How Can a Conclusion Be Drawn from a Sign?
Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s
Illuminating a Little the Presentation of Signs and Reasonings:
Beautiful Golden Garland of Eloquence, I

Katherine M. Rogers
Edited by Jeffrey Hopkins
In consultation with Lo-sang-gyal-tshan
UMA INSTITUTE FOR TIBETAN STUDIES
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UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies
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Translating texts from the heritage of Tibetan and Inner Asian Buddhist systems, the project focuses on Great Indian Books and Tibetan commentaries from the Go-mang College syllabus as well as a related theme on the fundamental innate mind of clear light in Tantric traditions. A feature of the Project is the usage of consistent vocabulary and format throughout the translations.

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Preface

JAM-YANG-ZHAY-PA

Jam-yang-zhay-pa Ngag-wang-tsön-drüa was born in the northeastern Am-do Province of Tibet in the Earth-Mouse year of 1648 east of the Blue Lake. At the age of five he was blessed by the Fifth Dalai Lama, from whom he later received monastic vows. Having studied the alphabet at age seven with his uncle, who was a monk, he mastered reading and writing and six years later became a novice monk, excelling among his fellow students by his ability quickly to understand texts and disputations. He went to Lhasa at age twenty-one to further his studies at the Gomang College of Dre-pung Monastic University. Arriving in Lhasa in 1668, he offered a presentation scarf to an image of Mañjushrī in the Jo-khang Temple, where the statue reportedly favored the young scholar with a smile, due to which he became known as Jam-yang-zhay-pa, “Smiled Upon by Mañjushrī.” Six years later he received full ordination and at twenty-nine entered Gyu-may Tantric College. From age thirty-three he spent two years in meditative retreat in a cave near Dre-pung.

At the age of thirty-eight in 1685 he published the first of his major works, Decisive Analysis of (Tsong-kha-pa’s) “Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive”: Storehouse of White Lapis-Lazuli of Scripture and Reasoning Free from Mistake, Fulfilling the Hopes of the Fortunate, commonly called Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive. In 1688 he published another of his great expositions, the Treatise on the Presentations of the Concentrative and Formless Absorptions: Adornment Beautifying the Subduer’s Teaching, Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning, Delighting the Fortunate, commonly called Great Exposition of the Concentrative and Formless Absorptions. He published the Root Text of Tenets: Lion’s Roar in 1689, and published the Great Exposition of Tenets—its prose auto-commentary—ten years later in 1699, and between those two, in 1695, he published the Decisive Analysis of (Chandrakīrti’s) “Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle’”:

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a ’jam dbyangs bzhad pa ngag dbang brtson grus, 1648-1722. For a longer biography of Jam-yang-zhay-pa see Derek F. Maher, “Knowledge and Authority in Tibetan Middle Way Schools of Buddhism: A Study of the Gelukha (dge lugs pa) Epistemology of Jamyang Shayba (’jam dbyangs bzhad pa) In Its Historical Context” (Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, 2003), 169-196.

Treasury of Scripture and Reasoning, Thoroughly Illuminating the Profound Meaning [of Emptiness], Entrance for the Fortunate, also called the Great Exposition of the Middle.

At age fifty-three in 1700 he became abbot of Go-mang College and in 1709 at sixty-two returned to Am-do Province, where he founded a highly influential monastery at Tra-shi-khyil in 1710. Seven years later he founded a tantric college at the same place. He wrote prolifically on the full range of topics of a typical Tibetan polymath and, having received honors from the central Tibetan government and from the Chinese Emperor, died at the age of seventy-three or -four in 1721/2.b

Partly because of the close connection between Go-mang College and the Mongolian peoples stretching from the Caspian Sea through Siberia, who were predominantly Ge-lug-pa by this time, Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s influence on the Ge-lug-pa order has been considerable. His life manifests a pattern typical of many influential Tibetan religious figures—child prodigy, learned scholar, disseminator of the religion, politician, priest to political personages, monastery leader, yogi, magician, popular teacher, and prolific writer.

**THE PRESENTATION OF SIGNS AND REASONINGS**

The text translated here is the opening section of Jam-yang-zhay-pa Ngag-wang-tson-drü’s Illuminating a Little the Presentation of Signs and Reasonings: Beautiful Golden Garland of Eloquence. Belonging to the debate-oriented decisive analysis (mtha’ dpyod) genre, it is an introductory textbook (yig cha) for the study of logic at the Go-mang Monastic College and at La-brang Tra-shi-khyil their affiliated institutions throughout Inner Asia. In the curriculum this aspect of study is followed by Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s very lengthy decisive analysis of Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid Cognition” titled Decisive Analysis of the “Commentary on Valid Cognition” Fully Revealing the Path of Liberation: Hundreds of Blazing Lights of Valid Cognition.

Since their founding by Tsong-kha-pa in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, Ge-lug-pa monastic institutions, like those of other Tibetan orders, created their own systems of education. These often included

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a bkra shis 'khyil.
b See Maher, “Knowledge and Authority in Tibetan Middle Way Schools of Buddhism,” 164.
c 'jam dbyangs bzhad pa'i rdzogs chen ngag dbang brtson grus, 1648-1721/1722.
d rtags rigs kyi rnam bzhag nyung gsal legs bshad gser gyi phreng mdzes.
a curriculum designed to enable the student to develop a “path of reasoning,” a consciousness trained in reasoned analysis until it can use analysis to realize initially the meaning of religious texts and eventually the true nature of reality. Reasoning is used to draw conclusions based on evidence, signs; and thus Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s book begins with a definition of a correct sign, and then lays out illustrations, ingredients, divisions, how entailment operates, and so forth—all within the rubric of sometimes jaw-dropping challenges in the form of debates.

EDITIONS CONSULTED

Three basic editions of Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s *Illuminating a Little the Presentation of Signs and Reasonings: Beautiful Golden Garland of Eloquence* were consulted:

1. *chos thams cad rigs pas gtan la ’bebs pa’i gtan tshigs kyi rnam bzhang legs par bshad pa bzhang so*. Published at Go-mang College, Lhasa, Tibet, date unknown. Interlinear reference in the Tibetan text “[G##a/b].” Abbreviated reference: “2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa,” so named because of being acquired in Lhasa, Tibet, at Go-mang College in 2015 by Jongbok Yi for the UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies. This version was likely originally printed at Go-mang College, Lhasa, Tibet, during Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s residence at Go-mang College. (To be made available at UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, uma-tibet.org.) Portion translated here: 1a.1-9b.4.

2. *rtags rigs kyi rnam bzhang nyung gs al legs bshad gser gyi phreng mdzes zhes bya ba bzhang so*. TBRC W22186.14:176-304, which is a PDF of: bla brang bkra shis ’khyil: bla brang bkra shis ’khyil dgon, [n.d.]. Interlinear reference in the Tibetan text “[L##a/b].” Abbreviated reference: “2011 TBRC bla brang,” so named because of being acquired by E. Gene Smith for the Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center at the request of the UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies in 2010 and added to TBRC in 2011. This edition, which is a revision of the above edition, was originally printed in La-brang-tra-shi-khyil monastery founded by Jam-yang-zhay-pa after his return to Am-do. It is the preferred edition, in general, though not always. Portion translated here: 1a.1-13a.4.

3. *rgtags rigs kyi rnam bzhang nyung gs al legs bshad gser phreng mdzes zhes bya ba bzhang so*. Drepung Gomang Library Computer Section, Drepung Gomang Library Computer Section, North Karnataka, India, 2015. It appears to have been edited based on

The digital Tibetan text of Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s *Presentation of Signs and Reasonings* provided in this book was supplied by the Drepung Gomang Library of Go-mang College in Mundgod, Karnataka State, India. I have edited it in consultation with all three of the above editions as well as other sources.

