Jam-yang-shay-pa’s
*Great Exposition of Tenets*
on the Two Truths
in the Consequence School
with Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s
*Annotations*
Sections 1-5

Jeffrey Hopkins

In consultation with Lo-sang-gyal-tshan

UMA INSTITUTE
FOR TIBETAN STUDIES
The Two Truths in the Consequence School, 1-5
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UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies
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Translating texts from the heritage of Tibetan and Inner Asian Buddhist system, the project focuses on Great Indian Books and Tibetan commentaries from the Go-mang College syllabus as well as a related theme on the fundamental innate mind of clear light in Tantric traditions. A feature of the Project is the usage of consistent vocabulary and format throughout the translations.

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Contents

Preface 6
  Presentations of Tenets: The Transformative Aim 6
  Indian Precursors of Presentations of Tenets 8
  Jam-yang-shay-pa 11
    Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of Tenets 12
    Controversy 13
  Ngag-wang-pal-dan 16
  Remarks about the Format 22
  Editions consulted 23

Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Explanation of Tenets: Sun of the Land of Samantabhadra
  Brilliantly Illuminating All of Our Own and Others’ Tenets
  and the Meaning of the Profound [Emptiness], Ocean of
  Scripture and Reasoning Fulfilling All Hopes of All Beings 27
  3* Features of the Basal Two Truths {2} 29
    a* Actual Exposition of the Features of the Basal
      Two Truths {10} 30
      1# Basis of Division into the Two Truths 30
      2# Meaning of the Division 43
      3# Definitions 61
      4# Etymologies 85
      5# Individual Divisions 109

Bibliography 185
  1. Sūtras and Tantras 185
  2. Other Sanskrit and Tibetan Works 188
  3. Other Works 221
PRESENTATIONS OF TENETS:
THE TRANSFORMATIVE AIM

The Tibetan cultural region\(^a\) stretches beyond the borders of Tibet through a vast area ranging from Kalmyk Mongolian lands near the Volga River in Europe where the Volga empties into the Caspian Sea, through Outer and Inner Mongolia, the Buryat Republic of Siberia, and through Bhutan, Sikkim, Ladakh, and parts of Nepal. In this vast Inner Asian area, schools of non-Buddhist and Buddhist Indian philosophy are systematized in texts called “presentations of tenets.”\(^b\) Focal topics and issues are presented in order to stimulate inquiry and to encourage development of an inner faculty capable of investigating appearances so as to penetrate their reality. In this context philosophy is, for the most part, related to liberative concerns—the attempt to extricate oneself and others from the round of painful existence and to attain freedom and full development.

The basic perspective is that afflictive emotions—such as desire, hatred, enmity, jealousy, and belligerence—bind beings in a round of uncontrolled birth, aging, sickness, and death and are founded on misperception of the nature of persons and other phenomena. When a practitioner penetrates reality and this insight is teamed with a powerful consciousness of concentrated meditation, the underpinnings of the process of cyclic existence can be destroyed, resulting in liberation. Also, when wisdom is further empowered through the development of love, compassion, and altruism—and the corresponding actions of generosity, ethics, and tolerant patience—wisdom is capable of achieving an all-knowing state in which one can help a vast number of beings.

Because of this basic perspective—namely, that false ideation traps beings in a round of suffering—reasoned investigation into the nature of persons and other phenomena is central to the process of spiritual development (though it is not the only concern). Schools of tenets primarily are studied not to refute other systems but to develop an internal force that can counteract one’s own *innate* adherence to misapprehensions. These innate forms of ignorance are part and parcel of ordinary life. They are not just

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\(^a\) This section is drawn from Jeffrey Hopkins, *Reflections on Reality* (Berkeley, CA.: University of California Press, 2002), chaps. 3-4.

\(^b\) *grub miha'i rnam bzhag, *siddhāntavyavasthāpana.
learned from other systems, nor do they just arise from faulty analysis.

The stated aim of studying the different schools is to gain insight into the fact that many of the perspectives basic to ordinary life are devoid of valid foundation. This realization leads practitioners to replace invalid assent to deceptive appearance with well-founded perspectives. The process is achieved through (1) first engaging in hearing great texts on such topics and getting straight the verbal presentation, (2) then thinking on their meaning to the point where the topics are ascertained with valid cognition, and (3) finally meditating on the same to the point where these realizations become enhanced by the power of concentration such that they can counteract innate tendencies to assent to false appearances.

Since it is no easy matter to penetrate the thick veil of false facades and misconceptions, it became popular in the more scholastic circles of India to investigate not just what the current tradition considered to be the best and final system but also the so-called lower systems. Systematic study provided a gradual approach to subtle topics so as to avoid confusion with less subtle ones. In Tibet, because of the need to get a handle on the plethora of Buddhist systems inherited from India, presentations of tenets comparing the views of the different schools of thought assumed considerable importance. That the primary concern is indeed with developing the capacity to appreciate the profound view of a high system of philosophy is evidenced by the amount of time actually spent by students probing the workings of the so-called lower schools. Since the stances of those schools are appreciated, they are studied in considerable detail.

In order to fulfil its liberative function a presentation of tenets provides a comprehensive worldview. Its descriptions, ranging from the phenomena of the world through to and including the types of enlightenment, give students a framework for study and practice as well as a perspective for relating with other beings. The hierarchical presentation, fortified with reasoned explanation, itself inculcates the basic posture that the power of reason can penetrate the false veils of appearance and lead to meditative perception of a liberative reality. Presentations of tenets are founded on confidence in the mind’s ability to overcome tremendous obstacles to the point where love, compassion, and altruism can be expressed in effective, continuous activity, and, therefore, they do more than just structure Indian Buddhist systems; they structure practitioners’ perception of their place in a dynamic worldview.

The perspective is that individuals are bound by misconception in a round of suffering and mired in afflicting emotions counterproductive to their own welfare, but also poised on a threshold of transformation. The uncontrolled course of cyclic existence lacks a solid underpinning; it is
ready to be transformed into a patterned advance toward liberation. The starkness of the harrowing appraisal of the current situation of multi-layered pain stands in marked contrast to the optimistic view of the liberative development that is possible. Such optimism stems from conviction that the affective emotions and obstructions, the causes of misery and finite intelligence, are not endemic to the mind but are peripheral to its nature and thus subject to antidotal influences that can remove them.

This vision serves as a powerful force orienting and ordering lives. It stimulates the metaphysical imagination, beckoning, pushing against, and resonating with inner potentials such that persons are drawn into the transformative process. I have found that it is helpful to apprehend it with a playful attitude—allowing exploration of this grand perspective without the pressure of commitment, letting horizons open on their own.

**INDIAN PRECURSORS OF PRESENTATIONS OF TENETS**

The main Indian precursors of these systemizations are texts such as the *Blaze of Reasoning* \(^a\) by Bhāvaviveka (500-570? C.E.)\(^b\) and the *Compendium of Principles*\(^c\) by the eighth-century scholar Shāntarakṣhita, with a commentary by his student Kamalashīla. Both Shāntarakṣhita and Kamalashīla visited Tibet in the late eighth century and strongly influenced the direction that Buddhism took there.

In Tibet, the presentations assumed a more developed structure.\(^d\) Some of these texts are long; for instance, a lengthy text entitled *Treasury of Tenets: Illuminating the Meaning of All Vehicles*\(^e\) was written by the

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\(^a\) rtog ge 'bar ba, tarkajvālā. This is Bhāvaviveka’s commentary on his Heart of the Middle (*dbu ma snying po, madhyamakahṛdaya*). For a partial English translation of the latter (chap. III. 1-136), see Shōtarō Iida, *Reason and Emptiness* (Tokyo: Hokuseido, 1980).


\(^d\) For more discussion on this genre of Tibetan literature, see Katsumi Mimaki, *Blo gsal grub mtha’* (Kyoto: Université de Kyoto, 1982), 1-12; and David Seyfort Ruegg’s foreword to Geshé Ngawang Nyima, *Introduction to the Doctrines of the Four Schools of Buddhist Philosophy* (Leiden, 1970).

\(^e\) theg pa mtha’ dag gi don gsal bar byed pa grub pa′i mtha’ rin po che′i mdzod.
fourteenth-century scholar Long-chen-rab-jamā of the Nying-ma order of Tibetan Buddhism. It appears that Tsong-kha-pa’s The Essence of Eloquence, which is the mother of presentations of tenets in the Ge-lug-pa order, was written in reaction to presentations like those of Long-chen-pa.

In response to Tsong-kha-pa’s writing, the fifteenth-century scholar Tag-tshang Shay-rab-rin-chen of the Sa-kyā order wrote a long text titled the Explanation of “Freedom from Extremes through Knowing All Tenets”: Ocean of Eloquence, detailing what he considered to be Tsong-kha-pa’s contradictions. Tag-tshang’s text in turn gave rise to the most extensive text of this type in Tibet. In part to refute Tag-tshang’s account of Tsong-kha-pa’s contradictions, Jam-yang-shay-pa (1648-1721) composed the Explanation of Tenets: Sun of the Land of Samantabhadra Brilliantly Illuminating All of Our Own and Others’ Tenets and the Meaning of the Profound [Emptiness], Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning Fulfilling All Hopes of All Beings, also known as the Great Exposition of Tenets. The word “tenets” in the title refers to the root text; his commentary on it is like the light of the lang of Samantabhadra, which is not lit by a sun that rises and sets but shines continuously through the power of meditative stabilization. This book of tenets fulfils the hopes of all beings seeking the ability to gain the wanted and avoid the unwanted, since it explains what the wanted and the unwanted are and how to achieve and avoid them. Through delineating the profound meanings of emptiness, it shows the path to liberation from cyclic existence and the eventual attainment of omniscience.

The Great Exposition of Tenets is replete with citations of Indian sources but is written, despite its length, in a laconic style (unusual for him) that sometimes can leave one wondering about the relevance of citations. Even more so, Jam-yang-shay-pa’s root text (which is translated in this book), published ten years earlier in nine-syllable poetry, often is more befuddling. However, once it is unpacked, it serves as an easy technique to memorize stances of tenet systems.

a klong chen rab ’byams / klong chen dri med ’od zer, 1308-1363.
b tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa, 1357-1419.
c drang ba dang nges pa ’i don rnam par phyed ba ’i bstan bcos legs shad snying po; Peking 6142, vol. 153. See the Bibliography for translations and so forth.
d Tsong-kha-pa’s main opponent is the fourteenth-century scholar-yogi Shay-rab-gyal-tshan; see Part 4 of Jeffrey Hopkins, Reflections on Reality (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).
e stag tshang lo tsā ba shes rab rin chen, born 1405.
f grub mtha’ kun shes nas mtha’ ’bral grub pa zhes bya ba’i bstan bcos rnam par bshad pa legs bshad kyi rgya mtsho.
Perhaps this inaccessibility was partly why the eighteenth-century Tibetanized Mongolian scholar Jang-kya Röl-pay-dor-jay—a whom Jam-yang-shay-pa, then an old man, helped to find as the reincarnation of the last Jang-kya—composed a more issue-oriented text of the same genre titled *Clear Exposition of the Presentation of Tenets: Beautiful Ornament for the Meru of the Subduer’s Teaching.* Jam-yang-shay-pa’s own reincarnation, Kön-chog-jig-may-wang-po, became Jang-kya’s main pupil and in 1733 wrote an abbreviated version of these texts, titled *Presentation of Tenets: A Precious Garland.* Many authors chose to write concise texts so that the general outlines and basic postures of schools could be taught and memorized without the encumbrance of a great deal of elaboration, though sometimes the brevity itself makes the issues being discussed inaccessible.

A medium-length presentation of tenets that also treats the other schools of Tibetan Buddhism but in a biased fashion was written by Jang-kya’s biographer and student, who was also a student of Kön-chog-jig-may-wang-po, Tu-ken Lo-sang-chö-kyi-nyi-ma. His text is called *Mirror of Eloquence Showing the Sources and Assertions of All Schools of Tenets.* The final major development was a text unraveling the difficult points of Jam-yang-shay-pa’s huge but terse *Great Exposition of Tenets,* written by the Khalkha Mongolian scholar Ngag-wang-pal-dan. As long as Jam-

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*a lcang skya rol pa’i rdo rje, 1717-1786. A Tibetanized Mongolian born in what is presently the Am-do Province of Tibet, currently the Qinghai Province of China, he is also known as the Second Jang-kya Hu-tok-tu (hu thog thu), using the Mongolian for tulku (sprul sku).

b Jam-yang-shay-pa himself had been tutored by the previous Jang-kya, Nga-wang-lo-sang-chö-den.

c grub pa’i mtha’i rnam par bzhag pa gsal bar bshad pa thub bstan lhan po’i mdzes rgyan.

d dkon mchog ‘jigs med dbang po, 1728-1791.

e grub pa’i mtha’i rnam par bzhag pa rin po che’i phreng ba. In this sub-genre of brief Presentations of Tenets are earlier texts such as the *Presentation of Tenets* by Jay-tsün Chökyi-gyal-tshan (1469-1546), the *Ship for Entering the Ocean of Tenets* by the Second Dalai Lama (1476-1542), the *Presentation of Tenets, Sublime Tree Inspiring Those of Clear Mind, Hammer Destroying the Stone Mountains of Opponents* by Pañ-chen Sō-nam-drak-pa (1478-1554), and the *Condensed Essence of All Tenets* by Jo-nay-pa Drak-pa-shay-drup (co ne ba grags pa bshad sgrub, 1675-1748). For a list of other such brief texts, see the bibliography (XLVI, and so forth) and introduction (5-12) in Katsumi Mimaki, *Blo gsal grub mtha’.*

f thu’u bkvan blo bzang chos kyi nyi ma, 1737-1802.

g grub mtha’ thams cad kyi khungs dang ’dod tshul ston pa legs bshad shel gyi me long.
h ngag dbang dpal ldan, b. 1797; also known as Pal-dan-chö-jay (dpal ldan chos rje).
yang-shay-pa’s commentary itself, his Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-pa’s) “Great Exposition of Tenets”: Freeing the Knots of the Difficult Points, Precious Jewel of Clear Thought elaborates key points, making the Great Exposition of Tenets clear and accessible.

The number, length, and quality of these texts testify to this genre’s having captured the attention of several important authors as a means to stimulate the metaphysical imagination and thereby to penetrate the veil of false appearances.

**JAM-YANG-SHAY-PA**

Jam-yang-shay-pa Ngag-wang-tsön-drü was born in the northeastern Am-do Province of Tibet in the Earth-Mouse year of 1648 east of the Blue Lake. At the age of five he was blessed by the Fifth Dalai Lama, from whom he later received monastic vows. Having studied the alphabet at age seven with his uncle, who was a monk, he mastered reading and writing and six years later became a novice monk, excelling among his fellow students by his ability quickly to understand texts and disputations. He went to Lhasa at age twenty-one to further his studies at the Gomang College of Dre-pung Monastic University. Arriving in Lhasa in 1668, he offered a presentation scarf to an image of Mañjushrī in the Jo-khang Temple, where the statue reportedly favored the young scholar with a smile, due to which he became known as Jam-yang-shay-pa, “Smiled Upon by Mañjushrī.” Six years later he received full ordination and at twenty-nine entered Gyu-may Tantric College. From age thirty-three he spent two years in meditative retreat in a cave near Dre-pung.

At the age of thirty-eight he authored the first of his major works, Decisive Analysis of (Tsong-kha-pa’s) “Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive”: Storehouse of White Lapis-Lazuli of Scripture and Reasoning Free from Mistake, Fulfilling the Hopes of the Fortunate, commonly called Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive. During this same period he also wrote another of his great expositions, the Treatise on the Presentations of the Concentrative and Formless Absorptions: Adornment Beautifying the Subduer’s Teaching, Ocean of Scripture

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a grub mtaha` chen mo`i mchan` grel dka` gnad mdud grol blo gsal gees nor.
b 'jam dbyangs bzhad pa ngag dbang brtson grus, 1648-1722. For a longer biography of Jam-yang-shay-pa see Derek F. Maher, “Knowledge and Authority in Tibetan Middle Way Schools of Buddhism: A Study of the Gelukha (dge lugs pa) Epistemology of Jamyang Shayba (jam dbyangs bzhad pa) In Its Historical Context” (Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, 2003), 169-196.
and Reasoning, Delighting the Fortunate, commonly called Great Exposition of the Concentratative and Formless Absorptions. He published the Root Text of Tenets: Lion’s Roar in 1689, which is the heart of the present book, and published the Great Exposition of Tenets—its prose auto-commentary—ten years later in 1699.

At age fifty-three he became abbot of Go-mang College and in 1710 at sixty-two returned to Am-do Province where he founded a highly influential monastery at Tra-shi-khyil. Seven years later he founded a tantric college at the same place. He wrote prolifically on the full range of topics of a typical Tibetan polymath and, having received honors from the central Tibetan government and from the Chinese Emperor, died at the age of seventy-three or -four in 1721/2.

Partly because of the close connection between Go-mang College and the Mongolian peoples stretching from the Caspian Sea through Siberia, who were predominantly Ge-lug-pa by this time, Jam-yang-shay-pa’s influence on the Ge-lug-pa order has been considerable. His life manifests a pattern typical of many influential Tibetan religious figures—child prodigy, learned scholar, disseminator of the religion, politician, priest to political personages, monastery leader, yogi, magician, popular teacher, and prolific writer.

Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of Tenets

Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Root Text of Tenets: Lion’s Roar, published in 1689, is written in unusually terse, sometimes opaque nine-syllable lines, largely devoid of customary grammatical endings and particles. An oral tradition reports that the stylistic oddness of his root text is due to Jam-yang-shay-pa’s composing it in an inspired state hearing the sounds of a lute-like

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\(a\) bkra shis 'khyil.

\(b\) See Maher, “Knowledge and Authority in Tibetan Middle Way Schools of Buddhism,” 164.

\(c\) There are two editions of the Root Text in Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Collected Works, the second also containing interlinear annotations; it is attributed to Jam-yang-shay-pa but on a few occasions contains material contrary to his commentary in the Great Exposition of Tenets, and, therefore, may have been authored by a student.

\(d\) Tag-tshang’s root text, on the other hand, contains sufficient grammatical endings and particles to be readily understood. His autocommentary, however, is sometimes difficult to follow because he uses the root text within explanatory sentences but cites it only by a syllable or two and “and so forth” (sogs); the difficulty is that the words of the root text are integral parts of the commentary, which, therefore, can be understood only by the reader’s supplying the remaining words of that phrase, line, or lines of the root text. In translation, I have supplied the missing words so as to make it accessible.
instrument played by the goddess Svarasvatī. His prose autocommentary, published ten years later in 1699, cites the entire root text section by section, and includes most but not all of the words of the root text scattered within the commentary. Monumental in length, the Great Exposition of Tenets expands greatly on the root text through citing sources, unraveling issues, and suggesting other issues.

Controversy

It is clear from Tag-tshang Shay-rab-rin-chen’s Commentary on “Knowing All Tenets” that the philosophical influence of Tsong-kha-pa, the founder of the Ge-lug-pa order, was already widespread by the middle of the fifteenth century at least in Central Tibet. Tag-tshang’s markedly different explanation of Tsong-kha-pa’s main source, the seventh-century Indian scholar-adept Chandrakīrti, caused him to take Tsong-kha-pa as his main opponent throughout his presentation of tenets but especially in a separate section in which he spells out eighteen contradictions in Tsong-kha-pa’s works with regard to Chandrakīrti’s Consequence School.

Two centuries later, the Fifth Dalai Lama suggested that a scholar refute Tag-tshang (see 1022), and the First Paṇ-chen Lama composed a forty-five folio text, Response to Objections by the Sanskritist Shay-rab-rin-chen: Roar of the Lion of Scripture and Reasoning in which he quotes Tag-tshang’s eighteen indictments one by one and gives responses, sometimes along with invective, likely in response to Tag-tshang’s several outbursts. Jam-yang-shay-pa, undoubtedly aware of the First Paṇ-chen Lama’s text, weaves a broader response into the Great Exposition of Tenets, providing a sustained refutation of Tag-tshang’s presentation of tenets, citing various parts of Tag-tshang’s root text and commentary, but then devoting a section that is more than an eighth of his own book to detailing twenty-seven contradictions in Tag-tshang’s own text.

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a blo bzang chos kyi rgyal mtshan, 1567(?)–1662.
b sgra pa shes rab rin chen pa’i rtsod lan lung rigs seng ge’i nga ro; Collected Works of blo bzang chos kyi rgyal mtshan, Paṇchen Lama I (New Delhi: Lama Gurudeva, 1973), vol. 4: 559-648. To my knowledge, the First Paṇchen Lama does not explicitly indicate that he was answering the Fifth Dalai Lama’s request.

There is also an early twentieth-century response to Tag-tshang by Pa-bong-kha-pa Jam-pa-tan-dzin-trin-lay-gya-tsho (pha bong kha pa byams pa bsTan ’dzin ’phrin las rgya mtsho, 1878-1941), Answer to the Translator Tag-tshang’s Objections: Vajra Nodes (stag tshang lo mtsho ba’i brgal lhan rdo rje’i gzegs ma) (Collected Works, New Delhi: 1973, Toh. 6154); thanks to Derek Maher for identifying this.

The core of Tag-tshang’s criticism of Tsong-kha-pa’s system is his predecessor’s assertion that all phenomena are established, or certified, by valid cognition:

They who, though following the glorious Chandrakīrti,
Assert—upon analyzing with many reasonings—
That impure mistaken appearances are established by valid cognition
Have the following great burden of contradictions.

In his *Sacred Word of Mañjushrī* the Fifth Dalai Lama makes reference to these lines:

Mañjushrī told the Foremost Lama [Tsong-kha-pa] that it was necessary to value the varieties of appearances. His thought was based on a qualm that, in the future, trainees who did not understand such an essential would fall into a view of nihilism. Thus, many modes of establishing the existence of appearances are [presented] in Tsong-kha-pa’s great and small expositions of the *Stages of the Path* and in his commentaries on Nāgārjuna’s *Treatise on the Middle* and Chandrakīrti’s *Supplement*. However, the lion of proponents, the translator Tag-tshang [criticizes Tsong-kha-pa] saying, “Upon analyzing with many forms of reasoning, he asserts that impure mistaken appearances are validly established.” [This criticism] is seen to arise from the same source of error.

Valid certification for Tag-tshang and for Tsong-kha-pa are different; Tag-tshang sees it as implying self-institution,\(^b\) due to which, in the Consequence School, only the ultimate is established by valid cognition. He views Tsong-kha-pa’s assertion that all phenomena—conventional and ultimate—are certified by valid cognition as having fallen to an extreme of reification, exaggerating a status of phenomena that does not exist as if it existed.

From Tsong-kha-pa’s perspective, self-institution is a synonym for inherent existence, and thus nothing—either ultimate or conventional—is self-instituting according to the Consequence School. Hence, establishment by valid cognition cannot possibly imply self-institution. As Jamyang-shay-pa indicates, Tag-tshang has fallen to an extreme of reification in asserting that the ultimate is self-instituting and thus truly existent (in

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\(^a\) Jeffrey Hopkins, “Practice of Emptiness” (Dharmsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 1974), 24.
\(^b\) tshugs thub tu grub pa.
Ge-lug-pa terms) and has fallen to an extreme of nihilism in denying the valid establishment of conventional phenomena.

In this very way Tag-tshang frequently criticizes Tsong-kha-pa for bringing the valid certification of conventional phenomena into the Consequence School, and Jam-yang-shay-pa frequently returns to criticizing Tag-tshang for over-concretizing valid establishment. Although Jam-yang-shay-pa indicates that he is aware that by that time Tag-tshang’s system had lost all of its adherents, during his step-by-step refutation he nevertheless repeatedly stoops to ad hominem incendiary invectives that can be at first shocking, then amusing, then boring, and finally counter-productive. Sometimes, they provide comic relief in the midst of the intellectual challenge of the intricate controversies, such as when he accuses Tag-tshang of drinking the water of a mirage, or when he says that Tag-tshang has become afraid of a mirage and is building a boat to cross over it. At other times, however, slurs—such as accusing him of being a fool, of confused bragging, of being overcast with darkness, and so forth—double back on Jam-yang-shay-pa, making one wonder why he needed to be so nasty, distracting his readers from interesting information and issues, thereby weakening his own position. On these occasions the remarks unwittingly and witlessly provide a model of how not to present a case. Though the virulent outbursts provide a window on the rough and tumble of inter-sectarian and even intra-sectarian rivalries in Tibet, they serve to warn against counter-productive harshness.

Nevertheless, the controversies (but not the name-calling) are valuable in that they highlight differing readings of the same Indian figure, Chandrakīrti; the contrasts make clearer their respective explanations and perhaps also multiple meanings in Chandrakīrti’s words. To this end in Maps of the Profound, I added before Jam-yang-shay-pa’s rebuttal more than sixty pages from Tag-tshang’s Knowing All Tenets and his autobiography on:

- the eighteen contradictions
- the three phases of spiritual training
- the five unique features of the Consequence School
- the three roots of cyclic existence
- the nature of an action’s having disintegrated
- the definitions of the two truths
- and the necessity to enter the Mantra Vehicle after achieving the Buddhahood of the Perfection Vehicle.

The gems of insight scattered throughout the controversy stimulate exploration and insight.
NGAG-WANG-PAL-DAN

The Khalkha Mongolian scholar Ngag-wang-pal-dan was born in Urga—present day Ulaanbaatar, the capitol of Mongolia—in the Fire-Serpent year of 1797. He received his monastic training in the Ge-lug-pa monastic college of Dra-shi-chö-pel and at the age of forty in 1836 was appointed to the seat of Doctrine Master of Urga, and thus he is more commonly known as Pal-dan-chö-jay. He went to Tibet in 1843 in connection with the funeral service of the Fifth Je-tsun-dam-pa, the reincarnation of Tāranātha, the second most important figure of the Jo-nang-pa sect, and in 1847 relinquished the post of Doctrine Master of Urga. It seems that he remained in Tibet at the Go-mang College of Dre-pung Monastery, west of and at that time outside of the city of Lhasa. He also avidly studied and sometimes wrote about the textbook literature of the Lo-sel-ling College of Dre-pung. He composed seven volumes of many works on a wide range of topics.

Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s extraordinary depth is exemplified in his extensive commentary titled Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-pa’s) “Great Exposition of Tenets”: Freeing the Knots of the Difficult Points, Precious Jewel of Clear Awareness, almost as long Jam-yang-shay-pa’s text itself. The Great Exposition of Tenets, despite being monumental in length, is

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* These two sentences are drawn from Lokesh Chandra, *Eminent Tibetan Polymaths of Mongolia* (New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1961), 24.
* chos rje.
* dpal ldan chos rje.
* sgo mang.
* 'bras spungs.
* Jeffrey Hopkins has a vague memory of being told that Ngag-wang-pal-dan was “removed from the comforts of the community” of the Go-mang College fourteen times, which he speculates was due to Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s occasional affinity for the positions of the Lo-sel-ling College.
* 505 folios, Guru Deva edition.
* 545 folios, bla brang edition.
often cryptic in its references and meaning (atypical for Jam-yang-shay-pa whose style is usually relatively clear); it is also laden with copy-editing problems. Seeing the tremendous value of the *Great Exposition of Tenets*, Ngag-wang-pal-dan sought to make it more accessible through lengthening, explaining, and identifying source materials and through expanding on issues. He also raises qualms about the relevance of certain source quotes and frequently corrects misprints, faulty citations, and other copy-editing problems in the Central Tibet Go-mang edition, although he forswears trying to make a list of what requires copy-editing. His attention to detail manifests the great value he put on the text, bringing tremendous clarity to what otherwise is an unusually abstruse work. His annotations are a necessary key for the *Great Exposition of Tenets* through providing rigorous contextualization and non-partisan critique.

The *Annotations* are invaluable as they reveal the systematic background of Jam-yang-shay-pa’s citations which, without this contextualization, sometimes even seem to be proving the opposite of what the author intends. Until one understands that Jam-yang-shay-pa intends his text to function also as lecture notes for a teacher competent in Tsong-kha-pa’s system, many of his citations are baffling. Undoubtedly, Ngag-wang-pal-dan saw this need and provided contextualization. His annotations do indeed untie the knots of a great many difficult points especially by elaborating the meaning of quotations, and thus I used it extensively for both understanding the meaning and adding bracketed material in *Meditation on Emptiness* and *Maps of the Profound*.

When Ngag-wang-pal-dan, evincing independence and intellectual honesty, disagrees with Jam-yang-shay-pa, he usually presents a carefully framed argument, sometimes in great detail. Due to this, in the Go-mang

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a Some of his corrections indicate that he did not have the Tra-shi-khyil edition.

b He says (*stod, ha*, 179.2):

Since, in general, I have not tried to write down the very many mistakes in wording (*yig nor*) here in Jam-yang-shay-pa’s *Great Exposition of Tenets*, I have mostly neglected them.

and (*dngos, tha*, 215.5):

Although in general there are very many tiny mistakes in wording in all of the omniscient Jam-yang-shay-pa’s textbook literature on philosophy and in particular in the *Great Exposition of Tenets*, such as the genitive case where the instrumental case should be and the instrumental case where the genitive case should be, I have not tried here to write [all of] them down, and hence have mostly neglected them.

