Explanation of the Presentation of Objects and Object-Possessors as well as Awareness and Knowledge [from within] "The Greater Path of Reasoning" [section] of The Magical Key to the Path of Reasoning, Presentation of the Collected Topics Revealing the Meaning of the Treatises on Prime Cognition

by

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I bow down to the Lama and the protector Manjughosha.

This is an explanation of the presentation of objects and object-possessors as well as awareness and knowledge [from within] "The Greater Path of Reasoning" [section] of The Magical Key to the Path of Reasoning, Presentation of the Collected Topics Revealing the Meaning of the Treatises on Prime Cognition.

If someone posits as the definition of "awareness" "that which knows an object" and as the definition of "object" "that which is known by an awareness" [we will respond], "It [absurdly] follows with respect to the subject, a prime cognizer, that object is a knower because of being an awareness."

[The Tibetan can also be read as: It follows that the subject, a prime cognizer, is that which knows an object because of being an awareness. The defender interprets it this way; thus the debate centers around proper grammatical formulation.]

If he says the reason is not established, "It follows that the subject, a prime cognizer, is an awareness because of being a knower."

If the basic consequence [that with respect to a prime cognizer, object is a knower] is accepted, "It [absurdly] follows with respect to the subject, a prime cognizer, that
object is a consciousness because object is a knower. The reason has been accepted."

[There is a grammatical play here. The challenger treats "object" (yul) as a subject nominative in both the predicate and the reason, whereas the defender would prefer to treat it as an object nominative—"that which knows an object," or "knower of an object."]

If it is accepted [that object is a consciousness], "It follows with respect to the subject, a prime cognizer, that object is not a consciousness because object is not a thing. Moreover, [even if the grammar is interpreted as the defender wishes] "It [absurdly] follows that whatever is an awareness is necessarily an awareness that knows an object because the definition of "awareness" is "that which knows an object. The reason has been asserted."

If it is accepted [that whatever is an awareness is necessarily an awareness which knows an object], "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, an awareness in the continuum of a person who does not realize an object, is an awareness which knows an object, because of being an awareness."

If this is accepted, "It [absurdly] follows with respect to the subject, an awareness in the continuum of a person who does not realize an object, that it is an awareness which
realizes an object because of being an awareness which knows an object. The reason has been accepted."

One cannot accept [that it is an awareness which realizes an object] because it is an awareness in the continuum of a person who does not realize an object.

Even though it is said that the limits of pervasion are thus, one must assert that a correctly assuming consciousness which realizes the selflessness of persons exists in the continuum of a person who has not realized the selflessness of persons.

With regard to the second definition posited above [the definition of "object" as "that which is known by an awareness"], a fault-flinger might say, "It follows that the subject, the horns of a rabbit, is an object because of being that which is known by an awareness. This follows because [the subject] is imputed by an awareness."

If someone says that this reason is not established, "It follows that the subject [the horns of a rabbit] is [imputed by an awareness] because of being imputed by thought."

If someone says that the reason is not established, "It follows that the subject [the horns of a rabbit] is [imputed by thought] because of being imputed by the thought which apprehends it."

[To this we respond] there is no pervasion.

Now [we say] to him, "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, the horns of a rabbit, is an object of an awareness
because of being the object of the awareness apprehending it. The pervasion has been asserted."

If he says that the reason is not established, "It follows that the subject, the horns of a rabbit, is [the object of the awareness apprehending it] because of being the object of the thought apprehending it."

If he says that the reason is not established, "It follows that the subject [the horns of a rabbit] is [the object of the thought apprehending it] because of being selfless."

Someone might say, "It follows that the subject, a prime cognizer, is a knower of an object because an object is known by a prime cognizer."

[To this we respond] there is no pervasion.

If someone else says that the reason is not established, "It follows with regard to the subject [a prime cognizer] that [an object is known by a prime cognizer] because an object is that which is known by a prime cognizer."

If someone says that the reason is not established, "It follows with regard to the subject [a prime cognizer] that [an object is that which is known by a prime cognizer] because an object is an object of comprehension."

If someone says that the definition of "object" is "that which is directly realized by an awareness", [we say to him] "It absurdly] follows that the subject, the selflessness of persons, is that which is directly realized by an awareness because of being an object."
If he accepts the consequence, "It follows that the subject, the selflessness of persons, is not that which is directly realized by an awareness because of not being directly realized by an awareness."

If he says that the reason is not established, "It follows that that subject [the selflessness of persons] is [not directly realized by an awareness] because of not being directly realized by any awareness. [That it is not directly realized by any awareness] follows because 1) it is not directly realized by a direct perceiver and 2) it is not directly realized by an inferential cognizer."

If he says that the first reason is not established, "It follows that that subject [the selflessness of persons] is [not directly realized by a direct perceiver] because of not being realized in a manifest manner by a direct perceiver."

If he says that the reason is not established, "It follows that that subject [the selflessness of persons] is [not realized in a manifest manner by a direct perceiver] because of not being a manifest phenomenon. That is because it is a non-affirming negative."

If he says that the second reason above [that the selflessness of persons is not realized directly by an inferential cognizer] is not established, "It follows that the subject [the selflessness of persons] is not directly realized by an inferential cognizer because direct realization by an inferential cognizer does not exist."
If he says that the reason is not established, "It follows [that direct realization by an inferential cognizer does not exist] because an inferential cognizer is a conceptual consciousness."

With respect to what has been said, someone might say, "It follows that the selflessness of persons is directly realized by an inferential cognizer because it is realized explicitly by an inferential cognizer."

[To this we respond] there is no pervasion.

If someone else says that the reason is not established, "It follows that that subject [the selflessness of persons] is [realized explicitly by an inferential cognizer] because of being the explicit object of comprehension of an inferential cognizer."

If someone says that the reason is not established, "It follows that the subject [the selflessness of persons] is [the explicit object of comprehension of an inferential cognizer] because of being an established base.

With respect to what has been said, someone might say, "It follows with respect to the subject, the selflessness of persons, that direct realization of it does not exist because realization of it in a manifest manner does not exist; this is so because it is a non-affirming negative. You have asserted the reason."

[To this we respond] there is no pervasion because an omniscient consciousness directly realizes the selflessness of
persons. This is so because it [an omniscient consciousness] directly realizes all phenomena.

Also, someone might say, "It follows that the selflessness of persons is realized in a manifest manner by an omniscient consciousness because the selflessness of persons is directly realized by an omniscient consciousness; this is so because an omniscient consciousness directly realizes the selflessness of persons."

[We respond] there is no pervasion.

Someone might say, "Whatever is an object is necessarily an object within the two-fold division into objects and object-possessors." [To him we respond] "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, an omniscient consciousness, is [an object within the two-fold division into objects and object-possessors,] because of being [an object]. The reason is easy."

If he accepts [the consequence], "It follows that the subject, an omniscient consciousness, is not an object within the two-fold division into objects and object-possessors because of being an object-possessor within the two-fold division into objects and object-possessors."

If he says the reason is not established, "It follows that the subject, an omniscient consciousness, is [an object-possessor within the two-fold division into objects and object-possessors] because of being a prime cognizer."

Moreover, [we say to him] "It [absurdly] follows that whatever is an object-possessor is necessarily an object-possessor
within the two-fold division into objects and object-possessors because whatever is an object is necessarily an object within the two-fold division into objects and object-possessors. The reason has been explicitly accepted."

If he accepts [the first pervasion that whatever is an object-possessor is necessarily an object possessor within the two-fold division into objects and object-possessors], "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, an expressive sound, is [an object-possessor within the two-fold division into objects and object-possessors,] because of [being an object-possessor]."

If he says the reason is not established, "It follows that the subject, an expressive sound, is an object-possessor because its object exists."

Moreover, "It follows that an expressive sound is an object-possessor because an expressive sound is an object of hearing that engages its object in a partial manner."

If he says the reason is not established, "It follows that the subject [an expressive sound] is [an object of hearing that engages its object in a partial manner] because of being a sound that is an eliminative engager. This is so because it is an expressive sound."

If he says there is no pervasion, "The pervasion exists [i.e. whatever is an expressive sound is a sound that is an eliminative engager] because the two, expressive sound and sound that is an eliminative engager, are synonymous."

If he accepts the above [consequence that an expressive sound is an object-possessor within the two-fold division into
objects and object-possessors], "It follows that the subject, an expressive sound, is not an object-possessor within the two-fold division into objects and object-possessors, because of being an object within the two-fold division into objects and object-possessors. This is so because it is matter; that is so because it is sound."

With respect to what has been said, someone might say "It follows that whatever is a consciousness is necessarily an object-possessor within the two-fold division into objects and object-possessors because whatever is matter is necessarily an object within the two-fold division into objects and object-possessors."

We accept this because object-possessor—within the two-fold division into objects and object-possessors—and consciousness must be asserted as synonyms, and object within that two-fold division [into objects and object-possessors] and existent which is not a consciousness must be asserted as synonyms.

With respect to what has been said, someone might say, "It follows that the subject, a thought consciousness apprehending the horns of a rabbit, is an object-possessor within the two-fold division into objects and object-possessors because of being a consciousness."

If that consequence is accepted, "It follows with regard to that subject [a thought consciousness apprehending the horns of a rabbit] that its object exists because it is an object-possessor."
If that consequence is accepted, "It follows with regard to that subject [a thought consciousness apprehending the horns of a rabbit] that its object of comprehension exists because its object exists."

[To this we say] there is no pervasion.

If someone says that the reason is not established, "It follows with respect to the subject, a thought consciousness apprehending the horns of a rabbit, that its object exists because its appearing object exists. That [its appearing object exists] follows because the meaning generality of horns of a rabbit is its appearing object."

If someone says that the reason is not established, "It follows with regard to the subject, the horns of a rabbit, that its meaning generality is the appearing object of the thought apprehending it because it is selfless."

Someone might say "It follows that a prime cognizer is not an object within the two-fold division into objects and object-possessors because an omniscient consciousness is not an object within the two-fold division into objects and object-possessors."

If the consequence is accepted, "It follows that the subject, a prime cognizer, is an object within the two-fold division into objects and object-possessors because 1) it is an existent within the two-fold division into objects and object-possessors and 2) whatever is an existent is necessarily an object."

[To this we respond] there is no pervasion.
[Moreover, we say to that person] "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, a self-knower, is an apprehended within the two-fold division into apprehendeds and apprehenders because 1) it is an existent within that two-fold division [into apprehendeds and apprehenders] and 2) whatever is an existent is necessarily an apprehended."

The pervasion is parallel.

However, one cannot accept the pervasion because [a self-knower] is an apprehender within that two-fold division. This is because it is a self-knower.

With respect to what has been said, someone might say "It follows that the subject, a self-knower, is not that which is suitable to be an object of an awareness within the two-fold division into awarenesses and that which are suitable to be an object of an awareness because you have accepted the statement. You cannot accept this because it [a self-knower] is an object of knowledge within the two-fold division into awarenesses and objects of knowledge. That [it is an object of knowledge within the two-fold division into awarenesses and objects of knowledge] follows because of being an existent within the two-fold division into awarenesses and existents."

[To this we respond] there is no pervasion, because it is an awareness within that two-fold division [into awarenesses and existents].
Our own system: Concerning the first from among the two, object and object-possessor, the definition of an object is:

that which is known by an awareness.

When objects are divided, there are appearing objects, determined objects, and objects of engagement.

The appearing object of a particular awareness and apprehended object of that awareness are synonymous. Whatever is an established base is necessarily an appearing object. This is because whatever is a thing is necessarily the appearing object of a direct perceiver, and whatever is permanent is necessarily the appearing object of a conceptual consciousness.

The first reason is established because appearing object of a direct perceiver, apprehended object [of a direct perceiver], and thing are synonymous. Furthermore, it follows that whatever is a thing must be the appearing object of a direct perceiver because whatever is a thing must be that which is realized in a manifest manner by a direct perceiver.

The second basic reason [i.e. whatever is permanent is necessarily the appearing object of a conceptual consciousness] is established because appearing object of a conceptual consciousness, apprehended object [of a conceptual consciousness], and permanent phenomenon are synonymous.

Also object of engagement of a direct perceiver, and object of the mode of apprehension of a direct perceiver are synonymous. Determined object of thought, object of engagement [of thought], and object of the mode of apprehension of thought are synonymous.
Whatever is an established base is necessarily the object of the mode of apprehension of both a conceptual and a non-conceptual consciousness. Whatever is the object of the mode of apprehension of the thought consciousness apprehending it is not necessarily an object of the mode of apprehension of thought. This is because the horns of a rabbit are not an object of the mode of apprehension of thought. This follows because [the horns of a rabbit] are not an object of thought. This is because [the horns of a rabbit] are not an object of an awareness, which is because [the horns of a rabbit] are not that which is suitable to be an object of an awareness. It follows that the subject [the horns of a rabbit] is the object of the mode of apprehension of a thought consciousness apprehending it because of being selfless.