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I wish to acknowledge the strategic input of Lo-sang-gyal-tshan, Lha-rampa Ge-she of the Go-mang College of Dre-pung Monastic University, Mundgod, Karnataka State, India. In October, 2015, he was appointed to the position of Abbot of Go-mang College of Dre-pung Monastic University in Mundgod, India, and also served a six-month term as Disciplinarian at the Tantric College of Lower Lhasa in Hunsur, India. He has worked with translators of the UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies since 2013.
Technical Notes

Please notice that:

• Full bibliographical references are given in the footnotes at first citation.
• For translations and editions of texts, see the Bibliography.
• The names of Indian Buddhist schools are translated into English in an effort to increase accessibility for non-specialists.
• For the names of Indian scholars and systems cited in the body of the text, \textit{ch}, \textit{sh}, and \textit{ś} are used instead of the more usual \textit{c}, \textit{ś}, and \textit{s} for the sake of easy pronunciation by non-specialists; however, \textit{cch} is used for \textit{cch}, not \textit{chchh}. In parentheses the usual transliteration system for Sanskrit is used.
• The names of Indian authors and orders are given in “essay phonetics” for the sake of easy pronunciation and internet accessibility.
• The names of Indian authors have been added to all citations.
• Ellipses are only used to depict authors’ own ellipses; thus, the usual practice of announcing citations that begin midstream with an ellipsis is not followed; the citation merely begins midstream, mirroring the Tibetan.
• In the Tibetan text when I have filled in an author’s ellipsis with the missing material, turquoise highlight indicates the material added in place of the author’s ellipsis and the added text is put in smaller type inside brackets in order to preserve access to the author’s intended text, and in the English translation only a footnote indicates that the material has been filled in, in order to avoid clutter in the translation.
• Tibetan passages cited in the notes often vary from Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s citations likely due to different editions and often also to his editing translations from Sanskrit.
Illuminating a Little the Presentation of Signs and Reasonings: Beautiful Golden Garland of Eloquence

First in the series: Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s Illuminating a Little the Presentation of Signs and Reasonings: Beautiful Golden Garland of Eloquence


Key to the colorization: In situations of debate the Tibetan text and the translation are highlighted in three colors: black, blue and red. Blue colored statements present what Jam-yang-zhay-pa considers to be right, while red colored statements represent what Jam-yang-zhay-pa considers to be wrong. Words in black are other information or function structurally. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight indicates material added in place of ellipses, and magenta highlight sets off the ellipsis indicators when the elided part has been filled in.
Illuminating a Little the Presentation of Signs and Reasonings: Beautiful Golden Garland of Eloquence

Homage to the lamas and the Protector Mañjushri

Concerning that, here with respect to explaining the presentation of reasons delineating all phenomena through reasoning, Dignāga’s Door to Valid Reasoning says:\(^a\)

A reason is the three modes. What are the three modes? The property of the subject, that ascertained as existent in just the similar class, and that ascertained as just nonexistent in just the dissimilar class.

To explain the meaning of that, Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid Cognition” says:\(^b\)

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\(^a\) tshad ma rigs par 'jug pa'i sgo zhes bya ba'i rab tu byed pa (nyāyapraveśa-nāma-pramāṇapraκaraṇa), in bstan 'gyur (snar thang, 4473), TBRC W22704.183:370-379 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 183b.6-183b.7.

\(^b\) tshad ma rnam 'grel gvi tshig le'ur byas pa (pramāṇavārttikakārikā), in bstan 'gyur (sde dge, 4210), TBRC W23703.174:189-304 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 94b.3-94b.4.

Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis; magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
A [valid] reason is a property (*chos*) of the subject (*phyogs*).
It is pervaded by a factor [that is, the predicate] of that [position
(*phyogs, pakṣa*)].

and Dharmakīrti’s *Ascertainment of Valid Cognition* says:

Ascertained as existent in the object of inference [that is, the sub-
ject] as well as in what is similar to [the object of inference],
and

Ascertained as nonexistent in the nonexistent [that is, ascertained
as nonexistent in what is without similarity to the object of in-
ference].

and Dharmakīrti’s *Drop of Reasoning* says:

The sign that is the three modes is ascertained as (1) just existent
in that which is to be inferred [that is, the subject], (2) just existent in just the similar class, and (3) just nonexistent in just the dissimilar class.

This has three: explaining the definitions of signs, explaining the divisions of signs, and explaining the defects and good qualities of the three—sign, example, and position (phyogs, pākṣa).

I. EXPLAINING THE DEFINITIONS OF SIGNS

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b 2011 BDRC bla brang, 2a.1, and New Go-mang, 159.9, phyogs nyid la; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 1a.4, phyogs la Dharmakirti’s Drop of Reasoning, 232a.1, phyogs la.

Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
That which is set as a sign is the definition of sign. Whatever is selfless is necessarily a sign, because the horn of a rabbit is a sign. It follows that [horn of a rabbit is a sign] because horn of a rabbit is set as a sign.

1. Someone says: [That the horn of a rabbit is set as a sign] is not established.

Our response: It follows that with respect to the subject, horn of a rabbit, it is set as a sign because it is set as a sign in the syllogism, “The subject, sound, is impermanent because of being it [the horn of a rabbit].”

It follows [that horn of a rabbit is set as a sign in the syllogism, “The subject, sound, is impermanent because of being the horn of a rabbit”] because there exists the syllogism, “The subject, sound, is impermanent because of being it [the horn of a rabbit].” It follows [that there exists the syllogism, “The subject, sound, is impermanent because of being the horn of a rabbit,”] because [horn of a rabbit] is selfless.

---

a 2011 BDRC bla brang, 2a.3; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 1a.5.
That which is set as a sign in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product, is the definition of sign in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product. Whatever is selfless is not necessarily that which is set as a sign in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product,] because whatever is that which is set as a sign in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product,] is necessarily one with product.

II. EXPLAINING THE DIVISIONS OF SIGNS

A. EXPLAINING CORRECT SIGNS

This has three: explaining the basis of relation of correct signs, explaining the definition of correct sign, and explaining the division of correct signs.

---

*a* Lo-sang-gyal-tshan indicated that su bkod pa might be omitted during oral debate.
1. Explaining the basis of relation of correct signs

This has two: (1) explaining the basis of relation of the property of the subject, the subject sought to be known, and (2) explaining the significance of the basis of relation of the pervasion [or entailment], along with its enumerations [the similar and dissimilar classes].

This has three: explaining the definition of the flawless subject sought to be known, explaining illustrations of the flawless subject sought to be known, and explaining the reasoning proving the flawless subject sought to be known.

Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
1) EXPLAINING THE DEFINITION OF THE FLAWLESS SUBJECT SOUGHT TO BE KNOWN

That observed as a common locus of (1) its being held as the subject in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product, and also (2) there occurring a person who, having ascertained it [sound] as a product by valid cognition, is engaged in wanting to know whether it is impermanent is the definition of the [flawless] subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product.

The three:
1. the subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product,
2. the basis of debate in the proof of [sound as impermanent by the sign, product, and]
3. the basis of inference in the proof of [sound as impermanent by the sign, product,]

are equivalent.

Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
2) **EXPLAINING ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE FLAWLESS SUBJECT SOUGHT TO BE KNOWN**

Sound is an illustration of [the flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent]. Opposite from not being sound and object of hearing are not, individually, [an illustration of the flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent].

3) **EXPLAINING THE REASONING PROVING THE FLAWLESS SUBJECT SOUGHT TO BE KNOWN**

With respect to the subject, object of knowledge, it follows that those two [opposite from not being sound and object of hearing] are not [individually] the subject sought to be known in the proof of [sound as impermanent] because, not only are [opposite from not being sound and object of hearing] both not [individually] the flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent, they are also not [individually] even the subject in proof of [sound as impermanent].
2. Someone says:\[^a\] [The sign which is that not only are those two—opposite from not being sound and object of hearing—not (individually) the flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent, they are also not (individually) even the subject in that proof] is not established.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, opposite from not being sound, is the flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as a positive because (1) [according to you] it is the flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent and (2) there exists a correct sign proving sound as a positive.

If you accept [that opposite from not being sound is the flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as a positive], it [absurdly] follows that the subject, opposite from not being sound, is a positive because of being the flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as a positive.

\[^a\] 2011 TBRC bla brang, 3a.2; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 2b.3.

Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
You cannot accept [that opposite from not being sound is a positive] because of [its] being a negative.

If you [incorrectly say that the sign which is that opposite from not being sound is a negative] is not established, [our own position is] it follows that with respect to the subject, sound, opposite from not being it [sound] is a negative because something that is it [sound] exists.

Furthermore, it follows that the subject, opposite from not being sound, is not the flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as a positive because of being the property of the subject in the proof of [sound as a positive]. [Being the property of the subject in the proof of sound as a positive] entails [not being the flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as a positive] because whatever is any one of the nine nonestablished reasons in a specified proof must not be the property of the subject in that proof.
It follows [that whatever is any one of the nine nonestablished reasons in a specified proof must not be the property of the subject in that proof] because Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid Cognition” says:

Because a subject that has become the actual reason
Is not established as a means of knowing.

[This statement] entails [that whatever is any one of the nine nonestablished reasons in a specified proof must not be the property of the subject in that proof] because “subject” indicates the basis of debate; “actual reason” is explained as the basis of debate at the time of being set as the sign or at the time of becoming the entity of the reason; “means of knowing” is explained as that reason being set in that way; “because not established” is explained as the two—the basis of debate and the sign set in that way—being “a reason that is not established due to a lack of difference between the basis [of debate] and the sign.”

Furthermore, it follows that [according to you] the subject, object of

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*a tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi tshig le'ur byas pa (pramāṇavārttikakārikā), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4210), TBRC W23703.174:189-304, 146b.2.

Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
hearing, is the flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as a definiendum because (1) it is the subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent and (2) there exists a correct sign in the proof of sound as a definiendum.

