How Can a Conclusion Be Drawn from a Sign?

Jam-yang-shay-pa’s
Illuminating a Little the Presentation of Signs and Reasonings:
Beautiful Golden Garland of Eloquence, 1

Katherine M. Rogers

Edited by Jeffrey Hopkins

UMA INSTITUTE
FOR TIBETAN STUDIES
How Can a Conclusion Be Drawn from a Sign?
How Can a Conclusion
Be Drawn from a Sign?

Jam-yang-shay-pa’s
Illuminating a Little the Presentation
of Signs and Reasonings:
Beautiful Golden Garland
of Eloquence, 1

Katherine M. Rogers

Edited by Jeffrey Hopkins

UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies
uma-tibet.org
UMA Great Books Translation Project
Expanding Wisdom and Compassion
Through Study and Contemplation

Supported by generous grants from
Venerable Master Bup-an
Yeshe Khorlo Foundation
and a bequest from Daniel E. Perdue

Translating texts from the heritage of Tibetan and Inner Asian Buddhist systems, the project focuses on Great Indian Books and Tibetan commentaries from the Go-mang College syllabus as well as a related theme on the fundamental innate mind of clear light in Tantric traditions. A feature of the Project is the usage of consistent vocabulary and format throughout the translations.

Publications available online without cost under a Creative Commons License with the understanding that downloaded material must be distributed for free: http://uma-tibet.org. UMA stands for Union of the Modern and the Ancient (gsar rnying zung jug khang). The UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies is a non-profit 501(c)3 organization.

Mailing address:
UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies
4109 SE Howe St.
Milwaukee, Oregon 97222
USA

Original printing: May, 2017; version: April, 2020
Library of Congress Control Number:
I. Rogers, Katherine M. 1952-. II. How can a conclusion be drawn from a sign? jam-yang-shay-pa’s illuminating a little the presentation of signs and reasonings: beautiful golden garland of eloquence, 1.
Includes bibliographical references.

I. Lo-sang-gyal-tshan, 1966- II. Title.
Contents

Preface 7

Jam-yang-shay-pa 7
The Presentation of Signs and Reasonings 8
Editions consulted 9
Acknowledgement 10

Illuminating a Little the Presentation of Signs and Reasonings:
Beautiful Golden Garland of Eloquence 11

I. Explanation of the definitions of signs 15

II. Explanations of the divisions of signs 16

A. Explanation of correct signs 17

1. Explanation of the basis of relation of correct signs 17

a. Explanation of the basis of relation of the property of the subject, the subject sought to be known 17

1) Explanation of the definition of the flawless subject sought to be known 18

2) Explanation of illustrations of the flawless subject sought to be known 19

3) Explanation of the reasoning proving the flawless subject sought to be known 19

b. Explanation of the significance of the basis of relation of the entailment, along with its enumerations [the similar and dissimilar classes] 39

1) Explanation of the basis of relation of the entailment, the predicate of the probandum 39

A) Definitions 39
B) Divisions 41
C) Proofs 42

2) Explanation of the enumerations of the basis of relation of the entailment, the similar and dissimilar classes 47

A) Actual explanation of the enumerations of the basis of relation of the entailment, the similar and dissimilar classes 47

1’ Definitions of similar and dissimilar classes 47
2’ Divisions of dissimilar classes 49
(1) Dissimilar class that is nonexistent 49
(2) Dissimilar class that is other 50
(3) Dissimilar class that is contradictory 51

3’ Etymology and [fully qualified] usage of similar and
Contents

dissimilar classes 51
4 The reasoning proving the similar and dissimilar classes 58
B Ancillary, an explanation of similar and dissimilar
eamples 77
Bibliography of Works Cited 81
1. Works in Tibetan and Sanskrit 81
2. Other Works 86
Preface

JAM-YANG-SHAY-PA

Jam-yang-shay-pa Ngag-wang-tsön-drü\(^a\) was born in the northeastern Am-do Province of Tibet in the Earth-Mouse year of 1648 east of the Blue Lake.\(^b\) At the age of five he was blessed by the Fifth Dalai Lama, from whom he later received monastic vows. Having studied the alphabet at age seven with his uncle, who was a monk, he mastered reading and writing and six years later became a novice monk, excelling among his fellow students by his ability quickly to understand texts and disputations. He went to Lhasa at age twenty-one to further his studies at the Gomang College of Dre-pung Monastic University. Arriving in Lhasa in 1668, he offered a presentation scarf to an image of Mañjushrī in the Jo-khang Temple, where the statue reportedly favored the young scholar with a smile, due to which he became known as Jam-yang-shay-pa, “Smiled Upon by Mañjushrī.” Six years later he received full ordination and at twenty-nine entered Gyu-may Tantric College. From age thirty-three he spent two years in meditative retreat in a cave near Dre-pung.

At the age of thirty-eight in 1685 he published the first of his major works, Decisive Analysis of (Tsong-kha-pa’s) “Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive”: Storehouse of White Lapis-Lazuli of Scripture and Reasoning Free from Mistake, Fulfilling the Hopes of the Fortunate, commonly called Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive. In 1688 he published another of his great expositions, the Treatise on the Presentations of the Concentrative and Formless Absorptions: Adornment Beautifying the Subduer’s Teaching, Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning, Delighting the Fortunate, commonly called Great Exposition of the Concentrative and Formless Absorptions. He published the Root Text of Tenets: Lion’s Roar in 1689, and published the Great Exposition of Tenets—its prose auto-commentary—ten years later in 1699, and between those two, in 1695, he published the Decisive Analysis of (Chan-drakīrti’s) “Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle’”: 

\(^a\) ‘jam dbyangs bzhad pa ngag dbang brtson grus, 1648-1722. For a longer biography of Jam-yang-shay-pa see Derek F. Maher, “Knowledge and Authority in Tibetan Middle Way Schools of Buddhism: A Study of the Gelukha (dge lugs pa) Epistemology of Jamyang Shayba (‘jam dbyangs bzhad pa) In Its Historical Context” (Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, 2003), 169-196.

Treasury of Scripture and Reasoning, Thoroughly Illuminating the Profound Meaning [of Emptiness], Entrance for the Fortunate, also called the Great Exposition of the Middle.

At age fifty-three in 1700 he became abbot of Go-mang College and in 1709 at sixty-two returned to Am-do Province, where he founded a highly influential monastery at Tra-shi-khyil in 1710. Seven years later he founded a tantric college at the same place. He wrote prolifically on the full range of topics of a typical Tibetan polymath and, having received honors from the central Tibetan government and from the Chinese Emperor, died at the age of seventy-three or -four in 1721/2.

Partly because of the close connection between Go-mang College and the Mongolian peoples stretching from the Caspian Sea through Siberia, who were predominantly Ge-lug-pa by this time, Jam-yang-shay-pa’s influence on the Ge-lug-pa order has been considerable. His life manifests a pattern typical of many influential Tibetan religious figures—child prodigy, learned scholar, disseminator of the religion, politician, priest to political personages, monastery leader, yogi, magician, popular teacher, and prolific writer.

THE PRESENTATION OF SIGNS AND REASONINGS

The text translated here is the opening section of Jam-yang-shay-pa Ngag-wang-tson-drü’s Illuminating a Little the Presentation of Signs and Reasonings: Beautiful Golden Garland of Eloquence. Belonging to the debate-oriented decisive analysis (mtha’ dpyod) genre, it is an introductory textbook (yig cha) for the study of logic at the Go-mang Monastic College and at La-brang Tra-shi-khyil their affiliated institutions throughout Inner Asia. In the curriculum this aspect of study is followed by Jam-yang-shay-pa’s very lengthy decisive analysis of Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid Cognition” titled Decisive Analysis of the “Commentary on Valid Cognition” Fully Revealing the Path of Liberation: Hundreds of Blazing Lights of Valid Cognition.

Since their founding by Tsong-kha-pa in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, Ge-lug-pa monastic institutions, like those of other Tibetan orders, created their own systems of education. These often included

---
a  bkra shis ’khyil.
b  See Maher, “Knowledge and Authority in Tibetan Middle Way Schools of Buddhism,” 164.
c  ’jam dbyangs bzhad pa’i rdo rje ngag dbang brtson grus, 1648-1721/1722.
d  rtags rigs kyi rnam bzhag nyung gsal legs bshad gser gvi phreng mdzes.
a curriculum designed to enable the student to develop a “path of reasoning,” a consciousness trained in reasoned analysis until it can use analysis to realize initially the meaning of religious texts and eventually the true nature of reality. Reasoning is used to draw conclusions based on evidence, signs; and thus Jam-yang-shay-pa’s book begins with a definition of a correct sign, and then lays out illustrations, ingredients, divisions, how entailment operates, and so forth—all within the rubric of sometimes jaw-dropping challenges in the form of debates.

EDITIONS CONSULTED

Two basic editions of Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Illuminating a Little the Presentation of Signs and Reasonings: Beautiful Golden Garland of Eloquence were consulted:

1. chos thams cad rigs pas gtan la 'bebs pa'i gtan tshigs kyi rnam bzhag legs par bshad pa bzhugs so. Published at Go-mang College, Lhasa, Tibet, date unknown. Interlinear reference in the Tibetan text “[G##a/b].” Abbreviated reference: “2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa,” so named because of being acquired in Lhasa, Tibet, at Go-mang College in 2015 by Jongbok Yi for the UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies. This version was likely originally printed at Go-mang College, Lhasa, Tibet, during Jam-yang-shay-pa’s residence at Go-mang College. (To be made available at UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, uma-tibet.org.)

2. rtags rigs kyi rnam bzhag nyung gsal legs bshad gser gyi phreng mdzes zhes bya ba bzhugs so. TBRC W22186.14:176-304, which is a PDF of: bla brang bkra shis 'khyil: bla brang bkra shis 'khyil dgon, [n.d.]. Interlinear reference in the Tibetan text “[L##a/b].” Abbreviated reference: “2011 TBRC bla brang,” so named because of being acquired by E. Gene Smith for the Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center at the request of the UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies in 2010 and added to TBRC in 2011. This edition, which is a revision of the above edition, was originally printed in La-brang-tra-shi-khyil monastery founded by Jam-yang-shay-pa after his return to Am-do. It is the preferred edition, in general, though not always.