Concerning what has been said, someone might say, "It follows that the subject, a pot, is the object of the mode of apprehension of a thought consciousness apprehending it because of being selfless. You have asserted the pervasion. However you cannot accept the consequence because [pot] is the appearing object of the thought consciousness apprehending it. This is because [pot] appears to that [thought apprehending pot]."

[To this we say] there is no pervasion.

If someone said that the reason is not established, "It follows with respect to the subject [a pot] that it appears to the thought apprehending it because it is selfless."
Someone might say, "It follows that the subject, the selflessness of persons, is a thing because of being the appearing object of a direct perceiver. This is because [the selflessness of persons] is the appearing object of a yogic direct perceiver realizing the selflessness of persons. This is because it [the selflessness of persons] appears clearly to that [yogic direct perceiver realizing the selflessness of persons]. This follows because, in dependence on having engaged in continuous cultivation of an inferential cognition realizing the selflessness of persons, the attainment of a clear appearance with regard to the object of familiarization does occur."

[To this we respond] there is no pervasion, because that [consciousness] through continuous familiarity with that attains clear appearance with respect to compositional factors which are devoid of a self of persons. This is so because such a yogic direct perceiver explicitly realizes compositional factors which are devoid of a self of persons and implicitly realizes the selflessness of persons.

Someone might say, "It follows that the subject, sound, is either permanent or nonexistent because of being either the appearing object or the determined object of a conceptual consciousness apprehending sound to be permanent; it follows [that it is either the appearing object or the determined object of a conceptual consciousness apprehending sound to be permanent] because of being the object of [such a consciousness]."
[To this we respond] there is no pervasion.

The reason [i.e., that sound is the object of such a consciousness] is established because [sound] is the object of observation of [such a consciousness].

If someone says that the definition "appearing object" is "that which is known through having appeared", [we will respond], "It [absurdly] follows that the definition of 'appearing object of a certain mind' is 'that which is known through having appeared to that mind' because the definition of 'appearing object' is 'that which is known through having appeared'. You have explicitly accepted the reason."

If the consequence [that the definition of "appearing object of a certain mind" is "that which is known through having appeared to that mind"] is accepted, "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, the meaning-genericity of permanent sound, is that which is known through having appeared to a conceptual consciousness apprehending sound to be permanent, because of being the appearing object of a conceptual consciousness apprehending sound to be permanent."

If he says the reason is not established, "It follows with respect to the subject, permanent sound, that its meaning-genericity is the appearing object of the conceptual consciousness apprehending it because it is selfless."

If the above consequence [that the meaning-genericity of permanent sound is that which is known through having appeared to a conceptual consciousness apprehending sound to be
permanent] is accepted, "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, the meaning-generality of permanent sound, is that which is known by a conceptual consciousness apprehending sound to be permanent because of being that which is known through having appeared to [such a conceptual consciousness]."

If that consequence is accepted, "It [absurdly] follows that the subject [the meaning-generality of permanent sound] is that which is realized by [such a conceptual consciousness]."

If this consequence is accepted, "It [absurdly] follows that there exists realization by a conceptual consciousness apprehending sound to be permanent."

If this is accepted, "It follows with respect to the subject, a conceptual consciousness apprehending sound to be permanent, that realization by it does not exist because it is a wrong consciousness; this is so because it is a conceptual wrong consciousness.

Moreover [we say to that person], "It [absurdly] follows that the definition of 'the object of a certain awareness' is 'that which is known by that awareness' because it was accepted [that the definition of 'appearing object of a certain mind' is 'that which is known through having appeared to that mind']."

If it is accepted [that the definition of 'the object of a certain awareness' is 'that which is known by that awareness'], "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, a single moon, is that which is known by a sense consciousness which sees a double moon because of being the object of a sense consciousness which sees a double moon."
If someone says that the reason is not established, "It follows that the subject [a single moon] is that [which is known by a sense consciousness which sees a double moon] because of being the appearing object of that [sense consciousness which sees a double moon]."

If someone says that the reason is not established, "It follows that the subject, a single moon, is the appearing object of that [sense consciousness which sees a double moon] because of appearing to that [sense consciousness which sees a double moon]."

If someone says that there is no pervasion, [we respond] "It follows with respect to the subject, a sense consciousness which sees a double moon, that whatever appears to it must be its appearing object because it is a non-conceptual consciousness.

If someone says that the reason is not established, "It follows that the subject, a sense consciousness which sees a double moon, is a non-conceptual consciousness because of being a sense consciousness."

If the above consequence [that a single moon is that which is known by a sense consciousness which sees a double moon] is accepted, "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, a single moon, is realized by a sense consciousness which sees a double moon because of being that which is known by a [sense consciousness which sees a double moon]. The reason has been accepted [although it should not have been]."
Chapter Two
Object-Possessors

With respect to the second, object-possessors, there are two parts: definition and divisions. First, the definition of something's being an object-possessor is:

a thing which possesses its respective object.

Second, when object-possessors are divided, there are three: persons, awarenesses, and expressive sounds. With regard to persons, the definition of something's being a person is:

a being imputed in dependence upon any of its five aggregates.

Self, I, person, and being are synonymous. An illustration is a being who possesses a basis of one of the three realms.

With regard to the second, awarenesses, there are two parts: definition and divisions. First, the definition of an awareness is:

a knower.

The definition of a consciousness is:

that which is clear and knowing.

Awareness, knower, and consciousness are synonymous.

Second, when awarenesses are divided, there are two: prime cognizers and non-prime awarenesses.

With regard to the first of these [that is, prime cognizers], someone might say that the definition of a "prime
cognizer" is "an incontrovertible knower."

[To that person we say,] "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, a subsequent cognizer, is a prime cognizer because of being an incontrovertible knower."

If someone says that the reason is not established, "It follows that the subject [a subsequent cognizer] is [an incontrovertible knower] because of being a knower which gets at its object of analysis."

If someone says that there is no pervasion, "It follows that the pervasion [that whatever is a knower which gets at its object of analysis is necessarily an incontrovertible knower] does exist, because the definition of something's being an incontrovertible consciousness is a knower which gets at its object of analysis."

If the root consequence [that a subsequent cognizer is a prime cognizer] is accepted, "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, a subsequent cognizer, is a knower which is a new realizer because of being a prime cognizer. The reason has been explicitly accepted."

If the consequence [that a subsequent cognizer is a knower which is a new realizer] is accepted, "It follows that the subject, a subsequent cognizer, is not a knower which is a new realizer because of being a knower realizing that which has already been realized. This is because of being that subject."

Also someone might say that the definition of "prime cognizer" is "a knower which is incontrovertible with regard to its object of comprehension."
[To such a person we say], "It [absurdly] follows with regard to that subject [a knower which is incontrovertible with regard to its own object of comprehension] that if a prime cognizer exists, it must exist, because it is the definition of a prime cognizer. The reason has been accepted."

If he accepts the consequence, "It [absurdly] follows with regard to the subject, pot, that there exists a knower which is incontrovertible with regard to its own object of comprehension because a prime cognizer exists. [That a prime cognizer exists] follows because a prime cognizer which knows all exists."

If the consequence [that with regard to the subject, pot, there exists a knower which is incontrovertible with regard to its own object of comprehension] is accepted, "It follows with regard to the subject, pot, that there does not exist a knower which is incontrovertible with regard to its own object of comprehension because its own object of comprehension does not exist."

If someone says that the reason is not established, "It follows with regard to the subject, pot, that its own object of comprehension (rang gi gzhal bya) does not exist because its object of comprehension (khyod kyi gzhal bya) does not exist. [That its object of comprehension does not exist] follows because it [pot] is matter."

Someone might say that the definition of "direct prime cognizer" is "a new incontrovertible knower which is free from conceptuality and non-mistaken."
Someone [else] might say to such a person, "It [absurdly] follows with regard to the subject, the first moment of an omniscient consciousness, that it is that definiendum [i.e. a direct perceiver is a prime cognizer] because of being that definition [a new incontrovertible knower that is free from conceptuality and non-mistaken]."

If the consequence is accepted, "It [absurdly] follows that a direct perceiver is a prime cognizer because the predicate was accepted. One cannot accept this consequence [that a direct perceiver is a prime cognizer] because the second moment of a direct perceiver is a direct perceiver."

[To this our own system says] there is no pervasion.

[The play in this debate concerns whether mngon sum tshad ma is taken to mean "directly perceiving prime cognizer" or "a direct perceiver is a prime cognizer." The Tibetan permits both readings.]

The fault according to our system is [that one can say] "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, a pot, is that definition [a new incontrovertible knower that is free from conceptuality and non-mistaken] because of being that definiendum [because a direct perceiver is a prime cognizer]. The reason and clarification [i.e. predicate] are easy."

If someone says that the definition of a "direct prime cognizer" is "a knower which is free from conceptuality", "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, a sense consciousness perceiving snow mountains as blue, is a direct prime cognizer because of being a knower free from conceptuality."
If someone says that the reason is not established, "It follows that that subject [a sense consciousness perceiving snow mountains as blue] is [a knower which is free from conceptuality] because of being a non-conceptual consciousness. This is because it is a sense consciousness."

If the root consequence [that a sense consciousness perceiving snow mountains as blue is a direct prime cognizer] is accepted, "It follows that that subject [a sense consciousness perceiving snow mountains as blue] is not a direct prime cognizer because of not being a non-mistaken consciousness. This is because it is a mistaken consciousness."

If someone says that the reason is not established, "It follows that that subject [a sense consciousness perceiving snow mountains as blue] is [a mistaken consciousness] because of being a wrong consciousness."

In our own system, the definition of a prime cognizer is:

a new incontrovertible knower.

There is a necessity for expressing the three--"new", "incontrovertible", and "knower"--as parts of the definition of prime cognizer, because "new" eliminates that subsequent cognizers are prime cognizers, "incontrovertible" eliminates that correctly assuming consciousnesses are prime cognizers, and "knower" eliminates that physical sense powers are prime cognizers.
When prime cognizers are divided, there are two: direct and inferential prime cognizers. The individual definitions, illustrations, and so forth will be explained later.

The definition of an awareness which is a direct perceiver is:

a knower which is free from conceptuality and non-mistaken.

When awarenesses which are direct perceivers are divided, there are four: sense, mental, self-knowing, and yogic direct perceivers.

With respect to the first of these [sense direct perceivers] there are two parts, definition and divisions. First, the definition of a sense direct perceiver is:

1) that which is produced in dependence on its own uncommon empowering condition, a physical sense power, and 2) is a knower that is free from conceptuality and non-mistaken.

Second, when [sense direct perceivers] are divided, there are three: prime cognizers, subsequent cognizers, and awarenesses to which an object appears but is not ascertained that are sense direct perceivers.

The first is, for example, the first moment of a sense direct perceiver apprehending a form. The second is, for example, the second moment of a sense direct perceiver apprehending a form. The third is, for example, a sense direct perceiver apprehending a form in the continuum of a person whose mind is especially attracted to a pleasant sound.
When sense direct perceivers are divided in another way, there are five: sense direct perceivers apprehending forms, sounds, odors, tastes, and tangible objects. The definition of a sense direct perceiver apprehending a form is:

1) that which is generated in dependence on its own uncommon empowering condition, the eye sense power, and its observed object condition, a form, and
2) is a knower that is free from conceptuality and non-mistaken.

Extend this format to the other [sense direct perceivers]. Thus, that which is generated in dependence on an ear sense power which serves as its own uncommon empowering condition and a sound which serves as its observed object condition [and is a knower that is free from conceptuality and non-mistaken is the definition of a sense direct perceiver apprehending a sound], etc.

With respect to the second, mental direct perceivers, there are two parts: definition and divisions. First, the definition of a mental direct perceiver is:

1) that which is generated in dependence on a mental sense power which is its own uncommon empowering condition and
2) is a consciousness that is an other knower which is free from conceptuality and non-mistaken.

Second, when mental direct perceivers are divided, there are three: prime cognizers, subsequent cognizers, and awarenesses to which an object appears but is not ascertained which are
mental direct perceivers. The first, [a prime cognizer which is a mental direct perceiver] is, for example, the first moment of a clairvoyance which knows another's mind. The second [a subsequent cognizer which is a mental direct perceiver] is, for example, the second moment of a clairvoyance which knows another's mind. The third [an awareness to which an object appears but is not ascertained which is a mental direct perceiver] is, for example, a mental direct perceiver apprehending a sound in the continuum of a person whose mind is especially attracted to a beautiful form.

With respect to the third, self-knowing direct perceivers, there are two: definitions and divisions. First, the definition of a self-knower is:

that which has the aspect of an apprehender.

The definition of a self-knowing direct perceiver is:

that which has the aspect of an apprehender, is free from conceptuality, and is non-mistaken.

Second, when [self-knowing direct perceivers] are divided there are three: prime cognizers, subsequent cognizers, and awarenesses to which an object appears but is not ascertained which are self-knowing direct perceivers. The first [a self-knowing direct prime cognizer] is, for example, the first moment of a self-knowing direct perceiver that experiences an eye consciousness. The second [a self-knowing direct subsequent cognizer] is,
for example, the second moment of a self-knowing direct perceiver that experiences an eye consciousness. Examples of the third [an awareness to which an object appears but is not ascertained which is a self-knowing direct perceiver] are a self-knowing direct perceiver in the continuum of a Samkhya that experiences bliss as being a consciousness, a self-knowing direct perceiver in the continuum of a Vaisheshika that experiences bliss as being a consciousness, and a self-knower in the continuum of a Nihilist which experiences an inferential cognizer as being a prime cognizer.

