Questioning the Buddha about Contradictions in his Teachings

Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive: 2

William Magee
In collaboration with Lo-sang-gyal-tshan
Edited by Jeffrey Hopkins

UMA INSTITUTE FOR TIBETAN STUDIES
Questioning the Buddha about Contradictions
Questioning the Buddha about Contradictions in his Teachings

Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive: 2

William Magee

In collaboration with Lo-sang-gyal-tshan

Edited by Jeffrey Hopkins

UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies
uma-tibet.org
Education in Compassion and Wisdom
UMA Great Books Translation Project

Supported by generous grants from the
ING Foundation and Yeshe Khorlo Foundation
and gifts from individual sponsors—
Hsu Shu-Hsun; Chou Mei-Dai;
Chien Jin-Hong; Pu Chih-Pin;
Daniel E. Perdue

Translating texts from the heritage of Tibetan and Inner Asian Buddhist systems. The project focuses on Great Indian Books and Tibetan commentaries from the Go-mang College syllabus as well as a related theme on the fundamental innate mind of clear light in Tantric traditions. A feature of the Project is the usage of consistent vocabulary and format throughout the translations.

Publications are available online without cost under a Creative Commons License with the understanding that downloaded material must be distributed for free: http://uma-tibet.org. UMA stands for Union of the Modern and the Ancient (gsar rnying zung 'jug khang). The UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies is a non-profit 501(c)3 organization.

UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies
7330 Harris Mountain Lane
Dyke, VA 22935-1008
USA

Version: December, 2015

ISBN: 978941381076
Library of Congress Control Number:

Magee, William (1949-)
Questioning the Buddha about contradictions in his teachings: jam-yang-shay-pa’s great exposition of the interpretable and the definitive / by William Magee.
Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN: 978941381076
1. Lo-sang-gyal-tshan, 1966- II. Title.
## Contents

Preface .................................................................................................................. 7
Editions consulted ................................................................................................. 8

Technical Notes ................................................................................................... 9

The Collaborator ................................................................................................. 11

Jam-yang-shay-pa’s *Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive*: 2, on Questioning the Buddha .... 13

II. How the interpretable and the definitive are differentiated ....................... 15
   A. The position relying on the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* ............... 15
      1. Stating what is said in the sūtra ....................................................... 15
         a. A question about dispelling contradiction in the sūtras ............. 16
            1) Refuting [mistakes] ................................................................. 18
            2) Presentation of our own system ........................................... 56
            3) Dispelling objections ............................................................. 59

Abbreviations ...................................................................................................... 74

Bibliography ....................................................................................................... 77
   1. Sūtras ......................................................................................................... 77
   2. Other Sanskrit and Tibetan Works .......................................................... 79
   3. Other Works .............................................................................................. 105
Preface

The text translated here is a portion of Jam-yang-shay-pa Ngag-wang-tson-drü’s Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive / Decisive Analysis of (Tsong-kha-pa’s) “Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive”: Storehouse of White Lapis-Lazuli of Scripture and Reasoning Free from Mistake, Fulfilling the Hopes of the Fortunate, a commentary on Tsong-kha-pa Lo-sang-drag-pa’s The Essence of Eloquence. It belongs to the debate-oriented decisive analysis (mtha’ dpyod) genre and is the textbook (yig cha) for the study of Tsong-kha-pa’s The Essence of Eloquence at Go-mang Monastic College.

This section treats Tsong-kha-pa’s analysis of the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought, including the Bodhisattva Paramārthasamudgata’s question regarding an apparent contradiction in Buddha’s sutras. The next volume will treat the Buddha’s reply avoiding contradiction by revealing the thought behind his statements.

Readers interested in a detailed discussion of The Essence of Eloquence and an overview of Ge-lug-pa’ writings on interpretation of scripture should consult the three volumes of Jeffrey Hopkins’ Dynamic Responses to Dzong-kha-ba’s The Essence of Eloquence devoted to the section of the Mind-Only School:

• Emptiness in the Mind-Only School of Buddhism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999);
• Reflections on Reality: the Three Natures and Non-Natures in the Mind-Only School (Berkeley: University of California Press Press; 2002);

The present work is indebted to these three volumes.

---
a ‘jam dbyangs bzhad pa’i rdo rje ngag dbang brtson grus, 1648-1721/1722.
b Written circa 1686. Herein called Great Exposition of the Interpretable and Definitive.
c tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa, 1357-1419.
d drang ba dang nges pa i don rnam par phy e ba’i bstan bcos legs bshad snying po / legs bshad snying po; Peking 6142, vol. 153.
e dge lugs pa.
EDITIONS CONSULTED

Two basic editions of Jam-yang-shay-pa’s *Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive* were consulted:

1. *drang ba dang nges pa'i don rnam par 'byed pa'i mtha' dpyod 'khrul bral lung rigs bai dūr dkar pa'i ngan mdzod skal bzang re ba kun skong*, TBRC W22186.10: 1-288, which is a PDF of: *bla brang bkra shis 'khyil, bla brang brka shis 'khyil dgon*, publishing date unknown. Abbreviated reference: “2011 TBRC bla brang.”


Also a codex edition based on the *bla brang* edition was used for convenience:


The digital Tibetan text of Jam-yang-shay-pa’s *Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive* provided in this book was supplied by the Drepung Gomang Library of Go-mang College in Mundgod, Karnataka State, India, which was likely based on the 1999 Mundgod codex. It has been edited in accordance with the “2011 TBRC *bla brang*” and the “1987 Go-mang Lhasa.”
Technical Notes

It is important to recognize that:

• translations and editions of texts are given in the Bibliography;

• the names of Indian Buddhist schools of thought are translated into English in a wish to increase accessibility for non-specialists;

• for the names of Indian scholars and systems used in the body of the text, \( ch, sh, \) and \( sh \) are used instead of the more usual \( c, s, \) and \( s \) for the sake of easy pronunciation by non-specialists; however, \( cch \) is used for \( cch, \) not \( chchh. \) Within parentheses the usual transliteration system for Sanskrit is used;

• transliteration of Tibetan is done in accordance with a system devised by Turrell Wylie; see “A Standard System of Tibetan Transcription,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 22 (1959): 261-267;

• the names of Tibetan authors and orders are given in “essay phonetics” for the sake of easy pronunciation; the system is aimed at internet searchability;

• titles of added subsections are given in square brackets;

• definitions are in bold type.
The Collaborator

Lo-sang-gyal-tshan is a Ge-she at Go-mang College of Dre-pung Monastic University, Mundgod, Karnataka State, India, who also served a six-month term as Disciplinarian at the Tantric College of Lower Lhasa in Hunsur, India. In October, 2015, he assumed the position of Abbot of Go-mang College of Dre-pung Monastic University in Mundgod, India. He has worked with translators of the UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies since 2013. In particular, he provided crucial assistance with filling in the dialectical moves throughout the text and by responding to questions about the meaning.
Jam-yang-shay-pa’s
GREAT EXPOSITION
OF THE INTERPRETABLE AND
THE DEFINITIVE: 2
on Questioning the Buddha

Decisive Analysis of (Tsong-kha-pa’s) “Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive”: Storehouse of White Lapis-Lazuli of Scripture and Reasoning Free from Mistake, Fulfilling the Hopes of the Fortunate

Continuing from:

Principles for Practice: The Four Reliances
Jam-yang-shay-pa’s
Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive: 1

The Tibetan text and the translation are highlighted in three colors: black, blue, and red. Blue colored statements present what Jam-yang-shay-pa considers to be right positions, while red colored statements represent what Jam-yang-shay-pa considers to be wrong positions. Words in black are other information or function structurally. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight indicates material added in place of ellipses, and magenta highlight sets off the ellipsis indicator when it has been filled in.
II. HOW THE INTERPRETABLE AND THE DEFINITIVE ARE DIFFERENTIATED

This has two parts: the position relying on the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought and the position relying on The Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra.

A. THE POSITION RELYING ON THE SŪTRA
UNRAVELING THE THOUGHT

This has two parts: stating what is said in the sūtra and how Aśaṅga and his [half-]brother [Vasubandhu] and so forth commented on its meaning.

1. Stating what is said in the sūtra

This has four parts: a question about dispelling contradiction in the sūtras, the answer dispelling that contradiction, identifying the entities of the three natures, and [Paramārthasamudgata’s] offering [to Buddha] the meaning established by these.
a. A question about dispelling contradiction in the sūtras

[Tsong-kha-pa paraphrases Paramārthasamudgata’s questioning of the Buddha in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought].\(^a\)

The Supramundane Victor [initially] spoke, in many ways, of the own-character of the aggregates. He also spoke of their character of production, character of disintegration, abandonment, and thorough knowledge. Just as he did with respect to the aggregates, so he also spoke with respect to the sense-spheres, dependent-arising, and the foods. In a similar fashion, he also spoke of the own-character of the [four] truths, thorough knowledge, abandonment, actualization, and meditation as well as the own-character of the constituents, the various [eighteen] constituents, and manifold [six] constituents, their abandonment, and thorough knowledge as well as the own-character of the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment [their] discordances, the antidotes, production of [virtues or antidotes] that have not been produced, the abiding of those that have been produced, nonloss [of antidotes that have been produced, their] arising again, and increasing and extending.

Also, the Supramundane Victor said [in the middle wheel of the teaching], “All phenomena are natureless; all phenomena are unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow.”

Therefore, I am wondering of what the Supramundane Victor was thinking when he said [in the middle wheel of the teaching], “All phenomena are natureless; all phenomena are unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow.” I [explicitly] ask the Supramundane Victor about the meaning of his saying [in the middle wheel of the teaching], “All phenomena are natureless; all phenomena are unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow.”

\(^a\) The following translation of Tsong-kha-pa’s paraphrase of the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought is taken from Hopkins, Emptiness in Mind-Only, 76-78.
On this occasion [of a question about dispelling contradiction in the sūtras] there are three parts: refuting [mistakes], presentation of our own system, and dispelling objections [to our own system].
1) REFUTING [MISTAKES]

1. Someone says: There is a way in which Paramārthasamudgata questions the Teacher [Buddha] in order to dispel contradiction because [in the Śūtra Unraveling the Thought, Paramārthasamudgata] explicitly questions [Buddha in this way]:

   In the first wheel as indicated here [in the Śūtra Unraveling the Thought, the Supramundane Victor] said that phenomena ranging from forms through to exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects are equally established by way of their own character. In the middle wheel as indicated here, he said that phenomena ranging from forms through to exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects are equally not established by way of their own character. Even if, left as they are verbally, these two [statements] are contradictory, the Teacher must be without contradiction, therefore thinking of what did you teach in the middle [wheel of doctrine that all phenomena are equally natureless and so forth]?

[Paramārthasamudgata] implicitly asks of what [Buddha] was thinking when in the first wheel he spoke like that [namely, that phenomena ranging...]

---

a 2011 TBRC bla brang, 13b.3; 1987 Go-mang Lhasa, 10b.2; 2008 Taipei reprint, 17.18.
b Please note that “here” in the phrase “as indicated here” (dir bstan) in this text will always refer to the Śūtra Unraveling the Thought; therefore, I often omit the name of the sūtra.
c This debate corrects an assertion by Pal-jor-hlun-drub (dpal 'byor lhun grub, gnyal [or gnyan] ston, 1427-1514)—the textbook-author of Se-ra Jay College prior to Jay-tsün Chökyi-gyal-tshan (rje btsun chos kyi rgyal mtshan, 1469-1544/1546)—that in the first wheel Buddha pronounced that phenomena ranging from forms through to exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects are established by way of their own character. Pal-jor-hlun-drub’s Lamp for the Teaching says:

   With respect to the bases posited by this sūtra as interpretable or definitive, there are three because there are the three—the first wheel in which, during the initial period, it is said equally that phenomena exist by way of their own character, the middle wheel in which it is said equally that phenomena do not exist by way of their own character, and the third wheel which teaches having differentiated individually whether the three—imputational natures, other-powered natures, and thoroughly established natures—do or do not exist by way of their own character.

See Hopkins, Absorption in No External World, 50-73.
Refuting Mistakes about the Question

from forms through to exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects are equally established by way of their own character].

Our response: Well then, it [absurdly] follows that in the first wheel indicated here [in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought] all phenomena ranging from forms through to exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects, having been taken as substrata, are explicitly said to be established by way of their own character because [according to you] your way [Paramārthasamudgata] questions [the Teacher] is logically feasible.
If you [incorrectly] accept [that in the first wheel all phenomena ranging from forms through to exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects, having been taken as substrata, are explicitly said to be established by way of their own character], then it [absurdly] follows that in the first wheel as indicated here the one hundred and eight bases of exposition, having been taken as substrata, are explicitly said to be established by way of their own character because you [incorrectly] accept [that in the first wheel all phenomena ranging from forms through to exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects, having been taken as substrata, are explicitly said to be established by way of their own character].

