Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s
Great Exposition of Tenets:
Introduction to the
Middle Way School
with Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s
Annotations

Jeffrey Hopkins
In consultation with
Lo-sang-gyal-tshan

UMA INSTITUTE
FOR TIBETAN STUDIES
Introduction to the Middle Way School

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Technical Notes

It is important to recognize that:

• Full bibliographical references are given in the footnotes at first citation.
• For translations and editions of texts, see the Bibliography.
• The names of Indian authors and orders are given in “essay phonetics” for the sake of easy pronunciation and internet accessibility.
• For the names of Indian scholars and systems cited in the body of the text, ch, sh, and sh are used instead of the more usual c, ś, and ṣ for the sake of easy pronunciation by non-specialists; however, cch is used for cch, not chchh. In parentheses the usual transliteration system for Sanskrit is used.
• Transliteration of Tibetan is done in accordance with a system devised by Turrell Wylie; see “A Standard System of Tibetan Transcription,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 22 (1959): 261-267.
• The names of Indian authors have been added to all citations.
• Ellipses are only used to depict authors’ own ellipses; thus, the usual scholarly practice of announcing citations that begin midstream with an ellipsis is not followed; the citation merely begins midstream.
• In the Tibetan text when I have filled in an author’s ellipsis with the missing material, turquoise highlight indicates the material added in place of the author’s ellipsis and the added text is put in smaller type inside brackets in order to preserve access to the author’s intended text, and in the English translation only a footnote indicates that the material has been filled in, in order to avoid clutter in the translation.
• Definitions are in bold type.
• Citations of the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought often include references to the edited Tibetan text and French translation of it in consultation with the Chinese by Étienne Lamotte in Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra: L’Explication des mystères (Louvain: Université de Louvain, 1935) and to the English translation from the stog Palace edition of the Tibetan by John C. Powers, Wisdom of Buddha: Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra (Berkeley, Calif.: Dharma, 1995). There is also a translation from the Chinese by Thomas Cleary in Buddhist Yoga: A Comprehensive Course (Boston: Shambhala, 1995), in which the references are easily found, as long as chapter 7 of Lamotte and Powers is equated with chapter 5 of Cleary as per the Chinese edition that he used (see my Emptiness in the Mind-Only School of Buddhism, Appendix 2, p.
457ff.).

- I have translated the term *drang don* (*neyārtha*) sometimes as “interpretable meaning” and other times as “requiring interpretation,” or a variant thereof. There is no significance to the multiple translations other than variety and clarity.
Background

**PRESENTATIONS OF TENETS: THE TRANSFORMATIVE AIM**

The Tibetan cultural region stretches beyond the borders of Tibet through a vast area ranging from Kalmyk Mongolian lands near the Volga River in Europe where the Volga empties into the Caspian Sea, through Outer and Inner Mongolia, the Buryat Republic of Siberia, and through Bhutan, Sikkim, Ladakh, and parts of Nepal. In this vast area, schools of non-Buddhist and Buddhist Indian philosophy are systematized in texts called “presentations of tenets.” Focal topics and issues are presented to stimulate inquiry and to encourage development of an inner faculty capable of investigating appearances to penetrate their reality. In this context philosophy is, for the most part, related to liberative concerns—the attempt to extricate oneself and others from a round of painful existence and to attain freedom and full development.

The basic perspective is that afflictive emotions—such as desire, hatred, enmity, jealousy, and belligerence—bind beings in a round of uncontrolled birth, aging, sickness, and death and are founded on misperception of the nature of persons and other phenomena. When a practitioner penetrates reality and this insight is teamed with a powerful consciousness of concentrated meditation, the underpinnings of the process of cyclic existence can be destroyed, resulting in liberation. Also, when wisdom is further empowered through the development of love, compassion, and altruism—and the corresponding actions of generosity, ethics, and tolerant patience—wisdom can achieve an all-knowing state in which one can effectively help a vast number of beings.

Because of this basic perspective—namely, that false ideation traps beings in a round of suffering—reasoned investigation into the nature of persons and other phenomena is central to the process of spiritual development (though it is not the only concern). Schools of tenets primarily are studied not to refute other systems but to develop an internal force that can counteract one’s own innate adherence to misapprehensions. These innate forms of ignorance are part and parcel of ordinary life. They are not just

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\[b \] *grub mtha’i rnam bzhag,* *siddhāntavyavasthāpana.*
learned from other systems, nor do they just arise from faulty analysis.

The stated aim of studying the different schools is to gain insight into the fact that many of the perspectives basic to ordinary life are devoid of valid foundation. This realization leads practitioners to replace invalid as- sent to deceptive appearance with well-founded perspectives. The process is achieved through (1) first engaging in hearing great texts on such topics and getting straight the verbal presentation, (2) then thinking on their meaning to the point where the topics are ascertained with valid cognition, and (3) finally meditating on the same to the point where these realizations become enhanced by the power of concentration such that they can counteract innate tendencies to assent to false appearances.

Since it is no easy matter to penetrate the thick veil of false facades and misconceptions, it became popular in the more scholastic circles of India to investigate not just what the current tradition considered to be the best and final system but also the so-called lower systems. Systematic study provided a gradual approach to subtle topics so as to avoid confusion with less subtle ones. In Tibet, because of the need to get a handle on the plethora of Buddhist systems inherited from India, presentations of tenets comparing the views of the different schools of thought assumed considerable importance. That the primary concern is indeed with developing the capacity to appreciate the profound view of a high system of philosophy is evidenced by the amount of time spent by students probing the workings of the so-called lower schools. Since the stances of those schools are appreciated, they are studied in considerable detail.

A presentation of tenets functions primarily to provide a comprehensive worldview. Its descriptions, ranging from the phenomena of the world through to and including the types of enlightenment, give students a framework for study and practice as well as a perspective for relating with other beings. The hierarchical presentation, fortified with reasoned explanation, itself inculcates the basic posture that the power of reason can penetrate the false veils of appearance and lead to meditative perception of a liberative reality. Presentations of tenets are founded on confidence in the mind’s ability to overcome tremendous obstacles to the point where love, compassion, and altruism can be expressed in effective, continuous activity, and, therefore, they do more than just structure Indian Buddhist sys- tems; they structure practitioners’ perception of their place in a dynamic worldview.

The perspective is that individuals are bound by misconception in a round of suffering and mired in afflictive emotions counterproductive to their own welfare, but also poised on a threshold of transformation. The uncontrolled course of cyclic existence lacks a solid underpinning; it is
ready to be transformed into a patterned advance toward liberation. The starkness of the harrowing appraisal of the current situation of multi-layered pain stands in marked contrast to the optimistic view of the liberative development that is possible. Such optimism stems from conviction that the affective emotions and obstructions, the causes of misery and finite intelligence, are not endemic to the mind but are peripheral to its nature and thus subject to antidotal influences that can remove them.

This vision serves as a powerful force orienting and ordering lives. It stimulates the metaphysical imagination, beckoning, pushing against, and resonating with inner potentials such that persons are drawn into the transformative process. I have found that it is helpful to apprehend it with a playful attitude—allowing exploration of this grand perspective without the pressure of commitment, letting horizons open on their own.

THE GENRE OF PRESENTATIONS OF TENETS

The main Indian precursors of systemizations are texts such as the Blaze of Reasoning a by Bhāvaviveka (500-570? C.E.) b and the Compendium of Principles c by the eighth-century scholar Shāntarakṣhita, with a commentary by his student Kamalashīla. Both Shāntarakṣhita and Kamalashīla visited Tibet in the late eighth century and strongly influenced the direction that Buddhism took there.

In Tibet, the presentations assumed a more developed structure. d Some of these texts are long; for instance, a lengthy text entitled Treasury of Tenets: Illuminating the Meaning of All Vehicles e was written by the fourteenth-century scholar Long-chen-rab-jam f of the Nying-ma order of

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a rtog ge ’bar ba, tarkajvāla. This is Bhāvaviveka’s commentary on his Heart of the Middle (du ma snying po, madhyamakahṛdaya). For a partial English translation of the latter (chap. III. 1-136), see Shōtarō Iida, Reason and Emptiness (Tokyo: Hokuseido, 1980).

b See David Seyfort Ruegg, The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India (Wiesbaden, Germany: Otto Harrassowitz, 1981), 61.


d For more discussion on this genre of Tibetan literature, see Katsumi Mimaki, Blo gsal grub mtha’ (Kyoto: Université de Kyoto, 1982), 1-12; and David Seyfort Ruegg’s foreword to Geshé Ngawang Nyima, Introduction to the Doctrines of the Four Schools of Buddhist Philosophy (Leiden, 1970).

e theg pa mtha’ dag gi don gsal bar byed pa grub pa’i mtha’ rin po che’i mdzod.

f klong chen rab ’byams / klong chen dri med ’od zer, 1308-1363.
Tibetan Buddhism. It appears that Tsong-kha-pa’s \textsuperscript{a} \textit{The Essence of Eloquence}, \textsuperscript{b} which is the mother of presentations of tenets in the Ge-lug-pa order, was written in reaction to presentations like those of Long-chen-pa.\textsuperscript{c}

Again, in reaction to Tsong-kha-pa’s writing, the fifteenth-century scholar Tag-tshang She-rab-rin-chen\textsuperscript{d} of the Sa-kya order wrote a long text titled the \textit{Explanation of “Freedom from Extremes through Knowing All Tenets”: Ocean of Eloquence},\textsuperscript{e} detailing what he considered to be Tsong-kha-pa’s contradictions. Tag-tshang’s text in turn gave rise to the most extensive text of this type in Tibet. In part to refute Tag-tshang’s account of Tsong-kha-pa’s contradictions, Jam-yang-zhay-pa (1648-1721) composed the \textit{Explanation of Tenets: Sun of the Land of Samantabhadra Brilliantly Illuminating All of Our Own and Others’ Tenets and the Meaning of the Profound [Emptiness], Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning Fulfilling All Hopes of All Beings}, also known as the \textit{Great Exposition of Tenets}.\textsuperscript{f} The word “tenets” in the title refers to the root text; his commentary on it is like the light of the land of Samantabhadra, which is not lit by a sun that rises and sets but shines continuously through the power of meditative stabilization. This book of tenets fulfills the hopes of all beings seeking the ability to gain the wanted and avoid the unwanted, since it explains what the wanted and the unwanted are and how to achieve and avoid them. Through delineating the profound meanings of emptiness, it shows the

\textsuperscript{a} tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa, 1357-1419.
\textsuperscript{c} Tsong-kha-pa’s main opponent is the fourteenth-century scholar-yogi She-rab-gyal-tshan; see Part 4 of Jeffrey Hopkins, \textit{Reflections on Reality} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).
\textsuperscript{d} stag tshang lo tsā ba shes rab rin chen, born 1405.
\textsuperscript{e} grub mtha’ kun shes nas mtha’ bral grub pa zhes bya ba’i bstan bcos rnam par bshad pa legs bshad kyi rgya mtsho.
path to liberation from cyclic existence and the eventual attainment of omniscience.

The Great Exposition of Tenets is replete with citations of Indian sources but is written, despite its length, in a laconic style (unusual for him) that sometimes can leave one wondering about the relevance of citations. Even more so, Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s root text (which is translated in this book), written ten years earlier in nine-syllable poetry, often is more befuddling. However, once it is unpacked, it serves as an easy technique to memorize stances of tenet systems.

Perhaps this inaccessibility was partly why the eighteenth-century Tibetanized Mongolian scholar Jang-kyä Röl-pay-dor-jay—a—whom Jam-yang-zhay-pa, then an old man, helped to find as the reincarnation of the last Jang-kyä—composed a more issue-oriented text of the same genre entitled Clear Exposition of the Presentation of Tenets: Beautiful Ornament for the Meru of the Subduer’s Teaching. Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s own reincarnation, Kön-chog-jig-may-wang-po, became Jang-kyä’s main pupil and in 1733 wrote an abbreviated version of these texts, entitled Presentation of Tenets: A Precious Garland. Many authors chose to write concise texts so that the general outlines and basic postures of schools could be taught and memorized without the encumbrance of a great deal of elaboration, though sometimes the brevity itself makes the issues being discussed inaccessible.

A medium-length presentation of tenets that also treats the other schools of Tibetan Buddhism but in a biased fashion was written by Jang-kyä’s biographer and student, who was also a student of Kön-chog-jig-

\[\text{\textsuperscript{a}} \text{\textsuperscript{b}} \text{\textsuperscript{c}} \text{\textsuperscript{d}} \text{\textsuperscript{e}} \]

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\[\text{\textsuperscript{a}} \text{\textsuperscript{b}} \text{\textsuperscript{c}} \text{\textsuperscript{d}} \text{\textsuperscript{e}} \]
may-wang-po, Tu-ken Lo-zang-chô-kyi-nyi-ma. His text is called *Mirror of Eloquence Showing the Sources and Assertions of All Schools of Tenets*. The final major development was a text unraveling the difficult points of Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s huge but terse *Great Exposition of Tenets*, written by the Khalkha Mongolian scholar Ngag-wang-pal-dan. As long as Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s commentary itself, his *Annotations for (Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s) “Great Exposition of Tenets”: Freeing the Knots of the Difficult Points, Precious Jewel of Clear Awareness* elaborates key points, making the *Great Exposition of Tenets* clear and accessible.

The number, length, and quality of these texts testify to this genre’s having captured the attention of several important authors to stimulate the metaphysical imagination and thereby to penetrate the veil of false appearances.

**ABOUT JAM-YANG-ZHAY-PA’S *GREAT EXPOSITION OF TENETS***

Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s *Root Text of Tenets: Lion’s Roar*, published in 1689, is written in unusually terse, sometimes opaque nine-syllable lines, largely devoid of customary grammatical endings and particles. (An oral tradition reports that the stylistic oddness of his root text is due to Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s composing it in an inspired state hearing a lute-like instrument played by the goddess Svarasvatī.) His prose autocommentary, finished ten years later in 1699, cites the entire root text section by section, and includes most but not all the words of the root text scattered within the commentary. Monumental in length, the *Great Exposition of Tenets* expands greatly on

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a **thu’u bkvan blo bzang chos kyi nyi ma**, 1737-1802.
b **grub mtha’ thams cad kyi khungs dang ’dod tshul ston pa legs bshad shel gyi me long.**
c **ngag dbang dpal ldan, b. 1797; also known as Pal-dan-chô-jay (dpal ldan chos rje).**
d **grub mtha’ chen mo’i mchan ’grel dka’ gnad mdud grol blo gsal gces nor.**
e There are two editions of the *Root Text* in Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s Collected Works, the second also containing interlinear annotations; it is attributed to Jam-yang-zhay-pa but on a few occasions contains material contrary to his commentary in the *Great Exposition of Tenets* and, therefore, may have been authored by a student.
f Tag-tshang’s root text, on the other hand, contains sufficient grammatical endings and particles to be readily understood. His autocommentary, however, is sometimes difficult to follow because he uses the root text within explanatory sentences but cites it only by a syllable or two and “and so forth” (*sogs*); the difficulty is that the words of the root text are integral parts of the commentary, which, therefore, can be understood only by the reader’s supplying the remaining words of that phrase, line, or lines of the root text. In translation, I have supplied the missing words to make it accessible.
the root text through citing sources, unraveling issues, and suggesting other issues. Yet, despite its length, it is often cryptic in its references and meaning (atypical for Jam-yang-zhay-pa whose style is usually clear); it is also laden with copy-editing problems.

Seeing the tremendous value of *Great Exposition of Tenets*, the Khalkha Mongolian scholar Ngag-wang-pal-dan sought to make it more accessible through lengthening, explaining, and identifying source materials and through expanding on issues. He also raises qualms about the relevance of certain source quotes and frequently corrects misprints, faulty citations, and other copy-editing problems in the Central Tibet edition,a though he forswears trying to make a list of what requires copy-editing.b His attention to detail manifests the great value he put on the text, bringing tremendous clarity to what otherwise is an abstruse work. His annotations are a necessary key for the *Great Exposition of Tenets* through providing rigorous contextualization and non-partisan critique.

When Ngag-wang-pal-dan, evincing independence and intellectual honesty, disagrees with Jam-yang-zhay-pa, he usually presents a carefully framed argument, sometimes in great detail (see his opinion on the meaning of “mine,” Hopkins, *Maps of the Profound*, 869ff.). Still, he adopts a humble attitude; for instance, after thoroughly challenging the relevance of Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s citation of a passage, he says:c

> These are stated in the manner of raising qualms for those of new awareness. The fact that there is no chance to debate with the explanations by the omniscient patriarch Jam-yang-zhay-pa-dor-je should be known everywhere throughout [my annotations].

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a Likely a Go-mang edition. Some of his corrections indicate that he did not have the Tra-shi-khyil edition at his disposal.
b He says (*stod, ha*, 179.2):
> Since, in general, I have not tried to write down the very many mistakes in wording (*yig nor*) here in Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s *Great Exposition of Tenets*, I have mostly neglected them.

and (*dngos, tha*, 215.5):
> Although in general there are very many tiny mistakes in wording in all the omniscient Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s textbook literature on philosophy and in particular in the *Great Exposition of Tenets*, such as the genitive case where the instrumental case should be and the instrumental case where the genitive case should be, I have not tried here to write [all of ] them down, and hence have mostly neglected them.

c *Annotations, dbu ma pa, ’a, 92.3.*
With this type of format, or mask, Tibetan and Mongolian authors critically examine the works of esteemed predecessors. Jam-yang-zhay-pa, for instance, uses similar formats when he examines and contextualizes Tsong-kha-pa’s works.

I have primarily woven together passages from Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s *Great Exposition of Tenets* and Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s *Annotations* to form an accessible, detailed commentary on Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s *Root Text*. Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s brilliant breadth and depth—eschewing simplistic reductions—and Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s addition of contextual complexity provide a magnificent vision of worldviews in the Tibetan cultural region.

For instance, about the often-cited stanza from Ṛṣyadeva’s *Four Hundred* (as Jam-yang-zhay-pa does below, 144)

> Even over a long period of time
> Censure cannot be expressed
> Of one who has no position of existence,
> Nonexistence, or existence and nonexistence.

Ngag-wang-pal-dan points out that according to Tsong-kha-pa Chandrakīrti cites this passage in his *Clear Words* as a source showing that it is unsuitable for a Proponent of the Middle to assert autonomous theses because existence in the four alternatives is refuted in texts of the Middle Way School and that Tsong-kha-pa shows that in his commentary on Ṛṣyadeva’s *Four Hundred* Chandrakīrti says that this passage indicates that censure cannot be expressed, even over a long period of time, to a proponent of emptiness, whereby this passage certainly does not indicate that Proponents of the Middle have no assertions since they, at minimum, propound emptiness. Also, Chandrakīrti cites the same passage in his own *Commentary on the “Supplement”* upon saying:

> This propounding of dualism is just unreasonable for proponents of imputed existence (**prajñaptivādin, btags par smra ba**); therefore, Proponents of the Middle cannot be defeated in any way through refutations and answers dependent on duality.

As Tsong-kha-pa says:

> [This passage] is cited [by Chandrakīrti] as a source showing that those who assert imputed existence which negates substantial ex-

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\[a\] XVI.25; P5246, vol. 95, 140.2.4; for Chandrakīrti’s commentary see P5266, vol. 98, 279.2ff.; see also Karen Lang’s translation in her masterful Ṛṣyadeva’s *Catuhśataka*, 150.

\[b\] *Annotations, dbu ma pa*, 58b.2-59b.6.
istence in the sense of establishment by way of its own entity cannot be refuted by Proponents of True Existence (*bhāvavādin, dngos po yod par smra ba) who assert that [phenomena] are established by way of their own entities and by the Proponents of No Things (*abhiphāvavādin, dngos po med par smra ba) who assert a negation of all capacity to perform functions in things such as forms. Therefore, it is not suitable as a source [showing that Proponents of the Middle] have no system.

Based on Tsong-kha-pa, Ngag-wang-pal-dan goes on to identify the four alternatives here as inherent existence, utter nonexistence, both, and a truly established category that is neither. The fourth alternative is specified as "truly established" since a category that is composed of neither of the positions, that is, that objects are neither inherently established nor utterly nonexistent is affirmed since objects do indeed exist conventionally.

Ngag-wang-pal-dan cites a passage from Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight in the Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path that gives a slightly different version of the four and sets forth the basic Ge-lug-pa perspective on the four alternatives. About the first alternative, he indicates that things established by way of their own entities are refuted whether these are asserted as conventional or ultimate truths, whereas things able to perform functions are not refuted conventionally (though indeed ultimately). About the second alternative, he says that non-things (abhāva, dngos med), uncaused phenomena, are refuted if they are asserted as established by way of their own entities (and not if they are only asserted to exist in conventional terms). Likewise, a combination of the two and a truly established position that is neither are refuted. Tsong-kha-pa concludes:

All refutations of the four alternatives should be understood in this way. If the four alternatives were refuted without affixing such qualification, when [the first two alternatives, that is, that something is] an existent thing (dngos po yod pa) and a non-thing (dngos po med pa) are refuted and then both are refuted saying “not both,” it would directly contradict one’s own assertion to make the refutation, “not not both.” If you [stupidly] insist that despite this there is no fault, [I can only say] “We do not debate with the insane.”

In the earlier version, the four alternatives were:

1. inherent existence
2. utter non-existence
3. both
4. a truly established category that is neither.

Here the four are:
1. inherently existent thing
2. inherently existent non-thing (that is, inherently existent uncaused phenomenon)
3. both
4. a truly established category that is neither an inherently existent thing nor an inherently existent non-thing.

In the first way, one would be considering whether something like a chair is inherently existent, utterly non-existent, both, or some inherently truly established possibility that is neither inherently existent nor utterly non-existent, such as that the chair is inherently established as conventionally existent. In the second way, one would be considering whether the chair is an inherently existent thing, an inherently existent non-thing, both an inherently existent thing and an inherently existent non-thing, or neither an inherently existent thing nor an inherently existent non-thing within being inherently existent. In both cases, the alternatives are carefully qualified so that conventional existence is not ruled out. The four alternatives thereby are all-inclusive only in the sense of including all possibilities of inherent existence; hence, when these are refuted, it can be decided that phenomena do not inherently exist. Thus, the four do not include all possibilities whatsoever. If one does not agree that such qualification is needed upon being shown the self-contradictions that are entailed without the qualification, one is beyond the pale of sensible discourse; as Tsong-kha-pa says, “We do not debate with the insane.”

Ngag-wang-pal-dan identifies another exposition of the four alternatives by Tsong-kha-pa’s student Khay-drub Ge-leg-pal-zang in his *Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate*; there it is considered whether a chair, for instance, is a truly established existent, a truly established non-existent, a truly established category that is both of those, or a truly established category that is neither. This version is the most symmetrical in that all four alternatives are considered as being qualified by true establishment, or inherent existence.

A result of this qualification is that there seems to be a lack of symmetry in the four positions; the fourth position, as given above in the first two expositions, is not simply a denial of a combination of the first two. Although a third position that is a combination of inherent existence and utter non-existence (or inherently existent thing and inherently existent
non-thing) is suitable to be refuted, a fourth position that is a mere denial of them is not, for phenomena are neither inherently existent nor utterly non-existent since they are conventionally existent. (Phenomena also are neither inherently existent things nor inherently existent non-things because they are conventionally existent things, or non-things.) Once the fourth position is qualified as something inherently existent that is neither of those, it is not a mere denial of a combination of the first two positions.

Through qualifying what is negated, Ge-lug-pa scholars maintain the commonsense notion that one cannot say that something does not exist and then claim that it also is not nonexistent. In this system the refutation of four alternatives is not used to lift the mind to a different, non-conceptual level through shock (or perhaps confusion) but to penetrate the nature of phenomena through a reasoned, conceptual process of refutation. When the negation of inherent existence is understood, one’s understanding is non-conceptual in the sense of not wandering among many conceptions but remaining on one. Then, through combining that realization with the force of calm abiding, the ability to remain one-pointedly on emptiness is greatly enhanced, but still one needs to alternate stabilizing and analytical meditation on emptiness to induce special insight, which in turn is deepened over the path of preparation, resulting in a totally non-conceptual realization of emptiness on the path of seeing.

Thus, even though it is sometimes disappointing to encounter Ge-lugpas’ conceptual qualifications of scriptural passages that without these qualifications seem to lift one beyond conceptuality, it should not be thought that somehow their systemization is intended to intellectualize the profound to a stultifying degree. Rather, they are seeking to put the intellect in its place, using it in a profound way in a process leading to direct perception.

In this endeavor, Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Annotations are invaluable, as they reveal the systematic background of Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s citations which, without this contextualization, occasionally even seem to be proving the opposite of what he intends. Until one understands that he intends his text as lecture notes for a teacher competent in Tsong-kha-pa’s system, many of his citations are baffling. Undoubtedly, Ngag-wang-pal-dan saw this need for contextualization and provided it.

**FORMAT OF THE TEXT**

Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s *Great Exposition of Tenets* is in thirteen chapters, starting with a description of tenets in general, then passing to non-Buddhist schools, and finally to Buddhist schools. He treats twelve renowned
non-Buddhist schools somewhat briefly over six chapters and then focuses on the four Buddhist schools and their main sub-schools, with an additional short chapter on Mantra, also called Tantra. In the order of their presentation (the list of Buddhist schools represents an ascent in order of estimation), these are:

**Non-Buddhist Schools**

1. Lokāyata\(^a\) (Hedonists)
2. Sāṃkhya\(^b\) (Enumerators) and Kāpila\(^c\) (Followers of Kapila)
3-6. Brahmaṇa\(^d\) (Followers of Brahmā), Vaiyākaraṇa\(^e\) (Grammarians), Vedānta\(^f\) (Proponents of the Finality of the Vedas), and Guhyaka\(^g\) (Secretists)
7-8. Vaishnava\(^h\) (Followers of Viṣṇu) and Mīmāṃsā\(^i\) (Analyzers or Ritualists)
9-11. Śaiva (Followers of Shiva), Vaiṣheṣhika\(^j\) (Particularists), and Naiyāyika\(^k\) (Logicians)
12. Nirgranthā\(^l\) (The Unclothed), also known as Jaina\(^m\) (Followers of Jina)

**Buddhist Schools**

*Lesser Vehicle (hīnayāna)\(^n\)*

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\(^a\) rgyang 'phan pa.
\(^b\) grangs can pa.
\(^c\) ser skya pa.
\(^d\) tshang pa ba.
\(^e\) brda sprod pa.
\(^f\) rig byed mtha' pa.
\(^g\) gsang ba pa.
\(^h\) khyab 'jug pa.
\(^i\) dpyod pa ba.
\(^j\) bye brag pa.
\(^k\) rig pa can pa.
\(^l\) gcer bu pa.
\(^m\) rgyal ba pa.
\(^n\) The term “Lesser Vehicle” (*theg dman, hīnayāna*) has its origin in the writings of Great Vehicle (*theg chen, mahāyāna*) authors and was, of course, not used by those to whom it was ascribed. Substitutes such as “non-Great Vehicle,” “Nikāya Buddhism,” and “Theravādayāna” have been suggested to avoid the pejorative sense of “Lesser.” However, “Lesser Vehicle” is a convenient term in this context for a type of tenet system or practice that is seen, in the tradition analyzed in this book, to be surpassed—but not negated—by a higher system. The “Lesser Vehicle” is not despised, most of it being incorporated into the “Great Vehicle.” The monks’ and nuns’ vows are Lesser Vehicle, as is much of the course
1. Great Exposition School
   Eighteen sub-schools
2. Sūtra School
   Sūtra School Following Scripture
   Sūtra School Following Reasoning

Great Vehicle (mahāyāna)
3. Mind-Only School
   Mind-Only School Following Scripture
   Mind-Only School Following Reasoning
4. Middle Way School
   Middle Way Autonomy School
   Middle Way Consequence School

The Great Exposition School is a collection of at least eighteen schools that never recognized themselves as belonging to a single, over-arching school except as being Buddhist, and their tenets are so various (some pre-figuring Great Vehicle schools) that it is difficult to recognize tenets common to all eighteen. Jam-yang-zhay-pa gives representative tenets found among these eighteen schools as explained in the root text of Vasubandhu’s Treasury of Manifest Knowledge. Strictly, even the name “Great Exposition School” might be limited to followers of the

Background
Mahāvibhāṣā (Great Exposition), a text of Manifest Knowledge\textsuperscript{a} by Vasumitra (translated into Tibetan from Chinese only in 1949 by Fa Zun). The amalgamation of many schools into one is a technique used to avoid unnecessary complexity that might hinder the main purpose of this genre of exegesis—the presentation of an ascent to the systems considered to be higher. Nevertheless, in the Great Exposition of Tenets Jam-yang-zhay-pa presents a great variety of different views to show the range of perspectives and ambiguities absent from short presentations.

Also, the division of the Sūtra School into those Following Scripture and those Following Reasoning is highly controversial as it is found only in Ge-lug-pa scholarship.\textsuperscript{b} The former are said to follow Vasubandhu's own commentary on his Treasury of Manifest Knowledge, in which he indicates disagreement with many assertions of the Great Exposition School as presented in his own root text. The latter—the Proponents of Sūtra Following Reasoning—are followers of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, who (even though Dignāga and Dharmakīrti themselves do not assert external objects) assert external objects—objects that are different entities from the consciousnesses perceiving them. Again, neither of these groups saw themselves as sub-divisions of a larger school called the Sūtra School. However, this does not militate against a grouping convenient to exposition. The burden then becomes to show that they demonstrate a commonality worthy of being called a single school or sub-school.

Similarly, the two sub-divisions of the Mind-Only School are those Following Scripture, who depend on the writings primarily of Asaṅga and his half-brother Vasubandhu (after the latter converted to Asaṅga’s system), and those Following Reasoning, who depend on what is accepted to be the main system of Dignāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s writings. Dignāga is reputed to be a student of Vasubandhu, and Dharmakīrti, though not a direct student of Dignāga, sought to explicate Dignāga’s works; yet whether Dignāga or Dharmakīrti cite Asaṅga or Vasubandhu as sources remains to be seen.