With respect to the fourth, yogic direct perceivers, there are two: definition and divisions. First, the definition of a yogic direct perceiver is:

1) that which is generated in dependence on its own uncommon empowering condition, a meditative stabilization which is a union of calm abiding and special insight, and
2) is an other-knowing exalted knower in the continuum of a Superior which is free from conceptuality and non-mistaken.

When [yogic direct perceivers] are divided there are two: prime and subsequent cognizers which are yogic direct perceivers. There are no awarenesses to which an object appears but is not ascertained which are yogic direct perceivers because whatever is a yogic direct perceiver necessarily ascertains its object of comprehension. This is because Dharmakirti's Commentary on (Dignaga's) "Compendium on Prime Cognition" says, "From just seeing, the great intelligent ones ascertain all aspects."
Although subsequent cognizers that are yogic direct perceivers exist, the second moment and so forth of an omniscient exalted wisdom are not subsequent cognizers because whatever is an omniscient exalted wisdom is necessarily a prime cognizer. This is so because Gyel-tsap's Explanation of (Dharmakirti's) "Commentary on (Dignaga's) 'Compendium on Prime Cognition'": Unmistaken Illumination of the Path to Liberation says, "No matter how much I turn inside and think about it, I do not feel that an omniscient exalted wisdom is not pervaded by being a new realizer" [in other words, an omniscient exalted wisdom is necessarily a new realizer]. Also Kay-drup Rin-bo-chay's Clearing Away Darkness of Mind with Respect to the Treatises on Prime Cognition says, "If [something] became a subsequent cognizer merely through [its object's] being apprehended by a former prime cognizer, it would follow that the second and subsequent moments of an omniscient exalted wisdom would be subsequent cognizers. There exist many such flaws as will be indicated below."

The definition of a direct prime cognizer is

a new incontrovertible knower that is free of conceptuality.

When direct prime cognizers are divided, there are four: self-knowing, sense, mental, and yogic direct prime cognizers. From among these, the definition of the first [a self-knowing direct prime cognizer] is:

a new incontrovertible knower, free from conceptuality, which is directed only inward and is just an apprehender.
The definition of the second [a sense direct prime cognizer] is:

a new incontrovertible knower, free from conceptuality, which arises in dependence upon a physical sense power that is its uncommon empowering condition.

When [sense direct prime cognizers] are divided, there are five—sense direct prime cognizers apprehending forms, and so forth.

The definition of the third [a mental direct prime cognizer] is:

a new incontrovertible knower, free from conceptuality, which arises in dependence upon a mental sense power that is its uncommon empowering condition.

When [mental direct prime cognizers] are divided, there are six—mental direct prime cognizers apprehending forms, and so forth.

The definition of the fourth [a yogic direct prime cognizer] is:

an other-knowing exalted knower in the continuum of a Superior which, in dependence upon a meditative stabilization that is a union of calm abiding and special insight and is its [uncommon] empowering condition, newly and directly realizes either subtle impermanence or the coarse or subtle selflessness of persons.

When [yogic direct prime cognizers] are divided, there are three: prime cognizers directly realizing subtle impermanence, the coarse selflessness of persons, and the subtle selflessness of persons.
The explanation of facsimiles of a direct perceiver has two parts: definition and divisions. First, the definition of a facsimile of a direct perceiver is:

a knower which is mistaken with regard to its appearing object.

[Facsimile of a direct perceiver] and mistaken consciousness are synonyms. Second, when [facsimiles of a direct perceiver] are divided, there are seven. This is because there are six conceptual and one non-conceptual facsimiles of a direct perceiver.

The first six [conceptual facsimiles of a direct perceiver] exist because there are mistaken conceptions, conventional conceptions, inferential conceptions, conceptions arisen from inference, memory conceptions, and wishing conceptions. Illustrations are, respectively, of the first, a thought apprehending sound as permanent; of the second, an inferential cognizer which realizes sound to be impermanent; of the third, a thought which is a mind apprehending a sign; of the fourth, a thought which arises after an inferential cognizer; of the fifth, a thought which today remembers an object of the past; and, of the sixth, a thought which today wishes for an object of the future.

There are many non-conceptual facsimiles of a direct perceiver. From among the two, [non-conceptual facsimiles of a direct perceiver] which are mental consciousnesses and which are sense consciousnesses, an illustration of the first was explained
above. With regard to the second, [non-conceptual facsimiles of a direct perceiver which are sense consciousnesses], there are four: the cause of error existing in the basis, in the abode, in the object, and in the immediately preceding condition. The first, [the cause of error existing in the basis], is, for example, an eye impaired by obscuring disease, for a sense consciousness which sees one moon as two is produced in dependence upon that. The second, [the cause of error existing in the abode], is, for example, sitting in a boat, for a sense consciousness which sees trees as moving is produced in dependence upon that. The third, [the cause of error existing in the object], is, for example, a quickly whirling firebrand, for a sense consciousness which sees a firebrand as a wheel is produced in dependence upon that. The fourth, [the cause of error existing in the immediately preceding condition], is, for example, a mind disturbed by hatred, for a sense consciousness which sees the earth as red is produced in dependence upon that.

Non-conceptual wrong consciousness, non-conceptual facsimile of a direct perceiver, and consciousness which has a clear appearance of a non-existent are synonymous.

The definition of an inferential prime cognizer is:

a new incontrovertible determinative knower that is directly produced in dependence on a correct sign which is its basis.

When [inferential prime cognizers] are divided, there are three:
inferential cognizers by power of the fact, through renown, and through belief. An illustration of the first, [an inferential cognizer by the power of the fact], is an inferential cognizer which realizes that sound is impermanent through the sign of being a product. An illustration of the second, [an inferential cognizer through renown], is an inferential cognizer which realizes that it is suitable to express the rabbit-possessor by the term moon from the sign of its existing among objects of thought. An illustration of the third [an inferential cognizer through belief], is an inferential cognizer which realizes that the scripture, "From giving, resources, from ethics, a happy [migration]," is incontrovertible with respect to the meaning indicated by it by the sign of its being a scripture free from the three contradictions.

An inferential cognizer through renown is necessarily an inferential cognizer by power of the fact. Also whatever is a direct perceiver is not necessarily a direct prime cognizer because the second moment of a sense direct perceiver apprehending a form is not a prime cognizer. That follows because that [i.e. the second moment of a sense direct perceiver apprehending a form] and the second moment of an inferential cognizer which realizes that sound is impermanent are subsequent cognizers. This is because Dharmottara's The Correct says, "The two, the first moment of a direct perceiver and the first moment of inferential cognizer, are prime cognizers, but subsequent moments in the continuums of those because of being non-different in establishment and abiding, have forsaken being prime cognizers."
Furthermore, when [prime cognizers] are terminologically divided there are two: inference for oneself and inference for another. The first [inference for oneself] and inferential cognizer are synonyms. The second [inference for another] and correct proof statement are synonyms.

Someone might say, "The definition of an inferential prime cognizer (rjes dpag tshad ma which can also be read as "the definition of inferential cognizer is a prime cognizer") is a determinative knower which is generated in dependence on the stating of a correct sign which is its basis and which is new and incontrovertible with respect to its object of comprehension, a hidden phenomenon."

[To that person we respond], "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, the horns of a rabbit, is that definition because of being that definiendum."

If he says that the reason is not established, "It follows with respect to the subject [the horns of a rabbit] that an inferential cognizer is a prime cognizer because an inferential cognizer is an inferential prime cognizer."

If he says that there is no pervasion, pervasion does exist because the three—inferential cognizer, inferential prime cognizer, and inference for oneself—are synonyms.

Ancillary, with respect to explaining minds apprehending a sign, there are two parts: definition and divisions. The definition of something's being a mind apprehending a sign in the proof that sound is impermanent by the sign product is:
it is a knower—in the continuum of a full-fledged other party for whom sound is being proved to be impermanent by the sign product—that is a common locus of (1) being incontrovertible with respect to either that sound is a product or that whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent and also (2) being the cause of an inferential cognizer realizing that sound is impermanent by the sign product and arises in dependence upon its acting as a causal condition.

When [minds apprehending a sign] are divided, there are two: (1) minds apprehending a sign—in the proof that sound is impermanent by the sign product—which comprehend that sound is a product, and (2) minds apprehending a sign [in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign product] which comprehend that whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent.

The definition of the first [something's being a mind apprehending a sign—in the proof that sound is impermanent by the sign product—which comprehends that sound is a product] is:

it is a knower—in the continuum of a full-fledged other party for whom sound is being proved to be impermanent by the sign product—that is a common locus of (1) being incontrovertible with respect to sound as a product and also (2) being the cause of an inferential cognizer which realizes that sound is impermanent by the sign product and arises in dependence upon its acting as a causal condition.
The definition of the second [something's being a mind apprehending a sign—in the proof that sound is impermanent by the sign product—which comprehends that whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent] is:

it is a knower—in the continuum of a full-fledged other party for whom sound is being proved to be impermanent by the sign product—that is a common locus of (1) being incontrovertible with respect to whatever is a product necessarily being impermanent and also (2) being the cause of an inferential cognizer which realizes sound as impermanent by the sign product and arises in dependence upon its acting as a causal condition.

When the first [minds apprehending a sign—in the proof that sound is impermanent by the sign product—which comprehend that sound is a product] are divided, there are three: direct perceivers, inferential cognizers, and subsequent cognizers that are minds apprehending a sign—in the proof that sound is impermanent by the sign product—which comprehend that sound is a product.

From among these, an illustration of the first [a direct perceiver that is a mind apprehending a sign—in the proof that sound is impermanent by the sign product—which comprehends that sound is a product] is a direct perceiver comprehending that sound is a product in the continuum of a full-fledged other party for whom it is being proved that sound is impermanent by the sign product.
An illustration of the second [an inferential cognizer that is a mind apprehending a sign—in the proof that sound is impermanent by the sign product—which comprehends that sound is a product] is an inferential cognizer comprehending that sound is a product in the continuum of [such a person].

An illustration of the third [a subsequent cognizer that is a mind apprehending a sign—in the proof that sound is impermanent by the sign product—which comprehends that sound is a product] is the second moment, and so forth, of an inferential cognizer comprehending that sound is a product, in the continuum of [such a person].

Also, with respect to the second [minds apprehending a sign—in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign product—which comprehend that whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent], there are three: direct perceivers, inferential cognizers, and subsequent cognizers that are minds apprehending a sign—in the proof that sound is impermanent by the sign product—which comprehend that whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent.

From among these, an illustration of the first [a direct perceiver that is a mind apprehending a sign—in the proof that sound is impermanent by the sign product—which comprehends that whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent] is a direct perceiver comprehending that whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent in the continuum of a full-fledged other party for whom it is being proved that sound is impermanent by the sign product.
An illustration of the second [an inferential cognizer that is a mind apprehending a sign—in the proof that sound is impermanent by the sign product—which comprehends that whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent] is an inferential cognizer comprehending that whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent, in the continuum of [such a person].

An illustration of the third [a subsequent cognizer that is a mind apprehending a sign—in the proof that sound is impermanent by the sign product—which comprehends that whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent] is the second moment, and so forth, of an inferential cognizer comprehending that whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent, in the continuum of [such a person].

When prime cognizers are divided [in another way], there are two, prime cognizers which induce ascertainment by themselves and prime cognizers when ascertainment is induced by another. With respect to each of those, there are two parts: definitions and divisions. Someone might say with respect to the first of those [the definition of a prime cognizer which induces ascertainment by itself], that the definition of "something's being a prime cognizer which induces ascertainment by itself" is "a new incontrovertible knower which by itself ascertains itself as being a prime cognizer."

[To this we respond] "It [absurdly] follows that whatever is a prime cognizer which induces ascertainment by itself must by itself ascertain itself (rang nyid tshad ma yin pa rang nyid
nges pa) as being a prime cognizer because that thesis [the above definition] is correct."

If he accepts the consequence, "It [absurdly] follows that whatever is [a prime cognizer which induces ascertainment by itself] necessarily ascertains itself by itself (khyod kyis khyod nges pa) because [the previous consequence] was accepted."

If he accepts this consequence, "It [absurdly] follows that whatever is [a prime cognizer which induces ascertainment by itself] necessarily realizes itself by itself because [the previous consequence] was accepted."

If he accepts this consequence, "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, a sense direct perceiver apprehending a form, [realizes itself by itself] because of being [a prime cognizer which induces ascertainment by itself]. The pervasion has been accepted."