You have explicitly asserted the first sign [which is that object of hearing is the subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent].

The second [sign which is that there exists a correct sign in the proof of sound as a definiendum] follows because triply qualified imputed existent is [a correct sign in the proof of sound as a definiendum].

It follows [that triply qualified imputed existent is a correct sign in the proof of sound as a definiendum] because [triply qualified imputed existent] is a correct sign proving just the convention in the proof of [sound as

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\[\text{a} \] This was asserted in the opponent’s opening statement of Debate 2 (22). For, the opponent asserted, at the beginning of Debate 2, “The sign—which is that not only are those two—opposite from not being sound and object of hearing—not (individually) the flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent, they are also not (individually) even the subject in that proof—is not established;” therefore it is the opponent’s view that opposite from not being sound and object of hearing are individually the subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent.

\[\text{b} \] One division of correct signs (by way of the mode of proof, sgrub tshul gyi sgo nas dbye ba) is made depending on whether the phenomenon being proved (the explicit predicate of the proposition) is a definition or a definiendum. When the phenomenon being proved is

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Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
If you accept [that object of hearing is the flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as a definiendum], then it [absurdly] follows that object of hearing is a definiendum because of being the flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as a definiendum.

You cannot accept [that object of hearing is a definiendum] because of [its] being a definition.

Furthermore, it follows that the subject, object of hearing, is not the a definiendum, the sign is proving the meaning (don). When the phenomenon being proved is a definiendum, the sign is proving the convention (tha snyad). Here “convention” can be understood as the term, or expression, by which a phenomenon is known.

According to some Ge-lug-pa scholars, including Jam-yang-zhay-pa, some correct signs prove both a definition and a definiendum; for example, in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product, both impermanent and its definition, momentary, are held to be the explicit predicate of the proposition. However, in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, momentary, because the definition of impermanent is being used as the sign, only a definiendum (impermanent) is being proved, and therefore momentary is a correct sign proving solely the convention in the proof of sound as impermanent. Jam-yang-zhay-pa discusses this below, 29.

Above, triply qualified imputed existent is a correct sign in the proof of sound as a definiendum because triply qualified imputed existent is the definition of definiendum. Because the sign (triply qualified imputed existent) is the definition of that which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition (definiendum), it is a correct sign proving solely the convention in the proof of sound as a definiendum.
flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent because of being the property of the subject in the proof of [sound as impermanent]. It follows [that object of hearing is the property of the subject in the proof of sound as impermanent] because it [object of hearing] is, from among the nine reasons that are the property of the subject in the proof of [sound as impermanent], an uncommon indefinite reason. It follows [that object of hearing is an uncommon indefinite reason in the proof of sound as impermanent] because Dignāga’s Wheel of Reasonings says:

In the center, an uncommon indefinite [reason].

3. Someone says: It follows that the subject, momentary, is that which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent because of being that which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product.
Our response: [Being that which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product,] does not entail [being that which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent].

Well then, for you it [absurdly] follows that whatever is that which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product, must be that which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent because whatever is a correct sign in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product, must be a correct sign in the proof of sound as impermanent. The three spheres [of self-contradiction]!

Above, if you [incorrectly] accept [that momentary is that which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent, our own position is] it follows that the subject, momentary is not that which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent because of being a correct sign in the proof of sound as impermanent. It follows [that momentary is a correct sign in
the proof of sound as impermanent] because of being a correct sign proving just the convention in that proof. It follows [that momentary is a correct sign proving just the convention in the proof of sound as impermanent] because it [momentary] is the definition of impermanent.

Our response: It follows that momentary is that which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product, because there exist both a definition and a definiendum which are [individually] that which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product.

4. Someone says: Momentary is not that which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product.

Our response: It follows that momentary is that which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product, because there exist both a definition and a definiendum which are [individually] that which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product.

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Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.

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a 2011 TBRC bla brang, 4a.6; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 3b.4.
It follows [that there exist both a definition and a definiendum which are (individually) that which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product] because product is a correct sign proving both the meaning and the convention in the proof of sound as impermanent. It follows [that product is a correct sign proving both the meaning and the convention in the proof of sound as impermanent] because there exists that which is a correct sign proving both the meaning and the convention in the proof of [sound as impermanent], because Dharmakīrti’s *Ascertainment of Valid Cognition* says:\(^a\)

Both the nonobservation of the cause and of the pervader are also reasonings.

and Dharmottara’s [*Greater* Logicality] [his *Commentarial Explanation of (Dharmakīrti’s) “Ascertainment of Valid Cognition”*] says:\(^b\)

Through the nonobservation of cause and pervader, both non-thing and the convention of non-thing are understood.
5. Also, about someone’s stating: \(b\) Opposite from not being impermanent is that which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product.\(c\)

Others say: It follows that product is a correct sign of a negative in the proof of sound as impermanent because there exists a common locus of (1) being that which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product, and (2) being a negative.

\(a\) Dharmottara’s *Greater Logicality*, 288b.4, does not include *dngos po* here.

\(b\) 2011 BDRC *bla brang*, 4b.4; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 3b.7.

\(c\) Jam-yang-zhay-pa makes it clear below, 50, that this is not his own view. He asserts that opposite from not being impermanent is that which is held as the *implicit* predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product.

*Key to colorization:* Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
Our response: [There existing a common locus of (1) being that which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product, and (2) being a negative] does not entail [that product is a correct sign of a negative in the proof of sound as impermanent.]

If you [incorrectly] accept [that product is a correct sign of a negative in the proof of sound as impermanent], then it [absurdly] follows that the subject, product, is not a correct sign of a positive in the proof of sound as impermanent because of being a correct sign of a negative in the proof of [sound as impermanent], [according to you]. It [absurdly] follows [that product is a correct sign of a negative in the proof of sound as impermanent] because there exists a common locus of (1) being that which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product, and (2) being a negative.

It follows [that there exists a common locus of (1) being that which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product, and (2) being a negative] because impermanent is that [common locus of (1) being that which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent]
by the sign, product, and (2) being a negative]. It follows [that impermanent is a common locus of (1) being that which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product, and (2) being a negative] because impermanent is a negative. It follows [that impermanent is a negative] because [impermanent] is an affirming negative. It follows [that impermanent is an affirming negative] because the ways in which the terms for emptiness and impermanent are negative words are similar.

[It follows that the ways in which the terms for emptiness and impermanent are negative words are similar] because Dharmakīrti’s Autocommentary on the ‘Commentary on (Dignāga’s) ‘Compilation of Valid Cognition’’ says:

With respect to the terms “emptiness,” “impermanence,” and so forth, the conventions are made upon having eliminated superimposed aspects in a way similar to how awarenesses imputing them do this.

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If you [incorrectly] accept the root [consequence which is that product is a correct sign of a negative in the proof of sound as impermanent, our own position is] it follows that the subject, product, is not a correct sign of a negative in the proof of sound as impermanent because of being a correct sign of a positive in the proof of [sound as impermanent]. It follows [that product is a correct sign of a positive in the proof of sound as impermanent] because of being a correct nature sign in the proof of [sound as impermanent]. [Being a correct nature sign in the proof of sound as impermanent] entails [being a correct sign of a positive in that proof] because whatever is either of the two, a correct effect or a correct nature sign in the proof of [sound as impermanent], must not be a sign of a negative in that proof because Dharmakīrti’s Autocommentary says:\(^a\)

Concerning that, two are [reasons of] a positive thing; one is a reason of a negative.

\(^a\) tshad ma rnam ’grel gyi ’grel pa (pramāṇavārttiṇavrtti), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4216), TBRC W23703.174:523-732, 262a.6.
6. Someone says: If there exists a subject in a specified proof, then there necessarily exists a flawless subject sought to be known in that proof.

Our response: Well then, it [absurdly] follows that there exists a flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as sound because there exists a subject in the proof of sound as sound.

If you [incorrectly say that the sign which is that there exists a subject in the proof of sound as sound] is not established, [our own position is] it follows that with respect to the subject, sound, there exists a subject in the proof of it [sound] as sound because it [sound] exists.

If you [incorrectly say that (sound’s) existing] does not entail [that there exists a subject in the proof of (sound) as sound, our own position is] it follows that with respect to the subject, sound, if it exists, then there necessarily exists a subject in the proof of it as sound because it is selfless.

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a 2011 TBRC bla brang, 5a.6; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 4a.6.
If you [incorrectly] accept [that there exists a flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as sound], then it [absurdly] follows that there exists a person who, having ascertained sound by valid cognition, is doubting whether sound is or is not sound because [according to you] sound is the flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as sound. You cannot accept [that there exists a person who, having ascertained sound by valid cognition, is doubting whether sound is or is not sound] because any person who has ascertained sound by valid cognition must be a person who has ascertained sound as sound by valid cognition.

7. Someone says.\(^a\) If there exists a flawless subject sought to be known in a specified proof, then there necessarily exists a property of the subject in that proof.