The digital Tibetan text of Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Presentation of Signs and Reasonings provided in this book was supplied by the Drepung Gomang Library of Go-mang College in Mundgod, Karnataka State, India. It has been edited in accordance with the “2011 TBRC bla brang” and the “2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa” editions as well as other sources.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I wish to acknowledge the strategic input of Lo-sang-gyal-tshan, a Ge-she of the Go-mang College of Dre-pung Monastic University, Mundgod, Karnataka State, India. In October, 2015, he assumed the position of Abbot of Go-mang College of Dre-pung Monastic University in Mundgod, India; he has worked with translators of the UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies since 2013, and also served a six-month term as Disciplinarian at the Tantric College of Lower Lhasa in Hunsur, India.
Illuminating a Little the Presentation of Signs and Reasonings: Beautiful Golden Garland of Eloquence

First in the series: Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Illuminating a Little the Presentation of Signs and Reasonings: Beautiful Golden Garland of Eloquence


Key to the colorization: In situations of debate the Tibetan text and the translation are highlighted in two colors: blue and red. Blue print presents what Jam-yang-shay-pa considers to be right positions, while red print presents what Jam-yang-shay-pa considers to be wrong positions. In the Tibetan, a turquoise background indicates material added in place of an ellipsis, and a magenta highlight sets off an ellipsis indicator when the elided part has been filled in.
Illuminating a Little the Presentation of Signs and Reasonings: Beautiful Golden Garland of Eloquence

Homage to the lamas and the Protector Mañjushrī

Concerning that, here with respect to explaining the presentation of reasons delineating all phenomena through reasoning, Dignāga’s Door to Valid Reasoning says:a

A reason is the three modes. What are the three modes? The property of the subject, definiteness as existent in just the similar class, and definiteness as just nonexistent in just the dissimilar class.

To explain the meaning of that, Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid Cognition” says:b

---

a Dignāga, tshad ma rigs par 'jug pa'i sgo zhes bya ba'i rab tu byed pa (nyāyapraveśa-nāma-pramāṇaprakarana), in bstan 'gyur (snar thang, 4473), TBRC W22704.183:370-379 (Narthang: [s.n.], [1800?]), 183b.6-183b.7.
b I.1ab; tshad ma rnam 'grel (pramāṇavārttikakārikā), in bstan 'gyur (sde dge, 4210), TBRC W23703.174:189-304 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 94b.3-4. The Sanskrit is found in Miyasaka (114.5): paksadhar-mas tadamśena vyāpto hetus.
A property of the subject pervaded by a factor [that is, the predicate] of that [position (phyogs, pakṣa)] is a [valid] reason.a

and Dharmakīrti’s Ascertainment of Valid Cognition says:b

Ascertained as existent in the object of inference and in what is similar to it [the object of inference],
And as nonexistent in the nonexistent [that is, what is without similarity to the object of inference].

and [Dharmakīrti’s Drop of Reasoning] says:c

The sign that is the three modes is ascertained as (1) just existent in that which is to be inferred, (2) just existent in just the similar class, and (3) just nonexistent in just the dissimilar class.

This has three parts: explanation of the definitions of signs, explanation of the divisions of signs, and explanation of the defects and good qualities of the three—sign, example, and property of the subject.

---

a g tão tshigs. That is to say, a [valid] reason is a property of the subject; it is pervaded by a factor [that is, the predicate] of that [position (phyogs, pakṣa)].
b tshad ma rnam par nges pa (pramāṇaviniścaya), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4211), TBRC W23703.174:305-462 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 168b.7.

Key to colorization: Blue print = right position. Red print = wrong position. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis; magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
I. EXPLANATION OF THE DEFINITIONS OF SIGNS

That which is set as a sign is the definition of sign. Whatever is selfless is necessarily a sign, because the horn of a rabbit is a sign. It follows that [horn of a rabbit is a sign] because horn of a rabbit is set as a sign.

1. Someone says: [That the horn of a rabbit is set as a sign] is not established.

Our response: It follows that with respect to the subject, horn of a rabbit, it is set as a sign because it is set as a sign in the syllogism, “The subject, sound, is impermanent because of being it [the horn of a rabbit].”

It follows [that with respect to the subject, horn of a rabbit, it is set as a sign in the syllogism, “The subject, sound, is impermanent because of being it (the horn of a rabbit)”] because there exists the syllogism, “The subject, sound, is impermanent because of being it [the horn of a rabbit].”

---

\(^{a}\) 2011 BDRC bla brang, 2a.3; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 1a.5.

Key to colorization: Blue print = right position. Red print = wrong position. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis; magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
follows [that there exists the syllogism, “The subject, sound, is impermanent because of being the horn of a rabbit,”] because of being selfless.

That which is set as a sign in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product, is the definition of sign in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product. Whatever is selfless is not necessarily that [which is set as a sign in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product] because whatever is that [which is set as a sign in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product] is necessarily one with product.

II. EXPLANATIONS OF THE DIVISIONS OF SIGNS

This has two parts: explanation of correct signs and explanation of facsimiles of signs.

---

a Lo-sang-gyal-tshan indicated that su bskod pa might be omitted during oral debate.
A. EXPLANATION OF CORRECT SIGNS

This has three parts: explanation of the basis of relation of correct signs, explanation of the definition of correct sign, and explanation of the division of correct signs.

1. Explanation of the basis of relation of correct signs

This has two parts: (1) explanation of the basis of relation of the property of the subject, the subject sought to be known, and (2) explanation of the significance of the basis of relation of the entailment, along with its enumerations [the similar and dissimilar classes].

a. Explanation of the basis of relation of the property of the subject, the subject sought to be known

Key to colorization: Blue print = right position. Red print = wrong position. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis; magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
This has three parts: explanation of the definition of the flawless subject sought to be known, explanation of illustrations of the flawless subject sought to be known, and explanation of the reasoning proving the flawless subject sought to be known.

1) EXPLANATION OF THE DEFINITION OF THE FLAWLESS SUBJECT SOUGHT TO BE KNOWN

That observed as a common locus of (1) its being held as the subject in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product, and also of (2) there occurring a person who, having ascertained it [sound] as a product by valid cognition, is engaged in wanting to know whether it is impermanent is the definition of the [flawless] subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product.

The three:
1. the subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product,
2. the basis of debate in the proof of [sound as impermanent by the sign, product, and]
3. the basis of inference in the proof of [sound as impermanent by the sign, product,]
are equivalent.

2) EXPLANATION OF ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE
FLAWLESS SUBJECT SOUGHT TO BE KNOWN

Sound is an illustration of that [flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent]. Opposite from not being sound and object of hearing are not, individually, [an illustration of the flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent].

3) EXPLANATION OF THE REASONING PROVING
THE FLAWLESS SUBJECT SOUGHT TO BE KNOWN

With respect to the subject, object of knowledge, it follows that those two [opposite from not being sound and object of hearing] are not [individually] the subject sought to be known in the proof of [sound as impermanent] because, not only are [opposite from not being sound and object of hearing] both not [individually] the flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent, they are also not [individually] even the subject in proof of [sound as impermanent].
2. **Someone says**: [The sign which is that not only are those two—opposite from not being sound and object of hearing—not (individually) the flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent, they are also not even the subject in that proof] is not established.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, opposite from not being sound, is the flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as a positive phenomenon because (1) [according to you] it is the flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent and (2) there exists a correct sign proving sound as a positive phenomenon.

If you accept [that opposite from not being sound is the flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as a positive phenomenon], it [absurdly] follows that the subject, opposite from not being sound, is a positive phenomenon because of being the flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as a positive phenomenon.

---

*a* 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 3a.2; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 2b.3.

*Key to colorization: Blue print = right position. Red print = wrong position. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis; magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.*
known in the proof of sound as a positive phenomenon.

You cannot accept [that opposite from not being sound is a positive phenomenon] because of [its] being a negative phenomenon.

If you [incorrectly say that the sign which is that opposite from not being sound is a negative phenomenon] is not established, [our own position is] it follows that with respect to the subject, sound, opposite from not being it [sound] is a negative phenomenon because something that is it [sound] exists.

Furthermore, it follows that the subject, opposite from not being sound, is not the flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as a positive phenomenon because of being the property of the subject in that proof. [Being the property of the subject in the proof of sound as a positive phenomenon] entails [not being the flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as a positive phenomenon] because whatever is any one of the nine nonestablished reasons in a given proof must not be the property of the subject in that proof.
It follows [that whatever is any one of the nine nonestablished reasons in a given proof must not be the property of the subject in that proof] because Dharmakīrti's Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Valid Cognition" says:a

A subject that has become the actual reason
Is not established as a means of knowing.

[This statement] entails [that whatever is any one of the nine nonestab-
lished reasons in a given proof must not be the property of the subject in
that proof] because “subject” indicates the basis of debate; “actual reason” is
explained as the basis of debate at the time of being set as the sign or at
the time of becoming the entity of the reason; “means of knowing” is ex-
plained as that reason being set in that way; “because not established” is
explained as the two—the basis of debate and the sign set in that way—
being “a reason that is not established due to a lack of difference between
the basis [of debate] and the sign.”

---

a tshad ma rnam 'grel (pramāṇavārttikārikā), in bstan 'gyur (sde dge, 4210), TBRC W23703.174:189-304 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 146b.2.
Furthermore, it follows that [according to you] the subject, object of hearing, is the flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as a definiendum because (1) it is the subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent and (2) there exists a correct sign in the proof of sound as a definiendum.

You have explicitly asserted the first sign [which is that object of hearing is the subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent].

The second [sign which is that there exists a correct sign in the proof of sound as a definiendum] follows because triply qualified imputed existent is [a correct sign in the proof of sound as a definiendum].

It follows [that triply qualified imputed existent is a correct sign in the proof of sound as a definiendum] because [triply qualified imputed existent] is a correct sign proving solely the convention in the proof of [sound...]

Key to colorization: Blue print = right position. Red print = wrong position. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis; magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
as a definiendum].

If you accept [that object of hearing is the flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as a definiendum], then it [absurdly] follows that object of hearing is a definiendum because of being the flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as a definiendum.

You cannot accept [that object of hearing is a definiendum] because of [its] being a definition.