College, which uses Jam-yang-shay-pa’s works as most of their basic textbooks, his Annotations are sometimes described as “not our own system” and even occasionally disparaged as “annotations about misprintings.” To the contrary, they are a necessary key to Jam-yang-shay-pa’s work through providing contextualization and are shining examples of rigorous, nonpartisan application of scholarly principles. Ngag-wang-pal-dan himself adopts a humble attitude; for instance, after thoroughly challenging the relevance of Jam-yang-shay-pa’s citation of a passage, he says:

These are stated in the manner of raising qualms for those of new awareness. The fact that there is no chance to debate with the explanations by the omniscient patriarch Jam-yang-shay-pa-dor-jay should be known everywhere throughout [my annotations].

With this type of format, or perhaps mask, Tibetan and Mongolian authors critically examine the works of esteemed predecessors. Jam-yang-shay-pa also uses similar formats when he examines—and improves upon—Tsong-kha-pa’s works.

Ngag-wang-pal-dan also wrote a separate text that examines the presentations of the two truths in the four schools of tenets, titled Explanation of Veil Truths and Ultimate Truths in the Four Systems of Tenets. Here he explains the intricacies of veil truths and ultimate truths often in the format of debates. His departure points often stem from Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of Tenets and Great Exposition of the Middle. For instance, Jam-yang-shay-pa’s exposition of the two truths in both of these texts eventually bogs down in articulating how veil truths (conventional phenomena), which are necessarily unreal because they appear in an unreal mode as inherently existent to their certifying consciousnesses, can be divided into the real and the unreal. Ngag-wang-pal-dan wades into the implications of framing the issue and resolves it through differentiating the meanings of the terms “in the perspective” (shes ngor) and “in relation

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a rang lugs ma yin.
b yig nor mcchan 'grel.
c Annotations, dbu ma pa, 'a. 92.3.
d 135 folios, Guru Deva edition.
to the perspective” (shes ngo la itos te) of a worldly consciousness, favoring usage of the latter.a

Another book, Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Presentation of the Grounds and Paths of the Four Great Secret Tantra Sets: Illumination of the Texts of Tantra, b is twice the length of his lama Yang-jan-ga-way-lo-drö’s c Presentation of the Grounds and Paths of Mantra According to the Superior Nāgārjuna’s System of the Glorious Guhyasamāja: Eloquence Serving as a Port for the Fortunate. d His lama’s text is solely concerned with Highest Yoga Tantra, whereas Ngag-wang-pal-dan devotes one fifth of his to the modes of progressing on the paths of the three lower tantra sets—Action, Performance, and Yoga Tantras. Also, within Highest Yoga Tantra, Yang-jan-ga-way-lo-drö treats only the Guhyasamāja system, whereas Ngag-wang-pal-dan also includes an exposition of the Kālachakra system. In addition, Ngag-wang-pal-dan from time to time provides interesting nuances in the form of challenges and responses. For instance, on the issue of whether in the Guhyasamāja system Buddhahood can be achieved in one lifetime with one body, Ngag-wang-pal-dan presents the hypothetical challenge that in order to achieve enlightenment in one lifetime an illusory body that is capable of remaining separate from the practitioner’s ordinary body must be achieved, and thus two bodies are needed, and so Buddhahood cannot be achieved in one lifetime with one body.

In response, Ngag-wang-pal-dan presents a complex defense of the position that Buddhahood can be achieved in one lifetime with one body. He does this by making the refinement that even though it is necessary for the practitioner to switch (brje ba) from the coarse, or ordinary, body to a subtle body, it is not necessary to discard (’dor ba) the ordinary body, since one has the capability to still use it for the sake of others. However, he immediately points out contrary evidence that casts doubt on his own hair-

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b The Two Truths, 111-157.

c The Two Truths, 111-157.

d The Two Truths, 111-157.
splitting refinement.\footnote{For this topic, see 576.3/29b.3-579.2-31a.2.}

Nevertheless, in notes by my lama Yang-jan-ga-lo\footnote{Yang-jan-ga-way-lo-drö.} there also is a statement by Shing-sa Rin-po-che,\footnote{shing bza’ rin po che.} that the previous Paṇ-chen [Lama], when bestowing the Guhyasamāja initiation on the members of the Upper Tantric College at Drag-yer-pa,\footnote{drag yer pa; ten kilometers northeast of Lhasa.} [explained] that when Tibetans asked Atisha, “Could there be full purification in one lifetime in one body?” Atisha said, “Complete purification in one lifetime exists, but complete purification in one body does not exist,” and the Tibetans took this answer to mean that Atisha did not understand, whereas this is speech [indicating] that Atisha understood an important point of Mantra, and therefore his opinion was most expert, and the Tibetans did not understand. Hence, [the position that there is enlightenment in one lifetime in one body] should be analyzed.

Atisha’s point is that a new subtle body is required to achieve enlightenment in one lifetime.

In another work, Ngag-wang-pal-dan compares stances in the textbooks of the Lo-sel-ling and Go-mang Colleges on the phases of study called “Middle Way” and “Perfection of Wisdom.” Among the Five Great Books of Buddhist India:

\begin{itemize}
  \item the “Middle Way” focuses on Chandrakīrti’s \textit{Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle,”}\footnote{dbu ma la 'jug pa, madhyamakāvatāra. Since Chandrakīrti often refers to Nāgārjuna’s \textit{Treatise on the Middle} (\textit{dbu ma’i bstan bcos, madhyamakaśāstra}) merely by the appellation \textit{madhyamaka}, the \textit{madhyamaka} of “madhyamakāvatāra” is held to refer to a text propounding the middle, specifically Nāgārjuna’s \textit{Treatise on the Middle}. My translation of \textit{avatāra} (\textit{'jug pa}) as “supplement” is controversial; others use “introduction” or “entrance,” both of which are attested common translations in such a context. My translation is based on the explanation by Tsong-kha-pa that Chandrakīrti was filling in holes in Nāgārjuna’s \textit{Treatise on the Middle}; see Tsong-kha-pa, Kensur Lekden, and Jeffrey Hopkins, \textit{Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism} (London: Rider, 1980; reprint, Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1980), 96-99. Among the many meanings of the Tibetan term for \textit{avatāra}, \textit{'jug pa} can mean “to affix” or “to add on.” To summarize the oral teachings of the late Ngag-wang-leg-dan:

\begin{quote}
\textit{Avatāra} means “addition” in the sense that Chandrakīrti’s text is a supplement historically necessary so as to clarify the meaning of Nāgārjuna’s \textit{Treatise on the

\textit{Madhyamaka} is held to refer to a text propounding the middle, specifically Nāgārjuna’s \textit{Treatise on the Middle}. My translation of \textit{avatāra} as “supplement” is controversial; others use “introduction” or “entrance,” both of which are attested common translations in such a context. My translation is based on the explanation by Tsong-kha-pa that Chandrakīrti was filling in holes in Nāgārjuna’s \textit{Treatise on the Middle}; see Tsong-kha-pa, Kensur Lekden, and Jeffrey Hopkins, \textit{Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism} (London: Rider, 1980; reprint, Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1980), 96-99. Among the many meanings of the Tibetan term for \textit{avatāra}, \textit{'jug pa} can mean “to affix” or “to add on.” To summarize the oral teachings of the late Ngag-wang-leg-dan:

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\end{itemize}
inherent existence, the ten grounds, and so forth

- the “Perfection of Wisdom” focuses on the coming Buddha Maitreya’s *Ornament for the Clear Realizations,* a rendering of the hidden teaching on the path structure in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras.

Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s synthetic book, titled *Stating the Modes of Explanation in the Textbooks on the Middle Way and the Perfection of Wisdom in the Lo-sel-ling and Go-mang Colleges: Festival for Those of Clear Intelligence,* treats issue after issue in the form of a list. It is clearly aimed at those familiar with the positions of one or the other of the two colleges on these vast areas, and thus the book cannot be approached as a way to learn these two topics from the ground up since the author lists and ex-

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*Middle.* He wanted to make clear that the *Treatise* should not be explained according to the Mind-Only system or according to the Middle Way Autonomy School (*dbu ma rang rgyud pa, svatanirikaññādhyamika*), the founding of which is attributed to Bhāvaviveka. During Nāgārjuna’s lifetime, Bhāvaviveka had not written his commentary on the *Treatise*, nor had he founded his system; therefore, it was necessary later to supplement Nāgārjuna’s text to show why it should not be explained in such a way. Moreover, it is said that Chandrakīrti sought to show that a follower of Nāgārjuna should ascend the ten grounds by practicing the vast paths necessary to do so. This is because some take the Middle Way perspective to be nihilistic. They see it as a means of refuting the general existence of phenomena rather than just their inherent existence and conclude that it is not necessary to engage in practices such as the cultivation of compassion. Therefore, in order to show that it is important to engage in three central practices—compassion, non-dual understanding, and the altruistic mind of enlightenment—and to ascend the ten Bodhisattva grounds, Chandrakīrti in reliance on Nāgārjuna’s *Precious Garland* wrote this supplementary text.


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*a* mngon rtogs rgyan, abhisamayālāṃkāra.

pands only on points of difference, making the text an eventually dry venture for those new to the territory despite being fascinatingly informative for those familiar with the terrain. For instance:

1. he presents (a) the series of reasons why Pañ-chen Sō-nam-drag-pa, the principal textbook author of Lo-sel-ling College, holds that the Maitreya who composed the Ornament for the Clear Realizations is a Bodhisattva and (b) the maneuvers Pañ-chen Sō-nam-drag-pa uses to explain away sources indicating that Maitreya is a Buddha

2. he presents (a) the series of reasons why Jam-yang-shay-pa, the principal textbook author of Go-mang College, holds that the Maitreya who composed the Ornament for the Clear Realizations is a Buddha and (b) the maneuvers Jam-yang-shay-pa uses to explain away sources indicating that Maitreya is a Bodhisattva.a

The central question is whether according to the Perfection Vehicle (the sūtra systems of the Great Vehicle) Maitreya’s enlightenment during his appearance as a human on this earth is the display of one of the twelve deeds of an already enlightened Buddha (Jam-yang-shay-pa’s position) or an actual case of becoming enlightened during a human life (Pañ-chen Sō-nam-drag-pa’s position). For Jam-yang-shay-pa, Maitreya is a Bodhisattva in the perspective of common trainees and is a Buddha for uncommon trainees, whereas for Pañ-chen Sō-nam-drag-pa the Perfection Vehicle views Maitreya from the common perspective of an actual birth but Mantra Vehicle views Maitreya from the uncommon perspective of a mere display. Nevertheless, both Jam-yang-shay-pa and Pañ-chen Sō-nam-drag-pa hold that (1) Shākyamuni Buddha was just making a display of becoming enlightened; (2) Maitreya is the next Buddha to appear in this world to openly enact the twelve deeds of a Buddha; and (3) in terms of the final perspective Maitreya was already a Buddha.

REMARKS ABOUT THE FORMAT

In Maps of the Profound my intention was to provide easy access to Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of Tenets by presenting all of his Root Text of Tenets: Lion’s Roar along with the outline from his Great Exposition of Tenets and all of the free-flowing Word Commentary on the Root Verses by Ngag-wang-pal-dan as well as a smattering of comments from Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of Tenets and Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Annotations and other authors. Here in this book on the two truths all of

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a 11b.3/434.3.
Jam-yang-shay-pa’s *Great Exposition of Tenets* and almost all of Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s *Annotations* are provided for the first five of ten sections, greatly expanding this part. The combined presentation of these two authors, Jam-yang-shay-pa and Ngag-wang-pal-dan, offers an anthology of Indian sources and an intriguing display of Tibetan and Mongolian ingenuity carving consistent meaning out of, from, and perhaps beyond these sources. In the section on the divisions of veilings into real and unreal veilings Ngag-wang-pal-dan also offers a sustained critique of Jam-yang-shay-pa’s position, unravelling a more nuanced presentation.a

As a complete translation of the first five of the ten sections on the two truths according to the Consequence School in Jam-yang-shay-pa’s *Great Exposition of Tenets* together with Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s *Annotations*, the translation followed by the Tibetan gives Jam-yang-shay-pa’s text at the margin and any commentary from Ngag-wang-pal-dan indented and in a three-sided box to clearly distinguish it.

**Editions Consulted**

Two main editions of Jam-yang-shay-pa’s *Explanation of Tenets: Sun of the Land of Samantabhadra Brilliantly Illuminating All of Our Own and Others’ Tenets and the Meaning of the Profound [Emptiness], Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning Fulfilling All Hopes of All Beings*, also called *Great Exposition of Tenets* were consulted:

1. *grub mtha’i rnam bshad rang gzhan grub mtha’ kun dang zab don mchog tu gsal ba kun bzang zhi gi nyi ma lung rigs rgya mtsho*. Published at Go-mang College, Lhasa, Tibet, date unknown. Interlinear reference in the Tibetan text “[G##a/b].” Abbreviated reference as in footnotes: “2016 Old Go-mang Lhasa,” so named because of being scanned in Mundgod, Karnataka, India, at Go-mang College in December 2016 by Jongbok Yi for the UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies. This version was likely originally printed at Go-mang College, Lhasa, Tibet, while Jam-yang-shay-pa was abbot of Go-mang College. (To be made available at UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, [uma-tibet.org](http://uma-tibet.org).)

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a For a thorough discussion of the two truths in the Consequence School see Guy Newland, *The Two Truths* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 1992) and Guy M. Newland, *Just What are the Two Truths in the Middle Way Consequence School? Section 1, Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six*, dual language edition by Craig Preston in collaboration with Lo-sang-gyal-tshan (Dyke, VA: UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, 2017: [uma-tibet.org](http://uma-tibet.org)).
2. **grub mtha’i rnam bshad rang gshzan grub mtha’ kun dang zab don mchog tu gsal ba kun bzung zhi g ni m la lung rgya mtsho.**

TBRC W22186.13:35-614 (PDF of bla brang bkra shis ’khyil: bla brang bkra shis ’khyil dgon, [n.d.])

Interlinear reference in the Tibetan text “[L###a/b].” Abbreviated reference as in footnotes: “2011 TBRC bla brang.” This edition, which is a revision of the above edition, was printed in La-brang-tra-shi-khyil monastery founded by Jam-yang-shay-pa after his return to Am-do. In general, it is the preferred edition, though not always.

These two editions are the sources of five other available editions:


In the body of the book and occasionally in notes Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-pa’s) “Great Exposition of Tenets”: Freeing the Knots of the Difficult Points, Precious Jewel of Clear Awareness from any of three editions are cited in indentations with borders on the top, bottom, and right side to demarcate it clearly from Jam-yang-shay-pa’s text:


Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Word Commentary as a separate text is available in his collected works:

Jam-yang-shay-pa’s
GREAT EXPOSITION
OF TENETS

Key to the colorization: In situations of debate the Tibetan text and the translation are highlighted in three colors: black, blue, and red. Blue print presents what Jam-yang-shay-pa considers to be right positions, while red print represents what Jam-yang-shay-pa considers to be wrong positions. Words in black are other information or function structurally. In the Tibetan, a turquoise background indicates material added in place of ellipses, and a magenta highlight sets off ellipsis indicators when the elided part has been filled in.

The translation of Jam-yang-shay-pa’s text is at the margin, and Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Annotations are indented within a three-sided box to clearly distinguish it.
Jam-yang-shay-pa’s
Explanation of Tenets: Sun of the Land of Samantabhadra Brilliantly Illuminating All of Our Own and Others’ Tenets and the Meaning of the Profound [Emptiness], Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning Fulfilling All Hopes of All Beings

༄༅།ཉི་མ་རིགས་མཚǑ་Dzེ་དགུའི་རེ་བ་ཀུན་ǰོང་ཞེས་Ɏ་བ་བོགས་སོ།

with Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s word-commentary and annotations from his:
Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-pa’s) “Great Exposition of Tenets”: Freeing the Knots of the Difficult Points, Precious Jewel of Clear Awareness

༄༅།ཉི་མ་རིགས་མཚǑ་Dzེ་དགུའི་རེ་བ་ཀུན་ǰོང་ཞེས་Ɏ་བ་བོགས་སོ།

3* Features of the Basal Two Truths {2}

This has two parts: actual exposition and ancillary topics.

a The portion translated in this book is 2016 Old Go-mang Lhasa, cha, 26b.7-37a.3; 2011 TBRC bla brang, pha, 172b.5-187a.6.
Great Exposition of Tenets: Two Truths, Sections 1-5

a* Actual Exposition of the Features of the Basal Two Truths {10}

This has ten parts: basis of division, meaning of the divisions, definitions, etymologies, individual divisions, difference between method and what arises from method, purpose of teaching the two truths as well as a dispelling of mistakes, order of overcoming bad views, stages of meditation on the profound which are the means of overcoming bad views, and subsequent attainment as well as union.

1" BASIS OF DIVISION INTO THE TWO TRUTHS

The basis of division is objects of knowledge. The divisions are the two truths, no more. If less, non-inclusion. They are limited in number to those.

Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Word Commentary on Root Text. The basis of division is objects of knowledge.

There are many systems of assertion with regard to the basis of division of the two truths, a variety being evident as in Tsong-kha-pa’s Explanation of (Chandrakīrti’s) Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle” and Stages of the Path:

1. Even the great beings upholding the Subduer [Buddha’s] teaching, the father Ngog the Translator* and his spiritual sons, assert that since ultimate truths are not objects of knowledge, these mere appearances are

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*a  Taipei edition, note na, 726.9.
*b  Taipei, 564.12.
*c  Ngog-lo-tsa-ba Lo-dan-she-rab (blo ldan shes rab, rngog lo chen po, 1059–1109). A renowned Ka-dam-pa (bka’ gdams pa) scholar, Ngog Lo-dan-she-rab is traditionally supposed (see Hopkins, Meditation on Emptiness, 535) to have been a disciple of Atisha (982–1054), but their mismatched dates cast some doubt on this. Ngog Lo-dan-she-rab translated
1. Basis of Division into the Two Truths

the basis of the division [into the two truths].

2. It is seen that the upholders of Middle Way system, some Thang-sag-pas⁠[a] and so forth, said that because Chandrakīrti explains that the entities of forms through to exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects each are twofold, the entities ranging [from forms through to exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects] are the basis of division.

3. Most Tibetan commentators on Nāgārjuna’s *Fundamental Treatise on* a large number of works, including Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words* and *Supplement*, and authored several works on Madhyamaka. His position is related in Gyal-tshab’s *Explanation of (Shāntideva’s) “Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds”* (223.6-224.2) and reiterated Jam-yang-shay-pa in his *Great Exposition of the Middle* (257b-258a). About Ngog, Kevin Alan Vose writes in “The Birth of Prāsaṅgika: A Buddhist Movement in India and Tibet,” (Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, 1992), 72-74:

Ngok Loden Sherab, having been ordained by his uncle, Ngok Lekpay Sherab, was part of a contingent of Tibetan translators that the king of Western Tibet convened in 1076 and that subsequently traveled to Kashmir, where Ngok studied for seventeen years. Ngok’s most important translations were Prajñākara-gupta’s *Ornament for (Dharmakīrti’s) Valid Cognition*, a commentary on one of Dharmakīrti’s most important epistemological treatises that emphasizes the confluence of Dharmakīrti’s logic and Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka; Dharmakīrti’s second main work, the *Compendium of Valid Cognition*, along with Dharmottara’s commentary to it; and Maitreya’s *Sublime Continuum*, one of five texts attributed to the future Buddha, Maitreya, primarily concerned with the “Buddha nature” present in all sentient beings. Furthermore, stemming from his studies in Kashmir, Ngok is credited with establishing the Tibetan study of “The Three Mādhyamikas from the East,” the main Madhyamaka writings of Jñānagarbha, Shāṅtaraśīla, and Kamalaśīla. Upon his return to Central Tibet, Ngok became the abbot of Sangpu Monastery where his mastery of Dharmakīrti’s writings increased his fame to the point where he was reported to have 23,000 students. Every important figure in Central Tibet was reported to have studied Dharmakīrti’s tradition at Sangpu. In addition to establishing Sangpu as the premier institute for Buddhist epistemology, Ngok wrote summaries (*bsdus don*) of and commentaries on “The Three Mādhyamikas from the East,” texts that emphasized the compatibility of Madhyamaka philosophy and Dharmakīrti’s epistemology. While only three of Ngok’s compositions are currently available, thus greatly limiting our knowledge of his views, his reported opposition to Prāsaṅgika accords well with what we see in Indian champions of Candrakīrti expounding in this period: Ngok’s commitments to the epistemological tradition would place him squarely in opposition to arguments against the inapplicability of valid cognition to the ultimate.

the Middle Called “Wisdom” and Tibetan Proponents of the Middle Way and Epistemologists (dbu tshad) have said that nonsuperimposed\(^a\) objects are the basis of division.

4. The Translator Tag-tshang She-rab-rin-chen\(^b\) and so forth who fancy themselves to be scholars say that noninvestigated and nonanalyzed

\(^a\) sgro ma btags pa; nonreified.

\(^b\) stag tshang lo tsa ba shes rab rin chen, b. 1405. A scholar made famous by Jam-yang-shay-pa’s extended refutation in his Great Exposition of Tenets of Tag-tshang’s refutation of Tsong-kha-pa’s views; Hopkins (Maps of the Profound, 15-16) says:

It is clear from Tag-tshang She-rab-rin-chen’s Commentary on “Knowing All Tenets” that the philosophical influence of Tsong-kha-pa, the founder of the Gelug-pa order, was already widespread by the middle of the fifteenth century at least in Central Tibet. Tag-tshang’s markedly different understanding of Tsong-kha-pa’s main source, the seventh-century Indian scholar-adept Chandrakīrti, caused him to take Tsong-kha-pa as his main opponent throughout his presentation of tenets but especially in a separate section in which he spells out eighteen contradictions in Tsong-kha-pa’s works with regard to Chandrakīrti’s Consequence School.

Two centuries later, the Fifth Dalai Lama suggested that a scholar refute Tag-tshang, and the First Paṇ-chen Lama composed a forty-five folio text, Response to Objections by the Sanskritist She-rab-rin-chen: Roar of the Lion of Scripture and Reasoning in which he quotes Tag-tshang’s eighteen indictments one by one and gives his responses, sometimes along with invective, perhaps in response to Tag-tshang’s several outbursts. Jam-yang-shay-pa, undoubtedly aware of the First Paṇ-chen Lama’s text, weaves a broader response into the Great Exposition of Tenets, providing a sustained refutation of Tag-tshang’s presentation of tenets, citing various parts of Tag-tshang’s root text and commentary, but then devoting a section that is more than an eighth of his own book to detailing twenty-seven contradictions in Tag-tshang’s own work.

The core of Tag-tshang’s criticism of Tsong-kha-pa’s system is his predecessor’s assertion that all phenomena are established, or certified, by valid cognition…Valid certification for Tag-tshang and for Tsong-kha-pa are different; Tag-tshang sees it as implying self-institution, due to which, in the Consequence School, only the ultimate is established by valid cognition. He views Tsong-kha-pa’s assertion that all phenomena—conventional and ultimate—are certified by valid cognition as having fallen to an extreme of reification, exaggerating what does not exist as if it existed.

From Tsong-kha-pa’s perspective, however, self-institution is a synonym for inherent existence, and thus nothing—either ultimate or conventional—is self-instituting according to the Consequence School. Hence, establishment by valid cognition cannot possibly imply self-institution. As Jam-yang-shay-pa indicates, Tag-tshang has fallen to an extreme of reification by asserting that the ultimate is self-instituting and thus (in Ge-lug-pa terms) truly existent, and hence Tag-tshang has fallen to an extreme of nihilism in denying the valid establishment of conventional phenomena.
1. Basis of Division into the Two Truths

objects of knowledge are the basis of division.

5. Some who are beclouded about the words say that truths are the basis of division, and when truths are divided, there are two, veil truths and ultimate truths.

6. Some, without even any qualms about the basis of division, propound much about the two truths that are the divisions.

and so forth.

Those are not logically feasible because:

1. If [according to you] ultimate truths do not exist [because they are not objects of knowledge, and hence not existents]:
   - It [absurdly] follows that the final mode of subsistence of forms and so forth does not exist.
   - It [absurdly] follows that because these that are seen now is the final mode of subsistence, all sentient beings are already released.
and so forth, whereby the first is repudiated.

2. Because just as the two truths are not a factor among the entities of a form, so it is through to exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects, whereby the second is repudiated. [If the two truths were both included within, for instance, form, then the ultimate truth of a form, which is its emptiness, would be a form, due to which emptiness absurdly would not be an uncompounded phenomenon which it actually is.]

3. Existing superimpositional systems [such as the Sāṃkhya system] are veil truths. [Even though the superimpositions of the Sāṃkhya system, like the principal, do not exist even as veil truths, the system itself exists and is not an emptiness, whereby it is a veil truth].

4. As before, the two truths have meanings to be analyzed, and therefore the fourth is bad talk and the worst mistake.

5. Veil truths, falsities, and so forth are equivalent, whereby the fifth is repudiated. [If the basis of division of the two truths is truth, then everything divided from it is a truth in which case veil truths would be truths. Then how could they be falsities?]
6. If the base of division and the mode of division are not known, then [the two truths] become attributes without a substratum, whereby the sixth also is not good.

Therefore, that objects of knowledge are the basis of division [of the two truths] is proved by:

- scripture: the Meeting of the Father and Son Sūtra which says, "Furthermore, objects of knowledge [that is, objects to be known] are exhausted as these two truths, veilings and ultimates."
- and reasoning: [the two truths] are objects of two awarenesses—that is, objects to be known and objects of analysis by those two types of awareness.

Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Word Commentary on Root Text. In them exist the divisions, the two truths—veil truths and ultimate truths. There is no need for more than those, and if less, they would not be inclusive. Hence, they are limited in number to those two truths.

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\[a\] yab dang sras mjal ba’i mdo, pitāputrasamāgamasūtra; P760.16, vol.23; D60, vol. nga (dkon brtsegs), 60b.4-60b.5.

\[b\] Taipei edition, note na, 726.9.
The divisions [of the two truths] are two, veil truths—objects of operation of worldly persons having dualistic appearance and objects of operation of worldly awarenesses having dualistic appearance—and ultimate truths. Furthermore, objects of knowledge have those two categories, and this is a definite number eliminating a third category that is not either of those two:

- because, within the context of objects of knowledge, if something is established as any one of the two truths—for instance, an ultimate truth—then it is perforce blocked in an exclusionary way from being the other one, that is, a veil truth, and if something is established as a veil truth, it is perforce blocked in an exclusionary way from being the other one, that is, an ultimate truth, and hence the two truths are explicit contradictories by way of mutual exclusion, and
- because if any one of the two truths were not existent, then all objects of knowledge would not be included in the truths, and it is established by both scripture and reasoning that a third and so forth truth that is not any of those two does not exist.

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* Taipei, 565.7.
1. Basis of Division into the Two Truths

The determination of the count is not like mere inclusion into a count, as is the case with the Four [Buddha] Bodies, but is a definite count eliminating a third category, for the scriptures are:

the Meeting of the Father and Son Sūtra says:

Objects of knowledge [that is, objects to be known] also are exhausted as these two, veil truths and ultimate truths.

and that same sūtra says:

The Knower of the World, without listening to others,
Teaches by way of just these two truths:
Veilings and the ultimate.
A third truth does not at all exist.

and the Superior Sūtra of the Meditative Stabilization Definitely Revealing Suchness says:

The conventional and likewise the ultimate—
There is not at all a third truth.

and in accordance with this, Nāgārjuna’s Treatise on the Middle (XXIV.8ab) says:

Doctrines taught by the Buddha
Rely wholly on the two truths.

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a  yab dang sras mjal ba'i mdo, pitāputrasamāgamāsūtra; P760.16, vol. 23; Toh. 60, vol. nga (dkon brtsegs); cited in Chandrakīrti’s Auto commentary (La Vallée Poussin, Madhyamakāvatāra, 70.6–9, and again at 175.9–12).

b  de kho na nyid nges par bstan pa'i ting nge 'dzin, tattvanirdesāmasādhi. Cited in Chandrakīrti’s Commentary on the “Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle,’” commenting on stanza VI.80; Toh. 3682, dбу ma, vol. ’a, 243a.4; La Vallée Poussin, Madhyamakāvatāra, 175.11-175.12; La Vallée Poussin, “Introduction au traité du milieu,” Muséon 11 (1910): 356; see also Hopkins, Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom, 224.

c  In La Vallée Poussin’s edition of the Sanskrit (Osnabrück: Bibli Verlag, 1970), 492.4–5.
and Chandrakīrti’s *Autocommentary* also says:

Similarly, any other truth that exists at all is also to be ascertained as only included within the two truths.

and so forth;

Similarly, any other truth that exists at all is also to be ascertained as only included within the two truths.

and the reasonings also are:

*Kamalashīla*’s *Illumination of the Middle* says:
Phenomena\textsuperscript{a} that have the character of being a dichotomy are such that if something is refuted to be the one and it is not established to be the other, then it does not exist. Therefore, it also is not reasonable to think of it as in a class that is neither of those two.

and Tsong-kha-pa’s Explanation of (Chandrakīrti’s) Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle”: Illumination of the Thought says: says:\textsuperscript{b}

This being so,\textsuperscript{c} whatever is [a dichotomous pair] covers all objects of knowledge, hence a further category that is both and a further category that is neither are eliminated.

Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Annotations: \textsuperscript{d} It is as Tsong-kha-pa’s Explanation of (Chandrakīrti’s) Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle”: Illumination of the Thought says:

The reasoning [why there are only two truths] is that if a certain base [that is, an object] is—on the positive side—distinct-
guished as a falsity, a deceptive object, then on the exclusionary side it must be eliminated that it is a non-deceptive suchness, due to which the deceptive and the non-deceptive are dichotomous explicit contradictories. Since whatever is [a dichotomous pair] covers all objects of knowledge, a further category that is both and a further category that is neither are eliminated.

and:

If there were no dichotomies that exclude a third category to be shown, there would be no way to make a refutation with analysis that limits the possibilities to two—[asking] whether it is asserted that something exists or does not exist, or is one or many, and so forth. If there are [dichotomies that exclude a third category], then when something is refuted as being one side of a dichotomy and it is not established as the other, it does not exist. Hence, to say that there are no explicit contradictories in the Middle Way Consequence School is a case of not having formed [understanding of] the presentation of refutation and establishment" [in this system]. The Middle Way Autonomy School and the Middle Way Consequence School do not differ with respect to [asserting] that [within existents] if something is eliminated as being one side of a dichotomy, it must be established as the other and that if one is refuted, the other is established.

\[ \text{dgag gezag gi rnam gezag.} \]
and Kamalashīla’s *Illumination of the Middle Way* says:\(^a\)

Two that are such that something does not exist if it is neither [of them]\(^b\) have the character of being a dichotomy. Those that have the character of being a dichotomy cover all aspects [that is, whatever exists is either one or the other]. Those that cover all aspects eliminate other categories. Examples are, for instance, particular [pairs] such as the physical and the non-physical,\(^c\) and so forth.

Hence, saying that Proponents of the Middle and Consequentialists have no explicit contradictories has also been refuted earlier.

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\(^a\) *Illumination of the Middle*, 219a.1–219a.2; see also Hopkins, *Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom*, 225.
\(^b\) gang zhig yongs su good pa gang rnam par bead pa med na med pa de gnyis; the translation is loose.
\(^c\) lus can dang lus can ma yin pa.
\(^d\) Ngag-wang-pal-dan (note cha) corrects the reading to:
གཉིས་དགེ་བཟོ་ལ་གཉིས་ཞིང་ཡིན་ནོ། ། ད་མ་དབུ་ཆོས་བུའི་རྡོ་རྗེ་ལ་འདུལ་གྱི་ཚེ་མེད་པར་་བཟོ་ལ་གཉིས་ཞིང་ཡིན་ནོ།
འས་མ་པའི་་ཞིང་གནས་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡིན་དེ་དག་ནི་ལ་ཁྱབ་པར་མེད་པའི་་ཞིང་བཟོ་ལ་གཉིས་ཞིང་ཡིན་ནོ། ། དཔེར་ན། ་ཅན་དང་མ་ཡིན་པ་ལ་སོགས་པའི་་ཐ་བོ་ཞེས་སོ། ། དེས་ན་དུ་མ་པ་དང་ཐལ་འདར་བ་ལ་དངོས་འགལ་མེད་ཟེར་བ་རམ་ཡང་བཀག་ཟིན་ཏོ།
Because it would be unsuitable as the mode of subsistence and all would directly perceive it, and so forth, the two truths are an indivisible entity, distinguished by their isolates.

Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s *Word Commentary on Root Text.*\(^a\) Because there are the fallacies that:

- If the two truths were different entities, the absence of true existence of forms would be unsuitable to be the mode of subsistence of forms, and so forth.
- If the two truths were one isolate, the ultimate truth would be an object of operation of all ordinary beings’ direct perception, and so forth.

the two truths are an indivisible entity, distinguished as different by way of their isolates.

Here\(^b\) what is the mode of difference [of the two truths]? There are various

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\(^a\) Taipei edition, note na, 726.13.
\(^b\) Taipei, 566.12.
propositions:

1. Confusing Sāṃkhya and the Sūtra of the Great Emptiness,\(^a\) proponents of other-emptiness—the Indian Dāṃśṭasena\(^b\) and his followers, the Tibetan Jo-nang-pa [Shay-rab-gyal-tshan] and so forth—assert that a temple and a person abide mutually empty of each other;\(^c\) hence, they assert that even the entities of the two truths are different.\(^d\) This is refuted due to contradicting [the descriptions of] three fallacies and

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\(^a\) stong pa nyid chen po'i mdo.

\(^b\) mche ba'i sde (Jig-may-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s Port of Entry, 690.3; and Chimpa and Chattopadhyaya, Tārānātha’s History, 268, n. 18). The same History (417) gives as alternate names Dāṃṣṭasena, Diṭṭasena, Dāṃṣṭasena, Dāṃṣṭrasena, Dāṃṣṭasayana, and so forth. See Hopkins, Emptiness in the Mind-Only School, 225-233, 335-341.

\(^c\) According to Shay-rab-gyal-tshan, just as a temple is not a person, and a person is not a temple, and thus they are empty of each other, so the ultimate is empty of conventional phenomena, and conventional phenomena are empty of the ultimate; by meditating on their otherness, one ceases to confuse the two, whereby one is liberated. In Sāṃkhya also the person is empty of the principal, and the principal is empty of the person; by meditating on their otherness the two are not confused, and the root of cyclic existence is severed. For a description of the Jo-nang-pa doctrine of other-emptiness, see Hopkins, Reflections on Reality, Chapter 17b.

\(^d\) However, Döl-po-pa Shay-rab-gyal-tshan (Ocean of Definitive Meaning, 384.4) clearly says that the two truths are different but not different entities and also are not the same entity:

An emptiness of all does not occur because an emptiness of the noumenon does not occur. A basis of the emptiness of all phenomena occurs; it is the noumenon. A basis empty of the noumenon does not occur because that is damaged by immeasurable great absurd consequences [such as that the noumenon would not exist]. Therefore, “empty of all” and “empty of all phenomena” are extremely different because the mode of subsistence is empty of phenomena but is not empty of the noumenon. This also clears away the assertion that phenomena and noumenon are one but different isolates and the assertion that they are utterly not different because those two are different in the sense of negating that they are the same entity.

Objection: Well then, this contradicts the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought which says that the two truths are not either one or different:

The character of the compounded realm and of the ultimate
Is a character devoid of sameness and difference.
Those who consider that they are the same or different
Are improperly oriented.

Answer: That passage refutes that the two truths are the same entity or are different entities because, although ultimate entities are established in the mode of subsistence, conventional entities are not established [in the mode of subsistence].
so forth\(^a\) (below, 54) in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*,\(^b\) the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras,\(^c\) Prajñāmokṣha’s *Commentary on (Atisha’s) “Quintessential Instructions on the Middle,”*\(^d\) and so forth and due to

\(^a\) For discussion of lists of three and four fallacies, see Newland, *Two Truths*, 64ff.

\(^b\) In the corresponding section of his *Great Exposition of the Middle* Jam-yang-shay-pa cites the passages:

If the character of compositional phenomena and the character of the ultimate were different, then the mere selflessness and mere naturelessness of compositional phenomena would not be the character of the ultimate. (In Lamotte’s edition (p. 45) and the Tog Palace edition (p. 24)).

\(^c\) For instance, in the corresponding section of his *Great Exposition of the Middle* Jam-yang-shay-pa cites:

The Supramundane Victor pronounced, “Subhūti, it is not that worldly veilings are one thing and the ultimate also is another; just that which is the suchness of the world is the suchness of the ultimate.”

\(^d\) Prajñāmokṣha (*shes rab thar pa*, c. 11th century), *madhyamakopadeśa-nāma-vṛtti*, *dbu ma'i man ngag ces bya ba'i 'grel pa*, sde dge 1426, vol. 110; in *bstan 'gyur* (sde dge), TBRC W23703, vol. 110: 234-248 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sun-grab partun khang, 1982-1985), 119a.1-119a.2. In the corresponding section of his *Great Exposition of the Middle* Jam-yang-shay-pa cites the passage:

If [the character of compositional phenomena and the character of the ultimate] were different, then [the ultimate and compositional phenomena] would not be that which possesses the noumenon and the noumenon [respectively]. The signs [of true existence] in compositional phenomena would not be overwhelmed; it would also be pointless to meditatively cultivate the path.
contradicting the description [of the two truths as like] product and impermanent thing in Nāgārjuna’s *Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment.*

Nāgārjuna’s *Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment* (stanza 68) says:

- Suchness is not observed
- As [an entity] different from the veilings.
- Veilings are described as emptiness [that is, as empty of inherent existence]
- And just emptiness is [positied in relation to] the conventional
- Because of the definiteness that [the one] would not occur without [the other],
- Like product and impermanent thing.

2. One of the great Tibetan upholders of the teaching asserts that the two truths are different in the sense of negating sameness.

3. Concerning the [correct] assertion by some that the two truths are one entity and their isolates are different, others refute this, saying that such is not logically feasible, for [according to them] a sameness of entity does not exist regarding the uncompounded. However, their refutation is not logically feasible because Chandrakīrti’s Supplement (VI.23) explains that all phenomena [individually] have two natures, and in accordance with Tsong-kha-pa’s Stages of the Path’s sameness of entity is not contradictory even when both of what are different are noneffective things or when one of them is a noneffective thing, as is the case, for example, with all phenomena being the same entity as [their own] selflessness. Kamalashīla’s Illumination of the Middle says:

*Objection:* The relationship of sameness of essence [or nature] is only among effective things and not others.

*Answer:* That is not reasonable because sameness of essence [or nature] is a synonym of non-difference. And since noneffective things are similar in selflessness, [sameness of essence] is only noncontradictory.

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*a* In the corresponding section of his Great Exposition of the Middle Jam-yang-shay-pa cites the passage from Tsong-kha-pa’s Medium-Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path:

It is good to take this in accordance with the statement in Kamalashīla’s Illumination of the Middle that the relationship of one essence is not contradictory even among non-effective things [that is, permanent phenomena]. Therefore, a oneness of entity and difference of isolates is not contradictory even in both cases—when both of the different phenomena are non-effective things or when one is.

Medium-Length Exposition, 453.2–453.3; translation by Hopkins, Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom, 106.
This also refutes the assertion that the two truths are different in the sense of negating sameness.

Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Annotations: As Tsong-kha-pa’s Small Exposition of the Stages of the Path says:

Since the two of the division into two must be different, what kind of difference is this? With respect to this, many earlier scholars propounded:

- Pot and woolen cloth, for instance, are different entities. Pot and impermanent thing, for instance, are one entity and different isolates. In these two cases, the two that are different are both effective things; however, in cases

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Notes:

a  dbu ma pa, ja, 178.7.
b  ngo bo tha dad.
c  ngo bo gcig la ldog pa tha dad.
of difference when either is a noneffective thing [that is, a permanent phenomenon] they have a difference that negates sameness. Among these three [modes of] difference, the two truths are different in the sense of negating sameness.

However, some [correctly] assert that the two truths are one entity and different isolates.

It is good to take this in accordance with the statement in Kamalashīla’s *Illumination of the Middle* that the relationship of one entity is not contradictory even in noneffective things [that is, permanent phenomena]. Therefore, a oneness of entity and difference of isolates is not contradictory even in both cases—when both of the different phenomena are noneffective things or when one is.

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*a* geig pa’i tha’ dad.

*b* dbu ma snang ba, madhyamakāloka; D3887, dbu ma, vol. sa, 221a.1-221a.2.
4. Though some who are confused about the mere words of scriptures say that the two truths are not either the same entity nor different entities because the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought says:\textsuperscript{a}

The character of the compounded realm and of the ultimate
Is a character devoid of sameness and difference.
Those who conceive sameness and difference
Are improperly oriented.

Their assertion is also incorrect:

• because the meaning of this scriptural passage is that it merely explains that (1) apprehending a basis of emptiness and an emptiness as a sameness in which even their isolates are one such that they are not to be individually differentiated and (2) apprehending them as different such that even their entities are not the same are wrong orientations, whereas if those two were not either the same entity or different entities, the entities of those two would necessarily not exist, due to which those two also would not exist, and

• because such an assertion contradicts the great chariots’ extensive explanations of the lack of oneness and manyness.

\textsuperscript{a} This is the first of two stanzas summarizing and concluding chapter three.
About the sameness of entity [of the two truths] and the undifferentiability of entity of the element of attributes [that is, emptiness], one Tag-tshang says that:  

The noumena of all phenomena must be mutually each other, and it is not sufficient that all phenomena are the same entity in the absence of true existence. Therefore, just as whatever is the noumenon of a pillar must be the noumenon of a pot, so it is with respect to all phenomena, due to which it is explained that the noumenon of phenomena is indivisible. Otherwise, whereas it would have been said that all compounded [phenomena] are undifferentiable, such is not said, and because it has the sense of a nonaffirming negative, even the space of all pots and of all houses must be mutually each other. So he says.

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\[a\] This appears to be a paraphrase, or the implications, of Tag-tshang’s *Commentary on “Knowing All Tenets,”* 185.
Like his saying earlier on the occasion of Sāṃkhya that the Sāṃkhyas’ mode of assertion appears to be close to that of the Consequentialists, he has written down the Sāṃkhyas’ assertion that the nature or ultimate is a partless unit, without altering its color. [According to the Sāṃkhyas] the fundamental nature pervades its manifestations, or objects of pervasion, which are very many, but it does not come to have many parts, and with respect to manifestations what pervades causes also pervades the effects, and what pervades the effects also pervades the causes, due to which there is no need for more than one fundamental nature, and it is indivisible. [I] wrote about such assertions and so forth earlier on the occasion of Sāṃkhya and refuted them, and it is likewise here [with respect to Tagtshang’s assertion of a partless fundamental nature].

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[a] See chapter three.
This [assertion] is extremely low. You must [absurdly] assert that:

- a pot’s substantial existence is the meaning of a person’s substantial existence
- the apprehension that a person substantially exists is the apprehension that a pot substantially exists
- the apprehension that a person truly exists is the apprehension that a pot truly exists
- a pot’s absence of true existence is the meaning of a person’s absence of true existence

and so forth because [according to you] the mode of subsistence of a person is the mode of subsistence of a pot. You have come to assert the three spheres of self-contradiction!

Likewise, [his assertion] is harmed by reasonings such as:

- It [absurdly] follows that the ultimate does not have parts.
- It [absurdly] follows that explanations that the ultimate has two, four, and so forth divisions are incorrect.

and so forth, and [his assertion] is contradicted by many scriptures, such as the *King of Meditative Stabilizations Sūtra:*

> Just as you understand the discrimination of a self,  
> So it should be applied with awareness to all.

and similarly many scriptural passages delineating selflessness by stages—Chandrakīrti’s *Supplement and Autocommentary,* Nāgārjuna’s *Precious Garland,* Shāntideva’s *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds.* The meaning of the statement that the element of attributes is indivisible will be explained below.
Therefore, the two truths are one entity and different isolates, like product and impermanent phenomenon. If the two truths are different without even a sameness of entity there are four fallacies:

- It [absurdly] follows that the absence of true existence of form must not be the mode of subsistence of form.
- It [absurdly] follows that realization of the absence of true existence of form must not overwhelm the apprehension of [truly existent] signs of form.
- It [absurdly] follows that yogis’ meditation of high paths is senseless.
- It [absurdly] follows that even a Buddha has not abandoned all the bonds of apprehending signs and defilements of assumption of bad states.

and so forth, because the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* says:

If the character of compositional phenomena and the character of the ultimate were different, then the mere selflessness and mere naturelessness of compositional phenomena would not be the character of the ultimate.

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\(^{a}\) Defilements of assumption of bad states are tendencies to unseemly behavior; for instance, when someone else is singing, the person will uncontrollably start singing, or upon seeing a monkey will uncontrollably jump up and mimic the monkey.

\(^{b}\) In Lamotte’s edition (p. 45) and the Tog Palace edition (p. 24).

\(^{c}\) In Lamotte’s edition (p. 43) and the Tog Palace edition (pp. 20-21).
Similarly, if [the character of compositional phenomena and the character of the ultimate] were different, then even those who see the truth would not be separated from signs [of true existence] in compositional phenomena.

and so forth, and Prajñāmokṣha’s Commentary on (Atisha’s) “Quintessential Instructions on the Middle Way” says:

If [the character of compositional phenomena and the character of the ultimate] were different, then [the ultimate and compositional phenomena] would not be that which possesses the noumenon and the noumenon [respectively]. The signs [of true existence] in compositional phenomena would not be overwhelmed; it would also be pointless to meditatively cultivate the path.

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b Or, real nature.
If the two truths are one such that not even their isolates are individually differentiable:

- It [absurdly] follows that just as mistaken veilings—[polluted] actions and afflicting emotions—are abandoned, so even the ultimate, the noumenon of those phenomena, is abandoned.
- It [absurdly] follows that like veilings, the ultimate has dissimilar, different aspects.
- It [absurdly] follows that just as veilings are defiled, so even the ultimate would be suitable to be polluted with defilements.
- It [absurdly] follows that even common beings are able to apprehend ultimates manifestly.

and so forth, because the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought says:

If the character of compositional phenomena and the character of the ultimate are not different, then just as the character of compositional phenomena is included within the character of the thoroughly afflicted, the character of the ultimate would also be included within the character of the thoroughly afflicted.

and:

Similarly, if [the two truths] are not different, then all ordinary beings would also see the truth.

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\(^a\) In Lamotte’s edition (44) and in the Tog Palace edition (22). Tog twice reads lhung where Jam-yang-shay-pa and Lamotte reads gtogs in this passage.
and so forth, and Prajñāmokṣha’s Commentary on (Atisha’s) “Quintessential Instructions on the Middle Way,” says:

Just as veiling are abandoned, so the ultimate would also be abandoned. Just as veiling are diverse, so the ultimate would also be diverse. Just as the veiling are defiled, so the ultimate would also be defiled.

Commentary on (Atisha’s) “Quintessential Instructions on the Middle Way,” 118b.7-119a.1.
Therefore, although the two truths are undifferentiable in entity as empty of true existence, they are established as different from the viewpoints of their isolate-factors of their respective bases of relation; Nāgārjuna’s *Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment* says:*

Suchness is not observed
As [an entity] different from the veiling.

Veiling are described as emptiness [that is, as empty of inherent existence]
And just emptiness is [posited in relation to] the conventional,
Because of the definiteness that [the one] would not occur without [the other],
Like product and impermanent thing.

The first two lines indicate that [suchness] does not exist as a different entity from veiling. Then two lines indicate how they are mutually one entity, and then one line indicates the mutual relationship that if the one does not exist, the other does not occur; that it is not like [the situation] that although object of knowledge and pot are one entity, object of knowledge is not related with pot is indicated by the last line through an example, and a *Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra* also states:

The Supramundane Victor pronounced, “Subhūti, it is not that worldly veilings are one thing and the ultimate also is another; just that which is the suchness of the world is the suchness of the ultimate.”

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* T2655, Gi fol., 42b–48a; translation by Hopkins, *Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom*, 221-222. This is stanza 68 as numbered in Lindner’s translation, *Nargarjuniyana*, 205. Because this work refutes a mind-basis-of-all (*kun gzhi rnam shes, ālaya-vijñāna*), its attribution to Nāgārjuna (who presumably lived before the formulation of the mind-basis-of-all doctrine) has been challenged by Paul Williams (1984, 73–104). However, this is not a difficulty for Tibetan traditions, which hold in their legendary history that Nāgārjuna lived for six hundred years. For a summary of a Tibetan view of Madhyamaka history, see Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, 353–364, and Nāgārjuna’s *Precious Garland*, 9-21.
Question: Then, should all explanations that the two truths are not logically feasible as either the same or different be explained in this way?

Answer: No. There are many cases when they must be explained as not being either truly established one or different as in, for instance:

- the statement that even if one treats those two as either one or different, one is coursing in signs [that is, engaging in misapprehension]
- and in the statement in Nāgārjuna’s Treatise on the Middle, “Not different, not the same.”a

These should be explained, as before, demonstrating the fallacies that if they are different, [the ultimate truth] would not be suitable as the final mode of subsistence and so forth, and if they are the same, then, as is the case with veilings, all would be engaging the final mode of existence and

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a From the expression of worship at the beginning of Nāgārjuna’s Treatise on the Middle.
so forth.

གྲུབ་པའི་སླེབ་ལེན་པོ་ཆེན་པོ་དང་རྣམ་ཐར་གྲོས་གཞི་བཞི་རྒྱ་མཚན
མ་ཡིན་པར་བཤད་དགོས་ཀྱི་སྣོ་དོན་གཅིག་མིན་དཔོན་གཅིག་མིན།
དེ་གཉིས་གཅིག་དང་ཐ་དད་དོན་མིན་
དོན་གཅིག་མིན།

དེ་གཉིས་ཐ་དད་ན་གནས་རྒྱས་ར་མི་ལང་བ་སོགས་དང་གཅིག་
ན་ཀུན་ɲོབ་ཙུར་གནས་རྒྱས་ཀུན་གྱིས་འོད་པར་ཐལ་བ་སོགས་
ཀྱིས་ཐོན་པ་དག་རྒྱ་མཚན་པར་བཤད་དགོས་སོ།

[G30a]

དེ་ཐ་དད་འང་བ་པ་རང་ལ་སྔོན་འབུབ་ཀྱི་གསར་ཐ་དད་
གང་ཡང་མ་ཡིན་པར་བཤད་དགོས་པ་ཐ་དད་འང་མང་ལ།

དེ་གཉིས་ཐ་དད་ན་གནས་རྒྱས་ར་མི་ལང་བ་སོགས་
དང་གཅིག་ན་ཀུན་ɲོབ་ཙུར་གནས་རྒྱས་ཀུན་གྱིས་འོད་པར་ཐལ་བ་སོགས་
### DEFINITIONS

**Definitions:** That with respect to which an awareness—a rational consciousness—comes to distinguish the ultimate and that which is found by it. That with respect to which a conventional awareness comes to distinguish a conventionality and that which is found by it.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Word Commentary on Root Text: Definitions of the two truths:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• An object with respect to which a rational consciousness comes to be a valid cognition distinguishing the ultimate and which is found by that valid cognition is the meaning of an ultimate truth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• An object with respect to which a conventional awareness comes to be a valid cognition distinguishing a conventionality and which is found by that valid cognition is the meaning of a conventional truth.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A definition\(^a\) (mtshan nyid) is [so called] because of characterizing (mtshon par byed pa) whatsoever substratum, and a rational consciousness (rigs pa ’i shes pa) is [so called] since it is a logical consciousness (’thad grub kyi shes pa); **an object explicitly found by a rational awareness**

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\(^a\) Taipei, 570.2.
**Great Exposition of Tenets: Two Truths, Sections 1-5**

*(blo)*, that is, consciousness (*shes pa*), **distinguishing the ultimate** is reasonable as [the definition of] an ultimate truth because Chandrakīrti’s *Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle”* (VI.23c) says, “Objects of perceptions of reality are suchness,” and his *Autocommentary* says:

> Also, between those two natures, the one that is the object of a perceiver of reality is suchness; this is the meaning of “ultimate truth” (*don dam bden pa, paramārtha-satya*). Its entity will be explained below.

and:

> Concerning these, the ultimate finds its entity by way of [being] the object of a specific pristine wisdom of those who thoroughly perceive reality; it is not established by its own selfness (*rang gi bdag nyid kyis grub pa ma yin*). This is one nature.

An awareness that engages worldly terminology or conventions is an awareness of conventions (*tha snyad pa’i blo*) or conventional awareness (*blo tha snyad pa*); **an object explicitly found by it** is reasonable as [the definition of] a veil truth, for Chandrakīrti’s *Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle”* (VI.23d) says, “And objects of perceptions of falsities are veil truths,” and his *Autocommentary* says:
The other finds the existence of its own entity through the power of perceptions of falsities by common beings whose eyes of awareness are entirely covered over by darkening films of ignorance. Having a nature as objects seen by childish beings, they are not established by way of their own entities.

In accordance with a statement in Tsong-kha-pa’s *Explanation* [his *Illumination of the Thought of (Chandrakīrti’s) “Supplement”*]:

The definitions of the two truths explained earlier are in consideration of the general because they are done in terms of treating the mode of exalted knowledge by a Buddha’s pristine wisdom as an exception distinct from the tenth ground and below.

these are general [definitions]; they cover all those for whom meditative equipoise and the state subsequent to meditative equipoise have not become one, that is, those at the end of the continuum [of being a sentient being with obstructions yet to overcome] and below.
The convention of “finding” does not apply in cases when the aspect of an object does not appear to that awareness; hence, that which is implicitly realized is not suitable to be an object found, and since on this occasion also appearing-object, conceived-object, engaged-object, apprehended-object, are asserted, their distinctions should be known; and since it is explained that the qualities of a Buddha’s exalted body, speech, and mind are inconceivable, the idea that whatever is an object found by an exalted-knower-of-all-aspects distinguishing a conventionality necessarily is an object found by a rational consciousness distinguishing a conventionality is a fool’s over-extension [of the above, limited definition to include the mode of perception of a Buddha]. Hence, in accordance with the statement in Tsong-kha-pa’s Exposition [his Illumination of the Thought of (Chandrakīrti’s) “Supplement”]:

Since you also assert that if the aspect of the object does not dawn, an awareness does not engage [the object] and so forth, here [Chandrakīrti’s Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle” (VI.72d)] explains:

[It is not suitable to say, “It exists] even without being apprehended.”

and “Without engagement by an awareness,” therefore if you wish to include also the separate positing of the two truths by one pristine wisdom [of a Buddha] in which meditative equipoise and the state subsequent to meditative equipoise have become one, then [the definitions] should be put together this way:

- ultimate truth: object found with respect to which [object an awareness] comes to be a rational consciousness distinguishing the ultimate

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"As appearing in:

གི་བཤད་པ་ཇི་ནད་མཐའ་ཇི་གཟིགས་གཅིག་ལོ་བཞིན་དོན་དབུས།

གི་བཤད་པ་ཇི་ནད་མཐའ་ཇི་གཟིགས་གཅིག་ལོ་བཞིན་དོན་དབུས།

ཀུན་ནས་ཤེས་མེད་པ་ནི་ཤེས་པར་ཇི་དམིགས་པར་འགལ་བར་འཛིན།

མཁྱེན་པོ་མེད་པར་ཁྱེད་ཀྱིས་གཞན་ལ་འདི་དམིགས་ོན་ཞིག་ོན།

སློ་བཅོམ་པ་ནི་ཞེས་པའི་གཞན་ལ་འདི་གྲོས་འབྲོས་པར་ཤེས་རོ།
3. Definitions

• veil truth: object found with respect to which [object an awareness] comes to be a rational consciousness distinguishing a conventionality.

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Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Annotations: a Because the statement in Chandrakīrti’s Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle” (VI.23cd): b

a dbu ma pa, tha, 180.5.

b The entire stanza VI.23 is:

[Buddha] said that all things hold two natures, Those found by perceptions of reality and of falsities— Objects of perceptions of reality are suchness, And objects of perceptions of falsities are veil truths.
Objects of perceptions of reality are suchness,
And objects of perceptions of falsities are veil truths.

says that an object by a rational consciousness seeing the meaning of reality is an ultimate truth and that an object found by the conventional valid cognition seeing a false deceptive object is a veil truth, these two definitions are done in terms of those on the tenth ground and below for whom meditative equipoise and subsequent attainment have not become of one entity, and hence these two definitions are general. If done in terms including the exception—the mode of individually knowing the two truths by one pristine wisdom of a Buddha Superior in which meditative equipoise and subsequent attainment have become of one entity—it must be posited that an object found with respect to which a rational consciousness seeing the meaning of reality comes to be a rational consciousness is the definition of an ultimate truth, and an object found with respect to which a conventional valid cognition comes to be a conventional valid cognition is the definition of a veil truth.
This is because Tsong-kha-pa’s *Explanation of (Chandrakīrti’s) Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle”: Illumination of the Thought* says:

The definitions of the two truths explained earlier are in consideration of the general because they are done in terms of treating the mode of exalted knowledge by a Buddha’s pristine wisdom as an exception distinct from the tenth ground and below. Therefore, if done in terms of including also the mode of a Buddha’s knowledge, that which is found by valid cognition rational consciousness seeing reality and is that object with respect to which a rational consciousness is a valid cognition is the definition of an ultimate truth, and through this the definition of a veil truth should be understood.

and Khay-drub’s *Great Compilation: Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate* also says:

These are flawless definitions for the systems of both the Consequentialists and Autonomists:

The definition of an ultimate truth: that which is such that the valid cognition that finds it comes to be a disinguisher of the ultimate with respect to it.