You cannot accept [that in the first wheel as indicated here the one hundred and eight bases of exposition, having been taken as substrata, are explicitly said to be established by way of their own character] because [Buddha], without taking the one hundred and eight bases of exposition as substrata in the explicit rendering of the first wheel as indicated here [in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought], takes a small number of phenomena such as the aggregates and so forth as the substrata because Tsong-kha-pa’s The Essence of Eloquence says:

---

a A traditional list of one hundred eight phenomena drawn from the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras that begins with forms and ends with exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects; for this list of fifty-three impure and fifty-five pure phenomena see Hopkins, Meditation on Emptiness (London: Wisdom Publications, 1983; rev. ed., Boston, Ma.: Wisdom Publications, 1996), 201-212.

b Sarnath gtsang edition (Sarnath, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1973), 87.15-20. According to Jam-yang-shay-pa, the passage should read:
Initially, at Varanāsi, he spoke of the selflessness of persons; [thus] there is one cycle [of teaching], in which the true establishment of the phenomena of the aggregates and so forth, except for a few, is not refuted and true existence is mentioned frequently.

Moreover, it [absurdly] follows that in the first wheel as indicated here [in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought] the twenty emptynesses, having been taken as substrata, are explicitly said to be established by way of their own character because you [incorrectly] accept [that in the first wheel all phenomena ranging from forms through to exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects, having been taken as substrata, are explicitly said to be established by way of their own character].

Initially, at Varanāsi, he spoke of the selflessness of persons; [thus] there is one cycle [of teaching], in which the true establishment of the phenomena of the aggregates and so forth—[these being] no more than a few [of the one hundred and eight phenomena]—is not refuted and true existence is mentioned frequently.
If you [incorrectly] accept [that the twenty emptynesses, having been taken as substrata, are explicitly said to be established by way of their own character], then it [absurdly] follows that the twenty emptynesses are explicitly taught in the literal rendering in the first wheel as indicated here because you [incorrectly] accept [that the twenty emptynesses, having been taken as substrata, are explicitly said to be established by way of their own character].

If you [incorrectly] accept [that the twenty emptynesses are explicitly taught in the literal rendering in the first wheel as indicated here], it [absurdly] follows that this [first wheel] explicitly teaches the twenty emptynesses, because you [incorrectly] accept [that the twenty emptynesses are explicitly taught in the literal rendering in the first wheel]. If you [incorrectly] accept [that this first wheel explicitly teaches the twenty emptynesses], it [absurdly] follows that this [first wheel] extensively explicitly teaches emptiness because you [incorrectly] accept [that this first wheel explicitly teaches the twenty emptinesses in the first wheel as indicated here].
It is not reasonable to accept [that the first wheel explicitly and extensively teaches emptiness] because those are Lesser Vehicle sūtra [passages].

2. About this formulation, someone says: It follows that this [first wheel] explicitly teaches that all phenomena from forms through to exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects are established by way of their own character because this [first wheel] explicitly teaches these [phenomena from forms through to exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects]—upon including them in the eighteen constituents—to be established by way of their own character. It follows [that this first wheel explicitly teaches these phenomena from forms through to exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects—upon including them in the eighteen constituents—to be established by way of their own character] because this [first wheel] explicitly teaches these [phenomena from forms through to exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects]—upon including them in eighteen constituents—to be established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them.

2011 TBRC bla brang, 14b.1; 1987 Go-mang Lhasa, 11a.3; 2008 Taipei reprint, 18.19. See Hopkins, Absorption in No External World, 56-57 (issues #23 and 24: “When the eighteen constituents are taught, are the one hundred eight phenomena taught?” and “Can this topic be trivialized?”).
Our response: [That this first wheel explicitly teaches these phenomena from forms through to exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects—upon including them in the eighteen constituents—to be established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them] does not entail [that this first wheel explicitly teaches these phenomena from forms through to exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects—upon including them in the eighteen constituents—to be established by way of their own character].

The reason [that this first wheel explicitly teaches these phenomena from forms through to exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects—upon including them in the eighteen constituents—to be established by way of their own character] is established because it is reasonable to comment on such statements [in the first wheel of establishment by way of its own character] as being of interpretable meaning because Tsong-kha-pa’s The Essence of Eloquence says:

Statements that those two [that is, phenomenon-constituent and phenomenon-sense-sphere] are established by way of their own character without differentiating [from among phenomena what does and does not exist by way of its own character] also require interpretation.

---

a See Hopkins, Emptiness in Mind-Only, 235.
b With more context, the passage is:
Moreover, it [absurdly] follows that [according to you] when teaching the mode of pronouncement in the first wheel as indicated here [in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought], there is no need [for the Buddha] to specify these

Since an imputational factor imputed to phenomena in the manner of entity and attribute is a phenomenon-constituent (chos kyi khams, dharmadhātu) and a phenomenon-sense-sphere (chos kyi skye mched, dharmāyatana), statements that those two [that is, phenomenon-constituent and phenomenon-sense-sphere] are established by way of their own character without differentiating [from among phenomena what does and does not exist by way of its own character] also require interpretation.

Hopkins notes:

Since these two, as categories, contain instances (such as uncompounded space) that are permanent, the categories themselves are considered to be permanent and hence not established by way of their own character. Tsong-kha-pa’s more specific reference is to imputational natures that are factors imputed in the manner of entity and attribute, and when it is taught in the first wheel that all phenomena, without differentiation, are established by way of their own character, these imputational natures, being existent, also are included as being established by way of their own character. Since they exist but actually do not exist by way of their own character, such scriptures also (that is, in addition to those teaching external objects) require interpretation.

Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 699.6) says that, with respect to the teaching that all phenomena are established by way of their own character, the factual basis in Buddha’s thought is that other-powered natures and thoroughly established natures are established by way of their own character; the purpose is to prevent the annihilationist view of holding that imputational natures do not exist at all; and the damage to the literal reading is the reasonings proving that imputational natures are not established by way of their own character.

About the word “also,” see Absorption, #52, 53.
phenomena ranging from forms through to the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment.\textsuperscript{a}

The Supramundane Victor spoke, in many ways, of the own-character of the aggregates. He also spoke of their character of production, character of disintegration, abandonment, and thorough knowledge. Just as he did with respect to the aggregates, so he also spoke with respect to the sense-spheres, dependent-arising, and the [four] foods. In a similar fashion, he also spoke of the own-character of the [four] truths, thorough knowledge, abandonment, actualization, and meditation as well as the own-character of the constituents, the various [eighteen] constituents, and manifold [six] constituents, their abandonment, and thorough knowledge as well as the own-character of the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment.

because [according to you] your thesis [that this first wheel explicitly teaches that all phenomena from forms through to exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects are established by way of their own character] is logically feasible.

\textsuperscript{a} Translation adapted from Hopkins, \textit{Emptiness in Mind-Only}, 76-77.
3. *Also someone says:* There is a way in which [Paramārthasamudgata] questions [the Teacher Buddha] because he asks this question:

In the first wheel as indicated here [in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought, the Supramundane Victor] said that phenomena ranging from forms through to the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are equally established by way of their own character; in the middle wheel as indicated here, [the Supramundane Victor] said that phenomena ranging from forms through to exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects are equally not established by way of their own character,

and so forth.

Our response: Well then, it [absurdly] follows that the first wheel as indicated here are sūtras explicitly teaching that phenomena ranging from forms through to the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are established by way of their own character because [according to you, your] way [Paramārthasamudgata] questions [the Teacher] is logically feasible.

---

If you [incorrectly] accept [that this first wheel as indicated here are sūtras explicitly teaching that phenomena ranging from forms through to the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are established by way of their own character], it [absurdly] follows that this [first wheel as indicated here] is a sūtra explicitly teaching that compounded phenomena ranging from forms through the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are established by way of their own character because you [incorrectly] accept [that this first wheel as indicated here are sūtras explicitly teaching that phenomena ranging from forms through to the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are established by way of their own character].

a Jam-yang-shay-pa takes the position that a sūtra explicitly teaching that compounded phenomena are established by way of their own character is non-deceptive and therefore a literally acceptable sūtra. Hence, if the Buddha taught in the first wheel as it is described here in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought that compounded phenomena are established by way of their own character, since the Mind-Only school also asserts this, then it would be literally acceptable and hence definitive, but since first wheel sūtras described here cannot be literally acceptable, he draws the conclusion that the term “own-character” that Paramārthasamudgata uses when describing the first-wheel teaching about all phenomena cannot refer to establishment by way of their own character but must refer to establishment by way of their own character as the referents of their respective conceptual consciousnesses. This type of establishment is refuted by the Mind-Only School for all phenomenon and therefore is not literally acceptable and must be of interpretable meaning. The upshot of Jam-yang-shay-pa’s position is that first wheel sūtras as described here in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought are strictly limited to passages setting forth this wrong type of mode of being of phenomena, and nothing else. See Hopkins, Absorption in No External World, 62.
forms through the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are established by way of their own character], then it [absurdly] follows that they are sūtras whose own explicit teaching is suitable to be asserted literally because you [incorrectly] accept [that the first wheel as indicated here are sūtras explicitly teaching that compounded phenomena ranging from forms through the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are established by way of their own character].

[འདིར་བྱན་འཁོར་ལོ་དང་པོ་དེ་གཞགས་ནས་ངོང་ོགས་སོ་བེན་གྱི་བར་གྱི་འོས་ཐོགས་ཀྱི་ཆོས་ོམས་རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ཤབ་པར་དངོས་ར་བྱན་པའི་མདོ་ཡིན་པ་]
[འདོད་ོ་]
[རང་གི་དངོས་བྱན་ོ་ཇི་བཞིན་པར་ཁས་ལེན་ཤང་བའི་མདོ་ཡིན་པས]
[འདོད་པའི་མདོར་ཐལ།]

4. Someone says: a Here there is no entailment [namely, that the first wheel as indicated here are sūtras explicitly teaching that compounded phenomena ranging from forms through the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are established by way of their own character does not entail that the first wheel as indicated here are sūtras whose own explicit teaching is suitable to be asserted literally].

[ཁ་ཅིག [འདིར་བྱན་འཁོར་ལོ་དང་པོ་དེ་གཞགས་ནས་ངོང་ོགས་སོ་བེན་གྱི་པར་གྱི་འོས་ཐོགས་ཀྱི་ཆོས་ོམས་རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ཤབ་པར་དངོས་ར་བྱན་པའི་མདོ་ཡིན་ན་འདིར་བྱན་འཁོར་ལོ་དང་པོ་དེ་རང་གི་དངོས་བྱན་ོ་ཇི་བཞིན་པར་ཁས་ལེན་ཤང་བའི་མདོ་ཡིན་པས]
[འདིར་མ་ཁྱབ་ཟེར།]

Our response: It is not reasonable to accept [that the first wheel as indicated here are sūtras whose own explicit teaching is suitable to be asserted literally] because the first unit of the Sūtra [Unraveling the Thought] on the meaning established says:b

---

b See Hopkins, Emptiness in Mind-Only, 116.
Furthermore, that wheel of doctrine turned [by the Supramundane Victor] is surpassable, affords an occasion [for refutation], requires interpretation, and serves as a basis for controversy.

Regarding the place [where you asserted] no entailment, it follows that there is entailment [that is, if the first wheel as indicated here are sūtras explicitly teaching that compounded phenomena ranging from forms through the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are established by way of their own character, then it must be that the first wheel as indicated here are sūtras whose own explicit teaching is suitable to be asserted literally] because whatever is a sūtra explicitly teaching that compounded phenomena are established by way of their own character also must be a literal sūtra, because a sūtra explicitly teaching that compounded phenomena are impermanent [must be a literal sūtra], because a sūtra explicitly teaching the sixteen [aspects of the four noble truths,] impermanence and so forth, [must be a literal sūtra].
It follows [that a sūtra explicitly teaching the sixteen aspects of the four noble truths, impermanence and so forth, must be a literal sūtra] because a sūtra explicitly teaching the four truths [must be a literal sūtra], because a sūtra that explicitly teaches what is to be discarded and what is to be adopted with respect to the four truths is a correct, concordant example that possesses the two—the reason and the predicate—in a proof that a sūtra teaching very hidden objects of comprehension is non-deceptive with respect to what it teaches by reason of the fact that it is a scripture purified by the three analyses [that is, devoid of contradiction].

because Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid Cognition” says:

Through thorough ascertainment of just these [teachings]
On adoption [of true cessations] and discarding [true sufferings]
as well as [their respective] methods [or causes, that is, true paths and true origins of suffering respectively],
It is established by inference through the force of the object itself that Buddha’s word] is non-deceptive with respect to the principal meaning [the four noble truths].

---

\[15b\] The Dalai Lama cites the last two lines in his *The Buddhism of Tibet and The Key to the Middle Way* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1975; reprint, Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1987), 83.
Therefore, [due to similarity] it is to be inferred that [Buddha’s word is non-deceptive] also with respect to other [very obscure topics as well].

Whoever has generated doubt
Toward what is not obvious in Buddha’s word,
Will believe that only Buddha [is omniscient]
Based on [his profound teaching of] emptiness.

