WHY DID DHARMAKĪRTI WRITE THE COMMENTARY?

Jam-yang-shay-pa’s
Decisive Analysis of Dharmakīrti’s
“Commentary on Valid Cognition”
Introduction 1

Hiroshi Nemoto

In collaboration with Lo-sang-gyal-tshan
Edited by Jeffrey Hopkins

UMA INSTITUTE
FOR TIBETAN STUDIES
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Introduction

The text translated here is the first part of the *Decisive Analysis of the Commentary on Valid Cognition* (hereafter “*Decisive Analysis*”) by Jam-yang-shay-pa-ngag-wang-tson-dru (1648–1721). The *Decisive Analysis* is a large commentary on Dharmakīrti’s (ca. 600–660) *Commentary on Valid Cognition*, a masterpiece of Buddhist logic and epistemology. Up to the present day, the *Decisive Analysis* has been used as a textbook at Drepung Gomang, Labrang Tashi-khyil, and other allied institutes of the Ge-lug-pa sect.

Jam-yang-shay-pa composed the first chapter of his *Decisive Analysis* at the age of fifty-three in Iron Dragon year, which corresponds to 1700 CE, at the request of De-si Sang-gyay-gya-tshod (1653–1705). According to his biography, Jam-yang-shay-pa was asked by De-si to make a teaching manual for the first chapter of the *Commentary on Valid Cognition* in accordance with the tenets of Dharmottara’s *Correct Commentary*. Since De-si deemed that there were considerable disagreements between Dharmottara and Khay-drub Ge-leg-pal-sang (1385–1438), the latter of whom De-si deeply disliked, he expected that Jam-yang-shay-pa would refute Khay-drub-je’s explanation of Dharmakīrti’s theory in favor of Dharmottara’s. To De-si’s disappointment, however, Jam-yang-shay-pa never criticized Khay-drub-je. Jam-yang-shay-pa instead quoted many passages from Khay-drub-je’s explanation of the *Commentary on Valid Cognition* to justify his own opinion, for Jam-yang-shay-pa evaluated Khay-drub-je as a matchless scholar among the disciples of Tsong-kha-pa (1357–1419). As a result, Jam-yang-shay-pa’s *Decisive Analysis* on the first chapter was far from contenting De-si. It was probably for this reason that Jam-yang-
shay-pa did not, or could not, complete the remaining three chapters at that time. It was only after he returned to Amdo Province that he set about composing the second and third chapters. His biography tells us that he composed the second chapter at the age of sixty-five in the Water Dragon year, which corresponds to 1712 CE. We may therefore assume that the (unfinished) third chapter was written not earlier than that year.

While the first chapter of the Decisive Analysis contains a detailed analysis of each topic concerning the theory of inference, the other three chapters are unfinished. The second chapter presents several important observations on the definition of valid cognition, the existence of transmigration, and so forth; the third chapter is only a sketch and does not provide a full discussion of Dharmakīrti’s theory of direct perception; and the fourth chapter was not written at all.

Now, let us look at the contents of the first chapter of the Decisive Analysis. The first chapter, which consists of 306 folios in the Labrang edition, comprises a detailed exegesis of Dharmakīrti’s theory of “inference for oneself.” This is one of the most extensive Tibetan commentaries ever written on the first chapter of the Commentary on Valid Cognition. The structure of the Decisive Analysis basically coincides with that of the Commentary on Valid Cognition. The following list shows the main topics that are discussed in the first chapter of the Decisive Analysis.

- the meaning of the title
- an analysis of the purpose, and so forth, of the Commentary on Valid Cognition
- explanation of the opening stanzas of the treatise
- the meaning of the term pākṣa (phyogs)
- the definition of a correct sign
- an analysis of eighteen theses
- the definition of a quasi-sign
- the definition and classification of a correct effect sign
- the definition and classification of a correct nature sign

---

a chu 'brug gi lo.
b I have not found information as to the year of composition of the third chapter.
c rang don rjes dpag.
d rtags yang dag.
e dam bca' bco brgyad.
f rtags ltar snang.
g 'bras rtags yang dag.
h rang bzhin gvi rtags yang dag.
Introduction

- the definition and classification of a correct nonobservation sign
- the definition of the three modes
- valid cognition ascertaining the invariable relationship between the sign and the property to be established
- discussion of a correct sign based on belief.

It is to be noted that Dharmakīrti’s theory of anyāpoha (gzhan sel) is not treated in Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Decisive Analysis although it is an important topic in the Commentary on Valid Cognition. It is clear from this that Jam-yang-shay-pa’s main concern here is to examine the theory of inference itself, and not other related issues discussed within the framework of the theory of inference.

The present volume covers the first two topics enumerated above. Let us summarize the main points of each topic.

1. THE MEANING OF THE TITLE

The title of Dharmakīrti’s text is “Pramāṇavārttika,” which is translated here as “Commentary on Valid Cognition” for the sake of conciseness. As regards the meaning of the word pramāṇa (“valid cognition”) in the title, Jam-yang-shay-pa criticizes opinions of others like Jayanta, and establishes his own idea of how to explain the meaning of the word. Jam-yang-shay-pa considers that pramāṇa here refers to the treatises that discuss valid cognition, and not valid cognition itself. Therefore, he says that the word is used only in its metaphorical sense of “valid cognition.”

Thus, according to Jam-yang-shay-pa, “Pramāṇavārttika” stands for “a commentary on the treatises of valid cognition.” What then are the treatises of valid cognition? The most relevant treatise is, of course, Dignāga’s (ca. 480–540) Compilation of Valid Cognition, which is a compilation of Dignāga’s own Gate of Reasoning. Another explanation is that the treatises commented on by Dharmakīrti are the Buddha’s scriptures, specifically, those included in the third turning of the wheel of doctrine. Following this explanation, Jam-yang-shay-pa asserts that the Commentary on Valid Cognition is also intended as a commentary on the Buddha’s words that reveal the nature of valid cognition, as well as being on the thought of

---

a ma dmigs pa'i rtags yang dag.
b tshul gsum.
c yid ches kyi rtags yang dag.
d pramāṇasamuccaya (tshad ma kun btus).
e nyāyamukha (rigs sgo).
earlier masters in the past, such as Asaṅga and Vasubandhu.