Furthermore, it follows that the subject, object of hearing, is not the flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent because of being the property of the subject in the proof of [sound as impermanent]. It follows [that object of hearing is the property of the subject in the proof of sound as impermanent] because it [object of hearing] is, from among the nine reasons that are the property of the subject in the proof of [sound as impermanent], an uncommon indefinite reason. It follows [that object of hearing is an uncommon indefinite reason in the proof of sound as impermanent] because Dignāga’s Wheel of Reasonings says:

In the center, an uncommon indefinite [reason].

---

a gtan tshigs kyi 'khor lo gtan la dbab pa (hetucaakraḍamara), in bstan 'gyur (sde dge, 4209, TBRC W23703.174:187-188 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa chödhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 93a.4.

Key to colorization: Blue print = right position. Red print = wrong position. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis; magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
3. Someone says. It follows that the subject, momentary, is that which is held as the explicit predicate of the probandum in the proof of sound as impermanent because of being that which is held as the explicit predicate of the probandum in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product.

Our response: [Being that which is held as the explicit predicate of the probandum in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product,] does not entail [being that which is held as the explicit predicate of the probandum in the proof of sound as impermanent].

---

a 2011 TBRC bla brang, 4a.2; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 3b.1.

Key to colorization: Blue print = right position. Red print = wrong position. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis; magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
Well then, for you it [absurdly] follows that whatever is that which is held as the explicit predicate of the probandum in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product, must be that which is held as the explicit predicate of the probandum in the proof of sound as impermanent because whatever is a correct sign in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product, must be a correct sign in the proof of sound as impermanent.

The three spheres [of self-contradiction]!

If you [incorrectly] accept [that momentary is that which is held as the explicit predicate of the probandum in the proof of sound as impermanent, our own position is] it follows that the subject, momentary is not that which is held as the explicit predicate of the probandum in the proof of sound as impermanent because of being a correct sign in the proof of sound as impermanent. It follows [that momentary is a correct sign in the proof of sound as impermanent] because of being a correct sign proving solely the convention in that proof. It follows [that momentary is a correct sign proving solely the convention in the proof of sound as impermanent] because it [momentary] is the definition of impermanent.
4. Someone says: Momentary is not that which is held as the explicit predicate of the probandum in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product.

Our response: It follows that momentary is that which is held as the explicit predicate of the probandum in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product, because there exist both a definition and a definiendum which are individually that which is held as the explicit predicates of the probandum in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product.

It follows [that there exist both a definition and a definiendum which are individually that which is held as the explicit predicates of the probandum in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product] be-

\[L4b\]

Key to colorization: Blue print = right position. Red print = wrong position. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis; magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
cause product is a correct sign proving both the meaning and the expression in the proof of sound as impermanent. It follows [that product is a correct sign proving both the meaning and the expression in the proof of sound as impermanent] because there exists that which is a correct sign proving both the meaning and the expression in that proof, because Dhar-makīrti’s *Ascertainment of Valid Cognition* says:\(^a\)

Both the nonobservation of the cause and of the pervader are also reasonings.

and Dharmottara’s *Logicality* [his *Commentary on (Dharmakīrti’s) “Ascertainment of Valid Cognition”*] says:\(^b\)

Through the nonobservation of cause and pervader, both non-thing and the convention of non-thing are understood.

\(^a\) tshad ma rnam par nges pa (pramāṇaviṇīcaya) in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4211), TBRC W23703.174:305-462 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 187a.5.

\(^b\) pramāṇaviṇīcayaṭīkā, tshad ma rnam par nges pa’i ’gre lshad (’had ldan), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4229), TBRC W23703.188:4-579 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 288b.4.

Key to colorization: Blue print = right position. Red print = wrong position. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis; magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
Furthermore, according to some, opposite from not being impermanent is that which is held as the explicit predicate of the probandum in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product.

5. Others say.\(^{a}\) It follows that product is a correct sign of a negative phenomenon in the proof of sound as impermanent because there exists a common locus of (1) being that which is held as the explicit predicate of the probandum in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product, and (2) being a negative phenomenon.

Our response: [There existing a common locus of (1) being that which is held as the explicit predicate of the probandum in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product, and (2) being a negative phenomenon] does not entail [that product is a correct sign of a negative phenomenon in the proof of sound as impermanent.]

If you [incorrectly] accept [that product is a correct sign of a negative phenomenon in the proof of sound as impermanent,] then it [absurdly] fol-

\(^{a}\) 2011 TBRC bla brang, 4b.5; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 4a.1.

Key to colorization: Blue print = right position. Red print = wrong position. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis; magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
lows that the subject, product, is not a correct sign of a positive phenomenon in the proof of sound as impermanent because of being a correct sign of a negative phenomenon in that proof, [according to you]. It [absurdly] follows [that product is a correct sign of a negative phenomenon in the proof of sound as impermanent] because there exists a common locus of (1) being that which is held as the explicit predicate of the probandum in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product, and (2) being a negative phenomenon.

It follows [that there exists a common locus of (1) being that which is held as the explicit predicate of the probandum in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product, and (2) being a negative phenomenon] because impermanent is that [common locus of (1) being that which is held as the explicit predicate of the probandum in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product, and (2) being a negative phenomenon]. It follows [that impermanent is a common locus of (1) being that which is held as the explicit predicate of the probandum in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product, and (2) being a negative phenomenon] because impermanent is a negative phenomenon. It follows [that impermanent is an affirming negative phenomenon] because the ways—in which the terms for emptiness and impermanent are negative words—are similar.

[It follows that the ways—in which the terms for emptiness and im-
permanent are negative words—are similar] because Dharmakīrti’s *Auto-
commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid Cognition” says.*

With respect to the terms “emptiness,” “impermanence,” and so forth, the conventions are made upon having eliminated superimposed aspects in a way similar to how awarenesses imputing them do this.

If you [incorrectly] accept the root [consequence which is that product is a correct sign of a negative phenomenon in the proof of sound as impermanent, our own position is] it follows that the subject, product, is not a

---

*a tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi 'grel pa (pramāṇavārttikavṛtti) in bstan 'gyur (sde dge, 4216), TBRC W23703.174:523-732 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 299b.6.*
correct sign of a negative phenomenon in the proof of sound as impermanent because of being a correct sign of a positive phenomenon in the proof of [sound as impermanent]. It follows [that product is a correct sign of a positive phenomenon in the proof of sound as impermanent] because of being a correct nature sign in the proof of [sound as impermanent]. [Being a correct nature sign in the proof of sound as impermanent] entails [being a correct sign of a positive phenomenon in that proof] because whatever is either of the two, a correct effect or a correct nature sign in the proof of [sound as impermanent], must not be a sign of a negative phenomenon in that proof because Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid Cognition” says:a

Concerning that, two are proofs of [effective] things; one is a reason of a negative phenomenon.

---

a This quotation is actually from the Auto-Commentary, tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi 'grel pa (pramāṇavārttikavṛtti) in bstan 'gyur (sde dge, 4216), TBRC W23703.174:523-732 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 262a.6.

Key to colorization: Blue print = right position. Red print = wrong position. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
6. Someone says: If there exists a subject in a proof, then there necessarily exists a flawless subject sought to be known in that proof.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that there exists a flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as sound because there exists a subject in the proof of sound as sound.

If you [incorrectly say that the sign which is that there exists a subject in the proof of sound as sound] is not established, [our own position is] it follows that with respect to the subject, sound, there exists a subject in the proof of it [sound] as sound because it exists.

If you [incorrectly say that its existing] does not entail [that there exists a subject in the proof of sound as it], our own position is] it follows that with respect to the subject, sound, if it exists, then there necessarily exists a subject in the proof of it as sound because it is selfless.

If you [incorrectly] accept [that there exists a flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as sound], then it [absurdly] follows that there exists a person who, having ascertained sound by valid cognition, is

---

a 2011 TBRC bla brang, 5a.6; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 4a.6.

Key to colorization: Blue print = right position. Red print = wrong position. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis; magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
doubting whether sound is or is not sound because [according to you] sound is the flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as sound. You cannot accept [that there exists a person who, having ascertained sound by valid cognition, is wondering whether sound is sound] because any person who has ascertained sound by valid cognition must be a person who has ascertained sound as sound by valid cognition.

7. Someone says: If there exists a flawless subject sought to be known in a proof, then there necessarily exits a property of the subject in that proof. 

Our response: Well then, it [absurdly] follows that there exists a property of the subject in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, sound, because there exists a flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, sound. It follows [that there exists a flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, sound] because sound is the flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, sound. It follows [that sound is the flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, sound] because (1) sound is held as the basis of debate in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, sound, and (2) there exists a person who, having ascertained sound as sound by valid cognition, is engaged in wanting to know whether sound is impermanent.

---

a 2011 TBRC bla brang, 5b.3; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 4b.2.

Key to colorization: Blue print = right position. Red print = wrong position. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis; magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
If you [incorrectly say that] the first [sign which is that sound is held as the basis of debate in the syllogism, “The subject, sound, is impermanent because of being a sound,”] is not established, [our own position is] it follows that with respect to the subject, object of knowledge, sound is held as the basis of debate in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, sound, because sound is held as the basis of debate in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, sound.

If you [incorrectly say that] the sign which is that sound is held as the basis of debate in the syllogism, “The subject, sound, is impermanent because of being a sound,”] is not established, [our own position is] it follows
that with respect to the subject, sound, it is held as the basis of debate in the syllogism, “The subject, it [sound], is impermanent because of being it [sound],” because there exists a syllogism, “The subject, it [sound], is impermanent because of being it [sound].” It follows [that with respect to the subject, sound, there exists a syllogism, “The subject, it (sound), is impermanent because of being it (sound),”] because of being selfless.