Our response: Well then, it [absurdly] follows that there exists a property of the subject in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, sound, because there exists a flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, sound. It follows [that there exists a

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\(^a\) 2011 TBRC bla brang, 5b.3; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 4b.2.

Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, sound] because sound is the flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, sound. It follows [that sound is the flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, sound] because (1) sound is held as the basis of debate in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, sound, and (2) there exists a person who, having ascertained sound as sound by valid cognition, is engaged in wanting to know whether sound is impermanent.

If you [incorrectly say that] the first [sign which is that sound is held as the basis of debate in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, sound] is not established, [our own position is] it follows that with respect to the subject, object of knowledge, sound is held as the basis of debate in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, sound, because sound is held as the basis of debate in the syllogism, “The subject, sound, is impermanent because of being sound.”

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If you [incorrectly say that] the second sign [which is that there exists a person who, having ascertained sound as sound by valid cognition, is engaged in wanting to know whether sound is impermanent] is not established, [our own position is] it follows that there exists a person who, having ascertained sound as sound by valid cognition, is engaged in wanting to know whether sound is impermanent because a full-fledged opponent is the person responding to a debate challenge. The “full-fledged opponent” (phyi rgyol yang dag) is a defender who—in relation to the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product—having ascertained that sound is a product, is wondering if sound is impermanent. The “former opponent” (snga’ rgyol) is the challenger, the person presenting the debate challenge.

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fledged opponent in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product, is a person who, having ascertained sound as sound by valid cognition, is engaged in wanting to know whether sound is impermanent] because [a full-fledged opponent in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product] is a person who, having ascertained sound as a product by valid cognition, is engaged in wanting to know whether sound is impermanent. It follows [that a full-fledged opponent in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product, is a person who, having ascertained sound as a product by valid cognition, is engaged in wanting to know whether sound is impermanent] because of being such a full-fledged opponent [in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product, who, having ascertained sound as a product by valid cognition, is engaged in wanting to know whether sound is impermanent].

Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
If you [incorrectly] accept the root [consequence which is that there exists a property of the subject in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, sound, our own position is] it follows that sound is not the property of the subject in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, sound, because [sound] is the basis of debate in the proof of [sound as impermanent by the sign, sound]. [Sound’s being the basis of debate in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, sound] entails [that sound is not the property of the subject in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, sound] because when a phenomenon is both the basis of debate and the sign in the proof of that phenomenon as that basis [of debate], then that phenomenon must be a nonestablished reason due to there being no difference between the basis of debate and the sign in that proof.

It follows [that when a phenomenon is both the basis of debate and the sign in the proof of that phenomenon as that basis (of debate), then, that phenomenon must be a nonestablished reason due to there being no difference between the basis of debate and the sign in that proof] because there exists a meaning [of Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid Cognition”] which says:

Because a subject that has become the actual reason
Is not established as a means of knowing,
A subject is not established as proof of itself,
Because for all things there is no dividing them
Into property [of the subject] and subject.

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a tsad ma rnam 'grel gyi tshig le'ur byas pa (pramāṇavārttikakārikā), in bstan 'gyur (sde dge, 4210), TBRC W23703.174:189-304, 146b.2.

Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
དགོས་པའི་ཨིར། [ཆོས་དེ་གཞི་དེར་Ȅབ་པར་Ɏེད་པའི་ɬོད་གཞི་དང་Ȧགས་གཉིས་ཀ་ཡིན་པ་དེའི་ཚǃ་ན་དེ་Ȅབ་ཀྱི་གཞི་Ȧགས་ཐ་དད་མེད་ནས་མ་Ȅབ་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཡིན་དགོས་པ་]

[ཤེས་Ȅེད་ཉིད་ȭ་མ་Ȅབ་ɉིར།]

[ཆོས་ཅན་གཏན་ཚིགས་དངོས་ǽར་ནི།]

[ཆོས་ཅན་ȷམ་དེ་Ȅད་པའི་ɉིར།]

Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis; magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
b. Explaining the significance of the basis of relation of the pervasion, along with its enumerations [the similar and dissimilar classes]

This has two: (1) explaining the basis of relation of the pervasion, the predicate of the proposition, and (2) explaining the enumerations of the basis of relation of the pervasion, the similar and dissimilar classes.

1) EXPLAINING THE BASIS OF RELATION OF THE PERVASION, THE PREDICATE OF THE PROPOSITION

This has three: definitions, divisions, and proofs.

A) DEFINITIONS

That which is held as the predicate of the proposition is the definition of predicate of the proposition.
Whatever is selfless is necessarily a predicate of the proposition because horn of a rabbit is a predicate of the proposition. It follows that [horn of a rabbit is a predicate of the proposition] because [horn of a rabbit] is that which is held as a predicate of the proposition, because [horn of a rabbit] is that which is held as the predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as the horn of a rabbit.

If you [incorrectly say that the sign which is that horn of a rabbit is that which is held as the predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as the horn of a rabbit] is not established, [our own position is] it follows that with respect to the subject, horn of a rabbit, it [horn of a rabbit] is that which is held as the predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as it [horn of a rabbit] because it [horn of a rabbit] is selfless.

That which is held as the predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent is the definition of predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent.

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B) **DIVISIONS**

When [the predicate of the proposition] is divided from the viewpoint of types of terminological expression, there are two, the explicit predicate of the proposition and the implicit predicate of the proposition in a specified proof.

That which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition in a specified proof is the definition of the explicit predicate of the proposition in a specified proof. “Impermanent” is an illustration of [the explicit predicate of the proposition in a specified proof].

That which is held as the implicit predicate of the proposition in a specified proof is the definition of the implicit predicate of the proposition in a specified proof. “Momentary” is an illustration of [the implicit predicate of the proposition in a specified proof].

C) **PROOFS**

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*Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.*
8. **Someone says:** Not being permanent is that which is held as the implicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent.

"ཁ་ཅིག། ප་མ་ཡིན་པ་དེ་ལེགས་ཀྱི་བོབ་མེ་ཤེས་པའི་ཆོས་ར་བོང་དེ་ཟེར་ན།"

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, [not being permanent], is that which is held as the predicate of the proposition in the proof of [sound as impermanent] because of being that which is held as the implicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of [sound as impermanent].

"དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེ་ོབ་ཀྱི་བོབ་མེ་ཤེས་པའི་ཆོས་ར་བོང་དེ་ཐལ།"

If you [incorrectly] accept [that not being permanent is that which is held as the predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent], it [absurdly] follows that the subject [not being permanent] is that which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition of a correct sign in the proof of sound as impermanent because you accepted [that (not being permanent) is that which is held as the predicate of the proposition in the proof of (sound as impermanent)].

"དེ་ོབ་ཀྱི་བོབ་མེ་ཤེས་པའི་ཆོས་ར་བོང་དེ་འདོད་ན།"

If you [incorrectly] accept [that not being permanent is that which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition of a correct sign in the proof of sound as impermanent], it [absurdly] follows that whatever is that which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition of a correct sign in the proof of sound as *not being permanent* by the sign of a specified

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a 2011 TBRC bla brang, 6b.6; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 5a.7.

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phenomenon must be that which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition of a correct sign in the proof of sound as *impermanent* by the sign of that phenomenon because you [incorrectly] accepted [that not being permanent is that which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition of a correct sign in the proof of sound as impermanent].

If you [incorrectly] accept [that whatever is that which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition of a correct sign in the proof of sound as not being permanent by the sign of a specified phenomenon must be that which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition of a correct sign in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign of that phenomenon], it [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, not being permanent, it is that which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition of a correct sign in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign of not being the common locus of phenomenon and the nonmomentary because [according to you] it [not being permanent] is that which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition of a correct sign in the proof of sound as not being permanent by the sign of not being the common locus of phenomenon and the nonmomentary.
How Can a Conclusion be Drawn from a Sign?

If you [incorrectly] accept [that not being permanent is] that which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition of a correct sign in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign of not being the common locus of phenomenon and the nonmomentary, it [absurdly] follows that there exists that which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition of a correct sign in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign of not being the common locus of phenomenon and the nonmomentary because [according to you] not being permanent is [that which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition of a correct sign in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign of not being the common locus of phenomenon and the nonmomentary].

You cannot accept [that there exists that which is held as the explicit
Predicate of the Proposition

predicate of the proposition of a correct sign in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign of not being the common locus of phenomenon and the nonmomentary] because the forward pervasion in the proof of [sound as impermanent by the sign of not being the common locus of phenomenon and the nonmomentary] is not established.a

If you say that [the sign which is that the forward pervasion in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign of not being the common locus of phenomenon and the nonmomentary is not established] is not established, then it [absurdly] follows that the subject, horn of a rabbit, is impermanent because of not being the common locus of phenomenon and the nonmomentary.