In addition, the names of the two sub-divisions of the Middle Way School—the Autonomy School and the Consequence School—were, as is clearly admitted by Tsong-kha-pa and his followers, never used in India. Rather, these names were coined in Tibet in accordance with the (infrequent) mention of autonomous syllogisms in the works of Bhāvaviveka

\textsuperscript{a} chos mngon pa, abhidharma.

\textsuperscript{b} See Anne C. Klein, Knowledge and Liberation: A Buddhist Epistemological Analysis in Support of Transformative Religious Experience: Tibetan Interpretations of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1986), 19-22, 40-44.
and Chandrakīrti’s extensive criticism of them.\(^a\)

Thus, the very format of the four schools and their sub-divisions often does not represent a historical account of self-asserted identities but is the result of centuries of classification of systems in India and Tibet based on certain shared assertions and teacher-student connections, all within the dictum that there are only four Buddhist schools of tenets. The purpose of the schematization is to give the emerging scholar-practitioner a handle on the vast scope of positions found in Indian Buddhism.

In Tibet and the Mongolias, students are first taught this fourfold classification, often without mention of the diversity of opinion that it conceals. Then, over decades of study, they gradually recognize through the study of such texts as Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s *Great Exposition of Tenets* that the structure of such presentations is a technique for gaining access to a vast store of opinion through focusing on topics crucial to certain Indian authors. The task of distinguishing between what is clearly said in the Indian texts and what is interpolation over centuries of commentary becomes a fascinating enterprise for the hardier. Even more interesting are on-going attempts to justify the hierarchy of views. The devotion to debate as a primary mode of education provides an ever-present avenue for students to challenge homegrown expositions and affords a richness of critical commentary within traditions.

The format of four schools can be seen as a horizon that opens a way

\(^a\) For a discussion of the Tibetan origins of the names of the sub-divisions of the Middle Way School, see:

- Katsumi Mimaki, *Blo gsal grub mtha’* (Kyoto: Université de Kyoto, 1982).
to appreciate the plethora of opinions, not as one that closes and rigidifies investigation. It serves as a framework for interrogating texts in order both to tease out their implications and to create interpretive conundrums absorbing the mind in attempts to maintain the hierarchy of systems.

**TOPICS**

Although Jam-yang-zhay-pa addresses various topics according to the school he is discussing, a principal structure revolves around five topics: their teachers, names of the school, texts, divisions, and tenets. The issues considered under the heading of “assertions of tenets” reveal the liberative orientation of the inquiry. These are divided into three categories—presentations of the basis, the paths, and the fruits of the path. The presentation of the basis refers to assertions on classes of phenomena, which provide the basis for practicing the spiritual paths, which, in turn, produce attainments, the fruits of the path. It is clear from this ordering that a principal reason for philosophical learning about phenomena is to enable spiritual practice that can transform the mind from being mired in a condition of suffering to being enlightened in a state of freedom.

The general structure of basis, paths, and fruits takes its lead from the emphasis in texts of the Middle Way School on three coordinated sets of twos:

1. Two truths—veil and ultimate—which are the basis
2. Two practices—method (that is, motivation and its incumbent deeds) and wisdom—which are the paths
3. Two Buddha Bodies—Form Bodies and body of attributes—which are the final fruits of the path.

According to Great Vehicle schools of tenets, taking as one’s basis veil truths, one practices the paths of method—love, compassion, and the altruistic intention to become enlightened as well the compassionate deeds that these induce—in dependence upon which one achieves the fruit of the Form Bodies of a Buddha. Also, taking as one’s basis ultimate truths, one practices the paths of wisdom—especially the realization of the final status of persons and phenomena, their emptiness—in dependence upon which one achieves the fruit of a body of attributes of a Buddha. This threefold
format, which finds its main expression in the Middle Way School, supplies the structure for the genre of presentations of tenets for both the Lesser Vehicle and the Great Vehicle.

Within the section on the basis, the emphasis—found in Tibetan presentations of tenets—on the two truths in all four schools derives from the fact that the two truths are a prime subject in the tenets of what is considered to be the highest school, the Middle Way School. As the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century scholar, Gung-thang Kön-chog-tan-pay-drön-me, a who was the chief student of Kön-chog-jig-may-wang-po, says, b the prime way that the Great Exposition School and the Sūtra School delineate the meaning of the scriptures is by way of the four noble truths, whereas the Mind-Only School accomplishes this through the doctrine of the three natures, and the Middle Way School, through the doctrine of the two truths. Thus, the emphasis on the four schools' delineations of the two truths derives from the system that this tradition has determined to be the highest, the Middle Way School. This is not to say that the two truths are not important topics in all four schools, for they are; rather, the two truths are not the central topic in the other schools in the way that they are in the Middle Way School.

In these ways, in the genre of presentations of tenets the very structure (basis, paths, and fruits) and the choice of some topics (such as the two truths) clearly do not arise from prime concerns within each school but are brought over from focal issues in other schools, particularly those considered to be higher. That topics of prime concern in the “higher” schools dominate to some extent the presentation of the tenets of all four schools is natural, given that the main aim is to draw readers into realizing the impact of the views of those systems. Nevertheless, since Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s aim also is to indicate the breadth of topics in each school, his presentation serves as an antidote to simplification; his attention to a plethora of topics and variant detail becomes a fascinating avenue to reflect on the import and implications of many profound topics.

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a  gung thang dkon mchog bstan pa’i sgron me, 1762-1823. For a brief biography, see E. Gene Smith, University of Washington Tibetan Catalogue (Seattle, Wash.: University of Washington Press, 1969), 1:81-82.

b  Gung-thang’s Beginnings of a Commentary on the Difficult Points of (Tsng-kha-pa’s) “Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive”: Quintessence of “The Essence of Eloquence” (drang nges nram ‘byed kyi dga’ ‘grel rtsom ‘phro legs bshad snying po’i yang snying), 80.6-80.12 and 235.9ff. Gung-thang wrote two biographies of Kön-chog-jig-may-wang-po that are included in the latter’s Collected Works; see the Bibliography.
THE AUTHOR

Jam-yang-zhay-pa Ngag-wang-tsön-drü was born in the Am-do Province of Tibet in 1648 east of the Blue Lake. Having studied the alphabet at age seven with his uncle, who was a monk, he mastered reading and writing and six years later became a novice monk. He went to Lhasa at age twenty-one to further his studies at the Gomang College of Dre-pung Monastic University; six years later he received full ordination and at twenty-nine entered the Tantric College of Lower Lhasa. From age thirty-three he spent two years in meditative retreat in a cave near Dre-pung. (Perhaps it was at this time that Mañjushrī, also called Mañjughoṣha, appeared to him and smiled, due to which, according to Ngag-wang-leg-dan, he came to be called “One on Whom Mañjushrī Smiled,” Jam-yang-zhay-pa.)

At age fifty-three he became abbot of Go-mang and at sixty-two returned to Am-do Province where he founded a highly influential monastery at Tra-shi-khyil, this being 1710. Seven years later he founded a tantric college at the same place. He wrote prolifically on the full range of topics of a typical Tibetan polymath and, having received honors from the central Tibetan government and from the Chinese Emperor, died at the age of seventy-three or -four in 1721/2.

Partly because of the close connection between Go-mang College and the Mongolian peoples stretching from the Caspian Sea through Siberia, who were predominantly Ge-lug-pa by this time, Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s influence on the Ge-lug-pa order has been considerable. His life manifests a pattern typical of many influential Tibetan religious figures—child prodigy, learned scholar, disseminator of the religion, politician, priest to political personages, monastery leader, yogi, magician, popular teacher, and prolific writer.

EDITIONS CONSULTED

Two main editions of Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Explanation of Tenets: Sun of the Land of Samantabhadra Brilliantly Illuminating All of Our Own and Others’ Tenets and the Meaning of the Profound [Emptiness], Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning Fulfilling All Hopes of All Beings, also called

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a ˈjam dbyangs bzhad pa ngag dbang brtson grus, 1648-1722.
b bkra shis ’khyil.
c For his life story see Derek Maher’s University of Virginia thesis, Knowledge and Authority in Tibetan Monastic Buddhism: A Biographical Study of the Gelukpa (dge lugs pa) Jamyang Shayba (ˈjam dbyangs bzhad pa) in his Historical Context.
Great Exposition of Tenets were consulted:

1. grub mtha’i rnam bshad rang gzhan grub mtha’ kun dang zab don mchog tu gsal ba kun bzang zhing gi nyi ma lung rigs rgya mtsho. Published at Go-mang College, Lhasa, Tibet, date unknown. Abbreviated reference: “2016 Old Go-mang Lhasa,” so named because of being scanned in Mundgod, Karnataka, India, at Go-mang College in December 2016 by Jongbok Yi for the UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies. This version was likely originally printed at Go-mang College, Lhasa, Tibet, while Jam-yang-shay-pa was abbot of Go-mang College. (To be made available at UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, uma-tibet.org.)

2. grub mtha’i rnam bshad rang gzhan grub mtha’ kun dang zab don mchog tu gsal ba kun bzang zhing gi nyi ma lung rigs rgya mtsho. TBRC W22186.13:35-614 (PDF of bla brang bkra shis ’khyil: bla brang bkra shis ’khyil dgon, [n.d.]). Abbreviated reference: “2011 TBRC bla brang.” This edition, which is a revision of the above edition, was printed in La-brang-tra-shi-khyil monastery founded by Jam-yang-shay-pa after his return to Am-do. In general, it is the preferred edition, though not always.

These two editions are the sources of five other available editions:


c. grub mtha’i rnam bshad rang gzhan grub mtha’ kun dang zab don mchog tu gsal ba kun bzang zhing gi nyi ma lung rigs rgya

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a The earlier Lhasa Go-mang edition is yet to be acquired.


Three editions of Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-pa’s) “Great Exposition of Tenets: Freeing the Knots of the Difficult Points, Precious Jewel of Clear Awareness were consulted:


REMARKS ABOUT THE FORMAT OF THE TRANSLATION

The translation has six basic components:

- Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s Root Text of Tenets: Lion’s Roar is in bold type poetry at the margin, divided into units in accordance with Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s autocommentary, Explanation of Tenets: Sun of the Land of Samantabhadra Brilliantly Illuminating All of Our Own and Others’


\[
\text{grub mtha’ rtsa ba gdong lnga’i sgra dbyangs / grub pa’i mtha’i rnam par bzhag pa ‘khrul spong gdong lnga’i sgra dbyangs kun mkhyen lam bzang gsal ba’i sgron me.}
\]
Tenets and the Meaning of the Profound [Emptiness], Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning Fulfilling All Hopes of All Beings, also known as the Great Exposition of Tenets.¹

- The Root Text is preceded by the running outline² in Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s Great Exposition of Tenets.
- Due to its terseness, the Root Text is followed in indented three-sided boxes by the word-commentary by the Khalkha Mongolian scholar Ngag-wang-pal-dan³ as found at the end of each chapter in his Annotations for (Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s) “Great Exposition of Tenets”: Freeing the Knots of the Difficult Points, Precious Jewel of Clear Awareness.⁴
- Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s own commentary follows at the margin from his Great Exposition of Tenets.
- Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s annotations from his Annotations for (Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s) “Great Exposition of Tenets” are indented in three-sided boxes close to the relevant material in Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s commentary.
- Occasional explanatory materials are added in indented three-sided boxes.

This volume contains all Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s root text and commentary in this section as well as all Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Annotations.

Gratitude to Craig Preston for copious bibliographic input.

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¹ grub mtha’ chen mo / grub mtha’i rnam bshad rang gzhan grub mtha’ kun dang zab don mchog tu gsal ba kun bzang zhing gi nyi ma lung rigs rgya mtsho skye dgu’i re ba kun skong
² A separate table of contents, titled Contents of the “Root Text of Tenets: Lion’s Roar” by Jam-yang-zhay-pa Ngag-wang-tsön-drü (grub mtha’ rtsa ba gdong lnga’i sgra dbyangs zhes bya ba’i tshig ‘grel”), was compiled by Ge-she Ngag-wang-nyi-ma (ngag dbang nyi ma) in 1976.
³ ngag dbang dpal ldan, b. 1797; also known as Pal-dan-chö-je (dpa’ ladan chos rje).
⁴ grub mtha’ chen mo ’i mchan ’grel dka’ gnad mdud grol blo gsal gces nor. The word-commentary also appears in a separate text as the last item in his Collected Works.
Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s
GREAT EXPOSITION
OF TENETS:
Introduction
to the Middle Way School
Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s

Presentation of Tenets: Lion’s Roar Eradicating Error, Precious Lamp Illuminating the Genuine Path to Omniscience

with his own commentary on the root text:

Explanation of Tenets: Sun of the Land of Samantabhadra Brilliantly Illuminating All of Our Own and Others’ Tenets and the Meaning of the Profound [Emptiness], Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning Fulfilling All Hopes of All Beings

and Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s word-commentary and annotations:

Annotations for (Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s) “Great Exposition of Tenets”: Freeing the Knots of the Difficult Points, Precious Jewel of Clear Awareness
About this, Āryadeva’s *Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas* says:

Finally, all views are overcome—
Those who know this are wise.

Accordingly, the supreme of the wise who eliminate all proliferations of views are the Proponents of the Middle.

Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s *Annotations Ka*: Initially the non-meritorious is overcome,
In the middle self is overcome, and
Finally, all views are overcome—
Those who know this are wise.

Initially, by way of teaching that a substantially existent self that

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a Taipei, 361.2.

b Āryadeva (*'phags pa lha, second to third century C.E.), *Four Hundred / Treatise of Four Hundred Stanzas*, bstan bcos bzhi brgya pa zhes bya ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa (ca-tuḥṣatakasāstrākārikā), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 3846), BDRC W23703.97:3-37 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 9b.6; Pe-king 5246, vol. 95.

c *dbu ma pa, ka*, 1.2. Āryadeva’s *Four Hundred*, 9b.5-9b.6:
accumulates karmas and experiences effects exists, the non-meritorious—the causes of bad transmigrations—are overcome; and in the middle, a substantially existent self is refuted, making [trainees] into vessels of the path; and finally, release is brought about through teaching the subtle emptiness, overcoming all proliferations of bad views, and so forth.

I. INDICATING THE MIDDLE WAY SYSTEM OF THE SUPREME SCHOLARS {5}

This has five: definition, etymology, divisions, history, and individual assertions.a

a  This volume presents the first four.
A. **DEFINITION**

Because they propound the center separate from extremes and propound naturelessness,

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Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s *Word Commentary on Root Text*: Because they propound as logically feasible a center separate from the extremes of permanence, that is, that phenomena ultimately exist, and annihilation, that is, that phenomena do not exist in conventional terms, and they propound [the middle] as the naturelessness of true establishment,

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Those of our own schools:

- who refute from the depths the extreme of permanence, or existence, that is, that any phenomenon ultimately exists, and the extreme of annihilation, or nonexistence, that is, that [phenomena] do not even exist in conventional terms
- and who assert that phenomena are established as truthless like illusions

are Proponents of the Middle because, having asserted the lion’s roar and so forth of selflessness which the Subduer set forth as the antidote to the diseases of the apprehension as actualities (*dngos 'dzin*)[^kha] because they, even when explaining and debating, like the Sovereign of Subduers [Buddha]:

- proclaim the lion’s roar of selflessness frightening the wild animals of the Proponents of True Existence among our own and others’

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[^kha]: Taipei, 361.5.
Introduction to the Middle Way School

• beat the drum of the excellent doctrine unlike others
• blow the conch [of the melodies] of the element of attributes pervading the three realms with the great sound: “Phenomena are natureless,”
• and spread to all transmigrating beings the ambrosia of the doctrine of dependent-arising and profound emptiness, antidote to all diseases of afflictive emotions.

For, Nāgārjuna’s *Praise of the Inconceivable* says:


\[
\text{vastugrahayocchēkaḥ kutārthanagabhitkarah} / \\
nairātmyasāmīnānādo 'yam adhūtān adhitān tvāṇa / \\
\]

\(^{a}\)
Eliminating the frights of apprehension as actualities,
Frightening the wild animals, the Forders,
You spoke the lion’s roar
Of selflessness, marvelous!

You beat the great drum of emptiness
And very profound doctrine.
You blew the doctrine conch
Of the great sound “Natureless!”

You spoke the substance of doctrine
Of the ambrosia of Buddha’s teaching!

Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Annotations Kha: All the sufferings of bad
migrations and cyclic existence are the frights of apprehension as
actualities (dngos 'dzin) because of arising from its cause, apprehen-
sion as truly existent (bden 'dzin);

śūnyatādhammagambhūtā dharmaḥbhī parāhato
naishvābhāvyamahānādo dharmasānkhaḥ prapāritaḥ //
dharmaṃautukam ākhyatam buddhānāṃ sāsanāṃrtam //

From Richard Mahoney and Christian Lindtner, *Aciṃtyastava of Nāgārjuna: Sanskrit Text*

a More likely yi as in Mahoney and Lindtner, *Aciṃtyastava of Nāgārjuna.*
As long as apprehension as aggregates exists,  
So long thereby does apprehension as I exist.  
Further, when apprehension as I exists,  
There is action, and from it there also is birth.a

since both Autonomists and Consequentialists maintain that apprehension as truly existent is the final foundational root of cyclic existence.

This is the thought of the Foremost Great Being [Tsong-kha-pa]. Still, as to whether there is or is not release from cyclic existence without overturning the final foundational root of cyclic existence, the two—the assertions of the Autonomists and the Consequentialists—do not agree, and through its force there are differences also in how they explain the meaning of the above text.

B. ETYMOLOGY

They are called Proponents of the Middle and Proponents of Naturelessness.

Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Word Commentary on Root Text: [for those two reasons respectively] they are called Proponents of the Middle and Proponents of Naturelessness.

The meaning of the profound dependent-arising, center separate from—through having refuted—the two extremes of permanence and annihilation, places of harm like great chasms if fallen into them, is called madhyāmaka, that is, “middle” (dbu ma) or “center” ( dbus), because it is like a center devoid (spangs pa) of extremes; the honorable Bhāvaviveka, a supreme son of Nāgārjuna, says:

Since it is like a center (dbus) devoid of the two extremes, it is the

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a Taipei, 361.20.
b This should read madhyama according to what appears just below as well as the beginning of Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s Decisive Analysis of the Middle; see Jules B. Levinson, What does Chandrakīrti Add to Nāgārjuna’s Treatise?: Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Beginning I (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version March, 2016: uma-tibet.org), 33ff.
c Bhāvaviveka (legs ldan ’byed, c.500-570?), Commentary on the “Heart of the Middle”: Blaze of Reasoning (madhyamakahṛdayavṛttiarkajñālā, dbu ma’i snying po’i ’grel pa rtog ge ’bar ba), Peking 5256, vol. 96; sde dge 3856, vol. 98; in bstan ’gyur (sde dge), BDRC W23703, vol. 98, 82-660 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmanpe choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 329a.3.
middle (dbu ma, madhya); the very center (dbus nyid) is the middle (dbu ma, madhyama), which is madhya with the taddhita affix \(^a\) [ma].\(^b\)

and the Pile of Jewels Sūtra states:\(^c\)

Kāshyapa, existence is the one extreme. Nonexistence is the second extreme. That which is the center between these two is called the middle path.

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\(^a\) An affix such as ma used to form a noun such as madhyama from another noun such as madhya.

\(^b\) madhyama is a derivative noun that means the same as its base, madhya, but with the sense of "very middle" or "middlemost."

\(^c\) P760.43, vol. 24 194.1.2ff. See also Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Annotations, dngos, 77a.7ff and dbu, 68b.5ff. There is a similar quote in Chandrakirti’s Clear Words, 91b.1; (Poussin, 358.10), which reads:

Also cited in Avalokitavrata (spyan ras gzigs brtul zhtags), Explanatory Commentary on (Bhāvaviveka’s) “Lamp for (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Wisdom’”, shes rab sgron ma’i rgya cher grel pa (prajñāpradīpīkā), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 3859), BDRC W23703.99:4-575

(Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 175a.2-175a.3, which reads:
Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Annotations Ga: About how due to falling to the extremes of permanence and annihilation one will be harmed, the Consequentialists assert that due to viewing as truly existing, one is not released from cyclic existence, and due to viewing as utterly nonexistent, one falls into bad migrations; [Nāgārjuna’s Precious Garland (stanza 57ab) states]:

A follower of existence goes to happy migrations.
A follower of non-existence goes to bad migrations.

and [Nāgārjuna’s Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning states]:

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a 109a.2-109a.3, which reads:

See Hopkins, Buddhist Advice for Living and Liberation: Nāgārjuna’s Precious Garland, stanza 57ab, page 101, where the order of the two lines is reversed and the Tibetan in the back does not have the instrumentals, perhaps indicating that this quote is from a different edition. Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words cites the full stanza (46a.1-46a.2):

Nāgārjuna’s Precious Garland explains:

A follower of non-existence goes to bad migrations.
A follower of existence goes to happy migrations.
Through correct and true knowledge
One does not rely on dualism and becomes liberated.

Due to [apprehending as] existent, one is not released. Due to [apprehending as] nonexistent, nothing else than this mundane existence.

According to the Autonomists these must be explained a little differently from this.

and also Kamalashīla’s *Illumination of the Middle* [nga] states:\(^a\)

To indicate the middle path devoid of the two extremes, he set up a textual system of just the definitive meaning.

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\(^a\) Kamalashīla (pad ma’i ngang tshul; ca. 740-795), dbu ma snang ba (madhyamakāśā), in *bstan ’gyur* (sde dge, 3887), BDRC W23703.107:268-489 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa chodhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 150a.3; Peking 5287. The full sentence (150a.3-150a.4) reads:

...
Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s *Annotations Nga*: The Yogic-Practice Middle Way Autonomy School maintains that on the occasion of the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*, upon (1) having cleared away depreciation through having refuted apprehending as literal the statement [in Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras] that production and cessation do not exist and (2) having cleared away superimposition through having taught [production and cessation] as ultimately character-non-natures, [the Buddha] intensively teaches a middle path separated from the two extremes, whereby a textual system in which the Mother Sūtras are of definitive meaning was instituted.

and Nāgārjuna’s *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called “Wisdom”* also states:

“Exists” is an apprehension as permanent.

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“Not exists” is an apprehension as annihilation. 
Hence in existence and nonexistence 
The wise do not dwell. 

and so forth—there are very many.

Therefore, although “emptiness” and “dependent-arising” differ in name, 
their meaning as the path separate from the two sorrowful extremes do not 
go as different{[ca]} because the meanings of the two go as the absence of 
true existence and not institutable (tshugs thub min pa) or substantially 
existent (rdzas yod) in the sense of true establishment, because even all 
phenomena forever abide free from those two extremes, like, for example, 
since forever water does not exist in a mirage, it is separate from [the ex-
tremes of] annihilation and permanence of establishment as water.

Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Annotations Ca: Although emptiness and
dependent-arising are not the same meaning (don gcig), the two—the emptiness of true establishment (bden pas stong pa) and the dependent-arising of any substratum such as a shoot—are the same meaning because if any substratum is truly established, it would not be a dependent-arising, and if any substratum is not a dependent-arising, it goes as truly established.

Nāgārjuna’s *Praise of the Inconceivable* says:

Just as a mirage of water for thirsty deer\(^a\)
Is without annihilation and without permanence,
So, you said all migrations also
Are without annihilation and without permanence.

\[^{a}\text{bsam gyis mi khyab par bstod pa (acintyastava), stanza 48, in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 1128), BDRC W23703.1:154-159 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sun-grab partun khang, 1982-1985), 78b.3. The Sanskrit is:}

\[\text{mṛgatṛṇa jālam yadvan nocchedi na ca śāśvatam} / \\
\text{tadvat sarvam jagat prokta nocchedi na ca śāśvatam} //\]


\[^{b}\text{ri dvags skom chu.}\]
and also the master Nāgārjuna:

Meditate on the meaning of conditionality,
Passed beyond existence and nonexistence,
For whose awareness has no support
That profundity is unobservable.

Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Annotations Chā: Because of not becoming
an object of positive inclusion, “has no support”; because of not
having dualistic appearance in the perspective of directly realizing
it, “unobservable”; because of being a dependent-arising, “the
meaning of conditionality.”

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a Cited in Nāropa (1016–1100), dbang mdor bstan pa’i ’grel bshad don dam pa bsdu pa zhes bya ba (paramārthasaṃgrahā-nāma-sekoddeśatikā), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 1351), BDRC W23703.13: 442–579 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 260a.7 which reads:
and [Nāgārjuna’s *Refutation of Objections*.]

Supreme [by] speaking
Of emptiness, dependent-arising,
And the middle path as having the same meaning,
To the unequalled Buddha, I make homage.

The *ka* [of madhyamaka] is used with the sense of teaching or proclaiming the center, since when explained from the viewpoint of the verbal root, it comes to mean this. Thus, a treatise on the middle is madhyamaka.

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\(\text{b} \quad \text{don gcig pa.}\)

\(\text{c} \quad \text{The verbal root is } \text{kai, which means to sound, or to proclaim; see Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s } \text{Great Exposition of the Middle, 4a.1ff.; translation by Jules B. Levinson, *What does Chandrakīrti Add to Nāgārjuna’s Treatise?:* Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Beginning 1 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version March, 2016: uma-tibet.org), 37:}\)

\(\text{“The verbal root for vocalization” (skad kyi byings) means “the verbal root for proclamation” (sgrog pa’i byings) because vocalization (skad), sound (sgra), and proclamation (sgrog) have a common equivalent in the original language [Sanskrit] because the Sūtra of Verbal Roots says “kai, gai, rai [are used] for sound [that is, vocalization].” (kalāpadhātusūtra, ka lā pa’i byings kyi mdo. TBRC W23703-1529, volume 211}\)
[teaching or proclaiming the center], and a person who has the name “middle” is a madhyamaka teaching or proclaiming the center. Or, in another way, it is permissible in general to impute madhyamaka to tenets of the middle [teaching or proclaiming the center]. As the master Bhāvaviveka says:

Due to teaching and proclaiming that middle path, the ka [of madhyamaka] is stated. Concerning [or due to] the term that is the verbal root for vocalization [madhyamaka means] a treatise (bstan bcos, śāstra) [on the middle]; or one who has the name “middle” is a madhyamaka; alternatively, due to being expressed with a stem having ka, madhyamaka is a tenet of the middle.

a  Bhāvaviveka (legs ldan 'byed, c.500-570?), Commentary on the “Heart of the Middle”: Blaze of Reasoning (madhyamakahṛdayavṛttitarīkavālā, dbu ma'i snying po'i 'grel pa rtag ge 'bar ba), Peking 5256, vol. 96; sde dge 3856, vol. 98; in bstan 'gyur (sde dge), TBRC W23703, vol. 98, 82-660 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa choedhey, Gyalwae sun-grab partun khang, 1982-1985), 329a.3–4.
Hence, let us make clear the meaning of those three in brief:

- The subject, the *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle*, is called “madhyamaka” because of being a treatise mainly teaching abandonment of the two extremes, the path of the actual middle, just as, for example, texts that take as their object of expression the mother, the perfection of wisdom, are imputed as [that is, are called] perfection of wisdom.

- The subject, the father Nāgārjuna and his spiritual sons, are called “madhyamaka” (“Proponents of the Middle”) because of being persons who mainly explain and hold the middle path that has abandoned the two extremes, just as, for example, those who propound objects of knowledge as cognition-only are called *vijñaptika* (“Proponents of Cognition”).

- The subjects, (1) reasonings proving that the path of the middle has abandoned the two extremes and (2) the basis, path, and fruit, are called “madhyamaka” because of being positions or factors that are established by reasoning as free from the two extremes, just as, for example, the midland, which is devoid of the chasms, is called the center.

Below (62) I will explain the way of being free from the two extremes and the way of falling into them.
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འོ་བོན་སོན་སྐྱེས་ཀྱང་དག་མི་ལོག་པར་འབོད་པའི་ཞོགས་སོམ་ཆ་ཡིན་པའི་ཞིར།
དེར་ན་གཡང་ཁ་དང་བར་འི་སའི་དཀྱིལ་གྱི་ཆ་ལ་བཞིན་ནོ།
འདིར་མཐའ་གཉིས་དང་ལོང་ས་དག་འོག་ཉེད་དོ།

**Objection:** If that is the case, what is the meaning of the explanation in the *King of Meditative Stabilizations Sūtra* of not abiding even in the center.\(^{a[a]}\)

Existence and nonexistence are both extremes.
Clean and unclean are also extremes.
Therefore, having abandoned both extremes
The wise do not at all remain even in the center.