If you [incorrectly say that] the second sign [which is that there exists a person who, having ascertained sound as sound by valid cognition, is engaged in wanting to know whether sound is impermanent] is not established, [our own position is] it follows that there exists a person who, having ascertained sound as sound by valid cognition, is engaged in wanting to know whether sound is impermanent because a full-fledged opponent in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product, is that [person, who, having ascertained sound as sound by valid cognition, is engaged in wanting to know whether sound is impermanent]. It follows [that a full-fledged opponent in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product, is that person, who, having ascertained sound as sound by valid cognition, is engaged in wanting to know whether sound is impermanent] because of being a person who, having ascertained by valid cognition that sound is a product, is engaged in wanting to know whether sound is impermanent. It follows [that a full-fledged opponent in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product, is a person who, having ascertained by valid cognition that sound is a product, is engaged in wanting to know whether sound is impermanent] because of being such a full-fledged opponent [who, having ascertained by valid cognition that sound is a product, is engaged in wanting to know whether sound is impermanent].
If you [incorrectly] accept the root [consequence which is that there exists a property of the subject in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, sound, our own position is] it follows that sound is not the property of the subject in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, sound, because [sound] is the basis of debate in the proof of [sound as impermanent by the sign, sound]. [Sound’s being the basis of debate in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product,] entails [that sound is not the property of the subject in that proof] because when a phenomenon is both the basis of debate and the sign in the proof of that phenomenon as that basis [of debate], then in that case, that phenomenon must be a nonestablished reason due to there being no difference between the basis of debate and the sign in that proof.

It follows [that when a phenomenon is both the basis of debate and the sign in a given proof, then, in that case, that phenomenon must be a nonestablished reason due to there being no difference between the basis of

Key to colorization: Blue print = right position. Red print = wrong position. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis; magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
debate and the sign in that proof] because there exists a meaning of Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid Cognition” which says:

A subject that has become the actual reason
Is not established as a means of knowing
Because for all things there is no way
Of dividing [them] into property [of the subject] and subject.

---

a tsad ma rnam 'grel (pramāṇavārttikākārikā), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4210), TBRC W23703.174:189-304 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 146b.2.
b. Explanation of the significance of the basis of relation of the entailment, along with its enumerations [the similar and dissimilar classes]

This has two parts: (1) explanation of the basis of relation of the entailment, the predicate of the probandum, and (2) explanation of the enumerations of the basis of relation of the entailment, the similar and dissimilar classes.

1) EXPLANATION OF THE BASIS OF RELATION OF THE ENTAILMENT, THE PREDICATE OF THE PROBANDUM

This has three parts: definitions, divisions, and proofs.

A) DEFINITIONS

That which is held as the predicate of the probandum is the definition of predicate of the probandum.

Key to colorization: Blue print = right position. Red print = wrong position. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis; magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
Whatever is selfless is necessarily a predicate of the probandum because horn of a rabbit is a predicate of the probandum. It follows that [horn of a rabbit is a predicate of the probandum] because [horn of a rabbit] is that which is held as the predicate of the probandum. It follows that [horn of a rabbit is that which is held as the predicate of the probandum] because [horn of a rabbit] is that which is held as the predicate of the probandum in the proof of sound as the horn of a rabbit.

If you [incorrectly say that the sign which is that horn of a rabbit is that which is held as the predicate of the probandum in the proof of sound as the horn of a rabbit] is not established, [our own position is] it follows that with respect to the subject, horn of a rabbit, it is that which is held as the predicate of the probandum in the proof of sound as it because it is selfless.

That which is held as the predicate of the probandum in the proof of sound as impermanent is the definition of predicate of the probandum in the proof of sound as impermanent.
When [the predicate of the probandum] is divided from the viewpoint of types of terminological expression, there are two, the explicit predicate of the probandum and the implicit predicate of the probandum in a given proof.

That which is held as the explicit predicate of the probandum in a given proof is the definition of the explicit predicate of the probandum in a given proof. “Impermanent” is an illustration of [the explicit predicate of the probandum in a given proof].

That which is held as the implicit predicate of the probandum in a given proof is the definition of the implicit predicate of the probandum in a given proof. “Momentary” is an illustration of [the implicit predicate of the probandum in a given proof].

Key to colorization: Blue print = right position. Red print = wrong position. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis; magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
C) PROOFS

8. Someone says: A not being permanent is that which is held as the implicit predicate of the probandum in the proof of sound as impermanent.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, [not being permanent], is that which is held as the predicate of the probandum in the proof of [sound as impermanent] because of being that which is held as the implicit predicate of the probandum in the proof of [sound as impermanent].

If you [incorrectly] accept [that not being permanent is that which is held as the predicate of the probandum in the proof of sound as impermanent], it [absurdly] follows that the subject [not being permanent] is that which is held as the explicit predicate of the probandum of a correct sign in the proof of sound as impermanent because you accepted [that not being permanent is that which is held as the predicate of the probandum in the proof (of sound as impermanent)].

---

a 2011 TBRC bla brang, 6b.6; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 5a.7.

Key to colorization: Blue print = right position. Red print = wrong position. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis; magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
If you [incorrectly] accept [that not being permanent is that which is held as the explicit predicate of the probandum of a correct sign in the proof of sound as impermanent], it [absurdly] follows that if it [not being permanent] is that which is held as the explicit predicate of the probandum of a correct sign in the proof of sound as not being permanent by the sign of a given phenomenon, then [not being permanent] must be that which is held as the explicit predicate of the probandum of a correct sign in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign of that [same] phenomenon because you [incorrectly] accepted [that not being permanent is that which is held as the explicit predicate of the probandum of a correct sign in the proof of sound as impermanent].

If you [incorrectly] accept [that if not being permanent is that which is held as the explicit predicate of the probandum of a correct sign in the proof of sound as not being permanent by the sign of a given phenomenon, then it follows that not being permanent must be that which is held as the explicit predicate of the probandum of a correct sign in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign of that same phenomenon], it [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, not being permanent, it is that which is held as the explicit predicate of the probandum of a correct sign in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign of not being the common locus of phenomenon and the nonmomentary because [according to you] it is that which is held as the explicit predicate of the probandum of a correct sign in the proof of sound as not being permanent by the sign of not being the common locus of phenomenon and the nonmomentary.

If you [incorrectly] accept [that not being permanent is that which is
held as the explicit predicate of the probandum of a correct sign in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign of not being the common locus of phenomenon and the nonmomentary, it [absurdly] follows that there exists that which is held as the explicit predicate of the probandum of a correct sign in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign of not being the common locus of phenomenon and the nonmomentary because [according to you] not being permanent is [that which is held as the explicit predicate of the probandum of a correct sign in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign of not being the common locus of phenomenon and the nonmomentary].

Key to colorization: Blue print = right position. Red print = wrong position. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis; magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
You cannot accept [that there exists that which is held as the explicit predicate of the probandum of a correct sign in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign of not being the common locus of phenomenon and the nonmomentary] because the forward pervasion in the proof of [sound as impermanent by the sign of not being the common locus of phenomenon and the nonmomentary] is not established. [The forward pervasion in that proof is: Whatever is not the common locus of phenomenon and the nonmomentary is necessarily impermanent.]

If you say that [the sign which is that the forward pervasion in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign of not being the common locus of phenomenon and the momentary is not established] is not established, then it [absurdly] follows that the subject, horn of a rabbit, is impermanent because of not being the common locus of phenomenon and the nonmomentary.

If you say that [the sign which is that horn of a rabbit is not the common locus of phenomenon and the nonmomentary] is not established then it [absurdly] follows that the subject, horn of a rabbit, is a phenomenon because of being the common locus of phenomenon and the nonmomentary.

You cannot accept [that horn of a rabbit is a phenomenon] because [horn of a rabbit] is definitely nonexistent.

*Key to colorization: Blue print = right position. Red print = wrong position. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis; magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.*
That which is held as the predicate of the probandum in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product is the definition of predicate of the probandum in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product.

When [predicate of the probandum in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product] is divided, there are the two, explicit predicate of the probandum and implicit predicate of the probandum in the proof [of sound as impermanent by the sign, product]. The first [explicit predicate of the probandum in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product] is [either] impermanent or momentary. The second [implicit predicate of the probandum in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product] is opposite from not being [either of] those two [that is, opposite from not being impermanent and opposite from not being momentary].
2) **EXPLANATION OF THE ENUMERATIONS OF THE BASIS OF RELATION OF THE ENTAILMENT, THE SIMILAR AND DISSIMILAR CLASSES**

This has two parts: the actual explanation and, ancillary, an explanation of similar and dissimilar examples.

**A) ACTUAL EXPLANATION OF THE ENUMERATIONS OF THE BASIS OF RELATION OF THE ENTAILMENT, THE SIMILAR AND DISSIMILAR CLASSES**

This has four parts: explanations of the definitions [of similar and dissimilar classes], the divisions [of dissimilar classes], the etymology and [fully qualified] usage [of similar and dissimilar classes], and the reasoning proving [similar and dissimilar classes].

1’ Definitions of similar and dissimilar classes

That which is not empty of the predicate of the probandum, in accordance with the mode of proof, in a given proof is the definition of similar
class in that proof.
Furthermore, there are two [types of similar class], those using an “is” statement and those using an “exists” statement.

That which is not empty of the predicate of the probandum, in accordance with the mode of proof, in the proof of sound as impermanent is the definition of similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent.

The two, [similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent] and impermanent, are equivalent.

In the context of an of an “exists” statement, that which is in the similar class [that is to say, is a member of the similar class] in a given proof is not necessarily equivalent to that which goes as the predicate of the probandum in that proof because smoke is not fire.

There are two modes of statement, that is to say, two ways of stating a syllogism: the copulative and the ontological. (1) The copulative mode is an “is” statement using the linking form of the verb “to be” and (2) the ontological mode can be either an “exists” statement using the verb “to exist” or an “is” statement using the ontological form of the verb “to be” as in “there is a cat in the backyard.” The syllogism, “The subject, sound, is impermanent because of being a product” is in the copulative mode: sound must be ascertained as being impermanent and being a product. The syllogism, “With respect to the subject, on a smoky pass, fire exists, because smoke exists” is in the ontological mode: smoke must be ascertained as existing on the smoky pass, and fire must be ascertained as existing on the smoky pass.

Key to colorization: Blue print = right position. Red print = wrong position. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis; magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
That which is empty of the predicate of the probandum, in accordance with the mode of proof, in the proof of [sound as impermanent] is the definition of dissimilar class in the proof of [sound as impermanent].

The two, [dissimilar class in the proof of sound as impermanent] and not being impermanent, are equivalent.

2’ Divisions of dissimilar classes

This has three parts: (1) dissimilar class that is nonexistent in a given proof, (2) dissimilar class that is other in a given proof, and (3) dissimilar class that is contradictory in a given proof. Horn of a rabbit is the first [a dissimilar class that is nonexistent]. Object of knowledge is the second [a dissimilar class that is other], and permanent is the third [a dissimilar class that is contradictory].