If you say that [the sign which is that horn of a rabbit is not the common locus of phenomenon and the nonmomentary] is not established then it [absurdly] follows that the subject, horn of a rabbit, is a phenomenon because of being the common locus of phenomenon and the nonmomentary.

You cannot accept [that horn of a rabbit is a phenomenon] because [horn of a rabbit] is definitely nonexistent.

a Roughly speaking, the forward pervasion in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign of not being the common locus of phenomenon and the nonmomentary is: Whatever is not the common locus of phenomenon and the nonmomentary is necessarily impermanent.

Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
That which is held as the predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product is the definition of predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product.

When [predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product] is divided, there are the two, explicit predicate of the proposition and implicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of [sound as impermanent by the sign, product]. The first, [explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product,] is [either] impermanent or momentary. The second, [implicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product,] is opposite from not being [either of] those two [that is, opposite from not being impermanent and opposite from not being momentary].
2) EXPLAINING THE ENUMERATIONS OF THE BASIS OF RELATION OF THE PERVASION, THE SIMILAR AND DISSIMILAR CLASSES

This has two: the actual explanation and, ancillarily, explaining similar and dissimilar examples.

A) ACTUAL EXPLANATION OF THE ENUMERATIONS OF THE BASIS OF RELATION OF THE PERVASION, THE SIMILAR AND DISSIMILAR CLASSES

This has four: explanations of the definitions [of similar and dissimilar classes], the divisions [of dissimilar classes], the etymology and [fully qualified] usage [of similar and dissimilar classes], and the reasoning proving [similar and dissimilar classes].

1’ Definitions of similar and dissimilar classes

That which is not empty of the predicate of the proposition, in accordance with the mode of proof, in a specified proof is the definition of...
similar class in that proof.

Furthermore, there are two [types of similar class], those using an “is” statement and those using an “exists” statement.\footnote{There are two modes of statement, that is to say, two ways of stating a syllogism: the copulative and the ontological. (1) The copulative mode is an “is” statement using the linking form of the verb “to be” and (2) the ontological mode can be either an “exists” statement using the verb "to exist" or an "is" statement using the ontological form of the verb "to be" as in "there is a cat in the backyard." The syllogism, “The subject, sound, is impermanent because of being a product” is in the copulative mode: sound must be ascertained as being impermanent and being a product. The syllogism, “With respect to the subject, on a smoky pass, fire exists, because smoke exists” is in the ontological mode: smoke must be ascertained as existing on the smoky pass, and fire must be ascertained as existing on the smoky pass.}

That which is not empty of the predicate of the proposition, in accordance with the mode of proof, in the proof of sound as impermanent is the definition of similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent.

The two, [similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent] and impermanent, are equivalent.

In the context of an “exists” statement, that which is in the similar class [that is to say, is a member of the similar class] in a specified proof is not necessarily equivalent to that which goes as the predicate of the proposition in that proof because smoke is not fire.

\footnote{Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in}
That which is empty of the predicate of the proposition, in accordance with the mode of proof, in the proof of [sound as impermanent] is the definition of dissimilar class in the proof of [sound as impermanent].

The two, [dissimilar class in the proof of sound as impermanent] and not being impermanent, are equivalent.

2’ Divisions of dissimilar classes

This has three: (1) dissimilar class that is nonexistent in a specified proof, (2) dissimilar class that is other in a specified proof, and (3) dissimilar class that is contradictory in a specified proof. Horn of a rabbit is the first [a dissimilar class that is nonexistent in a specified proof]. Object of knowledge is the second [a dissimilar class that is other in a specified proof], and permanent is the third [a dissimilar class that is contradictory in a specified proof].
(1) Dissimilar class that is nonexistent in a specified proof

It follows that the subject, horn of a rabbit, is a dissimilar class that is nonexistent in the proof of [sound as impermanent] because of (1) being the dissimilar class in that proof and (2) being nonexistent. Both [parts of the] sign [which is that horn of a rabbit is the dissimilar class in that proof and is nonexistent] are established because [horn of a rabbit] is definitely nonexistent.

(2) Dissimilar class that is other in a specified proof

It follows that the subject, object of knowledge, is a dissimilar class that is other in the proof of [sound as impermanent] because of (1) being the dissimilar class in that proof and (2) being other than impermanent. The first [sign which is that object of knowledge is the dissimilar class in the proof of sound as impermanent] is established because [object of knowledge] is permanent. The second [sign which is that object of knowledge is other than impermanent] is established because [object of knowledge] is a phenomenon that is not impermanent.
(3) Dissimilar class that is contradictory in a specified proof

It follows that the subject, permanent, is a dissimilar class that is contradictory in the proof of [sound as impermanent] because of (1) being the dissimilar class in that proof and (2) being contradictory with impermanent. Both signs [which are that permanent is the dissimilar class in the proof of (sound as impermanent) and contradictory with impermanent] are established because [permanent] is one with permanent.

3’ Etymology and [fully qualified] usage of similar and dissimilar classes

There exist three possibilities with respect to the etymology and [fully qualified] usage of similar class in a specified proof because there exist the three:

1. The possibility of being the similar class in a specified proof and of existing in accordance with the etymological explanation of similar class in that proof.

Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
2. The possibility of being the similar class in a specified proof and of not existing in accordance with the etymological explanation of similar class in that proof.

3. The possibility of neither being [the similar class nor existing in accordance with the etymological explanation of similar class in a specified proof].

The first [sign which is that there exists the possibility of being the similar class in a specified proof and of existing in accordance with the etymological explanation of similar class in that proof] is established because pot is that [possibility—that is, pot is the similar class in a specified proof and exists in accordance with the etymological explanation of similar class in that proof]. It follows [that pot is that possibility—that is, pot is the similar class in a specified proof and exists in accordance with the etymological explanation of similar class in that proof] because, pot is the similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent and exists in accordance with the etymological explanation of similar class in the proof of [sound as impermanent].
If you [incorrectly say that] the first [sign which is that pot is the similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent] is not established, [our own position is] it follows that the subject, pot, is the similar class in the proof of [sound as impermanent] because of being impermanent.

The second [sign which is that pot exists in accordance with the etymological explanation of similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent] is established because the two, it [pot] and sound, are qualitatively similar in being impermanent. It follows [that pot and sound are qualitatively similar in being impermanent] because the two, sound and it [pot], are impermanent.

The second [sign which is that there exits the possibility of being the similar class in a specified proof and of not existing in accordance with the etymological explanation of similar class in that proof] is established because uncompounded space is the similar class in the proof of sound as permanent and does not exist in accordance with the etymological explanation of similar class in that proof.

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This refers to the earlier second sign, p. 56.
The first [sign which is that uncompounded space is the similar class in the proof of sound as permanent] is established because [uncompounded space] is permanent. The second [sign which is that uncompounded space does not exist in accordance with the etymological explanation of similar class in the proof of sound as permanent] is established because the two, it [uncompounded space] and sound, are not qualitatively similar in being permanent because it [uncompounded space] is permanent and sound is impermanent. The third [sign which is that there exists the possibility of neither being the similar class nor existing in accordance with the etymological explanation of similar class in a specified proof] is easy [to prove].

There also exist three possibilities with regard to the etymological explanation of dissimilar class in a specified proof because there exist the three:

1. The possibility of being the dissimilar class in a specified proof and of existing in accordance with the etymological explanation of dissimilar class in that proof.
2. The possibility of not being the dissimilar class in a specified proof and of existing in accordance with the etymological explanation of dissimilar class in that proof.
3. The possibility of neither being [the dissimilar class] nor [existing in accordance with the etymological explanation of dissimilar class in a
The first [sign which is that there exists the possibility of being the dissimilar class and of existing in accordance with the etymological explanation of dissimilar class in a specified proof] is established because pot is that [possibility—that is, pot is the dissimilar class and exists in accordance with the etymological explanation of dissimilar class in a specified proof]. It follows that pot is that [possibility—that is, pot is the dissimilar class and exists in accordance with the etymological explanation of dissimilar class in a specified proof] because [pot] is the dissimilar class in the proof of [sound as permanent] and [pot] exists in accordance with the etymological explanation of dissimilar class in that proof.

If you [incorrectly say that] the first [sign which is that pot is the dissimilar class in the proof of sound as permanent] is not established, [our own position is] it follows that the subject, pot, is the dissimilar class in the proof of [sound as permanent] because of being impermanent.
The second [sign which is that pot exists in accordance with the etymological explanation of dissimilar class in the proof of sound as permanent] is established because the two, it [pot] and sound, are not qualitatively similar in being permanent because the two, sound and it [pot], are impermanent.

