'i mdo (dharaṇīśvararājaparipṛcchāsūtra), in bk’'gyur (ha sa, 148), BDRC W26071.57:310-641 (Lhasa: zhol bk’'gyur par khang, [194-]); in bk’'gyur (sde dge par phud, 147), BDRC W22084.57:285-486 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1976-1979), 267b.3, sgra rjes ’gro. Thanks to Jules Levinson for the note.

\(^c\) Correcting sgra spyir ’gro in 2011 BDRC bla brang (8b.4) and 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (7b.2) to sgra phyir ’gro in accordance with Jam-yang-shay-pa’s dbu ma chen mo 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (13b.3); see the previous note for the preferable sgra rjes ’gro in the zhol bk’’gyur par khang edition of the sūtra.

\(^d\) 2011 BDRC bla brang (8b.5) reads cig; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (7b.2) reads gcig.
not depend on reasoning] because of being Superiors. You have asserted
the three spheres of self-contradiction.

Furthermore, it [absurdly] follows that:

1. the explanation that even on the occasion of the fifth [Bodhisattva]
ground they learn calculation, logic, and so forth
2. the explanation in Maitreya’s *Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras*
   (XII.60ab) that without having become skilled in the five branches of
   science [that is, internal science, science of reason, grammar, medi-
   cine, and mechanical arts], it is impossible, even for the highest Supe-
   rior, to attain omniscience
3. the explanation in Śāntideva’s *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds,*
   “There is nothing that is not to be learned by the children of the Vic-
   tor,” and
4. the explanation that all ten Bodhisattva Superiors on the ten grounds
   listen to doctrine from many Buddhas

are not logically feasible because despite being Bodhisattva Superiors
even though they do not need to rely on logic, reasons, to comprehend the
ultimate, [according to you] they do not need to depend on proper eviden-
tial reasons [that are gained by] hearing and thinking in order to compre-
hend the limitless stages of the path. It [absurdly] follows [that despite
being Bodhisattva Superiors even though they do not need to rely on logic,
reasons, to comprehend the ultimate, they do not need to depend on proper
evidential reasons (that are gained by) hearing and thinking in order to
comprehend the limitless stages of the path] because [according to you]
whoever is a Superior does not depend on even any logic. You have as-
serted the three spheres of self-contradiction.

---

*a* Śāntideva’s *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds, sDe dge, dbu ma, la,* 14a.4. The Sanskrit is found in P. L. Vaidya, *Bodhicaryāvatāra of Śāntideva with the Commentary Pañjikā of Prajñākaramati* (Darbhanga: The Mithila Institute, 1960), 76.20: na hi tad vidyate kimcid yan na śikṣyam jinātmajaih/ (V.100ab).
14. Furthermore, someone says: The five branches of science [that is, internal science, science of reason, grammar, medicine, and mechanical arts] are mutually incompatible, and among the five, internal science [that is, Buddhist philosophy] and science of reason are incompatible.

\[\text{a} 2011 \text{ BDRC } \text{bla brang (8b.6) reads rig; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (7b.4) reads rigs.}\
\text{b} 2011 \text{ BDRC } \text{bla brang (9a.1) reads kyi; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (7b.5) reads kyi.}\
\text{c} 2011 \text{ BDRC } \text{bla brang (9a.3) reads brten; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (7b.7) reads rten.}\
\text{d} 2011 \text{ BDRC } \text{bla brang, 9a.3; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 7b.7.}\
\text{e} 2011 \text{ BDRC } \text{bla brang (9a.3) reads rig; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (7b.7) reads rigs.}]}{
Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subjects, Nāgārjuna’s Collections of Reasonings\(^c\) such as the *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called “Wisdom”*\(^d\) and so forth, and Maitreya’s *Great Vehicle Treatise on the Sublime Continuum*\(^e\) and *Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras* as well, are not internal science because of being treatises on the science of reason. You have asserted [that being treatises on the science of reason] entails [not being internal science].

The reason [which is that Nāgārjuna’s Collections of Reasonings such as the *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called “Wisdom”* and so forth, and Maitreya’s *Great Vehicle Treatise on the Sublime Continuum* and *Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras* as well are treatises on reason] is established because of being treatises that prove selflessness and the stages of the path from the approach of reasons for proof and repudiation.

\(^a\) 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (9a.4) reads *rig*; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (8a.1) reads *rigs*.
\(^b\) 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (9a.4) reads *rig*; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (8a.1) reads *rigs*.
\(^c\) *rigs tshogs*.
\(^d\) *rtsa she*.
\(^e\) *rgyud bla ma*.
\(^f\) 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (9a.4) reads *rig*; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (8a.1) reads *rigs*.
\(^g\) 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (9a.4) reads *rig*; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (8a.1) reads *rigs*.
\(^h\) Correcting 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (9a.4) which is missing *rtags grub ste/ in accordance with 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (8a.2).
Since Nāgārjuna’s Collections of Reasonings are renowned as such, there is no need to prove the point; and also, Maitreya’s *Great Vehicle Treatise on the Sublime Continuum* says:\(^a\)

Because [Buddhahood] has a nature without beginning,
Middle, or end, it is said to be uncompounded.
Because of having the quiescent body of attributes,
It is said to be spontaneous.

and so forth,

and furthermore, the same text explains plenty of reasons from beginning to end, like:\(^b\)

Because of being vast, without number,
Not an object of logic,
Unique, and having abandoned predispositions,
Respectively [the Nature Body] is unfathomable and so forth.

proving by means of five reasons respectively that the good qualities of the Nature Body are unfathomable, uncountable, inconceivable, unequalled, and completely pure,


\(^b\) Maitreya’s *Great Vehicle Treatise on the Sublime Continuum* (1.48), sDe dge, sems tsam, phi, 64a.7. The Sanskrit is found in Jonston (87.5-6): udāratvād aganyatvād tarkasyāgocaratvatvāḥ/ kāvalyād vāsanocchitter aprameyādāyah kramāt//.
and this statement in Maitreya’s *Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras* proves by means of signs and so forth, together with dispelling objections, that the *One Hundred Thousand Stanza [Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra]* and so forth are the word of the Buddha and, starting with this, makes explanations by means of reasons from beginning to end.d

Because of (1) not being prophesied beforehand, (2) arising together,
(3) Not being in the sphere of activity [of logicians], (4) being established,
(5) If existent, existing but if not existing, [both] not existing,
(6) Being an antidote, and (7) being other than literal.e

---

a 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (9a.6) reads rgya che’i phyir dang bgrang med phyir; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (8a.2-3) reads rgya che’i rang grangs med pa’i phyir.

b 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (9b.1) reads zhes; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (8a.4) reads zhes sogs.

c 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (9b.1) reads mthar; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (8a.5) reads mtha’.

d Maitreya’s *Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras*, sDe dge, sems tsam, phi, 2a.4. The Sanskrit is found in Lévi (3.5-6): ádāv avyākaraṇāt samapravṛttter agocarāt siddheḥ/ bhāvābhāve 'bhāvāt pratipakṣatvād rutānyatvāt// (I.7).

e Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-pa’s) “Great Exposition of Tenets” (BDRC W5842.1, dngos, cha, 7.4) comments:

Maitreya’s *Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras* says that the Great Vehicle was spoken by Buddha:

1. because if that were not the case and some later ones interfered with the holy doctrine [by putting forward a fake Great Vehicle], Buddha would have prophesied this beforehand, but he did not, and
because, for example, on this occasion with “not prophesied beforehand,” by means of the sign that [the Buddha] did not prophesy beforehand that

2. because the Great Vehicle and Lesser Vehicle arose simultaneously and were not newly made by some later beings, and
3. because since the profound and vast doctrine is not in the sphere of activity of logicians, it is not possible for some later logicians to have newly set it forth, and
4. because if some later ones set it forth upon having become fully enlightened, that perforce establishes that this is Buddha word, and
5. because if the Great Vehicle exists, it is perforce established that the Great Vehicle scriptural collections are Buddha’s word since there is no Great Vehicle other than this, but if the Great Vehicle does not exist, the Lesser Vehicle also would not exist, whereby it is not suitable to make a differentiation between Great Vehicle and Lesser Vehicle scriptural collections as to being or not being Buddha’s word, and
6. because when this Great Vehicle is meditatively cultivated, transformation into non-conceptual pristine wisdom serves as an antidote to all afflictive emotions, and
7. because it is not suitable, upon having taken [Buddha’s word] to be literal, to say that [a particular sūtra] is not Buddha’s word by reason of not being literal.

Adapted from Hopkins, Maps of the Profound, 197-198.
they will cause damage to his teachings, it sets out a nature sign\textsuperscript{a} for establishing that the *One Hundred Thousand Stanza [Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra]* and so forth do not damage the [Buddha’s] teachings, and similarly, it makes explanations from the beginning to the end from the approach of [signs that are] nonobservations of a pervader,\textsuperscript{b} observations of what is contradictory with a pervader,\textsuperscript{c} and so forth, because in commentary on this, Vasubandhu says:\textsuperscript{d}

For those wrongly oriented [about this], in order to establish that it is the word of the Buddha, [Maitreya composes] a stanza with distinct reasons: “Because of not being prophesied beforehand,” and so forth.

\textsuperscript{a} rang bzhin gyi rtags.
\textsuperscript{b} khyab byed ma dmigs pa.
\textsuperscript{c} khyab byed 'gal dmigs.
\textsuperscript{d} Vasubandhu’s *Commentary on (Maitreya’s) “Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras,”* sde dge, sems tsam, phi, 130b.3-4. The Sanskrit is found in Lévi (3.4-5): \textit{vipratipannās tasya buddhavacanātva-prasādhanārtham kāraṇavibhāgyam āraṇbhāyā śīlocāḥ/ ādvā avyākarāṇāt [...].}
Regarding the manner in which signs are demonstrated, see Cha-pa Chökyi-seng-ge’s Commentary on (Maitreya’s) Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras, Illumination of Sunshine, if though a text makes explanation in this manner, you still do not posit it as a text on the science of reason, then there would no way of positing a text on the science of reason.

Furthermore, it is very easy to realize not only that the assertion that the five branches of science are included within mechanical arts and that the five branches of science are mutually exclusive is internally contradictory, but also that the assertion that the five branches of science are treatises teaching the categories of logic and that internal science [that is, Buddhist philosophy] is not contained in them is internally contradictory.