(1) Dissimilar class that is nonexistent
It follows that the subject, horn of a rabbit, is a dissimilar class that is nonexistent in the proof of [sound as impermanent] because of (1) being the dissimilar class in that proof and (2) being nonexistent. Both [parts of the] sign [which is that horn of a rabbit is the dissimilar class in that proof and is nonexistent] are established because [horn of a rabbit] is definitely nonexistent.

(2) Dissimilar class that is other

It follows that the subject, object of knowledge, is a dissimilar class that is other in the proof of [sound as impermanent] because of (1) being the dissimilar class in that proof and (2) being other than impermanent. The first [part of the sign which is that object of knowledge is the dissimilar class in the proof of sound as impermanent] is established because [object of knowledge] is permanent. The second [part of the sign which is that object of knowledge is other than impermanent] is established because [object of knowledge] is a phenomenon that is not impermanent.
(3) Dissimilar class that is contradictory

It follows that the subject, permanent, is a dissimilar class that is contradictory in the proof of [sound as impermanent] because of (1) being the dissimilar class in that proof and (2) being contradictory with impermanent. Both [parts of the] sign [which are that permanent is the dissimilar class in that proof and contradictory with impermanent] are established because [permanent] is one with permanent.

3’ Etymology and [fully qualified] usage of similar and dissimilar classes

There exist three possibilities with respect to the etymology and [fully qualified] usage of similar class in a given proof because there exist the three:

1. The possibility of being [a member of] the similar class in a given proof and of existing in accordance with the etymological explanation of similar class in that proof.

2. The possibility of being [a member of] the similar class in a given proof and of not existing in accordance with the etymological explanation of similar class in that proof.

3. The possibility of neither being [a member of the similar class nor existing in accordance with the etymological explanation of similar class in a given proof].

Key to colorization: Blue print = right position. Red print = wrong position. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis; magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
The first [part of the reason which is that there exists the possibility of being a member of the similar class in a given proof and of existing in accordance with the etymological explanation of similar class in that proof] is established because pot is that [possibility—that is, pot is a member of the similar class in a given proof and exists in accordance with the etymological explanation of similar class in that proof]. It follows [that pot is that possibility—that is, pot is a member of the similar class in a given proof and exists in accordance with the etymological explanation of similar class in that proof] because, pot is [a member of] the similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent, for one, and exists in accordance with the etymological explanation of similar class in that proof.

If you [incorrectly say that] the first [part of the sign which is that pot is a member of the similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent] is not established, [our own position is] it follows that the subject, pot, is [a
member of] the similar class in the proof of [sound as impermanent] be-
cause of being impermanent.

The second [part of the sign which is that pot exists in accordance with
the etymological explanation of similar class in the proof of sound as im-
permanent] is established because the two, it [pot] and sound, are qualita-
tively similar in being impermanent. It follows [that pot and sound are
qualitatively similar in being impermanent] because the two, sound and it
[pot], are impermanent.

The second [part of the root reason which is that there exits the possi-
bility of being a member of the similar class in a given proof and of not
existing in accordance with the etymological explanation of similar class
in that proof] is established because uncompounded space is [a member
of] the similar class in the proof of sound as permanent, for one, and does
not exist in accordance with the etymological explanation of similar class
in that proof.

Key to colorization: Blue print = right position. Red print = wrong position. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight =
material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
The first [part of the sign which is that uncompounded space is a member of the similar class in the proof of sound as permanent] is established because [uncompounded space] is permanent.

The second [part of the sign which is that uncompounded space does not exist in accordance with the etymological explanation of similar class in the proof of sound as permanent] is established because the two, it [uncompounded space] and sound, are not qualitatively similar in being permanent because it [uncompounded space] is permanent, for one, and sound is impermanent.

The third [part of the root reason which is that there exists the possibility of neither being a member of the similar class nor existing in accordance with the etymological explanation of similar class in a given proof] is easy [to prove].

There also exist three possibilities with regard to the etymological explanation of dissimilar class in a given proof because there exist the three:

1. The possibility of being [a member of] the dissimilar class in a given proof and of existing in accordance with the etymological explanation of dissimilar class in that proof.

2. The possibility of not being [a member of] the dissimilar class in a given proof and of existing in accordance with the etymological explanation of dissimilar class in that proof.

3. The possibility of neither being [a member of the dissimilar class] nor [existing in accordance with the etymological explanation of dissimilar class in a given proof].

Key to colorization: Blue print = right position. Red print = wrong position. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis; magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
The first [sign which is that there exists the possibility of being a member of the dissimilar class and existing in accordance with the etymological explanation of dissimilar class in a given proof] is established because pot is that [possibility—that is, pot is a member of the dissimilar class and exists in accordance with the etymological explanation of dissimilar class in a given proof]. It follows that pot is that [possibility—that is, pot is a member of the dissimilar class and exists in accordance with the etymological explanation of dissimilar class in a given proof] because [pot] is [a member of] the dissimilar class in the proof of [sound as permanent], for one, and [pot] exists in accordance with the etymological explanation of dissimilar class in that proof.

If you [incorrectly say that] the first [part of the sign which is that pot is a member of the dissimilar class in the proof of sound as permanent] is not established, [our own position is] it follows that the subject, pot, is [a member of] the dissimilar class in the proof of [sound as permanent] because of being impermanent.
The second [part of the sign which is that pot exists in accordance with the etymological explanation of dissimilar class in the proof of sound as permanent] is established because the two, it [pot] and sound, are not qualitatively similar in being permanent because the two, sound and it [pot], are impermanent.

The second [part of] the root reason [which is that there exists the possibility of not being a member of the dissimilar class and of existing in accordance with the etymological explanation of dissimilar class in a given proof] is established because [uncompounded] space [is that possibility—not being a member of the dissimilar class and existing in accordance with the etymological explanation of dissimilar class in a given proof]. It follows [uncompounded space is not a member of the dissimilar class and exists in accordance with the etymological explanation of dissimilar class in a given proof] because [uncompounded space] is not [a member of] the dissimilar class in the proof of [sound as permanent], for one, and exists in accordance with the etymological explanation of dissimilar class in the proof [of sound as permanent].
If you [incorrectly say that] the first [part of the sign which is that uncompounded space is not a member of the dissimilar class in the proof of sound as permanent] is not established, [our own position is] it follows that the subject [uncompounded space] is not [a member of] the dissimilar class in the proof of [sound as permanent] because of being [a member of] the similar class in that proof. It follows [that uncompounded space is a member of the similar class in the proof of sound as permanent] because of being permanent.

If you [incorrectly say that] the second [part of the sign which is that uncompounded space exists in accordance with the etymological explanation of dissimilar class in the proof of sound as permanent] is not established, [our own position is] it follows that the subject [uncompounded space] exists in accordance with the etymological explanation of dissimilar class in the proof of [sound as permanent] because the two, it [uncompounded space] and [sound], are not qualitatively similar in being permanent. It follows that [the two, it (uncompounded space) and sound, are not qualitatively similar in being permanent] because, (1) it [uncompounded space] is permanent, and (2) sound is impermanent.

The third [part of the root sign which is that there exists the possibility...
of neither being a member of the dissimilar class nor existing in accordance with the etymological explanation of dissimilar class in a given proof—is easy [to prove].

With respect to the explanation of whether or not similar and dissimilar classes are explicitly contradictory, although similar class is explicitly contradictory with dissimilar class, dissimilar class is not explicitly contradictory with similar class because dissimilar class does not exist.

4’ The reasoning proving the similar and dissimilar classes

9. Someone says: a It follows that the subject, pot, is the similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent because of being impermanent. If you accept [that pot is the similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent], then it follows that the subject, [pot,] is the “class” in the phrase “similar class in the proof of [sound as impermanent]” because of being the similar class in that proof.

---

a 2011 TBRC bla brang, 9b.1; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 7a.3.

Key to colorization: Blue print = right position. Red print = wrong position. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis; magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
Our response: [Being the similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent] does not entail [being the “class” in the phrase “similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent.”]

If you [incorrectly] accept [that pot is the “class” in the phrase “similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent”] it [absurdly] follows that the subject, pot, is the predicate of the probandum in the proof of sound as impermanent because of being the “class” in the phrase “similar class in the proof of [sound as impermanent].”

[Being the “class” in the phrase “similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent”] entails [being the predicate of the probandum in that proof] because taking “class” in the phrase “similar class in the proof of [sound as impermanent]” as the predicate of the probandum in that proof, from between the two ways [of stating the predicate of the probandum]—in terms of an “is statement” and in terms of an “exists statement”—if it is in terms of an “is statement,” those that are similar to [the predicate of the probandum] are called “the similar class” and if it is in terms of an “exists statement,” those that are similar to [the predicate of the probandum] in existing in [the predicate of the probandum] are called “the similar class.”

Key to colorization: Blue print = right position. Red print = wrong position. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis; magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
That the reason is so follows because Dignāga’s *Aphorisms on Valid Cognition* [his *Compilation of Valid Cognition*] says:

- Existent in the object of inference and in what is similar to [the object of inference].
- Nonexistent in just the nonexistent [that is, nonexistent in just what is without similarity to the object of inference].

And the *Autocommentary* says:

“Class” moreover is the predicate of the probandum.

Furthermore, [according to you] it [absurdly] follows that the subject, pot, is the predicate of the probandum in the proof of sound as impermanent because of being the “class” in the phrase “similar class in the proof of [sound as impermanent].” [Being the “class” in the phrase “similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent,” entails being the predicate of the probandum in the proof of sound as impermanent] because “class” in the phrase “similar class in the proof of [sound as impermanent]” is taken as the predicate of the probandum in that proof.
It follows [that “class” in the phrase “similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent” is taken as the predicate of the probandum in the proof of sound as impermanent] because “class” in the phrase “product is existent or nonexistent in the similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent” is taken as the predicate of the probandum in the proof of [sound as impermanent]. It follows that [“class” in the phrase “product is existent or nonexistent in the similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent” is taken as the predicate of the probandum in the proof of sound as impermanent] because the “class” that is the object of relation of the entailment in the proof of [sound as impermanent] is taken as the predicate of the probandum in that proof.