The second root sign [which is that there exists the possibility of not being the dissimilar class and of existing in accordance with the etymological explanation of dissimilar class in a specified proof] is established because [uncompounded] space [is that possibility—that is, uncompounded space is not the dissimilar class and exists in accordance with the etymological explanation of dissimilar class in a specified proof]. It follows [that uncompounded space is that possibility—that is, uncompounded space is not the dissimilar class and exists in accordance with the etymological explanation of dissimilar class in a specified proof] because [uncompounded space] is not the dissimilar class in the proof of [sound as permanent] and exists in accordance with the etymological explanation of dissimilar class in the proof of [sound as permanent].
If you [incorrectly say that] the first [sign which is that uncompounded space is not the dissimilar class in the proof of sound as permanent] is not established, [our own position is] it follows that the subject [uncompounded space] is not the dissimilar class in the proof of [sound as permanent] because of being the similar class in the proof of [sound as impermanent]. It follows [that uncompounded space is the similar class in the proof of sound as permanent] because of being permanent.

If you [incorrectly say that] the second [sign which is that uncompounded space exists in accordance with the etymological explanation of dissimilar class in the proof of sound as permanent] is not established, [our own position is] it follows that the subject [uncompounded space] exists in accordance with the etymological explanation of dissimilar class in the proof of [sound as permanent] because the two, it [uncompounded space] and [sound], are not qualitatively similar in being permanent. It follows that [the two, uncompounded space and sound, are not qualitatively similar in being permanent] because, it [uncompounded space] is permanent, and sound is impermanent.
The third [sign\textsuperscript{a} which is that there exists the possibility of neither being the dissimilar class nor existing in accordance with the etymological explanation of dissimilar class in a specified proof]—is easy [to prove].

With respect to the explanation of whether or not similar and dissimilar classes are explicitly contradictory, although similar class is explicitly contradictory with dissimilar class, dissimilar class is not explicitly contradictory with similar class because dissimilar class does not exist.

4’ The reasoning proving the similar and dissimilar classes

9. Someone says:\textsuperscript{b} It follows that the subject, pot, is the similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent because of being impermanent. If you accept [that pot is the similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent], then it follows that the subject, [pot,] is the “class” (phyogs, pakṣa) that is a piece of the phrase “similar class (mthun phyogs) in the proof of [sound as impermanent]” because of being the similar class in that proof.

\textsuperscript{a} This refers to the third root sign, p. 59.
\textsuperscript{b} 2011 TBRC bla brang, 9b.1; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 7a.3.

\textit{Key to colorization:} Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis, magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
Our response: [Being the similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent] does not entail [being the “class” (phyogs, pakṣa) that is a piece of the phrase “similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent.”]

If you [incorrectly] accept [that pot is the “class” (phyogs, pakṣa) that is a piece of the phrase “similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent”] it [absurdly] follows that the subject, pot, is the predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent because of being the “class” (phyogs, pakṣa) that is a piece of the phrase “similar class in the proof of [sound as impermanent].”
that are similar in meaning with [the predicate of the proposition] in existing in [the predicate of the proposition] are posited as “the similar class.”

That the reason is so follows because Dignāga’s Aphorisms on Valid Cognition [his Compilation of Valid Cognition] says:

Existential in the object of inference and in what is similar to [the object of inference], and
Nonexistent in just the nonexistent [that is, nonexistent in just what is without similarity to the object of inference].

and Dignāga’s Autocommentary on “Compilation of Valid Cognition” says:

The phyogs (pakṣa) moreover is the predicate of the proposition.

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a tshad ma kun las btsa pa (pramāṇasamuccaya), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4203), BDRC W23703.174:189-304 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 4a.3.

b tshad ma kun las btsa pa’i ’grel pa (pramāṇasamuccaya-vṛtti), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4204), BDRC W23703.174:30-172 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 45a.2.
Furthermore, [according to you] it [absurdly] follows that the subject, pot, is the predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent because of being the “class” (phyogs, pakṣa) that is a piece of the phrase “similar class in the proof of [sound as impermanent].” [Being the “class” (phyogs, pakṣa) that is a piece of the phrase “similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent,”] entails being the predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent because “class” (phyogs, pakṣa) that is a piece of the phrase “similar class in the proof of [sound as impermanent]” is taken as the predicate of the proposition in that proof.

It follows [that “class” (phyogs, pakṣa) that is a piece of the phrase “similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent” is taken as the predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent] because “class” (phyogs, pakṣa) that is a piece of the phrase “product is existent or nonexistent in the similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent” is taken as the predicate of the proposition in the proof of [sound as impermanent]. It follows that [“class” (phyogs, pakṣa) that is a piece of the phrase “product is existent or nonexistent in the similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent” is taken as the predicate of the proposition in

\[L10a\] Dignāga’s Aphorisms on Valid Cognition [his Compilation of Valid cognition], 4a.3, yod dang med.

Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
the proof of sound as impermanent] because the position (phyogs, pakṣa) that is the object of relation of the pervasion [or entailment] in the proof of [sound as impermanent] is taken as the predicate of the proposition in the proof of [sound as impermanent].

It follows [that the position (phyogs, pakṣa) that is the object of relation of the pervasion in the proof of sound as impermanent is taken as the predicate of the proposition in that proof] because whatever is any one of the three—(1) the position (phyogs, pakṣa) that is the object of relation of the pervasion in the proof of [sound as impermanent], (2) the proposition (bsgrub bya) that is the object of relation of the pervasion in the proof of [sound as impermanent], and (3) the inferred object (rjes su dpag bya) that is the object of relation of the pervasion in the proof of [sound as impermanent]—must be the predicate of the proposition in the proof of [sound as impermanent].
It follows [that whatever is any one of those three—(1) the position (phyogs, pakṣa) that is the object of relation of the pervasion in the proof of (sound as impermanent), (2) the proposition that is the object of relation of the pervasion in the proof of (sound as impermanent), and (3) the inferred object that is the object of relation of the pervasion in the proof of (sound as impermanent)—must be the predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent] because whatever is the proposition (bsgrub bya) or position (phyogs, pakṣa) that is “the proposition established or not established by means of a reason proving sound as impermanent” must be a meaning combining sound and impermanent.

It follows that [whatever is the proposition or position that is “the proposition established or not established by means of a reason proving sound as impermanent” must be a meaning combining sound and impermanent] because:

1. There exist three separate ways of becoming referents of the term phyogs (pakṣa) in the context of proving sound as impermanent.
2. phyogs (pakṣa) in “property of the subject (phyogs chos, pakṣa dharma) in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product,” is taken as the flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of [sound as impermanent by the sign, product].
3. phyogs (pakṣa) in “similar class” (mthun phyogs, sapakṣa) that is a piece of the phrase “ascertained by valid cognition as just existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, in solely the similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product,” is taken as [both] (1) the position (phyogs, pakṣa) that is the object of relation of the pervasion in the proof of [sound as impermanent by the sign, product] and (2) the predicate of the proposition in the proof of [sound as impermanent by the sign, product].
The first [sign which is that there exist three separate ways of becoming referents of the term phyogs (pakṣa) in the context of proving sound as impermanent] is established because Dharmakīrti’s *Ascertainment of Valid Cognition* says:\(^a\)

Ascertained as existent in the object of inference [that is, the subject] as well as in what is similar to [the object of inference], and

Ascertained as nonexistent in the nonexistent [that is, ascertained as nonexistent in what is without similarity to the object of inference].

and Dharmottara’s *Greater Logicality* [his *Commentarial Explanation of (Dharmakīrti’s) “Ascertainment of Valid Cognition”*] says:\(^b\)

\(^a\) *tshad ma rnam par nges pa* (pramāṇaviniścaya), in *bstan ’gyur* (sde dge, 4211), TBRC W23073.174:305-462, 168b.7.

\(^b\) *tshad ma rnam par nges pa ’i ’grel bshad / ’thad ldan (le’u dang po dang gnyis pa)* (pramāṇaviniścayatikā), in *bstan ’gyur* (sde dge, 4229), TBRC W23073.213 (Delhi, India:}

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**Key to colorization:** Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
The conventions of “object of inference” (rjes su dpag par bya ba’i tha snyad) are three.

The second [sign which is that phyogs (pakṣa) in “property of the subject (phyogs chos, pakṣa dharma) in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product,” is taken as the flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product] is established because Dharmakīrti’s Autocommentary says: a

Phyogs (pakṣa) is the subject (chos can).

and Dharmakīrti’s Drop of Reasoning also says: b

The object of inference is here the subject endowed with the particularity of that which is sought to be known.

and Dharmottara’s [Greater] Logicality at this point says: c

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a tshad ma rnam pa ghryi sgyur (sde dge, 4216), TBRC W23703.174:523-732, 261b.4.

b rigs pa’i thigs pa zhes bya ba’i rab tu byed pa (nyāyabinduparakarana), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4212), TBRC W23703.174:463-477 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 232a.1.

c tshad ma rnam par nges pa’i ’grel bshad / ’thad ldan (le’u dang po dang gnyis pa) (pramāṇavinīścayaṭīkā), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4229), TBRC W23703.188:4-579. This appears to be a paraphrase of Dharmottara’s Greater Logicality, 182b.5-182b.6, which reads: chos can nyid rjes su dpag par bya zhes khyad par du byas pa yin no / ’dir zhes bya ba ni gtan tshigs kyi mthshan nnyid kyi skabs ‘dir ro / rjes su dpag par bya ba de la mthong ba ni nges pa ste /
[Dharmakīrti’s *Drop of Reasoning* says,] “The object of inference is here” and so forth [because] at the time of delineating the character [or impact] of the reason the subject is what is being inferred.