---

a phywa pa chos kyi seng ge, 1109–1169.
b ’grel pa nyi ’od snang ba.
c 2011 BDRC bla brang (9b.6) reads rig; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (8b.2) reads rigs.
d 2011 BDRC bla brang (9b.6) reads rig; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (8b.2) reads rigs.
e 2011 BDRC bla brang (9b.6) reads rig; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (8b.2) reads rigs.
15. Furthermore, certain older Tibetans say: a Since Dignāga’s Aphorisms [that is, his Compilation of Valid Cognition] and Dharmakīrti’s Seven Treatises were composed for the sake of overcoming objections by [non-Buddhist] Forders, they are not needed in a region where there are no Forders because the [Introduction to] the Two Truths by the Elder [Atisha] says: b

[Debate about] direct perception and inference is not needed. It was done by learned scholars For the sake of overcoming objections by others.

Our response: [That the Introduction to the Two Truths says this] does not entail [that Dignāga’s Compilation of Valid Cognition and Dharmakīrti’s Seven Treatises are not needed in a region where there are no Forders] because this [statement that these texts are not needed] has the purpose of being for the sake of abandoning the timidity of some having low intelligence [causing them to shy away from engaging in these topics], and has as its thought that in the Consequence School the two valid cognitions comprehending the own-character c of this [Sūtra School] are not needed. f

---

a 2011 BDRC bla brang, 10a.1; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 7b.7.
b Atisha’s Introduction to the Two Truths, sde dge, dbu ma, a, 72b.3. Jam-yang-shay-pa’s reading differs slightly from the canonical translation found in sde dge, dbu ma, a, 72b.3: mngon sum rjes dpag dgos pa med// mu stegs rgol ba bzlog pa'i phyir// mkhas pa rnams kys byas pa yin//. Jam-yang-shay-pa reads pha rol (“others”) for mu stegs (“Forders”).
c 2011 BDRC bla brang (10a.2) reads bzlog phyir; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (8b.4) reads bzlog pa'i phyir.
d 2011 BDRC bla brang (10a.2) reads dpag; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (8b.4) reads ‘phags.
e Establishment by way of the object’s own character.
f ‘di'i rang mthun ‘jal ba'i ISHAD ma gnyis.
If you [incorrectly] accept the root [consequence that Dignāga’s *Compilation of Valid Cognition* and Dharmakīrti’s Seven Treatises are not needed in a region where there are no Forders], this is a powerful abandonment of the doctrine. And, well then, it [absurdly] follows that in a region where there are no Forders it is not necessary to repudiate the conceived objects of the sixteen artificial views apprehending the opposites of the sixteen [aspects of the four truths] such as impermanence and so forth because artificial views are superimposed by tenets. You have asserted [that that artificial views are superimposed by tenets] entails [that in a region where there are no Forders it is not necessary to repudiate the conceived objects of the sixteen artificial views apprehending the opposites of the sixteen (aspects of the four truths) such as impermanence and so forth].

---

\[a\] Correcting *dgongs pa* in 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (10a.3) to *dgos pa* in accordance with 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (8b.5).

\[b\] *lta ba kun biags*.

\[c\] 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (10a.3-4) reads *chos spong rlabs can*; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (8b.5) reads *chos spongs brlabs can*. 
If you [incorrectly] accept [that in a region where there are no Forders it is not necessary to repudiate the conceived objects of the sixteen artificial views apprehending the opposites of the sixteen (aspects of the four noble truths) such as impermanence and so forth], it follows that it is not necessary to abandon those sixteen artificial views because you have [incorrectly] accepted [that in a region where there are no Forders it is not necessary to repudiate the conceived objects of the sixteen artificial views apprehending the opposites of the sixteen (aspects of the four noble truths) such as impermanence and so forth]. That in a region where there are no Forders it is not necessary to repudiate the conceived objects of the sixteen artificial views apprehending the opposites of the sixteen (aspects of the four noble truths) such as impermanence and so forth] entails [that it is not necessary to abandon those sixteen artificial views] because without repudiating the conceived objects of these there is no way to overcome those [artificial views] in the manner of removing an external thorn, because Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on Valid Cognition says:

---

a Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on Valid Cognition, II.222a-c. The Sanskrit is found in Miyasaka (32.10-11): adīśite 'syā viṣaye na śakyaṃ tasya varjanam// prahāṇir ic-chādvesāder gunadōsānu-bandhinah//. Cited in Great Treatise, vol. 3, 335; Napper, Dependent-Arising and Emptiness, 169 and 290. With brackets from Four Interwoven Annotations, vol. 2, 756.1, Jeffrey Hopkins’ translation of II.222-223ab is:

Without repudiating [through reasoning] the [conceived] object [of the apprehension of self]
This [apprehension of self] cannot be abandoned [by meditating on the self as having defects and so forth].
The abandonment of desire, hatred, and so on
Which are [generated due to being] related with [perceived] advantages [of happiness] and disadvantages [of unhappiness]
Is through not seeing those [advantages and disadvantages] in objects [in accordance with how they are apprehended by desire, hatred, and so forth, that is, through properly seeing that those do not exist],
Not through external ways [as when removing a thorn that has pierced the body].

Tsang-kha-pa comments:

When an external object of abandonment such as a thorn that has pierced oneself is removed, it can be removed from the root with a needle, for instance, without
Without repudiating the objects of these,  
It is impossible to abandon those.  
[The method of abandoning desire, anger and so forth] that are  
associated with good qualities and bad qualities  
[Consists in not seeing its object having such qualities in that  
way].

If you [incorrectly] accept [that it is not necessary to abandon those
sixteen artificial views):

1. it [absurdly] follows that it is not necessary to attain the path of seeing of any of the three vehicles, and

2. it [absurdly] follows that the detailed explanations of the sixteen aspects, such as impermanence and so forth, in many sūtras and treatises such as Āryadeva’s *Four Hundred Stanzas* a and so on are purposeless, and

3. it [absurdly] follows that it is reasonable to abandon the explanations in the *Teachings of Akshayamati Sūtra* b and so forth that if, delineating the path to liberation and omniscience even every day by means of hundreds of pure reasonings, you think upon them, you will have irreversible, firm predispositions to attain liberation and omniscience and will accumulate limitless collections of merit and wisdom, and

4. it [absurdly] follows that it is not that even if foolish ones, not knowing the meaning, practice asceticism for an eon for the sake of the mis-taken liberation and path like the Nirgranthas c (Jainas), the merit and predispositions of those with sharp faculties in each moment thinking [about the path] in such a manner does not come, and

5. it [absurdly] follows that in consideration of such a difference even Dharmakirti was not intent on analytical meditation on the path and the reasoning for liberation and omniscience as explained in the *Commentary*

because you have [incorrectly] accepted [that it is not necessary to aban-don those sixteen artificial views].

---

*a* *bzhi brgya.*  
*b* *blo gros mi zad pa.*  
*c* *gcer bu pa.*  
*d* 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (10b.1) reads *bzhi brgya*; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (9a.1) reads *bzhi brgya pa.*
If you [incorrectly] accept [those consequences], you will contradict many such as:

- the explanations in Maitreya’s *Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras* of the mode of release by hearing and so forth the twelve branches of high sayings and the differences between Great and Lesser Vehicles,
- the explanation about the purpose of Dharmakīrti’s treatises,

and so forth.

---

\(^a\) 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (10b.2) reads *la*; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (9a.3) reads *las.*

\(^b\) 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (10b.2) reads *miha’ yas sog*; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (9a.3) reads *miha’ yas pa sog.*

\(^c\) 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (10b.3) reads *bskal*; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (9a.4) reads *skal.*

\(^d\) 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (10b.4) reads *thai*; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (9a.5) reads *thai lo.*
By these we have refuted also the idea expressed by many Tibetans, sagacious and foolish, that although it helps in investigating high sayings, there is no great purpose in studying this treatise [Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on Valid Cognition].

The meaning of these [points] should be known at length in the high sayings of Tsong-kha-pa and his spiritual sons such as Khay-drub-ge-leg-pal-sang’s Commentary on the Difficult Points in (Dharmakīrti’s) Seven Treatises: Clearing Away Mental Darkness and so forth.

---

\[a\] 2011 BDRC bla brang (10b.4) reads gyis; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (9a.6) reads gyi.

\[b\] 2011 BDRC bla brang (10b.4) reads theg pa che chung gi khyad par; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (9a.6) reads theg pa che chung khyad par.
b. Our own system {5 parts}

This has five parts: the body of the treatise, its subject matter, its purpose, its essential purpose, and the relationship [among these].

1) THE BODY OF THE TREATISE

Both “valid cognitions” that are part of the titles “Compilation of Valid Cognition” and “Commentary on Valid Cognition” are imputed [or metaphorical] “valid cognition” because both are taken to be a treatise on valid cognition. It follows [that both are taken to be a treatise on valid cognition] because “valid cognition” in the former [Dignāga’s Compilation of Valid Cognition] is taken as treatises on valid cognition such as the Gate of Reasoning\(^a\) and so forth, and “valid cognition” in the latter [Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on Valid Cognition] is taken as Dignāga’s Compilation of Valid Cognition.

Furthermore, in the “valid cognitions” that are explicitly indicated by these two [“valid cognitions” that are part of the titles “Compilation of Valid Cognition” and “Commentary on Valid Cognition”] there are also the

\(^a\) rins sgo; Shankaravāmin’s Gate of Reasoning (Tibetan tradition attributes it to Dignāga), Peking, mdo ’grel, ce.

\(^b\) 2011 BDRC bla brang (11a.1) reads btags; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (9b.1) reads btags.
two, the [Buddha’s] word and the treatises that are it [that is, means of valid cognition] because—the treatises have already been explained—the [Buddha’s] word third turning of the wheel of doctrine is the root text, and [these two works] are commentaries on it, because Gyal-tshab Dar-ma-rin-chen’s Explanation says:⁴

Valid cognition is a consciousness newly realizing the two truths [that is, ultimate and conventional truths]. Also, the term “valid cognition” indicates the high sayings and Dignāga’s Compilation in which it [valid cognition] is discussed. Because of commenting on their thought, [Dharmakīrti’s text] is called Commentary.