It follows [that the “class” that is the object of relation of the entailment in the proof of sound as impermanent is taken as the predicate of the probandum in that proof] because whatever is any one of the three—(1) the “class” that is the object of relation of the entailment in the proof of [sound as impermanent], (2) the probandum that is the object of relation of the entailment in the proof of [sound as impermanent], and (3) the inferred object that is the object of relation of the entailment in the proof of [sound as impermanent]—must be the predicate of the probandum in the proof of [sound as impermanent].
It follows [that whatever is any one of those three—(1) the “class” that is the object of relation of the entailment in the proof of (sound as impermanent), (2) the probandum that is the object of relation of the entailment in the proof of (sound as impermanent), and (3) the inferred object that is the object of relation of the entailment in the proof of (sound as impermanent)—must be the predicate of the probandum in the proof of sound as impermanent] because whatever is the probandum or “class” that is “the probandum established or not established by means of a reason proving sound as impermanent” must be a meaning combining sound and impermanent.

It follows that [whatever is the probandum or “class” that is “the probandum established or not established by means of a reason proving sound as impermanent” must be a meaning combining sound and impermanent] because:

1. There exist three separate ways of becoming referents of the term phyogs (pakṣa) in the context of proving sound as impermanent.
2. phyogs (pakṣa) in “property of the subject (phyogs, pakṣa) in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product,” is taken as the flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of [sound as impermanent by the sign, product].
3. phyogs (pakṣa) in “similar class” (mthun phyogs) that is part of the
phrase “ascertained by valid cognition as just existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, in only the similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product,” is taken as [both] (1) the “class” that is the object of relation of the entailment in the proof of [sound as impermanent by the sign, product] and (2) the predicate of the probandum in the proof of [sound as impermanent by the sign, product].
The first [sign which is that there exist three separate ways of becoming referents of the term “class” in the context of proving sound as impermanent] is established because Dharmakīrti’s *Ascertainment of Valid Cognition* says:

Ascertained as existent in the object of inference and in what is similar to [the object of inference];
Ascertained as nonexistent in the nonexistent [that is, nonexistent in what is without similarity to the object of inference].

and Dharmottara’s *Greater Logicality* [his *Commentarial Explanation of (Dharmakīrti’s) "Ascertainment of Valid Cognition"] says:

The conventions of “the object of inference” are three.

The second [sign which is that “class” (*phyogs*) in “property of the subject (*phyogs*) in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product,” is taken as the flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product] is established because Dharmakīrti’s *Autocommentary on the “Commentary on (Dignāga’s) ‘Compilation of Valid Cognition’”* says:

---


*b* tshad ma rnam par nges pa’i fi ka ’thad ldan zhes bya ba (pramāṇaviniścayatikā), in *bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4227)*, TBRC W23703.213 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa cheodhey, Gyalwae sngurb partun khang, 1982-1985), 182b.3.

*c* tshad ma rnam ’grel gyi ’grel pa (pramāṇavārttikavṛtti) in *bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4216)*, TBRC W23703.174:523-732 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa cheodhey, Gyalwae sngurb partun khang, 1982-1985), 261b.4.

---

**Key to colorization:** Blue print = right position. Red print = wrong position. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis; magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
The class is the subject.

and Dharmakīrti’s *Drop of Reasoning* also says:\(^a\)

The object of inference is here the subject that is endowed with
the particularity of that which is sought to be known.

and Dharmottara’s *Logicality* [his Commentary on (Dharmakīrti’s) “Drop
of Reasoning’] at this point says:\(^b\)

[Dharmakīrti’s *Drop of Reasoning* says,] “The object of inference
is here” and so forth because the definition of reason is inference
of a subject during [the process of] delineation.

[The three quotations above entail that “class” in the phrase “property
of the subject in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product,”
is taken as the flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as
impermanence by the sign, product] because, in this context, the three—
object of inference, probandum, and class—are synonyms.

---

\(^a\) *rīgs pa’i thig pa* (nyāyabindu), *in bstan ’gyur (sde dge* 4212), TBRC W23703.174:463-477 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa chödhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 232a.1.

\(^b\) *tshad ma rnam par nges pa’i ’grel bshad / ’thad ldan* (pramāṇaviniścayatīkā), *in bstan ’gyur (sde dge* 4229), TBRC W23703.188:4-579 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa chödhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 182b.5.

*Key to colorization: Blue print = right position. Red print = wrong position. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis; magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.*
The third sign which is that “class” in “similar class” from the phrase “ascertained by valid cognition as just existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, in only the similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product,” is taken as (both) (1) the “class” that is the object of relation of the entailment in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product, and (2) the predicate of the probandum in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product] is established because this [very text, Dharmottara’s *Logicality*, his *Commentary on (Dharmakīrti’s) “Drop of Reasoning”*] says,a

The object of entailment is the predicate of the probandum.

Furthermore, it follows that whatever is the “class” that is part of the phrase “similar class in the proof of [sound as impermanent by the sign, product]” must be the predicate of the probandum in the proof of [sound as impermanent by the sign, product] because among what go as the predicate of the probandum in the proof of [sound as impermanent by the sign, product] there exist the two, the generality-isolate and the particularity-isolate, and [from among those two] when [the predicate of the probandum in that proof] is taken to be the generality-isolate, then “class” in the phrase “similar class in a [given] proof” is explained as “the similar class” due to being similar in meaning with [the generality-isolate]b because Dharmakīrti’s *Drop of Reasoning* says:

---

a *tshad ma rnam par nges pa'i 'grel bshad / 'thad ldan (pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā)*, in *bstan 'gyur (sde dge, 4229)*, TBRC W23703.188:4-579 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 199a.4.
b The point is that, in different contexts, the predicate of the probandum is taken as being

*Key to colorization: Blue print = right position. Red print = wrong position. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.*
That which is similar in meaning [or factually concordant] with the generality of the predicate of what is being proven is the similar class.

[That quotation entails the preceding explanation of “similar class”] because it explains “that which is similar in meaning with the generality [of the predicate of what is being proven] is the similar class” [as follows]:

In that passage:

1. “the predicate of what is being proven” is explaining “the predicate of the probandum in that proof”;
2. “generality” is explaining “the generality-isolate of that [predicate of the probandum]”;
3. “similar in meaning” is explaining “similar in meaning with that [generality-isolate]”;
4. together they are explaining “[that which is similar in meaning with the generality-isolate of the predicate of the probandum] is posited as the similar class”.

the generality-isolate of the predicate of the probandum or the particularity-isolate of the predicate of the probandum. The “class” in the phrase “similar class in the proof of that” is explained as being the similar class because of being concordant in meaning with the generality-isolate of the predicate of the probandum.

Key to colorization: Blue print = right position. Red print = wrong position. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
It follows [that the earlier passage explains “that which is similar in meaning with the generality (of the predicate of the probandum) is the similar class”] because Dharmottara’s Lesser Logicality [his Commentary on (Dharmakīrti’s) “Drop of Reasoning”] says:

The mention of “generality” [in Dharmakīrti’s Drop of Reasoning where he says, “That which is similar in meaning with the generality of the predicate of what is being proven is the similar class,”] has the meaning of distinguishing it from particularity; it is the probandum and is also a generality; hence, a generality; what is similar in meaning [or factually concordant] with that [generality] is the similar class.

Furthermore, it follows that “class” in the phrase “similar class in a [given] proof” is taken as the predicate of the probandum in that proof because the two, (1) “class” in the phrase “similar class that is the object of relation of the forward entailment in that proof” and (2) “class” in the phrase “dissimilar class that is the object of relation of the counter entailment in that proof” are taken as the predicate of the probandum in that proof.
It follows [that the two, (1) “class” in the phrase “similar class that is the object of relation of the forward entailment in that proof” and (2) “class” in the phrase “dissimilar class that is the object of relation of the counter entailment in that proof,” are taken as the predicate of the probandum in that proof] because the class or probandum, which is “the probandum established or not established by means of the reason that is the probans in that proof,” is taken as a meaning combining the two, the subject and the predicate of the probandum in that proof.

It follows [that the class or probandum, which is “the probandum established or not established by means of the reason that is the probans in that proof,” is taken as a meaning combining the two, the subject and the predicate of the probandum in that proof] because there exist also three referents of the term “class” in the context of proving sound as impermanent, for one, and the term “class” is used as an actual name for the meaning combining the two, the subject and the predicate of the probandum in that proof, whereas the term “class” is used as an imputed name for the two—the predicate of the probandum, which is the object of relation of the two entailments, and the subject sought to be known, which is the object [or focus] of the property of the subject.
[This is so] because Dharmottara’s Greater Logicality [his Commentarial Explanation of (Dharmakirti’s) “Ascertainment of Valid Cognition”] says:

With respect to the convention “inference,” there are three: the actual [is used] for the generality of the predicate and the subject that are what is being proven by the probans. The imputed [is used both] for the predicate of the probandum that is the object of the entailment and for the subject that is the object [or the focus] of the reason.

[b]To clarify, the “three” referred to here are: (1) the combination of the two, the subject and the predicate of the probandum, (2) the predicate of the probandum which is the object of relation of the two entailments, and (3) the subject sought to be known which is the object (or focus) of the reason.

---

*a* tshad ma rnam par nges pa’i fi ka ’thad ldan zhes bya ba (pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4229), TBRC W23703.213 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 182b.3-4.

To clarify, the “three” referred to here are: (1) the combination of the two, the subject and the predicate of the probandum, (2) the predicate of the probandum which is the object of relation of the two entailments, and (3) the subject sought to be known which is the object (or focus) of the reason.
are what is being proven by the probans and” explain that the term “class” is used as an actual name for the meaning combining the two, the subject and the predicate of the probandum; and [the words] “that is the object of entailment” and so forth explain that [the term “class”] is used as an imputed name for the two others, [the predicate of the probandum, which is the object of relation of the two entailments, and the subject sought to be known, which is the object (or focus) of the property of the subject].

10. Someone says: It follows that the generality of the predicate of the probandum in the proof of sound as impermanent is the “class” that is a piece of the phrase “similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent” because having taken “class” that is a piece of the phrase “similar class in the proof of [sound as impermanent]” to be the generality of the predicate of the probandum in that proof, then those that are similar in meaning with [the generality of the predicate of the probandum in that proof] are posited as “the similar class.” It follows [that having taken “class” that is a piece of the phrase “similar class in the proof of (sound as impermanent)” to be the generality of the predicate of the probandum in the proof of sound as impermanent, then those that are similar in meaning with (the generality of the predicate of the probandum in that proof) are posited as “the similar class”] because Dharmakīrti’s *Drop of Reasoning* says:

---

[Key to colorization: Blue print = right position. Red print = wrong position. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis; magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.]
That which is similar in meaning with the generality of the predicate of what is being proven is the similar class.