The definition of a veil truth: that which is such that the valid cognition that finds it comes to be a disinguisher of the conventional with respect to it.
Objection: If the definitions are such, how do they not contradict Shāntideva’s Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds (IX.2):\textsuperscript{a}

Veilings and ultimates,
These are asserted as the two truths.
The ultimate is not an object of activity\textsuperscript{b} of an awareness.
Awarenesses are asserted\textsuperscript{c} to be veilings.

\textsuperscript{a} Stanza IX.2; Toh. 3871, \textit{dbu ma}, vol. la; byang chub sams dpa’i spyod pa la ’jug pa, in \textit{bstan ’gyur (sde dge)}, TBRC W23703.105 (Delhi: Delhi karmapa choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 31a.1; Sanskrit in Swami Dwarika Das Shastri, \textit{Bodhicaryāvatāra of Ārya Śāntideva with the Commentary Pañjikā of Shri Prajñākaramati} (Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1988), 267: \textit{saṃvṛttiḥ paramārthaśca satyadvayamidaṃ matam / buddheragocarastattvam buddhiḥ saṃvyrtiracyate} //. See also, Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom, 222.

\textsuperscript{b} Object of activity of awareness, \textit{blo yi spyod yal}.

\textsuperscript{c} Jam-yang-shay-pa cites the fourth line of the stanza as ending with the verb “asserts (\textit{’dod}), while the \textit{sde dge} \textit{bstan ’gyur} ends with the verb \textit{brjod}, (express, say, describe); byang chub sams dpa’i spyod pa la ’jug pa, in \textit{bstan ’gyur (sde dge)}, TBRC W23703.105, 31a.1.
and the explanations in the *Introduction to the Two Truths Sūtra* and the *Meeting of Father and Son Sūtra* that the ultimate is beyond awareness, and so forth.

Response: They are extremely noncontradictory; the “ultimate” of Shāntideva’s *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* must be explained as that which is found as not an object of activity of a directly perceiving awareness involving dualistic appearance, and an object of activity of a directly perceiving awareness involving dualistic appearance is asserted as being a veiling.

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Devaputras, ultimately if the ultimate truth were of the nature of an object of body, of speech, or of mind, it would not be counted as an “ultimate truth”; it would be just a veil truth. However, Devaputras, ultimately the ultimate truth is passed beyond all conventions; it is not particularized, not produced, not ceasing, and devoid of object propounded and propounder as well as object known and consciousness.

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b  The passage is:

The One-Gone-Thus sees veilings as the province of the world. That which is ultimate is inexpressible, is not an object of knowledge, is not an object of individual consciousness, is not an object of thorough knowledge, is undemonstrable.

Toh. 3940, *dbu ma*, vol. *khī*, 142b.4-142b.5; Sanskrit in Bendall, *Cikṣāsamuccaya*, 256.5: *tatra samyātrīlokaprācāratastāhāgatena ṛṣṭā / yāḥ punaḥ paramārthaḥ so ‘nabhilāpyah / anājheyo ’vijheyo ’desito ’prakāśito.* English translation in Bendall and Rouse, *Śikṣā Samuccaya*, 236.
Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Annotations:

Or in another way, a phenomenon that is an object realized by the valid cognition directly realizing it in a manner in which dualistic appearance has vanished is the definition of an ultimate truth, and a phenomenon that is an object realized by the valid cognition directly realizing it in a manner involving dualistic appearance is the definition of a veil truth because the statement in Shāntideva’s *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds*:

Veilings and ultimates,
These are asserted as the two truths.
The ultimate is not an object of activity of an awareness.
Awarenesses are said to be veilings.

says that an ultimate truth is a phenomenon that is not an object of activity of a directly perceiving awareness involving dualistic appearance and that a phenomenon that is an object of activity of directly perceiving awareness involving dualistic appearance is a veil truth.

It should be known that:

• the definitions of both truths set out in Chandrakīrti’s *Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle”* are done in terms of their mode of realization common to both conceptual

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a *dbu ma pa, da*, 181.4.
and nonconceptual, rational consciousnesses and conventional consciousnesses

- the definitions of both truths set out in Shāntideva’s *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* are posited from the viewpoint of the uncommon way in which they appear to nonconceptual consciousnesses.
However, if unlike thus, [these lines in Shāntideva’s *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds*] are explained in accordance with Tö-lung-gya-mar\(^a\) and so forth, many faults are incurred; [their explanation] contradicts:

1. the citation in Shāntideva’s *Compendium of Instructions* that because Supramundane Victors know well the truth, they are described as Buddhas
2. and the earlier explanation of the ten powers in Chandrakīrti’s root text and commentary, and so forth.

Chandrakīrti’s *Autocommentary on the Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s)* “Treatise on the Middle” cites as a source for seeing the mode of subsistence of the aggregates and so forth in the manner of not seeing the aggregates and so forth the *Introduction to the Two Truths Sūtra*:\(^b\)

Devaputras, ultimately if the ultimate truth were of the nature of an object of body, of speech, or of mind, it would not be counted as an “ultimate truth”; it would be just a veil truth.

Thereby it explains that “If in the perspective of meditative equipoise [the so-called ultimate] were seen along with objects of activity of the three doors [body, speech, and mind], that object would be a veiling,” because [in the quote] “ultimately” is not the object of negation, true establishment, but is explained as not seeing the bases of emptiness, the proliferations of the objects of activity of the three doors—the aggregates and so forth—in [the face of] the object of meditative equipoise, the ultimate, and because

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\(^a\) *stod lung rgya dmār*, eleventh century; he was one of Cha-pa Chō-kyi-seng-ge’s (*phya pa chos kyi seng ge*: 1109-1169) teachers of the Middle Way School and of logic and epistemology.

the rest [of the quote] describes how not only merely those proliferations but all proliferations such as comprehended and comprehender, and so on have vanished; that very sūtra says:

However, Devaputras, ultimately the ultimate truth is passed beyond all conventions; it is not particularized, not produced, not ceasing, and devoid of object propounded and propounder as well as object known and knower. Devaputras, the ultimate truth is beyond right through to the objects of the omniscient pristine wisdom endowed with the supreme of all aspects; it is not as expressed in the phrase “ultimate truth.”

In that, “not particularized” means without different divisions; it explains that an exalted-knower-of-all-aspects does not engage the ultimate also as an object in the manner of dualistic appearance. And that very sūtra [passage continues]:

All phenomena are false; they are deceptive phenomena. Devaputras, the ultimate truth cannot be taught. Why? [Because] all those phenomena—[the person] by whom it is taught, what is taught, and [the person] to whom it is taught—are not at all produced ultimately. Phenomena that are not at all produced cannot describe phenomena that are not at all produced.

Thereby it explains that words cannot cause trainees to understand the mode of the absence of true establishment and the ultimate in direct perception.
དོན་དམ་པར་ན་ཞེས་པ་དགག་ཉི་བདེན་པ་ལ་ཞེས་པ་མིན་གྱི་མཉམ་བཞག་གི་ལ་དོན་དམ་པ་ལ་ངོ་སོགས་ོང་གི་ོད་ལ་གྱིས་ོས་པ་ངོང་ཞི་མ་གཟིགས་པར་བཤད་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཅིར་དང་།

ོས་པ་དེ་ཙམ་བ་མ་ཟད་གཞལ་ཉི་འཇལ་ེད་སོགས་ཀྱི་ོས་པ་མཐའ་དག་ལྷག་ལས་བཤད་པའི་ཅིར་ཏེ།

མདོ་དེ་ཉིད་ལས། འོན་ཀྱང་ཉའི་དོན་དམ་པར་ན་དོན་དམ་པའི་བདེན་པ་ནི་ཐ་དད་ཐམས་ཅད་ལས་འདས་པ།

ཐེ་ɐག་མེད་པ་མ་Dzེས་པ་མ་འགག་པ། ɩ་བར་ཉི་བ་དང་ɩ་བ་དང་།

ཤེས་པར་ཉི་བ་དང་ཤེས་པ་དང་ལྷོག་བའ།།

ཇི་Ȩར་དོན་དམ་པའི་བདེན་པའོ།

ཞེས་བོད་པ་Ȩར་ནི་མ་ཡིན་ནོ།

ཞེས་པའི་ཐེ་ɐག་མེད་པ་ནི་མི་འȮ་བའི་དོན་ཉེ་བ་མེད་པའི་དོན་ཡིན་ལ་ȷམ་མཁྱེན་ལས་ལའང་དོན་དམ་པ་གཉིས་ཡང་ལས་མི་འོག་པར་བཤད་ཅིང་།

དོན་དམ་པ་གོལ་ཉི་ལ་ཚིག་གིས་མངོན་བོ་ཁོ་བར་ིང་བི་Ȭབ་པར་བཤད་ལ།
Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Annotations: As Tsong-kha-pa’s Explanation of (Chandrakīrti’s) Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle”: Illumination of the Thought says:

The meaning of the former sūtra passage is that: “If in the perspective of seeing the ultimate the ultimate truth were not seen in the manner of not seeing veillings but became an object the way the aggregates and so forth become objects of activity of body and of speech and become objects of mind, then suchness in the perspective of direct seeing would not be devoid of proliferations, whereby it would not be ultimate truth, but would be a veiling proliferation.” Taken this way, it goes as a source for seeing in the manner of not seeing.

Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Annotations: As that very text [Tsong-kha-pa’s Explanation of (Chandrakīrti’s) Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle”: Illumination of the Thought]

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a dbu ma pa, na, 181.9.
b The first of the two passages cited just above:
Devaputras, ultimately if the ultimate truth were of the nature of an object of body, of speech, or of mind, it would not be counted as an “ultimate truth”; it would be just a veil truth.
c dbu ma pa, pa, 182.2.
The meaning of the second sūtra passage\(^a\) is: That in the perspective of directly seeing the ultimate the ultimate truth is not particularized [means] that it is without many various features. The other three [passed beyond all conventions, not produced, not ceasing] are easy to understand. That in that perspective it is devoid of propounded and propounder is easy. Although the pristine wisdom directly seeing suchness can be posited as a knower of the ultimate and ultimate truth can be posited as its object known, that in the perspective of this pristine wisdom the voidness of those two agents and objects is noncontradictory is because the two, agent and object, are posited in the perspective of only of conventional awarenesses; it is like, for example, although an inferential rational consciousness can be posited as the object-possessor (yul can) and ultimate truth as the object (yul), the two—the objects and agents of object and object-possessor—are not posited in the perspective of a rational consciousness (rigs ngor).

Then, with respect to the meaning of [Chandrakīrti’s continuing] citation:

Devaputras, the ultimate truth is beyond the objects of omniscient pristine wisdoms endowed with the supreme of all aspects; it is not as expressed in the phrase “ultimate truth.” All phenomena are false; they are deceptive phenomena. Devaputras, the ultimate truth cannot be taught. Why? [Because] all those phenomena—[the person] by whom it is taught, what is taught, and [the person] to whom it is taught—are not at all produced ultimately. Phenomena that are not at all produced cannot describe phenomena that are not at all produced.

\(^a\) The second of the two passages cited just above: However, Devaputras, ultimately the ultimate truth is passed beyond all conventions; it is not particularized, not produced, not ceasing, and devoid of object propounded and propounder as well as object known and knower. Devaputras, the ultimate truth is beyond the objects of omniscient pristine wisdoms endowed with the supreme of all aspects; it is not as expressed in the phrase “ultimate truth.” All phenomena are false; they are deceptive phenomena. Devaputras, the ultimate truth cannot be taught. Why? [Because] all those phenomena—[the person] by whom it is taught, what is taught, and [the person] to whom it is taught—are not at all produced ultimately. Phenomena that are not at all produced cannot describe phenomena that are not at all produced.
omniscient pristine wisdoms endowed with the supreme of all aspects,” as passed beyond the objects of omniscient pristine wisdoms is indicated by the second clause, “it is not as expressed in the phrase ‘ultimate truth’. When it is expressed, “This is ultimate truth,” in accordance with how it appears as cut off into two, individual object and subject, to a conceptual consciousness following after those words, it is beyond the objects of an omniscient exalted wisdom’s knowledge of the mode through such a manner of appearance. Since all dualistically appearing phenomena are false deceptive phenomena, they do not exist in the perspective of seeing the sole nondeceptive suchness.
Also, the Meeting of the Father and Son Sūtra explains through:

That which is ultimate is inexpressible, is not an object of knowledge, is not an object of individual consciousness, is not an object of thorough knowledge, not taught, not intensively taught, not heard, not made heard, not known, not individually known, not demonstrated, not seen, not investigated, not caused to be apprehended, not made realized, not caused to be attained, not attained, not acquainted, not cast aside, not set up, not abandoned, not acted upon, not acted, pacifying,

and so forth that the meaning of thusness is extinguished and devoid of all activities by the three—terms, awarenesses, and persons—the eight
of thusness terms and awarenesses, all activities by the three persons,\(^b\) all proliferations such as the eight worldly concerns\(^c\) and so forth are extinguished and void.

**Chandrakīrti’s Autocommentary on the “Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle’”** [continues the citation from the *Introduction to the Two Truths Sūtra*:

Therefore, with respect to that which has it [the ultimate] as its object, in suchness the attributes of things and nonthings, one’s own and others’ things, truth and nontruth, everlasting and annihilated, permanent and impermanent, blissful and suffering, clean and unclean, self and selfless, empty and nonempty, definition and definiendum, same and other, produced and ceasing, and so forth

\(^a\) Perhaps these are liking/disliking, gain/loss, praise/blame, and fame/disgrace, or perhaps these are others described in this sūtra.

\(^b\) Possibly these are persons above, below, and on the ground; or persons of the desire, form, and formless realms.

\(^c\) Liking/disliking, gain/loss, praise/blame, fame/disgrace.
do not occur because their entities are not observed.

and Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words* also says:

These do not exist in the ultimate; objects of verbalization vanished earlier because objects of activity of the mind have vanished.

and so forth,

Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s *Annotations*: a [Tsong-kha-pa’s *Explanation of (Chandrakīrti’s) Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle”: Illumination of the Thought*] says:

[Chandrakīrti] says that even though one without eye disease indicates to those with eye disease, “There are no falling hairs,” they do not realize the nonexistence of falling hairs in the way that such is seen by the one without eye disease; hence, even though those listeners [having eye disease] do not

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a * dbu ma pa, pha, 182.8.
realize such that way, it is not that they do not realize the non-
existence of falling hairs. Taking this as an example, [Chandra-
krīti] is asserting that when suchness is taught, even though
listeners do not realize it as it is seen by one who lacks the
pollution of the eye disease of ignorance, it is not that in gen-
eral they do not realize suchness. Therefore, it is not that ulti-
mate truth cannot be expressed by definitive scriptures having
the profound meaning [of emptiness] and by speech teaching
such, and it is not that ultimate truth cannot be realized even
by an awareness following upon those. You also should un-
derstand similarly all statements that the meaning of suchness
is not an object of consciousness and verbalization.
and the Kāshyapa Chapter [Sūtra] says:\(^a\)

[Inherent] existence is the one extreme. No [conventional] existence is the second extreme. That which is the center between these two is unanalyzable [because it cannot be analyzed just as it is by thinking about it], is undemonstrable [because it cannot be explained to another just as it is], is not a support [because it is not an object of the senses], is unperceivable [because from the viewpoint of the mind directly realizing it duality has disappeared], is unknowable [because it cannot be ascertained just as it is by a dualistic mind], and is placeless [because it is not a place or source of the afflicting emotions]. Kāshyapa, this is called the middle path, individual analysis of phenomena.

and the Meeting of the Father and Son Sūtra, the King of Meditative Stabilizations Sūtra, and Shāntideva’s Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds explain that the eight worldly concerns also do not exist there [in the face of the ultimate].

Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Annotations:\(^b\) It is as [Tsong-kha-pa’s Explanation of (Chandrakīrti’s) Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle”: Illumination of the Thought] says:

All those [statements] are sources for the nonappearance of veilings, such as the aggregates, in the perspective of directly

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\(^a\) P760.43, vol. 24 194.1.2ff. Two sentences are added at the beginning for context. Brackets are from Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Annotations, dngos, 77a.7ff and dbu, 68b.5ff. There is a similar quote in Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words (Poussin, 358.10).

\(^b\) dbu ma pa, ba, 183.3.
perceiving suchness. Therefore, none of the proliferations of dualistic phenomena such as effective thing, non-effective thing, and so forth occur in the perspective of directly perceiving suchness because the entities of those proliferations are not observed in that [perspective].
An ultimate truth is because of being an object, ultimate, and also truth. A veil truth is because of being a truth for the perspective of a veiling due to obstructing.

Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s *Word Commentary on Root Text*: It is called ultimate truth because of being:

- an object of knowledge
- the supreme, or ultimate, of objects
- non-deceptive, or true, in that the mode of appearance and mode of abiding are in accord.

Due to obstructing perception of the mode of subsistence, ignorance conceiving true existence is a veil (*kun rdzob, samvyāti*), and veil truths are so called because of being true for the perspective of that veiling awareness.

Let us explain this in accordance with the root text [Nāgārjuna’s *Treatise on the Middle* (XXIV.8cd)] and commentary [Chandrakīrī’s *Clear
Words] and so forth:\(^a\)

Worldly veil truths
And ultimate truths.

In the Sanskrit original \(^b\) of don dam bden pa (ultimate truth) paramārthasatya:

- *parama*\(^c\) is used for ultimate, supreme, and so forth
- *artha* is used for object
- *satya* is used for truth, permanence, and so forth.

Other than those, on this occasion:

1. “object” (don, artha) does not mean purpose and so forth but means the object known, analyzed, and found by ultimate pristine wisdom, hence object.
2. Because of being both such an object and the supreme, or ultimate, of objects, it is ultimate.
3. It is called “truth” since it does not deceive trainees by not abiding the way it appears or since the mode of appearance and the mode of abiding are concordant—not being discordant like false veilings.

\(^{\text{a}}\) In La Vallée Poussin’s edition of the Sanskrit (Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1970), 492.4–5.

\(^{\text{b}}\) Taipei, 572.18.

\(^{\text{c}}\) Both editions misread pārama.

\(^{\text{d}}\) Ibid.
Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Annotations: The meaning of concordance of mode of appearance and mode of abiding is as Tsong-kha-pa’s Small Exposition of the Stages of the Path says:

The mode of truth of an ultimate truth is nondeceptiveness. Moreover, it does not deceive the world through its mode of subsistence abiding one way and its appearing another way.

Ultimate truths necessarily are established in accordance with how they appear to the awarenesses to which they clearly appear. Thus, veil truths are necessarily falsities. The meaning of falsity is “deceptive,” and the meaning of deceptive is “discordance between the mode of appearance and the mode of abiding.” Furthermore, [this conflict] must be taken to be that although they appear—to the awarenesses to which they clearly appear—to be truly established, they are without true establishment.

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a *dbu ma pa, ma, 183.4.*
Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words* says:*

Since it is an object and also the ultimate, it is the ultimate object (*don dam, paramārtha*).

Object, not being taken as purpose and so forth, is taken as object found by a pristine wisdom; Chandrakīrti’s *Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle”* (VI.23c) says, “Objects of perceptions of reality are suchness,” and his *Autocommentary* says:

Also, between those two natures, the one that is the object of a perceiver of reality is suchness; this is the meaning of “ultimate truth” (*don dam bden pa, paramārthasatya*).

Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words* says:

The ultimate is not known from others is quiescent and known by Superiors by themselves individually and[…]

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In the [Sanskrit] original\(^a\) of 'jig rten kun rdzob bden pa (worldly veil truth) lokasamvṛtisatya, loka ('jig rten; world) on this occasion is also taken to be persons and dualistic awarenesses. With respect to its being posited on this occasion also for persons, since Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words* says:\(^b\)

Regarding this, since it is said:

The world is renowned as the aggregates.\(^c\)
The world definitely depends upon them.

a person imputed in dependence upon the aggregates is called “world.”

and Chandrakīrti’s auto-commentary says:\(^d\)

The other finds the existence of its own entity through the power of perceptions of falsities by common beings whose eyes of awareness are entirely covered over by darkening films of ignorance.

However, thinking of this it is not suitable to posit “world” on all occasions as common beings because that the “world” has the two, common beings and Superiors, is the thought of Shāntideva’s *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds*, root text and commentaries, and so forth; Shāntideva’s *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* (IX.3) says:\(^e\)

Among those, two aspects of the world are seen, Yogis and the ordinary. Among those, the ordinary world is harmed by the yogic world.

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\(^a\) Taipei, 573.7.

\(^b\) Poussin, *Prasannapadā*, 492.6–9.

\(^c\) Tibetan from Jacques May’s edition (p. 432): phung po; Sanskrit reads: skandhāma.


\(^e\) The Sanskrit in Das Shastri, *Bodhicaryāvatāra* is:

tatra loko dvidhā drṣṭo yogī prākṛta-kasthā /
tatra prākṛtako loko yogilokena bādhyate // //
and it is as the commentaries stated earlier, whereby Tsong-kha-pa’s Explanation of (Chandrakīrti’s) Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle”: Illumination of the Thought in consideration of these says:

Also, [as regards the finding of veilings, Chandrakīrti’s] statement that [the finders] are usualy common beings is made in consideration that they are the main perceivers of external and internal things—illustrations of veilings—through being under the outside-influence (gzhan dbang, literally “other-power”) of ignorance. He is not asserting that these things are not found by conventional valid cognitions in the continuums of Superiors.

\[ \text{rang dga’ ba; possible alternative translations may be nonreflective/ uneducated/ immature / capricious.} \]
Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Annotations: Since persons to whom external and internal things appear as truly established are mainly common beings and since the veiled awarenesses in the perspective of which external and internal things are true exist predominantly in the continuums of common beings, it is said that the finders of veilings are usual common beings.

Also, thinking of these, it would not be suitable [to take] “world” on this occasion as only persons because it is the thought of many sūtras and treatises that “world” on this occasion has many [instances meaning] dualistic consciousness:

- because with respect to “world” in the statement in the Meeting of the Father and Son Sūtra, “The One-Gone-Thus sees veilings as the province of the world,” both “worlds” in Chandrakīrti’s Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle” (VI.25cd) in his statement

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a  dbu ma pa, tsa, 184.1.
b  Cited by Shāntideva in his Compendium of Instructions, 142b.4. Cf. C. Bendall, Śīkṣā Samuccaya, 236.
about how the ways of acting in veiling are taken as the two, erroneous and non-erroneous:

Are true [or real] just from the world.
The rest are posited as unreal from just the world.

must be only consciousness,

• and because even with respect to dualistic consciousnesses many sūtras and treatises speak of worldly conventions, because there are consciousnesses and objects of consciousness and so forth in the “conventions” (tha snyad, vyavahāra) and “terminology” (brda, sanketa) mentioned in:

• the statement in Chandrakīrti’s Commentary on the “Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle’,” “If one has observation of that very giving as threefold [giver, giving, and gift], it is called with the convention ‘worldly perfection of giving.’”
• and the statement in Chandrakīrti’s Autocommentary, “[For, the unapprehendable are supramundane, and] the apprehendable are just worldly due to being just included within conventional truths.”

—The complete stanza with brackets from Tsong-kha-pa:

Objects realized by the world that are apprehended
By [the consciousnesses of] the six sense powers undamaged [by superficial causes of mistake]
Are true [or real] just from the world [because of being phenomena that prior to realizing emptiness cannot be realized to be a combination of appearing to be inherently existent but being empty of such].
The rest [that is, those apprehended by sense consciousnesses damaged by superficial causes of mistake such as reflections, echoes, and so forth] are posited as unreal from just the world [that is, relative to the world].

—La Vallée Poussin, Madhyamakāvatāra, 31.7-31.8, in commentary on I.16ab:

Giving void of gift, giver, and receiver
Is called a supramundane perfection.

—Jam-yang-shay-pa’s citation of this as from “a Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra” is corrected by Ngag-wang-pal-dan in note tsha:
 Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Annotations: a Tsong-kha-pa’s Explanation of (Chandrakīrti’s) Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle”: Illumination of the Thought says that due to the difference of not being conjoined and being conjoined with uncontaminated wisdom realizing the three spheres of giving [giver, giving, and gift] as not truly established, [giving is posited] as “worldly perfection of wisdom” and “perfection of wisdom passed beyond the world.”

a dbu ma pa, tsha, 184.2.
and the statement in the *Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra,* “Regarding that, what are veil-truths? They are whatever are indicated by worldly conventions, letters, terms, and terminology.”

Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Annotations: Since Tsong-kha-pa’s *Small Exposition of the Stages of the Path* says:

Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words* describes three meanings for *samvrṭi*—(1) obstructing suchness (*de kho na nyid la sgrib pa, tattvāvacchādana*), (2) mutually dependent objects (*phan tshun brien pa, parasparasambhavana*), and (3) worldly conventions (*jig rten gyi tha snyad, lokavyavahāra*). Since he explains the last as having the character of object of expression and means of expression, knower and object known, and so forth, it is not only subjective conventions—consciences and expressions—but also objects known and objects expressed. Nevertheless, [this is just an etymology and not a definition since] not all whatsoever objects of knowledge and objects of expression should be held to be veil truths [because an emptiness is an object of knowledge and object of expression but is an ultimate truth].

the meaning of this sūtra [passage from the *Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra*] must be explained this way. Thus, since the “worldly conventions” of this [passage] is equivalent to “worldly veilings,” it is unlike “nominal conventions” (*ming gi tha snyad*).
It is evident that “worldly conventions” are suitable to be explained as objects renowned in the world, or objects not investigated by a rational consciousness and falsities relative to a rational consciousness or unreal objects relative to a rational consciousness; fearing that the sources and so forth would be too much, [I] have not written them down.

Although in general *samvṛti* is used in many ways in accordance with the statement by the Great Translator’s *Great Commentary on Prefixes*.  

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a Throughout, the text reads *samvṛti*.

b *nyer bsgyur*, *upasarga*, prefix, preposition.
Samvṛti: veiled (kun rdzob), thoroughly bound (yang dag par bsadams pa), opened wide (gdangs pa), eighth (brgyad pa), confined (dog pa), round, spherical (zlum po), crumbled, broken down (zhom pa).

on this occasion samvṛti [means] veiling (kun rdzob), or samantavṛti obstructing all (kun sgrib), or obstructing reality (yang dag sgrib), that is, ignorance; “veil truths” (kun rdzob bden pa) are so called since they are true in the perspective of ignorance; Chandrakīrti’s Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle” (VI.28abc) says:

The Subduer said that because bewilderment [the apprehension of inherent existence] obscures [direct perception of] the nature [of the mode of subsistence of phenomena],
[This ignorance] is a veil (kun rdzob, samvṛti), and he said that those fabrications appearing
To be true due to this [ignorance] are veil truths (kun rdzob bden, samvṛti-satya) [because of being true in the perspective of the veiling apprehension of inherent existence].

and the Descent into Laṅkā Śūtra says:

That [consciousness] mistaken with regard to the lack of inherent existence
Is asserted as the veil of reality (yang dag kun rdzob, satyam samvṛti).

and Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words says:

Because of entirely obstructing, it is an entire veiling (kun rdzob, samvṛti); because ignorance entirely conceals the suchness of things, it is an entire veiling.

and Chandrakīrti’s Autocommentary on the “Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s)"

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b  The Four Interwoven Annotations (357.1) gives an etymology of kun rdzob:

Kun means “all of the nature of the mode of subsistence of phenomena” (chos kyi gnas lugs kyi rang bzhin kun), and rdzob means “obstructing” (sgrib pa) and “concealing” (’gebs pa).

c  lang kar gshegs pa’i mdo, laṅkāvātārasūtra, stanza X.429; Sanskrit in Bunyiu Nanjio, Laṅkāvatāra Śūtra, 319: [bhāvā vidyantī samvṛtyā paramabārthe na bhāvākāḥ / niḥsvabhāveṣu yā bhṛṁintastatsatyam sanvṛtirbhavet //.

d  La Vallée Poussin, Prasannapadā, 492.10–11.
‘Treatise on the Middle’” says:\(^a\)

Those which due to that veiling [consciousness] appear as true and while not inherently existent, individually appear as inherently existent, are truths for worldly, erroneous, veiling [consciousness, namely, bewilderment]; they are fabricated dependent-arising.

Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Annotations.\(^b\) It is as Tsong-kha-pa’s Explanation of (Chandrakīrti’s) Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle”: Illumination of the Thought says:\(^c\)

Because, through it, sentient beings are obstructed, that is to say, obscured, with respect to viewing the nature of how

\(^a\) The entire sentence is:

Those which due to that veiling [consciousness] appear as true and while not inherently existent, individually appear as inherently existent, are truths for worldly, erroneous, veiling [consciousness, namely, bewilderment]; they are fabricated dependent-arising.

\(^b\) dbu ma pa, wa, 184.7.

\(^c\) Commenting on VI.28.
things abide, it is [called] bewilderment, that is to say, ignorance, which has an essence of obstructing perception of the nature that is the mode of being [of phenomena through] superimposing inherent existence on the entities of things that do not inherently exist—the veil (kun rdzob, samvṛti). This is an identification of the veiling [consciousness] (kun rdzob / kun rdzob pa, samvṛti) in the perspective of which “truth” in “veil truth” is posited; it is not an identification of kun rdzob pa (samvṛti) in general [which also is etymologized below as “conventionality” and “interdependent”].