Moreover, b it [absurdly] follows that the Paramārthasamudgata Chapter is not a sūtra of definitive meaning because [according to you] it is not [a sūtra of definitive meaning] by reason of explicitly teaching within differentiating the true establishment and non-true establishment among the three natures. It [absurdly] follows [that the Chapter of Paramārthasamudgata is not a sūtra of definitive meaning by reason of explicitly teaching within differentiating the true establishment and non-true establishment among the three natures] because [according to you] a sūtra that explicitly teaches within differentiating the true establishment and non-true establishment among the three natures is not necessarily a sūtra of definitive meaning. It [absurdly] follows [that a sūtra that explicitly teaches within differentiating the true establishment and non-true establishment among the three natures is not necessarily a sūtra of definitive meaning] because

---

a bstan bcos bzhi brgya pa zhes bya ba’i tshig le’ur byas pa, catuhṣatakāśāstraikā; Peking 5246, vol. 95; stanza 280 which occurs in Chapter 12; parenthetical additions are from Gyel-tsab’s commentary, 90b.3-91a.2; see Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas: Gyel-tsap on Āryadeva’s Four Hundred, commentary by Geshe Sonam Rinchen, translated and edited by Ruth Sonam (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 1994), 241-242.

b See Hopkins, Absorption in No External World, 68, 74, and also 84, Issue #28: “Does non-deceptiveness require being literally acceptable?”
[according to you] a sūtra that explicitly teaches that other-powered natures are established by way of their own character is not necessarily a sūtra of definitive meaning because [according to you] your mode of apprehending the boundaries of non-entailment is logically feasible.

Moreover, it [absurdly] follows that compounded phenomena ranging from forms through the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are established by way of their own character is a meaning of the literal rendering of first wheel as indicated here [in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought] that is literal [and thus to be interpreted] because [according to you] your way [Paramārthasamudgata] questions [the Teacher] is logically feasible. If you [incorrectly] accept [that compounded phenomena ranging from forms through the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are established by way of their own character is a meaning of the literal rendering of first wheel as indicated here in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought] that is

\[\text{\[\text{See Hopkins, Absorption in No External World, 63, 75.}\]}

\[\text{\[\text{See Hopkins, Absorption in No External World, 63, 75.}\]}\]
[Because an awareness does not exist prior to name,]
[Because manifold, and because unrestricted,]
[There are the contradictions of being in the essence of that, of]
[many entities,]
[And of the mixture of entities. Therefore, it is proven.]

refutes that those [compounded phenomena] are established by way of
their own character because (1) you [incorrectly] accepted [that
compounded phenomena ranging from forms through the thirty-seven har-
monies with enlightenment are established by way of their own character
is a meaning of the literal rendering of first wheel as indicated here in the
Sūtra Unraveling the Thought that is literal] and (2) this scriptural passage
[“Because an awareness does not exist prior to name,” and so forth] is text
demonstrating damage to the literality of the literal rendering of the first
wheel as indicated here [in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought]. If you [in-
correctly] accept [that the passage, “Because an awareness does not exist
prior to name,” and so forth refutes that those compounded phenomena are
established by way of their own character], it very absurdly follows that
compounded phenomena are not established by way of their own char-
acter.

---

a This reasoning refutes the acceptability of the literal rendering of the first-wheel sūtras; see Hopkins, Emptiness in Mind-Only, 208.
b With commentary (Hopkins, Emptiness in Mind-Only, 324), the stanza is:

There are the contradictions that if a bulbous flat bottomed thing able to hold
fluid, for instance, were established through the force of its own mode of sub-
sistence as the referent of the verbal convention “pot”:

1. the imputational nature would exist in the essence of that bulbous thing because
   an awareness of the name of an object would have to exist prior to learning its
   name;
2. one object that has many names would have to be many entities because many
   names are used for one object; and
3. the entities of many objects that have the same name would be mixed because a
   name is not restricted to one object.

Therefore, it is proven (that objects are not established by way of their own char-
acter as the referents of terms and conceptual consciousnesses).

c According to Jam-yang-shay-pa this reasoning shows that objects are not established by
way of their own character as the referents of their respective terms and conceptual con-
sciousnesses.
Moreover, it [absurdly] follows that the five aggregates’ establishment by way of their own character is the own-character pronounced\(^a\) as being established with the five aggregates on the occasion of the statement, “The Supramundane Victor spoke, in many ways, of the own-character of the aggregates,”\(^b\) because [according to you, your] way [Paramārthasamudgata] questions [the Teacher] about the first wheel as indicated here [in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought] is logically feasible. If you [incorrectly] accept [that the five aggregates’ establishment by way of their own character is the own-character pronounced as being established with the five aggregates].

---

\(^a\) Or: announced, declared.

\(^b\) See Hopkins, *Emptiness in Mind-Only*, 76.
aggregates on the occasion of the statement, “The Supramundane Victor spoke, in many ways, of the own-character of the aggregates,”] it [absurdly] follows that the five aggregates’ establishment by way of their own character is the nonexistent nature of character mentioned on the occasion of [the Buddha’s rhetorical question], “Concerning that, what are character-non-natures of phenomena?“ because you [incorrectly] accepted [that the five aggregates’ establishment by way of their own character is the own-character pronounced as being established with the five aggregates on the occasion of the statement, “The Supramundane Victor spoke, in many ways, of the own-character of the aggregates,”] and the literal readings of the two—this sūtra passage [“Concerning that, what are character-non-natures of phenomena?” that is, phenomena’s absence of establishment by way of their own character as the referents of their respective terms and conceptual consciousnesses] and the first wheel explicitly indicated on the occasion of “spoke of the own-character of the aggregates” [that is, the aggregates’ establishment by way of their own character as the referents of their respective terms and conceptual consciousnesses] are

---

a In answering Paramārthasamudgata’s question, Buddha (Emptiness in Mind-Only, 86) asks a rhetorical question and answers it:

Paramārthasamudgata, concerning that, what are character-non-natures of phenomena? [That is, what are natureless in terms of being established by way of their own character?] Those which are imputational characters.

Why? It is thus: Those [imputational characters] are characters posited by names and terminology and do not subsist by way of their own character. Therefore, they are said to be “character-non-natures.”

According to the Go-mang tradition, if in the first wheel, when Buddha speaks of the “own-character” of the five aggregates, he were speaking of the aggregates as being established by way of their own character as Jay-tsun Cho-kyi-gyal-tshan and Pan-chen So-nam-drup-pa claim he is, then it would absurdly come to be that here in his answer the establishment of the mental and physical aggregates by way of their own character would be the character-nature that is non-existent!

Gung-ru Cho-jung and Jam-yang-shay-pa’s point is that this passage speaking of the character-non-nature demonstrates damage to the acceptability of the literal rendering of the first-wheel sūtras mentioned earlier by Paramārthasamudgata, and thus the literal meanings of the two passages must be contradictory. For the latter to damage the former, the “character-nature” of the latter (Buddha’s answer) and the “own-character” of the former (Paramārthasamudgata’s question) must be referring to the same thing. However, “character-non-nature” cannot refer to the five aggregates’ not being established by way of their own character simply because there is agreement that in the Mind-Only School they are established by way of their own character. Rather, according to Gung-ru Cho-jung and Jam-yang-shay-pa, the “character-nature” that is said to be non-existent in the latter passage is the establishment of objects by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses, and hence, the “own-character” mentioned in Paramārthasamudgata’s question must also be the same.
contradictory because the sūtra passage later [in Buddha’s rhetorical question] is a sūtra passage demonstrating damage to the literal reading of the literal rendering of the first wheel indicated on the occasion of the earlier sūtra passage [in Paramārthasamudgata’s question].
It is not reasonable to accept [that the five aggregates’ establishment by way of their own character is the nonexistent nature of character mentioned on the occasion of [the Buddha’s rhetorical question], “Concerning that, what are character-non-natures of phenomena?”] because the distinction—that although it is reasonable to take the five aggregates’ establishment by way of their own character as the nonexistent nature of character mentioned on this occasion [of (the Buddha’s rhetorical question), “Concerning that, what are character-non-natures of phenomena?”], it is not reasonable to take the five aggregates’ establishment by way of their own character that way—is logically feasible. For, *The Essence of Eloquence* says:a

Concerning that, what are character-non-natures of phenomena? Those which are imputational characters.

and:b

The rest of it indicates the mode of imputation. The imputation as, “This is a form aggregate,” is the mode of imputation of an entity, and the imputation as “[This] is the production of a form aggregate,” and so forth is the mode of imputation of particulars, or attributes.

---

*a* See Hopkins, *Emptiness in Mind-Only*, 86.

*b* See Hopkins, *Emptiness in Mind-Only*, 104.
5. Also, someone says: a It follows that this sūtra passage, b “The Supramundane Victor also spoke, in many ways, of the own-character of the aggregates,” explicitly teaches that the five aggregates are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them because it is reasonable to take the “own-character” that is part of phrase “speaks also of own-character” as “established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them.”

Our response: [That it is reasonable to take the “own-character” that is part of phrase “speaks also of own-character” as “established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them”) does not entail [that this sūtra passage, “The Supramundane Victor also spoke, in many ways, of the own-character of the aggregates,” explicitly teaches that the five aggregates are established by way

---
a 2011 TBRC bla brang, 16b.2; 1987 Go-mang Lhasa, 12b.5; 2008 Taipei reprint, 21.18.
b See Hopkins, Emptiness in Mind-Only, 76.
of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them].

You cannot accept [that this sūtra passage explicitly teaches that the five aggregates are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them] because this sūtra passage ["The Supramundane Victor also spoke, in many ways, of the own-character of the aggregates"] does not indicate such [that is, it does not explicitly indicate that the five aggregates are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them]. It follows [that this sūtra passage ("The Supramundane Victor also spoke, in many ways, of the own-character of the aggregates") does not explicitly indicate that the five aggregates are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them] because the distinction is logically feasible that:

- while this [sūtra passage ("also spoke of the own-character of the aggregates") does not indicate such [that is, does not explicitly indicate that the five aggregates are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them],

- the first wheel indicated here [in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought] when teaching on this occasion [of "also spoke of the own-character of the aggregates"] does indicate such [that is, does explicitly indicate that the five aggregates are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them].

It follows [that while this sūtra passage ("also spoke of the own-character of the aggregates") does not indicate such, the first wheel indicated here on this occasion (of "also spoke of the own-character of the aggregates") does indicate such] because “spoke” (bka' stsal) indicates “spoken there in that first wheel indicated here,” [simply] because there is a meaning of “spoke.”
Moreover, it follows that “spoke” (bka’ stsal) is to be taken as the mode of pronunciation here [in the Paramārthasamudgata Chapter] in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought because you [incorrectly] accept [that this sūtra passage—“The Supramundane Victor spoke, in many ways, of the own-character of the aggregates”—explicitly teaches that the five aggregates are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses]. If you accept [that “spoke” (bka’ stsal) is to be taken as the mode of pronunciation here (in the Paramārthasamudgata
Chapter) in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* it follows that the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* is a sūtra of interpretable meaning because you [correctly] accepted [that “spoke” (bka’ stsals) is to be taken as the mode of pronouncement here (in the Paramārthasamudgata Chapter) in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*]. [Extrapolate] in this way for later lines [of the text]; enough elaboration.

6. **Also someone says:** It follows that in first wheel sūtras as indicated here it is explicitly taught that phenomena ranging from forms to the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are established by way of their own character because in middle wheel sūtras as indicated here it is explicitly taught that all phenomena ranging from forms to omniscient consciousness equally are not established by way of their own character. It follows [that in middle wheel sūtras as indicated here it is explicitly taught that all phenomena ranging from forms to omniscient consciousness equally are not established by way of their own character] because *The Essence of Eloquence* says:

> The bases being posited as interpretable or definitive are the three—the statements [in the first wheel] that phenomena equally have nature in the sense of being established by way of their own character, the statements [in the middle wheel] that phenomena

---

*a 2011 TBRC bla brang, 16b.6; 1987 Go-mang Lhasa, 13a.2; 2008 Taipei reprint, 22.10.

equally do not have such, and the good differentiation [in the final wheel] of those [phenomena] that have [such establishment] and those that do not.

Our response: [That The Essence of Eloquence says, “The bases being posited as interpretable or definitive are the three—the statements (in the first wheel) that phenomena equally have nature in the sense of being established by way of their own character, the statements (in the middle wheel) that phenomena equally do not have such, and the good differentiation (in the final wheel) of those (phenomena) that have (such establishment) and those that do not” does not entail [that in middle wheel sūtras as indicated here it is explicitly taught that all phenomena ranging from forms to omniscient consciousness equally are not established by way of their own character] because that [statement by Tsong-kha-pa] means:]

The first wheel equally has statements of the words, “Phenomena ranging from forms to the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment have the nature of being established by way of their own character,” and the middle wheel equally has statements of the

\(^{a}\) See Hopkins, Absorption in No External World, 100.
words, “Phenomena ranging from forms to exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects do not have the nature of being established by way of their own character.”

7. Also someone says: There is a way in which [Paramārthasamudgata] questions [the Teacher] because he asks this question:

In the first wheel as indicated here [in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought, the Supramundane Victor] said that phenomena ranging from forms through to the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are equally established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them; in the middle wheel as indicated here, [the Supramundane Victor] said that phenomena ranging from forms through to exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects are equally not established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses.

and so forth.

Our response: Well then, it [absurdly] follows that in the second wheel [as indicated in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*] it is explicitly taught that all phenomena, forms and so forth, are not established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses because [according to you your] way [Paramārthasamudgata] questions [the Teacher] is logically feasible.