2. THE PURPOSE AND SO FORTH OF THE
COMMENTARY ON VALID COGNITION

Before examining the contents of the text, Jam-yang-shay-pa analyzes the overall idea of the Commentary on Valid Cognition in terms of the four categories: the subject matter, purpose, essential purpose, and relationship, or connection, of the subject matter to the purpose, as well as of the purpose of the essential purpose.

The subject matter of the text is the entire doctrine of the Buddha. Jam-yang-shay-pa says that in Dharmakīrti’s second chapter the Buddha’s doctrine is elaborated in terms the path to liberation and omniscience, and in the third chapter it is discussed in terms of the interpretable and definitive. Furthermore, he says that the first chapter is what explains reasons that serve as a means of determining such topics by oneself, and that the fourth chapter is one that explains the correct way to teach these things to others.

The purpose of the text is to make each reader comprehend the flawlessness of the Buddha, his doctrine (chos, dharma)—which consists of scripture and realization—and the spiritual community (dge 'dun, samgha) or practitioners who achieve what is taught by the Buddha, thereby leading the reader to achieve goodness. In addition to those that are Hearers, Solitary Realizers, or the followers of Great Vehicle, Jam-yang-shay-pa considers that the text must be studied by those who lack a lineage and merely pursue worldly pleasures, and even by those who have entered exceedingly wrong paths such as the Lokāyata, that is, those who have diverged far from the correct view. Thus, he holds that the intended readers are not necessarily Buddhists.

The essential purpose of the text is to cause readers gradually attain the supreme valid cognition (namely, omniscience) and attain the supreme state of a Buddha. This implies that, according to Jam-yang-shay-pa’s understanding, the Commentary on Valid Cognition is not merely a treatise

---

| a  | brjod bya. |
| b  | dgos pa.   |
| c  | nying dgos.|
| d  | 'brel ba.  |
| e  | nyan thos. |
| f  | rang sangs rgyas. |
| g  | theg chen. |
| h  | rigs chad. |
of secular science but rather one that serves as a means of achieving a religious purpose.

The relationship/connection of the text is stated in terms of causal relationship. Its essential purpose is causally related to its purpose; and the purpose causally relates to hearing the contents of this treatise.

3. EDITIONS CONSULTED

Two basic editions of Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Decisive Analysis of the “Commentary on Valid Cognition” Fully Revealing the Path of Liberation: Hundreds of Blazing Lights of Valid Cognition” were consulted:

1. tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi mtha’ dpyod thar lam rab gsal tshad ma’i ’od brgya ’bar ba. Published at Go-mang College in Tibet, date unknown. Abbreviated reference: “2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa,” so named because of being acquired in Lhasa, Tibet, at Go-mang College in 2015 by Jongbok Yi for the UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies.

2. tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi mtha’ dpyod thar lam rab gsal tshad ma’i ’od brgya ’bar ba, BDRC W22186.1, which is a PDF of: bla brang bkra shis ’khyil, bla brang brka shis ’khyil dgon, publishing date unknown. Abbreviated reference: “2011 BDRC bla brang.”

The digital Tibetan text of Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Decisive Analysis of the “Commentary on Valid Cognition” provided in this book was supplied by the Drepung Gomang Library of Go-mang College in Mundgod, Karnataka State, India, which was likely based on both of the above editions. It has been edited primarily in accordance with the “2011 BDRC bla brang.”
Technical Notes

It is important to recognize that:

- translations and editions of texts are given in the Bibliography;
- the names of Indian Buddhist schools of thought are translated into English in a wish to increase accessibility for non-specialists;
- for the names of Indian scholars and systems used in the body of the text, ch, sh, and śh are used instead of the more usual c, ś, and ś for the sake of easy pronunciation by non-specialists; however, ccḥ is used for cch, not chchḥ. Within parentheses the usual transliteration system for Sanskrit is used;
- transliteration of Tibetan is done in accordance with a system devised by Turrell Wylie; see “A Standard System of Tibetan Transcription,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 22 (1959): 261-267;
- the names of Tibetan authors and orders are given in “essay phonetics” for the sake of easy pronunciation; the system is aimed at internet searchability;
- titles of added subsections are given in square brackets;
- definitions are in bold type.
Jam-yang-shay-pa’s

DECISIVE ANALYSIS OF
(DHARMAKĪRTI’S)
“COMMENTARY ON
VALID COGNITION”

Key to the colorization: In situations of debate the Tibetan text and the translation are highlighted in three colors: black, blue, and red. Blue print represents what Jam-yang-shay-pa considers to be right positions, while red print represents what Jam-yang-shay-pa considers to be wrong positions. Words in black are other information or function structurally. In the Tibetan, a turquoise background indicates material added in place of ellipses, and a magenta highlight sets off ellipsis indicators when the elided part has been filled in.
From Jam-yang-shay-pa’s
Decisive Analysis of the “Commentary on Valid Cognition” Fully Revealing the Path of Liberation:
Hundreds of Blazing Lights of Valid Cognition

Decisive Analysis of the First Chapter: Necklace of Those with Clear Mind and Entrance for the Fortunate

༄༅།
།ཚད་མ་ȷམ་འགྲེལ་གྱི་མཐའ་དȾོད་ཐར་ལམ་རབ་གསལ་
ཚད་མའི་འོད་བȄ་འབར་བ་ལས་ལེɹ་དང་པོའི་མཐའ་དȾོད་ȟོ་
གསལ་མགུལ་Ȅན་ǰལ་བཟང་འșག་ངོགས་བɵགས་སོ།

[Expression of worship]

Namo guru ca nāthāmaṇḍjughoṣau ca svarasvastyai (Homage to Guru, Protector Maṇḍjughoṣa, and Sarasvatī.)
b
I always bow down to the feet of and go for refuge in the Foremost Venerable Guru [Maṇḍjughoṣa], the Foremost father [Tsong-kha-pa], and his spiritual sons.