If he accepts the consequence, [we respond] "It follows with respect to the subject, a sense direct perceiver apprehending a form, that it does not realize a sense direct perceiver apprehending a form because between the two, a sense direct perceiver apprehending a form and a form, it realizes only the form. This is because between the two, [a sense direct perceiver apprehending a form and a form] it [that is, a sense direct perceiver apprehending a form] is definite as an object possessor of only a form."

Someone else might say, "Whatever is a prime cognizer which induces ascertainment by itself is necessarily ascertained as a
prime cognizer by the self-knowing direct perceiver which experiences it."

[We respond], "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, a sense direct perceiver apprehending blue, is [ascertained as a prime cognizer by the self-knowing direct perceiver which experiences it] because [of being a prime cognizer which induces ascertainment by itself]. The pervasion has been accepted.

The reason [that a sense direct perceiver apprehending blue is a prime cognizer which induces ascertainment by itself is established because, 1) [a sense direct perceiver apprehending blue] is either a prime cognizer which induces ascertainment by itself or a prime cognizer when ascertainment is induced by another, and 2) it is not the latter. The first reason is established because [a sense direct perceiver apprehending blue] is a prime cognizer. The second reason is established because a sense direct perceiver apprehending a form is not a prime cognizer when ascertainment is induced by another."

If he says that the reason is not established, "It follows that the subject, [a sense direct perceiver apprehending a form] is [not a prime cognizer when ascertainment is induced by another] because of being a prime cognizer which induces ascertainment by itself."

If he says that the reason is not established, "It follows with regard to the subject, a form, that the sense direct perceiver which apprehends it is a prime cognizer which induces ascertainment by itself because it [the form] is matter."
With regard to what has been said, someone might say, "It [absurdly] follows with respect to the subject, a distant red color which in fact is the color of fire and with regard to which there is doubt wondering whether or not it is the color of fire, that the sense direct perceiver which apprehends it is a prime cognizer which induces ascertainment by itself because it is matter."

[We reply that] the subject is faulty and one cannot accept that consequence because that [subject] is a prime cognizer when ascertainment is induced by another. This follows because an illustration of that exists.

If he accepts the basic consequence [above, that a sense direct perceiver apprehending blue is ascertained as a prime cognizer by the self-knowing direct perceiver which experiences it], "It [absurdly] follows that the self-knowing direct perceiver which experiences a sense direct perceiver apprehending blue realizes that sense direct perceiver apprehending blue as being a prime cognizer because that [self-knowing direct perceiver] ascertains that [sense direct perceiver] as being a prime cognizer. The reason has been accepted."

One cannot accept this consequence because it is correct to make the distinction that although that [self-knowing direct perceiver] realizes that [sense direct perceiver] as being a consciousness, it does not realize that [sense direct perceiver] as being a prime cognizer.

He might say, "The self-knowing direct perceiver which experiences a sense direct perceiver apprehending blue realizes
the sense direct perceiver apprehending blue as a prime cognizer because that [self-knowing direct perceiver] apprehends the sense direct perceiver apprehending blue as a prime cognizer."

[We respond that] there is no pervasion.

The reason is established because although that [self-knowing direct perceiver] apprehends the sense direct perceiver apprehending blue as being a prime cognizer, since it does not realize that [sense direct perceiver] as being a prime cognizer, it is asserted as being like not apprehending [it as such].

Furthermore, it follows that the self-knowing direct perceiver which experiences a sense direct perceiver apprehending blue does not realize the sense direct perceiver apprehending blue to be a prime cognizer because that [self-knowing direct perceiver] can realize the entity of the sense direct perceiver apprehending blue and can realize the sense direct perceiver apprehending blue to be a consciousness, but ascertainment of the sense direct perceiver apprehending blue as a prime cognizer must depend upon another conventional prime cognizer arising after it.

Our own system is as follows: Gen-dun-drup's Ornament for Knowledge, the General Meaning [of Dharmakirti's Commentary on (Dignaga's) "Compendium on Prime Cognition"] posits thus:
The definition of a prime cognizer that induces ascertainment by itself is:

1. it is a prime cognizer; 2. it is able to induce ascertainment through its own power with respect to its own non-arising if the nature of its object of comprehension did not abide with the object.

The definition of a prime cognizer when ascertainment is induced by another is:

1. it is a prime cognizer; 2. ascertainment must be induced through the power of another [prime cognizer] with respect to its own non-arising if the nature of its object of comprehension did not abide with the object.

It is correct to posit these in this way.

With respect to the second, the explanation of the divisions, someone might say that among both prime cognizers that induce ascertainment by themselves and prime cognizers when ascertainment is induced by another there exist both direct prime cognizers and inferential prime cognizers.

[We respond that] that is incorrect because although both those [i.e. direct and inferential prime cognizers] exist among prime cognizers that induce ascertainment by themselves, whatever is a prime cognizer when ascertainment is induced by another must be a direct prime cognizer.

Moreover, that is incorrect because, although both of those [i.e. prime cognizers which induce ascertainment by
themselves and when it is induced by another] exist among direct prime cognizers, whatever is an inferential cognizer must be a prime cognizer that induces ascertainment by itself.

Someone might say, "It is not correct to say that a sense direct perceiver that apprehends from far away a reddish color that is, in fact, the color of fire and with respect to which a conceptual consciousness wonders whether or not it is the color of fire is a prime cognizer when ascertainment is induced by another; this is because there is no time when a conceptual consciousness wonders whether or not something that is, in fact, the color of fire is the color of fire. That follows because a conceptual consciousness that wonders whether or not something is the color of fire does not exist. This is so because whatever is the color of fire is necessarily realized as the color of fire by a conceptual consciousness."

In our own system, when prime cognizers that induce ascertainment by themselves are divided, there are five: sense direct prime cognizers to which the ability to perform a function appears, sense direct prime cognizers that have a familiar object, self-knowing direct prime cognizers, yogic direct prime cognizers, and inferential prime cognizers. Whatever is one of those five is necessarily a prime cognizer that induces ascertainment by itself.

Illustrations are as follows: the first [a sense direct prime cognizer to which the ability to perform a function appears] is, for example, a sense direct perceiver that apprehends fire
as able to perform the functions of cooking and burning; the second [a sense direct prime cognizer having a familiar object] is, for example, a sense direct perceiver in the continuum of a son apprehending his father's form; the third [a self-knowing direct prime cognizer] is, for example, a self-knowing direct perceiver that experiences an eye consciousness; the fourth [a yogic direct prime cognizer] is, for example, an omniscient consciousness that is an other-knowing mental consciousness; the fifth [an inferential prime cognizer] is, for example, an inferential consciousness that realizes sound to be impermanent.

When prime cognizers when ascertainment is induced by another are divided terminologically there are three: initial direct perceivers, inattentive direct perceivers, and direct perceivers having a cause of error. Illustrations are as follows: the first [an initial direct perceiver] is, for example, a sense direct perceiver in the continuum of a person who has not previously experienced seeing an utpala which apprehends the color of an utpala. The second [an inattentive direct perceiver] is, for example, a sense direct perceiver in the continuum of a person whose mind is especially attracted to a beautiful form which apprehends a sound; the third [a direct perceiver having a cause of error] is, for example, a sense direct perceiver apprehending the color of a mirage which directly generates a superimposition apprehending the mirage as water.

When [prime cognizers when ascertainment is induced by another] are terminologically divided [in another way], there
are three: prime cognizers when ascertainment of the appearance is induced by itself but of the truth by another, prime cognizers when ascertainment of the generality is induced by itself but of the particular by another, and prime cognizers when ascertainment of even the mere appearance is induced by another. The first is, for example, a sense direct perceiver apprehending in the distance a reddish color which is in fact the color of fire and with respect to which there is doubt, wondering, "Is that the color of fire or not?" The second is, for example, a sense direct perceiver apprehending a tree having leaves and branches which is in fact an Ashoka tree and with respect to which there is doubt, wondering, "Is that an Ashoka tree or not?" The third is, for example, a sense direct perceiver apprehending blue which induces a doubting consciousness that thinks, "Did I see blue or not?"

There is a difference between those [prime cognizers when ascertainment is induced by another] as to whether they are actual or imputed, for the first and second are actual [prime cognizers when ascertainment is induced by another] whereas the latter one [a prime cognizer when ascertainment of even the mere appearance is induced by another] is an imputed one.

Also, from amongst those, the first [a prime cognizer when ascertainment of the appearance is induced by itself but of the truth by another] is both that which induces ascertainment by itself and also a prime cognizer which induces ascertainment by itself with respect to a reddish color in the distance which
is in fact the color of fire but with respect to which there is doubt, wondering, "Is that the color of fire or not?" It is also both that when ascertainment is induced by another and a prime cognizer when ascertainment is induced by another with respect to such a reddish color being the color of fire. However, it is not a prime cognizer with respect to that [reddish color being the color of fire].

In brief, whatever is a prime cognizer when ascertainment is induced by another is necessarily a prime cognizer. However, whatever is a prime cognizer when ascertainment is induced by another with respect to a particular phenomenon is necessarily not a prime cognizer with respect to that phenomenon. This is because whatever is a prime cognizer with respect to a particular phenomenon is necessarily a prime cognizer which induces ascertainment by itself with respect to that phenomenon.

When prime/valid cognizers are terminologically divided [in another way] there are three: valid cognizers that are persons, valid cognizers that are speech, and valid cognizers that are consciousnesses. The first [a valid cognizer that is a person] is, for example, the teacher Buddha. The second [a valid cognizer that is speech] is, for example, the wheel of doctrine of the four noble truths. The third [a valid cognizer that is a consciousness] is, for example, a direct perceiver or an inferential cognizer.
With respect to the enumeration being definite, prime cognizers are divided into two, direct and inferential prime cognizers. That more than these are unnecessary and fewer would not be inclusive is the meaning of the enumeration of prime cognizers being limited to two for prime cognizers are limited to those two. If someone says the reason is not established, "That follows [i.e., that the enumeration of prime cognizers is limited to two] because the enumeration of objects of comprehension is limited to the two, specifically and generally characterized phenomena.

With respect to differences in substantial entity, direct perceiver and inferential cognizer are one substantial entity because direct perceiver is one substantial entity with inferential cognizer.

If someone says the reason is not established, "It follows that the subject, direct perceiver, is one substantial entity with inferential cognizer because of being one substantial entity with a self-knowing direct perceiver experiencing an inferential cognizer."

If he says there is no pervasion, "It follows with respect to the subject, an inferential cognizer, that whatever is one substantial entity with a self-knowing direct perceiver experiencing it must be one substantial entity with it because the two, it and the self-knowing direct perceiver experiencing it, are one substantial entity in establishment and abiding in terms of object, time, and nature. This is because it is a consciousness."
If he says the above reason [that a direct perceiver is one substantial entity with a self-knowing direct perceiver experiencing an inferential cognizer] is not established, "It follows with respect to the subject, direct perceiver, that it is one substantial entity with a self-knowing direct perceiver experiencing an inferential cognizer because (1) it is a thing, and (2) a self-knowing direct perceiver experiencing an inferential cognizer is a particularity of it."

In dependence on this reasoning, [all of the following] are established as one substantial entity: the two, conceptual consciousness and nonconceptual consciousness; the two, mistaken consciousness and nonmistaken consciousness; the two, sense consciousness and mental consciousness; the two, mind and mental factor; and the two, prime cognizer and non-prime cognizer.

Someone might say that the definition of "nonconceptual consciousness" is "that which is free from the substantial entity of conceptuality."

[To that person we respond], "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, a self-knowing direct perceiver experiencing a conceptual consciousness, is free from the substantial entity of conceptuality because of being free from conceptuality. [This is so] because it is a direct perceiver."

If he accepts the basic consequence [that a self-knowing direct perceiver experiencing a conceptual consciousness is free from the substantial entity of conceptuality], "It follows
that that subject [a self-knowing direct perceiver experiencing a conceptual consciousness] is not free from the substantial entity of conceptuality because of being one substantial entity in establishment and abiding with a conceptual consciousness in terms of object, time, and nature."

If he says the reason is not established, "It follows with respect to the subject, a conceptual consciousness, that the self-knowing direct perceiver experiencing it is one substantial entity in establishment and abiding with it in terms of object, time, and nature because it is a consciousness."

With respect to what has been said, someone might say "It follows that such a direct perceiver is not the substantial entity of conceptuality because of being the substantial entity of a non-conceptual consciousness."

[To this we respond] there is no pervasion.

If someone says the reason is not established, "It follows that [such a direct perceiver is the substantial entity of a nonconceptual consciousness] because of being a particularity of a nonconceptual consciousness."

Therefore, the definition of free from conceptuality is:

free from being a determinative knower that apprehends a sound [generality] and a meaning [generality] as suitable to be mixed.

With respect to what has been said, someone might say, "It follows that whatever is a direct perceiver is necessarily a non-mistaken
knower that is free from conceptuality because the definition of 'directly perceiving awareness' is 'a non-mistaken knower that is free from conceptuality.'"

Upon our accepting that statement, someone might say, "It follows that the subject, a sense consciousness which sees a single moon as two, is a non-mistaken knower because of being a directly perceiving awareness."