\(^{a}\) As cited in Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words*, 46a.2, which reads:

and again (91b.2-91b.3), which reads:
Nyag-bang-po’s Annotations: Whether subtle emptiness exists or does not exist in the center, or middle, explicitly indicated in “The wise do not at all remain even in the center,” needs to be analyzed because here [Jam-yang-zhay-pa] has deliberately set aside a coarse emptiness, “a negation of trifling extremes of existence and nonexistence, as the Proponents of Cognition do,” and because Gyal-tshab-je explains [this situation] as although having innate awareness apprehending subtle emptiness as truly established not having artificial [awareness apprehending subtle emptiness as truly existent].
[Having innate awareness apprehending subtle emptiness as truly existent, but not having artificial (awareness apprehending subtle emptiness as truly existent)] entails [that whether subtle emptiness exists or does not exist in the center, or middle, explicitly indicated in “The wise do not at all remain even in the center,” needs to be analyzed] because although having innate awareness apprehending true existence, a person whose continuum has it does not advocate this basis as truly established through the force of that awareness, because Gyal-tshab Dar-ma-rin-chens’a Commentary on (Maitreya’s) “Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehi-

cle” states:b

because apprehending selflessness as truely established] is to apprehend coarse selflessness as truely established] but when subtle selflessness has been realized and has not been forgotten, formulating the tenet that the negative negating such self as truly established does not occur. If an awareness apprehending selflessness that is the negative of the subtle object of negation is manifestly produced, know it as innate.

\[\text{[Having innate awareness apprehending subtle emptiness as truly existent, but not having artificial (awareness apprehending subtle emptiness as truly existent)] entails [that whether subtle emptiness exists or does not exist in the center, or middle, explicitly indicated in “The wise do not at all remain even in the center,” needs to be analyzed] because although having innate awareness apprehending true existence, a person whose continuum has it does not advocate this basis as truly established through the force of that awareness, because Gyal-tshab Dar-ma-rin-chens’a Commentary on (Maitreya’s) “Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehi-

cle” states:b} \]

\[\text{because apprehending selflessness as truely established] is to apprehend coarse selflessness as truely established] but when subtle selflessness has been realized and has not been forgotten, formulating the tenet that the negative negating such self as truly established does not occur. If an awareness apprehending selflessness that is the negative of the subtle object of negation is manifestly produced, know it as innate.} \]

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a rgyal tshab dar ma rin chen, 1364-1432.
About this, someone says: That artificial awareness apprehending emptiness as truly established is described as nonexistent in the continuum of a person who has realized emptiness, but in general such an artificial awareness is not described as nonexistent because it exists. It follows that it exists because an artificial awareness apprehending the thoroughly established [nature] as truly established exists. It follows [that an artificial awareness apprehending the thoroughly established (nature) as truly established exists] because the view—in the continuum of a Proponent of Mind-Only—of the other-powered and the thoroughly established as truly established is an artificial awareness, and furthermore, that [an artificial awareness apprehending the thoroughly established (nature) as truly established exists] because an artificial awareness—apprehending illusory-like emptiness of true establishment—as truly established exists.
[That an artificial awareness apprehending illusory-like emptiness of true establishment as truly established exists] entails [that an artificial awareness apprehending the thoroughly established (nature) as truly established exists] because if due to evidence that until emptiness is realized, an awareness apprehending emptiness as truly established does not arise, it is asserted an artificial awareness with respect to that does not exist, it is the same for the other one. At the juncture [where the demonstration of entailment in response to an expected complaint of] no entailment [began], the sign [which is that an artificial awareness apprehending the thoroughly established (nature) as truly established exists] is established because Gyal-tshab Dar-ma-rin-chen’s Explanation [of (Maitreya’s) “Ornament for the Clear Realizations” and (Harih-bhadra’s) Commentary: Ornament for the Essence] says:

Upon observing a being (skyes bu, puruṣa\(^b\)) as empty of true establishment like an illusion, apprehending such as truly established (longs spyod pa po) is a conceptualization apprehending imputed existence (btags 'dzin rtog pa); it should be known that it has artificial and innate.

\(^a\) theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma'i tīkka, in gsung 'bum (rgyal tshab rje), BDRC W22110.3:5-464 (bkras lhun par rnying bskyar par ma, New Delhi, India: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1980-1981).

\(^b\) Often translated as “person.”
[Response:] However, Tsong-kha-pa’s *The Essence of Eloquence* says that since refuting imputation by tenet is only a branch of refuting the innate, delineation of nonestablishment on the occasion of sūtras must principally be in accordance with the mode of innate adherence, due to which [I] think that the middle explicitly indicated by this text also need not be a coarse emptiness.

Because they propound that all phenomena are natureless in the sense of not having true existence, they are renowned as Proponents of Non-Nature; it is as the *Buddhapālita Commentary* states:

> Therefore, the Master [Nāgārjuna] composed [this text] in order to thoroughly indicate the naturelessness of things.

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*a* Buddhapālita (*sangs rgyas bskyangs*, c. 470-540?), *Buddhapālita Commentary on (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle”, dhu ma rtse ba’i ’grel pa buddha pa li ta (budhdpālita-mulamadhyamakavyārṇī)*, in *bstan 'gyur (sde dge*, 3842), BDRC W23703.96:318-563 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 159b.2.
and:

The Master [Nāgārjuna].

Blew the conch of the doctrine
Of the great sound of naturelessness.

C. DIVISIONS{2}

This has two: divisions and explanation of these as Proponents of the Middle.

1. Divisions

The divisions are two, Consequence and Autonomy Schools; the others are only names.

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a Praise of the Inconceivable, bsam gyis mi khyab par bstod pa (acintyastava), in bstan 'gyur (sde dge, 1128), BDRC W23703.1:154-159 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa chodhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 78b.6-78b.7.
Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s *Word Commentary on Root Text*: The divisions are two, Consequence School and Autonomy School, and those claiming to be Proponents of the Middle other than those two are only imputed with the name “Proponents of the Middle”; in fact, they are not suitable as Proponents of the Middle.

When Proponents of the Middle are divided, there are two, the Consequence School and the Autonomy School, which will be explained below; all others than those—aside from being distinctions of names—are not suitable in fact. What are these [Proponents of the Middle only in name]? Even in India others’ schools and our own schools—Mind-Only School and below—who claim to be Proponents of the Middle and those in Tibet who maintain nothingness are not Proponents of the Middle because they have fallen to extremes.

Hence, when Proponents of the Middle are divided, they are definite as two:

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\[a\] Taipei, 363.18.
those who accept external objects and those who do not accept external objects
and the Consequence School and the Autonomy School from the viewpoint of how the profound view is generated in the continuum.

As stated in the speech of Foremost Great Being [Tsong-kha-pa]:

Therefore, Proponents of the Middle are limited to two—those asserting and those not asserting external objects in conventional terms. Furthermore, when names are designated from the viewpoint of how the view ascertaining emptiness is generated in the mental continuum, they are limited to two—Autonomists and Consequentialists.

\[\text{སེམས་དཔའི་གཞུང་ལམ་ཐོབ་པོ་ཤེས་རབ་གཉིས་} \]

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\(a\) This appears in both Tsong-kha-pa’s Medium-Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path (Hopkins, Tsongkhapa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom [Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications, 2008], 35) and Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path (Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment, vol. 3, trans. and ed. Joshua W. C. Cutler and Guy Newland [Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 2004], 116).

\(b\) For discussion of the Tibetan origins of the names of the subdivisions of the Middle Way School, see:

- Katsumi Mimaki, Blo gsal grub mtha’ (Kyoto: Université de Kyoto, 1982).
- Peter della Santina, Madhyamaka Schools in India (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1986).
2. Explanation of These Divisions as Proponents of the Middle

Similarly refuting the extreme of nonexistence—not to exist even in conventional terms—And the extreme of permanence, true establishment, and thereupon asserting as the middle

Dependently arisen phenomena, both are Proponents of the Middle.

That devoid of all subtle extremes is the system of the

Consequentialists.

Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Word Commentary on Root Text: Although since they are similar in refuting

- the extreme of nonexistence, which is that nothing exists even in conventional terms
- and the extreme of permanence which is that [phenomena] are truly established

and thereupon asserting as the middle a nonaffirming negative that
is a mere elimination of the true existence of dependently arisen phenomena, both Consequentialists and Autonomists are Proponents of the Middle, that which is free from all extremes of subtle permanence and annihilation—such as establishment from its own side and non-establishment as external objects—is the system of the Consequentialists.

[Objection:] If someone thinks that it is not logically feasible to assert that the Autonomists are Proponents of the Middle because Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words* says that it is not suitable for one who is a Proponent of the Middle to use autonomous [syllogisms], and if these [Autonomists] refuted the two extremes, they would not differ from Consequentialists.

[Answer:] I will explain this. Although Chandrakīrti says such, there
is no fault in positing them as Proponents of the Middle because both Middle Way Consequentialists and Middle Way Autonomists have mostly similar ways of:

- extensively refuting the extreme of nonexistence that nothing exists even in conventional terms and the extreme of permanence that phenomena are ultimately or truly established actualities (dngos po) or substantially exist
- and thereupon asserting a coarse presentation of illusion-like and dream-like dependent-arisings.

and, therefore, even both must be posited as Proponents of the Middle, but if [Autonomists] are not posited as Proponents of the Middle, they cannot be posited as even another tenet system, since they are one of our own schools whose view is very much higher than even the Mind-Only School.

For, it abides as Avalokitavrata also explains:

Those propounding the middle path—the Superior Father and Son [Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva], and Bhāvaviveka, Buddhapālita, and so forth—knowing external and internal dependent-arisings existing as able to perform functions as only illusions in conventional terms and as natureless ultimately indicated the mode of the perfection of wisdom.
Introduction to the Middle Way School

Proponents of the Middle have no disagreement.

Therefore, although it is not suitable for a monastic—who has [vowed not to break] the formulated codes—to commit those faults, it is not contradictory that there are monastics who commit those.\[nya\]

Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Annotations Nya: Tsong-kha-pa’s The Essence of Eloquence says:\[c\]

Question: Since, according to these [Consequentialists], Autonomists such as Bhāvaviveka and so forth assert the mean-

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[a] Introduction to the Two Truths, bden pa gnyis la ’jug pa (satyadvayāvatāra), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 3902), BDRC W23703.109:145-147 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 72b.2.

[b] There are infractions of natural codes and of formulated codes; thus, there is naturally unseemly behavior (rang bzhin gyis kha na ma tho ba), such as murder, and unseeingly behavior that breaks formulated codes, such as sleeping on a high bed.

[c] Page 177 in unpublished manuscript.
ing of ultimate, or true, establishment, they should not be pos-
ited as Proponents of the Middle, should they?

Answer: Just as (1) since those who have ascertained a bulb-
ous thing but have not ascertained this base as a pot need es-
tablishment from the start [of this fact] by valid cognition, it
cannot be propounded that they accept this base as a pot, and
(2) although Particularists (bye brag pa, vaiśeṣika) establish
with valid cognition with respect to a pot the meaning [or fact]
of the nonexistence of a whole\(^a\) that is a substantial entity
other than its own parts [in the sense that Particularists in or-
dinary cognition validly know pots and so forth, but Particu-
larists nevertheless still are not proponents of the tenet assert-
ing that the whole is another substantial entity], in the same
way since those scholars [the Autonomists] refute through
many approaches of reasoning the tenet that phenomena truly
exist and vocally assert well that phenomena do not truly ex-
ist, they are Proponents of the Middle. This does not contra-
dict [Chandrakīrti’s] statement that it is not reasonable for
whoever is a Proponent of the Middle to use autonomous [syl-
logisms]; it is like the fact that although it is not reasonable
that monastics who have [committed infractions of] the for-
mulated code have contradicted the code, from merely contra-
dicting it it is not necessary that they are not monastics.

\(^a\) yan lag can, literally, “limbs-possessor.”
Therefore, the way these Middle Way Autonomists refute the two extremes differs greatly from the Proponents of Mind-Only and is very close to the Consequence School in how, within citing the path of reasoning of the Superior [Nāgārjuna] and his spiritual son [Āryadeva], they abandon the two extremes; also, among them, this exposition of the Middle Way Autonomy School by the master Bhāvaviveka and his spiritual son [Jñānagarbha]—being without mixture with the Mind-Only School in accordance with [his saying] that rather than getting dirty and then washing, it is better not to get dirty—even on the occasion of the Consequence School due to the essential that it mostly accords greatly with the speech of Chandrakīrti, even Atisha, the unequalled sole eye of the world, expounded on Bhāvaviveka’s Blaze of Reasoning many times also in India and expounded that way also in Tibet, and it is also Tsong-kha-pa’s thought [that Autonomists are Proponents of the Middle].

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a As cited just above by Ngag-wang-pal-dan in Annotations Nya, in The Essence of Eloquence Tsong-kha-pa makes this point within using the example of a monastic’s breaking a formulated code but still being a monastic.
Nevertheless, [Autonomists] accept establishment from its own side and inherent establishment, as in positing that the basis of imputation of a pot and the mere collection [of the parts] of a pot and special shape of a pot as a pot, and therefore that which is devoid of all subtle extremes of true establishment does not exist anywhere other than in the system of the Consequence School.\[^{15}\]

Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s *Annotations Ta:* There is a basis for analysis with respect to whether Autonomists accept or do not accept

\[^{15}\] Hopkins, *Emptiness in the Consequence School*, unpublished manuscript, 126.
that that the two, Autonomists and Consequentialists, differ about
the object of negation in refuting inherent existence with respect
to phenomena and persons because this statement in Tsong-kha-
pa’s *The Essence of Eloquence* appears to contain profound
thought:

Even Bhāvaviveka did not think that he differed from Bud-
dhapālīta with respect to asserting or not asserting autonomy;
his appears to be a system in which it is taken for granted [that
both masters agree] in asserting autonomy. Due to this essen-
tial, he also did not assert that the two, he and Buddhapālīta,
differed even with respect to the object of negation in the ref-
utation of an inherent nature with respect to phenomena and
persons. Since Bhāvaviveka’s follower, Avalokitavrata,\(^a\) had
acquaintance with Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words: Commentary
on (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle,”* it appears that it
would have been appropriate for him, at those points in his
explanatory commentary of the refutation of Buddhapālīta in
Bhāvaviveka’s *Lamp for (Nāgārjuna’s) “Wisdom”* to explain
whether the faults that Chandrakīrti ascribed to Bhāvaviveka
applied or did not apply, and it would also appear that the mas-
ter Shāntarakṣhita and his student [Kamalashīla] and so forth
also should have dispelled the fallacies [imputed] by Chan-
drakīrti in his refutation of autonomy, but [none of these] was
done.\(^b\)

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\(^a\) Avalokitavrata (P5259, *dbu ma*, vol. *wa*, 85a.8) lists Chandrakīrti as one of eight com-
mentators on Nāgārjuna’s *Treatise on the Middle*, the others being Nāgārjuna, Bud-
dhapālīta, Devasharman, Guṇashrī, Guṇamati, Sthiramati, and Bhāvaviveka.

\(^b\) Ngag-wang-pal-dan (*Annotations, dbu ma pa, pa*, 101.4) juxtaposes this with a state-
ment from Khay-drub Ge-leg-pal-zang’s *Compilation on Emptiness* indicating that Kam-
alashīla describes a refutation of Bhāvaviveka by Chandrakīrti and that Kamalashīla defends
Bhāvaviveka.
Concerning that, in general the reasonings set forth by these two masters [Buddhapālita and Chandrakīrti] explaining the great correctness of all presentations of cause and effect and so forth within an absence of inherent existence in which establishment by way of [the object’s] own character is refuted even in conventional terms and the reasonings that they explain to refute the object of negation by reason of dependent-arising, in which the dependent-arising of the mundane and the supramundane must definitely be asserted, appear to be the final among profound and subtle reasonings. Also, among these, this refutation of autonomy appears to be a subtler reasoning.
D. History of the Great Vehicle Teaching

The history: Four hundred years after the Subduer, Nāgārjuna brought The Great Vehicle and opened the way of commenting on it as the Middle.

Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Word Commentary on Root Text: With respect to the history of the commentators on the thought of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras, the Great Vehicle teaching, four hundred years after the Teacher, Sovereign of Subduers, passed away, the glorious protector the Superior Nāgārjuna brought the Great
Vehicle—the Mother *One Hundred Thousand Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra* and so forth—from Nāga Land, and thereupon opened the chariot-way of commenting on the thought of the Mother Sūtras as the Middle that has abandoned the two extremes.
The Sūtra on the Ten Grounds and so forth emerged within the year of the Teacher’s displaying buddhafication; therefore, the word of the Great Vehicle arose [at that time], since it is explained that the word of the Great and Lesser Vehicles arose simultaneously, such as, for instance, in the foremost venerable Maitreya’s statement, “Not revealed earlier, they arose together.”

The Great Vehicle sūtras remained in human lands for up to forty years after the Teacher passed away and then due to disturbances and so forth

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a Taipei, 365.8. All Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s exposition of the history in the Great Exposition of Tenet is included in this translation; all ellipses are his own. In Chapter One of Part One: Analysis of my Nāgārjuna’s Precious Garland: Buddhist Advice for Living and Liberation (Ithaca, New York: Snow Lion Publications, 1998), 9-21, I presented the prophecies of Nāgārjuna mentioned by Chandrakirti, additional citations by Tsong-kha-pa, and Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s exploration of Tsong-kha-pa’s sources in the Great Exposition of Tenets and the Great Exposition of the Middle (dbu ma chen mo/ dbu ma ’jug pa’i mtha’ dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zab don gsal skal bzang ’jug ngogs) (Buxaduor: Gomang, 1967), 193a.4-197a.1. For an excellent bibliography of scholarship on Nāgārjuna’s prophecies, see David S. Ruegg’s The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1981), 5 n.11. For a sense of the variety of accounts of Nāgārjuna’s life, see especially M. Walleser, The Life of Nāgārjuna from Tibetan and Chinese Sources, Asia Major, Introductory Volume (Hirth Anniversary Volume, Leipzig, 1923); rpt. Delhi: Nag Publishers, 1979), 421-55.

b That is, displaying the achievement of enlightenment, although he had achieved it many eons earlier.

c Maitreya’s Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras, theg pa chen po’i mdo sde rgyan gyi tshig le’er byas pa (mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4020), BDRC W23703.123.3-80 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 2a.4; Peking 5521, vol. 108; Dharma vol. 77. sde dge, sems tsam, phi, 2a.4. The Sanskrit for the stanza is found in S. Lévi, Mahāyāna-Sūtrālaṃkāra, Exposé de la Doctrine du Grand Véhicule (Reprint, Kyoto: Rinsen Book, 1983), 3.5-6: ādāv avyākaranaḥ samapraṇavṛtto agocaraḥ siddhiḥ bhāvābhāve 'bhāvāt pratipaksatvād rutānyavatā// (I.7). Thanks to Hiroshi Nemoto for the note.
vanished because some sūtras say that Ānanda sustained the [Great Vehicle] teaching for up to forty years even after the Teacher passed away, and the *Great Cloud Sūtra* also explains that it remained so, because (1) the *Great Cloud Sūtra* says:⁠

Children of gods,⁠ after I have passed away, those who have created roots of virtue and those who have served many Buddhas will explain sūtras such as this, teaching them also to others extensively. Furthermore, the *Great Cloud Sūtra* will be used in the Land of Jambu [that is, this world] for up to forty years and will be disseminated. After that, at a later time, the excellent doctrine will be abandoned, the kingdom will be disturbed, and the excellent doctrine will vanish.

and so forth, and (2) as will be explained, it was necessary for the Great Vehicle to be brought [here by Nāgārjuna from Nāga Land, and so forth] and to establish it as the word [of Buddha].

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[a] sprin chen po'i mdo (arya-mahamegha-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra), in bka' 'gyur (sde dge par phud, 232), BDRC W22084.64:227-430 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1976-1979), 292a.6-292b.4; P898, vol. 35, 253.3.3-253.3.5. The sentence continues (292b.2-292b.5) reading:

b⁠ lha'i bu, devaputra.

c⁠ See, for instance, Nāgārjuna’s *Precious Garland*, stanzas 367-398; also, see Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, 358.
One hundred twenty years after the Teacher passed away, the Brahmin Kauṇḍinya, who had discussion with the Lichavi [Liked-When-Seen-By-All-The-World] about whether or not the One-Gone-Thus would have relics, emerged again as the religious king Ashoka, worshiping the Three Jewels and making many periodic religious services. The Great Cloud Sūtra says:

\[\text{\textsuperscript{a} 'jig rten thams cad kyis mthong na dga' ba, sarvalokapriyadarśana.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{b} Liked-When-Seen-By-All-The-World speaks with Kauṇḍinya about whether Buddha would leave relics upon passing away. Kauṇḍinya, inspired by Buddha, answers that because a Buddha's body is not made of blood and bone, there could not be any such relics but that Buddha, out of skillful means, would nevertheless leave relics. Nāgārjuna is a rebirth of this illustrious youth.}\]

An almost identical conversation is also reported in the \textit{Excellent Golden Light Sūtra} (\textit{gser 'od dam pa, suvarnaprabhāsottama}); see \textit{Suvannaprabhāsottamasmātāra, Das Goldglanz-Sūtra}, ed. Johannes Nobel, (Leiden: Brill, 1944), Text chapter II, 12.13-17.6. Liked-When-Seen-By-All-The-World is mentioned three times in the sūtra: 13.2, 14.1, and 16.2. Thanks to the late Professor Shōtarō Iida of the University of British Columbia for identifying and providing this edition.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{c} 285b.5-286a.2. The ellipsis is Jam-yang-zhay-pa's (285b.7-285b.7; P898, vol. 35,}\]
Goddess, a the prophesied master, the Brahmin Kauṇḍinya also will be born one hundred twenty years after I pass away in the royal lineage of a half universal emperor called the Maurya lineage...Goddess, he will become the lay-practitioner King Ashoka. Goddess, that half universal emperor called Ashoka will proclaim the initial great lion’s roar of the treatises of doctrine and will manifestly make worship.

It is evident that although there were many Foe Destroyers at this time, the Great Vehicle was nonexistent.

251.4.3) which reads:

a Buddha is speaking to Vimalaprabhā (dri ma pa'i od) who earlier was the wife/queen/consort of King Nāga-Of-Great-Effort (an earlier incarnation of Nāgarjuna). The conversation begins on P898, vol. 35, 250.4.7.

b khor los sgvyur ba'i rgyal po, cakravartin. Such a ruler has dominion over from one to four of the continents of our type of world system (there are only four) by means of a wheel made, respectively, from different metals—iron/steel, copper, silver, or gold.

c In the Dalama edition (ca, 3b.8) read rya for rgya in accordance with the Peking edition (P898, vol. 35, 251.4.3).

d dge bsnyen, upāsaka.

e In the Dalama edition (ca, 3b.8) read phyed for khyed in accordance with the Peking edition (P898, vol. 35, 251.4.5).

f The Peking edition (P898, vol. 35, 251.4.5) reads bstan bcos.
When four hundred years had elapsed after the Teacher passed away, the Lichavi Liked-When-Seen-By-All-The-World—who had conversation about relics with the Brahmin Kaunḍinya at the time of the Teacher [Buddha Shākyamuni] and who [was the rebirth of] King-Nāga-Of-Great-Effort\(^a\) during the age of an earlier Buddha, Lamp-Of-The-Nāga-Lineage\(^b\)—was born again, as explained earlier, in a clan in south [India] of the Shākya lineage because:

- the **Great Cloud Sūtra** says:\(^c\)

That King, King-Nāga-Of-Great-Effort, is presently this Lichavi youth, Liked-When-Seen-By-All-The-World.

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\(a\) brtson ‘grus chen po ’i klu.

\(b\) klu rigs sgron me, nāgakulapradipa.

\(c\) 297a.4; P898, vol. 35, 254.5.1, also 251.5.5 but with nga’i nyan thos kyi mchog instead of da lta; sde dge par phud, 297a.4 reads:
the **Mañjushrī Root Tantra** says:

>   When four hundred years have passed  
>   After I, the One-Gone-Thus, have passed away,  
>   A monk called Nāga will arise.  
>   Faithful in and helpful to the teaching,  
>   He will attain the Very Joyful ground.  
>   Living for six hundred years,  
>   That great being will also achieve  
>   The knowledge[-mantra] of Mahāmāyūrī.  
>   He will know the meaning of various treatises  
>   And the meaning of no inherent existence.  
>   When he leaves that body,  
>   He will be born in the [Pure Land of] Bliss.  
>   Finally he will just definitely attain  
>   Thoroughly the state of Buddhahood.

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When four hundred years have passed
After I, the One-Gone-Thus, have passed away,
A monk called Nāga will arise.

- [and the Mañjushrī Root Tantra says,\(^a\)] “Living for six hundred years,”
  and

\[\text{དང༌།} འཇམ་དཔལ་ལ་དེ་བཞིན་གཤེགས་པ་ང་འདས་ནས།}
\[ལོ་ནི་བཞི་བȄ་ལོན་པ་ན།}
\[དགེ་ʃོང་ྱེས་དེ་འབོད་འཞུང༌།}
\[ཞེས་དང༌།} ལོ་ནི་༩ག་བȄ་དག་ȣ་འཚǑ།}

- the Great Cloud Sūtra of Twelve Thousand Stanzas says:\(^b\)

Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Annotations (dngos, ga, 113.4):

This passage in the Mañjushrī Root Tantra prophesies the Superior Nāgarjuna’s:
- time of arising
- name
- help to the teaching through proclaiming the first proclamation of doctrine and so forth
- how he gained realization of the first ground through the force of reading the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras
- his lifespan
- how he effected the welfare of transmigrators through the power of achieving knowledge-mantra
- his composing many treatises—Collections of Advice, Collections of Praises, medical and political treatises, and so forth, and in particular his clarifying the meaning of the profound emptiness by way of the Collections of Reasonings
- his going to the [Pure Land of ] Bliss upon passing away from sorrow
- how in the future he will be thoroughly purified [as a Buddha] in the desire realm through [the display of ] an emanation body.

\(^a\) 408a.3; see the full passage in the previous note.

\(^b\) Jam-yang-zhay-pa specifies the version of the sūtra in twelve thousand stanzas because this material is not in the version represented by the Tibetan translation of the sūtra; this citation is found in Chandrakīrti’s commentary on his Supplement to (Nāgarjuna’s)
Ānanda, four hundred years after I [Shākyamuni Buddha] pass away, this Licchavi youth Liked-When-Seen-by-All-the-World will become a monk known as Nāga and will disseminate my teaching. Finally, in the land known as Very Pure Light he will become a One-Gone-Thus, a Foe Destroyer, a completely perfect Buddha named Light-Which-Is-a-Source-of-All-Wisdom.\textsuperscript{c}

\begin{quote}
\textit{“Treatise on the Middle,”} (245a.6-245a.7) which reads:

\begin{quote}
ཀུན་དགའ་བོ་ལི་ཙ་ི་གཞོན་ȶ་སེམས་ཅན་ཐམས་ཅད་ཀྱིས་མཐོང་ན་དགའ་བ་
ཞེས་པ་འདི་ནི་ང་ɟ་ངན་ལས་འདས་ནས་ལོ་བཞི་བȄ་ལོན་པ་ན་ǩ་ཞེས་པའི་
ཐོང་ȭ་ǽར་ནས་ངའི་བȪན་པ་Ȅས་པར་རབ་ȣ་བȪན་ཏེ།

\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{a} In his translation, Poussin (\textit{Muséon} 11, 275) incorrectly has Buddha identifying the Licchavi youth as Ānanda (“Prince Licchavi, cet Ānanda, ainsi nommé parce que toute créature se réjouit en le voyant, quatre siècles après le nirvāṇa, sera le bhikṣu nommé Nāga”). However, Buddha is talking about the Licchavi youth who is a contemporary of Ānanda, and thus Buddha is addressing Ānanda and talking about the Licchavi youth. There is considerable justification for the latter reading because the Great Drum Sūtra indicates that Buddha is talking to Ānanda about the Licchavi youth who is called Liked-When-Seen-by-All-the-World (\textit{jig rten thams cad kyi mthong na ďga’ ba, sarvalokapri-yadarśana}), this phrase constituting his name and not describing Ānanda as Poussin has it. For the Sanskrit see Sūvarnaprabhāsottamasūtra, Das Goldglanz-Sūtra, ed. Johannes Nolb (Leiden: Brill, 1950), Glossary, 65). Poussin was perhaps misled into thinking that \textit{jig rten thams cad kyi mthong na ďga’ ba} refers to Ānanda because the literal meaning of the name “Ānanda” is “thoroughly happy.” I call attention to Poussin’s possible “mistakes” out of appreciation to this great scholar of scholars.

\textsuperscript{b} \textit{rab tu dang ba’i ’od}. Poussin (\textit{Muséon} 11, 275) gives the Sanskrit as “Saviṣḍhadhārabhūmi,” whereas Obermiller (\textit{History of Buddhism by Bu-ston}, 129) gives “Prasannaprabhā.”

\textsuperscript{c} ye shes ‘byung gnas ’od. Both Poussin (\textit{Muséon} 11, 275) and Obermiller (\textit{History of Buddhism by Bu-ston}, 129) give the Sanskrit as \textit{Jhānākaraprabha}.
and the master Bodhibhadra also says:

\[ \text{The Supramundane Victor [said], “When four hundred years have elapsed after I have thoroughly passed from sorrow, in a lineage in the south.} \]

The assertions that this master [Nāgārjuna] was born at a time when the [average] lifespan of humans was eighty years and that he did not live for more than a hundred years are not logically feasible because the time when the [average] lifespan was eighty years is the time of the last of the master [Nāgārjuna’s] three proclamations of the great sound of doctrine in the lands of humans, and a hundred years is the length of his setting forth that [third proclamation of] doctrine, because:

- Tsong-kha-pa’s Explanation of (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle”: Ocean of Reasoning says:

That prophecy in the Great Drum Sūtra is said to [refer

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\[ a \] Bodhibhadra (byang chub bzang po, ca. eleventh century), Connected Explanation of (Āryadeva’s) “Compilation of the Essence of Wisdom,” ye shes snying po kun las bu s pa shes bya ba'i bshad shyar (jñānasārasamuccayanāmanibandhana), in bstan 'gyur (sde dge, 3852), BDRC W23703.97:57-92 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 29b.1-29b.2, which reads:

\[ b \] In a later verse summation of the prophecy the sūtra itself (P888 vol. 35, 99.4.8) says:

That is his final emergence

In the southern direction.
to Nāgārjuna’s] final appearance in the south.”

...and there is much damage [to these assertions], such as that if [Nāgārjuna] did not live more than one hundred years, one would [absurdly] have to assert that even the master Bhāvaviveka was never contemporary with the master.

With regard to how this master [Nāgārjuna] found realization, according to the Mantra system, he became buddhafied in that lifetime, and even according to Sūtra he attained the eighth ground and finally passed away together with Āryadeva,[tha] the foremost of his spiritual sons, who had attained the eighth ground.

Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Annotations Tha: There also is an explanation that Āryadeva passed away earlier than Nāgārjuna.

See Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s Four Interwoven Annotations to (Tsong-kha-pa’s) “Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path,” 153.6.
Leaving his fruitional body in the Blissful [Pure Land, Nāgārjuna] listened to doctrine from the Protector Maitreya through one of many emanations. In the future he will further display the mode of complete purification [that is, attainment of Buddhahood].