“Logic” includes both conceptual awarenesses and reasons because both reasons and conceptual awarenesses analyzing in dependence upon reasons are logic.

“Treatises on logic” (rtog ge’i bstan bcos) and “treatises on the science of

---
⁴ Gyal-tshab Dar-ma-rin-chen’s Explanation of (Dharmakīrti’s) “Commentary on (Dignāga’s) ‘Compilation of Valid Cognition’”: Unerring Illumination of the Path to Liberation, Zhol, cha, 3a.1-2.

⁵ 2011 BDRC bia brang (11a.4) reads brten; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (9b.4) reads rten.
reason” (gtan tshigs rig pa’i bstan bcos) are equivalent.\textsuperscript{a} There are four possibilities as regards those [treatises on logic or treatises on the science of reason] and the treatises on Inner [Buddhist] science (nang rig pa’i bstan bcos) because:

1. that which is a treatise on Inner [Buddhist] science alone is, for instance, Guṇaprabha’s \textit{Root Aphorisms on Discipline},\textsuperscript{b} and
2. that which is both is, for instance, Nāgārjuna’s Collections of Reasonings, Dharmakīrti’s Seven Treatises, and Maitreya’s \textit{Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras}, and
3. that which is a treatise on logic alone is, for instance, Akṣhapāda’s teachings on the sixteen categories of logic, and
4. that which is neither [a treatise on logic nor a treatise on Inner (Buddhist) science] is, for instance, Vāgbhaṭa’s \textit{Eight Branches of Medical Treatment}.

\textsuperscript{2) THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE TREATISE}

The subject matter of this treatise [the \textit{Commentary on Valid Cognition}] exists because it delineates all topics upon including all the high sayings

\textsuperscript{a} don gcig.
\textsuperscript{b} ’dul ba mdo rtsa.
\textsuperscript{c} sman dpyad yan lag brgyad pa.
\textsuperscript{d} 2011 BDRC bla brang (11a.6) reads dpyad; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (9b.6) reads sphyad.
of the Victor in the two, the interpretable and the definitive, and in the paths to liberation and omniscience, because in its second chapter it explains all topics upon inclusion in the paths to liberation and omniscience; in the third chapter, it explains [all topics] upon inclusion in the interpretable and definitive; the former [first] chapter explains those topics differentiating between the two—proper reasons, the means of ascertaining those topics by oneself, and quasi-reasons, and the fourth chapter explains the proper way to teach those topics to others, and the quasi-way to teach those topics to others.

It follows [that in its second chapter it explains all topics upon inclusion in the paths to liberation and omniscience; in the third chapter, it explains (all topics) upon inclusion in the interpretable and definitive; the former (first) chapter explains those topics differentiating between the two—proper reasons, the means of ascertaining those topics by oneself, and quasi-reasons, and the fourth chapter explains the proper way to teach those topics to others, and the quasi-way to teach those topics to others], because it chiefly explains the four proper categories of logic as means of ascertaining those topics by oneself and others, and explains the four quasi-categories of logic, upon treating them as opposing positions, in order to eliminate places of deviance, that is, oneself and others making mistakes about those topics.

\[\text{gol sa.}\]

\[\text{a 2011 BDRC bla brag (11b.2) reads gis; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (10a.1) reads gi.}\]

\[\text{b gol sa.}\]
Our Own System: Subject Matter of the Treatise, Eight Categories of Logic

It follows [that the first chapter chiefly explains the four proper categories of logic as means of ascertaining those topics by oneself and others, and explains the four quasi-categories of logic, upon treating them as opposing positions, in order to eliminate places of deviance, that is, oneself and others making mistakes about those topics] because in accordance with the statement in (Dignāga’s) Gate of Reasoning:

Direct perception and inference
Together with their quasi-categories are for the sake of one’s own understanding.

Proof and refutation
Together with their quasi-categories are for the sake of others’ understanding.

from among the eight categories of logic:

- the first two lines (“Direct perception and inference together with their quasi-categories are for the sake of one’s own understanding”) speak of the two, proper direct perception and proper inference: (1) valid inference, an awareness ascertaining an obscure object as its object of
comprehension and (2) valid direct perception, an awareness ascertaining a manifest object; and [these lines] accordingly say that in order to eliminate places of deviance two quasi-categories need to be known: (3) quasi-inference such as quasi-inference generated in dependence upon a sign for proving a permanent self by others’ schools and (4) quasi-direct perception;

• furthermore, the last two lines (“Proof and refutation together with their quasi-categories are for the sake of others’ understanding”) speak of the two, (5 and 6) proper proof statement and proper refutation, branches generating realization in others of that which has been ascertained by oneself; and [these lines] accordingly say that in order to eliminate places of deviance two quasi-categories are explained: others’ schools’ (7) quasi-proof-statement and (8) quasi-refutation.

\[\text{\footnotesize \text{[དོན་དེ་དག་རང་གཞན་གྱིས་ངེས་པའི་ཐབས་ོག་གེའི་ཚིག་དོན་ཡང་དག་བཞི་གཙོ་བོར་བཤད་པ་དང་། 
དོན་དེ་དག་ལ་རང་གཞན་འལ་བའི་གོལ་ས་བཅད་པའི་ཆེད་ོག་གེའི་ཚིག་དོན་Ȧོར་ȹང་བཞི་ོགས་Ȧོར་Ȧོ་ཐལ།  
རིགས་Ȉོ་ལས།  
mངོན་Ȧོ་དང་ཉེས་Ȧོ་དཔག a Ȧོར་ȹང་ 
བཅས་པ་བདག་རིག་Ȉོ་ཅིར།  
ཞེས་གོངས་Ȧོར་Ȧོ་ཐལ།  
rིགས་Ȉོ་ལས་Ȧོར་ȹང་བཅས་པ་གཞན་Ȉོ་ཅིར།  
c Ȧོར་ȹང་སོགས་Ȧོར་Ȧོ་ཐལ།}}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize 

\text{\textsuperscript{a} 2011 BDRC bla brang (11b.4) reads dpag; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (10a.3) reads dpags. 
\text{\textsuperscript{b} 2011 BDRC bla brang (11b.4) reads kyis; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (10a.4) reads kyi. 
\text{\textsuperscript{c} 2011 BDRC bla brang (11b.5) reads dpag; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (10a.5) reads dpags.}}\]

\]
Let us summarize these topics and explain clearly. It follows that with respect to the subject, objects of knowledge, the eight categories of logic are needed as means for ascertaining objects of comprehension for oneself and others because:

1. as means for ascertaining objects of comprehension for oneself the four—proper direct perception and proper inference and quasi-direct perception and quasi-inference—are needed, and
2. as branches generating realization in others the two, proper proof statement and proper refutation, and in order to eliminate places of deviance the two, quasi-proof-statement and quasi-refutation, need to be known.

\[A) \textit{EIGHT CATEGORIES OF LOGIC}\]

\[a\] 2011 BDRC \textit{bla brang} (11b.5) reads \textit{dpag}; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (10a.5) reads \textit{dpags}.
The first sign [which is that as means for ascertaining objects of comprehension for oneself the four—proper direct perception and proper inference and quasi-direct perception and quasi-inference—are needed] is established because realization by oneself of two hidden phenomena is contingent on proper inference, and that also is contingent on its support, a valid reason, and the three modes of a proper sign also are established by direct perception or must finally meet back to what is established by direct perception.

It follows [that the three modes of a proper sign also are established by direct perception or must finally meet back to what is established by direct perception] because if it were not so and the [three] modes of the [sign] were entirely reliant on reasons as a means of proof, then having become endless, there would be the fallacies of (1) the nonestablishment of any object of proof and means of proof and (2) the correspondence of the means of proof and the object to be proved,¹ because of being like, for example, the nonstatement of a proof for the proof of fire as existing on a smoky pass by means of the sign “smoke,” and the nonstatement of a proof for most cases of signs of nonobservation.

¹ The fallacy of resorting to a means of proof that itself is an object to be proved.
It follows [that if it were not so and the (three) modes of the (sign) were entirely reliant on reasons as a means of proof, then having become endless, there would be the fallacies of (1) the nonestablishment of any object of proof and means of proof and (2) the correspondence of the means of proof and the object to be proved] because proper direct perception and inference are thus necessary for realizing hidden phenomena that are one’s own object of comprehension, and when one follows after those two, one is not deceived, whereas, that being so, since when one follows after an awareness that is quasi-direct perception or quasi-inference, which are not proper awarenesses, one is deceived, the two—quasi-direct perception and quasi-inference—are set forth in order to eliminate places of deviance in the path, because there are many statements of this, such as, for example, Khay-drub Ge-leg-pal-sang’s *Commentary on Difficult Points of the Seven Treatises: Clearing Away Mental Darkness* which says:

Furthermore, whether [topics] abide or do not abide in accordance with how they are delineated by oneself is contingent upon whether the delineating awareness has or has not become correct. Concerning this, the nondefective awareness ascertaining hidden phenomena is inference, and the nondefective awareness ascertaining manifest phenomena is valid direct perception; hence, it is said that valid cognition is twofold, direct perception and inference, and also if one follows after other awarenesses, one will be deceived, due to which the two, quasi-direct perception and quasi-inference, are set forth as branches eliminating places of deviance in the path.