If someone says that the reason is not established, "It follows that that subject [a sense consciousness that sees a single moon as two] is that [i.e. a directly perceiving awareness] because of being a facsimile of a direct perceiver."

[To this we respond] there is no pervasion.

If someone says that the reason is not established, "It follows that that subject [a sense consciousness that sees a single moon as two] is that [i.e., a facsimile of a direct perceiver] because of being a consciousness having a clear appearance of a non-existent. This is because of being a non-conceptual wrong consciousness."

With respect to what has been said, someone might say, "It follows that the subject, a non-existent sense consciousness that sees a single moon as double, is a consciousness because of being a consciousness having a clear appearance."

[We say back] to that person, "It follows that the subject, a previously non-existent pot, is a thing because of being newly generated."

If he says we have given an answer in which the basis of debate is faulty, it is similar to the former [subject which he
posited].

If he says that the reason [i.e., that a previously non-existent pot is newly generated] is not established, "It follows with respect to the subject, pot, that it is the new generation of what was formerly non-existent because of being newly generated. This is because it is a thing."

Someone might say, "It follows with respect to the subject, a sense consciousness which sees a single moon as two, that a non-existent appears to it because it is a consciousness having clear appearance of a non-existent."

[To this we respond] there is no pervasion, for, since a single moon appears to that [sense consciousness] as two whereas it is not, that [consciousness] is posited as having clear appearance of a non-existent.

With respect to what has been said, someone might say, "It follows that a single moon appears to that [sense consciousness which sees a single moon as two] because the single moon appears as two to it."

We accept the statement.

However, someone might say then, "It follows that two moons appear to that [sense consciousness seeing a single moon as two] because a single moon appears as two to it."

[To this we say] there is no pervasion.
Chapter Three
Non-Prime Consciousnesses

With respect to the second, the explanation of non-prime consciousnesses, there are two parts: definition and divisions. With respect to the first, someone might say that the definition of "non-prime consciousness" is "a knower that is mistaken with respect to its determined object."

[To this we respond], "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, the second moment of a direct perceiver, is a knower that is mistaken with respect to its determined object because of being a non-prime consciousness. This is because it is a subsequent cognizer."

If he says that the reason is not established, "It follows that [the second moment of a direct perceiver] is [a subsequent cognizer] because it is correct to make the distinction that the first moment of a direct perceiver is a prime cognizer and the second moment of a direct perceiver is a subsequent cognizer."

If the basic consequence [that the second moment of a direct perceiver is a knower that is mistaken with respect to its determined object] is accepted, "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, the second moment of a direct perceiver, is a wrong consciousness because you have accepted the [previous] consequence. One cannot accept [that the second moment of a direct perceiver is a wrong consciousness] because whatever is an established base is necessarily realized by the second moment of a direct perceiver. This is because whatever is an established base is necessarily realized by an omniscient consciousness."
In our own system the definition of a non-prime consciousness is:

a knower that is not newly incontrovertible.

Secondly, when non-prime consciousnesses are divided, there are five: subsequent cognizers, correctly assuming consciousnesses, awarenesses to which an object appears but is not ascertained, doubting consciousnesses, and wrong consciousnesses.

With respect to the first, the definition of a subsequent cognizer is:

a knower which realizes what has already been realized.

When subsequent cognizers are divided, there are three: directly perceiving subsequent cognizers, conceptual subsequent cognizers, and subsequent cognizers that are neither of those two.

With respect to the first [i.e., directly perceiving subsequent cognizers] there are five: directly perceiving subsequent cognizers that are sense direct perceivers, mental direct perceivers, self-knowing direct perceivers, and yogic direct perceivers, as well as directly perceiving subsequent cognizers that are none of those four.

Illustrations are as follows: The first, for example, is that second moment of a sense direct perceiver apprehending blue; the second is, for example, the second moment of a clairvoyance knowing another's mind; the third is, for example, the second moment of a self-knowing direct perceiver experiencing
an eye consciousness, and so forth; the fourth is, for example, the second moment of an uninterrupted path of a path of seeing; and the fifth is, for example, the second moment of a direct perceiver.

When the second, conceptual subsequent cognizers, are divided there are two: conceptual subsequent cognizers that are induced by direct perceivers and those that are induced by inferential cognizers. The first is, for example, a factually concordant ascertaining consciousness ascertaining blue that is induced by a sense direct perceiver apprehending blue. The second is, for example, the second moment of an inferential cognizer realizing sound to be impermanent.

With respect to what has been said, someone might say, "It follows that the subject, the second moment of a correctly assuming consciousness, is a subsequent cognizer because of being a knower that realizes what has already been realized."

If someone says that the reason is not established, "It follows that that subject [the second moment of a correctly assuming consciousness] is that [i.e., a knower that realizes that which has already been realized] because of being a knower which realizes its object of comprehension which has already been realized."

If someone says that the reason is not established, "It follows that the second moment of a correctly assuming consciousness is a knower realizing the object of comprehension of the second moment of a correctly assuming consciousness which has
already been realized because 1) it realizes the object of comprehension of the second moment of the correctly assuming consciousness and 2) the first moment of the correctly assuming consciousness also realized the object of comprehension of the second moment of the correctly assuming consciousness."

[To this we respond] there is no pervasion.

If someone says that both reasons are not established, "It follows that the subject, the object of comprehension of the second moment of a correctly assuming consciousness, is realized by both the first and second moments of a correctly assuming consciousness because of being realized by a correctly assuming consciousness. That is because it is an established base."

If the above consequence [that a correctly assuming consciousness is a subsequent cognizer] is accepted, "It follows that the subject, the second moment of a correctly assuming consciousness, is not a subsequent cognizer because of not being a knower that realizes what has already been realized. This is because of being a knower that is a new realizer. This is because it is a correctly assuming consciousness."

Also with regard to what has been said, someone might say, "It follows that a person who does not realize an object realizes an object because an awareness in the continuum of that [person] realizes an object. That follows [i.e., that an awareness in the continuum of a person who does not realize an object realizes an object] because an awareness which realizes an object exists in the continuum of that [person who does not realize an object]."
[We respond that] there is no pervasion.

If someone says that the reason [i.e., that an awareness which realizes an object exists in the continuum of a person who does not realize an object] is not established, "It follows that [an awareness which realizes an object exists in the continuum of a person who does not realize an object] because a correctly assuming consciousness which realizes an object exists in the continuum of that [person who does not realize an object].

"This follows because there exists a correctly assuming consciousness realizing sound to be impermanent in the continuum of a person who is about to realize that sound is impermanent.

"That follows [i.e., that there exists a correctly assuming consciousness realizing sound to be impermanent in the continuum of a person who is about to realize that sound is impermanent] because an inferential cognizer which realizes sound to be impermanent is produced from its direct substantial cause, a correctly assuming consciousness which realizes sound to be impermanent. This is because that [i.e., the inferential cognizer which realizes sound to be impermanent] is an inferential prime cognizer which realizes sound to be impermanent."

With regard to the second [of the non-prime consciousnesses], correctly assuming consciousnesses, there are [two parts]: definition and divisions. First, the definition of a correctly assuming consciousness is:

a factually concordant determinative knower which is controvertible with regard to determining its object.
When [correctly assuming consciousnesses] are divided there are five: correctly assuming consciousnesses which do not have a reason, which have a contradictory reason, for which the reason is indefinite [or lacks pervasion], for which the reason is not established, and for which a reason exists but is not settled.

The first [a correctly assuming consciousness which does not have a reason] is, for example, an awareness which apprehends sound to be impermanent in dependence upon the mere words, "Sound is impermanent." [This is a suitable example] because the words, "Sound is impermanent," express a thesis that sound is impermanent, but not a reason.

The second [a correctly assuming consciousness having a contradictory reason] is, for example, an awareness which apprehends sound to be impermanent from the sign of being empty of being able to perform a function. [This is a suitable example] because empty of being able to perform a function is contradictory with impermanence.

The third [a correctly assuming consciousness for which the reason is not ascertained] is, for example, an awareness which apprehends sound to be impermanent from the sign of being an object of comprehension. [This is a suitable example] because object of comprehension is a reason which is indefinite in the proof of that [i.e., whatever is an object of comprehension is not necessarily impermanent].

The fourth [a correctly assuming consciousness for which the reason is not established] is, for example, an awareness which apprehends sound to be impermanent from the sign of being
an object of apprehension by an eye consciousness. [This is a suitable example] because object of apprehension by an eye consciousness is a reason which is not established in the proof of that.

The fifth [a correctly assuming consciousness for which the reason exists but is not settled] is, for example, an awareness which apprehends sound to be impermanent from the sign of being a product, without its having been ascertained by prime cognition that sound is a product and whatever is a product must be impermanent. [This is a suitable example] because although product is a correct sign in the proof of sound as impermanent, that person has not settled it.

Someone might say that the definition of "correctly assuming consciousness" is a determinative knower which newly and one-pointedly ascertains its true object without depending on experience or a basis which is a correct sign."

[To this we say], "It [absurdly] follows that whatever is a correctly assuming consciousness does not depend on experience because that definition is correct."

If that consequence is accepted, "It follows that the subject, a correctly assuming consciousness which is the effect of experience, is that [i.e., does not depend upon experience] because of being [a correctly assuming consciousness]."

One cannot accept this consequence because [a correctly assuming consciousness which is the effect of experience] is produced in dependence on experience. This is because of being an effect of experience.
Moreover, "It [absurdly] follows that a correctly assuming consciousness realizing sound to be impermanent which is produced in dependence upon stating a correct sign that proves sound to be impermanent from the sign of being a product depends upon neither experience nor a correct sign, its basis, because of being a correctly assuming consciousness. The pervasion has been accepted."

If this consequence is accepted, "It follows that the subject, [a correctly assuming consciousness realizing sound to be impermanent which is produced in dependence upon stating a correct sign that proves sound to be impermanent from the sign of being a product] does not depend upon a correct sign, its basis, because it was accepted [that it depends upon neither experience nor a correct sign, its basis]."

One cannot accept this consequence because [that subject] is a correctly assuming consciousness which is produced in dependence upon stating as its basis a correct sign that proves sound to be impermanent from the sign of being a product.

If someone says that the reason is not established, "It follows that [that subject] is that [i.e., a correctly assuming consciousness which is produced in dependence upon stating as its basis a correct sign that proves sound to be impermanent from the sign of being a product] because such a correctly assuming consciousness exists.

"This is because, (1) there exists in the continuum of a person who is about to realize sound to be impermanent an awareness which realizes that sound is impermanent from the point of
view of a mere sound generality, in dependence upon the statement of a correct sign which proves that sound is impermanent from the sign of being a product; and, (2) it is incorrect to posit such an awareness as other than a correctly assuming consciousness—that is, as a direct perceiver, valid cognizer, or subsequent cognizer."

If someone says, "The meaning generality of a pot is all four objects of the thought apprehending a pot," [we will respond], "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, the meaning generality of pot, is the determined object of the thought apprehending a pot because of being all four objects of that [thought apprehending a pot]. The reason has been asserted."

If the consequence [that the meaning generality of pot is the determined object of the thought apprehending a pot] is accepted, "It [absurdly] follows that that subject [the meaning generality of pot] is the object of comprehension of the thought apprehending a pot because of being the determined object of that [thought apprehending pot]."

If this consequence [that the meaning generality of pot is the object of comprehension of the thought apprehending pot], is accepted, "It [absurdly] follows with respect to the subject, the thought apprehending pot, that it is an awareness that is not mistaken with respect to the meaning generality of a pot."

If this consequence is accepted, "It [absurdly] follows with respect to that subject [the thought apprehending pot] that the meaning generality of a pot does not appear to it as pot."
If someone says, "The thought apprehending a pot is an awareness that apprehends the meaning generality of pot as pot," [we respond], "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, the thought apprehending pot, is a wrong consciousness because of being an awareness that apprehends the meaning generality of a pot as a pot. The reason has been asserted."

If this consequence [that the thought apprehending pot is a wrong consciousness] is accepted, "It follows that that subject [the thought apprehending pot] is not a wrong consciousness because of being a factually concordant awareness. This is so because of [its] being a factually concordant conceptual consciousness. This is so because of [its] being a correctly assuming consciousness."

If he says the reason is not established, "It follows with respect to the subject, a pot, that the thought apprehending it is a correctly assuming consciousness because it is an established base."

Someone might say, "The thought apprehending a pot is not a correctly assuming consciousness because there exists a wrong consciousness which is that [i.e., a thought apprehending a pot]. This is so because a thought apprehending a pot on the subject [that is, a place] which is a basis of negation of a pot, is a thought apprehending a pot."

[We say] the reason is not established, [and say back to that person], "It [absurdly] follows that an awareness apprehending a pot as existent on a subject which is a basis of
negation of a pot is an awareness apprehending a pot as existent
because it has been accepted [that there exists a wrong con-
sciousness which is a thought apprehending pot].

[That such an awareness is an awareness apprehending pot
as existent] cannot be accepted because that [thought apprehending
pot as existent on a subject which is a basis of negation of a
pot] is a wrong consciousness apprehending a pot as existent,
whereas it is nonexistent.