For:

1. **Chandrakīrti’s Brilliant Lamp** explains that [Nāgārjuna] became buddhafied [in that lifetime through the path of Highest Yoga Tantra].

2. the **Great Drum Sūtra** (see 466) says:

   Having set him on the seventh ground, I will bless him as an ordinary being. Then, when the [average] lifespan is eighty years and so forth.

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**Footnotes:**

- a  *sgron ma gsal bar byed pa zhes bya ba'i rgya cher bshad pa / sgron gsal, (pradīpod-dyotananāmatikā)*, in bs tan 'gyur (sde dge, 1785), BDRC W23703.30:4-404, (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985).
- c  201b.3-201b.4; P888, vol. 35, 97.5.4. sde dge par phud (201b.3-201b.4) reads:

- d  The continuation of the passage (201b.4-202a.1) reads:
3. and [the Great Drum Sūtra says]:

Then, dying after a hundred years pass, you will be born in the worldly realm of the Blissful [Pure Land]. At that time, you will emit many great magical emanations. Staying on the eighth ground, one body will be set in the Blissful [Pure Land], and upon emanating one body you will set it in the Joyous [Pure Land], questioning the Undaunted Protector [Maitreya] about this sūtra.

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\[202a\]

\(a\) 166a.3-166a.5; P888, vol. 35, 88.2.6.

\(b\) dga’ ldan, tuṣita.
In this case, if [from the Sūtra point of view, Nāgārjuna] is considered as a seventh ground Bodhisattva who, upon assuming the manner of an ordinary common being, displayed the manner of newly attaining the first ground in that lifetime, it connects with [the statement in the Great Drum Sūtra given in the second quote just above] “as an ordinary being.” If Avalokitavrata’s explanation [that Nāgārjuna attained the first ground during that lifetime] and [the prophecies in] the Descent into Laṅkā and the Mañjushrī Root Tantra are taken as prophecies of [common] appearance, it fits together extremely well.

That [Nāgārjuna] newly attained the eighth ground in that lifetime accords with the general Sūtra system; hence, [I] think that is good. Also, the Great Drum Sūtra says:

Later he will become a Buddha. After a thousand Buddhas have thoroughly passed away, sixty-two eons will pass. One hundred thousand Solitary Realizers will pass, and then when eight Protectors have also passed, a monk who bears my name [in that he is a member of the Shākya clan], this Liked-When-Seen-By-All-The-World, will become a One-Gone-Thus, a Foe Destroyer, a

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a 205b.2-205b.5; P888, vol. 35, 98.5.7.
b The Peking edition (P888, vol. 35, 98.5.7) reads de nas phyis instead of de phyis as in the Dalama edition (ca. 4b.5).
c See the Great Cloud Sūtra (P898, vol. 35, 250.5.3) for sākya’i ras. Ngag-wang-paldan (Annotations, dbu ma pa, na, 5.8) reports that he has heard explanations by some scholars that “bears my name” and “monk concordant in name with the One-Gone-Thus” (see 465) refers to being renowned as a second Buddha. However, it seems to me that this would be out of place in reference to Liked-When-Seen-By-All-The-World at that time.
and the *Great Cloud Sūtra* says:¹

Child of lineage, once this good eon has passed,¹ after one thousand Buddhas have thoroughly passed away, for sixty-two eons a Buddha will not arise; one hundred ten million Solitary Realizers will arise. Child of good family, after those sixty-two eons have passed, seven other Buddhas will arise. Then, when the seventh has thoroughly passed away, at that time this worldly realm will be called Manifest Faith.² In this worldly realm called Manifest Faith this [Liked-When-Seen-By-All-The-World, that is, Nāgārjuna,] will become a One-Gone-Thus, a Foe Destroyer, a completely perfect Buddha called Light-Which-Is-A-Source-of-All-Wisdom.

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¹ 299a.5-299b.2; P898, vol. 35, 255.3.2.

² mgon par dad pa, *abhiprasanna. In the Dalama edition (ca, 4b.8) read mgon par dad pa both here and in the next sentence for mgon par dang ba in accordance with the Peking edition (vol. 35, 255.4.3) since the text immediately goes on to say that the beings born there are beautiful and attain faith.
and it also says that:

1. The lifespan of that One-Gone-Thus [the Buddha who Nāgārjuna will become] will be fifteen intermediate eons.
2. He will be born in [lands called] Manifestly Liking Doctrine and so forth.
3. Those places will be without Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and Forders, will be without absence of leisure [for the practice of doctrine], and will have many Bodhisattvas and be adorned always with pleasant sounds.
4. Even after [that Buddha] passes away, [his] teaching will remain for one thousand ten million years.
Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Annotations Da: The Sūtra of the Good Eon quoted in Nāgārjuna’s Compendium of Sūtra⁸ says that once this good eon has passed, sixty dark eons will arise; then ten thousand Buddhas called Great Fame will arise; after that, eighty thousand dark eons will arise; then, eighty thousand Buddhas called Star-like will arise; after that, three hundred dark eons will arise; then, eighty-four thousand Buddhas called Array of Qualities will arise.

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⁸ mdo kun las bu pa (sūtrasamuccaya), in bstan 'gyur (sde dge, 3934), BDRC W23703.110:298-431 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985); Peking 5330, vol. 102; 149a.5-149a.7, which reads:
[THREE PROCLAMATIONS OF DOCTRINE]
With respect to how this master [Nāgārjuna] raised the doctrine of the Great Vehicle, the Great Cloud Sūtra says that in accordance with wishes\(^a\) that he made in the presence of the [earlier] One-Gone-Thus, Lamp-of-the-Nāga-Lineage, to proclaim three proclamations and so forth of the excellent doctrine during the time of the teaching of Shākyamuni, he pro-claimed three proclamations of doctrine here; the Great Cloud Sūtra says:\(^b\)

Furthermore, look at the greatness of my hearer [Nāgārjuna], a monk concordant in name with the One-Gone-Thus,\(^c\) which upon having manifestly proclaimed three times great proclama-tions of doctrine, will enact the time of death.

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\(^a\) smon lam.

\(^b\) 299a.1-299a.2, which in full reads:

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P898, vol. 35, 255.2.6-255.2.7. The sūtra itself (vol. 35, 254.4.6) gives the specific wish:

…consider the greatness of the monk [Nāgārjuna] similar in name to the One-Gone-Thus. For, that monk made a promise and planted wishes in the presence of the One-Gone-Thus, Lamp-of-the-Nāga-Lineage. Having made [the promise and wish], “I will give my life to protect the excellent doctrine also during the teaching of the Supramundane Victor Shākyamuni,” he will manifestly proclaim proclamations of the excellent doctrine three times.

\(^c\) 'chi ba'i dus byed par 'gyur ba.
Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Annotations Ca: [I] have heard that some scholars say that “a monk concordant in name with the One-Gone-Thus” (de bzhin gshegs pa dang ming mthun pa’i dge slong) and a monk who bears my name (nga’i ming ‘chang ba’i dge slong) are taken as one renowned as a second Buddha.

[The First Proclamation]
Initially, he emerged [from the householder’s way of life] and took full ordination from the abbot Rāhulabhadra, whereupon he was designated with the name Shrīmān Glorious Mindful One; he proclaimed the first great proclamation of doctrine by:

1. protecting the spiritual community from the fright of famine through alchemy while acting as steward of the spiritual community at Nālanda
2. giving advice on the twelve qualities of training in the doctrine and so forth to some within the spiritual community [at Nālanda] such as Shankara who were indolent regarding the precepts
3. and expelling the wayward [at Nālanda].

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a Above 572, in “will become a monk bearing my name [in that he will be a member of the Shākya clan].”
b Identified as Saraha; see Tāranātha’s History of Buddhism, translated by Lama Chimpa and Alaka Chattopadhyaya (Varanasi, 1964), p.67.
c dpal ldan blo ‘chang, *buddhidhara.
d bde byed.
The Great Cloud Sūtra says:  

In the Land of Jambu at a time of the thorough degeneration of the excellent doctrine a monk similar to Mahākāshyapa will be born. Arising in the midst of my hearers, he will, in stages, wipe out famine and will express praise of the sūtras spoken by the One-Gone-Thus among unruly ones difficult to tame…He will stay in the monastery, express praise of the discipline, and defeat the unruly.

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a  293b.1-293b.5; P898, vol. 35, 253.4.8. Through the power of Buddha, Mahākāshyapa is answering a question about who would bear the teaching after Buddha’s passing away put by a devaputra king of Smell-Eaters called Liked-When-Seen (lha'i bu mthong na dga’ ba dri za’i rgyal po) in the presence of the Lichavi youth Liked-When-Seen-By-All-The-World.

b  In the Dalama edition (ca, 5a.5) read ba’i dge slong ’dzam for ba’i ’dzam in accordance with the Peking edition, P898, vol. 35, 253.4.8.

c  In the Dalama edition (ca, 5a.6) read mgo byi for mgo bya ba in accordance with the Peking edition, P898, vol. 35, 253.4.8.

d  In the Dalama edition (ca, 5a.6) read gnas for nas in accordance with the Peking edition, P898, vol. 35, 253.5.2.
and the *Great Drum Sūtra* says:\(^a\)

Having set him on the seventh [Bodhisattva] ground, I will bless him as an ordinary being. Then, when the [average] lifespan is eighty years at a time of the diminishment of the teaching, he—having been born in the family lineage called Kayāgaurī\(^b\) in a village called Base-of-the-Great-Garland\(^c\) in a district called Ayodhyā\(^d\) on the banks of a river in a southern area called Murunḍā\(^e\)—will become a monk bearing my name [in that he will be a member of the Shākya clan]. Through skill in sustaining the community he, having emerged from the householder’s life among those indolent about my training in virtue, will gather them together through the modes of gathering.\(^f\)

Having found this sūtra, he will hold it to his body, and having purified the spiritual community, initially he will thoroughly eradicate the great bases of unsuitability [at Nālanda], proclaiming the great sound of doctrine. He will proclaim the conch of the doctrine and victory banner of the doctrine spoken in the *Great Drum Sūtra*.

\(^a\) 201b.3-202a.1; P888, vol. 35, 97.5.4. Buddha is speaking to Mahākāśyapa in the presence of a group of Bodhisattvas including Liked-When-Seen-By-All-The-World.

\(^b\) *ka yo ri*.

\(^c\) *phreng ba chen po rten*.

\(^d\) *dmag gis mi tshugs pa*.

\(^e\) The Taiwan (368.19) edition misreads *ru mun de*; the Dalama edition (*nga*, 3a.3) reads *mu run de*. The Sanskrit might also be Murunta.

\(^f\) As Nāgārjuna himself says in the *Precious Garland of Advice* (stanza 133), the four modes of gathering students are by way of giving gifts, giving doctrine, teaching others to fulfill their aims, and oneself acting according to that teaching:

\begin{quote}
You should cause the assembling
Of the religious and the worldly
Through giving, speaking pleasantly,

Purposeful behavior, and concordant behavior.
\end{quote}

“Speaking pleasantly” is conversation based on high status and definite goodness. “Purposeful behavior” is to cause others to practice what is beneficial. “Concordant behavior” is for one to practice what one teaches others.
This is the direct source for his first proclaiming the great sound of doctrine thoroughly removing the points of unsuitability [at Nālanda]. The description of [the time as when the average] lifespan is eighty years and of finding the *Great Drum Sūtra* are in consideration of the latter [part of his six hundred year lifetime], for if these were from this time [of the first proclamation], it would contradict the explanation [in the *Great Drum Sūtra* itself] that he would proclaim the three great proclamations of doctrine in stages.
[The Second Proclamation]
In accordance with Tsong-kha-pa’s Explanation of (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle: Ocean of Reasoning” saying: a

[Nāgārjuna’s] coming at four hundred years [refers] to [his] second appearance in south [India].

at a point somewhere after four hundred years after Buddha’s passing away and before five hundred years had elapsed, the master [Nāgārjuna]—then about one hundred years old—brought back sūtras of the Perfection of Wisdom class, such as the One Hundred Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra, from Nāga Land and composed treatises commenting on [Buddha’s] thought, these being his Collections of Reasonings—the Treatise on the Middle and so forth—opening the chariot-way [of the Middle Way School] by commenting on [Buddha’s own] thought as being the middle that abandons the two extremes. [At that time] for his name he was called “Nāgārjuna.” [Thereby] he proclaimed the second great proclamation of doctrine by way of the profound emptiness.

For, at that time, when the master [Nāgārjuna] was explaining the three scriptural collections to many beings, two children came to listen, due to which a fragrant odor pervaded everywhere, and when those two left, the odor disappeared. Asked the reason for this, one of them said:

We are children of the Nāga King Takshaka. b In coming to the land of humans we are protected by gośrāc sandalwood.

The master [Nāgārjuna] asked if that sandalwood was obtainable, whereupon they said they would ask their father. They asked their father, who said, “If Nāgārjuna comes, [I] will offer it [to him].” Hence, in dependence upon that, [Nāgārjuna] went [to Nāga Land] to bring back mainly the Perfection of Wisdom and to construct many stūpas from the mud of the Nāgas.

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b  ‘jog po.
c  gor sha. Read gor shas for gor sha’i.
[Nāgārjuna] thereupon taught doctrine to the Nāgas and took alms [there],
due to which the Nāgas asked him to stay, but he did not, returning to the land of humans bringing Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras—the One Hundred Thousand and so forth—and Nāga mud, constructing around ten million stūpas and many images. The *Great Drum Sūtra* says:\(^a\)

As the second [proclamation of doctrine] he will set forth Great Vehicle sūtras, discourse on emptiness.

\(^a\) 202a.1; P888, vol. 35, 97.5.8.

\(^b\) *[phags pa ’jam dpal gyi rtsa ba'i rgyud (ārya-mañjuśrī-mūla-tantra), in bka' ’gyur (lha sa, 373)], BDRC W26071.88:110-900 (Lha sa: Zhol bka’ ’gyur par khang, [194-]); (H 501) rgyud, tha 53b3-448b3 (vol. 88) 408a.2. The full passage (Hopkins, *Maps of the Profound*, 297) is:

When four hundred years have passed
After I, the One-Gone-Thus, have passed away,
A monk called Nāga will arise.
Faithful in and helpful to the teaching,
He will attain the Very Joyful ground.
Living for six hundred years,
That great being will also achieve
The knowledge[-mantra] of Mahāmāyūrī.\(^b\)
He will know the meaning of various treatises
And the meaning of no inherent existence.
When he leaves that body,
He will be born in the [Pure Land of] Bliss.
Finally he will just definitely attain
Thoroughly the state of Buddhahood.

\(^b\) 202a.1; P888, vol. 35, 97.5.8.

and the *Mañjushrī Root Tantra* says:\(^b\)
He will know many treatises  
And the meaning of no inherent existence.

Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Annotations (dngos, ga, 113.4):

This passage in the *Mañjushri Root Tantra* prophesies the Superior Nāgārjuna’s:

• time of arising  
• name  
• help to the teaching through proclaiming the first proclamation of doctrine and so forth  
• how he gained realization of the first ground through the force of reading the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras  
• his lifespan  
• how he effected the welfare of transmigrators through the power of achieving knowledge-mantra  
• his composing many treatises—Collections of Advice, Collections of Praises, medical and political treatises, and so forth, and in particular his clarifying the meaning of the profound emptiness by way of the Collections of Reasonings  
• his going to the [Pure Land of] Bliss upon passing away from sorrow  
• how in the future he will be thoroughly purified [as a Buddha] in the desire realm through [the display of] an emanation body.

a If this citation is from the *Mañjushri Root Tantra* itself, it perhaps should read:
and the *Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra* says:

Destroying the [extreme] positions of [inherent] existence and [conventional] nonexistence,
He will thoroughly teach in the world
The unsurpassed Great Vehicle—my vehicle.

See the previous note. This reading might be translated as. “He will know many treatises teaching the basic constituent/ And the suchness of the meaning of no inherent existence.” Jam-yang-zhay-pa might have a different translation of the tantra, or his own reading.

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a *lang kar gshegs pa’i mdo (lankāvatārasūtra)*, in *bka’ ’gyur (sde dge par phud*, 107), BDRC W22084.49:113-384 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1976-1979), 265a.5; Peking 775, vol. 29. Chandrakīrti’s *Autocommentary* quotes the *Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra* with similar language (245a.4-245a.5) reading:
The [Sanskrit] equivalent of [the Tibetan] klu sgrub is Nāgārjuna. Nāga means “dragon,” and arjuna is used for “achieving temporal affairs” (srid sgrub) [the heroic person by that name famous in the Bhagavadgītā]. Just as Nāgas have the three [qualities of] dwelling in the ocean, possessing treasures of jewels such as wish-granting jewels, and burning fuel and overcoming others through the poisonous fire from their mouths, so the master [Nāgārjuna] also possessed understanding of the profound that eradicates duality, possessed the treasure of profound excellent doctrine, and burned away the fuel of bad views, clearing away mental darkness.

Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words says:

Who cleared away those dwelling in the situations of the two extremes,
Who found birth in the ocean of perfect Buddha awareness,
Who out of compassion taught the profundity of the treasure
Of excellent doctrine just as he realized it,
Whose fires of the view [of the emptiness
Of inherent existence] moreover destroy

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a Clear Words, Commentary on (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle,” dbu ma rtsa ba'i 'grel pa 'grel ba (mūlamadhyamakavrtyprasantapada), in bstan 'gyur (sde dge, 3860), BDRC W23703.102-4-401, vol.’a (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 1b.2-1b.4; Peking 5260, vol. 98.

This is from the expression of worship at the very beginning of the text. For the Sanskrit, see Mūlamadhyamakakārikās de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapada Commentaire de Candrakīrti publié par Louis de la Vallée Poussin, Bibliotheca Buddhica IV, (Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1970), 1.3.

b In the Dalama edition read rjes su rtogs bzhiṣn for rjes su rtog cing in accordance with the Dharamsala edition 2.5 which is confirmed by the Sanskrit (1.4) yathāmūdbuddham.
The fuel of textual systems of opponents
And the darkness of mind of the world,

Just as Arjuna protected the kingdom and tamed his enemies, so the master [Nāgārjuna] also protected the kingdom of doctrine and conquered the hosts of foes in cyclic existence. That same text [Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words] says [continuing from the above citation]:

Whose shower of arrows of the speech of non-dual exalted wisdom,
Brings about the welfare of the kingdom of the three realms
Of the world of trainees including gods,
Conquers the army of foes in mundane existence
Homage to that Nāgārjuna.

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a 1b.4-1b.5. which with the next line reads:

b In the Dalama edition read gang gi gnyis med ye shes gsung mda’i tshogs for gang gis gnyis med gsung ba mdzad pa’i tshogs in accordance with the Dharamsala edition 2.7 which is confirmed by the Sanskrit (2.1) yasyāśamajñānavacāśaraughā.
When it is taken this way, Abhayakārāguptapāda’s statement that “Nāgārjuna” is the master’s name when he had gained yogic feats also becomes feasible.

[The Third Proclamation]
There is a way that the master [Nāgārjuna] proclaimed the third great proclamation of doctrine. The Great Cloud Sūtra says:

When seven hundred years have passed after I thoroughly pass away through [my skill in] means, this goddess Vimalaprabhā will arise in a lineage of a king of the realm, called Udayana, in a city called Definite-As-Endowed-With-Glorious-Qualities on the

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a dngos grub, siddhi.
c bde spyod. For bde spyod ces in the Dalama edition (ca, 6a.7) the Peking edition (P898, vol. 35, 266.1.4) reads rgud pa gso ba zhes.
d dpal yon can nges pa.
southern bank of the river Auspicious-Blackness\(^a\) in the district of Mun can\(^b\) in a southern area.

and so forth.

It explains that when seven hundred years elapsed after the Teacher passed away, there was a king called Udayana, and when three generations of his royal lineage elapsed, the daughter of King Shrīmāla,\(^c\) Lo-tog-jor-ma,\(^d\) that is, the goddess Vimalaprabhā, was born [in that family]. In accordance with that explanation,\(^e\) seven hundred years had gone after the Teacher passed away when the master [Nāgārjuna]—on the road while going to the northern continent called Unpleasant Sound three hundred years [into his lifetime]—made a prophecy in the city of Definite-As-Endowed-With-Glorious-Qualities in a letter to the child Jitaka that he would become king.

\(^a\) nag po bzang,
\(^b\) This is the Tibetan; the Sanskrit is not known.
\(^c\) dpal phreng.
\(^d\) lo tog 'byor ma.
\(^e\) It appears that the sūtra citation is made in order to establish the time of Nāgārjuna’s appearance in that city of the Shātavāhanas and nothing more.
Nāgārjuna, having brought about the welfare of transmigrotors in [the continent called] Unpleasant Sound for two hundred years, again came to [the continent called] the Land of Jambu. When the [average] lifespan of humans had become eighty years and the master [Nāgārjuna] was in his sixth century, he proclaimed the third great proclamation of doctrine, composing the *Praise of the Element of Attributes* and so forth teaching the existence of the permanent matrix-of-One-Gone-Thus—the basic constituent, element of attributes—in all sentient beings [in accordance with] the *Great Drum Sūtra*, the *Great Cloud Sūtra*, and so forth, lecturing on such for up to a hundred years, finally passing away in the south, because:

the *Great Drum Sūtra* says:\(^a\)

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\(^a\) *Great Drum Sūtra*, rnga bo chen po'i le'u'i mdo (Mahābherihārakaparivartrasūtra), in bka' 'gyur (sde dge par phud, 222), BDRC W22084.63:170254 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1976-1979, 165b.7-166a.4; P888, vol. 35, 88.2.4. The earlier Buddha Lamp-Maker (mar me mdzad, dīpaṃkara) is speaking to an earlier birth of Liked-When-Seen, a prince, prophesying his appearance at the time of Shākyamuni Buddha. The full passage (sde dge par phud 165b.7-166a.4) reads:
When the Protector called Shākyamuni emerges in this obdurate\textsuperscript{a} world realm, you\textsuperscript{b} will become the Licchavi Liked-When-Seen. Then, when the [average] lifespan is eighty\textsuperscript{c} years at a time of the diminishment of the teaching after the Protector [Shākyamuni Buddha] has passed away in that worldly realm, you—having become the monk called Mindful\textsuperscript{d}—will bring out this sūtra without concern for your own life.\textsuperscript{e} Then, dying after a hundred years pass, as [cited] earlier (83), [it goes on to describe his] displaying emanations.

\textsuperscript{a} mi mjed.
\textsuperscript{b} The Peking edition (P888, vol. 35, 88.2.4) reads rgyal po chen po khyod instead of khyod as in the Dalama edition (ca, 6b.2).
\textsuperscript{c} The Peking edition (P888, vol. 35, 88.2.5) reads tshe/ lo brgyad bcu lon pa na instead of tshe lo brgyad cu pa na as in the Dalama edition (ca, 6b.3).
\textsuperscript{d} blo 'chang.
\textsuperscript{e} The Peking edition (P888, vol. 35, 88.2.6) reads bar byas te/ mdo 'di 'dzin par instead of bar mdo 'di byin par as in the Dalama edition (ca, 6b.3).
and also that sūtra says:\textsuperscript{a}

As a third [proclamation of doctrine] he will expound discourse examining the basic constituent\textsuperscript{b} [that is, the Buddha nature] of sentient beings and will discourse on the Great Drum…Later, hearing this sūtra at a time of great age, he will discourse on this sūtra for a hundred years, making the rain of doctrine fall. After a hundred years pass, he will display a great magical emanation among humans in the south and will display thorough passing beyond sorrow.\textsuperscript{c}

and the Mañjushrī Root Tantra says:\textsuperscript{d}

Many treatises teaching the basic constituent.

\textsuperscript{a} 202a.1-202a.4; P888, vol. 35, 97.5.8.
\textsuperscript{b} kham, dhātu.
\textsuperscript{c} In the Dalama edition (ca, 6b.5) read yongs su mya ngan las 'das pa for yongs su 'das pa in accordance with the Peking edition (vol. 35, 98.1.2).
\textsuperscript{d} The Peking edition (P162, vol. 6, 259.4.1) has a different reading: bstan bcos sna tshogs don dang ni rather than khams ston bstan chos du ma dang.
Concerning this, I propound that the modes of teaching topics in Nāgārjuna's Praise of the Element of Attributes, Maitreya's Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle, and the Questions of King Dhāraṇīśvara Sūtra are similar; moreover, although these are concordant with the meaning of the middle wheel since they (1) [teach that] a basic constituent for complete purification exists in all sentient beings and posit that it, moreover, is emptiness and (2) prove that there is one final vehicle, nevertheless [Nāgārjuna’s praises and so forth] are treated as a third proclamation of doctrine separate from the second in that they extensively [teach] the permanence of the continuum of a Buddha and how [a Buddha]—in terms of the definitive meaning—does not pass away.

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\( ^a \) Great Vehicle Treatise on the Sublime Continuum/ Treatise on the Later Scriptures of the Great Vehicle (theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma’i bstan bcos, mahāyānottaratantraśāstra; P5525.

\( ^b \) “Permanence of the continuum” (rgyun gyi rtag pa) is a way of saying the continuum goes on forever but is not actually permanent in the sense of not being momentary. Dol-po-pa She-rab-gyal-tshan holds that it is simply permanent.
At nine hundred years Asaṅga opened the way of mind-only.

Word Commentary on Root Text: When nine hundred years had passed [since Buddha’s passing away], the Superior Asaṅga opened the chariot-way of commenting on the thought of the Mother Sūtras as mind-only.

When nine hundred years had passed after the Teacher passed away, roughly the same period as when the master Nāgārjuna proclaimed the third great sound of doctrine, the master Superior Asaṅga came:

- commenting on the meaning of sūtras requiring interpretation—the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought and so forth—in the Five Treatises on the Grounds, the Two Summaries, and so forth
- explaining the thought of sūtras of definitive meaning—the King Dhāranīshvara Sūtra and so forth and the Matrix of One-Gone-Thus Sūtra and so forth—in his commentary on Maitreya’s Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle in agreement with the Consequence School
- and mainly opening the chariot-way of the Mind-Only School living for one hundred fifty years.

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a Taipei edition, note tsha, 573.9.
b Taipei, 371.19.
c From the viewpoint of the Consequence School, the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought requires interpretation.
d These are definitive sūtras from the viewpoint of the Consequence School; Ge-lug-pa scholars hold that Asanga evinces the view of the Consequence School in his commentary on Maitreya’s Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle.
For, the *Mañjushrī Root Tantra* says:\(^a\)

When nine hundred years have passed
After I have gone beyond sorrow,\(^b\)
There will be a monk called Asaṅga,
Skilled in the meaning of treatises.
He will differentiate many aspects
Of definitive meanings and interpretable meanings.\(^c\)

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\(^a\) 408a.5-408.6.
\(^b\) These first two lines appear in the *Mañjushrī Root Tantra* as cited in Wonch’uk’s *Great Commentary on the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*.
\(^c\) A longer citation (408a.6-408b.2), continues in Hopkins, *Maps of the Profound*, 299:

He will have the nature of explaining texts,
His selfhood being to teach worldly knowledge.
About his achievement of knowledge,
Through the power of the mantra
Of the one called Lady Messenger of Sala (*sa la’i pho nya mo*)
His awareness will grow good.
For the sake of the teaching remaining long
He will compile the meanings of the principles in sūtras.
He will live for one hundred and fifty years.
His body having disintegrated, he will go to a land of gods.
Having experienced bliss for a long time
Traveling in cyclic existence,
The great being finally
Will attain enlightenment.
Hence, mainly these two—Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga—opened the chariot-ways of the Middle Way School and the Mind-Only School, and subsidiarily commented on the thought of even Lesser Vehicle sūtras in the manner of the Middle Way and Mind-Only systems, of which there are many instances such as:
(1) in the master Nāgārjuna’s Precious Garland[^1] when the master explains that the abandonment of the entire aggregates [taught] in the Lesser Vehicle is in consideration of the perspective of meditative equipoise that has no remainder [of the appearance of inherent existence].

The absence of production taught in the Great Vehicle
And the extinction of the others are in fact the same emptiness
[Since they indicate] the nonexistence of [inherently existent] production and the extinction [of inherent existence].
Therefore let [the Great Vehicle] be allowed [as Buddha’s word].

and in his explanations that even in the Lesser Vehicle the selflessness of the Middle Way School is taught, such as [in the Treatise on the Middle when he cites]:

Forms are like balls of foam.
Feelings are like bubbles.
Discriminations resemble mirages.
Compositional factors are like banana tree trunks.[^2]

[^1]: Precious Garland of Advice for the King, rgyal po la gtam bya ba rin po che’i phreng ba (rājaparīkṣāhāratatvavāli), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4158), BDRC W23703.172:215-253 (Delhi, India: Del-hi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985); Peking 5658, vol. 129; Dharma vol. 93. 121b.1; Stanza 386. For Tsong-kha-pa’s and Gyal-tshab’s commentaries, see Hopkins, Buddhist Advice for Living and Liberation: Nāgārjuna’s Precious Garland, 84-89. For Bhāvaviveka’s extensive explanation of this passage, see Hopkins, Maps of the Profound 721-722.

[^2]: Jam-yang-zhay-pa cites the first line and “and so forth”; I have filled in the rest. This is cited in Nagarjuna’s dpal gsang ba ’dus pa’i rgyud kyi rgyud ’grel zhes bya ba (śrīgūhyasamājatantrasya tantratākā-nāma), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 1784a), BDRC W23703.294-568, (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 45a.1-45a.2, which reads:

[^3]: The plantain tree. This refers to the trunk of the tree which, much like an onion, has
Consciousnesses resemble magical illusions. Thus the Seer of Suchness pronounced. and so forth.\(^a\)

\(^a\) Cited in Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words* (13a.6-13a.7) as follows:

\[\text{no core. These lines are cited in } \text{Samyuttani\kya} \text{ III. 142.}\]
Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Annotations Pa: The two, the teaching—in the scriptural collections of the Great Vehicle—of cessation that is the natural [or primordial] nonexistence of production and the teaching—of the others, in the scriptural collections of the Lesser Vehicle—of extinction, emptiness, having same import as the meaning of extinction and nonproduction, that is, meaning natural extinction and nonproduction; therefore, be patient with the scriptural collections of the Great Vehicle as the word of Buddha.

and (2) the master Asaṅga also:

- explains, as earlier, in Summary of the Great Vehicle that “fundamental consciousness” and so forth teach the basis-of-all and so forth
- in Grounds of Bodhisattvas cites three Hearer scriptural passages on the occasion of refuting the two extremes, and
- in Grounds of Yogic Practice mostly cites many Great Vehicle sūtra passages and comments on them as mind-only.