[The three quotations above entail that *phyogs* (*pakṣa*) in “property of the subject (*phyogs* *chos*, *pakṣa* *dharma*) in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product,” is taken as the flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product] because, in this context, the three—object of inference, proposition, and position (*phyogs*)—are synonyms (ming gi rnam grangs).

By context this would seem to be a quotation from Dharmottara’s *Lesser Logicality*, his Commentary on (Dharmakīrti’s) “Drop of Reasoning” but it is found in the *Greater Logicality*, his Commentary on (Dharmakīrti’s) “Ascertainment of Valid Cognition.”
and (2) the predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product] is established because this [very text, Dharmottara’s Logicality] says:

The object of pervasion is the predicate of the proposition.

Furthermore, it follows that whatever is the “class” (phyogs, pakṣa) that is a piece of the phrase “similar class in a specified proof” must be the predicate of the proposition in that proof because among what go as the predicate of the proposition in a specified proof there exist the two, the generality-isolate and the particularity-isolate, and [from among those two] having taken the “class” (phyogs, pakṣa) that is a piece of the phrase “similar class in a specified proof” to be the generality-isolate, then that which is similar in meaning with [the generality-isolate] is thereby explained as “the similar class” because Dharmakīrti’s Drop of Reasoning says:

That which is similar in meaning [or factually concordant] with

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Key to colorization: Blue print – right. Red print – wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
the generality of the predicate of what is being proven is the sim-
ilar class.

[That quotation entails the preceding explanation of “similar class”] be-
cause it explains “that which is similar in meaning with the generality [of
the predicate of what is being proven] is the similar class” [as follows]:
In that passage:

1. “the predicate of what is being proven” is explaining “the predicate of
the proposition in a specified proof”
2. “generality” is explaining “the generality-isolate of that [predicate of
the proposition]:”
3. “similar in meaning” is explaining “similar in meaning with that [gen-
erality-isolate]:”
4. together they are explaining “[that which is similar in meaning with
the generality-isolate of the predicate of the proposition] is posited as
the similar class.”

It follows [that the earlier passage from Dharmakīrti’s Drop of Reasoning
explains “that which is similar in meaning with the generality (of the pred-
icate of the proposition) is the similar class”] because Dharmottara’s
Lesser Logicality [his Commentary on (Dharmakīrti’s) “Drop of Reason-
ing”] says: a

a rigs pa’i thigs pa’i rgya cher ’grel pa (nyāyabhūtaṅkā), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4231),
TBRC W23703.189:74-185 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa ehoedhey, Gyalwae sungrab
partun khang, 1982-1985). This passage was not found.
The mention of “generality” [in Dharmakīrti’s *Drop of Reasoning* where he says, “That which is similar in meaning with the generality of the predicate of what is being proven is the similar class,”] has the meaning of distinguishing it from particularity; it is the proposition and is also a generality; hence, a generality; what is similar in meaning [or factually concordant] with that [generality] is the similar class.

Furthermore, it follows that “class” (*phyogs, pakṣa*) that is a piece of the phrase “similar class in a specified proof” is taken as the predicate of the proposition in that proof because the two, (1) “class” (*phyogs, pakṣa*) that is a piece of the phrase “similar class that is the object of relation of the forward pervasion in a specified proof” and (2) “class” (*phyogs, pakṣa*) that is a piece of the phrase “dissimilar class that is the object of relation of the counter pervasion in a specified proof” are taken as the predicate of the proposition in that proof.

*Key to colorization:* Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
It follows that the two, (1) “class” (phyogs, pakṣa) that is a piece of the phrase “similar class that is the object of relation of the forward pervasion in a specified proof” and (2) “class” (phyogs, pakṣa) that is a piece of the phrase “dissimilar class that is the object of relation of the counter pervasion in a specified proof,” are taken as the predicate of the proposition in that proof because the proposition (bsgrub bya) or position (phyogs, pakṣa), which is “the proposition established or not established by means of the reason that is the probans in a specified proof,” is taken as a meaning combining the two, the subject and the predicate of the proposition in that proof.

It follows that the proposition or position, which is “the proposition established or not established by means of the reason that is the probans in a specified proof,” is taken as a meaning combining the two, the subject and the predicate of the proposition in that proof because there exist also three referents of the term phyogs (pakṣa) in the context of proving sound as impermanent and the term phyogs (pakṣa) is used as an actual name for the meaning combining the two, the subject and the predicate of the proposition in a specified proof, whereas the term phyogs (pakṣa) is used as an imputed name for the two—the predicate of the proposition, which is the object of relation of the two pervasions, and the subject sought to be known, which is the object [or focus] of the property of the subject.
[This is so] because Dharmottara’s Greater Logicality [his Commentarial Explanation of (Dharmakīrti’s) “Ascertainment of Valid Cognition”] says:

The conventions of “inference” (rjes su dpag pa‘i tha snyad) are three: the actual [is used] for the generality of the predicate and the subject that are what is being proven by the probans, and the

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a tshad ma rnam par nges pa‘i ’grel bshad / ‘thad ldan (le’u dang po dang gnyis pa) (pramāṇaviniścayatīkā), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4229), TBRC W23703.213. Earlier when Jam-yang-zhay-pa cited the same passage he used rjes su dpag par bya ba’i tha snyad rather than rjes su dpag pa’i tha snyad perhaps because earlier he wanted to refer only to the object of inference. Here this appears to be a paraphrase of Dharmottara’s Greater Logicality, 182b.3-182b.4:

The convention of “object of inference” (rjes su dpag par bya ba’i tha snyad) is [used] for three aspects:

that which is the generality of the predicate and the subject realized from the probans (sgrub par byed pa las rtogs pa chos dang chos can) is the actual object of inference (dngos su rjes su dpag par bya ba);

the two, the predicate of the proposition, which is the object of pervasion, and the subject—the object which is of the character of the reason (gtan tshigs kyi mtshan nyid kyi yul)—are the imputed inferences (rjes su dpag pa).

To summarize, the objects of inference are three: the first, the actual object of inference, is the subject and predicate of the proposition taken together; the second and third objects of inference, the imputed objects of inference, are the predicate of the proposition taken alone and the subject taken alone.
imputed [is used both] for the predicate of the proposition that is
the object of pervasion and for the subject that is the object [or the
focus] of the reason.

[The preceding passage] entails [that there exist also three referents of the
term phyogs in the context of proving sound as impermanent and that the
term phyogs is used as an actual name for the meaning combining the two,
the subject and the predicate of the proposition in a specified proof,
whereas the term phyogs is used as an imputed name for the two—the
predicate of the proposition, which is the object of relation of the two perva-
sions, and the subject sought to be known, which is the object (or focus)
of the property of the subject] because [in that passage, the words] “the
actual [is used] for the generality of the predicate and the subject that are
what is being proven by the probans, and” explain that the term phyogs is
used as an actual name for the meaning combining the two, the subject and
the predicate of the proposition; and [the words] “that is the object of per-
vasion” and so forth explain that [the term phyogs] is used as an imputed
name for the two others, [the predicate of the proposition, which is the
object of relation of the two pervasions, and the subject sought to be
known, which is the object (or focus) of the property of the subject].

10. **Someone says:** It follows that the generality of the predicate of the

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a 2011 TBRC bla brang, 11b.5; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 8b.5.
proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent is the “class” (phyogs, pakṣa) that is a piece of the phrase “similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent” because having taken “class” (phyogs, pakṣa) that is a piece of the phrase “similar class in the proof of [sound as impermanent]” to be the generality of the predicate of the proposition in that proof, then those that are similar in meaning with [the generality of the predicate of the proposition in that proof] are posited as “the similar class.” It follows [that having taken “class” (phyogs, pakṣa) that is a piece of the phrase “similar class in the proof of (sound as impermanent)” to be the generality of the predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent, then those that are similar in meaning with (the generality of the predicate of the proposition in that proof) are posited as “the similar class”] because Dharmakīrti’s Drop of Reasoning says:*

That which is similar in meaning with the generality of the predicate of what is being proven is the similar class.

\[ \text{That which is similar in meaning with the generality of the predicate of what is being proven is the similar class.} \]

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* rigs pa’i thigs pa zhes bya ba’i rab tu byed pa (nyāyabinduprakarana), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4212), TBRC W23703.174:463-477, 232a.1, which reads: mthun pa’i phyogs ni bgrub par bya ba’i chos kyi spyi dang don mthun pa’o.