Glory to the Buddha who—by seeing all phenomena just as they are and by accomplishing pure perfection abundantly—was born to be an authoritative being,c
Who—having actualized the untainted body of attributesd out of empathy for migratorse as if each of them were his only child—teaches the three vehicles and the coarse and subtle

---
a This should be emended to read: Namo gurave ca nāṭhāmaṇḍjughoṣaya ca svarasvastayai ca.
b Also known as Svarasvati.
c tshad mar gyur pa: literally, “one who has become a means of valid cognition.”
d chos sku.
e 'gro.
four truths,
Who—having overcome the faults of attachment and so forth,
the manifest, their seeds, and predisposing latencies—has
firmly realized suchness, thereby entirely going to bliss,
And who—protecting [beings] from the abyss of cyclic existence
and from the abyss of peace [for oneself alone] by teaching in
accordance with the fact—always resides at the top of all reli-
gious assemblies.

O you two—[white and yellow] Mañjughoṣhas—embodied as
Victors’ youthful children, but fathers of all Victors,
Raising swords of intense wisdom cutting through all wrong
views,
Staying in the lotus-lake at my heart
Please bestow on me today the wisdom to know all the knowa-
ble.

---

\[\text{Note:} \]

\(a\) 2011 BDRC \textit{bla brang} (1b.3) reads \textit{ston}; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (1b.3) reads \textit{son}.
\(b\) 2011 BDRC \textit{bla brang} (1b.3) reads \textit{skyob}; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (1b.3) reads \textit{skyobs}.
O Sarasvati, please decorate my mind
With hundreds of colors of insights
Like the Sindhu River decorated by a slender girl’s wine
And like a kumuda lotus decorated by moonlight (“rays of ambrosia”).

All Victors smiled and laughed as they observed here
That the world was illuminated by the elegant explanations of the great masters,
Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, skilled in dispelling all the darkness of mistaken, though very clever conceptions of faulty adversaries,
And that thereby their fame spread throughout the threefold world.

I bow down to Tsong-kha-pa, unmatched leader yet openly revealing the three secrecies\(^b\) in conformity with migrators’ minds (blo),
By nature unchangeably wise, righteous, and good (bzang) yet entirely destroying the troops of demons,
Endowed with the eight qualities of mastery\(^c\) of blazing renown.

---

\(^a\) 2011 BDRC bla brang (2a.3) reads brgal; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (1b.7) reads rgal.
\(^b\) Three secrecies of body, speech, and mind in accordance with the dispositions, thoughts, and tendencies of high, middle, and low trainees, called “secret” because no sentient being’s thought can encompass them.
\(^c\) dbang phyug brgyad ldan.
(grags pa), teacher of the three levels,\(^a\)

And like all actual Victors, gloriously at the top of whole assembly of the learned and adept.

\(^a\) Above, on, and below the ground; or the Desire, Form, and Formless Realms.

O spiritual sons of the Omniscient One, you two [Gyal-tshab-je and Khay-drub-je] are the sun and moon over the earth,
The crown ornaments of learned scholars whose minds shine
With a large collection of objects of knowledge, subtle and minute,
Just as the surface of the sky\(^b\) shines with constellations.

\(^b\) kun gsal ngos.

O Father King of Victors [the Dalai Lama] and his spiritual son [the Paṇchen Lama], together with their incarnations,
Omniscient protectors of three realms of the world,
Endowed with the good qualities equal to those of the entirety of mundane existence and peace\(^c\) collected together;

\(^c\) srid zhi'i yon tan.
Just like the sun (“the ruler of twelve months”) unmatched and shining in this world.

I bow down from my heart to feet of the Lord of Speech, The Omniscient Lo-sang-gya-tshoa\(^a\) [the Fifth Dalai Lama] Whose glorious and beauteous aspects of three secrets are not characterized Even if the entirety of all the good qualities of purification and release are collected together.

The glorious guru, chief of Vajradharas [the fifth Paṇchen Lama Lo-sang-ye-shay]\(^a\) Is laudable in spreading the teaching of the Second Victor, Lo-sang (blo bzang) [Tsong-kha-pa], and in being intent On the dance of the pristine wisdom of Limitless Illumination\(^b\) [Amitābha].

\(^a\) blo bzang rgya mtsho.
\(^b\) snang mtha’/snang ba mtha’ yas, another name for Amitābha.
I bow down to the feet of Lokeshvara [the Bodhisattva Avalokiteshvara]
Holding a white lotus in hand, who acting like a human,
Spreads the second Victor’s teaching, the sole supreme essence
Of the Buddha’s teaching, bringing help and happiness throughout
the three realms of world.

O supreme spiritual friends, kings of doctrine, you disseminate and propagate
The second Buddha Mañjunātha’s explanations, practices, and teachings
Throughout the earth via wisdom, empathy, and power,
Manifestations of Mañjushrī embodied by means of great magical emanation.

I bow down to the beneficent, matchless spiritual friends, the fourfold Mañjunātha and so forth,
Holding the modes of doctrine of Sūtra and Tantra like Ānanda,
Endowed with perfect aspiration very high like [Meru] the Lord of Mountains,
Combining learnedness, discipline, and goodness.

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\(^a\) 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (2b.5) reads *chos kyi*; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (2a.6) reads *gtsug na*. 
[Pledge to complete the composition]

Just as the Ruler of Humans [the Fifth Dalai Lama], omniscient
seer of the five sciences,\(^a\)
In a transmission of a series of a day-making lineage of holy
lives
Of divine offspring—Suchandra,\(^b\) Aniruddha,\(^c\) Asaṅga, Devaputra,\(^d\) and so forth
Commanded [me] to place authoritative Indian texts as the foun-
dation,

I will explain here the intended meaning of the *Aphorisms*
[Dignāga’s *Compilation*] and [Dharmakīrti’s] Seven Treatises
As very clearly as the drawings on the silk cloth of the King of
the East, *Dong Jun*,\(^g\)
By means of hundreds of scriptures and reasonings endowed
with the light of millions of suns

---

\(^a\) Internal science, logic, grammar, medicine, and mechanical arts.

\(^b\) zla bzang.

\(^c\) ma ’gags.

\(^d\) lha sras.

\(^e\) 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (2b.6) lacks the first two lines which appear in an extra errata line in 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (2a.8).

\(^f\) Correcting mig in 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (2a.8) to mi in accordance with 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (2b.7).