---

a *sde bdun gyi dka' 'grel yid kyi mun sel*, also called *tshad ma sde bdun gyi rgyan yid kyi mun sel*.
b *Zhol, tha*, 8b.2-4 (*sde dge 5501*).
c *mngon gyur*. 
Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Decisive Analysis of (Dharmakīrti’s) “Commentary”

["དེ་དག་མ་བཞིན་པར་དེའི་བཤེས་མཐའ་དག་ཞབ་ེན་གཏན་ཚིགས་ལ་ཐོས་ན་མི་མེད་སོང་ནས་བཟོད་ེད་ོང་ཡང་མི་འབོད་པ་དང་ོད་བཟོད་བཟོད་དང་མཛོད་པའི་ོན་ཡོད་པ་

དེར་ཐལ།

རང་གིས་གཞལ་ཝོལ་ར་གཟོགས་པ་ལ་མངོན་ཅེས་ཡང་དག་ལ་དེ་དག་དགོས་ཤིང་དེ་གཉིས་ཀྱི་ཅེས་རང་

a

ན་མི་བཟོ་ལ།

dེ་དག་ན་བཟོད་པའི་མངོན་ཅེས་པ་དོན་ལ་གནས་མི་གནས་ནི་གཏན་ལ་འབོད་ཀྱི་ོད་

c 2011 BDRC bla brang (12b.1) reads la; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (10b.5) reads las.

d 2011 BDRC bla brang (12b.1) reads 'beb; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (10b.5) reads 'bebs.

e 2011 BDRC bla brang (12b.2) reads dpag; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (10b.5) reads dpags.
As for the second root sign [which is that as branches generating realization in others the two, proper proof statement and proper refutation, and in order to eliminate places of deviance the two, quasi-proof-statement and quasi-refutation, need to be known], it follows that not only from the approach of debate but also from the approach of exposition, it is necessary to know also as branches generating realization in others the two, proper proof statement and proper refutation, and in order to eliminate places of deviance those two, quasi-proof-statements and quasi-refutations because whether in the context of exposition or debate:

1. in order to clear away unidirectional wrong conceptualizations in another’s [mental] continuum it is necessary to demonstrate refutations or consequences showing contradictions in those [places of deviance], and
2. in order to clear away doubt having qualms in two possibilities—regarding the similar class and the dissimilar class it is necessary to demonstrate proper proof statements, and in order to eliminate places of deviance regarding those two it is necessary to know the two, quasi-refutations and quasi-proof-statements.

---

a The right and wrong positions.
It follows [that whether in the context of exposition or debate:

1. in order to clear away unidirectional wrong conceptualizations in another’s (mental) continuum it is necessary to demonstrate refutations or consequences showing contradictions in those (places of deviance), and
2. in order to clear away doubt having qualms in two possibilities—regarding the similar class and the dissimilar class—it is necessary to demonstrate proper proof statements, and in order to eliminate places of deviance regarding those two it is necessary to know the two, quasi-refutations and quasi-proof-statements]

because:

• as long as one cannot see contradictions in one’s assertions, one cannot eliminate unidirectional superimpositions,
• and also without ascertaining the positive and negative concomitances between the sign and the predicate of the proposition, doubt suspecting that the sign is present in the dissimilar class, and so forth, is not overcome, whereby the two proper [that is, proper refutations and proper proof statements, are needed,
• and if the two quasi [that is, quasi-refutations and quasi-proof-statements] are not ascertained, the two proper [that is, proper refutations and proper proof statements] are not ascertained as proper, because it is like if, for example, these two [that is, quasi-refutations and quasi-proof-statements] for establishing sound’s permanence are not ascertained as quasi, the two proper [that is, proper refutations and proper proof statements] that are stated wishing to prove sound as impermanent will not serve as proper.

\[\text{\textit{a}}\] 2011 BDRC \textit{bla brang} (12b.5) reads \textit{shing}; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (11a.2) reads \textit{zhing}.
\[\text{\textit{b}}\] 2011 BDRC \textit{bla brang} (12b.5) reads \textit{gcad}; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (11a.2) reads \textit{gcod}.\]
For, Khay-drub Ge-leg-pal-sang’s *Commentary on Difficult Points of the Seven Treatises: Clearing Away Mental Darkness* says:*

The latter four—the proper and the quasi—are set out as branches of generating realization in another upon having ascertained it by oneself. Among them:

- [proper] refutations are demonstrated in order to diminish the grandeur (dpal) of unidirectional wrong conceptualizations [in another’s mental continuum],
- [proper] proof statements are set out in order to remove doubt having qualms in two possibilities, and
- the two quasi [quasi-refutations and quasi-proof-statements] are set out in order to eliminate places of deviance.

---

*a Zhol, tha, 8b.4-6.
b 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (13a.1) reads gis; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (11a.5) reads gi.
གོལ་ས་བཅད་པའི་ཞེས་གྲངས་པའི་ཞེས་ཁུལ།

西藏阿底耶 納巴 拉薩 善覺 伏藏 喜慧 聖賢

དབེན་པོའི་ཐོས་བསལ་བའི་ཞེས་བསོད་པ་དང་

གོང་གི་གི་མཁོ་བཞིན་བེད་ཀྱིས་ོད་པ་ཐོག་གྲངས་ཤིང་

\[a\] 2011 BDRC \textit{bla brang} (13a.3) reads \textit{bsal}; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (11a.6) reads \textit{gsal}.

\[b\] 2011 BDRC \textit{bla brang} (13a.3) reads \textit{shing}; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (11a.6) reads \textit{zhing}. 
[B] THE SEQUENCE OF DIRECT PERCEPTION AND INFEERENCE

With respect to the sequence [of direct perception and inference], since the explanation here in Dharmakīrti’s Commentary [initially of reasons, the basis of inference,] and the explanation in Dharmakīrti’s Ascertainment [of Valid Cognition] a and Drop of Reasoning b and in Dignāga’s Compilation of Valid Cognition initially of direct perception differ, one might think that one of these two modes of explanation is not logically feasible.

However, it follows that the fallacies:

• that one of these two [(1) the explanation here in Dharmakīrti’s Commentary (initially of reasons, the basis of inference,) and (2) the explanation in Dharmakīrti’s Ascertainment of Valid Cognition and Drop of Reasoning and in Dignāga’s Compilation of Valid Cognition initially of direct perception] is not logically feasible, and

• that they are mutually contradictory

do not exist because that the initial explanation of direct perception [in Dharmakīrti’s Ascertainment of Valid Cognition and Drop of Reasoning and in Dignāga’s Compilation of Valid Cognition] is the order of the mode of generation, and the initial explanation [here in Dharmakīrti’s Commentary] is for the sake of easily understanding valid cognition that is the means of delineation from the approach of having extensively eliminated wrong conceptualization.

---

a rnam nges.
b rigs thigs.
c 2011 BDRC bla brang (13a.3) reads thig; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (11a.7) reads thig.
d 2011 BDRC bla brang (13a.4) reads zhiig; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (11b.1) reads gcig.
Concerning the sequence, in accordance with the mode of generation and in terms of delineation [of an object], the sequence of teaching first manifest phenomena, then hidden phenomena, and then very obscure phenomena is logically feasible because:

- after realizing—from a sign in which the property of the subject is established by direct perception or by a manifest phenomenon that meets back to it [that is, direct perception]—with valid cognition a hidden phenomenon like the four truths which are the principal topics for those who wish to be liberated,
- one must realize with valid cognition very obscure phenomena like the cause and effect relationships generating the various sufferings of bad migrations and the relationships generating the specific particularities of gods.

---

a 2011 BDRC bla brang (13a.4) reads dpag; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (11b.1) reads dpags.
b 2011 BDRC bla brang (13a.5) reads bsal; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (11b.2) reads gsal.
c shin tu lkog gyur.
d An inferential sign in which the property of the subject should be either what is established by perception or a manifest phenomenon resulting from that which is established by perception; through this inferential sign one can understand by means of a valid cognition the four noble truths and so forth, which are hidden phenomena, and which are the principal topics for those who wish to be liberated; and it is only after this that one can understand by means of a valid cognition the causal relationship between various sufferings of bad migrations and their causes and the causal relationship between rebirth as a particular god and its causes and so forth, which are very obscure phenomena.
It follows [that after realizing—from a sign in which the property of the subject is established by direct perception or by a manifest phenomenon that meets back to it (that is, direct perception)—with valid cognition a hidden phenomenon like the four truths which are the primary topics for those who wish to be liberated, one must realize with valid cognition very obscure phenomena like the causes and effects relationships generating the various sufferings of bad migrations and the relationships generating the specific particularities of gods] because a scripture teaching the four truths is a proper concordant example—possessing the two, the sign and the predicate of the proposition—for proving, by a sign of [being] a scripture passing a threefold analysis, that a scripture teaching very obscure topics is non-deceptive with respect to what it teaches, because Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on Valid Cognition says:

---

\(^{a}\) 2011 BDRC bla brang (13a.6) reads bsal; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (11b.3) reads rims.

\(^{b}\) mthun dpe yang dag.

\(^{c}\) A sūtra passage that explicitly teaches what is to be discarded and what is to be adopted with respect to the four truths (sufferings and their origins are to be discarded, and cessations and paths are to be adopted) is a proper concordant example that possesses the reason and the predicate in a proof that a sūtra passage teaching very obscure topics is non-deceptive with respect to what it teaches by reason of the fact that it is a scripture devoid of contradiction.

\(^{d}\) Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on Valid Cognition, I.217. The Sanskrit is found in Miyasaka (146.22-23): heyopādeyutatvasya sopāayasya praviddhitah/ pradhānārthāvisaṃvādād anumāṇaṃ paratratva vā/.
Through thorough ascertainment of just these [teachings]
on adoption [of true cessations] and discarding [true sufferings]
as well as [their respective] methods [or causes, that is, true
paths and true origins of suffering respectively,
It is established that Buddha’s word] is non-deceptive with re-
spect to the principal meaning [the four noble truths].
Therefore, [due to similarity] it is to be inferred that [Buddha’s
word is non-deceptive] also with respect to other [very obscure
topics as well].

and Āryadeva’s Four Hundred Stanzas says:

Whoever has generated doubt
Toward the [very] obscure in Buddha’s sayings,
Will believe only Buddha about these
Based on [his teaching of the ultimate reality of] emptiness.
because although in practice one initially engages in realizing the doctrines
on [the attainment of] high status, the cycle on faith, and then engages in
realizing the doctrines on [attainment of] definite goodness, the two self-
lessnesses [of persons and of phenomena], it is, as explained above, oppo-
site the order of [philosophical] delineation.