If you [incorrectly] accept [that in the second wheel as indicated here it is explicitly taught that all phenomena, forms and so forth, are not established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses], it [absurdly] follows that the statement in the second unit of the *Sūtra [Unraveling the Thought]* on the meaning established, “is surpassable, provides an opportunity” is not logically feasible because you [incorrectly] accept [that in the second wheel as indicated here it is explicitly taught that all phenomena, forms and so forth, are not established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses] and because it [absurdly] follows that even the statement, “Thinking of what did you say?” has no relevance [that is, is senseless] because there is no mode of the explicit teaching by the middle wheel sūtras exceeding the mode of explicit teaching by the middle wheel sūtras indicated here [since the explicit teaching by the middle wheel sūtras indicated here would be literally acceptable, since all phenomena, forms and so forth, are indeed not established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses].
8. Also someone says: [Paramārthasamudgata] asks the question:

In the first wheel as indicated here [in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought, the Supramundane Victor] said that forms and so forth are established as external objects and said in the middle wheel that they are not established in that way [as external objects].

Our response: Well then, it [absurdly] follows that the explanation, Unraveling [The Supramundane Victor] also spoke [in many ways] of the own-character [of the aggregates],” is not logically feasible because [according to you] the distinction is not logically feasible that:

- even though in the first wheel as indicated here [in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought] it is explicitly indicated that forms and so forth are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them,
- establishment as an external object is not explicitly taught

---
a 2011 TBRC bla brang, 17b.2; 1987 Go-mang Lhasa, 13b.2; 2008 Taipei reprint, 23.6.
b For this stance, see above in debate 5, 123.
Because [according to you your] way [Paramārthasamudgata] questions [the Teacher] is logically feasible.

Moreover, it [absurdly] follows that it is reasonable to take own-character in the statement “[The Supramundane Victor] also spoke [in many ways] of the own-character [of the aggregates],” as establishment as an external object” because you accept [that (Paramārthasamudgata) asks the question:

In the first wheel as indicated here (in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought, the Supramundane Victor) said that forms and so forth are established as external objects and said in the middle wheel that they are not established in that way (as external objects).

and so forth. If you [incorrectly] accept [that it is reasonable to take own-character in the statement, “The Supramundane Victor also spoke in many ways of the own-character of the aggregates,” as establishment as an external object] it [absurdly] follows that this sūtra passage explicitly indicates the mode of pronouncement of establishment as an external object because you [incorrectly] accept [that it is reasonable to take own-character in the statement, “The Supramundane Victor also spoke in many ways of the own-character of the aggregates,” as establishment as an external object].

Because [according to you your] way [Paramārthasamudgata] questions [the Teacher] is logically feasible.
If you [incorrectly] accept [that this sūtra passage explicitly indicates the mode of pronunciation of establishment as an external object], it [absurdly] follows that the terms expressing “establishment by way of its own character as the referent of a conceptual consciousness apprehending it” explicitly express “establishment as an external object” because you [incorrectly] accept [that this sūtra passage explicitly indicates the mode of pronunciation of establishment as an external object]. If you [incorrectly] accept [that the terms expressing “establishment by way of its own character as the referent of a conceptual consciousness apprehending it” explicitly express “establishment as an external object”], it [absurdly] follows that a conceptual consciousness apprehending in that way [establishment by way of its own character as the referent of a conceptual consciousness] is that [that is, perceives (its object) as established as an external object] because you [incorrectly] accept [that these terms expressing “establishment by way of own character as the referent of a conceptual consciousness” explicitly express “establishment as an external object”].

It is not reasonable to accept [that a conceptual consciousness apprehending establishment by way of its own character as the referent of a conceptual consciousness explicitly perceives (its object) as established as an external object] because terms and consciousnesses are eliminative engagers of their own objects.a

---

a Since conceptual consciousnesses are eliminative in manner, they cannot explicitly know two things at once. See Hopkins, *Absorption in No External World*, 138.
Furthermore, it [absurdly] follows that [the passage in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought] “What are character-non-natures of phenomena?” and so forth explicitly refutes external objects because you [incorrectly] accept [that these terms expressing “establishment by way of own character as the referent of a conceptual consciousness” explicitly express “establishment as an external object.”] You cannot accept [that “What are character-non-natures of phenomena?” and so forth explicitly refutes external objects], because it is said that without explicitly refuting those [external objects] here [in the Questions of Paramārtasamudgata Chapter], through the force of explicitly refuting establishment by way of [objects’]

---

a The passage in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought is:

Concerning that, what are character-non-natures of phenomena? Those which are imputational characters.

Why? It is thus: Those [imputational characters] are characters posited by names and terminology and do not subsist by way of their own character. Therefore, they are said to be “character-non-natures.”

See Hopkins, Emptiness in Mind-Only, 86.
own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses one enters into Cognition-only\(^a\) that is an absence of external objects\(^b\) and because the distinction that those [external objects] are explicitly refuted in the Questions of Maitreya Chapter [of the Sutra Unraveling the Thought] is logically feasible.

The first corner of the reason [which is that it is said that without explicitly refuting those (external objects) here (in the Questions of Paramārtsamudgata Chapter), through the force of explicitly refuting establishment by way of (objects') own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses one enters into cognition-only that is an absence of external objects] because Tsong-kha-pa’s The Essence of Eloquence says:\(^c\)

---

\(^a\) _nam rig tsam, vijñaptimātra._

\(^b\) External objects are not explicitly refuted in the seventh chapter, the Questions of Paramārtsamudgata Chapter of the Sutra Unraveling the Thought, but through the force of the explicit refutation of establishment by way of objects’ own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses in that chapter, one can understand cognition-only that is an absence of external objects. Nevertheless, it is not that an explicit refutation of external objects is absent from the Sutra Unraveling the Thought, for an explicit refutation of external objects occurs in the eighth chapter, the Questions of Maitreya Chapter.

\(^c\) Translation taken from Hopkins, _Emptiness in Mind-Only_, 200-201.
Asaṅga’s *Summary of the Great Vehicle* says that entry by way of this [mode of emptiness] is entry into cognition-only.

The second corner of the reason [which is that the Questions of Maitreya Chapter explicitly refutes external objects] is established because the Questions of Maitreya Chapter says:

Maitreya asks, “Is the image that is the object of activity of meditative stabilization said to be different from the mind or not different?”

[The Supramundane Victor] spoke, “Maitreya, it is not different.”

and Tsong-kha-pa’s *The Essence of Eloquence* says:

in that sūtra on the occasion of [discussing] calm abiding [in the “Questions of Maitreya Chapter”], a refutation of external objects is clearly set forth.

---

a Correcting Jam-yang-shay-pa’s citation from Asaṅga’s *Grounds of Bodhisattvas* (byang sa) in the 2011 TBRC bla brang (18a.3) and in the 1987 Go-mang Lhasa (14a.1) to Asaṅga’s *Summary of the Great Vehicle* (theg bsdas) in accordance with *The Essence of Eloquence* (Hopkins, *Emptiness in Mind-Only*, 200 and 432.5), where indeed both of these texts are mentioned:

In Asaṅga’s *Grounds of Bodhisattvas*, this mode of emptiness [set forth in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought] is explained as the object observed by the exalted wisdom purifying the obstructions to omniscience and as the middle path abandoning the two extremes of which there is none higher, and his *Summary of the Great Vehicle* says that entry by way of this [mode of emptiness] is entry into cognition-only. Therefore, this is not already established by the Hearer Schools [that is, the Great Exposition and Sūtra Schools].


b See *Emptiness in Mind-Only*, 217; for discussion, *Reflections on Reality*, part 4; and *Absorption in No External World*, #52, #53.
9. Also someone says: It follows that it is reasonable to take “own-character” in the statement, “[The Supramundane Victor] spoke of the own-character” as the unique character because the Chinese Great Commentary [on the “Sūtra Unraveling the Thought” by Wonch’uk] explains it that way [as the unique character].

Our response: [That the Chinese Great Commentary (on the “Sūtra Unraveling the Thought” by Wonch’uk) explains it that way (as the unique character)] does not entail [that it is reasonable to take “own-character” in the statement, “The Supramundane Victor spoke of the own-character” as the unique character]. Although that [Chinese Great Commentary] does explain [“own-character” here] that way [as the unique character], it is not reasonable to assert it because Tsong-kha-pa’s The Essence of Eloquence says:

---

a 2011 TBRC bla brang, 18a.5; 1987 Go-mang Lhasa, 14a.4; 2008 Taipei reprint, 24.8.
b Tib. rdzogs gsal / wen tshig / wen tshegs / wanydzeg, Ch. Yüan-ts’ê, 613-696.
c Adapted from Hopkins, Emptiness in Mind-Only, 78-79.
In the Chinese *Great Commentary*, and so forth, the explanation of “own-character” here as the unique character [of the aggregates and so forth] is not reasonable.

If you [incorrectly] accept [that it is reasonable to take “own-character” in the statement, “(The Supramundane Victor) spoke of the own-character” as the unique character], it [absurdly] follows that it is reasonable to take “character” in the phrase “character-non-nature” as unique character because you [incorrectly] accept [that it is reasonable to take “own-character” in the statement, “(The Supramundane Victor) spoke of the own-character” as the unique character]. If you [incorrectly] accept [that it is reasonable to take “character” in the phrase “character-non-nature” as unique character], it [absurdly] follows that the statement in the Sutra [Unraveling the Thought], “does not subsist by way of its own character,”a is not logically feasible because you [incorrectly] accept [that it is reasonable to take “character” in the phrase “character-non-nature” as the unique character]. And because Tsong-kha-pa’s *The Essence of Eloquence* says:b

---

a As is explained just below in connection with the citation from Tsong-kha-pa’s *The Essence of Eloquence*, the sūtra does not speak of does not speak of lacking a unique character; see also Absorption in No External World, 94, and Emptiness in Mind-Only, 86.

b Hopkins, *Emptiness in Mind-Only*, 79. The Sūtra Unraveling the Thought (Emptiness in Mind-Only, 86) says:

Those [imputational characters] are characters posited by names and terminology and do not subsist by way of their own character. Therefore, they are said to be “character-non-natures.”

As Hopkins notes:
For the sūtra itself at the point of [speaking about] imputational factors clearly speaks of establishment by way of [the object’s] own character [and does not speak of the unique character].

Tsong-kha-pa’s well-taken point is that the sūtra, when describing how imputational natures are character-non-natures, says that they “do not subsist by way of their own character” (rang gi mtshan nyid kyis par gnas pa ni ma yin pa, svalaśaṇena avyavasthitaḥ: Lamotte, Samdhiḥirmocana, 68 [4], n. 1), that is to say, they are not established by way of their own character; the sūtra does not speak about the defining character of an object.

This clear identification in the sūtra itself is the pivot of Tsong-kha-pa’s argument (in his chapter on the Autonomy School) that when Bhāvaviveka says, in the context of criticizing the Mind-Only reading of this earlier passage, that to deny “character” of imputational natures is a deprecation, he indicates that he holds that existent imputational natures, such as uncompounded space, are established by way of their own character. Once Bhāvaviveka holds that even imputational natures are established by way of their own character, he must hold that all phenomena are established this way. It then becomes crucial to determine what Bhāvaviveka means by “establishment by way of its own character,” Tsong-kha-pa’s answer being that it means that an object is established from its own side, with the consequence that when it is sought among its bases of designation, it is found.
Furthermore, it [absurdly] follows that the presentation of the character-non-nature with respect to the imputational nature is not logically feasible because the unique character of the imputational nature exists, because Tsong-kha-pa’s *The Essence of Eloquence* says:

and since even imputational factors have a unique characterization, there would be the fallacy that the character-non-nature could not be explained with respect to imputational factors.

Imputational natures have the unique characteristic or definition of being just imputed by conceptuality (*rtog pas thugs tsam*; Gung-ru Chö-jung’s *Garland of White Lotuses*, 20a.4). Therefore, if the absence of “character” mentioned in Buddha’s answer to Paramārthasaṅgadhara’s question when discussing imputational natures merely referred to the non-existence of a unique characterization, such an absence could not be posited with respect to imputational natures, since they do indeed have a unique characterization. However, as is obvious in the next chapter, one of the main points of the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* is that imputational natures are non-natures in terms of “character,” and thus “character” in that context cannot refer to a unique or uncommon character.
2) PRESENTATION OF OUR OWN SYSTEM

There is a way in which Paramārthasamudgata questions the Teacher in order to dispel contradiction in the sūtras because Paramārthasamudgata’s explicitly asks this question about the middle wheel indicated here:

[Supramundane Victor,] in the first wheel as indicated here, you pronounced many times the words of sūtra:

The entities of compounded phenomena ranging from forms through the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment as well as [their attributes of] production, cessation, and so forth that are established by way of their own character exist, exist.

In the middle wheel of the teaching as indicated here, you pronounced many times the words of sūtra:

Production, cessation, and so forth that are established by way of their own character do not exist, do not exist, in phenomena ranging from forms through exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects.

If those two were left literally as they are, they would be contradictory, but since the Teacher does not have contradiction, of what were you thinking when in the middle wheel indicated here you spoke in that way [that production, cessation, and so forth that are established by way of their own character do not exist, do not exist, in phenomena ranging from forms through exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects]? And this implicitly asks, “Of what were you thinking when in the first wheel indicated here you spoke in that way [that production, cessation, and so forth that are established by way of their own character exist, exist, in compounded phenomena ranging from forms through the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment]?”