Our response: [That passage] does not entail [that having taken “class” that is a piece of the phrase “similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent” to be the generality of the predicate of the probandum in that proof, then those that are similar in meaning with the generality of the predicate of the probandum in that proof are posited as “the similar class”] because the meaning of that [passage from Dharmakīrti’s Drop of Reasoning] is that having taken the impermanent—which goes as the predicate of the probandum in the proof of sound as impermanent—to be that generality-isolate, then those that are similar in meaning with [the generality-isolate] are posited as the similar class in the proof of [sound as impermanent].

Key to colorization: Blue print = right position. Red print = wrong position. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis; magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
If you [incorrectly] accept [that having taken “class” that is a piece of the phrase “similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent” to be the generality of the predicate of the probandum in the proof of [sound as impermanent], then those that are similar in meaning with the generality of the predicate of the probandum in that proof are called “the similar class”], it [absurdly] follows that the generality of impermanent also is the “class” that is a piece of the phrase “similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent” because you [incorrectly] accepted [that those that are similar in meaning with the generality of the predicate of the probandum in that proof are called the similar class]. If you accept [that the generality of impermanent also is the “class” that is a piece of the phrase “similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent”] it [absurdly] follows that the subject, [the generality of impermanent,] is the predicate of the probandum in the proof of sound as impermanent because you accepted [that the generality of impermanent also is the “class” that is a piece of the phrase “similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent”].

You cannot accept [that the generality of impermanent is the predicate of the probandum in the proof of sound as impermanent] because although “class” in the phrase “similar class in the proof of [sound as impermanent]” is taken as impermanent, particularities of [impermanent], such as pot and so forth are not posited as that [“class” in the phrase “similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent”] because Dharmottara’s Greater Logicality [his Commentarial Explanation of (Dharmakirti’s) “Ascertainment of Valid Cognition”] says:a

A “generality of the predicate of the probandum” is not apprehended; the predicate of the probandum is called a “generality.”

---

a tshad ma rnam par ndag pa ’i fi ka ’thag ldan zhes bya ba (pramāṇaviniścayatikā), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4227), TBRC W23703.213 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 67a.1.

Key to colorization: Blue print = right position. Red print = wrong position. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis; magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
11. Someone says: It follows that whatever is selfless is not necessarily a similar class because dissimilar class exists. It follows [that dissimilar class exists] because pot is a dissimilar class. It follows [that pot is a dissimilar class] because [pot] is the dissimilar class in the proof of sound as permanent.

Key to colorization: Blue print = right position. Red print = wrong position. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis; magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
Our response: [Being the dissimilar class in the proof of sound as permanent does not entail being a dissimilar class]. The sign [which is that pot is the dissimilar class in the proof of sound as permanent] is established because [pot] is impermanent. You cannot accept [that pot is a dissimilar class (without specifying a context)] because whatever exists is necessarily a similar class, for one, and even whatever is nonexistent is necessarily a similar class.

The first [sign which is that whatever exists is necessarily a similar class] is established because pot is a similar class; it follows that [pot is a similar class] because [pot] is the similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent. It follows [that pot is the similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent] because of being impermanent.

The second [sign which is that even whatever is nonexistent is necessarily a similar class] is established because horn of a rabbit is a similar class. It follows [that horn of a rabbit is a similar class] because [horn of a rabbit] is the similar class in the proof that sound is the selflessness of persons. It follows [that horn of a rabbit is the similar class in the proof that sound is the selflessness of persons] because of being selfless.
12. **Someone says**: It follows that the subject, dissimilar class, is a similar class because of being a similar class in the proof of sound as the selflessness of persons. If you accept [that dissimilar class is a similar class] it follows that the subject, dissimilar class, exists because of being a similar class.

Our response: Being a similar class does not entail existing.
B) Ancillary, An Explanation of Similar and Dissimilar Examples

13. Someone says: It follows that dissimilar class exists because a dissimilar example exists. [A dissimilar example exists] because a correct proof statement using a qualitative dissimilarity exists.

Our response: [That a correct proof statement using a qualitative dissimilarity exists] does not entail [that dissimilar example exists].

It follows [that a correct proof statement using a qualitative dissimilarity exists] because the proof statement, “Whatever is permanent is necessarily a nonproduct, as is the case for example, with uncompounded space; sound, however, is a product” is [a correct proof statement using a qualitative dissimilarity].

If you [incorrectly] accept above [that dissimilar example exists], it [absurdly] follows that the subject, uncompounded space, is a dissimilar example because of being a dissimilar example in the proof of sound as impermanent. [Being a dissimilar example in the proof of sound as impermanent] does not entail [being a dissimilar example].

It follows [that uncompounded space is a dissimilar example in the

---

a 2011 TBRC bla brang, 12b.4; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 9a.6.
proof of sound as impermanent] because [uncompounded space] is a correct dissimilar example in a correct proof statement using a qualitative dissimilarity in the proof of [sound as impermanent].

You cannot accept [that uncompounded space is a dissimilar example (without specifying the context)] because [uncompounded space] is a similar example. It follows [that uncompounded space is a similar example] because [uncompounded space] is a similar example in the proof of sound as an object of knowledge. It follows [that uncompounded space is a similar example in the proof of sound as an object of knowledge] because [uncompounded space] is a similar example in the proof of sound as an object of knowledge, by the sign of being suitable to be taken as an object of awareness. It follows [that uncompounded space is a similar example in the proof of sound as an object of knowledge, by the sign of being suitable to be taken as an object of awareness] because of being a correct similar example in a correct proof statement using a qualitative similarity [between the example and the subject] in the proof of sound as an object of knowledge, by the sign of being suitable to be taken as an object of awareness.

It follows [that uncompounded space is a correct similar example in a correct proof statement using a qualitative similarity in the proof of sound as an object of knowledge, by the sign of being suitable to be taken as an object of awareness] because [uncompounded space] is a similar example in the correct proof statement using a qualitative similarity: “Whatever is suitable to be taken as an object of awareness is necessarily an object of knowledge, as is the case for example, with uncompounded space; sound also is suitable to be taken as an object of awareness.”
[བདེན་བསང་པོ་སོ་གསར་སེམས་དཔའི་ཕྱིར་]འདོད་སེམས་ཀྱི་བསྐོ་དཔེ་ཡིན་པ། [བདེན་བསང་པོ་སོ་གསར་སེམས་དཔའི་ཕྱིར་]འདོད་སེམས་ཀྱི་བསྐོ་དཔེ་ཡིན་པ་དེ་རིག་[བདེན་བསང་པོ་སོ་གསར་སེམས་དཔའི་ཕྱིར་]འདོད་སེམས་ཀྱི་བསྐོ་ལ་རིང་གི་བཤད་ཀྱིས་དེ་འིན་པ་[བདེན་བསང་པོ་སོ་གསར་སེམས་དཔའི་ཕྱིར་]འདོད་སེམས་ཀྱི་བསྐོ་དཔེ་ཡིན་པ་[བདེན་བསང་པོ་སོ་གསར་སེམས་དཔའི་ཕྱིར་]འདོད་སེམས་ཀྱི་བསྐོ་དཔེ་ཡིན་པ་[བདེན་བསང་པོ་སོ་གསར་སེམས་དཔའི་ཕྱིར་]འདོད་སེམས་ཀྱི་བསྐོ་དཔེ་ཡིན་པ་[བདེན་བསང་པོ་སོ་གསར་སེམས་དཔའི་ཕྱིར་]འདོད་སེམས་ཀྱི་བསྐོ་དཔེ་ཡིན་པ་[བདེན་བསང་པོ་སོ་གསར་སེམས་དཔའི་ཕྱིར་]འདོད་སེམས་ཀྱི་བསྐོ་དཔེ་ཡིན་པ་[བདེན་བསང་པོ་སོ་གསར་སེམས་དཔའི་ཕྱིར་]འདོད་སེམས་ཀྱི་བསྐོ་དཔེ་ཡིན་པ་[བདེན་བསང་པོ་སོ་གསར་སེམས་དཔའི་ཕྱིར་]འདོད་སེམས་ཀྱི་བསྐོ་དཔེ་ཡིན་པ་[བདེན་བསང་པོ་སོ་གསར་སེམས་དཔའི་ཕྱིར་]འདོད་སེམས་ཀྱི་བསྐོ་དཔེ་ཡིན་པ་[བདེན་བསང་པོ་སོ་གསར་སེམས་དཔའི་ཕྱིར་]འདོད་སེམས་ཀྱི་བསྐོ་དཔེ་ཡིན་པ་[བདེན་བསང་པོ་སོ་གསར་སེམས་དཔའི་ཕྱིར་]འདོད་སེམས་ཀྱི་བསྐོ་དཔེ་ཡིན་པ་[བདེན་བསང་པོ་སོ་གསར་སེམས་དཔའི་ཕྱིར་]འདོད་སེམས་ཀྱི་བསྐོ་དཔེ་ཡིན་པ་[བདེན་བསང་པོ་སོ་གསར་སེམས་དཔའི་ཕྱིར་]འདོད་སེམས་ཀྱི་བསྐོ་དཔེ་ཡིན་པ་[བདེན་བསང་པོ་སོ་གསར་སེམས་དཔའི་ཕྱིར་]འདོད་སེམས་ཀྱི་བསྐོ་དཔེ་ཡིན་པ་[བདེན་བསང་པོ་སོ་གསར་སེམས་དཔའི་ཕྱིར་]འདོད་སེམས་ཀྱི་བསྐོ་དཔེ་ཡིན་པ་[བདེན་བསང་པོ་སོ་གསར་སེམས་དཔའི་ཕྱིར་]འདོད་སེམས་ཀྱི་བསྐོ་དཔེ་ཡིན་པ་[བདེན་བསང་པོ་སོ་གསར་སེམས་དཔའི་ཕྱིར་]འདོད་སེམས་ཀྱི་བསྐོ་དཔེ་ཡིན་པ་[བདེན་བསང་པོ་སོ་གསར་སེམས་དཔའི་ཕྱིར་]འདོད་སེམས་ཀྱི་བསྐོ་དཔེ་ཡིན་པ་[བདེན་བསང་པོ་སོ་གསར་སེམས་དཔའི་ཕྱིར་]འདོད་སེམས་ཀྱི་བསྐོ་དཔེ་ཡིན་པ་[བདེན་བསང་པོ་སོ་གསར་སེམས་དཔའི་ཕྱིར་]འདོད་སེམས་ཀྱི་བསྐོ་དཔེ་ཡིན་པ་[བདེན་བསང་པོ་སོ་གསར་སེམས་དཔའི་ཕྱིར་]འདོད་སེམས་ཀྱི་བསྐོ་དཔེ་ཡིན་པ་[བདེན་བསང་པོ་སོ་གསར་སེམས་དཔའི་ཕྱིར་]འདོད་སེམས་ཀྱི་བསྐོ་དཔེ་ཡིན་པ་[བདེན་བསང་པོ་སོ་གསར་སེམས་དཔའི་ཕྱིར་]འདོད་སེམས་ཀྱི་བསྐོ་དཔེ་ཡིན་པ་[བདེན་བསང་པོ་སོ་གསར་སེམས་དཔའི་ཕྱིར་]འདོད་སེམས་ཀྱི་བསྐོ་དཔེ་ཡིན་প