**Key to colorization:** Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
Our response: [That passage] does not entail [that having taken “class” (phyogs, pakṣa) that is a piece of the phrase “similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent” to be the generality of the predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent, then those that are similar in meaning with the generality of the predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent are posited as “the similar class”] because the meaning of that [passage from Dharmakīrti’s *Drop of Reasoning*] is: Having taken [the generality of the predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent]—that is, impermanent which goes as the predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent—as the generality-isolate, then those that are similar in meaning with [the generality-isolate, that is, impermanent] are posited as the similar class in the proof of [sound as impermanent].

If you [incorrectly] accept [that the generality of the predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent is the “class” (phyogs, pakṣa) that is a piece of the phrase “similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent”], it [absurdly] follows that the generality of impermanent also is the “class” (phyogs, pakṣa) that is a piece of the phrase “similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent” because you [incorrectly] accepted [that the generality of the predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent is the “class” (phyogs, pakṣa) that is a piece of the phrase “similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent”]. If you accept [that the generality of impermanent also is the “class” (phyogs, pakṣa) that is a piece of the phrase “similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent”] it [absurdly] follows that the subject, [the generality of impermanent,] is the predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent because you accepted [that the generality of impermanent also is the “class” (phyogs, pakṣa) that is a piece of the phrase “similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent”].
Above, you cannot accept [that having taken “class” (phyogs, pakṣa) that is a piece of the phrase “similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent” to be the generality of the predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent, then those that are similar in meaning with the generality of the predicate of the proposition in that proof are posited as “the similar class”] because although “class” (phyogs, pakṣa) that is a piece of the phrase “similar class in the proof of [sound as impermanent]” is taken as impermanent, particularities of [impermanent], such as pot and so forth are not posited as that [“class” (phyogs, pakṣa) that is a piece of the phrase “similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent”] because Dharmottara’s Greater Logicality [his Commentarial Explanation of (Dharmakīrti’s) “Ascertainment of Valid Cognition”] says:

A “generality of the predicate of the proposition” is not apprehended; the predicate of the proposition is called a “generality.”

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*a tshad ma rnam par nges pa ’i ’grel bshad / ’thad ldan (le’u gsum pa) (pramāṇaviniścayacātikā), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4227), TBRC W23703.213 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa chödhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 67a.1.**
11. Someone says: It follows that whatever is selfless is not necessarily a similar class because dissimilar class exists. It follows [that dissimilar class exists] because pot is a dissimilar class. It follows [that pot is a dissimilar class] because [pot] is the dissimilar class in the proof of sound as permanent.

Our response: [Being the dissimilar class in the proof of sound as permanent does not entail being a dissimilar class]. The sign [which is that pot is the dissimilar class in the proof of sound as permanent] is established because [pot] is impermanent. You cannot accept [that pot is a dissimilar class (without specifying a context)] because whatever exists is necessarily a similar class and even whatever is nonexistent is necessarily a similar class.
The first [sign which is that whatever exists is necessarily a similar class] is established because pot is a similar class; it follows that [pot is a similar class] because [pot] is the similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent. It follows [that pot is the similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent] because of being impermanent.

The second [sign which is that even whatever is nonexistent is necessarily a similar class] is established because horn of a rabbit is a similar class. It follows [that horn of a rabbit is a similar class] because [horn of a rabbit] is the similar class in the proof of sound as the selflessness of persons. It follows [that horn of a rabbit is the similar class in the proof of sound as the selflessness of persons] because of being selfless.
12. Someone says: It follows that the subject, dissimilar class, is a similar class because of being a similar class in the proof of sound as the selflessness of persons. If you accept [that dissimilar class is a similar class] it follows that the subject, dissimilar class, exists because of being a similar class.

Our response: Being a similar class does not entail existing.

\[2011 \text{ TBRC } \text{bla brang}, 12b.3; 2015 \text{ Old Go-mang Lhasa, 9a.5.}\]
B) ANCILLARILY, EXPLAINING SIMILAR AND DISSIMILAR EXAMPLES

13. Someone says: It follows that dissimilar class exists because a dissimilar example exists. [A dissimilar example exists] because a correct proof statement using a qualitative dissimilarity [between the subject and an example] exists.

Our response: [That a correct proof statement using a qualitative dissimilarity exists] does not entail [that dissimilar example exists.]

It follows [that a correct proof statement using a qualitative dissimilarity exists] because the proof statement, “Whatever is permanent is necessarily a nonproduct, as is the case for example, with uncompounded space; sound, however, is a product,” is [a correct proof statement using a qualitative dissimilarity (between the subject, sound, and an example, uncompounded space)].

Above, if you [incorrectly] accept [that dissimilar example exists], it [absurdly] follows that the subject, uncompounded space, is a dissimilar example because of being a dissimilar example in the proof of sound as impermanent. [Being a dissimilar example in the proof of sound as impermanent] does not entail [being a dissimilar example].

It follows [that uncompounded space is a dissimilar example in the

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\(^a\) 2011 TBRC bla brang, 12b.4; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 9a.6.

Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
proof of sound as impermanent] because [uncompounded space] is a correct dissimilar example in a correct proof statement using a qualitative dissimilarity in the proof of [sound as impermanent].

You cannot accept [that uncompounded space is a dissimilar example (without specifying the context)] because [uncompounded space] is a similar example. It follows [that uncompounded space is a similar example] because [uncompounded space] is a similar example in the proof of sound as an object of knowledge. It follows [that uncompounded space is a similar example in the proof of sound as an object of knowledge] because [uncompounded space] is a similar example in the proof of sound as an object of knowledge, by the sign of being suitable to be taken as an object of awareness. It follows [that uncompounded space is a similar example in the proof of sound as an object of knowledge, by the sign of being suitable to be taken as an object of awareness] because of being a correct similar example in a correct proof statement using a qualitative similarity [between the example and the subject] in the proof of sound as an object of knowledge, by the sign of being suitable to be taken as an object of awareness.

It follows [that uncompounded space is a correct similar example in a correct proof statement using a qualitative similarity in the proof of sound as an object of knowledge, by the sign of being suitable to be taken as an object of awareness] because [uncompounded space] is a similar example in the correct proof statement using a qualitative similarity: “Whatever is suitable to be taken as an object of awareness is necessarily an object of knowledge, as is the case for example, with uncompounded space; sound also is suitable to be taken as an object of awareness.”

Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
Abbreviations

“2015 Old Lhasa Go-mang” = chos thams cad rigs pas gtan la ’bebs pa’i gtan tshigs kyi rnam bzhang legs par bshad pa bzhang so (Elegant Explanation of the Presentation of Reasons Delineating All Phenomena by Reasoning). Named “2015” because of being acquired in Lha-sa, Tibet, at Go-mang College in 2015 by Jongbok Yi for the UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies; originally published at Go-mang College, date unknown. (Complete edition, to be made available at UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, uma-tibet.org.)

“2011 TBRC bla brang” = rtags rigs kyi rnam bzhag nyung gsal legs bshad gser gyi phreng mdzes zhes bya ba bzhang so. Named because of being acquired by E. Gene Smith for the Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center in 2010 and added to TBRC in 2011; originally published in La-brang-tra-shi-khyil monastery, date unknown.

“co ne” = co ne bstan ’gyur. TBRC W1GS66030. co ne dgon chen: co ne, 1926.


“TBRC” = Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center (http://www.tbrc.org).
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2. OTHER WORKS

Katherine Rogers holds a B.A. in Religious Studies as well as an M.A. and a Ph.D. in Tibetan Buddhist Studies from the University of Virginia. She taught at Washington and Lee University as an Assistant Professor for two years.

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This book is a translation of the first section of Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s *Illuminating a Little the Presentation of Signs and Reasonings: Beautiful Golden Garland of Eloquence*, a textbook studied by beginners at the Gomang College of Drepung Monastery and at La-brang Tra-shi-khyil and their affiliated institutions throughout Inner Asia.

In their system, the student needs to develop a strong “path of reasoning”—a mind trained in valid knowledge—in order to pursue not only the academic path but also the path of meditation and self-transformation. The study of Signs and Reasonings plays an important role in the development of this path of reasoning, being an introduction to the fundamentals of logic, including syllogisms and their components, correct reasons (or “signs”) and how they come to be correct—able to induce in the debater or meditator new knowledge about something not formerly understood.

In this section of his work, Jam-yang-zhay-pa introduces the student to several of the basic concepts of correct reasoning, with a focus on laying the foundation for understanding the necessary relationship between the subject, predicate, and sign in the context of the generation of valid inferential knowledge, leading to direct perception of reality.