---

[a] See Hopkins, Absorption in No External World, 143-144.
[b] Or: announced, declared.
Paramārthasamudgata does not ask this upon a qualm thinking that the literal renderings of the first two wheels are discordant having been generated in him, because he asks this in order that such [a qualm thinking that the literal renderings of the first two wheels are discordant] which will arise in later trainees might be cleared away.
ཧོན་གི་ཞི་བཞུང་ངོ་བའི་ཐོན་པ་གི་རྣམ་ཐོན་གུན་བུ་མུ་
མི་བོད། དོགས་པ་[བདེ་བཟང་ད་དེ་དགའ་ཐོབ་དེ་དགའ་
དོགས་པ་]དེ་འང་བས་ཀྱི་གོལ་ལོ་འང་བ་སེལ་བའི་
ཆེད་ཡི་མི་ཡིན་པའི་ཆེར།
3) **Dispelling objections**

10. *Someone says:* It follows that the distinction is logically feasible that in the first wheel as indicated here [in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*] it is taught that phenomena ranging from forms to the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them—without explicitly teaching that these [phenomena ranging from forms to the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment] are established by way of their own character because such a way of questioning [about the first wheel] is logically feasible. If you accept [that the distinction is logically feasible that in the first wheel as indicated here (in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*) it is taught that phenomena ranging from forms to the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them—without explicitly teaching that these (phenomena ranging from forms to the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment) are established by way of their own character], it follows that the Hearer Schools, the intended trainees of that [teaching], assert in that way [that phenomena ranging from forms to the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment] because you accept [that the distinction is logically feasible that in the first wheel as indicated here (in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*) it is taught that phenomena ranging from forms to the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them—without explicitly teaching that these (phenomena ranging from forms to the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment) are established by way of their own character].

---

a 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 19a.4; 1987 Go-mang Lhasa, 14b.6; 2008 Taipei reprint, 25.15. See also Absorption, #51, 128-129.
Our response: [That the distinction is logically feasible that in the first wheel as indicated here (in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought) it is taught that phenomena ranging from forms to the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them—without explicitly teaching that these (phenomena ranging from forms to the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment) are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them] does not entail [that the Hearer Schools, the intended trainees of that (teaching) assert in that way (that phenomena ranging from forms to the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them)].

If you [incorrectly] accept [that the Hearer Schools, the intended trainees of that (teaching), assert in that way that phenomena ranging from forms to the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them] it [absurdly] follows that those [Hearer Schools] assert the eighteen constituents in that way [as established by way of their
own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them] because you [incorrectly] accept [that the Hearer Schools, the intended trainees of that (teaching), assert in that way that phenomena ranging from forms to the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them]. If you [incorrectly] accept [that those Hearer Schools assert the eighteen constituents in that way as established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them], it [absurdly] follows that [those Hearer Schools] assert the phenomenon-constituent in that way [as established by way of its own character as the referent of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending it] because you [incorrectly] accept [that those Hearer Schools assert the eighteen constituents in that way as established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them].

\[བདེ་བསོད་ནམས་ཀྱི་བདེ་ལེགས་བོད་པའི་ཞེན་གཞིར་རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་བ་པར་དངོས་ར་\]

\[a The eighteen constituents (\textit{khams, dhātu}) are the six objects, the six sense powers, and the six consciousnesses, each of which is called a constituent:

\textit{The Eighteen Constituents}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>object</th>
<th>sense power</th>
<th>consciousness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>form</td>
<td>eye sense power</td>
<td>eye consciousness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sound</td>
<td>ear sense power</td>
<td>ear consciousness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>odor</td>
<td>nose sense power</td>
<td>nose consciousness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>taste</td>
<td>tongue sense power</td>
<td>tongue consciousness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tangible object</td>
<td>body sense power</td>
<td>body consciousness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>phenomenon</td>
<td>mind sense power</td>
<td>mental consciousness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

“Phenomenon-constituent,” the sixth category of objects, refers to \textit{other} phenomena, those that are not sense objects but are objects only of the mental consciousness, such as impermanence and emptiness. Since sense objects are also objects of a mental consciousness, the category “phenomenon-constituent” does not include all objects of a mental consciousness—just its exclusive objects among which mental factors and permanent phenomena, such as uncompounded space, are included.

Jam-yang-shay-pa cites “phenomenon-constituent” here because as a category that includes both permanent and impermanent members, the category is considered to be permanent, and since the Hearer Schools do not assert that the permanent are established by way of their own character, they would not \textit{assert} that the phenomenon-constituent is established by way of its own character as the referent of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending it since the very words would violate their own assertions. In the next debate Jam-yang-shay-pa proceeds to show that nevertheless the Hearer Schools come to assert such, that is to say, they are reduced to asserting this.
It is not reasonable to accept [that those Hearer Schools assert the phenomenon-constituent in that way as established by way of its own character as the referent of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending it] because the distinction is logically feasible that although those [Hearer Schools] do not assert that uncompounded phenomena such as space and so forth are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them, those [Hearer Schools] assert that those [uncompounded phenomena such as space and so forth] are established through the force of their own measure of subsistence as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them, because if those [uncompounded phenomena such as space and so forth] are not established through the force of their own measure of subsistence, those [Hearer

---

a rang gi gnas tshod kyi dbang gis grub pa; or “established through the force of its own status.”
Schools] do not know how to posit them as existing, and although [the Hearer Schools do not] impute the term “own-character” [that is, “established by way of its own character”] to those [uncompounded phenomena such as space and so forth], according to the Mind-Only School those [Hearer Schools] come to assert that those [uncompounded phenomena such as space and so forth] are established by way of their own character [as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses].

For, Tsong-kha-pa’s *The Essence of Eloquence* says:

The two Proponents of [Truly Existent External] Objects do not know how to posit forms and so forth as existing if their being established by way of their own character as the referents of con-

---

*a* This bracketed material is from Hopkins, *Absorption in No External World*, 129.


*c* That is, the Great Exposition School and the Sūtra School.
ceptual consciousnesses and as the foundations of imputing terminology is negated. This is not the own-character that is renowned to the Epistemologists.\(^a\)

and Khay-drub-ge-leg-pal-sang’s Compilation on Emptiness [Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate] says:\(^b\)

The Proponents of Sūtra themselves do not impute the name “own-character”\(^c\) in their assertion that space, nirvāṇa, and so forth are established through the force of space’s, nirvana’s, and so forth’s own measure of subsistence\(^d\) as the foundations of reference of the names for space, the extinguishment of contamination, and so forth. However, according to the Proponents of Mind-Only, the Proponents of Sūtra have come to assert the meaning of own-character. This is the meaning [of Tsong-kha-pa’s statement]. Realizing this has very great import.

\(^a\) tshad ma pa, prāmāṇika. Hopkins (Absorption in No External World, 129) notes:

According to A-khu Lo-drö-gya-tsho (Precious Lamp, 259.2), Tsong-kha-pa is making the point that this sort of own-character is not limited to those objects that perform functions (a category that excludes permanent phenomena) since—according to the Mind-Only School—in the Great Exposition School and the Sūtra School all phenomena, both the permanent (which are not able to produce effects) and the impermanent, come to be established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses and as the foundations of the imputation of terminology. Therefore, in this context “own-character” refers to establishment through the force of objects’ own status (rang gi gnas tshod kyi dbang gis grub pa) and not to the ability to perform the function of creating an effect, as it does in the system of the “Epistemologists,” which here connotes the Proponents of Sūtra, who assert that the definition of own-character is that which is ultimately able to perform a function (don dam par don byed nus pa). In other contexts, “Epistemologists” refers also to the Proponents of Mind-Only that follow Dignāga and Dharmakīrti). See issue #40, 121-124.

\(^b\) mKhas grub dge legs dpal bzang, stong thun chen mo (Madhyamika Text Series, vol. 1, 1972), 58.1-2.

\(^c\) That is, “established by way of its own character.”

\(^d\) Or, “own status.”
Also, someone says: It follows that the intended trainees of the first wheel as indicated here—the two, Proponents of the Great Exposition and Proponents of Sūtra—do not need to be taught that the phenomenon-constituent is established by way of its own character as the referent of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending it because [both of] those [Proponents of the Great Exposition and Proponents of Sūtra] realize that [the phenomenon-constituent] is not established that way [by way of its own character as the referent of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending it] because [both of] those [Proponents of the Great Exposition and Proponents of Sūtra] assert that [the phenomenon-constituent] is not established that way [by way of its own character as the referent of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending it].

Our response: [That both of those Proponents of the Great Exposition and Proponents of Sūtra assert that the phenomenon-constituent is not established by way of its own character as the referent of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending it] does not entail [that both of those Proponents of the Great Exposition and Proponents of Sūtra realize that the phenomenon-constituent is not established by way of its own character as the referent of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending it].

12. Also, someone says: It follows that those [Proponents of the Great Exposition and Proponents of Sūtra] realize that the phenomenon-constituent is not established that way [by way of its own character as the referent of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending it] because those [Proponents of the Great Exposition and Proponents of Sūtra] realize that the phenomenon-constituent is not established by way of its own character.

Our response: [That Proponents of the Great Exposition and Proponents of Sūtra realize that the phenomenon-constituent is not established by way of its own character] does not entail [that Proponents of the Great Exposition and Proponents of Sūtra realize that the phenomenon-constituent is not established by way of its own character as the referent of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending it].

---

The opponent’s rejoinder: It follows that [realizing that the phenomenon-constituent is not established by way of its own character] entails [realizing that the phenomenon-constituent is not established by way of its own character as the referent of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending it] because ascertainment that [the phenomenon-constituent] is empty of a generality of imputational phenomena, establishment by way of its own character, entails ascertainment that it is empty of a particular, establishment by way of its own character as the referent of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending it. It follows [that ascertainment that (the phenomenon-constituent) is empty of a generality of imputational phenomena, establishment by way of its own character, entails ascertainment that it is empty of a particular, establishment by way of its own character as the referent of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending it] because ascertainment that products in general are empty of the permanence of sound\(^a\) entails ascertainment that products are empty of a particular, the permanence of the sound of a lute.

\(^a\) The permanence of sound does not exist.
Our response: [That ascertainment that products in general are empty of the permanence of sound\(^a\) entails ascertainment that products are empty of a particular, the permanence of the sound of a lute] does not entail [that ascertainment that (the phenomenon-constituent) is empty of a generality of imputational phenomena, establishment by way of its own character, entails ascertainment that it is empty of a particular, establishment by way of its own character as the referent of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending it]. The reason [which is that ascertainment that products in general are empty of the permanence of sound entails ascertainment that products are empty of a particular, the permanence of the sound of a lute] is established because Gyal-tshab-dar-ma-rin-chen’s *Clarifying the Path to Liberation* says:

It is established that ascertainment of the emptiness of a generality entails ascertainment of [its] particulars.

13. Also, someone says:\(^b\) It follows that [the Supramundane Victor] in the first wheel as indicated here [in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*] pronounced\(^c\) the words of sūtra, “The entities of phenomena ranging from forms through the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment as well as [their attributes of] production, cessation, and so forth that are established by way of their own character exist” because you accept [that in the first wheel as indicated here (in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*) it is taught that phenomena ranging from forms to the thirty-seven harmonies with

\(^a\) The permanence of sound does not exist.

\(^b\) 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 20a.4; 1987 Go-mang Lhasa, 15b.3; 2008 Taipei reprint, 27.2.

\(^c\) Or: announced, declared.
enlightenment are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them\(^a\). If you accept [that (the Supramundane Victor) in the first wheel as indicated here (in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*) pronounced the words of sūtra, “The entities of phenomena ranging from forms through the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment as well as (their attributes of) production, cessation, and so forth that are established by way of their own character exist”] it follows that [the Supramundane Victor] in the first wheel pronounced, “The entities of phenomena ranging from forms through the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment as well as (their attributes of) production, cessation, and so forth that are established by way of their own character exist” because you accept [that (the Supramundane Victor) in the first wheel as indicated here (in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*) pronounced the words of sūtra, “The entities of phenomena ranging from forms through the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment as well as (their attributes of) production, cessation, and so forth that are established by way of their own character exist”].

\(^a\) For this position see the beginning of debate 10, p. 84.
Our response: [That (the Supramundane Victor) in the first wheel as indicated here (in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought) pronounced the words of sūtra, “The entities of phenomena ranging from forms through the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment as well as (their attributes of) production, cessation, and so forth that are established by way of their own character exist”) does not entail [that (the Supramundane Victor) in the first wheel pronounced, “The entities of phenomena ranging from forms through the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment as well as (their attributes of) production, cessation, and so forth that are established by way of their own character exist”].

