Compatibly Appearing Subjects 3: Chandrakīrti Undermines Bhāvaviveka’s Assertion of Autonomy
Jeffrey Hopkins
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This is the third of eight volumes presenting Tibetan views on the controversy that arose in Buddhist India over how to refute production from self.
The controversy revolves around the opening phrase of the first stanza of the first chapter of Nāgārjuna’s Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called “Wisdom”:
Not from self, not from others,
Not from both, not causelessly
Do any things
Ever arise anywhere.
Nāgārjuna’s principal Indian commentators, however, explain the refutation of production from self in varying detail, the differences engendering the split between what came to be called the Autonomy School and the Consequence School.
Buddhapālita’s commentary on the refutation of production from self provoked Bhāvaviveka into extensive criticism and into a demonstration of his own preferred style of commentary. As explained in the second volume in this series, Chandrakīrti defended Buddhapālita, and in the present volume, the Tibetan scholar Jam-yang-zhay-pa (1648-1722) patiently explains Chandrakīrti’s counterattack on Bhāvaviveka’s own method for refuting refuting production from self. This turns into a discussion of compatibly appearing subjects, which is seen as the prime, but not only, source showing that Bhāvaviveka accepts that phenomena are established by way of their own character. This fascinating topic is used in monastic colleges to draw students into ever-deepening reflections about how phenomena appear and thereby to explore the nature of the reality behind appearances. Included is a separate translation of the corresponding section of Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words