a The bracketed material in the last two lines is drawn from Khay-drub Ge-leg-pal-sang’s
commentary, 135b.6. The Dalai Lama cites the last two lines in his The Buddhism of Tibet
and The Key to the Middle Way (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1975; reprint, Ithaca,
N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1987), 83.
b Āryadeva’s Four Hundred Stanzas, sDe dge, dbu ma, tsha, 13a.7-b.1. The Sanskrit is
found in K. Suzuki, Sanskrit Fragments and Tibetan Translation of Candrakīrti’s Bodhi-
sattvayogācārācatuskātakā (Tokyo: The Sankibo Press, 1994), 248.7-8: buddhokteṣu
parokṣeṣu jāyate yasya samśayaḥ/ ihaiva pratayayastena kartavyaḥ sūnyatāṁ prati//.
c mngon mtho.
d nges legs.
It follows [that although in practice one initially engages in realizing the doctrines on (the attainment of) high status, the cycle on faith, and then engages in realizing the doctrines on (attainment of) definite goodness, the two selflessnesses (of persons and of phenomena), it is, as explained above, opposite the order of (philosophical) delineation] because whoever is a proper disputant⁴ for the proof—by a sign of [being] a scripture passing a threefold analysis—that a scripture teaching very obscure objects is non-deceptive with respect to what it teaches must necessarily be a person who has already completed analysis of the first two categories objects of

---

⁴ 2011 BDRC bla brang (13b.1) reads ston; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (11b.5) reads bston.
⁵ 2011 BDRC bla brang (13b.2) reads dpag; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (11b.6) reads dpags.
⁶ 2011 BDRC bla brang (13b.3) reads gyur pa; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (11b.7) reads 'gyur ba.
⁷ phyi rgol yang dag.
comprehension [that is, manifest phenomena and hidden phenomena], because Dharmakīrti’s Commentary [on Valid Cognition] says: a

That treatise which is not invalidated
By what is established by reasoning with regard to perceptible objects
And what is not invalidated by its own words with regard to imperceptible objects,
Is to be accepted. And thereby analysis occurs.

and it says: b

When the two [types of] objects are [ascertained to be] flawless in this manner,
Then for one who wishes to adopt the treatise,
This indeed would be the occasion [to adopt it].

and the Supramundane Victor [Buddha] also says that as in the case of gold that is attested by the three—scorching, cutting, and rubbing—the meanings of his word on very obscure phenomena are to be adopted upon being analyzed and verified by means of the three—direct perception, inference through the power of the fact, and inference through belief: c

---

a Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on Valid Cognition, IV.108. The Sanskrit is found in Miyasaka (178.17-18): śāstraṃ yat siddhayā yuktyā svavācā ca na bādhyate/ drṣte 'drṣte 'pi tad grāhyam iti cintā pravartate //.
b Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on Valid Cognition, IV.50a-c’. The Sanskrit is found in Miyasaka (170.20-21): tathā viśuddhe visayadvaye śāstraparigraḥam/ cikīrvoh sa hi kālah syāt [...]//.
c The stanza is cited in Shāntarakṣhita’s Compendium of Principles (de kho na nyid bsdus pa’i tshig le’ur byas pa, tattvasamgrahakārikā), XXVI.3343 and 3587. The Sanskrit is found in Dwarikadas Shastri, Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Shāntarakṣita, with the Commentary “Pañjikā” of Shri Kamalashīla (Varanasi, India: Bauddha Bharati, 1968), vol. 2, 1115:

tāpāchedācca nikaṣāti suvarṇam iva paṇḍitaḥ/
parīkṣaya bhikṣavo grāhyam mad vaco na tu gauravāti//

This version accords with that by the Translator of Dro, Shay-rab-drag, which has dge slong dag (bhikṣavo) in the vocative. For a translation into English, see G. Jha, The Tattvasaṅgraha of Śāntirakṣita, with the Commentary of Kamalāśīla, Gaekwad’s Oriental Series, 80 and 83 (Baroda, India: Oriental Institute, 1937-1039), XXVI.3344 (p. 1485) and XXVI.3588 (p. 1558). The first citation occurs at the point of discussing the word of Buddha and how it is not annulled by direct perception, inference, and scriptural inference; the second citation occurs at the point of discussing identifying Buddha’s “lion’s roar” that brings about “the lowering of the arrogance of the maddened elephants in the shape of the False Philosophers” (Jha, Tattvasaṅgraha, 1558). Drawn from Jeffrey Hopkins, Emptiness
Like gold [that is acquired] upon being scorched, cut, and rubbed,
My word is to be adopted by monastics and scholars
Upon analyzing it well,
Not out of respect [for me].

in the Mind-Only School of Buddhism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 366-367.

\(^a\) 2011 BDRC bla brang (13b.4) reads phyi; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (12a.2) reads phyir.
\(^b\) 2011 BDRC bla brang (13b.5) reads gnod med; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (12a.3) reads gnod byed.
\(^c\) Read dpyod.
\(^d\) 2011 BDRC bla brang (14a.1) reads blang bar; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (12a.5) reads
Jam-yang-shay-pa's Decisive Analysis of (Dharmakirti's) "Commentary"

blangs par.

a 2011 BDRC bla brang (14a.2) reads dpag; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (12a.6) reads dpags.

b 2011 BDRC bla brang (14a.2) reads dpag; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (12a.6) reads dpags.
[C) THE STRUCTURE OF THE CHAPTERS]

The entire body of the treatise is included in three chapters because although it is included in the three chapters—the Chapter of Direct Perception, the Chapter of Inference for Oneself, and the Chapter of Inference for Others, it has additionally the Chapter of Establishment of Valid Cognition, which teaches the flawlessness of the Teacher and the teaching and thereupon explains that only the attainment of Buddhahood is the final refuge.a

Hence, the four—Dignāga’s Compilation of Valid Cognition and Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on Valid Cognition, Ascertainment of Valid Cognition, and Drop of Reasoning—are the treatises resembling a body, since they teach the words and [main] topics completely, and the four—Dharmakīrti’s Drop of Reasons, b Analysis of Relations, c the Proof of Other Continuums, d the Reasoning for Debate, e are the treatises resembling limbs.

---

a mthar thug gi skyabs.
b gtan tshigs thigs pa.
c 'brel ba brtags pa.
d rgyud gzhon sgrub pa.
e rtsod rigs.
f 2011 BDRC bla brang (14a.4) reads thigs; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (12b.1) reads brtsod.
For:

1. the *Drop of Reasons*, having refuted [the possibility of valid reasons] with one mode, two modes, four modes, and six modes, teaches that [a valid reason] has only three modes, being an offshoot from this [*Commentary on Valid Cognition* where it says]*:a

   A [valid] reason is a property of the subject. It is pervaded by a factor of the [subject].

2. the *Analysis of Relations* is a branch [treatise] that having refuted (1) that relations are the two—possession [as in the case of fire and smoke]d and inherence [as in the case of an ox and a horn]—and (2) that relations are substantially existent, teaches that relations are necessarily only the relations of one essencee and of provenance, being an offshoot from this [*Commentary on Valid Cognition* where it says]:g

   [A valid reason is precisely of three types]
   Because the inseparability [of the reason from what is to be established] is restricted to [the three types].

---

a Dharmakīrti’s *Commentary on Valid Cognition*, I.1ab’.
b 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (14a.5) reads *tshigs*; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (12b.2) reads *tshig*.
c 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (14a.5) reads *‘phrod*; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (12b.2) reads *‘phrad*.
d The examples are from Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s *Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-pa’s) “Great Exposition of Tenets”* (BDRC W5842.1, stod, ya, 202.1.
e *bdag gcig* ‘brel, *tadāmya-sambandha*; related in the sense of one essence/ entity/ nature.
f *de byung* ‘brel, *tadutpatti-sambandha*; related in the sense of arising from that.
g Dharmakīrti’s *Commentary on Valid Cognition*, I.1c. The Sanskrit is found in Miyasaka (114.6): *avinābhāvanyamād [*...*].*
3. The Proof of Other Continuums is an offshoot of the Chapter on Direct Perception, since it establishes the existence of other continuums in [the system of] Mind-Only.

4. And the Reasoning for Debate is an offshoot of the fourth chapter, since it teaches the ways to benefit others from the approach of proof statements and refutations.

---

\(^a\) 2011 BDRC bla brang (14b.1) reads sgrub; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (12b.5) reads sgrub ngag.
3) THE PURPOSE OF THE TREATISE

It has the purpose of joining to goodness not only the trainees of the three lineages [Hearer, Solitary Realizer, and Great Vehicle], but also those whose lineage is [temporarily] severed, merely seeking worldly pleasures, and even those who have entered greatly wrong paths like the Lokāyata.a For, the statement in Dharmakīrti’s Commentary saying:b

Speech that expresses relationship,
Concordant means, and the aims of beings
Is [indicated to be valid scripture] in terms of being thoroughly analyzed.

Those in other terms are not.
indicates by the three—“aims of beings,” “excellent means,” and “relationship”—that scriptural teaching (lung gi bstan pa) taught relatedly from the approach of hearing, thinking, and meditation is endowed with the three attributes in order:

1. the aims sought by beings wanting release,
2. the excellent means concordantly capable of achieving those,
3. the relationship of positive and negative concomitance such that if one employs the excellent means concordantly capable of achieving those aims, those aims are attained, but if one does not employ the excellent means and adopts wrong means, those aims are not attained,

these being in accordance with Dignāga’s Praise Called the One Hundred Fifty:c

---

a Literally, “Diverged Afar from the World”; Bodhibhadra’s Connected Explanation of (Āryadeva’s) “Compilation of the Essence of Wisdom” (sde dge 3852, 40a.1) says, “Since they have gone apart from the correct view of the world, they are ‘Diverged Afar.’” Thanks to William Magee for the note.
b Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on Valid Cognition, I.214. The Sanskrit is found in Miyasaka (146.16-17): sambaddhānuguposāyam purusārthabhāvyakam/ parikṣādhiṁkṛtāṁ vākyam ato ‘nadhikṛtāṁ param//.
c Dignāga’s / Ashvaghoṣha’s Śatapañcāśataka v. 90cd (Bailly 1951: 101):

kālatrayavibhāgo 'sti nānyatra tava sāsanāt /

sde dge, bstod tshogs, ka, 113b.3; the stanza is also found in Dignāga’s / Ashvaghoṣha’s and Mātṛceta’s Interwoven Praise (spel mar bstod pa, miśrak sostra; sde dge, bstod tshogs,
Through the division into three time periods [of hearing, thinking, and meditation]
It does not exist in other than your teaching.