These are from the Transmigration Sūtra, the Collection of Meanings Sūtra, and the Story of Samīthakarīyana; for the latter two passages, see 412; for all three passages, including the Tibetan and the Sanskrit, see Hopkins, Emptiness in the Mind-Only School, 199 and 202 footnote a.
Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Word Commentary on Root Text: The master Buddhapālita commented on the thought of Nāgārjuna’s *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called “Wisdom”* in the manner of the Consequence School.

Around just after the master Asaṅga opened the way of the Mind-Only School upon having come to this world, the master Buddhapālita wrote a commentary on Nāgārjuna’s *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called “Wisdom”* and thereby opened the way of the Consequence School because:

- in general, there are eight commentaries on Nāgārjuna’s *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called “Wisdom”*
- and although the other six commentaries mostly use syllogistic statements, this master flings many consequences.

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b Taipei edition, note its, 573.10.

c Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words*, like Buddhapālita’s commentary, mainly uses consequences.
Most of the explanations in the commentaries by masters [who wrote texts]—other than the two, the Akutobhayā Commentary and the Clear Words—that are mentioned in Bhāvaviveka’s Lamp for (Nāgārjuna’s) “Wisdom” are seen to be in the class of syllogisms. Also, Chandrakirti’s Clear Words says: a

Objection: However, the extensive expression of syllogistic statements is the system of commentators.

This [presents an opponent’s position that]:

Although syllogistic statements are manifest in Nāgārjuna’s Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called “Wisdom,” this is due to its being a root text, but the extensive statement of syllogisms is done by its commentaries, and why did Buddhālita not also do this?

a 8a.7-8b.1.
The master Buddhapālita refutes each of the four extreme types of production through consequences and similarly makes commentary within using many consequences; the Buddhapālita Commentary\(^a\) contains many [statements of consequences] such as, for instance:\(^b\)

About that, respectively, things are not produced from their own entities because [if they were],\(^c\) their production [again] would be

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\(^a\) The commentary is called by the name of its author.

\(^b\) 161b.3-161b.6; P5242, vol. 95, 75.1.6ff., commenting on Nāgārjuna’s Treatise on the Middle, I.1. For extensive discussion of Buddhapālita’s refutation of production from self and so forth, and the attack it provoked from Bhāvaviveka as well as Chandrakīrti’s defense of Buddhapālita, see the series Opposite of the Consequences and Compatibly Appearing Subjects, especially the first three items on the UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies website uma-tibet.org:

1. Buddhapālita’s Refutation of Production from Self, Bhāvaviveka’s Criticism, and Avalokitavrata’s Commentary: Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Opposite of the Consequences, 1.

2. Chandrakīrti Defends Buddhapālita against Bhāvaviveka: Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Opposite of the Consequences, 2.


4. [Forthcoming: Decisive Analysis of the Controversies over the Refutations of Production from Self: Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, 4]


7. Tsong-kha-pa’s Revised Presentation of Compatibly Appearing Subjects in The Essence of Eloquence with Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s Commentary, 7.


\(^c\) This and the next brackets are from Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle, 225a.6ff.
just senseless and because production would be endless. It is thus: the production again of things already existing in their own entities is purposeless. [Also] if, though existent, they are produced, they would never not be produced; hence, that also is not asserted. Therefore, respectively, things are not produced from self.

They also are not produced from other. Why? For it would [absurdly] follow that everything would be produced from everything.

They also are not produced from both self and other because the fallacies of both [production from self and production from other] would [absurdly] follow.

They also are not produced causelessly because it would [absurdly] follow that everything always would be produced from everything and because there would be the fallacy that all endeavor would be just senseless.
This master Buddhapālita [yogically] achieved [meeting with] the foremost venerable Mañjughoṣa, composed explanations of many treatises, and proceeded to an area of knowledge-bearers; Tsong-kha-pa’s Explanation of (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle”: Ocean of Reasoning says:

The one called Buddhapālita who achieved the word of the foremost venerable Mañjughoṣa and proceeded to a place of adept knowledge-bearers.

and the colophon to the translation of the Buddhapālita Commentary says:\(^a\)

Written by one who achieved the word of the youthful Mañjushrī, composed explanations of many treatises, properly entered the Great Vehicle, and proceeded to a special place of those who have achieved the holding of knowledge-mantra.

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\(^a\) 281a.2-281a.3, which reads:
Bhavya, apprehending fallacies, opened the way of the Middle Way Autonomy School.

Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Word Commentary on Root Text: The master Bhavyakara\(^a\) (legs ldan ’byed), apprehending fallacies in those [consequences presented by Buddhapālita], opened the chariot-way of commenting on the thought of Nāgārjuna’s *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called “Wisdom”* in the manner of the system of the Middle Way Autonomy School.

Then the master\(^b\) Bhavyakara—that is, *legs ldan ’byed* and in some translations also *skal ldan* and also master *snang bral*—who according to Khay-drub Ge-leg-pal-zang’s *Great Exposition of the General Tantra Sets*\(^c\) vowed to achieve the vajra seat [Buddhahood] in that lifetime but in his next lifetime became the master Vajraghaṇṭapāda (*rdo rje dril bu pa*) and attained the supreme feat [Buddhahood], in general composed many treatises and in particular:

\(^a\) That is, Bhāvaviveka.
\(^b\) Taipei, 373.15.
the Heart of the Middle, which is like a condensation of Nāgārjuna’s *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called “Wisdom,”* and its auto-commentary, the *Blaze of Reasoning,* setting forth at length our own and others’ assertions and mainly teaching both the profound and the vast of the basis, path, and fruit—the mind of enlightenment, calm abiding, special insight, and so forth

and the Lamp for (Nāgārjuna’s) “Wisdom,” a commentary on Nāgārjuna’s *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called “Wisdom.”*

Apprehending fallacies in the acceptances of many masters and in the [statement of] consequences by the master Buddhapālita when refuting production from the four extremes, he refutes them one by one extensively; refuting the acceptances by the Proponents of Mind-Only that imputational natures are not inherently established, and so forth, he newly opened the great way of Proponents of the Middle in which although phenomena do not ultimately exist, in conventional terms they exist inherently and by way of their own character because although it is explained that this master [Bhāvaviveka] followed Devasharma’s commentary called
Shining White,\(^a\) the opener of the chariot-way of the Middle Way Autonomy School is just he because after the Superior [Nāgārjuna] and his spiritual son [Āryadeva] this master is earlier in extensively opening the systemic-way in which the Mind-Only School is not logically feasible and mode of the Middle Way School is logically feasible; this also is known from the statement by the master Ye-she-de:\(^b\)

After them, the master Bhāvaviveka repudiated the system of Cognition-only and presented a system in which external objects exist in conventional terms.

Moreover because the master Shāntarakṣita made [the format of] nonexistence ultimately and inherent existence in conventional terms in accordance with the system of this master [Bhāvaviveka] and also cited it as the source.

\(^a\) dkar po nram par 'char ba.
\(^b\) ye shes sde; fl. c. 800.
With respect to the way [Bhāvaviveka] apprehends fallacies in [Buddhapālita’s] individual consequences, Bhāvaviveka’s Lamp for (Nāgārjuna’s) “Wisdom” says about [Buddhapālita’s] consequences establishing the nonexistence of production from selfː

That is not reasonable:

1. because [Buddhapālita] does not express a reason [capable of proving that there is no production from self] as well as an example, and
2. because [the reasoning as Buddhapālita states it] does not avoid the fallacies adduced by another [that is, the fallacies that a Śāṅkhya would be expected to adduce].
3. Since these are phrases of consequences, they [must] be re-

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b  The Sanskrit, as Chandrakīrti cites it (La Vallée Poussin, Prasannapadā, 15.1), rather than presenting this as three points as the Tibetan in Bhāvaviveka’s text does (dngos po rnams gzhan las skye ba ‘gyur ba dang / skye ba ’bras bu dang bcas pa nyid du ‘gyur ba dang /skye ba thug pa yod par ‘gyur ba ’i phyir: P5253, vol. 95, 155.5.1; Golden Reprint, vol. 107, 132.5; Karmapa sde dge bstan ’gyur, vol. 96, 97.7, as well as in Avalokitavrata’s commentary, Golden Reprint, vol. 109, 234.2; Peking P5259, 191.1.5; Karmapa sde dge bstan ’gyur, vol. 98, 148.3), reframes Buddhapālita’s syllogism in its opposite form:

parasmādutpānāḥ bhāvā janmasāphalāyāḥ janmaniruddhācceti (Things are produced from other because production has effects and because production has an end.)
versed from the meaning put forward, and hence what becomes evident is the meaning of the opposite of the thesis and the reasons, due to which it would be that things are produced from other, production has effects, and production has an end, whereby [Buddhapālita] would contradict tenets [of the Middle Way School].

The Tibetan of Chandrakīrti’s text, nevertheless, as above presents this as three points:

dngos po rnam gzhan las skye ba 'gur ba dang / skye ba 'bras bu dang bcas pa nyid du 'gur ba dang / skye ba thug pa yod par 'gur ba'i phyir (Golden Reprint, vol. 112, 13.4; Tibetan Publishing House 1968 edition, 10.19). I would render the Sanskrit into Tibetan, however, as:

dngos po rnam gzhan las skye ba yin te / skye ba don yod pa nyid yin pa'i phyir dang skye ba thug pa yod pa yin pa'i phyir ro/

Because of the unanimity of the Tibetan versions on this point (except for mine) and because Tsong-kha-pa and Jam-yang-zhay-pa speak to these versions, I use their casting of the meaning as three points but cite the Sanskrit version throughout.

a de’i chos. Avalokitavrata says:

the property of that (de’i chos, taddhārma): the property of that thesis, that is to say, [the reason which is] the property of the subject of that thesis (bsgrub par bya ba de’i phyogs kyi chos), “Things are not produced from self” (dngos po rnam bdag gi bdag nyid las skye ba med de, na svata utpadyanti bhāvāḥ), namely, “because their production would be just senseless and because production would be endless” (de dag gi skye ba don med pa nyid du ‘gur ba’i phyir dang skye ba thug pa med par ‘gur ba’i phyir ro, tadutpadayāyathāt/ atiprasaṅgadūṣācca).

what becomes evident is the meaning of the opposite of that (de bzog pa’i don mngon pas, vipāraṇaḥ...vyaktu): what becomes evident is the meaning of the opposite of “because their production would be just senseless” (de dag gi skye ba don med pa nyid du ‘gur ba’i phyir, tadutpadavaiyārthāt), namely, “because production has effects” (skye ba ‘bras bu dang bcas pa nyid du ‘gur ba’i phyir, janmasāphalāyāt)—and the opposite of “because production would be endless” (skye ba thug pa med par ‘gur ba’i phyir ro, atiprasaṅgadūṣācca)—namely, “because production has an end” (skye ba thug pa yod pa yin pa’i phyir, janmanirodha).

b As mentioned two notes above, at the end of the second reason Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s citation (374.12) reads ro—the equivalent of a period—which might seem to terminate the list of reasons, making it look as if there are only two reasons. In other versions, there is an “and” clearly denoting that there is a third, additional reason.
These are widely renowned; [their] meaning is:

1. It does not express a reason and an example capable of proving that there is no production from self.
2. It does not avoid others’ fallacies [adduced by Sāṃkhya] questioning whether this is conventional or ultimate [in the Sāṃkhyas’ own system].
3. Since the thesis—the nonexistence of production from self—is not a nonaffirming negative, it contradicts the tenet, or system, of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras and Nāgārjuna’s *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called* “Wisdom.”

Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s *Annotations Pha:* With respect to the

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a According to Tsong-kha-pa and his followers, the tenet being contradicted is that the reasonings prove a nonaffirming negative.
b *dbu ma pa, pha,* 6.3.
three fallacies:

1. Since [Buddhapālita’s commentary] does not express a reason and an example capable of proving that there is no production from self, it is reduced to a mere thesis.

2. [Buddhapālita’s commentary] does not avoid criticism by Sāṃkhyas upon examining the thesis:

   About the meaning of your “from their own entities,” if you are saying “from the entities of manifest effects,” [you] are proving what is already established [for us Sāṃkhyas] because we also do not assert that [things] are produced from the entities of already manifest effects. If you are saying “from potential entities that are non-manifest causes, the entailment is opposite because all that have production are only produced from those [non-manifest causes].

3. These are phrases affording an opportunity for censure by another party.

The syllogism of the verbal reading (tshig zin gyi sbyor ba) of the first commentary [by Buddhapālita] is:

The subjects, things, are not produced from self because production is senseless and endless.

The syllogism constructed by Bhāvaviveka as being what Buddhapālita was intending (dgongs tshod blangs pa’i sbyor ba) is:

With respect to the subjects, things, production from self is not just eliminated because production is sensible and has an

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a The translation of Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words, in which Chandrakīrti cites Bhāvaviveka’s criticisms of Buddhapālita, by Mahāsumati and Pa-tshab-nyi-ma-drag (pa tshab ngyi ma drags), that Jam-yang-zhay-pa uses just above reads “because these are phrases of consequences” (thal bar ‘gyur ba’i tshig yin pa’i phyir, prasangavākyatvāc ca), whereas the translation of Bhāvaviveka’s Lamp for “Wisdom,” by Jñānagarbha and Lui-gyal-tshan (glu’i rgyal mtshan), that Ngag-wang-pal-dan uses reads “because there are phrases affording an opportunity for censure” (glags yod pa’i tshig yin pa’i phyir te, sāvakāśvacanatvāc ca). The first version seems to be merely pointing out that Buddhapālita’s refutation uses consequences, whereas the second version indicates the Buddhapālita’s explanation is subject to another’s censure. The first version could also mean that Buddhapālita’s explanation is subject to another’s drawing out consequences as is suggested by Avalokitavrata’s commentary on Bhāvaviveka that clearly supports the second translation. Nevertheless, the second translation does not appear to be the meaning of the same phrases, cited below, from Chandrakīrti’s renditions of Bhāvaviveka’s objections to Buddhapālita’s refutations of production from other and of causeless production.
end.

[Bhāvaviveka] expresses the first two fallacies with respect to the syllogism of the verbal reading and expresses the fallacy of affording an opportunity for censure mainly with respect to the syllogism constructed as what [Buddhapālita] was intending.
The way in which these become an opportunity for censure [by another party] is as Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Commentary on (Nāgārjuna’s) “Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called Wisdom” says:

With respect to how [Buddhapālita’s refutation] becomes words affording an opportunity [to an opponent to expose contradiction within his own system], since [the thesis and the reason must] be reversed from the meaning put forward, the proposition “Things are not produced from their own entities” evinces the opposite meaning, whereby “Things are produced from other” and the opposite meanings of the signs that are the phenomena of proof—that production is meaningful and has an end—become evident, whereby it has the fallacy of contradicting his own tenets.\(^a\)

That [production] is senseless and endless is not the reason, and that “if produced from self, [their production] would be senseless and endless,” is also not suitable as the reason because when [the reason] is established upon the subject, the proposition would be established. Therefore, the two reverse meanings are the sign [or reason]. If the sign of the explicit rendering must be reversed, then the thesis of the explicit rendering also must be reversed because of being parallel. About this, since [the reversal of the thesis of the explicit rendering] is not doable in accordance with how the signs are reversed, that production from self is not just eliminated is the reverse meaning [of the original thesis “Things are not produced from their own entities.”]\(^b\)

\(^a\) See Refutation and Attack, 121.

\(^b\) See Refutation and Attack, 83-84.
Then, it is being said, “Because production is sensible and has an end, that things are produced from self is not just eliminated,” whereby it becomes that they are produced from other. In that case, the meaning of “is not from self” contradicts the tenet of being a mere elimination of production from self.\(^a\)

\(^a\) See Refutation and Attack, 84.
Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s *Annotations Ba*: Here “It does not avoid fallacies questioning whether this is conventional or ultimate” (*kun rdzob dang don dam gang yin 'dri ba'i nyes pa ma bsal ba*) is done in terms of the conventional or ultimate of the Śāṅkhya system, whereby it is the same essential as explained earlier.

**[Refuting Production From Other]**

[Bhāvaviveka]\(^a\) also speaks of fallacies in [Buddhapālita’s] refutation of production from other; Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words* says:\(^b\)

About this the master Buddhapālita explains:

> They also are not produced from other. Why? For it would [absurdly] follow that everything would be produced from everything.

The master Bhāvaviveka repudiates this, saying:

> Therefore, because this is speech of consequences, when the thesis and the means of proof are reversed, things would be produced from self, both, or causelessly and some would be produced from some, whereby the earlier position is contradicted. Also, in another way, it is because [things] would be produced from everything.

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\(^a\) Taipei, 374.19.

\(^b\) 12a.3-12a5. I have lengthened Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s citation of Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words* to include Chandrakīrti’s quotation of Buddhapālita’s refutation of production from other.
Hence, since in that [commentary by Buddhapālita] there are no proof and refutation, it is senseless.

The meaning:

• If the thesis and means of proof of the explicit rendering are not reversed, then since that all are produced from all is not suitable as the reason, one’s own position is not proven, and since [Buddhapālita] does not demonstrate any damage by direct perception and so forth to the assertion of production from other, the other’s position is also not repudiated, whereby [his commentary] is senseless.

• If the explicit thesis and means of proof are reversed, the opposite of the reason is: some are produced from some; and the opposite of the nonexistence of production from other is: production from other exists. However, these are not suitable because this is an occasion of demonstrating that ultimately those do not exist.

• Therefore, it must be that, having turned away from a mere negation of production from other, [Buddhapālita] is proving that [things] are produced from self, both, or causelessly, whereby this contradicts the earlier position, that is, that the assertion that “[things] are not produced from other” in [Nāgārjuna’s] root text is a nonaffirming negative.
Refuting Causeless Production

[Bhāvaviveka] also speaks of fallacies in [Buddhapālita’s] refutation of causeless production. Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words says:

The master Buddhapālita explains:

They also are not produced causelessly because it would [absurdly] follow that everything always would be produced from everything [and because there would be the fallacy that all endeavor would be just senseless].

The master Bhāvaviveka repudiates this, saying:

\[\text{Refuting Causeless Production}\]

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The master Buddhapālita explains:

They also are not produced causelessly because it would [absurdly] follow that everything always would be produced from everything [and because there would be the fallacy that all endeavor would be just senseless].

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The master Buddhapālita explains:

They also are not produced causelessly because it would [absurdly] follow that everything always would be produced from everything [and because there would be the fallacy that all endeavor would be just senseless].

The master Bhāvaviveka repudiates this, saying:
With regard to that also because it is the speech of a consequence, if that is accepted as the meaning of speech manifesting a thesis and proof, then it comes to indicate that things are produced from causes because at some times some are produced from some and that endeavor just has effects. However, that is not reasonable due to incurring the above-mentioned fallacy.

The meaning is:

- It is not suitable to reverse the literal reading, and thus production from causes is implicitly indicated as the opposite meaning of the thesis of that consequence—[the thesis being] the nonaffirming negative that [things] are not produced causelessly.
- The opposite meaning of the two signs that are the proofs must be stated as “because at some times some are produced from some and endeavor has effects.”
- Hence, this has the fallacies of contradicting the assertion that the non-existence of production from the four extremes is a nonaffirming negative.

\[a\] The literal reading of Buddhapālita’s thesis is “Things are not produced causelessly.” The opposite of that is, “Things are produced causelessly.” Bhāvaviveka’s point is that this is obviously not what Buddhapālita is proving.
1. The subjects, eyes and so forth, are not ultimately produced from self because of existing—as is the case, for example, with an existent consciousness.

2. The subjects, causes and effects such as semen and blood, which are causes of an eye, and the eye, which is their effect, respectively empty, inherently are not ultimately produced from other because of being other—as is the case, for example, with woolen cloth from clay.

3. Those subjects also are not ultimately produced from both [self and other] because of incurring the fallacies described for both.

4. The subject, eyes, are not causelessly produced adventitiously because of possessing general characteristics and a specific characteristic—as is the case, for example, with a pot.

Through such approaches Bhāvaviveka extensively refutes [production from the four extremes]. Below, these will be explained a little, together with sources.

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a gang dang gang gis stong pa de dag, translation doubtful.

Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Annotations Tsa: According to Chandrakirti, it is not reasonable for Proponents of the Middle to assert autonomous syllogisms because autonomous syllogisms do not exist, because the two, autonomous syllogism (rang rgyud kyi sbyor ba) and own-powered syllogism (rang dbang gi sbyor ba), have the same meaning, because Tsong-kha-pa’s The Essence of Eloquence explains that that which generates an inference realizing a thesis upon ascertaining the two subjects [that is, the subject of the thesis and the subject of the example] and the [three] modes of the sign through valid cognition without involving the assertions of the other party but autonomously from an objective mode of subsistence is the meaning of autonomous [syllogism].
Bhāvaviveka’s opening a systematic-tradition in this manner occurred after Asaṅga and his [half]-brother [Vasubandhu] widely spread the system of the Mind-Only School; the fifth chapter of Bhāvaviveka’s *Heart of the Middle* says:  

Due to pride in their own system  
Others who boasted of being wise  
Propounded that entry into the ambrosia of suchness  
Is taught well by the Yogic Practitioners.

and his autocommentary [the Blaze of Reasoning] says:  

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*a*  *Heart of the Middle, dbu ma'i snying po'i tshig le'ur byas pa* (madhyamakahādayakārikā), in *bstan 'gyur (sde dge),* BDRC W23703.98:4-82 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 20a.3-20a.4; Peking 5255, vol. 96; which reads:

*b*  *Blaze of Reasoning / Commentary on the “Heart of the Middle”: Blaze of Reasoning, dbu ma'i snying po'i grel pa rtog ge' bar ba* (madhyamakahādayavṛttiśāntakaśālā), in *bstan 'gyur (sde dge),* BDRC W23703.98:82-660. (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 199a.6-199b.1; Peking 5256, vol. 96. 199a.6-199b.1 reads:
Other masters of the Great Vehicle itself—Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, and so forth—interpreted otherwise the systematic meanings thoroughly realized by Superiors who were prophesied by the One-Gone-Thus and who gained [Bodhisattva] grounds. Without shame and embarrassment, taking pride in knowing the meaning while they did not know it and taking pride in being wise, they propounded the following.

Hence, it is evident that the master [Nāgārjuna] composed the Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment and so forth after Proponents of Mind-Only had appeared, whereby:

- the two—the master Bhāvaviveka and the master Chandrakīrti—are feasibly [Nāgārjuna’s] later-phase students
- and [Nāgārjuna’s] living for six hundred years is also well established.
Chandrakīrti, having refuted Bhāvaviveka well, established it as not shared.

Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s *Word Commentary on Root Text*: The master Chandrakīrti, having refuted Bhāvaviveka’s system well, established the thought of Nāgārjuna’s *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called “Wisdom”* as not shared with the Autonomy School and below.

After Bhāvaviveka opened the systematic tradition of the Autonomy Middle Way School, the master Chandrakīrti refuted autonomy in the master Bhāvaviveka’s system; having, moreover, not just refuted it but refuted it well, he established the system of the Consequence School as not shared with the Autonomy School and below because although Buddhapālita opened the mere systematic tradition of the Consequence School, it was not clear whether to assert autonomy or not, whereas Chandrakīrti demonstrated manifoldly:

- that Buddhapālita did not assert autonomy
- proofs that it is not suitable for Proponents of the Middle to use autonomous [syllogisms]
- and, oppositely, the damages to autonomous syllogisms and establishment by way of the object’s own character

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and thereby established [the Consequence School] as unshared, as in, for instance, Chandrakīrti’s autocommentary on the Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle” saying, a “May scholars ascertain that this system is unshared.”

a Autocommentary on the “Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) Treatise on the Middle” dbu ma la ’jug pa’i bshad pa / dbu ma la ’jug pa’i rang ’grel (madhaymakāvattabhāṣya), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 3862), BDRC W23703.102:442-697 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 347a.7; Peking 5263, vol. 98. With more context the passage (347a.6-347a.7) reads:

This is because a supramundane doctrine is not fit to be similar to a mundane doctrine. May scholars ascertain that this system is unshared.”

b Tsong-kha-pa’s The Essence of Eloquence cites and discusses the passage:

[Chandrakīrti] describes his own system as unshared with the commentaries [on Nāgārjuna’s thought]* by other Proponents of the Middle. His Autocommentary on the “Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) Treatise on the Middle” says (Louis de la Vallée Poussin, Mūlamadhyamakakārikās, Bibliotheca Buddhica 4 [Osnbrück, Germany: Biblio Verlag, 1970], 406.9, commenting on stanzas XIII.1-2) (347a.3-347a.6):

May scholars ascertain that just as, except for Nāgārjuna’s Treatise on the Middle, this doctrine called “emptiness” is not expressed non-erro-neously in other treatises, so the system that appears in this [treatise]— set out together with objections and answers to any [other] system— does not exist, in terms of the doctrine of emptiness, in other treatises. Therefore, it should be understood that a certain [scholar’s] propounding that just what are propounded ultimately in the system of the Sūtra School are asserted conventionally by the Proponents of the Middle Way School is a proposition only by one who does not know the suchness of Nāgārjuna’s Treatise on the Middle.
At the end of also saying such with respect to the system of Great Exposition School, [Chandrakīrti] (347a.6-347a.7; Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra*, 407.1) says:

This is because a supramundane doctrine is not fit to be similar to a mundane doctrine. May scholars ascertain that this system is unshared.”

Through the reason of his own system’s not being shared with other Proponents of the Middle Way School, [Chandrakīrti] posits that one who asserts that what are propounded ultimately by the two Proponents of [Truly Existent External] Objects [that is, the Great Exposition School and the Sūtra School] are propounded conventionally by the Proponents of the Middle Way School does not know the Middle Way suchness. The reason is that, in the [Consequentialists’] own system, even conventionally, phenomena that are established by way of their own character are not asserted, whereas those [Proponents of True Existence] only posit [all phenomena] in the context of that [establishment of objects by way of their own character].

If one falls from either of the two truths, one also falls from the other; therefore, it is not suitable that a supramundane doctrine which has not fallen from the mode of the two truths be similar in terms of either of the two truths with a mundane doctrine that has fallen from the two truths. Therefore, this system of the Superior [Nāgārjuna]—in terms not only of the ultimate but also of the conventional—is not shared with the schools of the Proponents of True Existence.

*The bracketed additions are mostly drawn from Ta-drin-rab-tan’s Annotations, 270.5-272.6.*
Concerning this, first [Chandrakīrti] refutes [Bhāvaviveka]:

- When Buddhapālita demonstrates internal contradictions in the other
side, flinging at the Sāṃkhyas the [absurd] consequences of senseless and endless re-production by way of reasons such as earth that exists in its own entity, why would the other side not be overcome?
• If, though they see their internal contradictions, they stubbornly persist, they would not be overcome even though syllogisms are stated to them.
• Both consequences and reasons [that is, syllogisms] can engender the mere perception of contradiction in an opponent.
• Therefore, Buddhapālita does not assert autonomous [syllogisms], and you [Bhāvaviveka] are reduced to only liking autonomous [syllogisms].

Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words says:

We [that is, Chandrakīrti] view all these fallacies as unreasonable. How? About this, respectively, his [Bhāvaviveka’s] saying “because [Buddhapālita] did not express a reason [capable of proving that there is no production from self] as well as an example” (gtan tshigs dang dpe ma brjod pa’i phyir dang, hetu-drṣṭāntānabhidhānā) is not reasonable. Why? [Buddhapālita] is

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a 5b.4-6a.2. In separate citations Jam-yang-zhay-pa quotes the first sentence and final clause; I have provided the rest to establish the context.
inquiring in the following way of an opponent who asserts production from self.a

You [Sāṃkhyas] propound that “from self” [means] that the existence [of things that involve production acts] as a cause and that just it [that is, the existent] is produced. b However, we [Buddhists] do not see that there is purpose in the production-again (yang skye ba, punarutpāda) of the existent, and we also see that [such production] would be endless. Still, you [Sāṃkhyas] do not assert that the already produced [that is, the already manifest] is produced again and also do not assert that [the production of a thing] is endless. Therefore, your debate [that is to say, your position of production from self] is devoid of logical feasibility and contradicts your own assertion.

When [Buddhapālita] debates through just these [consequences] that have the effects from stating a reason and an example, would the opponent not accept it? However, if opponents are not overcome even through debate by way of contradicting their own assertions, then due to their shamelessness they also just would not be overcome by reasons and examples. We [Consequentialists] do not debate with the crazily stubborn. Therefore, when the master [Bhāvaviveka] sets out inferences even at inappropriate times, he is manifesting just his own liking for inference.

La Vallée Poussin’s Sanskrit (15.4) reads “is inquiring in the following way about the purpose in production of the existent” (vidyamāṇasya punarupāde pravojanam), but Dr. Vaidya (5.17) drops this in accordance with the Tibetan.