Key to colorization: Blue print = right position. Red print = wrong position. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis; magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
Bibliography of Works Cited

1. WORKS IN TIBETAN AND SANSKRIT

Dharmakīrti (chos kyi grags pa, seventh century)

1. Seven Treatises on Valid Cognition
   Analysis of Relations
   sambandhaparākṣā
   'brel pa brtag pa
   Tibetan digital reprint edition: In bstan 'gyur (sde dge, 4215), TBRC W23703.174:513-523
   (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa chodhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985).
   Peking 5713, vol. 130.

2. Ascertainment of Valid Cognition
   pramāṇaviniścaya
   tshad ma ma mā par nges pa
   (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa chodhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985).
   Peking 5710, vol. 130.

3. Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid Cognition”
   pramāṇavārttikakārikā
   tshad ma ma mā ’gro gyi tshig le’ur byas pa
   (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa chodhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985).
   Peking 5709, vol. 130.


4. *Drop of Reasoning*

nyāyabinduprakaraṇa

rigs pa’i thigs pa zhes bya ba’i rab tu byed pa


Peking 5711, vol. 130.


5. *Drop of Reasons*

hetubindunāmaprakaraṇa

gtan thigs kyi thigs pa zhes bya ba rab tu byed pa


Peking 5712, vol. 130.

6. *Principles of Debate*

vādanyāya

rtsod pa’i rigs pa


Peking 5715, vol. 130.

7. *Proof of Other Continuums*

saṃtanāntarasiddhināmaprakaraṇa

rgyud gzhan grub pa zhes bya ba’i rab tu byed pa


Peking 5716, vol. 130.

*Autocommentary on the ‘Commentary on (Dignāga)’s ‘Compilation of Valid Cognition’’*

Pramāṇavārttikā

tshad ma ram ’grel gyi ’grel pa


Dharmottara (chos mchog, 8th century)

Commentarial Explanation of (Dharmakīrti’s) “Ascertainment of Valid Cognition” / Greater Logicality

pramāṇaviniścayaṭīka

tshad ma ram par nges pa’i ’grel bshad / ’thad ldan


Commentary on (Dharmakīrti’s) “Drop of Reasoning” / Lesser Logicality

nyāyabinduṭīka

rigs pa’i thigs pa’i rgya cher ’grel pa


Dignāga (phyogs kyi glangs po, sixth century)

[Auto-]Commentary on the Compilation of Valid Cognition

pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti

tshad ma kun las btsus pa’i ’grel pa

Tibetan digital reprint edition: *In bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4204).* TBRC W23703.174:30-172 (PDF

Compilation of Valid Cognition
pramāṇaśāsanauccaya
tshad ma kun las btus pa


Door to Valid Reasoning
nyāyapravṛte-nāma-pramāṇaprakaraṇa
tshad ma rigs par 'jug pa'i sgo zhes bya ba'i rab tu byed pa

Wheel of Reasonings
hetuacakraḍamaru
gtan sfishi kyi 'khor lo gtan la dbab pa

Jam-yang-shay-pa Ngag-wang-tson-drü (\'jam dbyangs bzhad pa'i rdo rje ngag dbang brtson grus, 1648-1721/1722)

Decisive Analysis of (Maitreya's) "Ornament for the Clear Realizations": Precious Lamp Illuminating All the Topics of the Perfection of Wisdom
bstan rgyas 'khor med par rtsis par phyin pa'i mchod bshad blo gsal mgul rgyan. (PDF of complete printing available at UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, http://www.uma-tibet.org.)

Eloquent Presentation of the Eight Categories and Seventy Topics: Sacred Word of Guru Ajita
dngos po brgyad don bdun cu'i rnam bzhag legs par bshad pa mi pham bla ma'i zhal lung
Tibetan editions:
1999 Tōyō Bunko CD-ROM: “Tibetan texts of don bdun bcu of \'jam dbyangs bzhad pa and rigs lam 'phred gyi ide mig of dkon mchog bstan pa'i sgron me.” In the Toyo Bunko Database CD Release II. Tokyo, Japan: Tōyō Bunko, 1999. CD-ROM. (This edition is based on the 1999 Mundgod.)

2011 TBRC bla brang: In gsung ’bum (jam dbyangs bzhad pa) TBRC W22186.14:115-178 (PDF of bla brang bkra shis ’khyil: bla brang bkra shis ’khyil dgon, publishing date unknown).


Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive / Decisive Analysis of (Tsong-kha-pa’s) “Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive”: Storehouse of White Beryl of Scripture and Reasoning Free from Mistake, Fulfilling the Hopes of the Fortunate drang ba dang nges pa’i don mam par ’byed pa’i mtha’ dpod ’khrul bral lung rigs bai dûr dkar pa’i ngan mdzod skal bzang re ba kun skong


Tibetan digital reprint edition: TBRC W1KG21952.1 (PDF of sbag sa: nang bstan shes rig ’dzin skyong slob gnyer khang, [1968]).


English translation of section two: William Magee. Questioning the Buddha About Contradictions in His Teachings. UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies. uma-tibet.org.


Great Exposition of the Middle / Decisive Analysis of (Chandrakīrti’s) “Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle’”: Treasury of Scripture and Reasoning, Thoroughly Illuminating the Profound Meaning [of Emptiness], Entrance for the Fortunate dbu ma chen mo / dbu ma ’jug pa’i mtha’ dpod lung rigs gter mdzod zab don kun gsal skal bzang ’jug ngogs

Tibetan digital reprint edition: In gsung ’bum (jam dbyangs bzhad pa’i rdo rje). TBRC W21503.9:11-894 (PDF of South India?: Gomang College?, 1997?).


Translation of part of chapter six: Jongbok Yi. *The Opposite of Emptiness in the Middle Way Autonomy School: Jamyang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six.*

Translation of part of chapter six: Jongbok Yi. *The Opposite of Emptiness in the Middle Way Consequence School: Jamyang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six.*

Great Exposition of Tenets / Explanation of Tenets: Sun of the Land of Samantabhadra Brilliantly Illuminating All of Our Own and Others’ Tenets and the Meaning of the Profound [Emptiness], Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning Fulfiling All Hopes of All Beings
grub mtha’ chen mo / grub mtha’i mam bshad rang gzhan grub mtha’ kun dang zab don mchog tu gsal ba kun brang zhing gi ngyi ma lung rigs rgya mtsho skye dgu’i re ba kun skong


*Illuminating a Little the Presentation of Awareness and Knowledge: Beautiful Golden Garland of Eloquence*

ttags rigs kyi mam bzhag nyung gsal legs bshad gser gyi phreng mdzes

*Tibetan digital reprint edition: In gsung ’bum (jam dbyangs bzhad pa’i rdo rje) TBRC W22186.14:305-376 (PDF of bla brang bkra shis ’khyil: bla brang bkra shis ’khyil dgon, [n.d.]).

*Illuminating a Little the Presentation of Signs and Reasonings: Beautiful Golden Garland of Eloquence*

ttags rigs kyi mam bzhag nyung gsal legs bshad gser gyi phreng mdzes
2. OTHER WORKS

Katherine Rogers holds a B.A. in Religious Studies as well as an M.A. and a Ph.D. in Tibetan Buddhist Studies from the University of Virginia. She taught at Washington and Lee University as an Assistant Professor for two years.

She has two published works, *Tibetan Logic* and *What Constitutes a Correct Reason? Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Illuminating a Little the Presentation of Signs and Reasonings: Beautiful Golden Garland of Eloquence 2* and is the translator and editor of *The Garland of Mahamudra Practices* by Khenpo Konchog Gyaltsen. She received a Doctoral Dissertation Research Grant from The American Institute of Indian Studies and also spent one year as a volunteer with The Tibet Information Network, working with Tibetan refugees in Northern India.

She served for four years on the Board of Trustees of Nurse Healers-Professional Associates, Incorporated. Currently, as well as working as a translator with the UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, she co-owns a small business, Valley of Gems.
This book is a translation of the first section of Jam-yang-shay-pa’s *Illuminating a Little the Presentation of Signs and Reasonings: Beautiful Golden Garland of Eloquence*, a textbook studied by beginners at the Gomang College of Drepung Monastery and at La-brang Tra-shi-khyil and their affiliated institutions throughout Inner Asia.

In their system, the student needs to develop a strong “path of reasoning”—a mind trained in valid knowledge—in order to pursue not only the academic path but also the path of meditation and self-transformation. The study of Signs and Reasonings plays an important role in the development of this path of reasoning, being an introduction to the fundamentals of logic, including syllogisms and their components, correct reasons (or “signs”) and how they come to be correct—able to induce in the debater or meditator new knowledge about something not formerly understood.

In this section of his work, Jam-yang-shay-pa introduces the student to several of the basic concepts of correct reasoning, with a focus on laying the foundation for understanding the necessary relationship between the subject, predicate, and sign in the context of the generation of valid inferential knowledge, leading to direct perception of reality.