The Subduer said that those fabricated phenomena such as blue and so forth—appearing to sentient beings as true, which are fabricated to appear as inherently established through the force of that veil [consciousness] apprehending true existence although lacking inherent establishment—are true in the perspective of the worldly, erroneous, veil [consciousness, namely, bewilderment].

\[\begin{align*}
\text{བོ་ཐོས་གི་ཞིག་ལས་པ་འོད་སེམས་ཅན་} \\
\text{ཡོད་པ་དངོས་པོ་ཇི་བོ་བྱེད་པའི་ཐོས་} \\
\text{ངོ་བོ་ནི་ཐོས་ནི་གཅིག་བཤད་ལ་} \\
\text{་ཀུན་ɲོབ་བོ།} \\
\text{ཞེས་པའི་བདེན་པ།} \\
\text{ཀུན་ɲོབ་པ་གང་གི་ངོ་བོ་རང་བཞིན་གྱིས་ཡོད་པ་} \\
\text{ཞེས་པའི་འཇོག་པ་ལ་} \\
\text{ཞེས་པའི་བདག་ཉིད་ཅན་ནི་ཀུན་ɲོབ་བོ།} \\
\end{align*}\]

\[\text{gti mug, moha. Although Sanskrit dictionaries gloss moha by “delusion,” this text does not describe it in these terms but as obstructing, or obscuring, and thus I translate the term as “bewilderment.”}\]

\[\text{ma rig pa, avidyā.}\]

\[\text{sgrib pa.}\]

\[\text{Commenting on VI.28.}\]
The *Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra* says: a

That [consciousness] mistaken with regard to the lack of inherent existence
Is asserted as the veil of reality (*yang dag kun rdzob, satyaṃ saṃvṛti*).

and Chandrakīrti’s *Autocommentary on the “Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle’”* says:

Those which due to that veiling [consciousness] appear as true b

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a  *lang kar gshegs pa'i mdo, laṅkāvatārasūtra*, stanza X.429cd; Sanskrit in Bunyiu Nan-jio, *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, 319: niḥsvabhāveṣu yā bhrāntistatsatyāṃ saṃvṛtitbhavet //.

b  The entire sentence is:

Those which due to that veiling [consciousness] appear as true and while not inherently existent, individually appear as inherently existent, are truths for worldly, erroneous, veiling [consciousness, namely, bewilderment]; they are fabricated dependent-arising.
Hence, it has already been explained that the [Sanskrit] original of kun rdzob which is samvṛti is used for obstructing reality (yang dag sgrib), obstructing all (kun sgrib), and obstructing the nature (rang bzhin sgrib). It also is used for mutual dependence (phan tshun brten pa, paraspara-sambhavana) and terminology (brda, samketa); mutual dependence means falsity, and terminology [means] conventions because it has the two, object expressed and means of expression, knower and object known, and so forth; Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words says:

Or alternatively, due to mutual dependence, it is samvṛti: by way of mutual dependence it means objects of knowledge. Or alternatively, samvṛti is terminology, which is the equivalent of “worldly conventions.” Those also have the character of object expressed and means of expression, knower and object known, and so forth.”

This accords with the Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra and so forth.
Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Annotations: It is as Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Commentary on (Nagarjuna’s) “Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called ‘Wisdom’” says:

Samvrtti (kun rdzob) is non-knowing (mi shes pa), or ignorance (ma rig pa), because it conceals and obstructs the suchness of things. Since the [Sanskrit] original equivalent of kun rdzob is used also for “obstruct” (sgrib pa), this is explained from that viewpoint; however, all [instances of] samvrtti are not to be explained as “obstructor.”

Or alternatively, samvrtti (kun rdzob) means mutually dependent. This means that due to necessarily being mutually dependent, that something has a self-instituting nature (rang la tshugs thub kyi rang bzhin yod pa) is untrue. Although the features of an etymology in this mode exist also in ultimate truths, it is not that the term samvrtti applies [to ultimate truths]; it is like, for example, that although the features of the etymology of “lake-born” (mtsho skyes, apja; meaning “lotus”) exist in a frog, [the term] does not apply [to a frog].

Or alternatively, samvrtti (kun rdzob) [means] terminology (brda, sakṣetra)—worldly conventions (jig rten gyi tha snyad, lokavyavahāra). Since these are explained as having the character of object expressed and means of expression, knower and object known, and so forth, do not hold that these are only subjective conventions—consciousnesses and expressions—[these are also objects known and objects expressed].

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\(^a\) dbu ma pa, zha, 185.3.

\(^b\) An ultimate truth is mutually dependent with the veil truth of which it is the final nature.
Hence, the world’s mutual dependence is called “interdependence” (kun rdzob, samvṛti), and “interdependent truths” (kun rdzob bden pa, samvṛtisatya) are so called since they exist just in mutual dependence. And since objects expressed and means of expression and objects known and consciousnesses are the world’s terminology (brda, samketa), or conventions (tha snyad, vyavahāra), those are called “conventional” (kun rdzob, samvṛti); “conventional truths” (kun rdzob bden pa, samvṛtisatya) are so called since their mode of appearance and mode of abiding accord in the world’s terminology, or conventions;\(^a\) Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words says:

\(^a\) From this triple etymology of samvṛti, it can be seen that the best translation of samvṛtisatya, though awkward, would be “veil/interdependent/conventional truth.” It appears that since in the Great Vehicle systems, the predominant, but certainly not the only,
Truths for the world’s conventions (kun rdzob, samvrti) are worldly conventional truths (kun rdzob bden pa, samvrtisatya); all entirely of those conventions of objects expressed and means of expression, knowers and objects known, and so forth are conventional truths of the world.

Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Annotations: Because of being truths for the conventions of the world since without depending on a rational consciousness the mode of appearance and mode of abiding of forms and so forth cannot be realized as discordant through the power of only worldly consciousnesses, they are called conventional truths.

meaning is veil truth, the translators into Tibetan settled on kun rdzob bden pa, and thus I also mainly use “veil truth.”

\(^a\) dbu ma pa, za, 185.6.
The assertion that there are mere veilings in the Middle Way Proponents’ own system that are not worldly veilings (jig rten kun rdzob) is utterly not logically feasible because:

- here the mention of “world” does not mean that Superiors do not assert these or do not assert veil truths,
- but “world” is mentioned for the sake of indicating how actualities (dngos po), that is, existents (yod pa), abide in undamaged worldly terminology, or conventions,
- and is for the sake of explaining that the yellow, falling hairs in space, and so forth as objects of sense powers deteriorated by jaundice and so forth do not exist in the world,

because Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words says:

Are there also veilings (kun rdzob, samvrti) that are not worldly from which worldly veilings are distinguished? This [word “worldly”] expresses how things abide. Here that analysis [that there must be veilings that are not worldly] does not apply. In a certain way, there are; those sights that abide erroneously due to a sense power impaired by eye disease, blue eye-film, jaundice, and so forth are not the world. Since those veilings in these [situations] are not worldly veilings, “Worldly veil truths” [in Nāgārjuna’s Treatise on the Middle (XXIV.8c)] are distinguished from those.

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a  La Vallée Poussin, Prasannapadā, 493.1–2.
b  This refers to a wide range of eye defects, including floaters, occluded or hazy vision, seeing spots, lines, dots, and so forth.
c  “Blue eye-film” (ling thog sngon po) is cataract; does not appear in the Sanskrit.
Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Annotations: It is as Tsong-kha-pa’s Explanation of (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle”: Ocean of Reasoning says:

If one wonders whether there are also veilings (kun rdzob, saṃvṛti) that are not worldly, this [supposedly] being the purpose for which “worldly” is mentioned in “worldly veilings,” “worldly” is not mentioned in order to distinguish that there are veilings that are not worldly; rather, it expresses measure of the abiding of things. In a certain way, those sights that

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a mthong ba in the Great Exposition of the Middle.
b abu ma pa, 'a, 185.7.
abide erroneously due to a sense power impaired by eye disease,\(^a\) blue eye-film,\(^b\) jaundice, and so forth are not the world in the perspective of which truth is posited in reliance upon them. Therefore, since those veilings—those objects of sense powers polluted by eye disease and so forth—are not true in accordance with [their] appearance relative to the world, in order to differentiate from those the qualification “truth” is mentioned in [Nāgārjuna’s *Treatise on the Middle (XXIV.8c)*] “Worldly veil truths.”

“Worldly” is mentioned also for the sake of expressing the measure of the abiding of things that are veil truths—that “these do not exist in the perspective of a rational consciousness but exist in the perspective of a worldly conventional consciousness.” In a certain way, they are taught as “Worldly veil truths,” in [Nāgārjuna’s *Treatise on the Middle (XXIV.8c)*] for the sake of indicating that a yellow conch appearing to one with jaundice, falling hairs in the sky appearing to one with an eye disease, and so forth—nonexistents in the perspective of undamaged conventional consciousnesses—are not veil truths.

\(^a\) This refers to a wide range of eye defects, including floaters, occluded or hazy vision, seeing spots, lines, dots, and so forth.

\(^b\) “Blue eye-film” (*ling thog sngon po*) is cataract; does not appear in the Sanskrit.
Also, the analytical should know that:

- thinking that the two, the “conventional” (tha snyad, vyavahāra) in “conventional truth” (tha snyad bden pa, vyavahārasatya) and in “existing conventionally” (tha snyad du yod pa, vyavahārasat) and the “veil” (kun rdzob, saṃvṛti) in veil truth (kun rdzob bden, saṃvṛtisatya), are necessarily ignorance, and
- thinking that a worldly consciousness must an innate one, and
- asserting that an etymology of kun rdzob (saṃvṛti) must be explained as only “obstructing reality,” and
- asserting kun [in kun rdzob] as only “all” (thams cad) and rdzob as only “fake” in the Zhangzhung language

and so forth have been demonstrated to be a pile of ignorance like a stupid ox by the glorious Chandrakīrti’s excellent explanation [in his Clear
Words] and Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Commentary on (Nagarjuna’s) “Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called ‘Wisdom’.”

I have explained these well; if you look into how skillfully earlier and later Tibetans have explained these, you will know. There are many points to be elaborated about these; I have explained them elsewhere [in the Great Exposition of the Middle].
Two, four, sixteen, and so on divisions of ultimate truth. The two—
awarenesses of common beings and of Superiors as well as their
objects—are enumerative and other. Real and unreal convention-
alities are not in the Middle Way’s own system. In the perspective
of a worldly consciousness a human and a reflection and so forth
are true and untrue, mere real and unreal.

Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s *Word Commentary on Root Text*: The divi-
sions of ultimate truths are two:
1. selflessness of persons
2. selflessness of phenomena

and four:
1. emptiness of effective things
2. emptiness of non-things
3. emptiness of own-entity
4. emptiness of others’ entity

and sixteen:
1. emptiness of the internal [that is, of the five senses
   (*adhyātmaśūnyatā*)]

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*a* For identifications of these, see the list of eighteen emptinesses in Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, 204-205. Ngag-wang-pal-dan gives the first four of the sixteen; the last
twelve are from Jam-yang-shay-pa’s *Great Exposition of Tenets* (Taipei, 576.13).
2. emptiness of the external [that is, of the six types of objects which are the objects of the five senses and of the mental consciousness (bahirdhāśūnyatā)]

3. emptiness of the internal and external [that is, of the loci of the senses, the gross orbs of the eyes, and so forth (adhyātmabahirdhāśūnyatā)]

4. emptiness of emptiness [that is, of the emptiness that is the nature of phenomena (this eliminates the qualms of those who might think that emptiness truly exists because it is established by a consciousness which analyzes suchness) (śūnyatāśūnyatā)]

5. emptiness of the great [that is, of the ten directions (mahāśūnyatā)]

6. emptiness of the ultimate [that is, of nirvāṇa (paramārthaśūnyatā)]

7. emptiness of the compounded (saṃskṛtaśūnyatā)

8. emptiness of the uncompounded (asaṃskṛtaśūnyatā)

9. emptiness of what has passed beyond extremes [that is, of what is free of the extremes of permanence and annihilation (atyantaśūnyatā)]

10. emptiness of what is beginningless and endless [that is, of what is beginningless and endless, that is, of cyclic existence (anavarāgraśūnyatā)]

11. emptiness of the indestructible [that is, of the indestructible Great Vehicle (anavakāraśūnyatā)]

12. emptiness of nature [that is, of the emptinesses which are the nature of phenomena (this eliminates the qualms of those who might think that an emptiness truly exists because a final nature exists without being produced by anyone) (prakṛtiśūnyatā)]

13. emptiness of all phenomena [that is, of the eighteen constituents, and so forth (sarvadharmaśūnyatā)]

14. emptiness of definitions [that is, of the definitions of all phenomena from forms through to omniscient consciousnesses (laksanaśūnyatā)]

15. emptiness of the unapprehendable [that is, of the past, present, and future which are unapprehendable as the cessation of phenomena, their presence, and their non-production (anupalambhaśūnyatā)]

16. emptiness of the inherent existence of non-things [that is, of inherently existent non-products (abhāvasvabhāvaśūnyatā)].
Included in the phrase “and so forth” in the root text are the eighteen emptinesses\(^a\) and the twenty emptinesses.

When divided terminologically:

- common beings’ awarenesses realizing emptiness through the route of generic images\(^b\) as well as [the emptinesses that are] their objects are enumerative ultimates\(^c\)
- Superiors’ awarenesses directly realizing emptiness as well as [the emptinesses that are] their objects are other, that is to say, nonenumerative ultimates\(^d\).

\(^a\) To the sixteen add:

17. emptiness of things, that is, of the five aggregates (bhavaśūnyatā)
18. emptiness of non-things, that is, of non-products (abhavaśūnyatā)

\(^b\) don spyi, arthasāṃśya; literally, “meaning-generalities.”

\(^c\) rnam grangs pa’i don dam; also called concordant ultimates (don dam rjes su mthun pa).

\(^d\) rnam grangs ma yin pa’i don dam.
When ultimate truths are divided there are explained:

- two, selflessness of persons and of [other] phenomena
- four:
  1. emptiness of effective things
  2. emptiness of noneffective-things
  3. emptiness of own-entities
  4. emptiness of other-entities
- sixteen—emptiness of the internal and so forth
- “and so forth” [in the root text] the eighteen emptinesses and the twenty emptinesses;

Chandrakīrti’s Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle” speaks of the two:

For the sake of migrators’ release, this selflessness
Is set out in two aspects through a division into phenomena and persons.

and a Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra speaks of four:

Subhūti, moreover, effective things are empty of effective things. Noneffective-things are empty of noneffective-things. Own-entities are empty of own-entities. Other-entities are empty of other-entities.

Chandrakīrti’s Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle” [speaks of the sixteen]:

Those emptinesses, with their elaborations,
[Summarized] upon being explained in sixteen,

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a VI:180ab.
Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Annotations: a In the Sūtra on the Seventeen Achievings through Collections twenty-one Great Vehicles are set forth because twenty-one consisting of the Great Vehicles of the six perfections, twenty collections of pristine wisdom, collection of merit containing twenty-one meditative stabilizations, establishments through mindfulness, thorough abandonings, legs of manifestation, five faculties, five powers, seven correct branches of enlightenment, the eight-fold path of Superiors, three doors of liberation, eleven knowledges, three faculties, three meditative stabilizations, ten recollections, five absorptions, ten powers, four fearlessnesses, four individual correct knowledges, eighteen unshared attributes of a Buddha, and retentions. In its sūtra passage indicating the pristine wisdom Great Vehicles the twenty emptinesses are explicitly explained whereupon the object-possessor pristine wisdoms are projected by import (don gyis ’phangs pa). Therefore, Chandrakīrti’s Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle” says:b

Those emptinesses, with their elaborations,
Summarized upon being explained in sixteen,
Again described as four,
Are also asserted as Great Vehicles.

Those need to be known from the Mother Sūtras, Tsong-kha-pa’s

a dbu ma pa, ya, 186.3.
b VI:180.
Golden Garland, and so forth.

a Usually, so rig.
and a *Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra* [speaks of the sixteen]:

Subhūti, moreover, the Great Vehicle of Bodhisattvas is thus: emptiness of the internal, emptiness of the external, emptiness of the internal and external, emptiness of emptiness, emptiness of the great, emptiness of the ultimate, emptiness of the compounded, emptiness of the uncompounded, emptiness of what has passed beyond extremes, emptiness of what is beginningless and endless, emptiness of the indestructible, emptiness of nature, emptiness of all phenomena, emptiness of definitions, emptiness of the unapprehendable, and emptiness of the inherent existence of non-things.a

Also, when the ultimate is divided from the viewpoint of types of terminological expression, there are two, (1) enumerative ultimates or concordant ultimates and (2) nonenumerative ultimates; Jñānagarbha’s *Differentiation of the Two Truths* (9ab) says:

We assert that a negation of production and so forth also

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a For Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s *Annotations, dbu ma pa*, note ra, 186.8, see Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, 204-205.
Is [an ultimate] due to being concordant with the real.

and his Autocommentary on this says:

We assert that by reason of negating the actuality of the conceptualization of really [existent] production and so forth it is an ultimate due to being concordant with the right.

and Kamalashīla’s Illumination of the Middle says:

Because the absence of production moreover accords with the ultimate, it is called an “ultimate,” but it is not actually so because actually the ultimate is beyond all proliferations.

and Shāntarakṣhita’s Ornament for the Middle says:

Because of according with the ultimate, This is called an “ultimate.”
In reality [the ultimate] is released from all The collections of proliferations.

and Shāntarakṣhita’s commentary prior to that says:

Although the absence of production and so forth also has been included as a real veiling.[…]

5. Individual Divisions

About the meaning of these, many earlier Tibetans\(^a\) asserted that:

- The emptiness that is a negative of forms’ ultimately existent production and so forth is an enumerative ultimate, an imputed ultimate truth (*don dam bden pa btags pa ba*), and a fully qualified veil truth (*kun rdzob bden pa mtshan nyid pa*).
- The nonenumerative ultimate truth cannot be taken as an object of any awareness and therefore is not an object of knowledge.

Those are very much not logically feasible:

- because within the enumerative ultimate and the nonenumerative ultimate each there is the object, the absence of true existence, not only that but also with respect to the former [the enumerative ultimate] there are awarenesses of hearing and thinking that have emptiness as their object, and with respect to the latter [the nonenumerative ultimate] there are pristine wisdoms of meditative equipoise [that have emptiness as their object],
- and because also [within the enumerative ultimate and the nonenumerative ultimate] each there are object-possessors (*yul can*; subjects, that is, consciousnesses), because Jñānagarbha’s *Differentiation of the Two Truths* says: \(^b\)

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\(^a\) Taipei, 577.5.

\(^b\) Stanza 4ab; Toh. 3881, *dbus ma*, vol. *sa*, 1a.4; Tibetan in Eckel, *Jñānagarbha’s Commentary*, 156; his English translation is on p. 71. For the Sanskrit see Khangkar and Yorihito, 222 note 319.
Because of being undeceiving, a rational [consciousness] is an ultimate.

and Kamalashila’s *Illumination of the Middle* says:

The statements also that production and so forth do not **ultimately** exist are asserted to mean the following: All consciousnesses arisen from correct hearing, thinking, and meditating are nonerroneous object-possessors; hence, they are called “ultimates” because of being the ultimate among these.

and Bhāvaviveka’s *Blaze of Reasoning* describes for the ultimate two, nonconceptual pristine wisdom and wisdom concordant with it.

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Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Annotations: The meaning of these texts must be known in dependence upon only Tsong-kha-pa’s Small Exposition of the Stages of the Path; moreover, these are as [Tsong-kha-pa’s text] itself says:

It is not the meaning of those texts that the explanation of two ultimates should be taken as ultimates only in terms of objects and not in terms of subjects. Concerning this, when the first [a Superior’s nonconceptual pristine wisdom of meditative equipoise] understands suchness, it is able to simultaneously eliminate with respect to its object the proliferations of [the apprehension of] true [existence] and the proliferations of dualistic appearance; hence, [a Superior’s nonconceptual pristine wisdom of meditative equipoise] is an actual ultimate; also, that is the meaning of being “beyond all proliferations” [in Kamalashīla’s Illumination of the Middle, above 116, “Because the absence of production moreover accords with the ultimate, it is called an “ultimate,” but it is not actually so because actually the ultimate is beyond all proliferations.”]. Although the second [a conceptual rational consciousness comprehending suchness in dependence on a sign, and so forth] is able to cease the proliferations [of the apprehension] of true [existence] with respect to its own object [emptiness], it cannot eliminate the proliferations of dualistic appearance; hence, it is an ultimate concordant in aspect with the supramundane ultimate.

It is necessary to set forth two modes also with respect to

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*a* dbu ma pa, la, 187.7.
the object-ultimate\(^a\) that is the negative of ultimately [existent] production—and so forth—of forms and so on. Concerning this:

- In the perspective of a nonconceptual rational consciousness, the object-emptiness is the actual ultimate free from both proliferations.
- In the perspective of a conceptual rational consciousness, the object-emptiness is not the actual ultimate free from both proliferations, since it is free from only one class of proliferations. However, this is not to say that in general it is not an actual ultimate truth.

Therefore, except for being free from all proliferations of dualistic appearance in the perspective of certain awarenesses, an emptiness of true existence free from all proliferations of appearance does not occur, and hence the meaning of those texts is not that whatever is an ultimate truth is necessarily free from all proliferations of dualistic appearance.

\(^a\) *yul gyi don dam*; 483.6. This is the ultimate that is the object of wisdom, not the wisdom that is called an ultimate.
Moreover, it is being said, “This uncontaminated pristine wisdom of a Superior is an actual object-possessor ultimate,” but it is not being said, “This [uncontaminated pristine wisdom of a Superior] is an actual ultimate truth,” and it is being said, “In general, the ultimate truth is the actual ultimate devoid of both proliferations in the perspective of a nonconceptual rational consciousness and is the ultimate devoid of only one class of proliferation in the perspective of a conceptual rational consciousness,” but it is utterly not being said, “This emptiness that is the object of comprehension of a conceptual rational consciousness is the ultimate devoid of only one class of proliferation because both—an ultimate devoid of both proliferations and an ultimate devoid of only one class of proliferation—do not occur because whatever is an ultimate is necessarily together with proliferation. These have been
explained in the *Explanation of the Two Truths*\(^a\) that I wrote.

\[\text{About this, someone says:}\]

It follows that whatever is an established base [that is, whatever exists] necessarily is together with

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\(^{a}\) *Explanation of the Meanings of Veiling (kun rdzob) and Ultimate (don dam) in the Four Systems of Tenets: the Spring Cuckoo’s Eloquent Song (grub mtha’ bzhi’i lugs kyi kun rdzob dang don dam pa’i don rnam par bshad pa legs bshad dpyid kyi dpal mo’i glu dbyangs).*

\(^{b}\) Ngag-wang-pal-dan himself poses a problem contradicting what he has just put forth.
proliferation because ultimate truth is not devoid of proliferation. You cannot assert this because the voidness of dualistic appearance exists, because the vanishing of dualistic appearance exists, because Tsong-kha-pa’s *The Essence of Eloquence* says:

If it were not the case [that the two—a conceptual consciousness’s having dualistic appearanceb and an object’s appearing in the aspect of dualistic appearancec—are not equivalentd], one would have to assert that it would not occur that a vanishing of dualistic appearance dawns to conceptuality, but this also is not reasonable, because a vanishing of dualistic appearance would not occur [that is, would not exist at all].

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\[\text{b}\] *rtog pa la gnyis snang yod pa*.

\[\text{c}\] *yul de gnyis snang gi rnam par ‘char ba*. Tsong-kha-pa says “in the aspect of dualistic appearance” (*gnysis snang gi rnam par*) whereas just above he says “as having the aspect of dualistic appearance (*gnysis snang gi rnam pa can du*)”. I do not take the difference to be significant; it is likely that he is seeking to indicate that these two have the same meaning.

\[\text{d}\] Gung-thang Lo-drö-gya-tsho (*Precious Lamp*, 269.2) says that indeed these are not equivalent, in that a conceptual consciousness’s having dualistic appearance refers to the fact that a meaning-generality appears in the perspective of its appearance factor (*rtog pa la gnyis snang yod pa snang ngor don spyi snang ba*), whereas appearance in an aspect of dualistic appearance refers to an appearance to the mode of apprehension (*gnysis snang gi rnam par ‘char ba ‘dzin stangs la ‘char ba*). Roughly speaking, the first refers to the fact that a conceptual consciousness gets at its object through the means of an intervening mental image, whereas the second refers to what the consciousness is understanding; thus, when a conceptual consciousness rightly understands what a self-cognizing consciousness is, it knows it just to be an entity of experience; it does not superimpose a sense of duality on self-consciousness itself even if self-consciousness appears to it through the route of a conceptual meaning-generality.

\[\text{e}\] As Gung-ru Chö-jung (*Garland of White Lotuses*, 112b.2) frames the point:

It [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, the vanishing of dualistic appearance, it would not occur among existents [literally, “among objects of knowledge”] because [according to you] the appearance of its aspect to a conceptual consciousness apprehending it does not occur.

The entailment being used is: If the appearance of something’s aspect to a conceptual consciousness apprehending it does not occur, then it would not exist. In other words, everything existent, at least in some vague way, can appear to conceptuality. It is said that the existence of an omniscient consciousness can be realized prior to realizing an omniscient consciousness, based on realizing with inference the validity of the four noble truths or of emptiness and making the extension that if someone can be correct about such profound
Response: Distinctions should be developed upon analysis with a subtle awareness.⁹

The meaning of the words of [Jñānagarbha’s Differentiation of the Two Truths (9ab):]

We assert that a negation of production and so forth also is [an ultimate] due to being concordant with the real.

and its Autocommentary:

We assert that by reason of negating the actuality of the conceptualization of really [existent] production and so forth it is an ultimate due to being concordant with the right.

is: Because a conceptual rational consciousness that upon analysis through reasoning has refuted ultimate production, cessation, and so forth also accords with a nonconceptual pristine wisdom, which is a right object-possessor, we assert that [a conceptual rational consciousness] is an ultimate object-possessor. The way that it is topics, that person must be correct with respect to everything else, even if those other topics, such as the relationship between a particular effect and its particular karmic cause, are even more hidden than the four truths or emptiness, which are only slightly hidden.

⁹ In lieu of a response, Ngag-wang-pal-dan calls for others to try to figure out how to handle the contradiction between the earlier statement and this challenge.
concordant is that by reason of, by dint of, negating the proliferations of the actuality—the apprehension of true establishment—conceptualizing really [existent] production and so forth accords with a nonconceptual pristine wisdom.

The meaning of the words of this passage in Kamalashīla’s *Illumination of the Middle* [“Because the absence of production moreover accords with the ultimate, it is called an ‘ultimate,’ but it is not actually so because actually the ultimate is beyond all proliferations”] is: Because this ultimate [conceptual rational consciousness] in “the absence of ultimate production” also accords with an actual ultimate object-possessor [that is, consciousness] in its elimination of the proliferations of the apprehension of true establishment, it is called an “ultimate object-possessor,” but it is not an actual ultimate object-possessor because an actual ultimate object-possessor must be a [non-conceptual] awareness beyond all proliferations of dualistic appearance. The meaning of the passage from Shāntarakṣhita’s *Ornament for the Middle* (see above) is also
similar.

With respect to how to explain the meaning of these passages within applying them to the object, emptiness: This absence of truly established production moreover is called an ultimate concordant with the ultimate that is devoid of only a portion of proliferations in the perspective of a conceptual rational consciousness, because voidness of the proliferations of the apprehension of true existence in its perspective accords only partially with voidness of the proliferations of dualistic appearance in the perspective of an uncontaminated consciousness. [Voidness of the proliferations of the apprehension of true existence in the perspective of a conceptual rational consciousness] is not an actual ultimate devoid of both proliferations in the perspective of a nonconceptual rational consciousness because if an ultimate truth is an actual ultimate in the perspective of a rational consciousness devoid of both proliferations, then in the perspective of that rational consciousness it must be beyond both proliferations.
Therefore, although the absence of ultimately existent production, which is the mode of subsistence, does not have proliferations from its own side, an inference of determinative realization [of the absence of ultimately existent production] comprehends [the absence of ultimately existent production] together with proliferations of dualistic appearance in the perspective of its appearance factor despite the disappearance of the proliferations in the perspective of its ascertainment factor, whereby since it accords with the ultimate that is the object of a Superior’s meditative equipoise, it is called a “concordant ultimate”; however, since the absence of ultimately existent production in the perspective of the ascertainment factor of meditative equipoise and even in the perspective of its appearance factor is without all of the collections of proliferations, it must be described as an “actual ultimate” or “nonenumerative ultimate.” Therefore, how could even the object found by inference—the absence of truly existent production—be a veiling! For, Kamalashīla’s *Illumination of the Middle* speaks of both the signs and the proposition [of the reasoning] of the lack of being one or many as nonaffirming negatives that are mere eliminations of the object of negation, and Śāntarakṣita, Āryavimuktasena, and Haribhadra also speak again and again about meditative equipoise as devoid of proliferations, because they do not assert an illusoriness that is a composite of the two, a substratum and emptiness, as an object found by rational consciousness and because there is not any great Middle Way Autonomist or Consequentialist who asserts that the mere meaning that is the object comprehended by inference is the latter of the two types concerning the elimination of the proliferations of the object of negation with respect
to appearances—eliminative (rnam bcad) and inclusionary (yongs gcod)—is the ultimate.