In accordance with J. W. De Jong’s splendid “Textcritical Notes on the Prasannapadā” (p. 29, n. 15.5) svata iti hetuvanā tad eva cotapadyata iti should read svata iti vidyamānaṇaḥ hetuvanā bravacati tad eva cotapadyata iti, which, as he says, is confirmed by the Tibetan (bdag las zhes bya ba ni yod pa rgyu nyid dang de nyid skye ’o zhes smras pa yin la).
It follows that it is not suitable for whoever is a Proponent of the Middle to make autonomous inferences:

• because when those are asserted, any of the four positions has to be asserted, but Proponents of the Middle do not assert any of the four positions, and
• because that is the thought of a Superior father [Nāgārjuna] and his spiritual son [Āryadeva].

and:

• Since Buddhapālita does not assert an autonomous [syllogism] such as “Eyes ultimately are not produced from self because of existing,” it

\[a\] Jam-yang-zhay-pa is foreshadowing the quotes from Chandrakirti’s *Clear Words* and Nāgārjuna’s *Refutation of Objections* to come below.
is not necessary to clear away fallacies adduced by another with respect to that reason. [tsa]

- Even if one needs to state an other-renowned reason and example, he stated them.
- Since only the opponent has asserted the opposite of the consequences, how could it be that we have contradicted [a tenet of the Middle Way School], and so forth!
- Also, that consequences clear away another’s position is the Superior [Nāgārjuna’s] thought.
- Though the Superior [Nāgārjuna] made a commentary, he did not use syllogistic statements.

Thereby, [Chandrakīrti] established well that it is not suitable to use autonomous [syllogisms]. [dz]

Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Annotations Tsha: It is not necessary for Buddhapañita, as explained earlier, to clear away fallacies upon [another’s] examination of a thesis because he did not express the syllogism taking “things are not produced from self” as the proposition, and even if he had expressed this, then since a commonly

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a Correcting rtags de pa in 2011 TBRC bla brang (14b.6) to rtags de la in accordance with 2016 Old Go-mang Lhasa (11b.7).
appearing proposition does not exist, it is not necessary to clear away such faults.

Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Annotations Dza: The ways to refute autonomy are clear in the two—Tsong-kha-pa’s The Essence of Eloquence and Great Exposition of Special Insight.

Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words says:

Also, it is not suitable for one who is a Proponent of the Middle to make autonomous inferences because of not asserting other positions [among the four extremes]. Moreover, Āryadeva explains:

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\(^{a}\) 6a.2- 8b.1. Jam-yang-zhay-pa cites the first and last sentences with an ellipsis in the middle; I have filled in the entire citation.

\(^{b}\) Āryadeva (\('phags pa lha, second to third century C.E.), Four Hundred / Treatise of Four Hundred Stanzas, XVI.25; bstan bcos bzhis brgya pa zhes bya ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa (catuḥśatakāśastrakārikā), in bstan 'gyur (sde dge, 3846), BDRC W23703.97:3-37 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhe, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985) 18a.5; Pe- king 5246, vol. 95, 140.2.4; Lang, Āryadeva’s Catuḥśataka, 150. For Chandrakīrti’s commentary see P5266, vol. 98, 279.2ff. sde dge, 18a.5 reads:
Introduction to the Middle Way School

Even over a long period of time
Censure cannot be expressed
Of one who has no position of existence,
Nonexistence, or existence and nonexistence.

Also, Nāgārjuna’s Refutation of Objections says:

For discussion of the four alternatives according to Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Annotations for (Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s) “Great Exposition of Tenets,” see Background, 16.


sde dge 28a.1-28a.2 reads:

Also, Nāgārjuna’s Refutation of Objections says:
If I had any [inherently existent] thesis,  
Then I would have that fault [of contradicting my own  
thesis that there is no inherent existence].  
Because I have no [inherently existent] thesis,  
I am only faultless.  

If [in accordance with your thought] the factualities  
Of direct perception and so forth did observe some [in-  
herently established objects of comprehension],  
Then [it would be suitable] to prove those [in your own  
system] and refute [others], but since [valid cognitions observing  
Such objects of comprehension] do not exist [even conventionally], there is no [chance for you] to censure me.

When in that way a Proponent of the Middle just does not express  
autonomous inferences, how could [Buddhapālita] have an auton-  
omous thesis [such as Bhāvaviveka stated]—“The inner sense-  
spheres are not produced from self” (nang gi skye mched rnams  
bdag las skye ba med de, nādhyātmikāyāyatanāni svata ut-  
pannāni)—which the Śāṃkhyas would object to as follows:a

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a Here Chandrakīrti cites the hypothetical objection by a Śāṃkhyya that Bhāvaviveka himself raised and answered (above, 101)
What is the meaning of this thesis? Does “from self” [mean] “from the entity of the effect” or “from the entity of the cause”? Which of those is it? If it is from the entity of the effect, then [you have the fallacy of] proving what is already established [for us]. Otherwise, if it is from the entity of the cause, then [your reasoning] is an object of contradiction because [according to us Sāṃkhya] all that have production are produced only within the context of existing in the entities of [their] causes.\(^a\)

Also, how could we [Consequentialists, Buddhapālita and Chandrakīrti] have a reason [such as that stated by Bhāvaviveka]—“because of existing” (yod pa’i phyir, vidyamānatvāt)—which would be either [a case of] proving what is already established [for a Sāṃkhya] or being an object of contradiction and with respect to which we would have to toil to get rid [of the fault that we would

\(^a\) The Tibetan from the Golden Reprint (vol. 112, 14.6) is:

\[
\text{dam bcas pa ’di’i don gang yin/ ci bdag las shes bya ba ’bras bu bdag nyid las sam/ ‘on te rgyu’i bdag nyid las yin grang/ de las cir ’gyur/ gal te ’bras bu bdag nyid las na ni grub pa la sgrub bo/ rgyu’i bdag nyid las na ni ’gal ba’i don nyid du ’gyur te/ skye ba dang ldan pa thams cad ni rgyu’i bdag nyid du yod pa kho na las skye ba’i phyir ro zhe/}
\]

The Sanskrit:

\[
\text{ko ‘yam pratijñārthah/ kim kāryātmakāt svata uta kāraṇātmakāditi/ kim cātah/}
\text{kāryātmakācet siddhasādhanān/ kāraṇātmakācced viruddhārthāt/ kāraṇāt-
\text{manā vidyamānasyaiva sarvasyotpattimata utpādāditi/}
\]
[A hypothetical Bhāvaviveka] might think: [I might allow that] since, according to Proponents of the Middle, the position [that is, the thesis], the reason, and the example [of an autonomous syllogism] are not established, autonomous inferences (rang gi rgyud kyi rje su dpag pa, svatantra-anumāna) are not to be expressed, and, therefore, one would not prove the meaning of a thesis refuting production from self and would not clear away the other’s thesis through an inference established for both [parties] (gnyi ga la grub pa, ubhayasiddha). Still, one must express contradiction of the other’s thesis through one’s own inference (rang gi rjes su dpag pa, svata evānumāna). Hence, one must have\(^a\) a position [that is, a thesis] and so forth that are devoid of fallacies of position, reason, and example. Therefore, since [Buddhapālita] did not express such and did not avoid the fallacies of those [which a Śāṃkhyya would be expected to draw, Buddhapālita] just has those faults [of not stating a reason and example capable of proving no production from self and of not avoiding the fallacies that a Śāṃkhyya would cite upon examining what no production from self means].

\(^a\) rang nyid la yod pa bya dogos.
Answer: That is not so. Why? Those [such as Sāṃkhyas] who [upon being pressed by the consequences set forth by Buddhapālita] wish to generate ascertainment of something—which they hold as a thesis—in others in just the way that they have ascertained it, should demonstrate to others [that is, Proponents of the Middle] just that logical proof through which that meaning is understood. Therefore, it is respectively the general procedure for just the other party [here, the Sāṃkhya] to state a proof of the meaning of a thesis that they themselves assert [in response to the contradictions shown by Buddhapālita’s consequences rather than for Buddhapālita to proceed to set forth an other-renowned inference].

However, this [reason that Sāṃkhyas state to a Proponent of the Middle to try to prove production from self] is not a [valid] reason for the other [party, the Proponent of the Middle]. Because there are no reason and example, the proof of the meaning of their thesis is just a statement of outflows of [their own] assertions; therefore, since they have asserted a position that is devoid of logical feasibility, they deceive only themselves, due to which they cannot generate ascertainment in another. In this way, [due to being faulty] just this inability of their attempt to prove the meaning of their thesis is the clearest repudiation of their [position]. What need is there here to still express damage [to their position] by way of inference! [For, the contradiction of their view that something exists and yet needs to be re-produced has been shown, and upon the Sāṃkhya’s presentation of their own view in syllogistic inference, the Proponent of the Middle has given answers showing its illogicality.]
[A hypothetical Bhāvaviveka] might say: Nevertheless, contradiction by one’s own inference [that is to say, by an inference acceptable to Sāṃkhya] must, without question, be expressed.

Answer: The master Buddhapālita also just expressed such. How? For he said, “Things are not produced from self because their production would be just senseless” (dngos po rnams bdag gi bdag nyid las skye ba med de/ de dag gi skye ba don med pa nyid du ‘gyur ba’i phyir, na svata utpadyanti bhāvāḥ/ tadutpadavyātryāḥ). In that, the [word] “their” (de dag, tad) [in the reason clause] holds [or indicates] “those which [already] exist in their own entities.” Why? This is because [Buddhapālita’s subsequent statement], “The production-again of things already existing in their own entities is purposeless” (dngos po bdag gi bdag nyid yod pa rnams la ni yang skye ba la dgos pa med do, na hi svātmanā vidyāmānānām padārthānām punaruptāde prayojana-masti), is his commentary on that abbreviated statement [and, therefore, it must be carried over to the shorter statement]. Moreover, this [longer] statement [“those which already exist in their own entities”] contains a concordant example [“a manifest pot”] renowned to the other [party, the Sāṃkhya.] that possesses the predicate of the proposition [“senseless production-again”] and the attribute that is the means of proof [that is, the probans]

a Jam-yang-zhay-pa (above, 96) cites this as ko rather than go.
Concerning that, just as in:

A sound is impermanent because products are impermanent. It is seen that products are impermanent, like, for example, a pot. Likewise, a sound is also a product; therefore, because of being a product, [a sound] is impermanent.

product which is manifested by the syllogistic application is the reason, so here also:

Things [such as a nonmanifest pot and so forth] are not produced from self because the production-again of what already exists in their own entities is just senseless. Just as it is seen here that a pot and so forth that already abide in front [of oneself] and that already exist in their own manifest entities do not rely on being produced again, so if you think that there are pots and so forth that already
exist in their own entities even at the time of the lump of clay and so forth, then production even at the time of what already exist in their own entities does not exist.

the reason—“already existing in their own entities”—which is manifested by the syllogistic application and which is unmistaken with respect to refuting production—again expresses contradiction through the Sāṃkhya’s own inference [that is, an inference acceptable to a Sāṃkhya]. Therefore, how is it that [Bhāvaviveka] says, “That is not reasonable because [Buddhapālita] does not express a reason and an example”!

Not only is it just not that a reason and example were not expressed [by Buddhapālita], but also it is not that the fallacies ad-duced by the other [party, the Sāṃkhya] were not avoided. How? For, Sāṃkhyas do not assert that a pot dwelling in front [of one-self], which has a manifest form, a manifests again, and [thus] here it is an entity established as an example [of something that already

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\[^a\] mgon par gsal ba’i rang bzhin, abhivyaktarāpa.
exists in its own entity and is not produced again]. Since the proposition is:

those which are potential entities and do not have a manifested nature are predicated with a negation of production,

how could [the Sāṃkhya] have the qualm that [Buddhapālita’s syllogism has] the fault of a position [that is, thesis] that is proving what is already established or have the qualm that [Buddhapālita’s syllogism] has the sense of a contradictory reason [proving for them not that things are not produced from self but that they are produced from self]?

Therefore, even if [Buddhapālita] did express contradiction [of, or damageb to, the Sāṃkhya view] through self[-renowned] inference, [the Sāṃkhya] would not set forth the fallacies that [Bhāvaviveka] mentioned. Hence, it is just not that [Buddhapālita] did not avoid fallacies adduced by the other [party, since they would not adduce them]. For these reasons, it should be known that these [two] objections [by Bhāvaviveka to Buddhapālita’s presentation] are just senseless.

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a Or, according to the Sanskrit, “and [thus] due to being established [for the Sāṃkhya] here it is held as the example”; the Tibetan does not translate upadānam (La Vallée Pous-sin, Prasannapadā, 21.10).

b De Jong (n. 21.13) corrects the Sanskrit to anumānabādhacodanāyām, which translates as “damage” (gnod pa).

c That is to say, a syllogistic statement approved by the Sāṃkhya.
Because the term “and so forth” in “a pot and so forth” (bum pa la sogs pa, ghaṭādika) is expressed with the intention of including all things asserted as being produced, [Buddhapālita’s syllogistic statement] also does not become indefinite by way of [not including] cloth (snam bu, pata) and so forth.a

Or, [the brief statement by Buddhapālita indicates] this other syllogism:

Objects other than the person which [Sāṃkhyas] propound as being produced from self are not produced from self because of existing in their own entities, like, for example, the person.

[In that brief statement by Buddhapālita] this example [of another syllogism] is expressed.b

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a With respect to why cloth, or woolen cloth as the word means in Tibetan, is frequently used as the second after pot, it strikes me that it is merely because of the similarity in sound between the two words in Sanskrit, ghata and pata, an amusing play on sounds.

b Jam-yang-zhay-pa (Great Exposition of the Middle, 240b.6) appears to take “example” as referring to an example of another syllogism, whereas according to La Vallée Poussin (Prasannapadā, 22, n. 3) it might refer to the example in this syllogism (the person) which does not have the fault of indefiniteness in the sense of being overly vast by including everything and thus incurring the fault that when the example is realized, the main thesis would also be realized. However, the person does not appear to fit Chandrakīrti’s context, for Chandrakīrti appears to be concerned that the subject of the main syllogism, not the subject of the example, include all phenomena that are produced. This is probably why Jam-yang-zhay-pa usually takes the subject to be “things such as a non-manifest pot and so forth” instead of just as “things.” In the second syllogism, Chandrakīrti provides another all-inclusive subject; thus the issue does not revolve around the example (which in the first syllogism is a pot already in its manifest state), and thus Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s opinion is preferable; the reference is more likely to an example of another syllogism.
[Certain Sāṃkhyas might object that] a refutation of production does not harm a proponent of manifestation [rather than production]. Even so, manifestation is designated with the term “production,” and—due to the qualitative similarity [between production and manifestation] with respect to earlier nonapprehendability and later apprehendability—the term “production” just expresses manifestation. Thereby, it is not that refuting it [that is, production] does not damage [the assertion of the manifestation of what already exists in an unmanifest state].

Moreover [a hypothetical Bhāvaviveka might object:] Without [Buddhapālita’s] having anything that expresses the meanings you have expounded, how was such analysis found?

Answer: These meaningful statements[a] by Buddhapālita, due to having great import, contain an abbreviation of the above-mentioned meanings. Being explained, they issue forth this having the nature of the meanings given. Hence, there is nothing [in what I Chandrakīrti have said] that is not indicated in them.

Furthermore, the opposite meaning of the consequences [which is that things are produced again sensibly and not endlessly] is

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[a] Dr. Vaidya (Buddhist Sanskrit Texts 10, 7, n.4) objects to La Vallée Poussin’s (Prasannapadā, 23, n.1) editing the text from atha vākyāni to artha vākyāni in accordance with the Tibetan don gyi ngag ’di dag, but the usage of this same term on 7.22 of Vaidya’s edition suggests that La Vallée Poussin could be right.
related only with the other [party, the Sāṃkhya] not with us because we do not have [such] a thesis. Therefore, how could we be contradicting [the tenet of the Middle Way School that the refutation of production is a nonaffirming negation]?a Through proving that the opposite of the consequences [is related with, or held by, the other party] we only wish to adduce as many fallacies as possible to the other party [so that they will give up their assertion of production from self].b Therefore, how could the master Buddhālita—following the unerring system of the master Nāgārjuna [in which production from other, as well as sensible and finite reproduction, are not asserted]c—have said any words that would make him susceptible in the sense of affording an opportunity for another [to show contradiction with the system of the Middle Way School]

When proponents of the absence of inherent existence adduce a consequence for a proponent of inherent existence, how could it follow that they are subject to the opposite meaning of the consequence? Words do not make the speaker powerless like [an executioner]d with a club or noose [forcing a victim to say all sorts of things]. Then, how [do words indicate what they express]? If they

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a The Sanskrit (La Vallée Poussin, Prasannapāda, 23.4) reads, “And, due to that, there is no contradiction with a tenet.”

b Gom-de Nam-kha-gyal-tshan’s Settling Difficult Points in the Opposite of the Consequences, 617.6.

c Gom-de Nam-kha-gyal-tshan’s Settling Difficult Points in the Opposite of the Consequences, 618.4.

d The bracketed additions in this and the next two sentences are from Gom-de Nam-kha-gyal-tshan’s Settling Difficult Points in the Opposite of the Consequences, 619.2ff.
have the capacity [to indicate their respective meaning], they ac-
cord with the speaker’s intention in speaking. Therefore, [Bud-
dhapālita’s] adducing consequences [here] has the effect only of
refuting the other party’s thesis [that re-production is sensible and
finite];
a hence [he] does not come to have the opposite meaning
of the consequences.
b
Moreover, in this way the master [Nāgārjuna] mostly eradicates
others’ positions by way of only adducing consequences such as
through:
c
Space does not at all exist
Before [its] definition.
If space existed before [its] definition,
It would follow it was without definition [at that time, due
to which it would not exist],

a Tsong-kha-pa’s Ocean of Reasoning, 55.17.
b Jam-yang-zhay-pa (Great Exposition of the Middle, above, 140) remarks that Chandrakīrti is saying that Buddhapālita’s consequences here at this point of refuting production from self do not project their opposite meaning but that Chandrakīrti is not saying that no consequences project their opposite meaning. See the layout of the five types of consequences in my remark at that point.
c Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called “Wisdom,” V.1; 4a.2. Through an absurd consequence Nāgārjuna is refuting that a definition inherently subsists in what is defined. The bracketed addition in the first citation is from Tsong-kha-pa’s commentary, 136.7, Varanasi 1973 edition. In this and the next two notes the identification of what is being refuted in these three quotes is from Gom-de Nam-kha-gyal-tshan’s Settling Difficult Points in the Opposite of the Consequences, 621.1ff.
and:

If a form [such as a sense power] existed [inherently] Separate from the form’s causes [the elements], It would follow that a form is causeless [because depending on causes would be contradictory with its inherent existence]. Nowhere is there any [functioning] object that is causeless.

and likewise:

Nirvāṇa is not an effective thing (dngos po, bhāva). [For] it would follow that it would have the characteristics of aging and death. There are no effective things Without aging and death.

and so forth.

Through an absurd consequence Nāgārjuna is refuting that dependent establishment exists inherently in conventionalities. The bracketed additions in this citation are from Tsong-kha-pa’s commentary, 128.19, Varanasi 1973 edition. Tsong-kha-pa (129.8) says that this projects its opposite meaning; I presume that the other two also do so.
If the master [Nāgārjuna’s] statements are considered to be causes of many syllogisms due to being meaningful statements and thus of great import, why are the master Buddhapālita’s statements also not considered that way!

Objection [by a hypothetical Bhāvaviveka]:
It is the custom of commentators to set forth syllogisms at length.

Answer: That also is not so because when even the master [Nāgārjuna] commented on his Refutation of Objections, he did not set out syllogistic statements.

Following Yamaguchi, De Jong (“Textcritical Notes,” p. 30, n. 25.3) says that both this question and the response are spoken by Bhāvaviveka; however, Gom-de Nam-khyung-tshan (621.3-3.2) divides it as I have, though he does not specify the disputants, which are obvious. This reading fits the pattern of the section better than that suggested by Yamaguchi and De Jong.

As Gom-de Nam-khyung-tshan’s Settling Difficult Points in the Opposite of the Consequences (623.1) points out, the fact that Chandrākirti does not mention the Akutobhayā adds credence to the argument that it is not an auto-commentary on the Treatise on the Middle.
Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Annotations: According to Chandrakīrti, it is not suitable for a Proponent of the Middle to assert autonomous syllogisms because autonomous syllogisms do not exist, since the two—autonomous syllogism\(^a\) and self-powered syllogism\(^b\)—are equivalent, because Tsong-kha-pa’s *The Essence of Eloquence*\(^d\) explains that that which generates an inference realizing the proposition upon having ascertained with valid cognition the two subjects\(^c\) and the modes of the sign in the manner of [their being] self-powered, without involvement in the opponent’s assertions, is the meaning of an autonomous [syllogism].

\(^a\) dbyu ma pa, tsa, 7.3.  
\(^b\) rang rgyud kyi sbyor ba.  
\(^c\) rang dbang ba’i sbyor ba.  
\(^d\) Tsong-kha-pa’s *The Essence of Eloquence* says:

That which generates an inference realizing the proposition upon having ascertained with valid cognition the two subjects and the modes of the sign, without involvement in the opponent’s assertions but in the manner of [their being] self-powered from an objective mode of abiding, is the meaning of autonomous [syllogism].

Jeffrey Hopkins, *Emptiness in the Consequence School of Buddhism*, unpublished manuscript, 159.

\(^e\) That is, the subject of the thesis and the subject of the example.
This assertion [by Bhāvaviveka of autonomous syllogisms] opposite to the non-assertion of autonomous syllogisms by Proponents of the Middle is a locus of many fallacies because it has the fallacy of affixing “ultimately” to production from self and it has fallacies of the subject, position [that is, thesis], sign, and so forth individually not being established, and so forth, whereas it is asserted that we Consequentialists do not have those fallacies.

Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words* says:

Furthermore, despite asserting the view of the Proponents of the Middle, this logician [Bhāvaviveka], while wishing merely to demonstrate that he has great skill in treatises of logic, expresses statements of autonomous syllogisms that are realized to be the locus of collections of a great many fallacies. How? Respectively, here he states this syllogism:

Ultimately the internal sense-spheres are not produced from self because of existing, like intelligence.

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*a* 2016 Old Go-mang Lhasa, ca 12a.3-12b.4; 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 'a, 15a.4-15b.6;

*b* 8b.1-11a.2. Jam-yang-zhay-pa cites this passage with a large ellipsis, which I have filled in.


*d* The Tibetan of the example *shes pa yod pa nyid bzhin* is a mere translation of the Sanskrit *caitanya* and is not an extension of it to include the reason (“existing”). The reference of “intelligence” is to the *purusa*—the person, or pure spirit, pure consciousness.
Why is the qualification “ultimately” (don dam par, paramārthatas) stated in this [syllogism]?

[Hypothetical answer by Bhāvaviveka: It is affixed to the predicate] because production that is asserted in accordance with worldly conventions is not to be refuted and because even if [production] were refuted [conventionally], it would follow that [the refutation] would be damaged by [our own] assertion [of conventionally existent production].

The Tibetan:

\[ \text{don dam par nang gi skye mched rnams bdag las skye ba med par nges te yod pa'i phyir shes pa yod pa nyid bzhin no//} \]

The Sanskrit:

\[ \text{na paramārthata ādhyaṁmikānyāyatanāni svata utpannāni vidyāmānaṃ caitanyavād//} \]

a Jam-yang-zhay-pa attributes this position hypothetically to Bhāvaviveka. In this case, the argument reads, “The internal sense-spheres are not ultimately produced from self because of existing, like intelligence.”

b Anne MacDonald in brief says:

Candrakīrti intends the technical meaning of abhyupetādha, specifically, that the thesis of the inference would be sublated by what the Mādhyamika’s own system accepts: the unqualified proposition that the inner bases have not arisen from self is contradicted, is sublated—has, so to speak, the rug pulled out from
Response: This is not reasonable because [Proponents of the Middle] do not assert production from self even conventionally. [The Rice Seedling] Sūtra says:\(^a\)

Also, when a shoot is produced, arising from its cause—a seed—it is not created by itself, not created by others, not created by both, not produced causelessly, not created by Ishvara, and not metamorphosed by time. It does not arise from particles, does not arise from the nature,\(^b\) and does not arise from its own entity.

and similarly [the Extensive Sport Sūtra] says:\(^c\)

under it—by the fact that the Mādhyamika does accept the arising of things on the surface level; without the qualification, (hypothetical) Bhāviveka argues, the opponent would attack the proposition as being spurious (paksābhāṣa).

For this and more, see Anne MacDonald, In Clear Words: The Prasannapadā, Chapter One (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2015), 94 n. 202.

\(^a\) The Tibetan has “is not produced causelessly” at the end. La Vallée Poussin (Prasannapadā, 26, n. 3) draws our attention to Shāntideva’s Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds, IX.142, and his Compendium of Learnings, 219.10. See also the notes in Yotsuya, Critique, 82-83.

\(^b\) rang bzhin, prakṛti; the source of material objects as in Sāṃkhya.

\(^c\) mdo rgya cher rol pa (lalitavistara-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra), in bk’gyur (sde dge par phud, 95), BDRC W22084.46.3-434 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa chodhegy, Gyalwae sunggrab partun khang, 1976-1979), 145a.2-145a.3; Peking 763, vol. 27. La Vallée Poussin identifies this as 210.3-210.5 and calls our attention to Shāntideva’s Compendium of Learnings, 238.10, 239.4. Chandrakirti cites the stanza again twice in commentary at the end of chapters two and twenty-one. As per Yotsuya (Critique, 83 n. 38, citing S. Lefmann, Lalitavistara [Halle a. S.: Verlag der Buchhandlung des Waisenhauses], p. 176, II.11-12), the Sanskrit is:

bijasya sato yathāṅkuro
na ca yo bija sa caiva āṅkuro/
If a seed exists, the shoot does also.
The shoot is not what the seed is.
It is not other than it nor just it.
Hence the noumenon\(^a\) is not permanent\(^b\) and not annihilatory.

and also this very [text, Nāgārjuna’s *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called “Wisdom,”*] says:\(^c\)

Whatever arises dependently is respectively
Not just those [that is, its causes] and also is not
Other than those. Hence [causes]
Are not annihilated nor permanent.

\(\text{na ca anya tato na caiva tat}\\text{evam anuccheda asāśvata dharmatā}\\)\(^a\)

\(\text{chos nyid, dharmatā. I use the term “noumenon” in its basic meaning as “final reality,” and not with a Kantian overlay or others.}\\)

\(\text{Since in Ge-lug-pa the nature of phenomena is indeed permanent, here “permanent” is read, as is often the case, as the extreme of inherent existence.}\\)

\(\text{XVIII.10; 11a.4, which reads:}\\)

\(\text{pratītya yadyadbhavati na hi tāvattadeva tat/}\\text{na cānyadapi tattasmānoccchinnaṁ nāpi śāśvatam}\\)

Brackets are from Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words*. The Sanskrit, as Chandrakīrti cites it (La Vallée Poussin, *Prasannapadā*, 26.11 and 375.11) is:

\(\text{pratītya yadyadbhavati na hi tāvattadeva tat/}\\text{na cānyadapi tattasmānoccchinnaṁ nāpi śāśvatam}\\)
[Hypothetical response by Bhāvaviveka:] The qualification is made relative to the other’s [that is, the Sāṃkhya’s] system.

Answer: That also is not reasonable because their presentations are not asserted [by Proponents of the Middle] even conventionally. It is to be realized that it is advantageous to the extent that the Forders (mu stegs pa, tīrthika) who have fallen from nonerro-}

Furthermore, the world—in relation to which the qualification would be fruitful [that is, meaningful, if it did assert production from self]—does not construe production from self. Worldly be-

a gzhung, mata.
**Hypothetical response by Bhāvaviveka:** This qualification is made wishing to refute the conventional production [of objects that are asserted to exist ultimately].

Answer: Then, for you there would be the fault of a position [that is, thesis] in which the base [that is, subject] is not established\(^a\) or the fallacy of a reason in which the base [that is, subject] is not established,\(^b\) because you do not assert sense-spheres, eyes and so forth, ultimately.\(^c\)

**Hypothetical response by Bhāvaviveka:** Since eyes and so forth exist conventionally, there is no fault.

Answer: Well then, what does “ultimately” qualify?

**Hypothetical response by Bhāvaviveka:** Since the ultimate production of veilings [conventionalities] such as eyes is being refuted, “ultimately” qualifies the refutation of production.

Answer: In that case, you should have said, “Ultimately there is no production of veilings [conventionalities] such as eyes,”\(^d\) but

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\(^a\) gzhi ma grub pa, asiddhādha.  
\(^b\) gzhi ma grub pa, āśrayaśiddha.  
\(^c\) Stcherbatsky (The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana, 113) translates this clause extremely freely, adding in considerable commentary as if Chandrakīrti says such in his text: “Indeed (Bhāvaviveka) himself being a Proponent of the Middle does not admit the transcendent reality of separate mental phenomena and at the same time he composes a syllogism about this very non-existing thing.” The last clause is total speculation stemming from Stcherbatsky’s assumption that Chandrakīrti does not accept the existence of anything.  
\(^d\) Or, to keep the subject-predicate order: “Conventionalities such as eyes do not have
such was not proposed. Even if you had [said such], the other party [a Sāṃkhya] asserts eyes and so forth just as substantially existent\(^a\) and does not assert them as imputedly existent,\(^b\) due to which the position [that is, thesis] would be fallacious in that the base [that is, subject] would not be established for the other [party, the Sāṃkhya]. Hence, this is not reasonable.

[Response by Bhāvaviveka:]\(^c\) It is like [on an occasion when to an opponent\(^d\) a Buddhist puts forward the thesis that] sound is impermanent, just generalities of the two, the subject and the predicate, are to be used, not specifics. If specifics were used, the conventions of inference and object of inference\(^e\) would be nonexistent. It is as follows: If “sound that is derived from the four great

\(^{a}\) rdayas su yod pa, dravyasat; following De Jong’s correction (“Textcritical Notes,” 31, n. 28.1) of vastutasām to dravyasatām.

\(^{b}\) btags par yod pa, prajñaptisat.

\(^{c}\) Tsong-kha-pa’s presentation of the controversy between Buddhapālita, Bhāvaviveka, and Chandrakīrti in his Great Exposition of Special Insight (see Volume 5 in this series) in the Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path begins with this point, 37-41 and 123-126.