\(^g\) stong khun (= tūn kus).
As if Dignāga and Dharmakīrti came [here to teach their treatises].

May the intelligent who desire a clear and unconfused explanation—with reasoning by the force of actualities—
Of the mode of progress to liberation and omniscience,
The meaning of the entirety of the Sūtras and Tantras,
The supreme ford to all scholars and practitioners, listen to this.

Since I do not make myself a laughingstock for having the wish to save others
From the mud of reification while I myself am bound by hundreds of fetters of doubts
Like a madman trying to tame an elephant,
May you take delight in this system of the great scholars of India ("the land of Superiors").

---

*a dngos stobs rigs pa.*

*b 2011 BDRC bla brang (3a.3) reads sgrog; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (2b.2) reads sgrags.*
Concerning this, here regarding the explanation of the contents of Dhar-makīrti’s *Commentary on Valid Cognition*, there are three parts: the meaning of the beginning section, the meaning of the main text, and the meaning of the ending section.
I. The meaning of the beginning section {2 parts}

This has two parts: the meaning of the title and the translators’ homage.

A. The meaning of the title

[The title] reads:

In the language of India: pramāṇavārttikakārikā (pra mā na bār ti kā kā ri ka), Commentary on Valid Cognition.

In the language of Tibet: tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi tshig le'ur byas pa.

1. Decisive analysis of the four properties—the purpose and so forth—of this [Commentary on Valid Cognition] {2 parts}

This has two parts: refutation [of others’ mistakes] and our own system.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{a}}\] 2011 BDRC bla brang (3a.4) reads byung; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (2b.4) reads gsungs.
a. Refutation [of others’ mistakes]

I. As regards the topic, the purpose [of the treatise] and so forth, a
Jayanta’s Commentary on (Prajñākaragupta’s) “Ornament” b says: c

[The term] pramāṇa (“means of valid cognition”) d in the title
Pramāṇavārttika (Commentary on Valid Cognition) is to be taken
as high sayings in general, e and what is to be commented on by
[Dharmakīrti’s] Commentary f is the thought g of [Buddha’s] high
sayings in general, but it is not that it comments on the meaning
of Dignāga’s Compilation of Valid Cognition. h Furthermore, since
[Dharmakīrti’s Commentary] does not contain the words “I will
explain the text of the Compilation,” it is not logically feasible to
assert that he composed [the Commentary] for the sake of refusing
accusations i against the master Dignāga.

a These are the treatise’s subject matter, purpose, essential purpose, and the relationship
among these, commonly called “the four, the purpose and so forth” (dgos sogs bzhi) even
though the four begin with the subject matter (brjod bya).
b rgyan gyi 'grel bshad rgyal ba can.
c 2011 BDRC bla brang, 3a.5; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 2b.4; 2007 Taipei codex reprint,
3.10. This is paraphrase; the actual text follows.
d tshad ma.
e gsung rab spyi.
f rnam 'grel.
g dgongs pa.
h tshad ma kun btus.
i brnyas pa spangs pa'i phyir.
Jayanta’s Commentary [on (Prajñākaragupta’s) “Ornament”] says:\(^a\)

It is unreasonable to say that [Dharmakīrti] composed the Commentary on Valid Cognition as a commentary on that text [that is, Dignāga’s Compilation of Valid Cognition] out of compassion, desiring to help people who are mistaken into committing the unseemly act\(^b\) of accusing the master [Dignāga]. There is no valid argument to [justify] this [opinion], since the words “I will explain his [Dignāga’s] text” do not exist in [Dharmakīrti’s] text.

*Our response:* It [absurdly] follows that to explain the meaning of “valid cognition” (pramāṇa) and “person who is a means of valid cognition”\(^d\) in

\(^a\) Jayanta’s Commentary on (Prajñākaragupta’s) “Ornament,” sde dge, tshad ma, de, 2a.4-5.

\(^b\) kha na ma tho ba.

\(^c\) 2011 BDRC bla brang (3b.1) reads thugs rjes; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (2b.6) reads thig pas.

\(^d\) tshad ma’i skyes bu.
Dignāga’s Aphorisms\textsuperscript{a} [that is, Dignāga’s Compilation of Valid Cognition]\textsuperscript{b}:

[I bow down to the Buddha who] has become a means of valid cognition (pramāṇabhūta), and who takes up the task of saving transmigrants.

does not occur because [according to you] your thesis is logically feasible. If you [incorrectly] accept [that this passage explaining the meaning of Dignāga’s Compilation of Valid Cognition does not occur in Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid Cognition”], it very absurdly follows that this text [Dharmakīrti’s Commentary] does not explain the evident reason why, in Dignāga’s Compilation, the Supramundane Victor is said to be a means of valid cognition! For, you have [incorrectly] accepted [that this passage explaining the meaning of Dignāga’s Compilation of Valid Cognition does not occur in Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid Cognition”]. If you [incorrectly] accept [that this text (that is, Dharmakīrti’s Commentary) does not explain the evident reason why, in the Compilation, the Supramundane Victor is said to be a means of valid cognition], it very absurdly follows that you do not know how to explain these passages!

\textsuperscript{a} tshad ma mdo.

\textsuperscript{b} Dignāga’s Compilation of Valid Cognition, Peking, gtan tshigs rig pa, ce, 1b.2-4. The stanza is cited in Prajñākaragupta’s Ornament. The Sanskrit is found in R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana, Pramāṇavārttikābhāṣya (Patna: Tibetan Sanskrit Works 1, 1953), 3.6: pramāṇabhūta jagaddhitaiṣe praṇaṁyā śāstre sugatāya tāvīye/.