With respect to the third [of the five types of non-prime con-
sciousnesses, awarenesses to which the object appears without
being ascertained], the definition of something's being an
awareness to which an object appears without being ascertained
is:

a knower that is a common locus of (1) having clear appearance
of the specifically characterized phenomenon which is its
object of operation and (2) being unable to induce ascertain-
ment with respect to the specifically characterized phenomenon
which is its object of operation.

However, one should know the manner in which not to posit as the
definition of "something's being an awareness to which the
object appears without being ascertained," "that which is a
common locus of (1) having clear appearance of the specifically
characterized phenomenon which is its object and (2) being
unable to induce ascertainment with respect to the specifically
characterized phenomenon which is its object." This is because
a sense consciousness that sees snow mountains as blue sees as blue the white color of the snow mountains, which is its object of operation, and therefore does not see clearly the specifically characterized phenomenon which is its object of operation. Still, since its appearing object, the white color of snow mountains, appears clearly as blue whereas it does not exist [as blue], there is clear appearance of the specifically characterized phenomenon which is its object. Also it is unable to induce ascertainment with respect to that because it engages that [object] perversely.

Illustrations of awarenesses to which an object appears without being ascertained are, for example, a sense direct perceiver apprehending blue which induces the doubt that wonders, "Did I see blue or not?"; mental direct perceivers in the continuums of ordinary beings apprehending the five objects--forms, and so forth; and self-knowers experiencing those [mental direct perceivers].

Someone might say with respect to what has been said, "It follows that the subject, a direct prime cognizer, is that definiendum [i.e., an awareness to which an object appears without being ascertained] because of being that definition [i.e., a knower that is a common locus of having clear appearance of a specifically characterized phenomenon that is its object of operation and being unable to induce ascertainment with respect to the specifically characterized phenomenon that is its object of operation]. This is so because a direct perceiver cannot induce
ascertainment with respect to its object; this is so because [a direct perceiver] is not an ascertaining consciousness."

[To this we say] there is no pervasion; for, it follows that a direct prime cognizer ascertains its object because a direct prime cognizer is a knower that is incontrovertible with respect to its object.

Someone might say the above reason [that a direct perceiver is not an ascertaining consciousness] is not established. [To this we say], "It follows that the subject, a direct prime cognizer, is not an ascertaining consciousness because of not being a conceptual consciousness."

Similarly [someone might say], "It follows that the subject, a clairvoyance that remembers former states, is a memory consciousness because of being a consciousness that remembers its object."

[To this we say] again there is no pervasion.

If someone says the reason is not established, "It follows that [a clairvoyance that remembers former states is a consciousness that remembers its object] because of being a consciousness that remembers the former states which are its object."

One cannot accept [that a clairvoyance that remembers former states is a memory consciousness] because [it] is not a conceptual consciousness; this is so because [it] is a clairvoyance.

With respect to the fourth [of the five non-prime consciousnesses, doubting consciousness], someone might say that the definition
of "doubting consciousness" is "that which has qualms with respect to its object."

[To this we respond], "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, a person who has qualms with respect to his object, is a doubting consciousness because of being that which has qualms about its object. The pervasion has been asserted."

If he says the reason is not established, "It follows that that subject, [a person who has qualms about his object,] is [that which has qualms about its object] because of being a person who has qualms about his object."

If he says the reason is not established, "It follows that such a person is himself because such a person exists."

If he says the reason is not established, "It follows [that such a person exists] because a person who possesses in his continuum doubt that has qualms with respect to its object exists."

If he says the reason is not established, "It follows with respect to the subject, doubt that has qualms about its object, that a person who possesses it in his continuum exists because it is a doubting consciousness."

If the basic consequence [that a person who has qualms with respect to his object is a doubting consciousness] is accepted, "It follows that the subject, a person who has qualms about his object, is not a doubting consciousness because of not being a consciousness."
Someone might say that the definition of "doubting consciousness" is "a knower that has qualms about its object."

[To this we respond], "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, a main mind that possesses similarity with a doubting consciousness, is that definiendum [i.e., a doubting consciousness] because of being that definition [i.e., a knower that has qualms about its object]. The reason is easy."

One cannot accept [that a main mind which possesses similarity with a doubting consciousness is that definiendum [i.e., a doubting consciousness] because of [its] not being a mental factor."

If he says the reason is not established, "It follows that that subject [a main mind which possesses similarity with a doubting consciousness] is [not a mental factor] because of being a main mind.

Moreover, "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, the feeling that accompanies a [main] mind which possesses similarity with a doubting consciousness, is a doubting consciousness because of being that definition [i.e., a knower that has qualms about its object]."

If this consequence [that the feeling that accompanies a (main) mind that possesses similarity with a doubting consciousness is a doubting consciousness] is accepted, "It [absurdly] follows that whatever are mental factors which accompany that [i.e., a mind that possesses similarity with a doubting consciousness] are necessarily doubting consciousnesses."
One cannot accept this consequence because whatever is a doubting consciousness is necessarily a mental factor that by its own power has qualms two-pointedly.

Our own system is that the definition of a doubting consciousness is:

a knower which has qualms two-pointedly by its own power.

A mind which possesses similarity with doubt and the feelings, etc., which are accompaniers of that [mind possessing similarity with doubt] have qualms by the power of doubt, but do not have qualms two-pointedly by their own power.

When doubting consciousnesses are divided there are three: doubt tending toward the factual, doubt tending toward the non-factual, and equal doubt. The first is, for example, doubt which thinks that sound is probably impermanent. The second is, for example, doubt which thinks that sound is probably permanent. The third is, for example, doubt which wonders whether sound is permanent or impermanent.

Someone might say that wrong consciousness and doubting consciousness are contradictory.

[To this we reply], "It [absurdly] follows that whatever is a doubting consciousness is necessarily not a wrong consciousness because these two are contradictory. The reason has been asserted."

If this consequence is accepted, "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, a doubting consciousness which thinks that the
sound is probably permanent, is not a wrong consciousness because of being a doubting consciousness. This is because it is doubt tending toward the non-factual."

If the consequence [that a doubting consciousness which thinks that sound is probably permanent is not a wrong consciousness] is accepted, "It follows that the subject [a doubting consciousness which thinks that sound is probably permanent] is a wrong consciousness because of being a conceptual wrong consciousness. This is because [it] is a wrong thought.

"The pervasion [that whatever is a wrong thought is necessarily a conceptual wrong consciousness] exists because wrong thought and conceptual wrong consciousness are synonyms. This is because [Kay-drup's] Clearing Away Darkness of Mind with Respect to the Seven Treatises says, 'Wrong thought and conceptual wrong consciousness are synonyms.'"

Furthermore, "It follows that wrong consciousness and doubting consciousness are not contradictory because wrong thought and doubting consciousness are not contradictory. This is because the doubt which thinks that sound is probably permanent is both a wrong thought and a doubting consciousness. In accordance with that Kay-drup's Clearing Away Darkness of Mind with Respect to the Seven Treatises says, "The assertion that all wrong thoughts possess an aspect which is definite as a one-pointed mode of apprehension is incorrect because it would follow that the conceptual consciousness thinking that sound is probably permanent would not be a wrong thought," and [continues] "Therefore, wrong thought and doubt are not contradictory."
With regard to the fifth [of the five non-prime consciousnesses], wrong consciousnesses, there are the two parts: definition and divisions. With regard to the first, someone might say that the definition of "something's being a wrong consciousness" is "a knower which is mistaken with regard to its determined object".

[We reply] "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, a sense consciousness which sees snow mountains as blue is that definition [i.e., a knower which is mistaken with regard to its determined object] because of being that definiendum [i.e., a wrong consciousness]."

If it is accepted [that that subject is a knower which is mistaken with regard to its determined object], "It [absurdly] follows that the subject [a sense consciousness which sees a snow mountain as blue] is a determinative knower because it was accepted [that it is a knower which is mistaken with regard to its determined object].

One cannot accept [that it is a determinative knower] because [it] is a non-conceptual consciousness. This is because it is a sense consciousness.

Our own system is that the definition of a wrong consciousness is:

a knower which engages its object erroneously.

Second, when wrong consciousnesses are divided, there are two: conceptual and non-conceptual ones. Examples of the first are a thought apprehending sound as permanent and a thought apprehending the horns of a rabbit.
With regard to the second, [non-conceptual wrong consciousnesses], there are two, mental and sense consciousnesses. The first, [a mental non-conceptual wrong consciousness] is, for example, a dream consciousness which clearly sees as blue the blue of a dream. This subject is a mental consciousness, a non-conceptual consciousness, and a wrong consciousness. Respectively, [it is a mental consciousness] because of being a dream consciousness, [a non-conceptual consciousness] because of being a consciousness which is free from being a determinative knower which apprehends a sound generality and a meaning generality as suitable to be mixed, and [a wrong consciousness] because of being a consciousness which apprehends its object, a form which is a phenomenon-source, as blue, whereas it does not exist as blue. However, we say that for the person who is dreaming that [dream consciousness which clearly sees the blue of a dream as blue] is a factually concordant sense consciousness. Examples of the second, wrong consciousnesses which are sense consciousnesses, are a sense consciousness which sees snow mountains as blue and a sense consciousness which sees a white conch as yellow.
Chapter Four
Other Divisions of Consciousness

With respect to the threefold division of awarenesses and knowers there are three parts: explanation of conceptual consciousnesses which take a meaning generality as their apprehended object, of non-conceptual non-mistaken consciousnesses which take a specifically characterized phenomenon as their apprehended object, and of non-conceptual mistaken consciousnesses that take a clear appearance of a non-existent as their apprehended object.

With respect to the first, [explanation of conceptual consciousnesses which take a meaning generality as their apprehended object] there are two parts: definition and divisions. First, the definition of a conceptual consciousness is:

a determinative knower which apprehends a sound [generality] and a meaning [generality] as suitable to be mixed.

The [term] "sound" of "sound and meaning", [refers] to a sound generality and the "meaning" [refers] to a meaning generality. That which apprehends those two as mixed apprehends a collection of those two.

There is a purpose for saying "suitable" [to be mixed] because it is necessary to include conceptual consciousnesses in the continuum of a person who has not trained in nomenclature. This is because a conceptual consciousness in the continuum of such [a person] does not apprehend sound and meaning generalities as mixed, but merely as suitable to be mixed.
Second, when conceptual consciousnesses are divided, there are three: conceptual consciousnesses that apprehend only a sound generality, only a meaning generality, and those that apprehend both a sound and a meaning generality.

An illustration of the first [a conceptual consciousness that apprehends only a sound generality] is a conceptual consciousness in the continuum of a person who does not know that a bulbous flat-based thing that is able to perform the function of holding water is a pot which, generated in dependence on merely on the sound "pot" apprehends pot. An illustration of the second [a conceptual consciousness that apprehends only a meaning generality] is a conceptual consciousness in the continuum of such a person [who does not know that a bulbous flat-based thing able to perform the function of holding water is a pot] which, generated in dependence on merely seeing a bulbous thing apprehends a bulbous thing. An illustration of the third [a conceptual consciousness that apprehends both a sound and a meaning generality] is a conceptual consciousness—in the continuum of a person who knows pot—apprehending a pot.

"What are the sound and meaning generalities of pot?" That appearance which is an appearance as pot to the first conceptual consciousness [in the above three illustrations] is just a sound generality. That appearance which is the appearance of a bulbous thing to the second conceptual consciousness [in the above illustrations] is just a meaning generality. When either a pot or a bulbous thing appears to the third conceptual consciousness [in the above illustrations] there is the appearance of both a sound and a meaning generality.
If someone asks, "Is whatever appears to a conceptual consciousness that [is produced in] dependence on just sound necessarily only a sound generality?" there is no [such] pervasion. This is because the appearance of a prominent rabbit horn to a conceptual consciousness apprehending the horns of a rabbit is an appearance to a conceptual consciousness which [is generated in] dependence on just sound but is not only a sound generality. That [it is not only a sound generality] follows because it is both the sound and the meaning generality of the horns of a rabbit.

When conceptual consciousness are divided [in another way], there are two: conceptual consciousnesses that affix names, and conceptual consciousnesses that affix meanings. A conceptual consciousness that apprehends [its object within] thinking "This bulbous thing is a pot," is both [a conceptual consciousness that affixes a name and one that affixes a meaning]. Respectively, [it is the first] because of being a determinative knower that apprehends [its object] within affixing the name "pot" to the object [the bulbous thing. It is the second] because of being a determinative knower that apprehends [its object] within affixing attributes to a substratum.

Whatever is a conceptual consciousness that affixes a meaning is not necessarily one that affixes a name, for a conceptual consciousness that apprehends [its object within] thinking, "This person has a stick," is a conceptual consciousness that affixes [only] a meaning. It is a conceptual
consciousness that apprehends [its object] within affixing an attribute—stick—to a substratum—person.

Also, whatever is a conceptual consciousness is not necessarily either of those two, for a conceptual consciousness that apprehends merely the substratum "pot" is neither of those two.