Hence, concerning the description in Shāntarakṣhita’s Ornament for the Middle of a negation of ultimately [existent] production and so forth as real veilings: Since with respect to the negation of ultimately [existent] production and so forth there are the two—the rational consciousness by
which [ultimately existent production] is negated and its object of comprehension, it is asserted that the rational consciousness is posited as a real veiling [or correct veiling] without such individual differentiation and within such individual differentiation; Shāntarakṣhita’s *Autocommentary on the “Ornament for the Middle”* says:

Although the absence of production and so forth also has been included as a real veiling,[…]

To the objection that the object that is the illusory-like composite of the emptiness of true establishment and the basis of emptiness does not appear to a sense consciousness:

*Objection:* Just as since really [existent] production and so forth do not appear [to sense consciousnesses] when things appear, those are unreal veilings, so the negatives of really [existent] production and so forth also are unreal veilings.

and so forth, Jñānagarbha’s *Autocommentary to the “Differentiation of the Two Truths”* explains in answer that it does appear and is a veil truth. Although the ultimate mentioned in Jñānagarbha’s *Autocommentary to the “Differentiation of the Two Truths”*:

Others [that is, Proponents of Mind-Only] hold [that emptiness is] only real; therefore, “also” [in the root text]a has the meaning of a conjunction. [However,] when analyzed with reasoning, it is only conventional. Why?

Since the object of negation [that is, a self of phenomena,]

does not exist,

It is clear that the negative does not exist in reality.b

Is asserted by Proponents of True Existence as truly established, here it is described as conventionally established, due to which the assertion that the nonexistence of truly established production is a veil truth is also mistaken.

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a Jñānagarbha’s *Differentiation of the Two Truths* (9ab) says:

We assert that a negation of production and so forth also is [an ultimate] due to being concordant with the real.

(bskye la sogs pa bkag pa yang / yang dag pa dang mthun phyir ’dod)

Jñānagarbha is contrasting his assertion with the assertion by the Proponents of Mind-Only that emptiness ultimately exists.

b *yang dag tu na:* 485.5. Ge-lug-pa scholars often explain this phrase as meaning “existing as its own reality,” that is to say, ultimately. By demonstrating that the negative of the object of negation—emptiness—does not exist ultimately, Jñānagarbha indicates that since emptiness exists, it must exist conventionally.
Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Annotations: a With respect to the meaning

a dbu ma pa, a, 190.3.
of the first between the descriptions (1) in Shāntarakṣhita’s *Ornament for the Middle* and (2) in Jñānagarbha’s *Autocommentary to the “Differentiation of the Two Truths”* of the negation of ultimately [existent] production and so forth as veilings, the meaning of the statement in Tsong-kha-pa’s *Small Exposition of the Stages of the Path*:

Also, with respect to the negation of really [existent] production and so forth, since there are two—the rational consciousness by which it is negated and its object of comprehension, the mode of inclusion as a real conventionality also should be known in terms of those.

The meaning of the second [which is the description in Jñānagarbha’s *Autocommentary to the “Differentiation of the Two Truths”* of the negation of ultimately (existent) production and so forth as veilings] is as that text itself [Tsong-kha-pa’s *Small Exposition of the Stages of the Path*] says:

In connection with the explanation of the negative of production and so forth as a concordant ultimate, Jñānagarbha’s *Autocommentary on the “Differentiation of the Two Truths”*

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*b* This point is in response to an objector’s position:  
Jñānagarbha’s own commentary on that text as well as Maitreya’s *Ornament*
Great Exposition of Tenets: Two Truths, Sections 1-5

Others [that is, Proponents of Mind-Only] hold [that emptiness is] only real; therefore, “also” [in the root text] has the meaning of a conjunction. [However,] when analyzed with reasoning, it is only conventional. Why?

Since the object of negation [that is, a self of phenomena,] does not exist,
It is clear that the negative does not exist in reality.

He says that:

- others—Proponents of Mind-Only—assert that an emptiness, which is a negative of a self of phenomena in a base of negation, is established in reality,
- but his own system asserts that since the self of phenomena, which is the object of negation, does not exist, the negation that is the negative of this is not established in reality.

Therefore, [Jñānagarbha’s] explanation that a negative of ultimately existent production and so forth is conventional means that it exists conventionally; it does not indicate that

speak of the negative of ultimately [existent] production and so forth as conventional.

The misguided claim is that for Jñānagarbha and Maitreya the emptiness of ultimately existent production is a conventional truth, not an ultimate truth; Tsong-kha-pa’s opinion is that for these scholars it is an ultimate truth that, like everything else, exists conventionally.

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Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s *Word Commentary on Root Text*: A division of veil truths into real and unreal veilings does not exist in the Middle Way’s own system. However, in the perspective of a worldly consciousness, a human face and a reflection of a face, and so forth, are suitable to receive the conventions “true” and “untrue,” and hence respectively are mere real veilings and mere unreal veilings.

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*a* As will be seen below, Ngag-wang-pal-dan refines this to mean “relative to conventional valid cognition.”
[The phrase] “In the Middle Way’s own system” is to be taken as “in the perspective of the Middle Way rational consciousness of the unique Middle Way system.” In its perspective it is not suitable to divide veil truths into the real whose mode of appearance and mode of subsistence agree and the unreal whose mode of appearance and mode of subsistence do not agree because not only Superiors’ meditative equipoise but also their pristine wisdom subsequent to meditative equipoise perceive forms and so forth as like illusions and do not perceive their mode of appearance and mode of subsistence as in agreement and because it is explained that all conventions proving true existence and the absence of true existence are unreal; Chandrakīrti’s Commentary on the “Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle’” says:

[Therefore, those realizations of objects—apprehended by the six sense powers without the condition of damage by the world as explained—] are true just from the world, but not upon reliance on Superiors.

and Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words says:\textsuperscript{b}

[This] exists for the world, and not for Superiors.

\textbf{Objection:} Are Superiors not endowed with reasoning?

\textbf{Response:} Who [could] propound this existence or nonexistence! The ultimate of Superiors is unspoken.

\textsuperscript{a} Taipei, 578.13; 2011 TBRC \textit{bla brang,pha}, 185a.5.

\textsuperscript{b} See also the extensively annotated excellent translation by Anne MacDonald, \textit{In Clear Words, The Prasannapadā, Chapter One, Vol. II, Annotated Translation, Tibetan Text} (Verlag Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften: Wien, 2015) 211-212.
Therefore, veil truths are divided into the two—real and unreal—in relation to the perspective of coarse, innate, worldly consciousnesses because:

- the six senses free from superficial damage and the six objects apprehended by them are posited as real\(^a\) in the perspective of innate coarse consciousnesses
- and the six senses having superficial damage and the six objects apprehended by them are posited as unreal\(^b\) in the perspective of worldly consciousnesses;

Chandrakīrti’s *Commentary on the “Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle’”* says:

In order to indicate that since those perceiving falsities are also

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\(^a\) *yang dag:* this is better translated as “correct” for consciousnesses.

\(^b\) *log pa:* this is better translated as “incorrect” for consciousnesses.
just two, right\textsuperscript{a} perceptions and false perceptions, whereby there are the two, the objects apprehended by them and the consciousnesses, [in the root text, the Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle,” VI.24] it is explained:

and Chandrākīrti’s Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) “Treatise on the Middle” (VI.24ab) says that there are right and wrong subjects:\textsuperscript{b}

Also, those that perceive falsities are asserted as twofold—
Those with clear sense powers and those having defective sense powers.

and that very text (VI.25) says:

Objects realized by the world that are apprehended
By [the consciousnesses of] the six sense powers undamaged [by superficial causes of mistake]
Are true [or real] just from the world [because of being phenomena that prior to realizing emptiness cannot be realized as a combination of appearing as inherently existent but empty of such].
The rest [that is, those apprehended by sense consciousnesses damaged by superficial causes of mistake such as reflections, echoes, and so forth] are posited as unreal from just the world [that is, relative to the world].

\[I\] have refuted many wrong ideas about this elsewhere [in the Great Exposition of the Middle].\textsuperscript{c}

\begin{itemize}
  \item[^a] yang dag pa.
  \item[^b] yul can, literally “object-possessors.”
  \item[^c] See Guy M. Newland, Just What are the Two Truths in the Middle Way Consequence School? Section 1, Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, dual language edition by Craig Preston in collaboration with Lo-sang-gyal-tshan (Dyke, VA: UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, 2017: uma-tibet.org).
\end{itemize}
Therefore, the various propositions by Tag-tshang and so forth upon thinking that whatever are posited in the perspective of worldly conventional consciousnesses are not asserted by Proponents of the Middle Way are the worst because in that case since (1) that forms and so forth do not ultimately exist must be proven in the perspective of a conventional consciousness this also would not be asserted by Proponents of the Middle Way, and since also (2) veilings and veil truths are described as the province of the world, those also would not be asserted by Proponents of the Middle Way, whereby the two truths would not suitable for Proponents of the Middle Way. Becoming like what is stated in Chandrakīrti’s Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle” (VI.80cd) there are very many damages:

Those who do not know the division of the two truths
Are involved in bad paths through their wrong conceptions.

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a The Meeting of the Father and Son Sūtra says, “The One-Gone-Thus sees veilings as the province of the world.” Cited by Śāntideva in his Compendium of Instructions, 142b.4. Cf. C. Bendall, Śikṣā Samuccaya, 236.
Hence, with respect to the modes of positing of forms and so forth as real in the perspective of worldly consciousness, there are ones that Proponents of the Middle Way assert:

- one that is a positing [of forms and so forth as real in the perspective of worldly consciousness] due to concordance between the mode of appearance in accordance with the perspective of that consciousness and the mode of abiding
- and one that is a positing as “real or true” of what exists concordantly with its appearance to the perspective of that consciousness or [is a case of] the existence of the object that is the basis of the appearance.
Tsong-kha-pa’s *Exposition of the Stages of the Path*\(^a\) says:\(^b\)

Although sense consciousnesses are alike in being mistaken with respect to their appearing objects, from the approach of whether in the perspective of a worldly consciousness the object concord-

\(^a\) When the title *Exposition of the Stages of the Path* is used without specifying whether this is Tsong-kha-pa’s *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path* or his *Medium Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path*, it often refers to both texts, but in this case it is his *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path*. There is a similar passage in his *Medium Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path*:

The Consequentialist system:

- posits the six consciousnesses not polluted by superficial causes of mistake and the six objects apprehended by those consciousnesses as real veilings, and
- posits the six consciousnesses polluted by superficial causes of mistake and the six objects apprehended by those consciousnesses as unreal veilings, and moreover
- posits real and unreal veilings in relation to *just* worldly or conventional valid cognitions, but not in relation to a rational consciousness following a Superior’s perception.

Therefore, since in the Middle Way’s own system the two appearances—of (1) reflections, and so forth, and (2) blue, and so forth—to those who possess ignorance do not differ with respect to whether [consciousnesses of them] are mistaken or not in relation to their appearing object, they do not make a division into the two—real and unreal veilings.

ant with the appearance exists or does not exist, sense consciousnesses to which reflections and so forth appear are unreal [or wrong] veilings whereas sense consciousnesses other than those, that is, undamaged, are real [or right] veilings.

and Chandrakīrti’s Commentary on (Nāgārjuna’s) “Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning” says:

Those observations moreover are erroneous and nonerroneous. Concerning those, the erroneous are whatsoever apprehensions as pleasure and so forth because even conventionally those things just do not abide in that essence. The nonerroneous are whatsoever apprehensions as pain and so forth because those things conventionally just exist in that essence.

Therefore, Proponents of the Middle\(^a\) themselves also assert such real and unreal [veilings relative to worldly valid cognition], but they conventionally do not assert the former type of real [veilings relative to a rational consciousness] in their own system, and the statement moreover in Shāntideva’s Engaging in the Bodhisattva’s Deeds (31a.4),\(^b\) “Relative to [the conception by] the world [of the unclean as clean, pain as pleasure, the impermanent as permanent, and so forth, it is merely asserted that when impermanence and so forth is seen,] suchness is seen,”\(^c\) is in accordance with Chandrakīrti’s Commentary on (Nāgārjuna’s) “Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning.”

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\(\text{a Taipei, 580.3.}\)

\(\text{b Shāntideva’s Engaging in the Bodhisattva’s Deeds reads ‘jig rten la los de nyid mthong rather than ‘jig rten de nyid mthong: the latter occurs in Chandrakīrti’s Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s)“Treatise on the Middle” (VI.30) but is not relevant here.}\)

\(\text{c The brackets in the following quote are drawn from Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Annotations, sha:}\)
Therefore:
• The perspective of a worldly consciousness in “existing in conventional terms,” the perspective of a worldly consciousness in “existing in the world’s conventions,” the convention in “conventional truth,” and the noble in “noble truth” are conventional valid cognitions.

• The perspective of a worldly consciousness in [Chandrakirti’s Supplement, VI.25c.] “Are true [or real] just from the world,” is innate usual consciousness.

• The veiling consciousness (kun rdzob, samvrti) in the perspective of which forms and so forth are posited as true must be ignorance.

Hence, many among ourselves and others who do not know such distinctions gather together hundreds of contradictions; Tsong-kha-pa’s Stages of the Path says:

Since the refutation—by reasoning—of the inherent existence of forms and so forth in the sense of their being established by way of their own entities is not suitable ultimately, it must be done in conventional terms, and in the perspective of such a conventional consciousness sense consciousnesses are mistaken.

and also that very text says:

If the two, the convention that is the context of being mistaken in conventional terms and the conventional consciousness that is the consciousness upon reliance on which [something] is posited as erroneous, were one, it would be contradictory, but those two are

La Vallée Poussin, Madhyamakāvatāra, 104.4-104.7; Illumination of the Thought, Sarnath 2009, 221.11-221.14; translation by Hopkins, Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom, 257.
and so forth, and this statement in Chandrakīrti’s Commentary on (Nāgārjuna’s) “Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning”:

Therefore, even with respect to worldly things those which abide without passing beyond abiding exactly in their own entity attain the expression “Superior” (’phags pa, ārya).

explains the meaning the [Sanskrit] original of “superior” ārya (’phags pa); furthermore, since grammatical treatises explain that ārya is also [used] for the noble class, it need not be explained only for persons; that very commentary [Chandrakīrti’s Commentary on (Nāgārjuna’s) “Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning”] says:

Upon reliance on merely this, like the convention “superior” (’phags pa, ārya), the “superior truths” [that is, “truths for conventional valid cognitions.”]

You need to know that the statement also in Khay-drub’s Great Compilation: Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate:

The meaning is that the division into the two, real and unreal, is made by worldly innate usual awareness. is not suitable as a single awareness, whereby it is in consideration of two different innate [awarenesses], and you need to how those are to be mainly treated in the identification of [Chandrakīrti’s Supplement, VI.25c,] “Are true [or real] just from the world”; I have explained this elsewhere [in my Great Exposition of the Middle].

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a For stanza VI.25 see the previous footnote.
དགོས་པས་ཁྱད་པར་དེ་གཉིས་པའི་རང་གཞན་དེས་པའི་ལམ་རིམ་ལས།
གཤེགས་སོགས་ལ་རང་གི་ངོ་བོ་ནི་དོན་དམ་ལི་ཐ་དད་དགོས་ལ།
དེ་འཕི་ཐ་དད་པའི་ཤེས་ངོ་དེར་ནི་དབང་པོའི་ཤེས་པ་ལས་ཞེས་དང་།
ཡིན་ལ། གཤེས་དང་། དེ་ཉིད་ལས། གཤེས་པ་གང་ལ་བོས་པའི་ཐ་དད་པའི་ཤེས་པ་གཉིས་གཅིག་ཡིན་ན་འགལ་བ་ཡིན་ཀྱང་།
དེ་གཉིས་སོ་སོ་བ་ཡིན་པས་ཞེས་སོགས་དང་། རིགས་པ་འགྲེལ་པ་ལས།
དེའི་འཇིག་གེན་གྱི་དངོས་པོ་ལ་ཡང་གང་གིས་རང་གི་ངོ་བོ་ཇི་ཙུམ་བ་བཞིན་བགས་པ་ལས་མ་འདས་པར་ལས་བཤད་དེས་ནི་འཕགས་པའི་བཙོད་པ་ཐོབ་བོ། །ཞེས་གོངས་པ་འདིས་འཕགས་པའི་ཐ་དད་དོད་ཨ˗འི་དོན་བཤད་ལ་མདོ་ལས་ཀྱང་ཨ˗་ཛེས་ཐ་དད་གཉིས་ལ་དགོངས་ལ།
དེ་ཡང་འཇིག་གེན་ཉིད་ལས་བདེན་ཡིན་ཞེས་པའི་ངོས་འཛིན་གཙོ་བོར་ཐོག་པ་ཡིན་ལས་ཤེས་པར་ཐོབ་ཡེ་གཞན་བཤད་
Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Annotations: It is not that “real veilings do not exist in the Proponents of the Middle Way own system because real veilings do not exist for the perspective of a rational consciousness”; otherwise, because veil truths do not exist for the ascertainment perspective of a rational consciousness, veil truths would not exist in the Proponents of the Middle Way own system. Hence, it is being said that there are real veilings relative to (la ltos te) worldly valid cognition, or conventional valid cognition, but real veilings relative to a rational consciousness do not exist because real veilings relative to the mode of analysis by a rational consciousness do not exist, because that which is established as real relative to this does not exist, for, according to the mode of analysis by a rational consciousness, all phenomena must be established as false and the truly established does not exist.

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\(^a\) dbu ma pa, ka, 190.8.
The meaning of the words of [Chandrakīrti’s Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle” (VI.24-25):

Also, those that perceive falsities are asserted as twofold—Those with clear sense powers and those having defective sense powers.
Consciousnesses of those having defective sense powers are asserted As wrong in relation to those having good sense powers.
Objects realized by the world that are apprehended By [the consciousnesses of] the six sense powers undamaged [by superficial causes of mistake]
Are true [or real] just from the world [because of being phenomena that prior to realizing emptiness cannot be realized to be a combination of appearing to be inherently existent but being empty of such].
The rest [that is, those apprehended by sense consciousnesses damaged by superficial causes of mistake such as reflections, echoes, and so forth] are posited as unreal from just the world [that is, relative to the world].
is: Also, subjects perceiving falsities have two aspects, right subjects and wrong subjects:

1. the six sense powers not polluted by superficial causes of mistake and the six consciousnesses that depend on them
2. the six sense powers polluted by superficial causes of mistake and the six consciousnesses that depend on them.

The six consciousnesses polluted by superficial causes of mistake are asserted as wrong subjects upon reliance (ltos nas) on consciousnesses polluted by superficial causes of mistake, and the former six are asserted as right subjects upon reliance on those.
Also, object veilings have two [aspects], real and unreal relative (ltos te) to conventional valid cognition:

1. objects of the six consciousnesses not polluted by superficial causes of mistake, which are real objects relative to conventional valid cognition
2. objects of the six consciousnesses polluted by superficial
causes of mistake, which are real objects relative to conventional valid cognition.
In this system:

- Since veiling phenomena are not established in accordance with how they appear and conventional consciousnesses are mistaken consciousnesses [in that objects falsely appear to inherently exist], a division of veiling objects and subjects into the real and unreal is not asserted.
- Among the six non-conceptual consciousnesses in the continuum of a common being there are none that are unmistaken. However, it is not contradictory that those consciousnesses are valid cognitions able to posit phenomena—forms and so forth—as existing because although an unmistaken subject [that is, consciousness] is needed to posit a true object, a mistaken subject itself serves to assist in positing a false object.

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a  *dbu ma pa, ga, 191.7.*
It is explained that:

- The division of veilings into real and unreal by other [that is, non-Consequentialist] Proponents of the Middle derives from their assertion of establishment by way of the object’s own character.

- Here [in the Consequence School] their not dividing veilings into real and unreal derives from their not asserting establishment by way of the object’s own character.

Since if forms and so forth were posited as real, this would be damaged by a rational consciousness realizing their emptiness, [the Consequentialists] do not divide veilings into real and unreal; however, relative to only the perspective of conventional consciousnesses (tha snyad pa’i shes pa’i ngo tsam la llos te)—and not relative to a rational consciousness (rigs shes la llos te)—it is suitable to make a division into real and unreal because although dividing an illusory horse and a fully qualified horse into false and true relative to a rational consciousness is not logically feasible, these are suitable to receive the conventions “false” and “true” relative to conventional consciousnesses, because this is like, for example:

When two villagers were looking at paintings drawn on a temple wall, one said that this holding a trident is Nārāyaṇa (Viṣṇu), while that holding a wheel is Maheshvara. Due to the other villager’s expounding the opposite, they argued; when they asked a wandering ascetic who was staying nearby, the wanderer did indeed know—relative to valid cognition realizing Nārāyaṇa and Īshvara [are not paintings but are gods],

\* Īshvara holds a trident and Nārāyaṇa holds a wheel.
that those two had no difference of truth or falsity—and an-
swered relative to the thought of the questioners, saying, “This 
is true; that is false,” whereby the desire of the villagers was 
achieved, and the wanderer also did not incur the fault of 
speaking falsely.a

a Jam-yang-shay-pa’s lengthier presentation of this topic in his Great Exposition of 
Tenets, translation by Jongbok Yi, The Opposite of Emptiness in the Middle Way Conse-
quence School: Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Object 
of Negation 2 (Dyke, VA: UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, uma-tibet.org) is:

Buddhapālita in dependence upon the Heap of Jewels Sūtra, from stating dis-
cerning what is true and false in a debate about an image of a deity as an example, 
proved in that way (the feasibility of the performance of functions within name-
only) is established because although the imputed object is not found when 
sought, all actions and agents are suitable [in terms of] whether they are or are 
not in worldly name-only, because it is like, for example:

Two persons debate in a temple; one person propounds that the one 
holding a wheel is Īshvara and the one holding a trident is Viśnū; the 
other says it is the opposite [the one holding a wheel is Viśnū and the 
one holding a trident is Īshvara].

A mediator does not say that these two gods [Īshvara and Viśnū] 
do not exist in this [temple] and that these [ones holding a trident and 
holding a wheel] are paintings; rather, in conformity with the world, 
the mediator tells the second [who said that the one holding a wheel is 
Viśnū and the one holding a trident is Īshvara], “You are true,” and 
the other, the first, who propounded [that the one holding a wheel is 
Īshvara and the one holding a trident is Viśnū], “You are not true.”

The Budhāpālita Commentary (Buddhapālita, buddhā pālī, 244b.1-244b.2) 
says:

In this way, the Supramundane Victor also says, “Whatever is re-
nowned to the world as existent, I also propound as existent. Whatever 
is renowned to the world as nonexistent, I also propound as nonexistent.” Therefore, it is said that when acting in the conventions of the 
world, what is renowned as real in the world the Supramundane Victor 
also says is real, and what is renowned as unreal in the world the Su-
pramundane Victor also says is unreal.

and it says (244b.4-244b.7):

For example, when two villagers went to a city for some matters, they 
entered into a temple for the spectacle, and when they began to look at 
the paintings, one said, “The one holding a trident in his hand is 
Nārāyaṇa; the one holding a wheel is Maheshvara.” The other said, 
“You misunderstood; the one holding a trident is Maheshvara; the one 
holding a wheel is Nārāyaṇa.” Debating, they went to a wanderer [holy 
man] who was nearby. Having paid homage, they told him their re-
spective thoughts, and he told one, “What you said is true,” and told 
the other, “What you said is not true.” When he propounded like this, 
although the wanderer knew that Maheshvara did not at all exist in this
As Jang-kya (Hopkins, *Emptiness Yoga*, 368-369) paraphrases this part of the story:

A wandering holy man was nearby. They went up to him, and each spoke his thought. The wanderer thought, “Being murals on a wall, these are neither Maheshvara nor Narayana.” Although he knew that, still he did not say, “These are not gods, but paintings.” Instead, in conformity with the conventions of the world, he told the two villagers that one of them was right and the other wrong. Through his speaking thus, the wishes of the two villagers were fulfilled, and the wanderer also did not incur the fault of telling a lie.

Likewise, although all phenomena do not have objective establishment, presentations such as, “This is correct, and that is incorrect,” are feasible within the context of mere nominalities. Although the Supramundane Victor [Buddha] sees that all phenomena do not truly exist, even he teaches the adopting [of virtues] and discarding [of non-virtues] using terminology as the world does, thereby bringing about the welfare of transmigrants.
Thus, you should know that:

- Although [veilings] are divided into the real and unreal relative to (la ltos te) conventional valid cognition, they are not divided into real and unreal in the perspective of (ngor) conventional valid cognition.a
- Although veiling phenomena are posited as unreal relative to a rational consciousness, they are not also posited as unreal in the perspective of a rational consciousness.b

When it is understood this way, even the two statements:

1. the statement in Tsong-kha-pa’s Small Exposition of the Stages of the Pathc that [objects] are posited as real and unreal

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a ths nyad pa'i thsPad ma la ltos te yang log gnyis su 'byed kyang ths nyad pa'i thsPad ma'i ngor yang log gnyis su mi 'byed; 192.6.
b kun rdzob pa'i chos nams rigs shes la ltos te log par 'jog kyang rigs shes kyi ngor log par 'jog pa min; 192.7.
c The passage being paraphrased in Tsong-kha-pa’s Short Stages of the Path (also called the Medium Stages of the Path) but with more context is:

The Consequentialist system:
- posits the six consciousnesses not polluted by superficial causes of mistake and the six objects apprehended by those consciousnesses as real conventionalities, and
- posits the six consciousnesses polluted by superficial causes of mistake and
veilings upon reliance (los nas) on just worldly, or conventional, valid cognition, and

2. the statement in Khay-drub’s Great Compilation: Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate:

It is utterly not that the division into the two, real and unreal, is made by worldly conventional valid cognition because the proposition—upon having asserted the fact of establishment by valid cognition—that “[The division into the two, real and unreal.] is not asserted in our own system is to cause the understanding that it has passed beyond the mode of the proponents of reasoning.”

will be known as noncontradictory.

the six objects apprehended by those consciousnesses as unreal conventionalities, but

• posits real and unreal conventionalities upon reliance (los nas) on just worldly, or conventional, valid cognition, not relative (los te) to a rational consciousness following a Superior’s perception.*

Therefore, since in the Middle Way’s own system the two appearances—of (1) reflections, and so forth, and (2) blue, and so forth—to those who possess ignorance do not differ with respect to whether [consciousnesses of them] are mistaken or not relative (los te) to their appearing object, they do not make a division into the two—real and unreal conventionalities.

*See Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition on Wisdom, 229-230, for more on this point, starting from “Objection.”
Therefore, although “real” in “real veilings are not asserted in the Middle Way’s own system” and “real” in “they assert a distinction of real and unreal relative to worldly consciousnesses” are similar in name, they are not at all similar in meaning because the former “real” is taken as establishment by way of the object’s own character, and the latter is taken as an object suitable to receive the convention “true” relative to ordinary worldly thought, just as, for example, the two in “some persons are coming, and some persons are not coming,” the some who are coming and the some who are not coming do not refer to one substratum.