\textsuperscript{c} Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on Valid Cognition, II.1a-7a. The Sanskrit is found in Y. Miyasaka, “Pramāṇavārttika-Kārikā (Sanskrit and Tibetan)” in Acta Indologica 2 (Narita-san Shinshoji, 1971-72), 2.13: pramāṇam avisanvādi jhānam [...]/. For the latter part of the citation, the Sanskrit is found in Miyasaka (4.3): tadvat pramāṇam bhagavān [...]/. Note that Tibetan version of this stanza reads de ldan for tadvat in accordance with Prajñākaragupta’s commentary, which takes -vat not as the comparative suffix but as the possessive suffix (Ornament, 32.5: tadvān iti kṛtvā; cf. Tillemans 1993: 7; Franco 1997: 17).
Furthermore, as regards [Jayanta’s] statement that [Dharmakīrti’s Comment-ary] does not contain the words, “I [Dharmakīrti] will explain his [Dignāga’s] text,” it [absurdly] follows that it is not that this statement in the second chapter [of Dharmakīrti’s Commentary].

\[abhūtavinijñeyaiḥ bhūtoktib...\]

Furthermore, as regards [Jayanta’s] statement that [Dharmakīrti’s Commentary] does not contain the words, “I [Dharmakīrti] will explain his [Dignāga’s] text,” it [absurdly] follows that it is not that this statement in the second chapter [of Dharmakīrti’s Commentary].

a Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on Valid Cognition, II.7bc. The Sanskrit is found in Miyasaka (4.3-4): \(abhitaviniyavetya bhūtakītiḥ...\). Jam-yang-shay-pa’s reading of this stanza differs slightly from the canonical translations of the text, which are found in Miyasaka (5.1-2): \(ma skyes pa ni bzlog don du/ gyur pa nyid gsungs de yi phyir// Jam-yang-shay-pa’s citation reads: ma skyes pa ni bzlog don du/ gyur pa zhes ni bjod pa yin//.\
[Dignāga] says “bhūta (become)” in order to refute [the assertion that the Buddha’s being a means of valid cognition is] what is not produced.

is commentary on the word bhūta in [the compound] pramāṇa-bhūta in Dignāga’s Compilation because [according to you] your thesis is logically feasible. If you [incorrectly] accept [that it is not] that this statement in the second chapter is commentary on the word bhūta in (the compound) pramāṇa-bhūta in Dignāga’s Compilation, it [absurdly] follows that [Dharmakīrti] does not explain that [Dignāga] in his Compilation uses the word bhūta for the sake of denying the existence of a means of valid cognition that would be permanent because you [incorrectly] have accepted [that it is not] that this statement in the second chapter is commentary on the word bhūta in (the compound) pramāṇa-bhūta in Dignāga’s Compilation. If you [incorrectly] accept [that Dharmakīrti does not explain that (Dignāga) in his Compilation uses the word bhūta for the sake of denying the existence of a means of valid cognition that would be permanent], it very absurdly follows that you do not know how to explain the way that [Dharmakīrti] says in the passage above, “[Dignāga] says [bhūta]”!

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\textsuperscript{a} \textit{rtag pa'i tshad ma}. 

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Furthermore, it [absurdly] follows that it is not that [Dharmakīrti], in the Commentary, explains extensively the meaning of each the three: “Teacher,” “Sugata,” and “Protector,” upon associating his commentary with the root text, Dignāga’s Compilation, where it says, “I bow down to the Teacher, Sugata, and Protector,” because [according to you] your thesis [that it is unreasonable to assert that it is logically feasible that (Dharmakīrti) composed the Commentary on Valid Cognition as a commentary on Dignāga’s Compilation of Valid Cognition out of compassion, desiring to help people who are mistaken into committing the unseemly act of accusing the master (Dignāga)].

If you [incorrectly] accept [that it is not that (Dharmakīrti), in the Commentary, explains extensively the meaning of each the three—“Teacher,” “Sugata,” and “Protector”—upon associating his commentary with the root text, Dignāga’s Compilation, where it says, “I bow down to the Teacher, Sugata, and Protector,”] then because you have [incorrectly] accepted this, it [absurdly] follows that it is not reasonable that [Dharmakīrti] explains [their meaning] by relating [Dignāga’s Compilation and his Commentary in the following ways]:

1. With regard to explaining the meaning of “Teacher,” [Dharmakīrti] says in the second chapter [of the Commentary]:

Since [Buddha] has familiarized for a long time

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a Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on Valid Cognition, II.136c. The Sanskrit is found in Miyasaka (20.30): bahuṣo bahuḥdhopāyaṃ kālena bahunāṣya ca/ gacchanty abhyasyatas tatra guṇadosāḥ prakāśatām//.
With the means [of eliminating suffering]
Manifoldly in various aspects,
It has become evident to him
What the defects [in objects of abandonment] are
And what the good qualities [of antidotes] are.

and:

[We] consider this familiarization with the means itself
To be the teaching [of the Teacher] because [it is done] for that purpose.

2. With regard to explaining the meaning of Sugata that very text [Dharmakīrti’s Commentary] gives a brief explanation:

Being a Sugata consists in the triply qualified abandonment of the cause [of suffering].

and then having taken the meaning of su in Sugata (bder gshegs) as “properly” (legs pa) and the meaning of gata as “abandoned” (spangs pa)

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a Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on Valid Cognition, II.138cd. The Sanskrit is found in Miyasaka (22.2): upāyābhyaśa evāyam tādarthYAŚa chāsānaṃ maṭam\/. b Four lines between these are: d Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on Valid Cognition, II.139c. The Sanskrit is found in Miyasaka (22.5): heto prahānaṃ triguṇaṃ sugatavat...
or “previously occurred” (song ba), takes Sugata as “one who has abandoned [the cause of suffering] properly”\(^a\) or “one who [learned] proper techniques preliminarily”\(^b\) and also having taken the meaning of su as “entirely” (shin tu) and the meaning of gata as “realized” (rtogs pa), takes Sugata as one who has reached irreversibility,\(^c\) whereby [the cause of suffering] is abandoned entirely, or properly. To explain [su] that very text [Dharmakīrti’s Commentary] says:\(^d\)

Because of not being a base of suffering, properly and so forth, and to explain the meaning of gata, that very text says:\(^e\)

Because [gata is derived from the verb root] gam, which means “to realize.”