When conceptual consciousnesses are divided [in another way] there are two: factually concordant and discordant conceptual consciousnesses. The definition of factually concordant conceptual consciousness is:

a factually concordant determinative knower which apprehends a sound generality and a meaning generality as suitable to be mixed.

If something is an established base, the conceptual consciousness apprehending it is necessarily a factually concordant conceptual consciousness. The definition of a factually discordant conceptual consciousness is:

a factually discordant determinative knower which apprehends a sound generality and a meaning generality as suitable to be mixed.

If something is not an established base, the conceptual consciousness apprehending it is necessarily a factually discordant conceptual consciousness.
With regard to the second [of the threefold division of awarenesses and knowers, non-conceptual non-mistaken consciousnesses which take a specifically characterized phenomenon as their apprehended object], there are two parts: definition and divisions. The definition of something's being a non-conceptual non-mistaken consciousness is:

a knower having clear appearance which is non-mistaken with regard to its appearing object.

The two, [non-conceptual non-mistaken consciousness] and directly perceiving awareness are synonyms. When [non-conceptual non-mistaken consciousnesses] are divided, there are four: sense, mental, self-knowing, and yogic direct perceivers. Since they were already explained above (pp. 23-27) one should know this.

With regard to the third [of the threefold division of awarenesses and knowers, non-conceptual mistaken consciousnesses which take a clear appearance of a non-existent as their apprehended object], there are two parts: definition and divisions. First, the definition of something's being a non-conceptual mistaken consciousness is:

a knower having clear appearance which is mistaken with regard to its appearing object.

When [non-conceptual mistaken consciousnesses] are divided, there are two: sense and mental consciousnesses which are [non-conceptual mistaken consciousnesses]. The definition of the
first [a sense consciousness which is a non-conceptual mistaken consciousness] is:

that which is a common locus of being a non-conceptual mistaken consciousness and being produced in dependence upon a physical sense power which is its uncommon empowering condition.

The definition of the second [a mental consciousness which is a non-conceptual mistaken consciousness] is:

that which is a common locus of being a non-conceptual mistaken consciousness and being produced in dependence upon a mental sense power which is its uncommon empowering condition.

Furthermore, with regard to awarenesses, there are two: self-knowers and other-knowers. The first of these [i.e., self-knower] and consciousness which is directed only inward are synonyms. The second [i.e., other-knower] and consciousness which is turned outward are synonyms. Sense, mental, and yogic direct perceivers, as well as conceptual consciousnesses are illustrations of the second [i.e., other-knowers]. Whatever is any of those [a sense direct perceiver, mental direct perceiver, yogic direct perceiver, or conceptual consciousness] must be an other-knower.
With regard to self-knowers and other-knowers being contradictory, someone might say, "It follows that the subject, a self-knower in the continuum of a Buddha Superior, is not an other-knower because of being a self-knower."

If someone says that the reason is not established, "It follows that a self-knower in the continuum of a Buddha Superior is a self-knower because there exists a self-knower in the continuum of [a Buddha Superior]. This is because a self-knowing direct perceiver which experiences a mental consciousness in the continuum of [a Buddha Superior] is a self-knower in the continuum of [a Buddha Superior]."

If someone says that the reason is not established, "It follows with regard to the subject, a Buddha Superior, that the self-knowing direct perceiver which experiences a mental consciousness in his continuum is a self-knower in his continuum because he is a person possessing form." That self-knowers and other-knowers are contradictory is stated in accordance with the first chapter of Jay-dzun-ba's (rJe-btsun-pa) Analysis of the Limits of Pervasion in the First Chapter [of (Dharmakirti's) Commentary on (Dignaga's) "Compendium on Prime Cognition"] and is not my own fabrication.

If the basic consequence [that a self-knower in the continuum of a Buddha Superior is not an other-knower] is accepted, [someone might say], "It follows that that subject [a self-knower in the continuum of a Buddha Superior] is an other-knower because of being a consciousness turned outward. This is because [a
self-knower in the continuum of a Buddha Superior] takes external phenomena, forms, and so forth, as its object."

[To this we respond] there is no pervasion.

If someone says that the reason is not established, "It follows that the subject, [a self-knower in the continuum of a Buddha Superior] is a consciousness which takes external phenomena, forms, and so forth, as its object because of being an exalted knower which takes all phenomena as its object. This is because [a self-knower in the continuum of a Buddha Superior] is an omniscient consciousness.

Furthermore, with respect to awarenesses and knowers there are two: minds and mental factors. The definition of a main mind is:

a main knower that is posited by way of apprehending the entity of its object.

Main mind (gtso sems), mind (sems, chitta), sentience (yid, manas), and perceiver (rnam shes, vijñāna) are mutually inclusive and synonymous.

When [minds are] divided by way of entity there are six, from eye perceiver up to mental perceiver. If condensed, they are included into two: sense, and mental perceivers.

There are four possibilities between the two, sentience (yid, manas) and mental consciousness (yid shes, manovijñāna). This is because an eye perceiver is a possibility that is
sentience but not a mental consciousness; the feeling accompanying a mental perceiver is a possibility that is a mental consciousness but is not sentience; a mental perceiver is a possibility that is both sentience and a mental consciousness; and the feeling accompanying an eye perceiver is an alternative that is neither sentience nor a mental consciousness.

One should know similarly the way of positing four possibilities between the two, sentience and sense consciousness (dbang shes, indriyajñāna) and four possibilities between the two, exalted wisdom (ye shes, jñāna) and mental consciousness (yid shes, manojñāna).

The definition of a mental factor is:

a knower which apprehends any of the features of its object and accompanies whatever main mind has similarity with it.

A mind and its accompanying mental factors possess the five aspects of mutual similarity because of having similarity of basis, object of observation, aspect, time, and substantial entity. This is so because the accompanying mental factor depends on the sense power, as its basis, on which the main mind depends; because the accompanying mental factor is produced from that object of observation in dependence on which the main mind is produced; because the aspect of any object appears to the accompanying mental factor just as it appears to the main mind; because the accompanying mental factor is also produced at the same time the main mind is produced; because a main mind and its accompanying mental factor are produced qualified by [being] one
type of substantial entity and are not produced as different substantial entities. Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Knowledge* (Abhidharmakosha) says: "... synonymous. Mind and mental factors have five aspects of possessing similarity."

When mental factors are divided, there are fifty-one—the five omnipresent factors, five determining factors, eleven virtuous factors, six root afflictions, twenty secondary afflictions, and four changeable factors.

The first five—feeling, discrimination, intention, mental engagement, and contact—accompany all minds and thus are explained as "omnipresent." This is so because whenever any one among these five is not complete, enjoyment of the object is not complete: without feeling, the experiencing of pleasure, pain, and so forth, does not arise; without discrimination, designation of verbal conventions does not occur; without intention, engagement of the object does not occur; without mental engagement, directing the mind to the object of observation does not occur; without contact, feeling—pleasure, pain, and so forth—is not generated.

However, it is not definite that these [omnipresent mental factors] must exist manifestly, because at times such as the occasion of the subtle mind of death, or the time of just having made the connection [to one's next rebirth, i.e., having just entered the womb] or when absorbed in [an equipoise of] cessation, some of these—feelings and so forth—merely engage [their object] in a dormant manner.

With respect to the first from among these, feeling, there are two parts: definition and divisions. First, the definition
of feeling is:

a knower which is distinguished by being that which experiences. Feeling and feeling aggregate are synonymous.

Second, when [feelings] are divided, there are three: two-fold, three-fold, and five-fold divisions. With respect to the first, [i.e., the twofold division of feeling], there are the two, physical feeling and mental feeling. The first [i.e., physical feeling], feeling which is a sense consciousness, and external feeling are synonyms. The second [i.e., mental feeling], feeling which is a mental consciousness, and internal feeling are synonyms.

Also, there is a two-fold [division of feeling] into materialistic feeling and non-materialistic feeling. The first [i.e., materialistic feeling] and contaminated feeling are synonyms. The second [non-materialistic feeling] and non-contaminated feeling are synonyms.

The three-fold division [of feelings] is into the three, pleasurable feelings, painful feelings, and feelings of equanimity. Moreover, although whatever is pleasure or pain is necessarily feeling, whatever is equanimity is not necessarily feeling. This is because, with regard to equanimity, there are three: the feeling of equanimity [or neutral feeling], equanimity of [that is to say, desisting from] application, which is included among the eleven virtuous [mental factors], and immeasurable equanimity [or a sense of equality devoid of desire and hatred].
The five-fold division [of feeling] is into the five: pleasureable feeling, mental pleasure, pain, mental displeasure, and the feeling of equanimity. Whatever is mental pleasure is necessarily pleasure but is necessarily not the pleasure that is within the five-fold division of feeling. This is because whatever is pleasure within the five-fold division of feeling must be a physical feeling of pleasure. Similarly, whatever is mental displeasure is necessarily pain, but is necessarily not the pain that is within the five-fold division of feeling. This is because whatever is pain within the five-fold division of feeling must be a physical feeling of pain.

The latter [four omnipresent mental factors] discrimination, and so forth, are to be known from the lower and upper Knowledges [that is, from Vasubhandu's Treasury of Knowledge and Asanga's Compendium of Knowledge (Abhidharmasamuchchaya)].

The second [group of mental factors]—the five, aspiration, belief, mindfulness, stabilization, and wisdom—individually ascertain objects and thus are called "ascertainers [or determiners] of objects". Aspiration aspires to or seeks the object. Belief engages that object joyfully. Mindfulness apprehends the object of observation and the aspect. Stabilization abides one-pointedly. Wisdom analyzes individually. The first [i.e., that aspiration aspires to or seeks the object] is established because aspiration ('dun pa, chhanda), wish ('dod pa, kāma), and seeking (don gnyer, ) are synonyms. Thus, if there exists an aspiration which seeks a certain phenomenon, effort for the sake of that phenomenon is begun.
OTHER DIVISIONS OF CONSCIOUSNESS

The third [group of mental factors]—the eleven, faith, shame, embarrassment, non-desire, the mental factor that is non-hatred, the mental factor that is non-ignorance, effort, pliancy, conscientiousness, equanimity, and non-harmfulness—are virtues by way of turning away from their opposites, non-faith, and so forth. Thus, they are called the "eleven virtuous factors" and are a definite enumeration.

However, faith in that which is not an object of faith, such as demons, and so forth, and effort in the direction of non-virtue are imputed faith and effort, but not actual [faith and effort]. Since this is so, it is necessary to distinguish these.

The fourth [group of mental factors]—the six, desire which is that [i.e., a root affliction], anger, pride, ignorance, afflicted doubt, and afflicted view—act as the root of both cyclic existence and the secondary afflictions, and thus are called root afflictions.

Whatever is either desire or ignorance is not necessarily a root affliction for these [occurring] in the continuum of a Bodhisattva Superior are not root afflictions because they are diminished in capacity, like poison overcame by medicine or mantra.

The fifth [group of mental factors]—the twenty, belligerence, resentment, concealment, spite, jealousy, miserliness, deceit, dissimulation, haughtiness, harmfulness, non-shame, non-embarrassment, lethargy, excitement, non-faith, laziness,
non-conscientiousness, forgetfulness, non-introspection, and
distraction--arise from and are close to their causes, the root
afflictions, and thus are called "secondary afflictions".

The sixth [group of mental factors]--the four, sleep,
contrition, investigation, and analysis--can become [any of
the] three, virtuous, non-virtuous, or neutral, and thus are
called "changeable". This is because such change can occur due
to [there being] at the time of sleep, for instance, faith or
non-faith in the Three Jewels, contrition or non-contrition for
virtues and sins, and so forth.

Ancillarily, with respect to the mode of asserting tenets,
Vaibhashikas, Sautrantika-Svatantrika-Madhyamikas, and Prasangikas
assert that direct prime cognizers are limited to three: sense,
mental, and yogic direct perceivers. This is because they do
not assert self-knowing direct perceivers. Sautrantikas,
Chittamatrins and Yogachara-Svatantrika-Madhyamikas assert
direct prime cognizers to be limited to four: sense, mental,
self-knowing, and yogic direct perceivers.

The Sautrantikas assert that whatever is a direct perceiver
is necessarily a non-mistaken consciousness, but the Chittamatrins
do not, for Chittamatrins assert that a sense direct perceiver
in the continuum of an ordinary person apprehending a form is
a mistaken consciousness.

If someone says that the reason is not established, "It
follows that [Chittamatrins] assert that because they assert
that a sense direct perceiver in the continuum of an ordinary person apprehending a form is an awareness having clear appearance of a non-existent. This is because in the Chittamatra system external objects do not exist but to a sense direct perceiver—in the continuum of an ordinary person apprehending a form—the form appears to exist as an external object. Apply this similarly to the latter four [sense direct perceivers]—sense direct perceivers apprehending sounds, and so forth. The Yogachara-Svatantrika-Madhyamikas have similar [assertions].