Nandipriya’s (dga’ ba’i snyan pa) Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Praise Called the One Hundred and Fifty” (brgya lnga bcu pa zhes bya ba’i bstod pa’i ’grel pa, šatapañcāśatakā-nāma-stotraṭīkā; 153b.7ff.) says:

This stanza explains that only the Buddha’s teaching has the teaching of wisdoms having the nature of hearing, thinking and meditating, not others.

\[ \text{(sangs rgyas kyi bstan pa kha na la thos pa dang bsam pa dang bsom pa’i rang bzhin gyi shes rab rnams kyi bstan pa yod de/ gzan la ni ma yin no)} \]

\[ ^a \text{2011 BDRC bla brang (14b.2) reads mtshol;} \quad \text{2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (12b.6) reads tshol. Read ’tshol.} \]

\[ ^b \text{2011 BDRC bla brang (14b.1) reads rjod;} \quad \text{2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (12b.6) reads brjad.} \]
The purposes of individual trainees exist [in scriptural teaching] because concerning how that scripture endowed with three attributes is proved to be flawless:

- scripture is established as flawless from its manifest and hidden objects of expression being established by valid cognition, and its very obscure objects of expression being purified by the three analyses, and
- the realizational teaching is well established as flawless from the approach of specification of nature, specification of number, and specification of order of the paths as well as the fruits of the three vehicles [Hearer, Solitary Realizer, and Great Vehicle],

---

a 2011 BDRC bla brang (14b.4) reads spyad; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (13a.1) reads dpyad.

b 2011 BDRC bla brang (14b.5) reads zhes; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (13a.2) reads shes.

c Its subject matter.

d Being purified by way of three analyses means that (1) what the scripture teaches about manifest objects is not contradicted by direct perception, (2) what the scripture teaches about slightly hidden objects is not contradicted by usual inference (called inference by the power of the fact), and (3) with respect to what the scripture teaches about very obscure objects, inaccessible to either direct perception or usual inference, there are no internal contradictions on those topics.
whereupon through this sign, the Teacher [Buddha] uniquely is established as the consummate valid person,

at which point the spiritual community who achieve the doctrines taught are also established as flawless,

and when such is established, it comes that for individual trainees their real purposes in accordance with their respective situations are each achieved.

It follows [that when such is established, it comes that for individual trainees their real purposes in accordance with their respective situations are each achieved], because the purpose of this treatise is that when these are established this way:

(1) those having the Great Vehicle lineage wanting to bring about the aims

\[\text{\footnotesize a 2011 BDRC bla brang (15a.1) reads grangs; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (13a.4) reads drang.}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize b 2011 BDRC bla brang (15a.2) reads 'tsham; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (13a.5) reads mtshams.}\]
of all having lineage find pure\textsuperscript{a} ascertainment with respect to the fact that nobody other than a Buddha has the capacity to bring about the aims of all having lineage, whereupon they generate the Great Vehicle [altruistic] mind-generation\textsuperscript{b} thinking, “[I] will attain that Buddhahood,” generating what has not been previously generated and serving as a cause of the irreversibility of what has been generated,

\[\text{[ཉན་རང་གི་རིགས་ཅན་དག་ཀྱང་དེ་ཅི་གེ་བསམ་ཟེད་ལེན་པའི་ཐེག་ཆེན་]}\]

(2) and when those having the Hearer lineage and Solitary Victor lineage also realize such, they understand that the Buddha alone is the Teacher for those seeking release, whereupon they attain clear faith in the Teacher, his doctrine, and the spiritual community; and they generate definite knowledge—that cannot be led astray by others—of the absence of release in the paths of Others’ Schools, such as the Kāpilas [Sāṃkhyas] and so forth,

\[\text{[ཉན་རང་གི་རིགས་ཅན་དག་ཀྱང་དེ་ཅི་གེ་བསམ་ཟེད་ལེན་པའི་ཐེག་ཆེན་]}\]

\textsuperscript{a} rnam dag; “pure” has the sense of “thorough” or “complete.”
\textsuperscript{b} thgyur sems bskyed.
\textsuperscript{c} 2011 BDRC bla brang (15a.2) reads thgyur; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (13a.6) reads thgyur gyi.
\textsuperscript{d} 2011 BDRC bla brang (15a.3) reads bskyed; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (13a.7) reads skyed de.
(3) and when even trainees with [temporarily] severed lineage who seek the mere worldly pleasures of the next life realize such, they hold that the Buddha uniquely is the Teacher of refuge and that the doctrine explains high status as the entrance [to their attainment], ascertaining that Ishvara, Brahman and others, who themselves are not released from the bondage of flaws, are not the refuge, and realize that all propositions that:

- one attains the status of good transmigrations\(^c\) by means of the sacrifice of cattle and so forth, and
- one attains release by receiving an initiation of Ishvara without realization of the profound meaning [of emptiness] or by mere physical torment

are the babblings of an infant and great non-methods, like someone panged by heat entering into fire,

\(^a\) 2011 BDRC bla brang (15a.4) reads dang ba ’thob; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (13b.1) reads dad pa thob.
\(^b\) 2011 BDRC bla brang (15a.4) reads bkrir; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (13b.1) reads bkri bar.
\(^c\) bde ’gro.
\(^d\) 2011 BDRC bla brang (15a.6) reads shing; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (13b.3) reads cing.
\(^e\) 2011 BDRC bla brang (15a.6) reads phyugs kyi; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (13b.3) reads dbang phyug gi.
(4) and when even those blinded by bad explanations [formulated by those such as Lokāyatas, engaging in whatever they like, such as taking life and so forth, for the sake of worldly pleasures of just this present lifetime, realize such, they realize that to propound and hold that only the present lifetime is enough is like propounding that only enjoyment for one day in the present lifetime is enough, and upon ascertaining that nonvirtuous actions such as killing and so forth, which harm self and others, are just like a road of razors,\(^b\) they abstain from those [actions] and eagerly take up the paths of wholesome actions of this and future [lives].

\(^a\) 2011 BDRC bla brang (15a.6) reads \(\text{’phang}\); 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (13b.3) reads \(\text{’phangs}\).

\(^b\) \text{spu gri’i lam}, like what manifests in a hell.

\(^c\) 2011 BDRC bla brang (15b.1) reads \(\text{phan}\); 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (13b.4) reads \(\text{pan}\).

\(^d\) 2011 BDRC bla brang (15b.1) reads \(\text{nyes bshad}\); 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (13b.4) reads \(\text{nyad chad}\).

\(^e\) 2011 BDRC bla brang (15b.1) reads \(\text{long ba}\); 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (13b.4) reads \(\text{longs pa}\).
Dharmakīrti’s second chapter [of the Commentary on Valid Cognition] says:

From [the reason] “[being] the Protector,” it is established that [the Buddha]
knows suchness, knows stably, and knows features entirely,

For [the gata (of sugata) is derived from the verbal root] gam,
which means “to realize.”
Therefore, since [the Buddha] surpasses Outsiders, learners, and non-learners,[It is concluded that the Buddha has been instilled with] teaching concerning trainings in knowledge for others.

When there is [a notion of] self, there occurs a notion of others.
From the factors of self and other, attachment and hatred [arise].

---

a 2011 BDRC bla brang (15b.3) reads ’di phyi’; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (13b.6) reads ’di dang phyi ma’.
b Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on Valid Cognition, II.280c-281. The Sanskrit is found in Miyasaka (40.2-4): tātāt tattvasthirāvivāśavāśajñānasādhanaṃ// bodhaḥθatvād gamer bāhyasāiśa-saiksādhikas tataḥ/ parārthajñānaghaṭanam tasmaḥ tacchāsanaṃ [...]/.
c 2011 BDRC bla brang (15b.3) reads skyob; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (13b.7) reads skyobs.
d 2011 BDRC bla brang (15b.3) reads brtan; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (13b.7) reads ldan.
e Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on Valid Cognition, II.219a; Jam-yang-shay-pa cites the first line and adds “and so forth”; the remaining three lines have been filled in. The Sanskrit is found in Miyasaka (32.5): ātmapi sati parasaṃjñā [...]/.
From the connections of these
All defects arise.

and:\(^a\)

Even though—toward one—owing to her defects
His attitude of desire reverses for a moment,
He does not become devoid of desire,
As do the desirous toward another woman.

and:\(^b\)

Because of having abandoned what is to be adopted and what is
to be discarded
Having equality toward all—
[Whether anointed with] sandalwood or [destroyed with] an
axe—
[A Foe Destroyer] is said to be “devoid of desire.”

and says:\(^c\)

When an antidote [to desire] increases, [desire] decreases;
And when its own class increases, [desire] increases.

I will expound at length on how to explain these in the Chapter of Establishment of Valid Cognition.
For, these are like what is stated by Kamalashīla in his *Commentary on (Shāntarākṣita’s) “Compendium of Principles”*:\(^a\)

[The expression of worship by way of (his) qualities] teaches that the Supramundane Victor is endowed with a superior essence of greatness. Upon hearing this, respectively, followers of faith\(^b\) generate faith toward the Supramundane Victor immediately without doubt. Moreover, followers of fact\(^c\) also generate the faith of clarity toward the Supramundane Victor upon definite determination—not seeing damage [contradicting possession] of such [qualities] and thereupon through familiarization enhancing the qualities of wisdom and so forth and becoming skilled in such aspects through valid cognition of accomplishment for the sake of transcending the senses, as will be explained. Those who, from the faith of clarity in him, desire his good qualities, after having understood his high sayings and the treatises based on them and so forth, are intent so as to hold [the teachings]. Through those by generating the wisdoms arisen from hearing and so forth […]\(^d\)

---

\(^a\) *tsad chen ’grel pa;* Kamalashīla’s *Commentary on the Compendium of Principles*, sDe dge, tshad ma, ze, 138a.6-b.2. The Sanskrit is found in Dwarikadas Shastri, *Tattvasaṅgrahā of Ācārya Shāntarākṣita, with the Commentary “Pañjikā”* of Shri Kamalashīla (Varanasi: Baudhā Bharati, 1968), 8.9-16: *tathā hi gunagāṇāḥkaṇḍhāvādāvānād bhagavato māhātyam utbhāvyate, tadupāṣṛtya ca śraddhāṃśa rīmanasāṃ taśad asamśayāṃ bhagavati jñātā citraspaśādāḥ samudeti/ ye ‘pi prajñānusārīnas [te ‘pi tathāvidhiśu bādhām apaśyaṃ tajjñādaṃ ca ganānām abhyāsāt prakāryam avagnçchanto vaktamānād aya atindriyārthadāhakāt pramānān nūnām jagati sambhāvyantat eva tāthāvidhāḥ sūraya ity avadhāraya] bhagavati prasādāṃ upajānayate eva/ tatprasādāc ca taddunās tatpravacaneṣu tadāśīrite ca śāstrādau parīkṣāparahsaram udgrahanārtham ādīrīyante, ta-tah śrutamayāviprajñādāyakramena āvats parama śreyo ‘dhigacchaṃti mahatsu prasādāḥ sarvāsaṃ vodhigateḥ pradāhanām karmanāt/.