\(^a\) legs par 'spangs pa.
\(^b\) thabs legs pa sngon du song ba.
\(^c\) slar mi ldog par gshegs pa.
\(^d\) Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on Valid Cognition, II.139d-140a. The Sanskrit is found in Miyasaka (22.5-6): anihśrayādu/ dūkhhasya sāstam [...].
\(^e\) Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on Valid Cognition, II.281a. The Sanskrit is found in Miyasaka (40.3): bodhārthatvād gamer [...].
\(^f\) 2011 BDRC bla brang (4a.3) reads bder gshegs; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (3a.7) reads bde gshegs.
\(^g\) 2011 BDRC bla brang (4a.3) reads legs pa; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (3b.1) reads legs par.
\(^h\) 2011 BDRC bla brang (4a.3) reads 'chad; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (3b.1) reads bshad.
Furthermore:

1. to explain the inferential sign having three modes\(^b\) stated in Dignāga’s Compilation:\(^c\)

   [Inference for oneself consists in] seeing an object from a sign having the three modes.

   it [absurdly] follows that it is not that that very text [Dharmakīrti’s Commentary] says:\(^d\)

   A [valid] reason\(^e\) is a property of the subject. It is pervaded by a factor of the [subject].

2. and to explain the way “ascertainment”\(^f\) is used in specifying the individual three modes stated in Dignāga’s Compilation:\(^g\)

   [The three modes of a correct sign consists in its] presence in the object of inference as well as in that which is similar to it, and its absence in their absence.

\(^a\) 2011 BDRC bla brang (4a.4) reads ’chad; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (3b.2) reads bshad.
\(^b\) tshul gsum pa’i rtags.
\(^c\) Dignāga’s Compilation of Valid Cognition, Peking, gtan tshigs rig pa, ce, 4a.7. The Sanskrit is found in H. Kitagawa, Indo koten ronrigaku no kenkyū, Jinna no taikei (Tokyo: Suzuki Gakujutsu Zaidan, 1973), 74, n. 7: trirūpāḥ līṅgāt iṣṭadṛk./
\(^d\) Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on Valid Cognition, 1.1ab’. The Sanskrit is found in Miyasaka (114.5): pakṣādharma tadamśena vyāpto hetus [...]/
\(^e\) gtan tshigs.
\(^f\) nges pa. Dharmakīrti holds that Dignāga implicitly speaks of an ascertainment.
\(^g\) Dignāga’s Compilation of Valid Cognition, Peking, gtan tshigs rig pa, ce, 4b.2-3. The Sanskrit is found in Kitagawa (1973: 96): anumey ‘iḥa tattulye saddhāvo nāstiṣāt/.
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It [absurdly] follows\(^a\) it is not that the [first] chapter “Inference for One-

self” [of Dharmakīrti’s Commentary] says:\(^b\)

He [Dignāga] made expression of ascertainment
Even with regard to [each of] the three modes of a [valid] reason
In order to exclude [invalid reasons] that are unestablished,
Or lead to contradictions, or are deviating.

because [according to you] your thesis [that the words “I (Dharmakīrti) will explain his (the master Dignāga’s) text” do not exist in (Dharmakīrti’s) text] is logically feasible.

If you [incorrectly] accept this, it very absurdly follows that you do not know how to explain the meaning of the two [words] “he” (de yis) and “made [expression]” (mdzad pa)!

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\(^a\) “It [absurdly] follows” appears only once but is repeated in translation for the sake of clarity.

\(^b\) Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on Valid Cognition, I.15. The Sanskrit is found in Miyasaka (116.9-10): _hetos triṣu api rūpesu niṣcayas tena varṇitah/ asiddhaviparīṭarhavyabhicāri-vipakṣatāh/_.
Similarly, broadly apply this to other topics, such as “eliminative engagement” and so forth, in the first chapter, and to the [third] chapter “Direct Perception” and the fourth chapter [“Inference for Others”].

2. About this formulation, the master Jayanta says: Well then, it follows that it is not that in Dharmakīrti’s Commentary:

- the meaning of the six contradictions with scriptures;
  He [Dignāga] made expression of ascertained
  Even with regard to [each of] the three modes of a
  [valid] reason
  In order to exclude [invalid reasons] that are unestablished,
  Or lead to contradictions, or are deviating.

  and so forth,

- and the assertion that direct perception is devoid of conception are expoundable as being on the thought of earlier masters in the past because [according to you] this is a commentary explaining Dignāga’s thought.

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a sel 'jug.
b 2011 BDRC bla brang, 4b.2; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 3b.6.
c lung 'gal drug.
d Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on Valid Cognition, I.15. Cited above, 37.
e mngon sum rtog bral.
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You have come to accept the sign [which is that this is a commentary explaining Dignāga’s thought. That whatever is a commentary explaining Dignāga’s thought] entails [that it is not that in Dharmakīrti’s Commentary the meaning of the six contradictions with scriptures and the assertion that direct perception is devoid of conception are expoundable as being on the thought of earlier masters in the past] because [according to you] it expounds commentary on Dignāga’s thought alone.

However, you cannot accept [that it is not that in Dharmakīrti’s Commentary the meaning of the six contradictions with scriptures and the assertion that direct perception is devoid of conception are expoundable as being on the thought of earlier masters in the past] because Dignāga restates the oral tradition from the Supramundane Victor to earlier masters that was stated by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu and also merely repeated by Dharmakīrti’s Commentary, like, for example, the [half-brothers Asaṅga and Vasubandhu] again and again making statements as when Asaṅga in the section on the five branches of sciencea in his Treatises on the Groundsb says:c

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\(a\) rig pa’i gnas lnga\: internal science, logic, grammar, medicine, and mechanical arts.

\(b\) \(\text{sde} \text{ sde}\).

\(c\) I have not found this stanza in the Treatises on the Grounds, but similar passages can be found in Asaṅga’s works. See, for example, Asaṅga’s Summary of Manifest Knowledge, sde dge, sens tsam, ri, 118a.6-7: smra ba rnam par nges pa gang zhe na/ smra ba dang/ smra ba’i zhal che ba dang/ smra ba’i gzhi dang/ smra ba’i rgyan dang/ smra ba chad pa bcad pa dang/ smra ba las ’byung ba dang/ smra ba la gces spras byed pa’i chos rnam so/\/. The Sanskrit is found in P. Pradhan, Abhidharma Samuccaya of Asanga (Santiniketan:
[The seven topics in logic are] debates,
Referees in debates, foundations of the [debates],
Adornment [of debates], defeat in the [debates],
Expulsion [from debates] and good qualities [of debates].