The opponent’s rejoinder: [That (the Supramundane Victor) in the first wheel as indicated here (in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought) pronounced the words of sūtra, “The entities of phenomena ranging from forms through the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment as well as (their attributes of) production, cessation, and so forth that are established by way of their own character exist”) entails [that (the Supramundane Victor) in the first wheel pronounced, “The entities of phenomena ranging from forms through the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment as well as (their attributes of) production, cessation, and so forth that are established by way of their own character exist”] because [the Supramundane Victor] in that first wheel pronounced the words of sūtra teaching, “Those [phenomena ranging from forms through the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment] are established by way of their own character,” because [the Supramundane Victor] in that first wheel pronounced the words of sūtra, “Entities and so forth—that are established by way of their own character—of those [phenomena ranging from forms through the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment]” exist.
Our response: [That (the Supramundane Victor) in that first wheel pronounced the words of sūtra, "Entities and so forth—that are established by way of their own character—of those (phenomena ranging from forms through the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment) exist,"] does not entail [that (the Supramundane Victor) in that first wheel pronounced words of sūtra teaching, "Those (phenomena ranging from forms through the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment) are established by way of their own character."]

Well then, it [absurdly] follows that (the Supramundane Victor) pronounced in the Heart Sūtra, "Forms and so forth do not exist," because the words of sūtra, "Those [forms and so forth] do not exist," exist in that [Heart Sūtra]. You have [incorrectly] asserted [that the words of sūtra, "Those [forms and so forth] do not exist," existing in the Heart Sūtra] entails [that the Supramundane Victor pronounced in the Heart Sūtra, "Forms and so forth do not exist."]
Moreover, it [absurdly] follows that [the Supramundane Victor] pronounced in that [Heart Sūtra] words of sūtra teaching, “These [forms and so forth] do not exist,” because (the Supramundane Victor) pronounced in the Heart Sūtra the words of sūtra, “These [forms and so forth] do not exist.” You have [incorrectly] asserted [that (the Supramundane Victor) pronouncing in the Heart Sūtra the words of sūtra, “These forms and so forth do not exist,”] entails [that (the Supramundane Victor) pronounced in that Heart Sūtra words of sūtra teaching, “These forms and so forth do not exist.”] Both reasons [which are that the words of sūtra, “Those [forms and so forth] do not exist,”] exist in that (Heart Sūtra) and that (the Supramundane Victor) pronounced in the Heart Sūtra the words of sūtra, “These (forms and so forth) do not exist,” are established because the words of sūtra, “Forms do not exist, sounds do not exist,” exist in the Heart Sūtra.

It is not reasonable to accept the root [consequence that (the Supramundane Victor) pronounced in the Heart Sūtra words of sūtra teaching,
“Forms and so forth do not exist.”] because there is no need for such a teaching [that “Forms and so forth do not exist.”]

[ཤེས་རབ་ȡིང་པོ་དེར་གɶགས་སོགས་མེད་ཅེས་Ȫོན་པའི་མདོ་ཚིག་བཀའ་ɮལ་པ་]

[དེ་Ȩར་བȪན་པ་ལ་དགོས་པ་མེད་པའི།] [གɶགས་སོགས་མེད་ཅེས་] [དེ་ Española]

[གཞི་མས་པའི་དོན་དམིགས་ལམ་] [ཞེས་རབ་] [ཤིད་བཤེས་] [བཞག་པའི་དོན་དམིགས་] [དེ་ Española]
Abbreviations


“2011 TBRC bla brang” = drang ba dang nges pa’i don rnam par ‘byed pa’i mtha’ dpyod ‘khrul bral lung rigs bai dûr dkar pa’i ngan mdzod skal bzang re ba kun skong, TBRC W22186.10: 1-288, which is a PDF of: bla brang bkra shis ’khyil, bla brang brka shis ’khyil dgon, publishing date unknown.

“lha sa” = lha sa bka’’ gyur. TBRC W26071, which is a PDF of: Zhol bka’’ gyur par khang, Lhasa, Tibet, 1934.


“TBRC” = Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center (http://www.tbrc.org).

“Tenets” = Jam-yang-shay-pa’s *Great Exposition of Tenets / Explanation of “Tenets”: Sun of the Land of Samantabhadra Brilliantly Illuminating All of Our Own and Others’ Tenets and the Meaning of the Profound [Emptiness], Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning Fulfilling All Hopes of All Beings* (grub mtha’ chen mo / grub mtha’ i rnam bshad rang gshan grub mtha’ kun dang zab don mchog tu gsal ba kun bzang zhing gi nyi ma lung rigs rgya mtsho skye dgu’i re ba kun skong).
Bibliography

Sūtras are listed alphabetically by English title in the first section; the terms “glorious” and “supreme” at the beginning of titles are often dropped in the Bibliography. Indian and Tibetan treatises are listed alphabetically by author in the second section; other works are listed alphabetically by author in the third section. Works mentioned in the first or second sections are not repeated in the third section.

1. SŪTRAS

Condensed Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra
prajñāpāramitāsañcayagāthā
shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa sdud pa tshigs su bcad pa

Eight Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra
aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā
shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa brgyad stong pa

Five Hundred Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra
aryapañcasatiśāstra-prajñāpāramitā
‘phags pa shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa lnga brgya pa

One Hundred Fifty Modes of the Perfection of Wisdom
prajñāpāramitānaśatapañcāśatikāsūtra
shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa ’i tshul brgya lnga bcu pa’i mdo

**One Hundred Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra**

śatasahasrikāprajñāpāramitā
tibetan digital reprint edition: In bka’ ’gyur (co ne rdzong), 1926.


**One Letter Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra**

ekāksar/mātānāmasarvatathāgataprajñāpāramitāsūtra
debzhin gehegs pa thams cad kyi yum shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa yi ge gcig ma’i mdo
P741, vol. 21; Dharma vol. 12.

**Perfection of Wisdom in Few Letters**

svalpākṣaraprajñāpāramitāsūtra
shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa yi ge nyung ngu
In bka’ ’gyur (lha sa). TBRC W26071.34:513-518 (PDF of Lhasa: zhol bka’ ’gyur par khang, [194-]).
P159, vol. 6.


**Twenty-five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra**

pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā


**Verse Summary of the Perfection of Wisdom**

prajñāpāramitāsañcayagāthā
shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa su dud pa tshiogs su bcad pa
Peking 735, vol. 21; sde dge 13, vol. ka (shes rab sna tshogs)


**White Lotus of Excellent Doctrine Sūtra**

dam pa’i chos pad ma dkar po zhes bya ba theg pa chen po’i mdo saddharmapuṇḍarīka
2. OTHER SANSKRIT AND TIBETAN WORKS

Abhayākaragupta (‘jigs med ’byung gnas sbas pa)

Commentary on the “Eight Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra”: Moonlight of Essential Points

aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāvṛttimarmakaumudī


Peking 5202, vol. 92.

Ornament to the Subduer’s Thought

munimatāṃkāra


Āryavimuktisena (’phags pa rnam grol sde, ca. 6th century C.E.)

Commentary on (Maitreya’s) “Treatise of Quintessential Instructions on the ‘Superior Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra’: Ornament for the Clear Realizations”

pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikāprajñāpāramitopadeśaśāstrābhisamayālaṃkāravṛtti


Peking 5185, vol. 88.


[Sub]commentary on (Maitreya’s) “Treatise of Quintessential Instructions on the ‘Superior Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra’: Ornament for the Clear Realizations”

āryapañcaviṃśatisāhasrikāprajñāpāramitopadeśaśāstrābhisamayālamkārakārikāvārttika

In bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 3788). TBRC W23703.81:- 364 (PDF of Delhi, India: Karmapa choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985).

P5186, vol. 88.

Asaṅga (thogs med, fourth century)

Commentary on (Maitreya’s) “Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle” / Explanation of (Maitreya’s) “Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle”

mahāyānottaratantraśāstravyākhya


Peking 5526, vol. 108.


Five Treatises on the Grounds
1. **Grounds of Yogic Practice**
   yogačārabhūmi

2. **Compendium of Synonyms**
   paryāyasamgrahaṇi

3. **Grounds of Bodhisattvas**
   bodhisattvabhūmi

4. **Grounds of Hearers**
   nyan sa
   śrāvakabhūmi

5. **Compendium of Ascertainments**
   nirvāyasamgrahaṇi / vinirvāyasamgrahaṇi

6. **Compendium of Bases**
   vastusamgraha
Bibliography

4. *Compendium of Enumerations*
paryāyasamgraha
nam grang bsdu ba
Peking 5542, vol. 111.

5. *Compendium of Explanations*
vivarānasamgraha
nam par bshad pa bsdu ba
Peking 5529, vol. 96-97; Peking 5543, vol. 111.

Two Summaries

1. *Summary of Manifest Knowledge*
abhidharmasamuccaya
chos mngon pa kun btus
Peking 5550, vol. 112.

2. *Summary of the Great Vehicle*
mahāyānasamgraha
theg pa chen po bsdu pa
Peking 5549, vol. 112.

Atisha (*dīpaṃkaraśīraḥ, mar me mdzad ye shes, 982-1054)

*Lamp Summary of (Maitreya’s) “Perfection of Wisdom”*
prajñāpāramitāpiṇḍārthapradīpa
shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa’i don bsdu sgron ma
Peking 5201, vol. 92.

*Lamp for the Path to Enlightenment*
boṭhipaṭṭhapradīpa
byang chub lam gyi sgron ma
Peking 5343, vol. 103.
Bibliography


Bodhibhadra (byang chub bdang po)

Connected Explanation of (Āryadeva’s) “Compilation of the Essence of Wisdom” jñānasārasamuccayānāṁanibhandha

ye shes snying po kun las btus pa shes bya ba’i bshad sbyar


Buddhaśrījñāna

Commentary on (Maitreya’s) “Treatise of Quintessential Instructions on the Supramundane Victorious Mother Perfection of Wisdom: Ornament for the Clear Realizations” Wisdom Lamp Garland

abhisaṃāputrabhāvagāvatiprajñāpāramitopadeśaśāstravṛttiprajñāpradīpāvali

bcom ldan ’das ma shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa’i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa’i rgyan gyi ’grel pa shes rab sgron ma’i phreng ba


Peking 5198, vol. 91.

Commentary on the Difficult Points of the “Verse Summary” sañcayagāthāpañjikā

bsdus pa’i shig su bcad pa’i dka’ ’grel


Peking 5196, vol. 91.

Chandrakīrti (zla ba grags pa, seventh century)

Autocommentary on the “Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle’” madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya

dbu ma la ’jug pa’i bshad pa / dbu ma la ’jug pa’i rang ’grel


Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle” madhyamakāvatāra

dbu ma la ’jug pa

Peking 5261, PS262, vol. 98; Toh. 3861, Toh. 3862, vol. ’a


See also references under Chandrakīrti’s *Autocommentary on the “Supplement.”*

Chim Jam-pay-yang (mchims ’jam pa’i dbyangs or mchims nam mkha’ grags, died 1289 / 1290)

*Commentary on [Vasubandhu’s] “Treasury of Manifest Knowledge”: Ornament of Manifest Knowledge*
chos mngon mdzod kyi tshig le’ur byas pa’i ’grel pa mngon pa’i rgyan
Tibetan digital reprint edition: No TBRC entry found.
Buxaduor, India: Nang bstan shes rig ’dzin skyong slob gnyer khang, n.d.

Dharmakīrti (chos kyi grags pa, seventh century)

**Seven Treatises on Valid Cognition**

1. *Analysis of Relations*
sambhandhaparīkṣā ’brel pa brtag pa
(PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985).
Peking 5713, vol. 130

2. *Ascertainment of Prime Cognition*
pramāṇaviniścaya tshad ma ram par nges pa
(PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985).
Peking 5710, vol. 130

3. *Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Prime Cognition”*
pramāṇavārttikakārikā
(PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985).
Peking 5709, vol. 130.


4. *Drop of Reasoning*
nyāyabinduprākāraṇa
rigs pa’i thigs pa zhes bya ba’i rab tu byed pa
Peking 5711, vol. 130.
5. *Drop of Reasons*
hetubindunāmaprakaraṇa
gtan thugs kyi thigs pa zhes bya ba rab tu byed pa
(PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985).
Peking 5712, vol. 130.

6. *Principles of Debate*
vādanyāya
rtsod pa’i rigs pa
(PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985).
Peking 5715, vol. 130.

7. *Proof of Other Continuums*
saṃtānāntarasiddhānāmaprakaraṇa
rgyud gzhan grub pa zhes bya ba’i rab tu byed pa
Peking 5716, vol. 130.

Dharmakīrtishrī (chos kyi bgegs pa dpal / gser gling pa)

*Explanation of (Haribhadra’s) “Commentary on (Maitreya’s) ‘Treatise of Quintessential Instructions on the Perfection of Wisdom: Ornament for the Clear Realizations’”: Illumination of the Difficult to Realize*
prajñāpāramitopadeśaśāstrābhisamayālaṃkāravṛttidurbodhālokānāmaṭīkā
shes rab kyi pha rol tu phrin pa’i man ngag gi bstan bcos mgon par rtogs pa’i rgyan gyi ’grel
pa rtogs par dka’ ba’i snang ba zhes bya ba’i ’grel bshad
In *bstan ’gyur* (dpe bsdur ma). TBRC W1PD95844.52:395-684 (Pe cin:/ krung go’i bod rig
Peking 5192, vol. 91.