\(^b\) *dad pa'i rjes su 'brangs pa rnam.*

\(^c\) *chos kyi rjes su 'brangs pa.*

\(^d\) The quotation continues in the next section.
4) THE ESSENTIAL PURPOSE OF THE TREATISE

With respect to the subject, this treatise [Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on Valid Cognition], its essential purpose exists because the gradual attainment of:

- the consummate valid cognition that is the omniscience perceiving all
phenomena like olives in the palm of the hand,\(^a\) and
• the consummate authoritative being\(^b\)

for the sake of trainees through hearing, thinking, and meditating is that [essential purpose]. Kamalashīla’s Commentary on (Shāntarakṣita’s) “Compendium of Principles” says:\(^c\)

Through those by generating the wisdoms arisen from hearing and so forth, they gradually attain the supreme goodness.

According to the proponents of Mind-Only who assert three final vehicles, the paths of no-more-learning\(^e\) of the three vehicles and three liberations of the three vehicles also are taken to be the essential purpose.

\(^a\) lag mthil gyi syu ru ra ltar.
\(^b\) tshad ma’i skyes bu mthar thug; literally, “consummate person who is a means of valid cognition.”
\(^c\) Kamalashīla’s Commentary on the Compendium of Principles, sDe dge, tshad ma, ze, 138b.2-3. The Sanskrit is found in Shastri (8.15): tataḥ śrutānyādiprajñodayakrame yāvat paraṃ śreya ‘dhigacchāntī” [...].
\(^d\) 2011 BDRC bla brang (16a.2) reads pas; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (14a.5) reads pa’i.
\(^e\) mi slob lam.
5) THE RELATIONSHIP

The relationship of this treatise exists because the omniscience and Enjoyment Body that are its essential purpose are [causally] related to the ten grounds that are its purpose, and these are [causally] related to the hearing and so forth that are the contents of this [treatise].

The meaning of the title has been explained well!

Transitional stanza

The white components [the full moon] of the topics, the eight categories [of logic], are complete.

The darkness obscuring the three types of objects\(^a\) is completely dispelled.

A hundred thousand ambrosias for exposition, debate, and composition drip down [from the moon],

Eliciting the glory of smiles of the totality of the intelligent, jasmine flowers.

\(^a\) gzhal bya’i gnas gsum; the three categories of objects of comprehension—manifest objects, slightly hidden objects, and very obscure objects.
128 Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Decisive Analysis of (Dharmakirti’s) “Commentary”

西藏佛法法性法尊那尔巴

\[\text{西藏佛法法性法尊那尔巴} \]

*a 2011 BDRCbla brang (16a.6) reads zhes; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (14b.2) reads ces.*
Abbreviations

“2015 Old Lhasa Go-mang” = *chos thams cad rigs pas gtan la ’bebs pa’i gtan tshigs kyi rnam bzhag legs par bshad pa bzhugs so* (Elegant Explanation of the Presentation of Reasons Delineating All Phenomena by Reasoning). Named “2015” because of being acquired in Lha-sa, Tibet, at Go-mang College in 2015 by Jongbok Yi for the UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies; originally published at Go-mang College, date unknown. (Complete edition, to be made available at UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, uma-tibet.org.)

“2011 BDRC bla brang” = *rtags rigs kyi rnam bzhag nyung gsal legs bshad gser gyi phreng mdzes zhes bya ba bzhugs so.* Named because of being acquired by E. Gene Smith for the Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center in 2010 and added to BDRC in 2011; originally published in La-brang-tra-shi-khyil monastery, date unknown.

“co ne” = *co ne bstan ’gyur.* BDRC W1GS66030. *co ne dgon chen: co ne,* 1926.


“BDRC” = Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center (http://www.tbrc.org).
Bibliography of Works Cited

1. SŪTRAS

Questions of King Dhāranīśvara Sūtra / Sūtra Teaching the Great Compassion of a One-Gone-Thus dhāranīśvarājaparipačchāsūtra

†phags pa gzungs kyi dbang phyug rgyal pos zhūs pa'i mdo


2. WORKS IN SANSKRIT AND TIBETAN

Anubhūti

Sarasvatī’s Sūtra on Grammar

sarasvatīvyākaraṇasūtra

brda sprod pa dbyangs can gyi mdo


In sgra dang sde byor. BDRC W29032.419-640 (PDF of Lan Kru’u: Kan su’u mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 2004)


Āryadeva (†phags pa lha, second to third century C.E.)

Four Hundred Stanzas

catuḥśatakaśāstrakārikā

bstan bcos bzhi brgya pa


Asaṅga (thogs med, fourth century)

Compendium of Ascertainties

yogācārahūmīvinśayasaṃgrahaṇi

mal ’byor spyod pa’i sa rnam par gtan la dbab pa bsduas pa


Summary of Manifest Knowledge

abhidharmasamuccaya

chos mngon pa kun las btsus pa


Atisha (alias Dīpaṃkarajñāna, mar me mdzad ye shes, 982-1054)

Introduction to the Two Truths

satyaadvayāvatāra

bden pa gnyis la ’jug pa


Bodhibhadra (byang chub bzang po)

Connected Explanation of (Āryadeva’s) Compilation of the Essence of Wisdom

ye shes snying po kun las btsus pa zhes bya ba’i bshad sbyar

jñānasārasamuccayanāmanibandhana

Dharmakirti (chos kyi grags pa, seventh century)

**Seven Treatises on Valid Cognition**

Three resembling a body

1. **Commentary on Valid Cognition** / Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid Cognition”
   - pramāṇavārttikakārikā
   - tshad ma rnam ’grel gyi tshig le’ur byas pa
   - Peking 5709, vol. 130.


2. **Ascertainment of Valid Cognition**
   - pramāṇavinīcayā
   - tshad ma rnam par nges pa
   - Peking 5710, vol. 130.

3. **Drop of Reasoning**
   - nyāyabinduprakarana
   - rigs pa’i thigs pa zhes bya ba’i rab tu byed pa
Bibliography of Works Cited

133

Peking 5711, vol. 130.

**Four resembling limbs**

4. *Drop of Reasons*
   hetubindānāmaprakaraṇa
gtan thigs kyi thigs pa zhes bya ba rab tu byed pa
   (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985).
   Peking 5712, vol. 130.

5. *Analysis of Relations*
sambandhaparīkṣā
   'brel pa brtag pa
   (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985).
   Peking 5713, vol. 130.

6. *Proof of Other Continuums*
saṃtānāntarasiddhināmaprakaraṇa
   rgyud gzhan grub pa zhes bya ba'i rab tu byed pa
   Peking 5716, vol. 130.

7. *Reasoning for Debate*
vādanyāya
   rtsod pa'i rigs pa
   (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985).
   Peking 5715, vol. 130.

Auto-Commentary on the “Commentary on Valid Cognition”
tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi 'grel pa
   pramāṇavārttikavṛtti
   (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985).
   Peking 5717, vol. 130.

Dharmottara (chos mchog, 8th century)

Commentarial Explanation of (Dharmakīrti’s) “Ascertainment of Valid Cognition” / Greater Logicality
   pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā
   tshad ma rnam par nges pa'i 'grel bshad / 'thad ldan / 'thad ldan che ba
   Tibetan digital reprint edition: In *bstan 'gyur (sde dge*, 4229). BDRC W23703.188:4-579 (PDF
   Peking 5718, vol. 130.

Commentary on (Dharmakīrti’s) “Drop of Reason” / Lesser Logicality
   nyāyabindufūtkā
   rigs pa'i thigs pa'i rgya cher 'grel pa / 'thad ldan Chung ba
   Peking 5719, vol. 130.

Dignāga (phyogs kyi glangs po, sixth century)

[Auto-]Commentary on the “Compilation of Valid Cognition”
   pramāṇaśasamuccayavṛtti
   tshad ma kun las btsus pa'i 'grel pa
   Tibetan digital reprint edition: In *bstan 'gyur (sde dge*, 4204). BDRC W23703.174:30-172 (PDF
Autocommentary on the “Explanation of Objects of Observation”
ālaṃbanaparīkṣāvṛtti
dmigs pa brtag pa ‘i ’grel pa
(PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985).

Compilation of Valid Cognition
pramāṇasamuccaya

Gate of Reasoning [also ascribed to Śaṅkarasvāmin in Indian and Chinese traditions]
nyāyapraveśa-nāma-pramāṇaprakaraṇa

Wheel of Reasonings
hetucakradāmaru
(PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985).

Gyal-tshab Dar-ma-rin-chen (rgyal tshab dar ma rin chen, 1364-1432)

Explantion of (Dharmakīrti’s) “Commentary on (Dignāga’s) ‘Compilation of Valid Cognition’”:
Unerring Illumination of the Path to Liberation
tshad ma rnam ’grel gvi tshig le’ur byas pa ‘i rnam bshad thar lam phyin ci ma log par gsal bar byed pa / rnam ‘grel thar lam gsal byed
Tibetan editions: In gsung ‘bum (rgyal tshab rje, bla brang par ma) BDRC W4CZ2710.5:229-410 (PDF of bla brang: bla brang bkra shis ‘khyil, 1999).