[The seven topics in logic are] debates,
Referees in debates, foundations of the [debates],
Adornment [of debates], defeat in the [debates],
Expulsion [from debates] and good qualities [of debates].

because Jayanta’s Commentary [on (Prajñākaragupta’s) “Ornament”] says:c

This is not an explanation by him [Dharmakīrti] of his [Dignāga’s] system; instead, the master Dignāga also repeats here [in his text the Compilation of Valid Cognition] what has been said before in order to expound on such topics as [the nature of direct perception] that is free from conception and so forth, which are traditionally

Visva Bharati Studies 12. 1950), 104.8-9: vādaviniścayah katamah/ samkṣepataḥ saptavi-
dhah/ vādah vādādhikaranam vādādhīṣṭhānam vādālmākaraḥ vādānigrahaḥ vādanihsaranam bāde bahuṭkāraḥ dharmāś ca//. See also Asaṅga’s Compendium of Ascert-
tainments, sde dge, sems tsam, zhi, 189a.5-6: gtu mthugs kyi rig pa rnam pa bzhin ni ’di lta ste/ sgra ba dang/ sgra ba’i zhal ce ba dang/ sgra ba’i gzhi dang/ sgra ba’i rgyan
dang/ sgra ba’i chad pa bcad pa dang/ sgra ba las ’byung ba dang/ sgra ba’i gce spras la
dgos pa’i chos rnam so//.

a 2011 BDRC bla brang (4a.4) reads gyis; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (4a.1) reads gyi.

b 2011 BDRC bla brang (4a.5) reads de yi; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (4a.2) reads de’i.

c Jayanta’s Commentary on (Prajñākaragupta’s) “Ornament,” sde dge, tshad ma, de, 3a.7-
3b.1.
discussed by earlier masters, and that the author of the *Commentary* [Dharmakīrti] also repeats [what has been discussed by earlier masters] in order to expound on [those topics] in exactly the same way. Therefore, it is not that [Dharmakīrti’s *Commentary*] is dependent on the explanation of his [Dignāga’s] text.

and so forth,

and also the same text [Jayanta’s commentary] says:

[Dharmakīrti] did so [that is, referred to passages from Dignāga’s *Compilation of Valid Cognition*] for the sake of ease in exposition, but not for the sake of expounding on his text.

There is entailment; for, this latter passage asserts that it is for the sake of ease in exposition that [Dharmakīrti] cited the master Dignāga’s statements concerning [the definition of] a property of the subject and so forth and did not cite other sūtras and treatises.

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a 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (4a.6) reads *brgyud*; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (4a.3) reads *rgyud*.
b Jayanta’s *Commentary on (Prajñākārāgupta’s) Ornament*, sde dge, tshad ma, de, 3b.3.
Our response: As regards the root consequence [which is that:

it follows that it is not that in Dharmakīrti’s Commentary:

- the meaning of the six contradictions with scriptures;
  He (Dignāga) made expression of ascertainment
  Even with regard to (each of) the three modes of a
  (valid) reason
  In order to exclude (invalid reasons) that are unes-
  tablished,
  Or lead to contradictions, or are deviating.a
  and so forth,

- and the assertion that direct perception is devoid of conceptionb
  are expoundable as being on the thought of earlier masters in the past
  because (according to you) this is a commentary explaining Dignāga’s
  thought.]

it follows [that whatever is a commentary explaining Dignāga’s thought] does not entail [that it is not that in Dharmakīrti’s Commentary the meaning of the six contradictions with scriptures and the assertion that direct perception is devoid of conception are expoundable as being on the thought of earlier masters in the past] because there is no contradiction in the three, this text [Dharmakīrti’s Commentary]:

1. explicitly commenting on the thought of Dignāga’s Aphorisms on
   Valid Cognition [his Compilation of Valid Cognition].
2. and 3. and commenting on the word [of the Buddha] and on the asser-
   tions of earlier masters [such as Asaṅga and so forth].

If [you say that the reason] is not established, it [absurdly] follows that the
subject, Dignāga’s Autocommentary on the “Compilation of Valid Cogni-

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a Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on Valid Cognition, I.15. Cited above, 37.
b mngon sum rtog bral.
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“...tion,” is [not commenting on the word (of the Buddha) and on the assertions of earlier masters] because [of commenting on the thought of Dignāga’s Aphorisms on Valid Cognition]. You have asserted the three spheres [that is, the sign (rtags khas langs pa), the opposite of “thesis” of the consequence (bsal ba’i bzlog phyogs khas langs pa), and the entailment between them (khyab pa khas langs pa)].

Similarly, fling [unwanted consequences] with respect to Vasubandhu’s Autocommentary on the Treasury of Manifest Knowledge, its subcommentaries, b and so forth. And it appears that this has refuted well Tibetans’ assertion that [Dharmakīrti’s Commentary] is a commentary solely on Dignāga’s Compilation of Valid Cognition. Look at those for expansion.

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a 'khor gsum khas.
b mngon pa mdzod kyi rang 'grel dang 'grel bshad.
3. Also, someone asserts: [Dharmakīrti’s Commentary] chiefly describes the eight categories of logic as its own system; therefore, it is a text common to Insiders and Outsiders [Buddhists and non-Buddhists].

Our response: Well then, it [absurdly] follows [that (Dharmakīrti’s Commentary) chiefly describes the four quasi-categories of logic as its own system because [according to you] it chiefly describes each of the eight categories as its own system. You have [incorrectly] asserted the sign. You have come to assert the three spheres [of self-contradiction].

If you [incorrectly] accept [that (Dharmakīrti’s Commentary) chiefly describes the four quasi-categories of logic as its own system], it [absurdly] follows that [Dharmakīrti’s Commentary] chiefly describes even the following as its own system:

• signs endowed with [only] one mode;

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a 2011 BDRC bla brang, 5a.5; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 3b.1.
b rtog ge’i tshig don brgyad.
c phyi nang thun mong gi gzhung.
d 2011 BDRC bla brang (5a.5) reads pas; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (4b.1) reads pa.
e Quasi-direct perception, quasi-inference, quasi-proof-statement, and quasi-refutation.
f ’khor gsum song.
g Ngag-wang-pal-dan briefly describes the Kṣhapanaś (that is, Jainas’) assertion on one mode:

That which is the three modes is not feasible as the definition of a correct sign
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- inferential signs endowed with six modes [as postulated by Īsh-varasena];
- Sāṃkhyas’ three valid cognitions: the two, direct perception and inference, and valid cognition arisen from sound, which is neither of those two;\(^a\)
- Naiyāyikas’ four valid cognitions: direct perception, inference, analogy,\(^b\) and arisen from sound;\(^c\)
- Mīmāṃsakas’ six valid cognitions: direct perception, inference, analogy, arisen from sound, understanding through import,\(^d\) and nonexistents;

because:

- it is not necessary to have the forward- and counter-entailments
- and the presence of the sign in the subject also is included in the one mode that has the name “otherwise infeasible.”