The Sautrantikas assert that whatever is a direct perceiver is necessarily a non-mistaken consciousness, for they assert that a sense direct perceiver in the continuum of an ordinary person apprehending a form is a non-mistaken consciousness. This is because they assert that a form is an external object in just the way that it appears to be one to a sense direct perceiver in the continuum of an ordinary person apprehending a form.

If someone says that the reason is not established, "It follows that [the Sautrantikas] do assert such because they assert external objects." This is because the definition of a Sautrantika is:

a person propounding Hinayana tenets who asserts both external objects and self-knowers to be truly established.

The definition of a Chittamatin is:

a person propounding Mahayana tenets who does not assert external objects but does assert self-knowers as truly established.
Such is stated in the presentations of tenets.

Sautrantikas and Chittamatrans, as well as Svatantrikas, assert that direct perceivers are necessarily free from conceptuality, but Prasangikas do not. This is because there are many differences in [the Prasangikas'] mode of assertion: [They] assert "incontrovertible knower" to be the definition of "prime cognizer"; that subsequent cognizers are necessarily prime cognizers; that among direct prime cognizers there are both conceptual and non-conceptual consciousnesses; and so forth.

According to Kay-drup's Ocean of Reasoning, Explanation of (Dharmakirti's) "Commentary on (Dignaga's) 'Compendium on Prime Cognition';

Here [in Prasangika] the definition of "prime cognizer" is "that which is incontrovertible". Such is asserted in accordance with how it is posited in the world. In the world, without distinguishing new incontrovertibility, that which is incontrovertible in general is posited as a prime cognizer and thus it is clear that even subsequent cognizers which are induced by nonconceptual direct prime cognizers are asserted as prime cognizers. Because of this there are direct prime cognizers even among conceptual prime cognizers.

The order of the four direct perceivers must be just as it is, for Gen-dun-drup's Ornament for Valid Reasoning; the General Meaning of (Dharmakirti's) "Commentary on (Dignaga's) 'Compendium of Prime Cognition'" says,
In what way is the order of the four direct perceivers definite?

[Answer]: Since yogic direct perceivers exist only in the continuums of Superiors, they are indicated last; since the other three [direct perceivers] exist in the continuums of both common beings and Superiors, they are indicated first. Moreover, within those [first three], the two other knowers are indicated first because they are objects of experience; since self-knowers experience both of those, they are indicated last. Furthermore, between [the first two], sense direct perceivers are indicated first because they are causes [of mental direct perceivers] and mental direct perceivers are indicated last because they are effects.
Chapter Five
Expressive Sounds

With respect to the third, expressive sounds, there are two parts: definition and divisions. First, the definition of something's being an expressive sound is:

an object of hearing that causes the understanding of its own object of expression through the force of nomenclature.

When these are divided by way of entity, there are three: names, phrases, and letters.

With respect to the first, [names], there are two parts: definition and divisions. First, the definition of something's being a name is:

an object of hearing that causes understanding of its own meaning.

When these are divided, there are two, actual names and designated names. The definition of the actual name of a certain object is:

that which is observed as the common locus of (1) being a term initially applied arbitrarily to that object and (2) being the main name of that object.

The definition of the designated name of a certain object is:

that which is observed as a common locus of (1) being a term later applied to that object and (2) being a secondary
name of that object.

An illustration of an actual name is speech calling the king of beasts a lion.

When designated names are divided, there are two, names designated by reason of similarity and names designated by reason of relationship. An illustration of the first [a name designated by reason of similarity] is speech calling a brahmin's son who has a big mouth and pug nose a lion; this is because Dharmakīrti's Commentary on (Dignaga's) "Compendium on Prime Cognition" says, "calling the son of a brahman a lion in this way exists also in the world."

With respect to the second [names designated by reason of relationship], there are two, names designated by reason of a causal relationship and those designated by reason of a relationship of nature. With respect to the first [a name designated by reason of a causal relationship] there are two, designated names in which the name of the cause is designated to the effect and designated names in which the name of the effect is designated to the cause.

An illustration of the first [a designated name in which the name of the cause is designated to the effect] is speech calling sunlight sun. An illustration of the second [a designated name in which the name of the effect is designated to the cause] is speech calling a correct proof statement an inferential cognizer. An illustration of the second, a name designated by reason of a relationship of nature is speech calling the burned fringe of a piece of cloth burned cloth.
With respect to what has been said, someone might say, "It follows that the subject, the sound expressing 'horns of a rabbit', is an object of hearing which, through the force of nomenclature, causes understanding of an object of expression because of being an expressive sound."

If that consequence is accepted, "It follows that the object of expression of that [sound expressing 'horns of a rabbit'] exists."

If that consequence is accepted, "It follows that the indicated object of that [sound expressing 'horns of a rabbit'] exists because such has been accepted."

[To this we respond] there is no pervasion.

One cannot accept that consequence because [the sound expressing 'horns of a rabbit'] is a meaningless sound. This is because a treatise on the realization that crows have teeth is a meaningless treatise.

Someone might say, "It follows that the sound calling sunlight the sun is not a name designated by way of a casual relationship because sunlight is not causally related to the sun. This is because [sunlight] is not an effect of the sun. This is because [sunlight] is not a different substantial entity from the [sun]. This is because [sunlight] and [sun] are one substantial entity."

If someone says that the reason is not established, "It follows [that sunlight and sun are one substantial entity] because the two, the scent of a flower and the flower, are one substantial entity."
[To this we respond] there is no pervasion.

If someone says that the reason is not established, "It follows with respect to the subject, a flower, that the two, its smell and it, are one substantial entity because it is a thing which possesses a scent."

Furthermore, "It follows that sunlight is an effect of the sun because of arising from the sun."

If someone says that the reason is not established, "It follows [that sunlight arises from the sun] because moonlight arises from the moon."

If someone says that the reason is not established, "It follows [that moonlight arises from the moon] because the waves of the ocean arise from the ocean."

If someone says that the reason is not established, "It follows [that the waves of the ocean arise from the ocean] because Chandrakirti's Supplement to the Middle Way (Madhyamakāvatāra) says "Just as the waves arise from the great ocean by the stirring by wind, similarly . . . "

Someone might say "It follows that the rainbow of space arises from space because the waves of the ocean arise from the ocean."

[To this we respond] there is no pervasion.

If the consequence [that the rainbow of space arises from space] is accepted, "It follows that the rainbow of space does not arise from space because an arising from space does not exist."

If someone says that the reason is not established, "It follows with respect to the subject, space, than an arising
from it does not exist because it is permanent."

With respect to the second [of the threefold division of expressive sounds], the definition of a phrase is:

an object of hearing which indicates [meaning] by joining substratum and attribute.

An illustration [of a phrase] is "Alas, products are impermanent, subject to production and disintegration."

With respect to the third [of the threefold division of expressive sounds] the definition of a letter is:

a vocalization which is a basis of forming the two, names and phrases. Illustrations [of letters] are the thirty letters, ka, and so forth.

With respect to this, someone might say, "It follows that an object of expression of a letter does not exist because a letter is permanent. This is because the three--name, phrase, and letter--are permanent. This is because all three are non-things. This is because Dharmakirti's Commentary on (Dignaga's) "Compendium on Prime Cognition" says 'Phrases, and so forth, are imaginaries and non-things.'"

[To this we respond] there is no pervasion, for that passage means that the self-reverses of the meaning or object of expression of the three--name, phrase, and letter--are non-things, but the means of expression, the three--name, phrase
and letter—are things. That follows because those are produced from a person's motivational consciousness which is their cause. This is because Dharmakirti's *Commentary on (Dignaga's) Compendium on Prime Cognition* says, "A letter is produced from a motivational consciousness, and a sound is produced by a consciousness."

When expressive sounds are terminologically divided, there are two, sounds which express types and sounds which express collections.

With respect to the difference between these two, someone might say "Whatever is a sound expressing a type necessarily explicitly expresses all [members of] the type which is its object of expression and whatever is a sound expressing a collection necessarily explicitly expresses all members of the collection which is its object of expression."

[To this we respond] "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, the sound expressing 'object of knowledge', explicitly expresses all [members of] the type which is its object of expression because of being a sound which expresses a type. The pervasion has been accepted."

If someone says that the reason is not established, "It follows with respect to the subject, object of knowledge, that the sound which expresses it is a sound expressing a type because it [object of knowledge] is a type generality."
If the previous consequence [that the sound expressing 'object of knowledge' explicitly expresses all [members of] the type which is its object of expression] is accepted, "It follows that the subject, the sound which expresses 'object of knowledge', explicitly expresses golden pot because (1) object of knowledge is a type generality of golden pot and (2) it [the sound which expresses 'object of knowledge'] explicitly expresses all [members of] the type which is its object of expression. The second reason has been accepted."

Furthermore, "It [correctly] follows that the sound expressing 'object of knowledge' is an eliminative engager with respect to object of knowledge because (1) it engages object of knowledge and (2) is not a collective engager with respect to object of knowledge."

If someone says that the first reason is not established, "It follows that [the sound expressing 'object of knowledge'] engages [object of knowledge] because such a sound explicitly engages [object of knowledge]."

If someone says that the reason is not established, "It follows with regard to the subject, object of knowledge, that the sound expressing it explicitly engages it because it is an established base."

If someone says that the previous second reason [that the sound expressing "object of knowledge" is not a collective engager] is not established, "It [absurdly] follows that the sound which expresses 'object of knowledge' engages object of knowledge through the force of the thing because it is a collective engager with respect to object of knowledge. The reason
has been accepted."

If it is accepted [that the sound expressing 'object of knowledge' engages object of knowledge through the force of the object], "It [absurdly] follows that the thought consciousness which engages object of knowledge also engages object of knowledge through the force of the object because that consequence was accepted."

If this consequence is accepted, "It [absurdly] follows that the thought consciousness which apprehends thing also engages thing through its [thing's] own force because of engaging object of knowledge through the force of the thing."

If this consequence is accepted, "It [absurdly] follows that the two, thing and thing's meaning generality, are mixed because that was accepted."

One cannot accept this because a mixture of those two does not occur.

If someone says that the reason is not established, "It follows [that a mixture of the two, object and object's meaning generality, does not occur] because a mixture of the two, specifically characterized phenomena and generally characterized phenomena, does not occur."

With respect to the difference between sounds which express types and sounds which express collections, there are four possibilities: (1) something which is a sound expressing a type but not a sound expressing collection, (2) something which is a sound expressing a collection but not a sound expressing a type, (3) something which is both of those, and (4) something which is neither of those.
The first possibility exists because the sound which expresses "object of knowledge" is a sound expressing a type but is not a sound expressing a collection. The first reason [i.e., that the sound expressing "object of knowledge" is a sound expressing a type] has already been established. If someone says that the second reason [i.e., that the sound expressing "object of knowledge" is not a sound expressing a collection] is not established, "It follows with regard to the subject, object of knowledge, that the sound which expresses it is not a sound which expresses a collection because it is not a collection generality. This follows because [object of knowledge] is not a thing."

The second possibility [a sound expressing a collection but not a sound expressing a type] exists because the sound expressing "the two, pillar and pot" is a sound which expresses a collection but not a sound which expresses a type. If someone says that the first reason [that the sound expressing "the two, pillar and pot" is a sound which expresses a collection] is not established, "It follows with respect to the subject, the two, pillar and pot, that the sound expressing it is a sound which expresses a collection because it is a collection generality." If someone says that the second reason, [that the sound expressing "the two, pillar and pot" is not a sound which expresses a type] is not established, "It follows with respect to the subject, the two, pillar and pot, that the sound expressing it
is not a sound which expresses a type because it is not a type
generality. This follows because it [the two, pillar and pot]
is not a generality. This follows because an instance of it
does not exist."

The third possibility [both a sound which expresses a collec-
tion and a sound which expresses a type] exists because the
sound expressing pot is both of those. If someone says that the
reason is not established, "It follows with respect to the sub-
ject, pot, that the sound which expresses it is both a sound
expressing a type and a sound expressing a collection because it
is both a generality and a mass which is an aggregate of the
eight substances [earth, water, fire, wind, visible form, odor,
taste, and tangible object]."

The fourth possibility [something which is neither a sound
which expresses a collection nor a sound which expresses a
type] exists because the sound which expresses "the two, per-
manent phenomenon and thing" is neither of those two. If some-
one says that the reason is not established, "It follows that
the subject [the sound which expresses 'the two, permanent
phenomenon and thing'] is [neither of those] because it is not
a sound which expresses a type and is not a sound which expresses
a collection." If someone says that the first reason is not
established, "It follows with respect to the subject, the two,
permanent phenomenon and thing, that the sound which expresses
it is not a sound which expresses a type because it is not a
type generality." If someone says that the second reason is
not established, "It follows with respect to the subject, the
two, permanent phenomenon and thing, that the sound expressing it is not a sound which expresses a collection because it is not a collection generality." If someone says that the reason is not established, "It follows that the subject, the two, permanent phenomenon and thing, is not a collection generality because of being a non-disintegrating phenomena.

Based on these few words explaining
Awareness and knowledge illuminating
Limitless topics of knowers and objects known,
May the vast paths of reasoning increase.

Sarvamaṅgalam