Dharmamitra (chos kyi bshes gnyen)

*Explanation of (Haribhadra’s) Commentary on (Maitreya’s) “Ornament for the Clear Realizations”: Very Clear Words*
ahbisamayālaṃkārakārikāprajñāpāramitopadeśaśāstraṭīkāprasphuṭapadā
shes rab kyi pha rol tu phrin pa’i man ngag gi bstan bcos mgon par rtogs pa’i rgyan gyi tshig
le’ur byas pa’i ’grel bshad tshig rab tu gsal ba
Tibetan digital reprint edition: In *bstan ’gyur* (sde dge, 3796). TBRC W23703.87:4-221 (PDF of
Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985).
Peking 5194, vol. 91.

Dharmashrī

*Explanation of the “Eight Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra”*
saṭasāhasrāṣṭrākārikāvivaraṇa
stong phrag bgya pa’i rnam par bshad pa
Peking 5203, vol. 92.

Key to the Treasury of the Perfection of Wisdom
prajñāpāramitopadeśaśāstrābhisasamayālaṃkāravṛttidurbodhālokānāmaṭīkā
shes rab kyi pha rol tu phrin pa’i mdzod kyi lde mig
Döl-po-pa Shay-rab-gyal-tshan (dol po pa shes rab rgyal mthshan; 1292-1361)

The Great Calculation of the Doctrine, Which Has the Significance of a Fourth Council


Gen-dün-drub, First Dalai Lama (dge ‘dun grub, 1391-1474)

Commentary on (Gunaprabha’s) “Aphorisms on Discipline” / Essence of the Entire Discipline, Eloquent Holy Doctrine

Gen-dün-gya-tso, Second Dalai Lama (dge ‘dun rgya mtsho, 1476-1542)
Bibliography

Lamp Illuminating the Meaning / Commentary on the Difficult Points of “Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive” from the Collected Works of the Foremost Holy Omniscient [Tsong-kha-pa]: Lamp Thorougly Illuminating the Meaning of His Thought

Tibetan digital reprint edition: In gsung ’bum (dge ’dun rgya mtsho). TBRC W861.2:607-817 (dkar mdzes par ma: [s.n.], 199-).

n.d. [blockprint borrowed from the library of H.H. the Dalai Lama and photocopied] volume ‘a

Gunaprabha (yon tan ’od )
Aphorisms on Discipline

vinayasūtra
’dul ba’i mdo


Peking 5619, vol. 123

Gung-ru Chö-jung / Gung-ru Chö-kyi-jung-nay (gung ru chos ’byung / gung ru chos kyi ’byung gnas; fl. mid 16th to early 17th centuries)

drang ba dang nges pa’i rnam par ’byed pa legs bshad snying po zhes bya ba’i mtha’ dpyod padma dkar po’i phreng ba

No TBRC data found.

sku bum, Tibet: sku bum Monastery, n.d. [blockprint obtained by Hopkins in 1988].

Gung-tang Kön-chok-tan-pay-drön-me (gung thang dkon mchog bstan pa’i sgron me; 1762-1823)

Presentation of the Four Truths, Port of Those Wishing Liberation: Festival for the Wise

bden bzhí’i rnam gzhag thar ‘dod ’jug ngogs mkhas pa’i dga’ ston

Tibetan digital reprint edition: In gsung ’bum (dkon mchog bstan pa’i sgron me / bla brang par ma). TBRC W22185.2:687-726 (PDF of bla brang bkra shis ’khyil: bla brang dgon pa, [199-]).


Gung-tang Lo-drö-gya-tsho (gung thang blo gros rgya mtsho, 1851-1928/1930)

Annotations to (Haribhadra’s) Small Clear Meaning Commentary on (Maitreya’s) “Ornament for the Clear Realizations”: Clearing Away the Darkness for Those Wanting Liberation

mgon rtogs rgyan gyi ’grel chung don gsal ba’i mchan ’grel kun bzang zhung gi rgyi ma thar ‘dod mun sel


TBRC W00EGS1017126 (PDF of Lhasa? : dge ldan legs bshad gsung rab ‘grem spel khang, 2006).


drang ba dang nges pa’i don rnam par ’byed pa’i bstan bcos legs bshad snying po’i dka’ ’grel rin chen sgron me

TBRC W2CZ6655 (PDF of bla brang bkra shis ’khyil par khang, republished by: N. Kanara, Karnataka State, India: Kesang Thabkhes, 1982).

Gyal-tshab-dar-ma-rin-chen (rgyal tshab dar ma rin chen, 1364-1432)

Commentary on (Maitreya’s) “Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle” / Commentary on (Maitreya’s) “Treatise on the Later Scriptures of the Great Vehicle”

theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma’i t’kka
Bibliography 87


Explanation of (Āryadeva’s) “Four Hundred”: Essence of Eloquence
bzhi brgya pa’i rnam bshad legs bshad snying po


Explanation of (Shāntideva’s) “Engaging in the Bodhisatta Deeds”: Entrance for Conqueror Children
byang chub sems dpa’i spyan pa la ’jug pa’i rnam bshad rgyal sras ’jug ngog

Sarnath: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press, 1973

Illumination of the Essential Meanings of (Nāgārjuna’s) “Precious Garland of the Middle Way”
dbu ma rin chen ’phreng ba’i snying po’i don gsal bar byed pa

Collected Works, ka. Lhasa: zhol par khang, 15th rab ’byung in the fire rooster year, that is, 1897 (78 folios); also, Collected Works, ka. New Delhi: Guru Deva, 1982 (349-503, 78 folios), “reproduced from a set of prints from the 1897 lha-sa old zhol (dga’ ldan phun tshogs gling) blocks.” [These are two separate editions.]

Illumination of the Path to Liberation / Explanation of (Dharmakīrti’s) Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Prime Cognition”: Unerring Illumination of the Path to Liberation that lam gsal byed / tshad ma rnam ’grel gyi tshig le’ur byas pa’i rnam bshad thar lam phyin ci ma log par gsal bar byed pa


Notes [on Tsong-kha-pa’s Teachings] on the Eight Difficult Topics
dka’ gnas brgyad kyi zin bris tse’i gsung bzhin brjed byang du bkod pa

Haribhadra (seng ge bzang po, late eighth century)

Clear Meaning Commentary / Commentary on (Maitreyas) “Treatise of Quintessential Instructions on the Perfection of Wisdom: Ornament for the Clear Realizations”
spuṭhārtha / abhisamayālaṃkāraṇāmaṇḍapārāMITAPADEŚĀŚRAYAVRUTTI
’grel pa don gsal / shes rab kyi pa rol tu phyin pa’i man ngag gi bstan beos par rtogs pa’i rgyan ces bya ba’i ’grel pa
Sanskrit editions:


Bibliography

1999 Tōyō Bunko CD-ROM: “Tibetan texts of don bdun bcu of ’jam dbyangs bzhad pa and rigs lam ’phrul gyi lde mig of dkon mchog bstan pa’i sgron me.” In the Toyo Bunko Database CD Release II. Tokyo, Japan: Tōyō Bunko, 1999. CD-ROM. (This edition is based on the 1999 Mundgod.)


2011 TBRC bla brang: In kun mkhyen ’jam dbyangs bzhad pa’i rdo rje mchog gi gsung ’bun, vol. 14. TBRC W22186.14: 115-178, which is a PDF of: bla brang bkra shis ’khyil: bla brang bkra shis ’khyil dgon, publishing date unknown.


Translation of the section of the distinctive tenets of the Consequence School: Daniel Cozort, Unique Tenets of the Middle Way Consequence School (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1998).


dngos po brgyad don bdun cu’i rnam gzhag
Bibliography


kan su’u, China: mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 2005.

Rje btsun pa’i Don bdun cu: An Introduction to the Abhisamayālañkāra
Edited with Introduction by Shunzō Onoda
Kyoto, Japan: The Association of Indian and Buddhist Studies, Nagoya University, 1983.

Khay-drub-ge-leg-pal-sang (mkhas grub dge legs dpal bzang, 1385-1438)

Compilation on Emptiness / Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate: Treatise Brilliantly Clarifying the Profound Emptiness
stong thun chen mo / zab mo stong pa nyid rab tu gsal bar byed pa’i bstan bcos skal bzang mig ’byed
TBRC W1KG15939, 1 vol (PDF of Lha sa: ser gtsug nang bstan dpe mying ’tshol bsdu phyogs sgrig khang , 2009).


Extensive Explanation of (Dharmakīrti’s) “Commentary on (Dignāga’s) ‘Compilation of Prime Cognition’”: Ocean of Reasoning
tshad ma rnam ’grel gi rgya cher bshad pa rigs pa’i rgya mtsho

Kön-chog-jig-may-wang-po (dkon mchog ‘jigs med dbang po, 1728-1791)

Condensed Presentation of the Eight Categories and Seventy Topics
dngos brgyad don bdun cu’i rnam bzha’ bsdu’ pa


Precious Garland of Tenets / Presentation of Tenets: A Precious Garland
grub pa’i mtha’i rnam par bzha’ ba rin po che’i phreng ba


Presentation of the Grounds and Paths: Beautiful Ornament of the Three Vehicles

sa lam gyi ram bzhag theg gsum mdzes rgyan


Thorough Expression of the Natures of the One Hundred Seventy-Three Aspects of the Three Exalted Knowers: White Lotus Vine of Eloquence

mkyhen gsum gyi ram pa brgya dang don gsum gyi rang bzhin yang dag par brjod pa legs bshad padma dkar po’i khris shing
Tibetan editions:


Kumārashrībhadra

Summary of (Maitreya’s) “Perfection of Wisdom”

prajñāpāramitāpiṇḍārtha
shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa’i don bs dus pa
Peking 5195, vol. 91.

Long-döl Ngag-wang-lo-sang (klong rdol ngag dbang blo bzang, 1719-1794)

Vocabulary Occurring in the Perfection of Wisdom

phar phyin las byung ba’i ming gi ram drangs
Tibetan editions:
TBRC W87: 343-412 (PDF of khreng tu’u, China: [s.n.], [199-]).

Lo-sang-chö-kyi-gyal-tshan (blo bzang chos kyi rgyal mtshan, 1570-1662)

Explanation of the First Category in the Ocean of Good Explanation Illuminating the Essence of the Essence of (Maitreya’s) “Treatise of Quintessential Instructions on the Perfection of Wisdom: Ornament for the Clear Realizations”

shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa’i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa’i rgyan gyi snying po’i snying po gsul bar legs par bshad pa’i rgya mtsho las skabs dang po’i mam par bshad pa Tibetan editions:
Maitreya (byams pa)

Five Doctrines of Maitreya

mahāyānottaratantrāstra
theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma’i bstan bcos
(PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985).

2. Differentiation of Phenomena and Nomomenon
dharmadhatvavibhāga
chos dang chos nyid rnam par ’byed pa

3. Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes
madhyāntavibhāga
dbus dang mtha’ rnam par ’byed pa

4. Distinguishing Phenomena and Pure Being with Commentary by Mipham
mahāyānottaratantraśāstra

5. Distinguishing Phenomena and Pure Being with Commentary by Mipham
mahāyānottaratantraśāstra

6. Distinguishing Phenomena and Pure Being with Commentary by Mipham
mahāyānottaratantraśāstra

4. Ornament for the Clear Realizations
abhisamayâlaṃkâra/abhisamayâlaṁkâra-nâma-prajñâparamitopadeśastra-sâstrakârikâ
mngon par rtogs pa’i rgyan/ shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa’i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa’i rgyan shes bya ba’i tshig le’ur byas pa
Sanskrit editions:

5. Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras
mahâyânasūtrâlaṃkâra
theg pa chen po’i mdo sde rgyan gyi tshig le’ur byas pa
Peking 5521, vol. 108; Dharma vol. 77.

Nâgârjuna (klu sgrub; first to second century, C.E.)
Commentary on the “Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness”
śūnyatāsaptavitṛti
stong pa nyid bdun cu pa’i ’grel pa
Bibliography


Compendium of Sūtra
sūtrasamuccaya
mdo kun las btus pa
Peking 5330, vol. 102.

Conquest Over Mistake
madhyamakabramaghāta
dbu ma 'khrul pa 'joms pa
Peking 2665 and 2666, vol. 61.

Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment
bodhicittavivaraṇa
byang chub sms kyi 'grel pa
Peking 2665 and 2666, vol. 61.

Praise of the Element of Attributes
dharmadhūstotra
chos kyi dbyings su bstod pa

Praise of the Inconceivable
acintyastava
bsam gyis mi khyab par bstod pa
Peking 2012, vol. 46.

Praise of the Supramundane [Buddha]
lokātītastava
'jig rten las 'das par bstod pa
Peking 2012, vol. 46.

Six Collections of Reasoning
1. Treatise on the Middle / Fundamental Treatise on the Middle, Called “Wisdom”
madhyamakāśāstra / prajñānāmamūlamadhyamakārikā
dbu ma'i bstan bcos / dbu ma rtsa ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa shes rab ces bya ba
Bibliography 95


Peking 5224, vol. 95.


2. Refutation of Objections

vigrahāvyāvartanikārikā

rtsod pa bzlog pa ’i tshig le’ur byas pa


Peking 5228, vol. 95


3. Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness

śūnyatāsaptatikārikā

stong pa nyid bdun cu pa’i tshig le’ur byas pa


Peking 5227, vol. 95.


4. Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning

yuktiṣaṣṭikākārikā

rigs pa drug cu pa’i tshig le’ur byas pa


Peking 5225, vol. 95.