Due to having to take the former “real” [that is, “real” in “real veilings are not asserted in the Middle Way’s own system”] as own-character [that is, establishment by way of the object’s own character], there arises the difference that on this occasion [of the Consequence School] real veilings are not asserted, and the Autonomists do assert them because the Foremost Great Being [Tsong-kha-pa] asserts that “upon reliance on Superiors’ perception (’phags pa ’i gzigs pa la llos nas), “upon reliance on rational consciousness” (rigs shes la llos nas), and “the Middle Ways’ own system on this occasion” (skabs ’di’i dbu ma rang lugs) are similar in meaning, and there is a difference between the two, the Consequence School and the Autonomy School, in that the Consequence School asserts that a rational consciousness damages establishment by way of its own character whereas the Autonomy School asserts that it does not.
The meaning of the latter “real” [that is, “real” in “they assert a distinction of real and unreal relative to worldly consciousnesses”] must be taken as before [that is, as an object suitable to receive the convention “true” relative to ordinary worldly thought] but not taken as establishment by way of the object’s own character because:
• in Tsong-kha-pa’s Short [also called Medium] Stages of the Path [objects] are said to be posited as real and unreal upon reliance (ltos nas) on conventional valid cognition, and

• in his Great Stages of the Path it is said that although sense consciousnesses to which forms and so forth and reflections and so forth appear are alike in being mistaken with respect to their appearing objects [in that their objects falsely appear to be inherently existent], from the approach of whether in the perspective of a worldly consciousness the object concordant with the appearance exists or does not exist, [those are posited] as real and unreal veilings, and

• in his Explanation of (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle”: Ocean of Reasoning also says that [objects] are posited as real and unreal from the approach of whether there does not exist or does exist damage by a worldly consciousness with respect to existing as the object in accordance with its appearance

and because in Chandrakīrti’s Commentary on (Nāgārjuna’s) “Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning” it is explained that conceptions as the four, permanent and so forth, are wrong and as the four, impermanent and so forth, are right, and because this is understood also by the statement in the Buddhapālita Commentary of the answer to the debate over what is true and not true about the images of gods.
Since “the true” on this occasion is taken as a meaning [or object] suitable to receive the convention “true” upon reliance (litos nas) on only the perspective of conventional consciousness without reliance on a rational consciousness but is not taken as true establishment, the consciousness explicitly indicated by the former “world” [in Chandrakīrti’s Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle” VI.25c, “Are true [or real] just from the world”] also is taken as a conventional valid cognition but is not taken as a [consciousness] apprehending true establishment. Otherwise, there would no purpose in [Chandrakīrti’s] singling out objects apprehended by the six operative consciousnesses not damaged by superficial causes of mistake because even reflections and so forth that are perceived as objects by sense consciousnesses polluted by

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a Chandrakīrti’s Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle” (VI.25):
Objects realized by the world that are apprehended
By [the consciousnesses of] the six sense powers undamaged [by superficial causes of mistake]
Are true [or real] just from the world.
The rest [that is, those apprehended by sense consciousnesses damaged by superficial causes of mistake such as reflections, echoes, and so forth] are posited as unreal from just the world [that is, relative to the world].
superficial causes of mistake are true in the perspective of con-
sciousnesses apprehending them as true [that is, as truly estab-
lished], because of being veil truths.

Since “Are true [or real] just from the world,” (Supplement,
VI.25c, ’jig rten nyid las bden yin) means “Forms and so forth
receive the convention ‘true’ upon reliance on a worldly con-
sciousness,” but utterly does not mean “Forms and so forth are
true in the perspective of a worldly consciousness,” you should
know that although:

- it is not necessary to posit [a consciousness] apprehending
  true existence as the worldly consciousness explicitly indi-
cated by the former “world,” and
- the consciousness in the perspective of which (gang gi ngor)
  forms and so forth are posited as real is necessarily a con-
sciousness apprehending true existence,

there is not the slightest contradiction that a conventional valid
cognition is posited as the consciousness relative to which (gang
la llos te) forms and so forth are suitable to receive the convention
“true.”

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a dbu ma pa, ga, 194.4.
About this, someone says: It follows that positing a conventional valid cognition as the worldly consciousness explicitly indicated by [Chandrakīrti’s Supplement to Nāgārjuna’s] “Treatise on the Middle” VI.25c “Are true [or real] just from the world” is not logically feasible:

- because Jam-yang-shay-pa’s [Middle Way] textbook says¹ that the six operative consciousnesses not polluted by superficial causes of mistake are not consciousnesses explicitly indicated by the former “world” [that is, the “world” in Chandrakīrti’s Supplement to Nāgārjuna’s] “Treatise on the Middle” (VI.25c) “Are true (or real) just from the world” and
- because [Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Middle Way textbook] says

¹ As worded, Ngag-wang-pal-dan finds these three statements to contain severe problems as he will explain in detail, but afterwards, he posits Jam-yang-shay-pa’s thought such that these three can be taken in another way to make them acceptable.
that the two, an inference realizing the coarse selflessness and an inference realizing the coarse apprehension of self as a mistaken consciousness, are not consciousnesses explicitly indicated by the former “world” [that is, the “world” in Chandrakīrti’s *Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s)* “Treatise on the Middle” (VI.25c) “Are true (or real) just from the world”] and

• because [Jam-yang-shay-pa’s *Middle Way* textbook] says that whatever is a consciousness explicitly indicated by the former “world” [that is, the “world” in Chandrakīrti’s *Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s)* “Treatise on the Middle” (VI.25c) “Are true (or real) just from the world”] necessarily is a usual worldly consciousness.

*Our response:* Well then, it [absurdly] follows that the subjects, forms and so forth, are not real relying (*ltos pa’i yang dag*) on the perspective of a worldly consciousness because Jam-yang-shay-pa’s *[Middle Way]* textbook says:

*Someone says:* It follows that the five objects, forms and so
forth, are real in relation (ltos pa'i yang dag)⁸ to the perspective a worldly consciousness because those five are real in relation to the worldly perspective explicitly indicated in [Chandrakīrti’s Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle” (VI.25c)] “Are true [or real] just from the world].”

[Our (Jam-yang-shay-pa’s) Response: That those five are real in relation to the worldly perspective explicitly indicated in “Are true (or real) just from the world],” does not at all entail [that the five objects, forms and so forth, are real in relation to the perspective a worldly consciousness].

You have asserted [that Jam-yang-shay-pa’s saying this] entails [that forms and so forth, are not real relying on the perspective of a worldly consciousness]. If you accept [that forms and so forth are not real relying on the perspective of a worldly consciousness], it [absurdly] follows that real relying on the perspective of a worldly consciousness does not exist because you have accepted [that forms and so forth are not real relying on the perspective of a worldly consciousness]. If you accept [that real relying on the perspective of a worldly consciousness does not exist], it [absurdly] follows that whatever is a veil truth is necessarily an unreal veiling relying on the perspective of a worldly consciousness because you have accepted [that real relying on the perspective of a worldly consciousness does not exist]. If you accept [that whatever is a veil truth is necessarily an unreal veiling relying on the perspective of a worldly consciousness], it very absurdly follows that the explanations in Chandrakīrti’s Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle” and his Autocommentary and in Tsong-kha-pa’s two Great Expositions on Nāgārjuna’s Fundamental Treatise on the Middle, Called “Wisdom” and on Chandrakīrti’s Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle” are not logically feasible!

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⁸ I find no significance in the switch from ltos pa’i yang dag to ltos pa’i yang dag.

⁹ Jam-yang-shay-pa holds that in general the worldly perspective is the perspective of conventional valid cognition, but since in the context of Chandrakīrti’s statement some objects are true for just the world, the worldly perspective is the perspective of ignorance.
Furthermore, it [absurdly] follows that the two, a fully qualified horse and a horse in a magician’s illusion, have no difference of being true or false relative to the perspective of a worldly consciousness, and it [absurdly] follows that the two, a consciousness...
apprehending water as water and a consciousness apprehending
an illusion as water, have no difference of being erroneous and
nonerroneous because [according to you] real relying on the per-
spective of a worldly consciousness does not exist. You have as-
serted the reason [which is that real relying on the perspective of
a worldly consciousness does not exist].

Therefore, the statements in [Jam-yang-shay-pa’s *Middle Way*

- that the consciousnesses of the six undamaged sense powers
  are not consciousnesses explicitly indicated by the former
  “world” [that is, the “world” in Chandrakīrti’s *Supplement to
  (Nāgārjuna’s)* “Treatise on the Middle” (VI.25c) “Are true
  (or real) just from the world”], and so forth, and
- that a consciousness explicitly indicated by the former
  “world” necessarily is a usual worldly consciousness

are in consideration of [a consciousness] apprehending true estab-
ishment since a worldly consciousness in the perspective of
which forms and so forth are posited as real must be [a conscious-
ness] apprehending true establishment, because [Jam-yang-shay-
pa’s *Middle Way*] textbook says:

because (1) it is stated and established in Tsong-kha-pa’s
*Stages of the Path* and all of his *Expositions* [his *Illumination
of the Thought* and *Ocean of Reasoning*] that the worldly con-
sciousnesses on this occasion in the perspective of which
forms and so forth are posited as real must be usual worldly nonvalid consciousnesses, and (2) the consciousnesses in the perspective of which magical illusions and so forth are posited as unreal are necessarily valid cognitions, those valid cognitions having two [types], usual innate awarenesses and inferential valid cognitions which are not [usual innate awarenesses],

and because [Jam-yang-shay-pa’s *Middle Way* textbook] says that the worldly consciousness in the perspective of which [forms and so forth] are posited as real is [a consciousness] apprehending true establishment.

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*a* The passages to which Jam-yang-shay-pa apparently refers include the following. The *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path* (838.4), states “The nonmistakenness [of sense consciousnesses] is posited in relation to usual worldly consciousnesses; Proponents of the Middle Way do not assert [that sense consciousnesses] are nonmistaken.” Also, the *Illumination of the Thought* (201.3–4) and the *Ocean of Reasoning* (409.7–9) both say, “The positing of a conventional object—apprehended by [any of] the six consciousnesses that are without [superficial] damage—as real…is done in relation only to worldly consciousnesses.” Other passages specifying that something is real in relation to usual worldly thought refer not to forms and so forth, but to various nonexistents such as the Sāṃkhyas’ prakṛti and an inherently existent self.
Furthermore, it follows that it is not logically feasible to take the meaning of “Are true (or real) just from the world” [in Chandrakīrti’s Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle’ (VI.25c)] as “true for the perspective of a consciousness apprehending them as truly established” because [“Are true (or real) just from the world”] means that “the objects apprehended by the six operative consciousnesses not polluted by superficial causes of mistake are true relative to the worldly perspective.” It follows [that the meaning of “Are true (or real) just from the world” is that “the objects apprehended by the six operative consciousnesses not polluted by superficial causes of mistake are true relative to the worldly perspective,”] because those [objects apprehended by the six operative consciousnesses not polluted by superficial causes of mistake] are both (1) true relative to worldly or conventional valid cognition and (2) not true [that is, not truly established] relative to a rational consciousness, because Chandrakīrti’s Autocommentary on the “Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle’” says:

> Those objects realized by the world that are apprehended by the six sense powers without the conditions of damage to the sense powers explained earlier are true [or real] from just the world but are not upon reliance on a superior.

and because “superior” (ārya, ‘phags pa) is said in Tsong-kha-

\[a\] La Vallée Poussin, Madhyamakāvatāra, 105.1.
pa’s Exposition [his *Illumination of the Thought of (Chandrkīrti’s) “Supplement”] to be taken as “rational consciousness,”a [and] because Tsong-kha-pa’s *Small Exposition of the Stages of the Path* says:

The Consequentialist system:

- posits the six consciousnesses not polluted by superficial causes of mistake and the six objects apprehended by those consciousnesses as real conventionalities, and
- posits the six consciousnesses polluted by superficial causes of mistake and the six objects apprehended by those consciousnesses as unreal conventionalities, but
- posits real and unreal conventionalities upon reliance (*litos nas*) on just worldly, or conventional, valid cognition, not

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a Tsong-kha-pa’s *Illumination* in commentary on VI.25 says:

Objects realized by the world that are apprehended by the consciousnesses of the six sense powers undamaged by superficial causes of mistake are true, that is, real, from just—that is to say, only—the world; however, it is not that those objects are posited as true and real upon reliance on a superior. “Superior” and “Middle Way system” have similar meanings here. The rest—that is to say, reflections and so forth—which appear as objects when sense powers are damaged are posited as being unreal in relation to just the world. The word “just” indicates that to posit those consciousnesses as mistaken just a conventional valid cognition is sufficient; such does not rely on a rational consciousness [realizing emptiness].

See also the discussion of multiple meanings of “superior” (*ārya, ’phags pa*) above, 142.
upon reliance (ltos nas)\(^a\) on a rational consciousness following a Superior’s perception.\(^b\)

[That these texts say this] entails [that those objects apprehended by the six operative consciousnesses not polluted by superficial causes of mistake are both (1) true relative to worldly or conventional valid cognition and (2) not true (that is, not truly established) relative to a rational consciousness] because [Tsong-kha-pa] says that both real and unreal are posited in reliance on worldly, or conventional, valid cognition but did not say “The real is posited by [a consciousness] apprehending true establishment and the unreal is posited by a conventional valid cognition.

\[^{a}\text{Hopkins, Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition on Wisdom, 229, reads “relative (ltos te) to a rational consciousness”; the two readings are not an issue.}\]

\[^{b}\text{See Hopkins, Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition on Wisdom, 229-230, for more on this point, starting from “Objection.”}\]
Furthermore, on this occasion that forms and so forth are real and reflections and so forth are unreal is posited upon reliance on only worldly consciousness but not posited upon reliance on a rational
consciousness and not posited upon reliance on a [consciousness] apprehending true establishment because those two are posited upon reliance on only worldly consciousness, for one, and are not posited upon reliance on a [consciousness] apprehending true establishment. The first [part of the reason which that forms and so forth are real and reflections and so forth are unreal are posited upon reliance on only worldly consciousness] is established because Tsong-kha-pa’s Exposition [his Illumination of the Thought of (Chandrakīrti’s) “Supplement”] says:

The positing of veiling objects apprehended by consciousnesses without such damage as real and the positing of the opposite objects as unreal is upon reliance on only worldly consciousnesses because their existing as objects in accordance with how they appear does not have damage worldly consciousnesses and does have damage by worldly consciousnesses [respectively] and Tsong-kha-pa’s Exposition of (Nāgārjuna’s) “Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called ‘Wisdom’” speaks similarly about this and because except for dividing into the two, real and unreal, in reliance (llos nas) on the perspective of worldly consciousnesses, not even a mere syllable of a division into the two, real and unreal, in the perspective (ngor) of worldly consciousnesses occurs in the text of the great Foremost Being [Tsong-kha-pa]. Although Khay-drub’s Great Compilation: Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate says there is a division of the two, real and unreal, in the perspective (ngor) of worldly consciousnesses, this is explaining as a branch of analytic decision making, “If real and unreal are posited in the perspective (ngor) of worldly consciousnesses, they are posited this way,” but that the meaning of the two, real and unreal, in reliance (llos nas) on the perspective of worldly consciousnesses on this occasion is not such is very clear if one looks at Tsong-kha-pa’s two Great Expositions on Nāgārjuna’s Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called “Wisdom” and on Chandrakīrti’s Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle” and on his Great and Short Expositions of the Stages of the Path and so forth.
ཁོ་ན་ལ་Ȩོས་ནས་འཇོག་པ་ཡིན་གྱི་རིགས་ཤེས་ལ་Ȩོས་ནས་འཇོག་པ་མིན་ཞིང་བདེན་འཛིན་ལ་Ȩོས་ནས་འཇོག་པ་མིན་ཏེ།

དེ་གཉིས་འཇིག་Ȧེན་པའི་ཤེས་པ་ཁོ་ན་ལ་Ȩོས་ནས་འཇོག་པ་གང་ཞིག

རིགས་ཤེས་དང་བདེན་འཛིན་ལ་Ȩོས་ནས་འཇོག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ɉིར།

གོགས་སོགས་ཡང་དག་དང་གོགས་བȟན་སོགས་ལོག་པ་ནི་འཇིག་Ȧེན་པའི་ཤེས་པ་ཁོ་ན་ལ་Ȩོས་ནས་འཇོག་པ་དང་པོ་ǿབ་Ȫེ།

འșག་པའི་ȷམ་བཤད་ལས།

dེ་Ȩ་ɍའི་གནོད་པ་མེད་པའི་ཤེས་པ་vêག་གིས་གɶང་བའི་ཀུན་ɲོབ་པའི་དོན་དང༌།

དེ་ལས་བɷོག་པའི་དོན་ལ་ཡང་དག་དང་ལོག་པར་འཇོག་པ་ནི་འཇིག་Ȧེན་པའི་ཤེས་ངོ་ལ་Ȩོས་ནས་ཡང་ལོག་གཉིས་ར་ɉེ་བ་མ་གཏོགས་འཇིག་Ȧེན་ཤེས་ངོར་ཡང་ལོག་གཉིས་ཀྱི་དɎེ་བ་ཡོད་པར་གʀངས་ཀྱང༌།

དེ་ནི་མཐའ་གཅོད་པའི་ཡན་ལག་ȣ་འཇིག་Ȧེན་ཤེས་ངོར་ཡང་ལོག་འཇོག་ན་འདི་Ȩར་འཇོག་ཅེས་བཤད་པ་ཡིན་
The second root reason [which is that forms and so forth are real and reflections and so forth are unreal is not posited upon reliance on a rational consciousness and on a (consciousness) apprehending true establishment] is established because the two, real and unreal on this occasion, are not posited upon reliance on a rational consciousness, for one, and are not posited upon reliance on a (consciousness) apprehending true establishment. The first [part of the reason which is that the two, real and unreal on this occasion, are not posited upon reliance on a rational consciousness] is established because both of Tsong-kha-pa’s Expositions on Nāgārjuna’s Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called “Wisdom” and on Chandrakīrti’s Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle” say:

They do not exist as the two, real and unreal, upon reliance on Superiors because just as reflections and so forth do not exist as objects in accordance with how they appear, so although blue and so forth appear to be established by way of their own character to those who possess ignorance, they do not exist as objects in accordance with how they appear. Therefore, these two consciousnesses [that is, a consciousness of a reflection and a consciousness to which blue appears to be established by way of its own character] are not divisible even in terms of being mistaken or not mistaken [since both are mistaken with respect to their appearing objects].

The second [part of the reason which is that the two, real and unreal on this occasion, are not posited upon reliance on a (consciousness) apprehending true establishment] is established because if the two, real and unreal on this occasion, were posited upon reliance on a (consciousness) apprehending true establishment, the statement in Tsong-kha-pa’s Small Exposition of the Stages of the Path that they are posited upon reliance on conventional valid cognitions would not be logically feasible and because
it would not be possible that all relative to the perspective (ngo la llos te) of a (consciousness) apprehending true establishment are unreal.

Great Exposition of Tenets: Two Truths, Sections 1-5

...
Also, someone says: It follows that real veilings relative to the perspective of a worldly consciousness (jig rten shes nga la lhos te) do not exist because Khay-drub Ge-leg-pal-sang’s Great Compilation: Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate says:

The glorious Chandrakīrti says that “A division into the two, real and unreal, in the perspective of a worldly consciousness (jig rten pa’i shes nga na) exists,” but nowhere does he say that a division into the two, real veilings and unreal veilings in the perspective of a worldly consciousness (jig rten pa’i shes nga na) exists. My lama [Tsong-kha-pa] also does not explain [such a division], and it is utterly unsuitable to assert [such a division] because objects of usual worldly awarenesses—pillars, pots, and so forth—are not veilings, and because it would be very absurd to posit something as a falsity upon reliance on the perspective (ngo la lhos nas) of the awareness in whose perspective it is posited as truly established.

Our response: [That Khay-drub says this] does not entail [that real
veilings relative to the perspective of a worldly consciousness (jig rten shes ngo la ltos te) do not exist] because this means that real veilings for the perspective of a [consciousness] apprehending true establishment do not exist. It follows [that this means that real veilings for the perspective of a (consciousness) apprehending true establishment do not exist] because the meaning of “real of the perspective of a worldly consciousness” (jig rten shes ngo’i yang dag) in Khay-drub’s Great Compilation is taken as “real for the perspective of a [consciousness] apprehending true establishment” and because it has already been explained that this is not the meaning of “real of the perspective of a worldly consciousness” on this occasion. Because if those passages in Khay-drub’s Great Compilation did describe the “real of the perspective of a worldly consciousness” on this occasion, there would be the unreasonableness of the omniscient Khay-drub’s saying that the Foremost Lama [Tsong-kha-pa] does not assert “real of the perspective of a worldly consciousness” and because it would [absurdly] follow that the Foremost Khay-drub had not seen [Tsong-kha-pa’s] Great and Small Exposition of the Stages of the Path.
Furthermore, the assertion the two, real and unreal on this occasion, are posited by usual worldly awarenesses also is not logically feasible because Tsong-kha-pa’s Explanation of (Chandrakīrti’s) Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle” says:

Since a usual worldly awareness does not realize that objects—apprehended wrongly due to the intellect having damage by bad tenets—are erroneous, how are they posited as unreal from just the world [as Chandrakīrti says]? Here the damage that is analyzed as to whether or not there is damage is not taken to be damage by innate erroneous apprehension; therefore, those that are imputed by bad tenets [and are realized to be wrong by a worldly consciousness do not include the inherent existence that is innately misapprehended but] are the principal⁰ and so forth, which are wrongly imputed only by those whose awarenesses have been affected by tenets. Although those are not realized to be erroneous by a usual worldly awareness, they are realized to be wrong by conventional valid cognition that is not directed toward suchness, in which case they are realized to be wrong by a worldly consciousness.

⁰ gtsō bo, pradhāna; also called the fundamental nature (rang bzhin, prakṛti) in the Śaṅkhyā system.
Furthermore, you need to know the distinctions that:

- Although an eye consciousness apprehending a form is mistaken for the perspective of a conventional consciousness (tha snyad pa’i shes pa’i ngor ’khrul ba), it is not mistaken relative to a conventional consciousness (tha snyad pa’i shes pa la ltos te ’khrul ba).

- Although an eye consciousness apprehending a form is mistaken relative to a rational consciousness (rigs shes la ltos te ’khrul ba), it is not mistaken for the perspective of a rational consciousness (rigs shes kyi ngor ’khrul ba).

because Tsong-kha-pa’s Stages of the Path says:

To sense consciousnesses forms, sounds, and so forth appear as established by way of their own character, but establishment by way of their own character in accordance with [such] appearance does not exist even in conventional terms; therefore, this master [Chandrakīrti] asserts that these [consciousnesses] are mistaken even in conventional terms. Nevertheless, there is no infeasibility for sense consciousnesses to be valid cognitions positing [that is, certifying] objects such a forms, sounds, and so forth in conventional terms; for, the nonexistence of objects established by way of their own char-

\[ dbu ma pa, ga, 198.7. \]
acter in accordance with [such] appearance, which is the evidence positing those [consciousnesses] as mistaken, is established by a rational consciousness analyzing whether inherent existence exists or does not exist, but is utterly not established by a conventional valid cognition, whereby [objects such as forms, sounds, and so forth] are not mistaken relative to a conventional consciousness (thā nyad pa’i shes pa la bltos te ‘khrul ba). Concerning consciousnesses to which two moons appear and to which reflections and so forth appear, since the objects in accordance with the appearances—the two moons, the face, and so forth—are established as nonexistent by just conventional valid cognition without reliance on a rational consciousness, the division of unreal and real veilings are also feasible for these and the former [objects such as forms, sounds, and so forth].

གཞན་ཡང༌། གཞགས་འཛིན་མིག་ཤེས་དེ་ཐ་ȡད་པའི་ཤེས་པའི་ངོར་འǺལ་བ་ཡིན་ཀྱང་ཐ་ȡད་པའི་ཤེས་པ་ལ་Ȩོས་ཏེ་འǺལ་བ་མ་ཡིན་པ་དང༌།

དེ་རིགས་ཤེས་ལ་Ȩོས་ཏེ་འǺལ་བ་ཡིན་ཀྱང་རིགས་ཤེས་ཀྱི་ངོར་འǺལ་བ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཁྱད་པར་ȷམས་ཤེས་དགོས་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ།

ལམ་རིམ་ལས། དབང་པོའི་ཤེས་པ་ལ་གཞགས་Ȍ་སོགས་རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ȇབ་པར་ȷང་ལ་ȷང་བ་Ȩར་གྱི་རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ȇབ་པའི་དོན་མེད་པ་ནི་ȷང་བཞིན་ཡོད་མེད་
About this, someone says: It follows that [an eye consciousness apprehending a form] is not mistaken for the perspective of a conventional consciousness (tha snyad pa’i shes pa’i ngor ’khrul ba) because of being a correct object-possession on this occasion for the perspective of a conventional consciousness (tha snyad pa’i shes pa’i ngor skabs ’di’i yul can yang dag).

Our response: [That (an eye consciousness apprehending a form) is a correct object-possession on this occasion for the perspective of a conventional consciousness] does not entail [that an eye consciousness apprehending a form] is not mistaken for the perspective of a conventional consciousness because there is no fallacy since the conventional consciousness for the perspective of awareness in which an eye consciousness apprehending a form is posited as mistaken, and the conventional consciousness for the

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a _dbu ma pa, ga_, 199.4.
perspective of awareness in which an eye consciousness apprehending a form is posited as an unmistakable object-possessor on this occasion are separate. It follows [that the conventional consciousness for the perspective of awareness in which an eye consciousness apprehending a form is posited as mistaken, and the conventional consciousness for the perspective of awareness in which an eye consciousness apprehending a form is posited as an unmistakable object-possessor on this occasion are separate] because a conventional valid cognition realizing that an eye consciousness apprehending a form is mistaken [with regard to its appearing-object since the object appears to inherently exist] and a conventional valid cognition realizing that an eye consciousness apprehending a form is a real [that is, correct] object-possessor [in that it apprehends the form correctly] are not equivalent, and the factor proven by the one is also not refuted by the other.a

For example, it is like the fact that when it is said, “Some people are here, and some people are not here,” then since the two, the some who are and the some who are not, are not posited about one substratum, the mention of the one does not damage the other. For, in this way, Tsong-kha-pa’s Stages of the Path says:

**Objection:** If [something] is erroneous relative to conventional consciousness, it is contradictory for it to be mistaken in conventional terms.

**Our response:** If the two, the convention that is the context of being mistaken in conventional terms and the conventional consciousness that is the consciousness upon reliance on which [something] is posited as erroneous, were one, it would be contradictory, but those two are separate; hence, where is the contradiction! It is as follows: The reasoned refutation of nature in the sense of establishment by way of [the object’s] own entity with respect to forms and so forth is not suitable ultimately, whereby it must be done in conventional terms; since for the perspective of such a conventional consciousness, sense consciousnesses are mistaken, but for the perspective of other usual conventional consciousnesses [sense consciousnesses] are not mistaken, it is not contradictory; it is like, for example, in the conventions of the world when it is said, “Some people are here, and some people are not here,” although the word “some” is the same, the two, the some who are and the some who are not, are not posited as having the same meaning.
5. Individual Divisions

About this, someone says: It follows that the subjects, the five objects—forms and so forth—and the five sense consciousnesses, are unreal veilings because there exist reasons for not asserting them as real veilings and they must be posited as unreal veilings upon reliance on a rational consciousness.
Our response: [That there exist reasons for not asserting the five objects—forms and so forth—and the five sense consciousnesses as real veilings and they must be posited as unreal veilings upon reliance on a rational consciousness] does not entail [that the five objects—forms and so forth—and the five sense consciousnesses are unreal veilings] because Tsong-kha-pa’s *Explanation of (Chandrakīrti’s) Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle”* says:

**Objection:** Since you do not assert real veilings, you do not divide [veilings] into real and unreal, but why do you not posit objects and subjects polluted by ignorance as unreal veilings?

**Answer:** It is because veilings must be posited by conventional valid cognition, and therefore even if [objects and subjects polluted by ignorance] were to be posited [as] unreal conventionalities, [such] would have to be posited upon reliance on those [conventional valid cognitions, but objects and subjects] polluted by the predispositions of ignorance are not established by conventional valid cognitions to be mistaken.
བོད་ཡིག་པར་ཟིན་གཉིས་དབཤིག་
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   rgyud gzhan grub pa zhes bya ba'i rab tu byed pa
   P5716, vol. 130
Dignāga (phyogs kyi glangs po, sixth century)

Compilation of Prime Cognition
   pramāṇasamuccaya
   tshad ma kun las btus pa
   P5700, vol. 130
Examination of Objects of Observation
ālambanaparīkṣa
dmigs pa brtag pa
P5703, vol. 130

Summary Meanings of the Eight Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra
prajñāpāramitāpiṇḍārtha / prajñāpāramitāśāṃkrahakārikā
brgyad stong don bsdu / shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin ma bsdu pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa
P5207, vol. 94

Tsong-kha-pa Lo-sang-drak-pa (tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa, 1357-1419)
Explanation of (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle": Ocean of Reasoning / Great Commentary on (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle"
dbu ma ra'i tshig le'ur byas pa shes rab ces bya ba'i mam bshad rigs pa'i rgya mtsho / rtsa shes tīk chen

Extensive Commentary on the Difficult Points of the Mind-Basis-of-All and Afflicted Intellect: Ocean of Eloquence: Ocean of Eloquence
yid dang kun gzhi'i dka' ba'i gnas rgya cher 'grel pa legs par bshad pa'i rgya mtsho

Extensive Explanation of (Chandrakīrti's) "Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle'": Illumination of the Thought
dbu ma la 'jug pa'i rgya cher bshad pa dgyungs pa rab gsal

Golden Garland of Eloquence / Extensive Explanation of (Maitreya's) "Ornament for the Clear Realizations, Treatise of Quintessential Instructions on the Perfection of Wisdom" as Well as Its Commentaries: Golden Rosary of Eloquence
legs bshad gser 'phreng / shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rjigs pa'i rgyan 'grel pa dang bcas pa'i rgya cher bshad pa legs bshad gser gyi phreng ba

Great Exposition of Secret Mantra / The Stages of the Path to a Victor and Pervasive Master, a Great Vajradhara: Revealing All Secret Topics
snags rim chen mo / rgyal ba khyab bdag rdzogs pa'i lam gyi rim pa gsang ba kun gyi gnad mam par phyie ba

Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path / Stages of the Path to Enlightenment Thoroughly Teaching All the Stages of Practice of the Three Types of Beings
lam rim chen mo / skyes bu gsum gyi nyams su blang ba’i rim pa thams cad tshang bar ston pa’i byang chub lam gyi rim pa


*Introduction to the Seven Treatises on Prime Cognition: Clearing Away the Mental Darkness of Seekers*

sde bdun la ’jug pa’i sgo don gnyer yid kyi mun sel

*Medium-Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path / Small Exposition of the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment*
lam rim ’bring / lam rim chung ngu / skyes bu gsum gyi nyams su blang ba’i byang chub lam gyi rim pa


English translation of the section on special insight: Jeffrey Hopkins. “Special Insight: From Tsong-kha-pa’s Middling Exposition of the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment Practiced by Persons of Three Capacities, with supplementary headings by Trijang Rinbochay.” Unpublished manuscript.