Jam-yang-shay-pa Ngag-wang-tson-drü (jam dbyangs bzhad pa ’i rdo rje ngag diang bstan grus, 1648-1721/1722)
Decisive Analysis of (Maitreya’s) “Ornament for the Clear Realizations”: Precious Lamp Illuminating All the Topics of the Perfection of Wisdom
bstan bcos mgon par rogs pa ’i rgyan gvi mtha’ dpyod shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa ’i don kun gsal ba ’i rin chen sgron me

Eloquent Presentation of the Eight Categories and Seventy Topics: Sacred Word of Guru Ajita
dngos po brgyad don bdun cu ’i rnam bzhag legs par bshad pa mi pham bla ma ’i zhal lung
Tibetan editions:


1999 Tōyō Bunko CD-ROM: “Tibetan texts of don bdun bcu of ’jam dbyangs bzhad pa and rigs lam ’phrub gyi lde mig of dkon mchog bstan pa'i sgron me.” In the Toyo Bunko Database CD Release II. Tokyo, Japan: Tōyō Bunko, 1999. CD-ROM. (This edition is based on the 1999 Mundgod.)


2011 BDRC bla brang: In gsung 'bum ('jam dbyangs bzhad pa) BDRC W22186.14:115-178 (PDF of bla brang bkra shis 'khyil: bla brang brka shis 'khyil dgon, publishing date unknown).


Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive / Decisive Analysis of (Tsong-kha-pa’s) “Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive”: Storehouse of White Beryl of Scripture and Reasoning Free from Mistake, Fulfilling the Hopes of the Fortunate drang ba dang nges pa'i don mam par 'byed pa'i mtha' dpyod 'khrul bral lung rigs bai dūr dkar pa'i ngan mdzod skal brang re ba kun skong


Tibetan digital reprint edition: BDRC W1KG21952.1 (PDF of sbag sa: nang bstan shes rig 'dzin skyong slob gnyer khang, [1968]).


English translation of section two: William Magee. Questioning the Buddha About Contradictions in His Teachings. UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, uma-tibet.org.


Great Exposition of the Middle / Decisive Analysis of (Chandrakīrti’s) “Supplement to (Nāgār-
Bibliography of Works Cited

Juna's "Treatise on the Middle". Treasury of Scripture and Reasoning, Thoroughly Illuminating the Profound Meaning [of Emptiness], Entrance for the Fortunate

Tibetan digital reprint edition: In gsung 'bum (jam dbyangs bzhad pa'i rdo rje). BDRC W21503.9:11-894 (PDF of South India?: Gomang College?, 1997?).


Translation of part of chapter six: Jongbok Yi. The Opposite of Emptiness in the Middle Way Autonomy School: Jam-yang-shay-pa's Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six.
Translation of part of chapter six: Jongbok Yi. The Opposite of Emptiness in the Middle Way Consequence School: Jam-yang-shay-pa's Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six.

Great Exposition of Tenets / Explanation of Tenets: Sun of the Land of Samantabhadra Brilliantly Illuminating All of Our Own and Others' Tenets and the Meaning of the Profound [Emptiness], Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning Fulfilling All Hopes of All Beings
grub mtha' chen mo / grub mtha'i mam bshad rang gzhan grub mtha' kun dang zab don mehog tu gsal ba kun brang zhi ngi nyi ma lung rigs rgya mts increasing dgu'i re ba kun skong


Illuminating a Little the Presentation of Awareness and Knowledge: *Beautiful Golden Garland of Eloquence*

blo rig gi rnam bzhag nyung gsal legs bshad gser gyi ‘phreng mdzes


Illuminating a Little the Presentation of Signs and Reasonings: *Beautiful Golden Garland of Eloquence*

rtags rigs kyi rnam bzhag nyung gsal legs bshad gser gyi phreng mdzes


Jayanta (rgyal ba can)

*Commentary on (Prajñākārama) Ornament*

pramāṇavārttikākālamāraṇī
tshad ma rnam ’grel gyi rgyan gyi ’grel bshad


Jetāri / Jitāri (dgra las rgyal ba, c. 10th century)

*Explanation of the Suchness of the Reasons*

hetutattvopadesa
gtan tshigs kyi de kho na nyid bstan pa


Introducing Childish Beings to Logic

byis pa ’jug pa’i rtog ge bālāvatāratarka


Jñānashrībhadra

*Commentary on the Ascertainment of Valid Cognition*

pramāṇaviniścayaṇī
tshad ma rnam par nges pa’i ’grel bshad


Kamalashīla (eighth century)

*Commentary on the Compendium of Principles*

tattvasaṃgrahapāñjikā
de kho na nyid bsus pa’i dka ’grel
Bibliography of Works Cited


Khay-drub Ge-leg-pal-sang ( mkhas grub dge legs dpal bzang, 1385-1438)

Great Commentary on (Dharmakīrti’s) “Commentary on (Dignāga’s) ‘Compilation of Valid Cognition’” / Extensive Explanation of the Great Treatise (Dharmakīrti’s) “Commentary on (Dignāga’s) ‘Compilation of Valid Cognition’”
tshad ma sde bdun gyi rgyan yid kyi mun sel

Kön-chog-jig-may-wang-po (dkon mchog 'jigs med dbang po, 1728-1791)

Biography of the Omniscient Jam-yang-shay-pa
kun mkhyen 'jam dbyangs bzhad pa'i rnam thar

Maitreya (byams pa)

Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras
mahāyānasūrāḷaṃkāra


Great Vehicle Treatise on the Sublime Continuum
mahāyānottaratantraśāstra


Mātṛceta [also ascribed to Āsvaghoṣa and Dignāga in Tibetan tradition]

Praise Called the One Hundred and Fifty śatapañcāśataka
bṛgya lnga bcu pa shes bya ba'i bstd pa


Intertwoven Praise
niṣrakṣastotra
spel mar bstd pa,

Nandipriya (dga’ byed snyan pa)
Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Praise Called the One Hundred and Fifty”
śatapāchāsatsatanmānattatāktā
bṛgya lnga bcu pa’i zhes bya ba’i bstdod pa’i ’grel pa
Ngag-wang-pa-dan (ngag dbang dpal ldan, b. 1797)
Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-pa’s) “Great Exposition of Tenets”: Freeing the Knots of the Difficult Points, Precious Jewel of Clear Thought
grub mtha’ chen mo’i mchan ’grel dka’ gnad mdud grol blo gsal gces nor
Shāntideva (chi ba lha, eighth century)
Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds
bodhiṣattva-caryāvatāra
byang chub sems dpa’i spyod pa la ’jug pa
Sthiramati (blo bstan, fl. late fourth century)
Explanation of (Vasubandhu’s) Commentary on the Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes
madhyāntavibhaṅgayāvatāra
dbus dang mtha’ rnam par ’byed pa’i ’grel bshad
Vasubandhu (dbyig gyen, fl. 360)
Treasury of Manifest Knowledge
abhidharmakośa
chos mngon pa’i mdzod kyi tshig le’ur byas pa
Commentary on the Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras
sūtrālanākāravyākhyātyā
mdo sde’i rgyan gyi bshad pa
Commentary on (Maitreya’s) “Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes
madhyāntavibhaṅgayāvatāra
dbus dang mtha’ rnam par ’byed pa’i ’grel bshad
Vinītadeva (dal ba lha)
Explanation of (Dignāga’s) Autocommentary on the Explanation of Objects of Observation
ālaṃbanaparīkṣāktā
dngags pa brtag pa’i ’grel bshad
3. OTHER WORKS


Hiroshi Nemoto is a Professor of Indian Philosophy at Hiroshima University, Japan. He received a B.A. degree in 2001, an M.A. degree in 2004, and a Ph. D in 2009 from Hiroshima University, where he specialized in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism and learned Sanskrit, Pāli, and Tibetan. He studied Buddhism with Geshe Lobsang Tsultrim (Blo bzang tshul khrims, 1959–2016) at Drepung Gomang Monastic University (Mundgod, India) from 2004 to 2006, and has been studying with many other Tibetan Geshes from Drepung Gomang Monastic University at Mañjuśrī Mahāyāna Buddhist Association (Hiroshima, Japan) from 2007. He also studied Tibetan poetics at Qinghai Normal University, Xining, from 2013–2014. He is the author of two books written in Japanese: A Study of the dGe lugs pa’s View of Time (Geruku-ha ni okeru jikan-ron no kenkyu, Kyoto: Heirakuji-Shoten, 2011), and Tsong kha pa’s Philosophy and Poetry: A Study of the Rten ’brel bstod pa (Tson-kha-pa no shiso to bungaku: Engisan wo yomu, Kyoto: Heirakuji-Shoten, 2016). He has also written numerous articles written in both English and Japanese, including “Who is a Proper Opponent? The Tibetan Buddhist Concept of phyi rgol yang dag” (Journal of Indian Philosophy 41-2: 151–165, 2013) and “The Myth of Maitreya in Tibet” (Journal of Tibetology 10: 99–110, 2015). Since 2014, he has been teaching at Hiroshima University.
The text translated here is the first part of the *Decisive Analysis of the Commentary on Valid Cognition* by Jam-yang-shay-pa-ngag-wang-tson-dru (1648–1721). The *Decisive Analysis* is a large commentary on Dharmakīrti’s (ca. 600–660) *Commentary on Valid Cognition*, a masterpiece of Buddhist logic and epistemology. Up to the present day, the *Decisive Analysis* has been used as a textbook at Drepung Gomang, Labrang Tashi-khyil, and other allied institutes of the Ge-lug-pa sect throughout Inner Asia.

The title of Dharmakīrti’s text is “Pramāṇavārttika,” which is translated here as *Commentary on Valid Cognition*. According to Jam-yang-shay-pa, “valid cognition” stands for “a commentary on the treatises of valid cognition.” The most relevant treatise is Dignāga’s (ca. 480–540) *Compilation of Valid Cognition*, and Jam-yang-shay-pa also indicates that the Dharmakīrti’s text is also intended as a commentary on the Buddha’s words that reveal the nature of valid cognition.

Thus the subject matter is the entire doctrine of the Buddha. Jam-yang-shay-pa says that in Dharmakīrti’s second chapter the Buddha’s doctrine is elaborated in terms the path to liberation and omniscience, and in the third chapter it is discussed in terms of the interpretable and definitive. The first chapter explains reasons serving as means of determining such topics by oneself, and that the fourth chapter explains the proper way to teach these to others.

The purpose of the text is to help each reader to comprehend the flawlessness of the Buddha, his doctrine—which consists of scripture and realization—and the spiritual community who achieve what is taught by the Buddha, thereby leading the reader to achieve supreme goodness.