\(^{d}\) Tsong-kha-pa, as is evident below, identifies the opponent as a Vaiśeṣika, but Kodo Yotsuya (The Critique of Svatantra Reasoning by Chandrakīrti and Tsong-kha-pa, 93 n. 73) points out that since Vaiśeṣikas assert that sound is impermanent (as is explained in the next footnote), there is no need for a Buddhist to prove to a Vaiśeṣika that sound is impermanent; therefore, he identifies the opponent as a Mīmāṃsaka. However, it may be that because Vaiśeṣikas hold that a sound is a quality of space and space is permanent, the Buddhist here is holding that Vaiśeṣikas are forced by reasoning to assert that a sound is permanent.

\(^{e}\) Gung-thang Lo-drö-gya-tsho’s (gung thang blo gros gya mtsho, 1851-1928/1930) Day-making Illumination Clarifying the Meaning of the Thought of (Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s) “Decisive Analysis of the Middle: Treasury of Scripture and Reasoning” (dbyul ma’i mtha’ dpoyod lung rigs gter mdzod kyi dgon gos don gsal bar byed pa’i nyin byed snang ba zab lam lla ba’i mig byed) BDRC W140-11KG15988, 152.14, glosses inference (rje su dpag pa) with “the sign that is the means of inference” (dpag byed rtags, anumāna) and object of inference (rje su dpag par bya ba, anumeyā) with “predicate of the proposition that is the object inferred” (dpag bya bsgrub bya’i chos).
elements” were used, it would not be established for the other party. However, if “sound that is a quality of space” were used, it would not be established for oneself, the Buddhist.

Similarly, even when a Vaisheṣhika makes the thesis that sound is impermanent, if “sound that is a product” is used, it

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\( \text{a nam mkha', ākāśa. As Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Explanation of Obscurational and Ultimate Truths (54.1; Hopkins, Maps of the Profound, 166) says about the Vaisheṣhika assertion that sound is a quality of space:} \)

“Whatever has production and disintegration necessarily depends upon some substance; for example, [the flame of] a butter lamp. Sound also has production and disintegration.” By such reasoning, sound is proved to depend upon a substance. Because sound is heard apart from the four elements, earth and so on, it does not depend on those four. Also, because it is observed externally by a sense consciousness, as shared between oneself and others, it is not a quality of the self. Since it is an object of apprehension by the ear, it is not a quality of the three—direction, time, and consciousness. Hence, it is asserted to be established as a quality only of space.

Kodo Yotsuya (The Critique of Svatantra Reasoning by Chandrakīrti and Tsong-kha-pa, 93 n. 73) points out that Māṃsakas also assert that sound is a quality of space.

\( \text{b Here in this second example, a Vaisheṣhika is proving to another party that sound is impermanent. Tsong-kha-pa, as is evident above, identifies the opponent as a Dipaka (gsal byed pa), which The Four Interwoven Annotations (vol. 2, 526.4) explains is a type of Sāṃkhya, but Kodo Yotsuya (The Critique of Svatantra Reasoning by Chandrakīrti and Tsong-kha-pa, 93) here also takes the opponent to be a Māṃsaka; in both cases his identifications are Māṃsaka.} \)

Jam-yang-zhay-pa (see the previous volume) identifies the other party as a Nirgrantha (gce r pa), another name for Jaina; Stcherbatsky (The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa, 115) identifies the opponent as a Māṃsaka, inserting the identification into the text as if Chandrakīrti so specified it, whereas he did not; Wayman (Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real, 310) goes along with Stcherbatsky; Gom-de Nam-kha-gyal-tshan (Settling Difficult Points in the Opposite of the Consequences, 633.2) identifies the other party as a Dipaka. In any case, the assertion of the Vaisheṣhika’s opponent is that sound is pre-existent in a nonmanifest state and is made manifest by conditions, something which the Vaisheṣhika cannot accept.
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would not be established for the other party. However, if “manifested,” it would not be established for oneself.

Likewise, respectively, if “disintegration” is “caused,” it would not be established for oneself, a Buddhist. However, if “causeless,” it would not be established for the other party. Therefore, just as for these mere generalities of subject and predicate are to be used, so here also a mere subject devoid of specifics is to be used.

\[
\text{དེ་བཞིན་ȭ་Ɏེ་ɐག་པ་Ȍ་མི་Ȧག་པར་དམ་འཆའ་བ་ན་ཡང་།} \\
\text{Ɏས་པའི་Ȍ་འཛིན་nage dêk na de gshen la ma yon brba.} \\
\text{འོན་ཏེ་མངོན་པར་གསལ་བར་Ȍ་པ་ཡིན་ན་ནི་} \\
\text{རང་ལ་མ་ǿབ་པ་ཡིན་ནོ།} \\
\text{དེ་བཞིན་ȭ་ཅི་རིགས་པར་འཇིག་པ་ཡང་གལ་} \\
\text{ȏ་དང་བཅས་པ་ཡིན་ན་ནི།} \\
\text{དེ་སངས་Ȅས་པ་རང་ལ་མ་ǿབ་པ་ཡིན་ལ།} \\
\text{འོན་ཏེ་ȏ་} \\
\text{མེད་པ་ཡིན་ན་ནི་ཕ་རོལ་པོ་ལ་མ་ǿབ་པ་} \\
\text{ཡིན་ནོ།} \\
\text{དེའི་ɉིར་ཇི་Ȩར་འདིར་} \\
\text{ཆོས་དང་ཆོས་ཅན་Ȅི་ཙམ་ཞིག་འཛིན་པ་} \\
\text{དེ་བཞིན་ȭ།} \\
\text{འདིར་ཡང་ཁྱད་པར་དོར་} \\
\text{བའི་ཆོས་ཅན་ཙམ་ཞིག་འཛིན་པར་} \\
\text{ȏར་རོ་ཞེ་ན།}
\]

Answer: That is not so. For, at just that time [of proving that eyes and so forth are without production]\(^a\) a negation of production is asserted as the predicate of the proposition, this one

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\(^a\) Brackets are Gom-de Nam-kha-gyal-tshan’s Settling Difficult Points in the Opposite of the Consequences, 634.4.1, and Four Intertwoven Annotations, 530.1. The predicate of what Bhāvaviveka is proving is an absence, or negation, of production (ultimately) with respect to the subject, eyes and so forth; in this sense, Chandrakīrti says, “when a negation of production (\(\text{utpādapratīṣedha, skye ba bkag pa}\)) is asserted (\(\text{abhipreta, 'dod pa}\)) here as the predicate of the proposition (\(\text{sādhya-dharma, bsgrub bya'i chos}\)).” Wayman (Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real, 311-312) misconstrues the sentence to read, “At the very time that he denies in this phase (of proof) an arising (in the absolute sense) and believes in a feature to be proved (the sādhya-dharma).” The Sanskrit double nominative \(\text{utpādapratīṣedha} \text{ and sādhya-dharma} \) is rendered into Tibetan in a very clear way as an objective nominative \(\text{skye ba bkag pa} \) and an adverbial accusative \(\text{bsgrub bya'i chos su}; \) the particle \(\text{su} \) means “as” and can in no way be construed as “and.” Thus, Chandrakīrti is providing the context for his following remarks—that of ultimate analysis, such as in this case when a negation of production is being asserted as, or taken as, the predicate of what one is proving.

Many Tibetan scholars take this as showing that Chandrakīrti is speaking only about occasions of debating about the final mode of subsistence of phenomena and that his remarks about no compatible subjects should not be extended to times when debating about conventional phenomena such as impermanence, since the question of whether the consciousness certifying the subject and so forth is valid with respect to the mode of subsistence is relevant only when one is debating about that mode of subsistence. There is more about this topic in the next volume.
[Bhāvaviveka] himself indeed has asserted that the entities of the subjects—the substrata of that [predicate, the absence of production from self,] which gain their thingness by mere erroneous [consciousnessness]—have degenerated from [establishment] in suchness.a Erroneous and nonerroneous [objects] are different [mutually exclusive and a dichotomy].

Therefore, when, like the falling hairs and so forth [apprehended] by one with eye disease and so on, what is nonexistent is apprehended by an erroneous [consciousness] as just existing, how then could even a portion of an object existent [by way of its own character] be observed! When, like the falling hairs and so forth [not apprehended] by one without eye disease, the unreal is not superimposed by a nonerroneous [consciousness], how then could even the merest portion of nonexistent objects, veilings, be observed! Hence, the holy master [Nāgārjuna] also says [in the Refutation of Objections]:

If direct perception and so forth did observe some [inherently established] objects,

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a Translated in accordance with Tsong-kha-pa’s citation with ‘dod pa de ’i tshe de kho nar; for a lengthy discussion of Tsong-kha-pa’s two readings of this crucial passage in his The Essence of Eloquence and Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path and Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s creative rendition as well as others’ glosses, see Jeffrey Hopkins, Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s Expansion on Compatibly Appearing Subjects in Tsong-kha-pa’s The Essence of Eloquence, 8 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, forthcoming: uma-tibet.org).

b Stanza 30; 28a.1-28a.2; P5228, vol. 95, 15.1.2; 28a.1-28a.2 reads:

Then [it would be reasonable] to prove those or refute [those in others’ systems],
But since those do not exist,
There is no [chance for you] to censure me.

Because, in that way, the erroneous and the nonerroneous are different, the erroneous do not exist in a state [directly perceiving] the nonerroneous. Therefore, how could there be a veiling, an eye, that is a subject! Hence, there is no overturning the fallacy of a position whose base is not establisheda and the fallacy of a reason whose base is not established,b and, therefore, this is just not a response.c

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a  gzhi ma grub pa, asiddhādhāra.
b  gzhi ma grub pa, āśrayāsiddha.
c  Wayman (Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real, 312) translates the last line as, “You have no answer to this.” However, the Four Interwoven Annotations (533.4) make it clear that the reference is to the hypothetical Bhāvaviveka’s earlier answer, “The response that you have given is just not a response concordant with the fact (khyed kyi bsnyin bsnyin pa ’di ni don dang mthun pa ’i lai ma yin pa nyid do).” Bhāvaviveka’s earlier answer was that just generalities are to be used as subject, predicate, and so forth without being qualified by the particular assertions of the two schools. Chandrakīrti’s refutation of this is built around his perception that a tenet unacceptable to a Proponent of the Middle is automatically attached to the subject and so forth—inherent existence—because schools that propound inherent existence hold that the consciousness certifying the subject and so forth perforce must certify their inherent existence.
The example also lacks similarity [with the intended meaning]. Even if there [in the example] general sound and general impermanence that are not wished to be expressed as qualified [with particular tenets] do exist for both [parties], nevertheless proponents of emptiness and proponents of non-emptiness do not assert in that fashion general eyes conventionally and also not ultimately; hence, the example lacks similarity [with the exemplified meaning].

Just this mode of expressing the fallacy of the position [that is, thesis,] which is that the substratum [the subject] is not established is to be applied also in expressing the fallacy of nonestablishment with respect to this [Bhāvaviveka’s] reason—“because of existing.” For, this logician [Bhāvaviveka] himself [comes to] assert the points as explained earlier. How? Another stated this proof:

Causes and so forth producing the internal sense-spheres just exist because the One-Gone-Thus said so. Whatever the One-Gone-Thus said is so, as, for example, like his saying that nirvāṇa is peace.

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a The example is not similar to what it is intended to exemplify.

b Gom-de Nam-kha-gyal-tshan ends his commentary at this point.
To this:

What are you asserting as the meaning of the reason? [Are you saying] “because the One-Gone-Thus said [such in terms of] conventional [existence]” or “because the One-Gone-Thus said [such in terms of] ultimate [existence]?” If conventionally, the meaning of the reason is not established for yourself, but if ultimately, [then as Nāgārjuna’s *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called “Wisdom”* says:]

When [one analyzes whether] the phenomena [of effects] exist, Do not exist, or [both] exist and do not exist [at the time of their causes], they are [understood as] not established [by causes].

At that time, conditions [producing] effects that have a nature of existence, nonexistence, or both [at the time of their causes] are refuted. Therefore:

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a The bracketed material in this sentence is from the *Four Interwoven Annotations*, 561.4ff.

b 1.7ab; 2a.2. the bracketed material in the stanza is from Tsong-kha-pa’s *Ocean of Reasoning*, 77.3ff. (Varanasi 1973 edition).

c 1.7cd; 2a.2.
How could [an ultimately established definition, such as] “that which establishes”ª be [the definition of] causal [condition]?! In that case, it is not feasible [to say that because the definition of causal condition ultimately exists, causal conditions ultimately exist].

The meaning of [Nāgārjuna’s] statement is that those [ultimately existent things] are just not causes producing [effects]. Therefore, because [we Proponents of the Middle assert that]ª what is established [that is, effects] and establishers [that is, causes] do not ultimately exist, this reason is just nonestablished [for a Proponent of the Middle if the referent is to ultimate existence], and it is just contradictory [because this ultimately existent reason is very contradictory with a predicate of the proposition that is a conventionality].

this [Bhāvaviveka] propounded this fallacy.

Because this one [Bhāvaviveka] himself [comes] in this way to assert the nonestablishment of reasons, in all inferences in which he states phenomena that are actualities (dngos po’i chos,

ª sgrub byed, nirvartaka; or “that which produces.”

ª rgyu’i rkyen, hetupratyaya.

ª The bracketed material in this sentence and the next is from the Four Interwoven Annotations, 562.4, except for “effects” and “causes” which come from the context above.
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vastudharma\(^a\) as reasons, the reason and so forth are not established for him, whereby all [his] proofs are destroyed.

For, in:

Ultimately the internal sense-spheres are not produced from their conditions which are other [than them] because of being other, as, for example, is the case with a pot.\(^b\)

or:

The producers of the internal sense-spheres such as eyes, which others\(^c\) want to say [exist] ultimately, are not ascertained as conditions [producing the internal sense-spheres] because of being other, as, for example, is the case with threads and so forth.

“other” and so forth are not established for oneself [that is, for Bhāvaviveka].

On an occasion when another expressed the following reason:

The internal sense-spheres are just produced because of

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\(^a\) The *Four Intertwoven Annotations on (Tsang-kha-pa’s) “Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path,”* 569.5, identifies this term as meaning “substantially established which is established by way of its own character” (*rang gi mtshan nyid kyis pa’i rdzas grub*).

\(^b\) Reading *ghaṭasya* in accordance with De Jong (“Textcritical Notes,” 31, n. 31.14).

\(^c\) Following the Tibetan *gzhan gyis*; the Sanskrit is *pare* which Stcherbatsky (*Conception of Buddhist Nirvana*, 119, n.7) prefers as *paraiḥ* but De Jong (“Textcritical Notes,” 31, n. 31.14) decides should be left as it is.
creating the special conventions of those that possess their objects [that is to say, because of being the reasons why their respective consciousnesses are called “eye consciousness” and so forth].\(^a\)

this one [Bhāvaviveka], wanting to speak of the nonestablishment of that reason, says that if production, going, and so forth were

\(^a\) The meaning is conjectured from discussion with Ye-shay-thub-tan, who pointed to a statement in Dignāga’s Compilation of Valid Cognition, **iṣhad ma kun las btus pa (pramāṇasamuccaya)**, in **bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4203)**, BDRC W23703.174:3-29 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 1.4ab; 1b.4; (P5700, vol. 130, 3.1.3:

*Because [the sense powers] are the uncommon cause [of their respective consciousness],
That [consciousness] is designated [with the term “sense direct perception” (dbang po’i mngon sum, pratyakṣa)] by way of the sense powers.

**(thun mong ma yin rgyu yi phyir/ de’i* tha snyad dbang pos byed, asādhāraṇa- hetutvād aksās taḥ vyapadīṣyate.)**

sde dge 1b.4 reads:

\[\text{ṭṛṅ ṇeṅ mīn pa’i ā yī yī rgyu yi phyir/ dī’ē thā snyad dbang po sbyed, asādhāraṇa- hetu-tvād aksās taḥ vyapadīṣyate.}\]

*The Peking misreads **de yis thea snyad**; **de yi** would also be suitable; the reading as **de’i** follows M. Hattori’s translation and analysis in Dignāga, **On Perception** (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), 26 and 86-87, n. 1.30 and n.1.32.

Both Ye-shay-thub-tan and Hattori also point out that there is a similar statement in Vasubandhu’s **Treasury of Knowledge**, 1.45:

*Since due to their [that is, the sense powers] changing [that is, becoming duller or clearer, the respective consciousnesses] change [becoming duller or clearer], the bases are the eye [sense power] and so forth.

Therefore, because of being the uncommon [cause], the consciousnesses are called by way of them [that is, a consciousness of visible forms is called a eye consciousness, not a form consciousness].

**(de dag gyur pas ’gyur nyid phyir/ten ni mig la sogs pa yin/ de phyir thun mong ma yin phyir/ de dag gis ni rnam shes bstan [148.16, Varanasi 1978 edition]; tad-vikāra-vikārtvād āśrayaṇa caksur-adāyayah/ ato’s ādārṣaṇavāc ca vijhānam tair nirucyate, [Hattori, 76 n. 1.11]).**

Thus, here Bhāvaviveka is responding to a non-Proponent of the Middle who is arguing that since the sense powers are themselves causes, they must be ultimately produced.

Stcherbatsky (**Conception of Buddhist Nirvana**, 120) translates the passage as:

*Thesis: Internal facts, that is, mental phenomena really arise, that is, they have a real existence. Reason: Because they produce purposive actions directed towards the same objects as our thoughts have been directed to. Major premise: Whatever is efficient is real.

His translation, though a bit strained, is getting at the same point.
established as existing ultimately by the eye of wisdom\textsuperscript{a} of a yogi in meditative equipoise seeing the reality of things just as it is, then that reason—“because of creating the special conventions of those that possess their objects”—would just have the sense of being established, [but it is not established] because [ultimately existent] going is also refuted just through the refutation of [ultimately existent] production.

\textsuperscript{a} In the Tibetan Cultural Printing Press edition (22.19), read shes rab kyi mig for shes rab kyis mig in accordance with the Peking (vol. 98, 6.5.5). It seems to me that the syntax of the Tibetan:

don dam par rnal 'byor pa mnyam par bzhag pa'i shes rab kyi mig gis dngos po rnams kyi yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin nyid mthong ba'i skye ba dang 'gro ba la sogs pa dag yod par bsgrub na ni

would be better rendered as:

dngos po rnams kyi yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin nyid mthong ba'i rnal 'byor pa mnyam par bzhag pa'i shes rab kyi mig gis skye ba dang 'gro ba la sogs pa dag don dam par yod par bsgrub na ni.
This [sort of reasoning that Bhāvaviveka uses against his opponent] likewise is to be applied also\(^a\) to a reason that he formulates:

Ultimately the not-yet-gone-over is not being gone over because of being a path, like the path already gone over.

In that, the reason—path—is not established for him [due to not being established by the meditative equipoise of a yogi seeing suchness, this being the only unmistaken consciousness that a non-Buddha has].

Also, in:

An eye that serves as a basis [of an eye consciousness], does not ultimately see forms because of being an eye sense power, as, for example, is the case with [an eye sense power] that is similar [to one that serves as the basis of an eye consciousness but does not actually serve as a basis of an eye consciousness such as during sleep].

\[\text{དེ་བཞིན་ȭ་རང་གིས་ȭས་པའི་ȭབ་པར་ȭེད་པ་ལ་ཡང་།}
\text{དོན་དམ་པར་མ་སོང་བ་ལ་འགྲོ་བ་མེད་དེ།}
\text{ལམ་ཡིན་པའི་ྲིར།}
\text{སོང་བའི་ལམ་བཞིན་ནོ།}
\text{།}
\text{ཞེས་ȭ་བའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ལམ་ཉིད་རང་ཉིད་ལ་མ་ȭབ་པའི་དོན་ཉིད་ȭ་ɚར་བར་ȭེ་ལ།}
\text{དོན་དམ་པར་བȦེན་པ་དང་བཅས་པའི་མིག་ནི་གɶགས་ལ་ȭ་བར་མི་ȭེད་དེ།}
\text{མིག་གི་དབང་པོ་ཡིན་པའི་ྲིར།}
\text{དཔེར་ན་དེ་དང་མɰངས་པ་བཞིན་ནོ་ཞེས་ȭ་བ་དང་།}
\text{and likewise:}

An eye does not [ultimately] see forms because of having arisen from the elements, as, for example, is the case with form.\(^b\)

and:

Earth is not [ultimately] an entity of hardness because of

\(^a\) In the Tibetan Cultural Printing Press edition (23.4) read sgrub par byed pa la yang for sgrub par byed pa la yod pa in accordance with the Peking (vol. 98, 6.5.7). Stcherbatsky (Conception of Buddhist Nirvana, 121) takes Bhāvaviveka’s refutation of going as a refutation of time; though there is a similarity between space and time, this refutation at least explicitly is concerned with motion, as in the second chapter of Nāgārjuna’s Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called “Wisdom,” the “Analysis of Going and Coming.”

\(^b\) De Jong (“Textcritical Notes,” 31, n. 33.1) corrects the Sanskrit rūpavat to svarūpavat in accordance with Bhāvaviveka’s Heart of the Middle, III.39ab, in which case the Tibetan would be rang gzugs behin (“like its form”), meaning the form that the eye sees.
being an element, as, for example, is the case with wind.\(^a\)

and so forth, it is to be applied that the reasons and so forth are not established for yourself [Bhāvaviveka].

Also,\(^b\) this reason—“because of existing”—is indefinite in that the other party [would wonder], “Is it that the internal sense-spheres because of existing, are not produced from self in accordance with how intelligence\(^c\) exists, or is it that, like pots and so forth, they are produced from self?”

[Hypothetical objection by Bhāvaviveka:]\(^d\) It is not indefinite because pots and so forth are equally proven [not to be produced from self because of existing].

Answer: That is not so because such was not expressed.

\(^a\) Bhāvaviveka’s Heart of the Middle, III.27ab; 4b.4-4b.5; see De Jong, “Textcritical Notes,” 32, n. 33.2. 4b.4-4b.5 reads:

\(^b\) Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle (2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 168b.7, and 2011 TBRC bla brang, 269b.4) reads ‘di la yang whereas the Peking of Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words (vol. 98, 7.1.2) reads ‘di yang. Here, Chandrakīrti (La Vallée Pous-sin, Prasannapadā, 33.4) gives the reason of Bhāvaviveka’s syllogism as sattvāt, not vidyamāṇatvāt as he did earlier (26.1); the Tibetan is yod pa’i phyir throughout.

\(^c\) The Tibetan of “intelligence” shes pa yod pa nyid gzin is a translation of the Sanskrit caitanya and is not intended to include in this example the reason (“existing”). The reference of “intelligence” is, for a Sāṃkhya, to the puruṣa—the person, that is to say, pure consciousness, the spirit.

\(^d\) Stcherbatky’s reading (Conception of Buddhist Nirvana, 123) of the objection is quite fanciful. As this passage is not cited in the Four Interwoven Annotations, Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle, or Gom-de’s Settling Difficult Points in the Opposite of the Consequences whose commentary has ended, the reading of the objection as coming from Bhāvaviveka is mine. That it is by the hypothetical Bhāvaviveka makes sense since Chandrakīrti argued earlier for the all-inclusiveness of Buddhāpālita’s syllogism.
Having refuted the other’s [that is, Bhāvaviveka’s] system, [Chandrakīrti shows that] it is not the same for other-renowned signs:

Hypothetical objection by Bhāvaviveka:] Is it not that just those faults that you ascribe to another’s [that is, my own] syllogisms follow for your inferences, due to which they would just have the fallacies of nonestablishment of the subject, reason, and so forth? Therefore, do not object to one [of us] with the faults that are incurred by both. Therefore, all these faults are not reasonable.

Answer: Proponents of autonomous inferences (rang rgyud kyi rjes su dpag pa, svatantra-anumāṇa) come to have these faults, but we do not use autonomous inferences because our\textsuperscript{b} inferences

\textsuperscript{a} 11a.2-11b.6. Jam-yang-zhay-pa cites this passage with a long ellipsis which I have filled in.

\textsuperscript{b} “Our” is missing in the Tibetan. The Sanskrit (La Vallée Poussin, Prasannapadā, 34.5) has \textit{asmad anumāṇānām}. The Four Interwoven Annotations (572.4) glosses this as referring to the inferences appearing in Chandrakīrti’s \textit{Clear Words} and so forth, thereby reading the statement as referring not to all syllogistic reasoning in general but to those refuting production from self such as those drawn from Buddhāpālita’s text. This reading preserves other-renowned inferences, or syllogisms, as a means also for positively communicating one’s own tenets, though the interpolation seems forced. Later in the \textit{Four In-
have the fruit of only refuting others’ theses. It is as follows. Others\(^a\) who think that the eye sees are refuted by an inference established for them:

You assert on the one hand (\(kyang\)) that an eye has the attribute of not seeing its own entity and also\(^b\) assert that if it does not have the attribute of seeing other [forms such as blue, then seeing] just does not occur. Therefore:

Whatever [substratum] does not possess [the attribute of] seeing its own entity also does not possess [the attribute of] seeing others [such as blue and so forth], as, for example, like a pot [which because of not seeing its own entity does not see others]. Also, an eye possesses [the attribute of] not seeing its own entity; therefore, this also does not possess [the attribute of] seeing others [such as forms]. Because of that, seeing others—blue and so forth—which is contradictory with not seeing its own entity is cleared away by inference established for them.

Since only such is expressed by our\(^d\) inferences, how could our position be subject to those faults as mentioned and due to which\(^e\) fallacy would be equally incurred?

\(^a\) La Vallée Poussin (Prasannapadā, 34.6 and n. 5) changes \(\text{paraś caksuḥ}\) to \(\text{param caksuḥ}\) recognizing that the Tibetan (\(\text{gshan}\)) does not confirm the change and preferring that it read \(\text{gshan la}^\prime\); however, Dr. Vaidya leaves the manuscript as is, and the Four Interwoven Annotations (573.5) follows the same reading, identifying the term as referring to other parties who assert that the eye sees. I consider La Vallée Poussin’s emendation to be unnecessary.

\(^b\) The bracketed material in this and the next section is from the Four Interwoven Annotations, 573.6-574.2.

\(^c\) Four Interwoven Annotations, 574.4.

\(^d\) Missing in the Tibetan; the Sanskrit (La Vallée Poussin, Mūlamadhyamakakārikās avec la Prasannapadā, 34.11) has \(\text{asmad anumānānair}\).

\(^e\) Both editions of Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s text (2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 169b.3, and 2011 TBRC \(\text{bla brang}\), 230b.3) read \(\text{gang la}^\prime\); Peking, vol.98 7.2.2, reads \(\text{gang las}\), which is preferable.
[Hypothetical rejoinder by Bhāvaviveka:] Is there damage by inference even from an inference established for either [of the parties]?

[Answer:] There is. It moreover is just by a reason established to that [opponent] oneself, but not by what is established for the other [disputant], because such is seen in the world. In the world, sometimes [one party] prevails and [the other] is defeated by the word of a judge that both take to be valid, and sometimes comes about only by their own words, but victory or defeat does not come about by the other’s words. Just as it is in the world, so it is also in reasoning because only the conventions of the world are appropriate in treatises of reasoning.
Therefore, some say, “There is no damage by inference that is through the force of being approved by the other [party] because [we] wish to refute what is merely renowned to others.” Also, there is someone who thinks, “That [sign]\(^a\) which expresses ascertained [established] for both is [capable of] proof and refutation; that which is either established for just one or about which there is doubt [by either party as to whether it is established] is not [capable of such].” In dependence upon the world’s presentation of conventions they also should assert just this mode, as described above, with respect to inference. For, damage through scripture is not from the approach of only scripture established for both [parties]. Then how? It is also from the approach of [scripture] established for [the opponent] oneself. [Furthermore] in inference for oneself, always just what is established for oneself is weightier, not what is established for both.

\(^a\) The bracketed material is from the *Four Interwoven Annotations, 591.1ff.*

\(^b\) *Four Interwoven Annotations, 592.2.*
knowing suchness\textsuperscript{a}—with the tenable in accordance with what is renowned to them.

About this master [Chandrakīrti], the foremost venerable Mañjughoṣha told the Great Foremost Being [Tsong-kha-pa] that he was a sovereign of the ten grounds who from a high realm of the world took birth in accordance with his own wish to spread the Superior Nāgārjuna’s system, and Mañjughoṣha said that when making explanation on any and all aspects it is permissible to take him as valid. This indeed is the case because no one—such as followers of Bhāvaviveka and so forth—in the country of Superiors [India] refuted this master within mentioning his name, whereas this very master made refutations within mentioning the names of the master Bhāvaviveka, the master Dharmapāla, the master Dignāga, and so forth, but no Proponent of the Middle or Proponent of Mind-Only was able to do as he had done even though they disagreed with him. And he overcame [others’] adherence to true existence upon milking a cow in a painting, and even his coarse body resided in lands of humans for three hundred years and, having gained a rainbow body, resides [here] even now, as is explained in the speech of lama Dor-jay-dan-pa,\textsuperscript{b} translated by Pa-tshab,\textsuperscript{c} and so forth.

\textsuperscript{a} With respect to “who do not know suchness” the Sanskrit (La Vallée Poussin, Prasannapadā, 36.1) is merely tadanabhijña “who do not know that [or those, which could refer to ‘definitions’]” whereas the Tibetan reads de kho na mi shes pa’i “who do not know suchness.” I have followed the Tibetan as it presumably reflects the translators’ reading of tad as meaning tattva (see La Vallée Poussin, Prasannapadā, 36, n.3). The Four Interwoven Annotations (592.3) takes it even further: chos kyi de kho na nyid ma shes pa’i “who do not know the suchness of phenomena.”

\textsuperscript{b} rdo rje gdan pa; perhaps Lalitavajra.

Introduction to the Middle Way School

With respect to how the chariot-way of the Middle Way Autonomy School, in which there are no external objects, was opened:

After that, Shāntarakṣhita made the second Autonomy School.

Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Word Commentary on Root Text: After that, the master Shāntarakṣhita made the second Autonomy School, the Yogic Middle Way Autonomy School.
Some Tibetans, mistaking a statement by the master Ye-she-de, assert that prior to Shāntarakṣhita there did not arise a Proponent of the Middle who asserted that external objects do not exist and that all phenomena are established in conventional terms and are not ultimately established. This is not logically feasible:

Ye-she-de, according to Tsong-kha-pa’s synopsis in both expositions of the stages of the path, says that “the master Shāntarakṣhita made a different Middle Way system, teaching—based on Yogic Practice [that is, Mind-Only] treatises—that external objects conventionally do not exist and that the mind ultimately is without inherent existence.” Ye-she-de does not address whether other Proponents of the Middle had these assertions earlier than Shāntarakṣhita. Ye-she-de’s opinion with more context from Tsong-kha-pa’s *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path* is:

In the Middle Way treatises composed by the master the Superior father [Nāgārjuna] and his spiritual son [Āryadeva], the mode of whether external objects exist or not is not made clear; after them, the master Bhāvaviveka refuted the system of Cognition-Only [or Mind-Only] and presented a system in which external objects exist in conventional terms. Then, the master Shāntarakṣhita, in dependence upon Yogic Practice [that is, Mind-Only] treatises, made a different Middle Way system, teaching that external objects in conventional terms do not exist and that the mind ultimately is without inherent existence. Thereby, the Middle Way School arose in two forms; the former is designated the Sūtra Middle Way School and the latter, the Yogic Middle Way School.
1. because prior to Shāntarakṣhita Maitreya’s *Ornament for the Clear Realizations* had already appeared in the land of humans\(^a\)
2. and because as Haribhadra’s *Clear Meaning Commentary*\(^b\) says:

Having seen that [those commentaries] done by those [two]\(^c\) did not treat [it properly, he\(^d\)] revealed it with an awareness dwelling in the Middle Way.\(^e\)

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\(a\) Since this Middle Way text was brought here by Asaṅga after visiting Maitreya in the Joyous Pure Land, it has to predate Shāntarakṣhita.

\(b\) Haribhadra (seng ge bzang po, late eighth century), *Clear Meaning Commentary / Commentary on (Maitreya’s) “Treatise of Quintessential Instructions on the Perfection of Wisdom: Ornament for the Clear Realizations”*, ‘grel pa don gsal / shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa’i man ngag gi bstan bcos mgon par rtogs pa’i rgyan ces bya ba’i ‘grel pa (spuṭārtha / abhisamayālaṃkāraṇāprajñāpāramitopadeśāśāstraavṛtti), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 3793), BDRC W23703.86:158–281 (Delhi, India: Karmapa chodhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 78b.4. This citation is from stanza 4 (Amano edition, 3) of Haribhadra’s *Clear Meaning Commentary* which is one from among the twenty-one Indian commentaries on Maitreya’s *Ornament for the Clear Realizations* contained in the Translation of the Treatises (*bstan ’gyur*). Both Haribhadra and Āryavimuktisena, who preceded Shāntarakṣhita, comment on Maitreya’s text in accordance with the Middle Way School and also assert the absence of external objects.

\(c\) Asaṅga and Vasubandhu.

\(d\) Āryavimuktisena.

\(e\) Gung-thang Lo-drö-gya-tsho’s *Annotations to (Haribhadra’s) Small Clear Meaning Commentary on (Maitreya’s) “Ornament for the Clear Realizations,”* vol. 1, 8.17-8.28, gives detailed commentary on the stanza including the first two lines—“Included among Superiors (ārya), The one called Vimuktisena [Āryavimuktisena also]”, which in selective paraphrase is:

**Included among Superiors (ārya)** due to having generated supramundane pristine wisdom,

**The one called Vimuktisena (rnam par grol ba’i sde)** because of being released (grol bas) from the objects to be abandoned by the path of seeing also,

**Having seen that** the commentaries done by the earlier two masters [Asaṅga and Vasubandhu] **were not done** exactly in accordance with the meaning of the Mother [Sūtras] since they were done in accordance with the texts of Cognition-Only or since Vasubandhu had not given up adherence to Cognition and Asaṅga made his [commentary in terms of mind-only] for the sake of taming Vasubandhu,

**With intelligence dwelling in the middle**—the meaning of the Mother and of [Maitreya’s] treatise free from the extremes of permanence and annihilation and
Āryavimuktisena also commented on its meaning as the Middle Way.

Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Annotations Wa: Having seen that those commentaries done by those two earlier masters [Asaṅga and Vasubandhu] did not treat the meaning of the Mother Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras exactly as it is, either because their commentaries accorded with the texts of Cognition-only or because they did not express the contextual meaning and had not abandoned adherence to cognition-only, he [Āryavimuktisena] revealed [the meaning of the [Perfection of Wisdom] Sūtras and Maitreya’s Ornament for the Clear Realizations with an awareness dwelling in the Middle Way.

realizing such or with unbiased intelligence—properly differentiated the topics in commentary connecting the Ornament with the Twenty-five Thousand. Gyaltsab’s Explanation says that thereby it is not redundant, and also the general stages of the vast paths also are concordant between this and the two earlier masters.

a ca. 6th century.
and also explains that the types of realization of the three vehicles\(^a\) are different\(^b\) in accordance with the statements in the root text\(^[\text{[zha]}]\) [Maitreya’s Ornament for the Clear Realizations, II.8ab]:\(^c\)

Abandoning conceptualization of apprehended objects [as external objects]
And not abandoning [conceptualization of] apprehending [subjects as truly existent are features of Solitary Realizers’ paths].

Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Annotations Zha: The explanation of abandoning conceptualization of apprehended objects as external objects and not abandoning conceptualization of the apprehender, that is, consciousnesses, as truly existent is a feature of Solitary Realizers’ paths, and it is said that the Great Vehicle path of preparation is superior to the path of preparation of Hearsers as well as of the Rhinoceros-like by way of the aspect of realizing the absence of true existence.

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\(^a\) Hearer, Solitary Realizer, and Great Vehicles.
\(^b\) Hearers meditate on the subtle selflessness of persons; Solitary Realizers mainly meditate on the absence of external objects, which is the coarse selflessness of phenomena; Bodhisattvas meditate mainly on the absence of true existence, which is the subtle selflessness of phenomena.
\(^c\) mngon par rtogs pa’i rgyan/ shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa’i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa’i rgyan shes bya ba’i tshig le’ur byas pa (abhisamayālāṃkāra/ abhisamayālāṃkāra-nāma-prajñāpāramitopadeśāstraśāstrakārikā), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 3786), BDRC W23703.80:3-28 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa Choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 5a.4-5a.5. The bracketed additions in these two passages are from Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Annotations, dbu ma pa, zha, 7.8, given in full just below.
and (I.26cd): a

[The Great Vehicle path of preparation] is superior to [the path of preparation of] Hearers as well as of the Rhinoceros-like [by way of the aspect of realizing the absence of true existence].

3. and because even the master Bhāvaviveka: b

- takes Proponents of the Middle who refute external objects as the opponent, [their system being] first to cause [followers] to assert that external objects do not exist and that the mind is truly established and then later to present [to them] that even the mind does not truly exist
- and explains—through the example of its being better to not get polluted in the first place rather than first getting contaminated with filth and then washing—that rather than first teaching Mind-Only and later teaching the Middle Way, it is better to teach the Middle Way from the beginning. Bhāvaviveka’s Lamp for (Nāgārjuna’s) “Wisdom” says: c
Even if it is asserted that first one takes up cognition-only and later completely gives it up, rather than getting contaminated with filth and then washing it is better to keep a distance, not touching it from the beginning. Just as an inherent nature of external objects is considered to be nonexistent, so it is fitting to consider consciousness also to be selfless and unproduced.

Although Avalokitavrata’s Commentarial Explanation<sup>a</sup> associates this passage with the Mind-Only School, and [this passage] is similar in

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<sup>a</sup> Commentarial Explanation / Explanatory Commentary on (Bhāvaviveka’s) “Lamp for (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Wisdom’”, shes rab sgron ma’i rgya cher ’grel pa (prajñāpradīpikā), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 3859), BDRC W23703.99.4-575 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985).
thought to Bhāvaviveka’s explanation of such on the occasion of the Mind-Only School in his Blaze of Reasoning. [this is the Yogic-Practice Autonomy Middle Way School, not the Mind-Only School]:[zs]

- because the meaning of this passage [“it is fitting to consider consciousness also to be selfless and unproduced”]a appears to be that “it is fitting to realize the mind to be without a self of persons and to be without truly existent production”
- and because also when Bhāvaviveka’s Blaze of Reasoning says [in the Autonomy School section], “Certain others” and so on, it uses the word “others” to distinguish these from Proponents of Mind-Only,
- and because when Bhāvaviveka’s Blaze of Reasoning speaks of other assertions by Proponents of Mind-Only [in the Mind-Only School section], no more than the likes of “These propound” and “If” appears.

Hence, this also refutes well the statement that before Chandrakīrti such [Autonomist] Proponents of the Middle did not arise.

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a Bhāvaviveka’s Lamp for (Nāgārjuna’s) “Wisdom” (247a.1-247a.2) reads:

Just as an inherent nature of external objects is considered to be nonexistent, so it is fitting to consider consciousness also to be selfless and unproduced.
Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Annotations Za: This is not the Mind-Only School because there does not exist a Mind-Only School that accepts to first cause [students] to enter into mind-only and then later causes them to discard it.

Furthermore, prior to Shāntarakṣita, both Proponents of the Middle who assert external objects and Proponents of the Middle who do not assert external objects arose because from Bhāvaviveka’s having refuted Proponents of the Middle who assert that external objects do not exist, Shāntarakṣita analyzed those two and thereupon asserted the system of former Proponents of the Middle [that is, those prior to Bhāvaviveka who assert that external objects do not exist], because:

1. Shāntarakṣita’s Autocommentary on Ornament of the Middle says:a

Those conventional effective things asserted by all bad proponents who, in wanting to respond, make the thesis of cause and effect are to be analyzed.

Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Annotations 'a: The bad proponents are the Proponents of [Truly Established] Things who from the approach of asserting cause and effect want to respond to the refutation of true establishment.

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*a* Shāntarakṣita (*śāntarakṣita, zhi ba 'tsho, 725-788), dbu ma rgyan gyi 'grel pa (*madhyamakālaṃkāraśāntarāṣṭiT*), in bstan 'gyur (*sde dge, 3885), BDRC W23703.107:114-169 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 78b.5-78b.6. The *sde dge* version differs slightly from what Tsong-kha-pa cites, reading: གང་དག་གིས་ȅ་དང་འɐས་ɍའི་དངོས་པོར་དམ་བཅས་བས་Ȃོལ་བ་ངན་པ་ཐམས་ཅིད་ཀྱི་ལན་བཏབ་ཕར་འདོད་པའི་ཀུན་ɲོབ་ཀྱི་དངོས་པོ་དེ་དག་གང་ཡིན་པ་དེ་དȾད་པར་Ɏ西藏语 |
2. and Kamalashila’s Commentary on the Difficult Points concerning that passage says:

With respect to “those are to be analyzed,” the two aspects of Middle Way paths are the means of analysis…This was set forth in the master Bhavya’s [Bhāvaviveka’s] Heart of the Middle. “Others” think” are those that see only the opposing position as reasonable.


gzhan dag; as is clear below, this is dual, since it means “the other two.”

c  The elided portion is not relevant to Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s citation:
Therefore, “the two aspects of Middle Way paths” are systems of Proponents of the Middle:

- because although Proponents of Mind-Only assert themselves as Proponents of the Middle, not any Proponent of the Middle calls Proponents of Mind-Only Proponents of the Middle, and
- because “others” is a dual term, and since the plural marker in “those that see” (mthong ba rnams) indicates that the others are plural, although the thought of the Foremost [Tsong-kha-pa] is that Shāntarakṣita is an illustration of them, they are not necessarily [just] Shāntarakṣita.

Hence, although prior to that time there were indeed mere Proponents of the Middle who accorded with the Yogic Practitioners, only the master Shāntarakṣita is the opener of the chariot-way of the Yogic-Autonomy Middle Way School because this master [Shāntarakṣita], just after even Chandrakīrti, set up a great way upon extensively composing texts such as the Ornament for the Middle—root text and commentary—which present such a system. Although even prior to this there existed the mere systematic tradition, this does no damage [to Shāntarakṣita being the opener of the chariot-way] because it is like the fact that in the world for a road on

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a *rnams.*
which great chariots can travel the mere existence of a road is not sufficient, a broad and great highway is needed; the master Ye-she-de says:

Then, the master Shāntarakṣita made a different Middle Way system, teaching—based on Yogic Practice [that is, Mind-Only] treatises—that external objects conventionally do not exist and that the mind ultimately is without inherent existence.\(^a\) Thereby, the Middle Way School arose in two forms.

This is the thought also of the Foremost Great Being [Tsong-kha-pa]; his *The Essence of Eloquence* says:

\(^a\) According to Ge-lug-pa presentations of Shāntarakṣita, the mind conventionally exists inherently but does not ultimately exist inherently.
Therefore, such a system also arose here and there [prior to Shāntarakṣhita]; however, it is a good [to hold], in accordance with the master Ye-she-de’s assertion, that through extensively composing texts the master Shāntarakṣhita opened the way of the Middle Way tenet system in the mode of the conventional nonexistence of external objects.

Nevertheless, some Tibetans say that prior to Bhāvaviveka there were no Proponents of the Middle, such as the Superior Nāgārjuna and his spiritual son [Āryadeva] and so forth who refuted the Mind-Only School since the master Ye-she-de says:

In the Middle Way treatises by the Superior father [Nāgārjuna] and his spiritual son [Āryadeva], whether external objects exist or not is not clear. After them, the master Bhāvaviveka refuted the system of Cognition-Only [Mind-Only] and presented a system in which external objects exist in conventional terms. Then, the master Shāntarakṣhita made a different Middle Way system, teaching—based on Yogic Practice [that is, Mind-Only] treatises—that external objects do not exist in conventional terms and that the mind ultimately is without inherent existence.

It follows that their thinking this is not logically feasible because the master Superior Nāgārjuna clearly refutes the Proponents of Mind-Only, because his Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment individually refutes the self asserted by Other Schools, partless particles asserted by the Hearer.

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a Jam-yang-zhay-pa ends the citation here with “and so forth”; I have included more for context.
schools, and the three characters and the consciousness-basis-of-all asserted by Proponents of Mind-Only, and so forth.\(^a\)

When the self imputed by Forders
Is analyzed with reasoning,
It is not found anywhere
Among all the aggregates.

\[\ldots\] \(^b\)

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\(^a\) Stanzas 4 and 27; 38b.4-39b.1. The ellipsis is Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s. The beginning of the sde dge version differs from what Tsong-kha-pa cites (38b.4) reading:

\(^b\) Ellipsis 38b.4-39b.1 reads:
The statement by the Subduer
“All these [three realms]a are mind-only”
Is so that childish beings might give up
Their fear [of the profound]b—it is not thus. c

a Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s Port of Entry, vol. 2, 32.2.
b Ta-drin-rab-tan’s Annotations, 184.3.
c Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho (Port of Entry, vol. 2, 32.3) comments on the final line as
“It does not abide in accordance with the literal [reading]” (de ni sgra ji bzhin pa de bzhin
du gnas pa nyid min pa); it seems to me that this properly reflects the significance of the
adverbial ablative in the Sanskrit tattvataḥ, which in the Tibetan translation of the Essay
on the Mind of Enlightenment is rendered simply as de bzhin nyid.
Hence, it is also the thought of the Foremost Great Being [Tsong-kha-pa] that the master Ye-shes-de is logically feasible about the mere chronology of the opening of systematic traditions by Bhāvaviveka and Śāntarakṣita, but not all his explanations on the literal level are logically feasible because Tsong-kha-pa’s *Exposition of the Stages of the Path* says:\(^b\)

\(^a\) Jam-yang-zhay-pa ends the citation here with “and so forth”; I have filled in the “and so forth” for important understanding of both the current context and Jig-me-dam-chö-gyatso’s next point.

\(^b\) It is likely that Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s reason for not specifying whether this is from Tsong-kha-pa’s *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path* or *Medium-Length Exposition*...
Concerning this, the master Ye-shay-de explains that:

of the Stages of the Path is that similar statements are made in both; see Tsong-kha-pa, *The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment*, vol. 3, trans. and ed. Joshua W. C. Cutler and Guy Newland (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 2002), 116. The ellipsis is Jamyang-zhay-pa’s.

Ye-shay-de (ye shes sde, fl. 8th century). The synopsis of his opinions on this subject is a paraphrase drawn from Ye-shay-de’s *Distinctions of the Views, lta ba’i khyad par*, in *bstan ‘gyur (sde dge, 4360)*, BDRC W23703.206:428-457 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 213b.1-213b; P5847; Toh. 4360, sna ’shogs, volume jo, 213b.1-213b.4:)

See also Napper, *Dependent-Arising and Emptiness*, 165-166 and 277-279.
In the Middle Way treatises by the Superior father [Nāgārjuna] and his spiritual son [Āryadeva], whether external objects exist or not is not clear. After them, the master Bhāvaviveka refuted the system of Cognition-Only [or Mind-Only] and presented a system in which external objects exist in conventional terms. Then, the master Śāntarakṣhita made a different Middle Way system, teaching—based on Yogic Practice [that is, Mind-Only] treatises—that external objects do not exist in conventional terms and that the mind ultimately is without inherent existence. Thereby, the Middle Way School arose in two forms; the former is called the Sūtric Middle Way School and the latter, the Yogic Middle Way School.

The chronology [of the clarification (of the model texts of Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva by those masters) through great treatises] is evident in accordance with that [explanation by Ye-she-de]. However, although the master Chandrakīrti asserts that external objects exist in conventional terms, he does not do so through comparison with another tenet system, whereby it is not suitable to call him a Proponent of the Sūtric [Middle Way School], and similarly that he asserts in accordance with the Proponents of the Great Exposition also is very unreasonable.

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a Jam-yang-zhay-pa (Four Interwoven Annotations, vol. 2, 171.2) points out, as above, that Nāgārjuna in his Precious Garland (stanzas 394-396) indicates that mind-only is a lower doctrine.

b According to Tsong-kha-pa’s explanation of Śāntarakṣhita’s views, the mind conventionally exists inherently but does not ultimately exist inherently.

c The phrase “of the clarification through great treatises” is in Tsong-kha-pa’s Middle-length Exposition of the Stages of the Path but not his Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path.

d Tsong-kha-pa accepts the chronology, namely, that Bhāvaviveka preceded Śāntarakṣhita in illuminating the works of Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva through great treatises that founded the systems of the Sūtric Middle Way School and the Yogic Middle Way School by setting these systems forth in contradistinction to other systems. Nevertheless, there were earlier great Proponents of the Middle who had assertions similar to Bhāvaviveka and Śāntarakṣhita. Namely, Śūra asserted external objects prior to Bhāvaviveka, and Āryāvimuktiṣena—in accordance with Maitreya’s Ornament for Clear Realization and Haribhadra’s Clear Meaning Commentary—refuted external objects prior to Śāntarakṣhita. See Four Interwoven Annotations (vol. 2, 172.2); for more detail see Napper, Dependent-Arising and Emptiness, 279 and 797-798 n. 482, and Hopkins, Maps of the Profound, 500-505.

e In his The Essence of Eloquence Tsong-kha-pa clearly states the reasons for these
[Chandrakīrti] describes his own system as not shared with the commentaries [on Nāgārjuna’s thought]* by other Proponents of the Middle. His Autocommentary on the “Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle’” says (Louis de La Vallée Poussin, Madhyamakāvatāra par Chandrakīrti, Bibliotheca Buddhica 9 [Osnabrück, Germany: Biblio Verlag, 1970], 406.9, commenting on stanzas XIII.1 and 2):

May scholars ascertain that just as, except for Nāgārjuna’s Treatise on the Middle, this doctrine called “emptiness” is not expressed non-erro-
neously in other treatises, so the system that appears in this [treatise]—
set out together with objections and answers to any [other] system—
does not exist, in terms of the doctrine of emptiness, in other treatises.
Therefore, it should be understood that a certain [scholar’s] propound-
ing that just what are propounded ultimately in the system of the Sūtra School are asserted conventionally by Proponents of the Middle Way School is a proposition only by one who does not know the suchness of Nāgārjuna’s Treatise on the Middle.

At the end of also saying such with respect to the system of the Great Exposition School (La Vallée Poussin, Madhyamakāvatāra, 407.1), [Chandrakīrti] says:

This is because a supramundane doctrine is not fit to be similar to a
mundane doctrine. May scholars ascertain that this system is unshared.

Through the reason of his own system’s not being shared with other Proponents of the Middle Way School, [Chandrakīrti] posits that one who asserts that what are propounded ultimately by the two Proponents of [Truly Existent External] Objects [that is, the Great Exposition School and the Sūtra School] are propounded conventionally by Proponents of the Middle Way School does not know the Middle Way suchness. The reason is that, in the [Consequentialists’] own system, even conventionally, phenomena that are established by way of their own character are not asserted, whereas those [Proponents of True Existence] only posit [all phenomena] in the context of that [establishment of objects by way of their own character].

If one falls from either of the two truths, one also falls from the other; there-
fore, it is not suitable that a supramundane doctrine that has not fallen from the mode of the two truths be similar in terms of either of the two truths with a mundane doctrine that has fallen from the two truths. Therefore, this system of the Superior [Nāgārjuna]—in terms not only of the ultimate but also of the conventional—is not shared with the schools of the Proponents of True Existence.

*The bracketed additions are mostly drawn from Ta-drin-rab-tan’s revised Annotations, 270.5-272.6. Jam-yang-zhay-pa (Four Interwoven Annotations, on (Tsong-kha-pa’s) “Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path,” vol. 2, 172.6) points out that although Chandrakīrti, like the Great Exposition School, asserts external objects and does not assert self-cognition, he, unlike the Great Exposition School, asserts that external objects do not substantially exist, and also his non-assertion of self-cognition derives from not asserting establishment by way of the object’s own character.
Let it be said:

Through setting my Lama at the crown of my head,
   The two Mañjushrīs at my heart, and Daughter of Brahmā

These are White and Yellow Mañjushrīs and Svarasvatī, the objects of obeisance in the second and third stanzas of the expression of worship; The allusions harken back to Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s obeisances to the two Mañjushrīs and Svarasvatī at the beginning of Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s root text of tenets, see Hopkins, Maps of the Profound, 59ff.:

[2. Obeisance to Mañjushrī, Father of all Victors]

O you two, the sole father of all Victors—simultaneous with raising the sharp sword of incomparable wisdom in the empty sky you destroy the enemy, ignorance; simultaneous with eyes of compassion your lips smiling at beings expound eloquence; and simultaneous with bringing a treasury of doctrine you bestow on those in mindful yoga the ability to answer questions without forgetting. Brightly bestow on me simultaneously supreme intelligence and speech.

Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Word Commentary on Root Text: O you two, white and yellow Mañjughoṣhas:

- simultaneously, all at once, with raising the sword of incomparable wisdom in the sky of emptiness you clear away the enemy of trainees, ignorance
- simultaneously with looking at beings with eyes of compassion your smiling, laughing lips bestow on them a festival of eloquent doctrine
my tongue,
And summoning the middle path on the strings of a melodious lute,
May the Victors, their children, and the wise smile with pleasure."
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Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho (’jigs med dam chos rgya mtsho); poetic name Mi-pam-dbyangs can dgyes [or dgyes] pa’i rdo rje: 1898-1946 Part of Entry / Treatise Distinguishing All the Meanings of (Tsong-kha-pa’s) “The Essence of Eloquence”: Illuminating the Differentiation of the Interpretable and the Definitive: Port of Entry to “The Essence of Eloquence” drang ba dang nges pa’i don rnam par phye ba gsal bar byed pa legs bshad snying po’i don mtha’ dag mnam par ’byed pa’i bstan bcos legs bshad snying po’i ’jug ngogs bkra shis chos sde, India: 199-?

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*Compendium of Sūtra*

sūtrasamuccaya

mdo kun las btus pa

P5330, vol. 102

*Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment*

bodhicittavivarana

byang chub sems kyi ‘grel pa

P2665 and 2666, vol. 61; D1800 and 1801, vol. ngi


Five Stages

pañcakrama

rim pa lnga pa

P2667, vol. 61


*Praise of the Element of Attributes*

dharmadhātuṣṭotra

chos kyi dbyings su bstod pa

P2010, vol.46; D1118, vol. ka

*Praise of the Inconceivable*

acintyastava

bsam gyis mi khyab par bstod pa


*Praise of the Supramundane [Buddha]*

lokāṭṭhastava

’jig rten las ’das par bstod pa

P2012, vol. 46; D1120, vol. ka

Six Collections of Reasonings

1. *Treatise on the Middle / Fundamental Treatise on the Middle, Called “Wisdom”* madhyamakasāstra / paṇṇanāṃmaḥmadhyamakārikā
dbu ma’i bstan bcos / dbu ma rtsa ba’i tshig le’ur byas pa shes rab ces bya ba
P5224, vol. 95; D3824, vol. tsa
(PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa choedhey, gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985).

\[\text{The order of the Six Collections is drawn from Gareth Sparham, *Sources, Homage, Purpose, and Openers of the Chariot-Ways: Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s Decisive Analysis: Introduction 1*, (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, April, 2015: uma-tibet.org), 37, and endnotes 4 and 5, 179-180:}\]

The way Nāgārjuna comments on the thought of those Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras in the Six Collections of Reasoning that refute a trul[ly established] actuality, the proposition [taken up by our own and others’ Proponents of Truly Established Things] is established because there are the six:

1. *Treatise on the Middle*, refuting [in general the proposition of] trul[ly established] actualities [by our own and others’ Proponents of Truly Established Things]*

Brackets from Gung-thang Lo-drö-gya-tsho’s *Clarification of Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s “Decisive Analysis”* and Gung-thang Kön-chog-tan-pay-drön-me’s “Annotations,” TBRC W1KG21227, 6a.5: rang gzhun gyi sde pa dngos smra ba rnams kyi bsgrub byar byas pa ’i bden dngos

2. *Refutation of Objections*, an extension of the meaning of the first chapter of that *[Treatise on the Middle]*


Gung-thang Lo-drö-gya-tsho (*Clarification of Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s “Decisive Analysis”* and Gung-thang Kön-chog-tan-pay-drön-me’s “Annotations,” TBRC W1KG21227, 6a.5) explains (1) that the *Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning* proves that from accustoming to the pristine wisdom realizing the absence of true existence nirvāṇa is attained and (2) that the *Precious Garland* proves that from it omniscience is attained, due to which these two texts are said to refute the truly established actualities propounded by our own Buddhist sects in particular.

6. *Treatise Called the Finely Woven* [or *Fine Pulverization Treatise*], refuting the logicians’ sixteen categories of proofs of trul[ly established] actualities.


2. *Refutation of Objections*

   *vigrahavyāvartanakārikā*

   *rtṣod pa bzlog pa’i tshig le’ur byas pa*

   P5228, vol. 95; D3828, vol. tsa


3. *Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness*

   *śūnyatāsaptārikā*

   *stong pa nyid bdun cu pa’i tshig le’ur byas pa*

   P5227, vol. 95; D3827, vol. tsa


4. *Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning*

   *yuktiṣṭikārikā*

   *rigs pa drug cu pa’i tshig le’ur byas pa*

   P5225, vol. 95; D3825, vol. tsa


5. *Precious Garland of Advice for the King*

   *rājāparikāthārātnvālī*

   *rgyal po la gnam bya ba rin po che’i phreng ba*

   P5658, vol. 129; D4158, vol. 93


6. Treatise Called the Finely Woven
vaidalyasūtramā

citation: P5226, vol. 95; D3826, vol. tsa


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Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-pa’s) “Great Exposition of Tenets”: Freeing the Knots of the Difficult Points, Precious Jewel of Clear Awareness

citation: P5226, vol. 95; D3826, vol. tsa


Explanation of Veil Truths and the Ultimate in the Four Systems of Tenets

citation: P5226, vol. 95; D3826, vol. tsa


Stating the Modes of Explanation in the Textbooks on the Middle Way and the Perfection of Wisdom in the Lo-sel-ling and Go-mang Colleges: Festival for Those of Clear Intelligence

citation: P5226, vol. 95; D3826, vol. tsa


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byang chub lam gyi rim pa’i ‘khrid yig ’jam pa’i dbyangs kyi zhal lung


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P2064, vol. 46


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laksābhidhanāuddhātyalaghuṭantraprīñārthavivarana mngon par brjod pa’i bum pa las phyung ba nyung nga’i rgyud kyi bsdu sba’i don rnam par bshad pa
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mahāyānasamgrahabhāṣya thig pa chen po bsdu sba’i ’grel pa
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Vasumitra (*dbyig bshes*

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    sum cu pa’i ’grel bshad
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*The Main Gomang Textbook on Chandrakīrti’s Supplement: Jamyang-zhay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle*


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Dictionary


Bibliography


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Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s *Great Exposition of Tenets: Introduction to the Middle Way School* with Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s *Annotations* By Jeffrey Hopkins

What is the definition of “Middle”? The etymology? What is Nāgārjuna’s history over lives? How did the divisions of the Middle Way School, the Autonomy School and the Consequence School, diverge?

The format of the translation has six basic components:

- Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s running outline from his *Great Exposition of Tenets*
- His *Root Text of Tenets: Lion’s Roar*
- An indented word-commentary from the Khalkha Mongolian Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s *Annotations for the “Great Exposition of Tenets”: Freeing the Knots of the Difficult Points, Precious Jewel of Clear Awareness*
- Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s own commentary *Explanation of Tenets: Sun of the Land of Samantabhadra Brilliantly Illuminating All of Our Own and Others’ Tenets and the Meaning of the Profound [Emptiness], Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning Fulfilling All Hopes of All Beings*, also known as the *Great Exposition of Tenets*
- Remarks indented from Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s *Annotations for (Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s) “Great Exposition of Tenets”*
- Occasional, other indented explanatory materials.

This presentation contains all Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s root text and commentary as well as all Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s clarifying word-commentary and enlivening observations.

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