*Praise of Dependent-Arising / Praise of the Supramundane Victor Buddha from the Approach of His Teaching the Profound Dependent-Arising: The Essence of Eloquence*

rten ’brel bstod pa / sang rgyas bcom ldan ’das la zab mo rten cing ’brel bar ’byung ba gsung ba’i sgo nas bstod pa legs par bshad pa’i snying po


*Treatise Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive: The Essence of Eloquence*
drang ba dang nges pa’i don rnam par phybe ba’i bstan bcos legs bshad snying po


Gen-dün-drub, First Dalai Lama (dge-'dun grub, 1391-1474)

*Commentary on [Ganaprapaha’s] “Aphorisms on Discipline” / Essence of the Entire Discipline, Eloquent Holy Doctrine*

legs par gsums pa’i dam chos ‘dul ba mtha’ dag gi snying po


*Explanation of [Vasubandhu’s] “Treasury of Manifest Knowledge”: Illuminating the Path to Liberation*

dam pa’ichos mngon pa’i mdzod kyi rmam par bshad pa thar lam gsal byed


*Great Treatise on Valid Cognition: Adornment of Reasoning*

tshad ma’i bstan bcos chen po rigs pa’i rgyan


Gom-day Nam-kha-gyal-tshan (sgom sde nam mkha’ ‘rgyal mtshan) (1532-1592)

*Ornament for the Thought of Chandrakirti, Ford for Those Seeking Liberation: An Explanation of (Chandrakirti’s) “Supplement”*

dbu ma la ’jug pa’i rmam bshad thar ‘dod ’jug ngogs zla ba’i dgongs rgyan section within dga’ ldnan byang rtsi’ dbu ma’i yig cha


*Settling Difficult Points in the Opposite of the Consequences: Key to (Chandrakirti’s) “Clear Words.” Written by Jam-pa-yang Gom-day Nam-kha-gyal-tshan*

thal bzlog gi dka’ ba’i gnas gtan la ’bebs pa’jam pa’i dbyang sgom sde nam mkha’ rgyal mtshan gyis mzdad pa’i tshig gsal gyi ide mig

in The Obligatory Texts (*Yig-cha*) for the Study of Madhyamika of Byes Grwa-tshan of Se-ra Monastery, Madhyamika Text Series, vol. 4


Kön-chog-jig-may-wang-po (dkon mchog ‘jigs med dbang po, 1728-1791)

*Precious Garland of Tenets / Presentation of Tenets: A Precious Garland*

grub pa’i mtha’i rmam par bzhag pa rin po che’i phreng ba


Presentation of the Grounds and Paths: Beautiful Ornament of the Three Vehicles


Gunaprabha (yon tan 'od)

Aphorisms on Discipline

vinayasūtra
dul ba ’i mdo
P5619, vol. 123

Gung-ru Chö-jung / Gung-ru Chö-kyi-jung-nay (gung ru chos ’byung / gung ru chos kyi ’byung gnas; fl. most likely in sixteenth century, since he refutes positions like those of Pan-chen Sö-nam-drak-pa and Jay-tsün Chö-kyi-gyal-tshan)


drang ba dang nges pa ’i rnam par ’byed pa legs bshad snying po zhes bya ba ’i mtha’ dpyod padma dkar po ’i phreng ba

sku bum, Tibet: sku bum Monastery, n.d. [blockprint obtained by the author in 1988].

Gung-thang Kön-chog-tan-pay-drön-may (gung thang dkon mchog bstan pa ’i sgron me, 1762-1823)


bstan bcos legs par bshad pa’i snying po las sms pm skor gyi mchan ’gre l rtsom ’pho rnam rig gzhung brgya’i snang ba


drang nges rnam ’byed kyi dka’ l rtsom ’phro legs bshad snying po’i yang snying


Gyal-tshab-dar-ma-rin-chen (rgyal tshab dar ma rin chen, 1364-1432)

Commentary on (Maitreya’s) “Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle” / Commentary on (Maitreya’s) “Treatise on the Later Scriptures of the Great Vehicle”

theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma ’i ltkka


Explanation of (Shántideva’s) “Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds”: Entrance of Victor Children

byang chub sms dpai sphyod pa la ’jug pa’i rnam bshad rgyal sras ’jug ngogs


How to Practice the Two Stages of the Path of the Glorious Kalachakra: Quick Entry to the Path of Great Bliss

dpal dus kyi ’khor lo’i lam rim pa gnyis ji lta nyams su len pa’i tshul bde ba chen po’i lam du myur du ’jug pa

Illumination of the Path to Liberation / Explanation of (Dharmakīrti’s) Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Prime Cognition”; Unerring Illumination of the Path to Liberation that lam gsal byed / tshad ma rnam ’grel gyi tshig le’ur byas pa’i rnam bshad thar lam phyin ci ma log par gsal bar byed pa


Haribhadra (seng ge bzang po, late eighth century) Clear Meaning Commentary / Commentary on (Maitreya’s) “Ornament for the Clear Realizations, Treatise of Quintessential Instructions on the Perfection of Wisdom” spuṭhārtha / abhisamayālaṃkārāṇamāmaprajñāpāramitopadeśaśāstravṛtti ’grel pa don gsal / shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa’i man ngag gi bstan bcos mgon par rtogs pa’i rgyan ces bya ba’i ’grel pa

P5191, vol. 90


Jam-yang-shay-pa Ngag-wang-tson-drü (’jam dbyangs bzhad pa’i rdo rje ngag dbang brtson gnyis, 1648-1721/1722) Decisive Analysis of (Maitreya’s) “Ornament for the Clear Realizations”: Precious Lamp Illuminating All the Topics of the Perfection of Wisdom bstan bcos mgon par rtogs pa’i rgyan gyi mtha’ dpyod shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa’i don kun gsal ba’i rin chen sgron me


Eloquent Presentation of the Eight Categories and Seventy Topics: Sacred Word of Guru Ajita dngos po brgyad don bdun cu’i rnam bzhag legs par bshad pa mi pham bla ma’i zhal lung Tibetan editions:


1999 Tōyō Bunko CD-ROM: “Tibetan texts of don bdun bcu’i of ’jam dbyangs bzhad pa and rigs lam ’phred gyi lde mig of dkon mchog bstan pa’i sgron me.” In the Toyo Bunko Database CD Release II. Tokyo, Japan: Tōyō Bunko, 1999. CD-ROM. (This edition is based on the 1999 Mundgod.)


2005 Mundgod: dngos po brgyad don bdun cu’i rnam gzhag legs par bshad pa mi pham bla

2011 TBRC bla brang: In gsung 'bum ('jam dbyangs bzhad pa) TBRC W22186.14:115-178
(PDF of bla brang bkra shis 'khyil: bla brang bkra shis 'khyil dgon, publishing date unknown).


Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive / Decisive Analysis of (Tsong-kha-pa’s) “Differentiating the Interpretible and the Definitive”: Storehouse of White Beryl of Scripture and Reasoning Free from Mistake, Fulfilling the Hopes of the Fortunate drang ba dang nges pa’i don mam par 'byod pa'i mtha' dpyod 'khrul bral lung rigs bai dūr dkar pa’i ngan mdzod skal bzang re ba kun skong
Tibetan digital reprint edition: TBRC W1KG21952.1 (PDF of sbag sa: nang bstan shes rig ‘dzin skyong slob gnyer khang, [1968]).


English translation of section two: William Magee. Questioning the Buddha About Contradictions in His Teachings. UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, uma-tibet.org.


Great Exposition of the Middle / Decisive Analysis of (Chandrakīrti’s) “Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle’”’s: Treasury of Scripture and Reasoning, Thoroughly Illuminating the Profound Meaning [of Emptiness], Entrance for the Fortunate dbu ma chen mo / dbu ma ‘jug pa’i mtha’ dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zab don kun gsal skal bzang ‘jug ngogs


Translation of the beginning of chapter six: Craig Preston, Meaning of “The Manifest,” Vessels...
Translation of part of chapter six: Jongbok Yi. The Opposite of Emptiness in the Middle Way Autonomy School: Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six.

Translation of part of chapter six: Jongbok Yi. The Opposite of Emptiness in the Middle Way Consequence School: Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six.

Great Exposition of Tenets / Explanation of Tenets: Sun of the Land of Samantabhadra Brilliantly Illuminating All of Our Own and Others’ Tenets and the Meaning of the Profound [Emptiness], Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning Fulfills All Hopes of All Beings grub mtha’ chen mo / grub mtha’i rnam bshad kun dang zab don mchog tu gsal ba kun brang zhi nig ni yi ma lung rigs rgya mtsho skye dgu’i re ba kun skong


Translation of the section of the distinctive tenets of the Consequence School: Daniel Cozort, Unique Tenets of the Middle Way Consequence School (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1998).


Illuminating a Little the Presentation of Awareness and Knowledge: Beautiful Golden Garland of Eloquence blo rig gi rnam bzhag nyung gsal gser gyi ’phreng mdzes


Illuminating a Little the Presentation of Signs and Reasonings: Beautiful Golden Garland of Eloquence rtags rigs kyi rnam bzhag nyung gsal gser gyi ’phreng mdzes

Tibetan digital reprint edition: In gsung ’bum (’jam dbyangs bzhad pa’i rdo rje). TBRC
Jig-may-dam-chö-gya-tsho (’jigs med dam chos rgya mtsho); poetic name Mi-pam-yang-jan-gye-pay-dor-je (mi pham dbyangs can dgyes [or dges] pa’i rdo rje; 1898-1946)

*Port of Entry / Treatise Distinguishing All the Meanings of (Tsong-kha-pa’s) “The Essence of Eloquence”: Illuminating the Differentiation of the Interpretable and the Definitive: Port of Entry to “The Essence of Eloquence”*

drang ba dang nges pa’i don mam par phyé ba gsal bar byed pa legs bshad snying po’i don mtha’ dag mam par ’byed pa’i bstan bcos legs bshad snying po’i ’jug ngogs


Jinendrabuddhi (rgyal dbang blo)

*Explanatory Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Prime Cognition”*

viśālāmalavatīnāmapramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā

yangs ba dang dri ma med pa dang ldan pa zhes bya ba tshad ma kun las btus pa’i ’grel bshad P5766, vol. 139; Tohoku, 4268

Jñānashrībhadra

*Commentary on the “Descent into Laṅkā Śūtra”*

’phags pa lang kar gshegs pa’i mdo āryalakāvatārvṛttī

P5519, vol. 107

Khay-drub-ge-leg-pal-sang (mkhas grub dge legs dpal, 1385-1438)

*Compilation on Emptiness / Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate: Treatise Brilliantly Clarifying the Profound Emptiness*

stong thun chen mo / zab mo stong pa nyid rab tu gsal bar byed pa’i bstan bcos skal bzang mig ’byed

Tibetan digital reprint edition: In dbu ma stong thun chen mo. TBRC W00EGS1016265:9-481


Tibetan digital reprint edition: In gsung ’bum (mkhas grub rje). TBRC W1KG10279.1:185-708

(PDF of bla brang par ma: bla brang bkra shis ’khyil, 1997).


*General Presentation of the Tantra Sets*

rgyud sde spyi mam / rgyud sde spyi mam lung rgyun


*Great Commentary on (Dharmakīrti’s) “Commentary on (Dignāga’s) ‘Compilation of Prime Cognition’” / Extensive Explanation of the Great Treatise (Dharmakīrti’s) “Commentary on (Dignāga’s) ‘Compilation of Prime Cognition’”*
viśālāmalavatī-nāma-pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā

rgyas pa’i bstan bcos tshad ma rnam ‘grel gi rgya cher bshad pa rigs pa’i rgya mtsho
[n.d., blockprint in library of HH the Dalai Lama]

Extensive Commentary on the Worldly Realm Chapter of (Kalāṇḍikā Puṇḍarīka’s) “Stainless Light”
dri med ‘od gyi dka’ gnas kyi zin bris rgyal ba tsong kha pa’i gsung bzhin mkhas grub rin po ches brjed byang du mzdad pa shin tu myed dka’ ba.
Tibetan digital reprint edition: In gsung ’bum (mkhas grub rje) TBRC W29195.4:765-918 (PDF of Dharamsala: Sherig Parkhang, 1997).

Ornament for the Set of Seven Valid Cognition Treatises Dispelling Mental Darkness / Ornament for the Seven Treatises
tshad ma sde bdun gyi rgyan yid kyi mun sel
Kön-chog-jig-may-wang-po (dkon mchog ’jigs med dbang po, 1728-1791)
Commentary on (Jang-kya Röl-pa-dor-je’s) “Song of the View” : Lamp for the Words
lta ba’i gsung mgur gyi ’grel pa tshig gi sgron me

Condensed Presentation of the Eight Categories and Seventy Topics
dngos brgyad don bdun cu’i rnam bzhaṅ bsdus pa
Tibetan digital reprint edition: In gsung ’bum (dkon mchog ’jigs med dbang po) TBRC W1KG9560.6:618-635 (PDF of New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1971)

Decisive Analysis of the Great Treatise, (Chandrakirtti’s) Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle” : Lamp of Scripture and Reasoning, Transmission of the Speech of the Omniscient Lama Jam-yang-shay-pay-dor-je
dbu ma la ’jug pa’i mthwa’ dpayod lung rigs sgron me zhes bya ba kun mkhyen bla ma ’jam dbyangs bzhad pa’i rdo rje’i gsung rgyun
In TBRC W4CZ57175.1 (PDF not available. Sarath Varanasi, India: [rgya gzhung slob dpon phun tshogs don grub], [2003]).

Precious Garland of Tenets / Presentation of Tenets: A Precious Garland
grub pa’i mthwa’ rnam par bzhag pa rin po che’i phreṅ ba
twenty-eight folios obtained in 1987 from Go-mang College in Lha-sa, printed on blocks that predate the Cultural Revolution.


Presentation of the Grounds and Paths: Beautiful Ornament of the Three Vehicles

sa lam gyi ma mben theg gsum mdzes rgyan


Thorough Expression of the Natures of the One Hundred Seventy-Three Aspects of the Three Exalted Knowers: White Lotus Vine of Eloquence

mkyi rgyan gsum gyi ma rnam pa brgya dang don gsum gyi rang bzhin yang dag par brjod pa legs bshad padma dkar po ’i khris shing


In gsung ‘bum (dkon mchog ’jigs med dbang po), TBRC W2122.6: 627-646 (PDF of bla brang bkra shis ’khyil, Tibet: bla brang dgon pa, 1999).


Long-chen-rap-jam (klong chen rab ’byams / klong chen dri med ’od zer, 1308-1363)

Precious Treasury of Tenets: Illuminating the Meaning of All Vehicles

mtha’ rtsa ba’i tshig ṭik shel dkar me long: in Three Commentaries on the grub mtha’ rtsa ba gdoṅ nga’i sgra dbyaṅs of ’jam dbyaṅs-bzad-pa’i rdo-rje nag-dbang-hrton-’grus

Delhi: Chophel Legden, 1978

Maitreya (byams pa)

Five Doctrines of Maitreya


māhāyānottaratantraśāstra

teg pa chen po rgyud bla ma’i bstan bcos


Peking eking 5525, vol. 108; sde dge 4024, Dharma vol. 77


2. Differentiation of Phenomena and Noumenon

dharmadharmatāvibhāga

chos dang chos nyid rnam par 'byed pa


Peking 5522, vol. 108.


3. Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes

madhyāntavibhāga

dbus dang mtha’ rnam par ’byed pa


Peking 5522, vol. 18; Dharma vol. 77.


4. Ornament for the Clear Realizations

abhisaṃyālāṃkāra/ abhisamayālāṃkāra-nāma-prajñāpāramitopadeśaśāstra-kārikā mngon par rtags pa’i rgyan/ shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa’i man ngug gi bstan bcos mngon par rtags pa’i rgyan shes bya ba’i tshig le’ur byas pa

Sanskrit editions:


English translations:


5. Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras

mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra
teh pa chen po’i mdo sde rgyan gyi tshig le’ur byas pa

Mi-pam-gya-tsho, Ju (mi pham rgya mtsho, ’ju, 1846-1912)
Annotations on (Maitreya’s) “Great Vehicle Treatise, The Sublime Continuum”: Sacred Word of Mi-pam

Nāgārjuna (klu sgrub, first to second century, C.E.)
Commentary on the “Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness”
sūnyatāsaptativṛtti
stong pa nyid bdun cu pa’i ’grel pa

Compendium of Sūtra
sūtrasamuccaya
mdo kun las btsus pa
Conquest Over Mistake
madhyamakabhramagāta
dbu ma 'khrul pa 'joms pa

Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment
bodhicittavivaraṇa
byang chub sems kyi 'grel pa

Praise of the Element of Attributes
dharmadhātustotra
chos kyi dbyings su bstod pa

Praise of the Inconceivable
acintyastāvā
bsam gis mi khyab par bstod pa

Praise of the Perfection of Wisdom (also attributed to Rāhulabhadra)
prajñāpāramitāstotra
shes rab kyipha rol tu phyin ma ’i bstod pa/nam par mi rtag par bstod pa

Praise of the Supramundane [Buddha]
lokātītastāvā
’jig rten las ’das par bstod pa

Tree of Wisdom / Treatise on Moral Conduct Cane of Wisdom
prajñādanda/nītiśāstraprajñādanda
lugs kyi bstan bcos shes rab sdong bu
Six Collections of Reasoning

1. Treatise on the Middle / Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called “Wisdom”
   madhyamakāśāstra / prajñānāmaṇḍūlaṃadhyamakārikā
dbu ma’i bstan bcos / dbu ma rtsa ba’i tshig le’ur byas pa shes rab ces bya ba
   (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa choe dhey, gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985).
   Peking 5224, vol. 95.
   Edited Sanskrit: J. W. de Jong. Nāgārjuna, Mūlamadhyamakārikāh. Madras, India: Adyar Li-
   brary and Research Centre, 1977; reprint, Wheaton, Ill.: Agents, Theosophical Publishing
   English translation: Frederick Streng. Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning. Nashville,
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   juna: The Philosophy of the Middle Way. Albany, N.Y.: State University Press of New York,

2. Refutation of Objections
   vigrāhavyāvartanikārīkā
   rtsod pa bzlog pa’i tshig le’ur byas pa
   Tibetan digital reprint edition: In bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 3828). TBRC W23703.96:55-59 (PDF of
   Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa choe dhey, gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985).
   Peking 5228, vol. 95
   Edited Tibetan and Sanskrit and English translation: Christian Lindtner. Master of Wisdom. Oak-
   English translation: K. Bhattacharya, E. H. Johnston, and A. Kunst. The Dialectical Method of
   English translation from the Chinese: G. Tucci. Pre-Dīnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chi-
   French translation: S. Yamaguchi. “Traité de Nāgārjuna pour écartier les vaines discussion

3. Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness
   sūnyatāsaptatikārīkā
d Wong pa nyid bdun cu pa’i tshig le’ur byas pa
   Tibetan digital reprint edition: In bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 3827). TBRC W23703.96:49-55 (PDF of
   Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa choe dhey, gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985).
   Peking 5227, vol. 95.
   English translation: David Ross Komito. Nāgārjuna’s “Seventy Stanzas” : A Buddhist Psychol-

4. Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning
   yuktisāttikārīkā
   rigs pa drug cu pa’i tshig le’ur byas pa
   Tibetan digital reprint edition: In bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 3825). TBRC W23703.96:42-46 (PDF of
   Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa choe dhey, gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985).
   Peking 5225, vol. 95.
   Edited Tibetan with Sanskrit fragments and English translation: Christian Lindtner. Master of
5. *Precious Garland of Advice for the King*

rājarājakathārātnāvallī

Peking 5658, vol. 129; Dharma vol. 93.


6. *Treatise Called the Finely Woven*

vaidalyasūtranāma

zhib mo mam par ’thag pa zhes bya ba’i mdo


Peking 5226, vol. 95


Ngag-wang-pal-dan (ngag dbang dpal ldan, b. 1797), also known as Pal-dan-chö-jay (dpal ldan chos rje)

Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-pa’s) “Great Exposition of Tenets”: Freeing the Knots of the Difficult Points, Precious Jewel of Clear Thought

grub mtha’ chen mo ’i mchan ‘grel dka’ gnad rnal ’gyal blo gsal gees nor


Explanation of (Maitreya’s) Treatise “Ornament for the Clear Realizations” from the Approach of the Meaning of the Words: Sacred Word of Maitreyanātha

bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa’i rgyan tshig don gyi sgo nas bshad pa byams mgon zhal lung
Bibliography


English translations:


Explanation of Veilings and the Ultimate in the Four Systems of Tenets

grub mtha’ “behi’i lugs kyi kun rdzob dang don dam pa’i don nram par bshad pa legs bshad dpyi kyi dpal mo’i glu dbyangs


Stating the Modes of Explanation in the Textbooks on the Middle Way and the Perfection of Wisdom in the Lo-sel-ling and Go-mang Colleges: Festival for Those of Clear Intelligence

blo gsal gling dang bkra shis sgo mang grwa tshang gi dbu phar gyi yig cha’i bshad tshul bkod pa blo gsal dga’ ston


Word Commentary on the Root Verses of (Jam-yang-shay-pa’s) ‘Great Exposition of Tenets’

tshig ’grel / grub mtha’ chen mo’i mchan ’grel gyi skabs skabs su mdrug pa’i rtsa ba’i tshig ’grel zur du bkod pa


grub mtha’ chen mo’i mchan ’grel dka’ gnad mdud grol blo gsal gces nor, Taipei Edition (see above), includes Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Word Commentary on the Root Verses.

Ngag-wang-lo-sang-gya-tsho (ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho, Fifth Dalai Lama, 1617-1682)

Instructions on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment: Sacred Word of Mañjushrī

byang chub lam gyi rim pa’i ’khrin yig ’jam pa’i dbyangs kyi zhal lung


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P5914

Prajñāvarman (shes rab go cha, pra dznyā wa rman)
**Commentary on (Udbhaṭasiddhavāmin’s) “Exalted Praise”**
viśeṣastavanāmamūlatantrānusāriṇīdvādaśasāhasrikālaghukālacakratantrarājṭīkā
khyad par du ’phags pa’i bstod pa’i rgya cher bshad pa
2002, vol. 46

**Puṇḍarīka, Kalkī (rigs ldan pad ma dkar po)**

**Great Commentary on the “Kālachakra Tantra”: Stainless Light**
vimālaprabhānāmūlatantrānusāriṇīdvādaśasāhasrikālaghukālacakratantrarājṭīkā
bsdus pa’i rgyud kyi rgyal po dus kyi ’khor lo’i ’grel bshad rtsa ba’i rgyud kyi rjes su ’jug pa stong phrag bcu gnyis pa dri ma med pa’i ’od ces bya ba
P2064, vol. 46


**Sarvarvarman**
Kālāpaśūtra
kalāpaśūtra
ka lā pa’i mdo
P5775, vol. 140

**Ser-shül Ge-shay Lo-sang-pün-tshog** (blo bzang phun tshogs, ser shul dge bshes; fl. in early twentieth century)

**Notes / Notes on (Tsong-kha-pa’s)** “Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive”: Lamp Illuminating the Profound Meaning
drang nges mam ’byed kyi zin bris zab don gsal ba’i sgron me

**Shāntarakṣita (śāntarakṣita, zhi ba tsho, eighth century)**

**Autocommentary to the “Ornament for the Middle”**
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dbu ma rgyan gyi ’grel pa
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*The Great Calculation of the Doctrine, Which Has the Significance of a Fourth Council*

bka’ bsdus bzhis pa’i don bstan rtis chen po


*Mountain Doctrine, Ocean of Definitive Meaning: Final Unique Quintessential Instructions*

ri chos nges don rgya mtsho zhes bya ba mthar thug thun mong ma yin pa’i man nag
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madhyāntavibhāgāṭīkā
dbus dang mtha’ mam par ’byed pa’i ’grel bshad / dbus mtha’i ’grel bshad
Peking 5334, vol. 109


Explanation of (Vasubandhu’s) “The Thirty”
trimśikābhāṣya
sum cu pa’i bshad pa
P5565, vol. 113


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sūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya
mdo sde’i rgyan rgyi ’grel bshad
P5531, vol. 108
Ta-drin-rab-tan (tra mngon rab brtan, tre bhor dge bshes, 1920-1986)

Annotations / Annotations for the Difficult Points of (Tsung-kha-pa’s) “The Essence of Eloquence”: Festival for the Unbiased Endowed with Clear Intelligence

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Frederick Buechecker Tsangpo via e-mail

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Four Interwoven Annotations on (Tsong-kha-pa’s) “Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path” /
The Lam rim chen mo of the incomparable Tsong-kha-pa, with the interlinear notes of Ba-so Chos-ki-rgyal-ntshan, Sde-drug Mkhan-chen Ngag-dbang-rab-rtan, Jam-dbyangs-bshad-pa’i-rdo-rje, and Bra-sti Dge-bses Rin-chen-don-grub

lam rim mchan bzhi sbrags ma/ mnyam med rje btsun tsong kha pa chen pos mdzad pa’i byang chub lam rim chen mo’i dka’ ba’i gnad mams mchan bu bzhi’i sgo nas legs par bshad pa theg chen lam gyi gsal sgron

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legs bshad gser ’phreng / shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa’i man ngag gi bstan bcos mgon par rtogs pa’i rgyan ’grel pa dang bcas pa’i rgya cher bshad pa legs bshad gser gyi phreng ba


Great Exposition of Secret Mantra / The Stages of the Path to a Conqueror and Pervasive Master, a Great Vajradhara: Revealing All Secret Topics

sngags rim chen mo / rgyal ba khyab bdag rdo rje ’chang chen po’i lam gyi rim pa gsang ba kun gyi gnad mam par phyi ba


Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path / Stages of the Path to Enlightenment Thoroughly Teaching All the Stages of Practice of the Three Types of Beings

lam rim chen mo / skyes bu gsum gyi nyams su blang ba’i rim pa thams cad tshang bar ston pa’i byang chub lam gyi rim pa

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skyes bu gsum gyi nyams su blang ba'i byang chub lam gyi rim pa / skyes bu gsum gyi nyams su blang ba'i byang chub lam gyi rim pa bring po sa bcad kha skong dang bcas pa / lam rim 'bring / lam rim chung ngu
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dbu ma rgyan gyi zin bris
Buxa: Se-ra Jay, 196-?
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rgyal tshab rjes rje'i drung du gsan pa'i tshad ma'ai brjed byang chen mo / tshad ma brjed byang chen mo / rje'i tshad ma 'i lam sgrig

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byang chub lam gyi rim pa'i nyams len gyi rnam bzhag mador bsdu te brjed byang du byas pa / lam rim nyams mgur

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Nāgārjuna’s *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called “Wisdom”* says:

Doctrines taught by the Buddha
Rely wholly on the two truths.

In *Maps of the Profound* my intention was to provide easy access to Jam-yang-shay-pa’s *Great Exposition of Tenets* by presenting all of his *Root Text of Tenets: Lion’s Roar* along with the outline from his *Great Exposition of Tenets* and all of the free-flowing *Word Commentary on the Root Verses* by the Mongolian scholar Ngag-wang-pal-dan as well as a smattering of comments from Jam-yang-shay-pa’s *Great Exposition of Tenets* and Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s *Annotations* and other authors. Here in this book on the two truths all of Jam-yang-shay-pa’s *Great Exposition of Tenets* and almost all of Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s *Annotations* are provided for the first time.

Greatly expanding this exposition of Buddha’s fundamental teaching, the combined presentation of these two authors, Jam-yang-shay-pa and Ngag-wang-pal-dan, offers an intriguing anthology of Indian sources and a provocative display of Tibetan and Mongolian ingenuity, carving consistent meaning from, and perhaps beyond, these sources.

At the heart of this program of study is the uncovering of the veil of false appearance preventing perception of the true nature of phenomena, undermining the ignorance assuming that phenomena exist the way they appear and thus assuming that these things around us are suitable objects of lust, hatred, and all the other afflictive emotions. It calls for using our intelligence to unmask the deceptive appearance of phenomena in order to cease belief in the way things so concretely appear, drawing us into the mess of a cycle of pain.

This complex topic is used in Tibetan monastic colleges to draw students into captivating reflections about how objects appear and thereby into the nature of the reality behind appearances in hopes of becoming free from the noose of counterproductive emotions and from the misdeeds that these exaggerations induce.

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