5. Precious Garland of Advice for the King
Bibliography

رَايٌ پْاگٌ بْثٌ پْاگٌ بْثٌ
Peking 5658, vol. 129; Dharma vol. 93.


Treatise Called the Finely Woven
vaidalyasūtranāma
Peking 5226, vol. 95

Ngag-wang-pal-dan (ngag dbang dpal ldan, b.1797), also known as Pal-dan-chö-jay (dpal ldan chö-jay)

Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-pa’s) “Great Exposition of Tenets”: Freeing the Knots of the Difficult Points. Precious Jewel of Clear Thought grub mtha’ chen mo’i mehan ‘gre dka’ gnad mdud grol blo gsal gces nor
Tibetan digital reprint edition: In gsung 'bum (nga dbang dpal ldan). TBRC W5926,177. 3-356 (Delhi, India: Mongolian Lama Gurudev, 1983).


Explanation of (Maitreya’s) Treatise “Ornament for the Clear Realizations” from the Approach of the Meaning of the Words: Sacred Word of Maitreyanātha
bstan bcos mgon par rtags pa’i rgyan tshig don gyi sgo nas bshad pa byams mgon zhal lung TBRC W5926-3:221-416 (PDF of: Delhi: Gurudev, 1983).

English translations:
Explanation of the Obscurational and the Ultimate in the Four Systems of Tenets
grub mtha’ bzhis’i lugs kyi kun rdzob dang don pa’i don nam par bshad pa legs bshad dpuyid kyi dpal mo’i glu dbangs

Ngag-wang-lo-sang-gya-tso (ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho, Fifth Dalai Lama, 1617-1682)
Instructions on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment: Sacred Word of Manjushri
byang chub lam gyi rim pa’i ‘khrin yig ’jam pa’i dbangz kyi zhal lung
English translation of the “Perfection of Wisdom Chapter”: Jeffrey Hopkins. “Practice of Empi-

Pa-bong-ka-pa Jam-pa-ten-dzin-trin-lay-gya-tso (pha bong kha pa byams pa bstan ’dzin ’phrin las rgya mtsho, 1878-1941)
Presentation of the Interpretable and the Definitive, Brief Notes on the Occasion of Receiving Pro-
found [Instruction from Jo-ne Pandita Lo-sang-gya-tso in 1927] on (Tsog-kha-pa’u’s) “The Essence of Eloquence”
drang ba dang nges pa’i don mam par bzhag pa legs par bshad pa’i snying po’i zab nos skabs kyi zin bris mdo tsam du bkod pa
Tibetan digital reprint edition: In gsung bum (bde chen snying po), TBRC W3834.4:417-494 (Lha sa: [s.n.], [199-]).

Pal-jor-hlun-drub, Nyal-tön (dpal ’byor lhun grub, gnyal [or gnyan] ston, 1427-1514)
Lamp for the Teaching / Commentary on the Difficult Points of (Tsog-kha-pa’u’s) “The Essence of Eloquence” — Lamp for the Teaching
legs bshad snying po’i dka’ ’grel bstan pa’i sgron me

Pan-chen Sö-nam-drag-pa (paṇ-chen bsod nams grags pa, 1478-1554)
Distinguish through Objections and Answers (Tsong-kha-pa’u’s) “Differentiating the Interpretable and Definitive Meanings of All the Scriptures, The Essence of Eloquence” — Garland of Blue Lotuses
gsung rab kun gi drang ba dang nges pa’i don mam par ’byed pa legs par bshad pa’i snying po
brgal lan gyis mam par ’byed pa utpa la’i phreng ba

phar phyin spyi don/ shes rab kyipha rol tu phyin pa’i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa’i rgyan ’grel pa dang bcas pa’i nnam bshad snying po rgyan gyi don legs par bshad pa yum don gsal ba’i sgron me


Buxadur: Nang bstan shes rig ’dzin skyong slob gnyer khang, 1963.

Prājñākaramati (shes rab ’byung gnas blo gros, 950-1030)

**Summary of (Haribhadra’s) “Commentary on (Maitreya’s) ‘Ornament for the Clear Realizations’”**

abhisaṃayālaṃkāraavṛittiḥṁdrthā

mngon par rtogs pa’i rgyan gyi ’grel pa’i bs dus don


Peking 5193, vol. 91.

Ratnākarashānti (rin chen ’byung gnas zhi ba)

**Commentary on (Nāgārjuna’s) “Compendium of Sūtra,” Ornament Sparkling with Jewels**

śīrasaṃuccayaḥṣayaratnālakāṃkṣā

mdo kun las btsu pa’i bshad pa rin po che’i snang ba’i rgyan


Peking 5331, vol. 102

**Commentary on the Difficult Points of the “Eight Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra”: The Supreme Essence**

ārya-aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāpañjikāsārottamā

phags pa shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa brgyad stong pa’i dka’ ’grel snying po mchog


P5200, vol. 92

**Pure Commentary on (Maitreya’s) “Ornament for the Clear Realizations”**

abhisaṃayālaṃkāraāvṛittiḥśuddhamatīnāmā

mngon par rtogs pa’i rgyan gyi ’grel pa’i tshig le’ur byas pa’i ’grel pa dag ldan


Peking 5199, vol. 91

**Quintessential Instructions on the Perfection of Wisdom**

prajñāpāramitāpaḍeṣa

shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa’i man ngag


P5579, vol. 114

Shāntideva (zhi ba lha, eighth century)

**Compendium of Instructions**

śīkṣāsāmuccaya

bṣlab pa kun las btsus pa


Peking 5272, vol. 102


*Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds*
bodhi[sattvaj]caryāvatāra
byang chub sems dpal ’jug pa
English translations:
Contemporary commentary:

Sūtra:
Indicating Through Eight Concordant Meanings the Mother Perfection of Wisdom Taught Extensively in One Hundred Thousand, Taught in Medium Length in Twenty-five Thousand, and Taught in Brief in Eight Thousand [Stanzas]
prajñāpāramitāśāstraḥ hasīräktābhracchāsana- paḥcāñciśarāskāmadyāvāsaṃśāstāsāhasrākālavāsaṃnārṭhāsāsana
yum shes kyi pha rol tu phyin pa brgyas pa bstan pa ’bum dang ’bring du bstan pa nyi khrī inga stong dang bs dus te bstan pa khrī brgyad stong pa rnam thun par don brgyad kyi bstan pa
P5187, vol. 88.
Tshe-chog-ling Ye-shay-gyal-tshan (tshe mchog gling ye shes rgyal mtshan, 1713-1793)
Quintessential Instructions Clearly Teaching the Essentials of (Tsong-kha-pa’s) “Stages of the Path to Enlightenment,” Correlating the “Eight Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra” with (Maitreya’s) “Ornament for Clear Realization”: Lamp Illuminating the Perfection of Wisdom sher phyin stong phrag brgyad pa dang mgon rongs rgyan sbyar te byang chub lam gyi rim pa’i gnad mams gsal bar ston pa’i man ngag sher phyin gsal ba’i sgron me
Tsong-kha-pa Lo-sang-drag-pa (tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa, 1357-1419)
Explanation of (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle”: Ocean of Reasoning / Great Commentary on (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle”
dbu ma rtsa ba’i tshig le’ur byas pa shes rab ces bya ba’i mam bshad rigs pa’i rgya mtsho / rtsa shes tīk chen


Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path / Stages of the Path to Enlightenment Thoroughly Teaching All the Stages of Practice of the Three Types of Beings

lam rim chen mo / skyes bu gsum gyi nyams su blang ba’i rim pa thams cad tshang bar ston pa’i byang chub lam gyi rim pa


Peking 6001, vol. 152.


Introduction to the Seven Treatises on Prime Cognition: Clearing Away the Mental Darkness of Seekers

sde bdun la ’jug pa’i sgo don gnyer yid kyi mun sel


sde dge, 5416.


Medium-Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment to be Practiced by Beings of the Three Capacities / Medium-Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment to be Practiced by Beings of the Three Capacities together with an Outline / Short Exposition of the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment

skyes bu gsum gyi nyams su blang ba’i byang chub lam gyi rim pa / skyes bu gsum gyi nyams su blang ba’i byang chub lam gyi rim pa bring po sa bcad kha skong dang bcas pa / lam rim ‘bring / lam rim chung ngu


Praise of Dependent-Arising / Praise of the Supramundane Victor Buddha from the Approach of His Teaching the Profound Dependent-Arising: The Essence of Eloquence / Praise of the Supramundane Buddha from the Viewpoint of Dependent-Arising


Three Principal Aspects of the Path


Treatise Differentiating Interpretable and Definitive Meanings: The Essence of Eloquence


Ye shes thabs mkhas. shar tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pas mchad pa’i drang ba dang nges pa’i don mam par ‘byed pa’i bsad bcos legs bsad snying po (The Eastern Tsong-khu-pa Lo-sang-drag-pa’s “Treatise Differentiating Interpretable and Definitive Meanings: The
Commentary on (Asaṅga’s) “Summary of the Great Vehicle”

mahāyānasamgrahabhāṣya
Peking 5551, vol. 112

Commentary on (Maitreya’s) “Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes”
dbus dang mtha’ rnam par ’byed pa’i ’grel pa/dbus mtha’i ’grel pa
Peking 5528, vol. 108


Commentary on the “Sūtra on Dependent-Arising”
pratītyasamutpadābhāṣya
Peking 5496, vol. 107

Commentary on the “Sūtra on the Ten Grounds”
daśabhūmivyākhyāna
Peking 5494, vol. 104

Commentary on the “Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra”
āryākṣayamatinirdeśakā
Peking 5527, vol. 108

Extensive Explanation of the Superior One Hundred Thousand Stanza, Twenty-five Thousand Stanza, and Eighteen Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras / Conquest Over Objections about the Three Mothers

āryaśatasāhasrikāpañcaviṃsatisāhasrikā-āṣadāsasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitābṛhatītikā

\'phags pa shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa 'bum pa dang nyi khi lnga stong pa dang khi brgyad stong pa'i rgya cher bshad pa / yum gsum gnod 'joms

No TBRC data found.
Peking 5206, vol. 93

Principles of Explanation

vyākyhayukti

nang par bshad pa'i rigs pa


The Thirty / Treatise on Cognition-Only in Thirty Stanzas

triṃśikākārikā / saravijñānamātradeśakatriṃśakakārikā

sum cu pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa / thams cad mam ngi rig tsam du ston pa sum cu pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa
Peking 5556, vol. 113


The Twenty

vīṃśatikā / vīṃśikākārikā

nyi shu pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa

Peking 5557, vol. 113


Treasury of Manifest Knowledge

abhidharmakoṣa

chos mngon pa'i mdzod


---

\(^a\) This text is attributed by Tsong-kha-pa to Damṣṭhasena (damṣṭhasena).
3. OTHER WORKS


—. *The Gilgit manuscript of the Aṣṭadakṣaśāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā: Chapters 55 to 70 corresponding to the 5th Abhisamaya*. Roma, Italy: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1962.


WILLIAM MAGEE, PH.D., Vice President of the UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies and Associate Professor, taught for eight years at the Dharma Drum Buddhist College in Jinshan, Taiwan. Author of *Paths to Omniscience: the Geluk Hermeneutics of Nga-wang-bel-den* and *The Nature of Things: Emptiness and Essence in the Geluk World* and co-author of *Fluent Tibetan: A Proficiency-Oriented Learning System*, he also published a novel about Tibet *She Still Lives* and a detective novel *Colombo and the Samurai Sword*. 
The text translated here is from the second section of Jam-yang-shay-pa Ngag-wang-tson-drü’s *Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive*, more formally called *Decisive Analysis of (Tsong-kha-pa’s) “Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive”*: *Storehouse of White Lapis-Lazuli of Scripture and Reasoning Free from Mistake, Fulfilling the Hopes of the Fortunate*, a commentary on Tsong-kha-pa Lo-sang-drag-pa’s *The Essence of Eloquence*. Composed in 1686, the *Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive* is used at Go-mang Monastic College and related institutions throughout inner Asia as a textbook for the study of interpretation of scripture. Although *The Essence of Eloquence* is considered to be Tsong-kha-pa’s most difficult treatise, Jam-yang-shay-pa’s penetrating analysis clarifies his discussion of the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* on the Mind-Only School. Through logical debates and prose exposition, Jam-yang-shay-pa explores Tsong-kha-pa’s analysis of the Bodhisattva Paramārthaśamudgata’s question to Buddha regarding an apparent contradiction in Buddha’s sutras.

The Bodhisattva’s question goes to the heart of the Mind-Only presentation of reality. Within that context, Jam-yang-shay-pa’s carefully crafted debates expose logical problems his Tibetan predecessors encounter in explaining Tsong-kha-pa’s discussion of the *Sūtra*. His arguments skillfully resolve questions about the relationship between non-deceptiveness and literality, the meaning of the term “own-character,” and its relationship to the externality refuted by the Mind-Only School.

The first volume in this series—available for download on the UMA Institute website as *Principles for Practice*—treats the topic of the Four Reliances. This second volume focuses on Paramārthasamudgata’s presentation of the apparent crucial contradiction in the Buddha’s teachings, and the third volume will discuss the Buddha’s reply, avoiding contradiction by revealing the purpose and thought behind his statements.