Inferential valid cognition depends on one mode.


\(^a\) sgra byung tshad ma.

\(^b\) dpe; comprehension through analogy. In the *Great Exposition of Tenets* Jam-yang-shay-pa illustrates this with:

To someone who has first seen an ox, someone else says, “A gayal is like that,” and later when a gayal is seen, its neck is seen to be without a dew-lap and to be roundish, and its limbs are seen to be mostly similar [to an ox’s limbs] and that is a direct perception.


\(^c\) sgra byung.

\(^d\) don gyis go.
• Chārakas\(^a\) five valid cognitions: reasoning, non-apprehension, common knowledge,\(^b\) renown,\(^c\) and conjecture\(^d\)

because [according to you] it chiefly describes the four quasi-categories as its own system. You have [incorrectly] asserted the sign.

It [absurdly] follows that on this occasion chiefly denying them means that it chiefly explains them because you have [incorrectly] accepted [that Dharmakīrti's Commentary chiefly describes the four quasi-categories as its own system. You have asserted] the three spheres of self-contradiction.

\(^a\) cāraka. Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-pa’s) “Great Exposition of Tenets”:: Freeing the Knots of the Difficult Points, Precious Jewel of Clear Awareness gives the Tibetan as sman dpyad pa.

\(^b\) srid pa.

\(^c\) zhes grags.

\(^d\) snyams sems.

\(^e\) 2011 BDRC bla brang (5b.1) reads gyis; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (4b.3) reads gyi.

\(^f\) 2011 BDRC bla brang (5b.1) reads ces; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (4b.3) reads zhes.

\(^g\) 2011 BDRC bla brang (5b.2) reads snyams; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (4b.4) reads nyams.
If you [incorrectly] accept [that on this occasion chiefly denying them means that it chiefly explains them], it [absurdly] follows that the two, the *One Hundred Thousand Stanzas* [Mother Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra] and the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*, are sūtras that chiefly explain the self of phenomena because those two chiefly deny the self of phenomena.

You have asserted the entailment [which is that if the two, the *One Hundred Thousand Stanzas* (Mother Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra) and the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*, chiefly deny the self of phenomena, those two necessarily are sūtras that chiefly explain the self of phenomena. You have asserted the three spheres of self-contradiction. If you [incorrectly] accept [that the two, the *One Hundred Thousand Stanzas* (Mother Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra) and the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*, are sūtras that chiefly explain the self of phenomena], it [absurdly] follows that both of them extensively do not chiefly explain the selflessness of phenomena, and it very absurdly follows that the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* is also of interpretable meaning!

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The text contains the following abbreviations:

a. *'bum pa.*
b. *dgongs 'grel.*
c. *chos bdag.*
d. *'bum pa.*
4. Also, someone says: The assertion that “valid cognition” in the title Commentary on Valid Cognition is [Dignāga’s] Compilation of Valid Cognition and is an imputed valid cognition and the assertion that blue, yellow, and so forth are the consciousnesses [apprehending them] are contradictory.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, object of knowledge, blue is the direct perception apprehending blue because [according to you] it [blue] is the consciousness apprehending blue, and a common locus of blue and a conceptual consciousness apprehending blue does not exist. You have asserted the first reason [which is that blue is the consciousness apprehending blue].

The second [reason which is that a common locus of blue and a conceptual consciousness apprehending blue does not exist] is established because an appearance as blue to a conceptual consciousness apprehending blue is not

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a 2011 BDRC bla brang (5b.4) reads ka’i; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (4b.6) reads kas.
b 2011 BDRC bla brang, 5b.4; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 4b.6.
c tshad ma btags pa ba, that is, a valid cognition in a metaphorical sense.
d sngon 'dzin rtog pa.
the apprehended-aspect\(^a\) of a conceptual consciousness apprehending blue.

If you say [that the reason which is that an appearance as blue to a conceptual consciousness apprehending blue is not the apprehended-aspect of a conceptual consciousness apprehending blue] is not established, it follows [that an appearance as blue to a conceptual consciousness apprehending blue is not the apprehended-aspect of a conceptual consciousness apprehending blue] because an appearance as object of knowledge to the conceptual consciousness apprehending object of knowledge is not the apprehended-aspect of a conceptual consciousness apprehending object of knowledge.

If you say [that the reason which is that an appearance as object of knowledge to the conceptual consciousness apprehending object of knowledge is not the apprehended-aspect of a conceptual consciousness apprehending object of knowledge] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, an appearance as object of knowledge to the conceptual consciousness apprehending object of knowledge, it is not the apprehended-aspect of the conceptual consciousness apprehending the knowable, because it is permanent. You have asserted the three spheres of self-contradiction.

\(^a\) **gzung rnam**: this term means “that which has the aspect of the apprehended aspect,” namely, the subject, which in this case is a conceptual consciousness apprehending blue.

\(^b\) Correcting *rnams* in 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (5a.1) to *rnam* in accordance with 2011 BDRC bla brang (5b.6).
It follows [that an appearance as object of knowledge to the conceptual consciousness apprehending object of knowledge is permanent] because a common locus of it [an appearance as object of knowledge to the conceptual consciousness apprehending object of knowledge] and a permanent [phenomenon] exists. It follows [that a common locus of an appearance as object of knowledge to the conceptual consciousness apprehending object of knowledge and a permanent (phenomenon) exists] because object of knowledge is a common locus of it [that is, a common locus of an appearance as object of knowledge to the conceptual consciousness apprehending object of knowledge] and a permanent (phenomenon).

If you [incorrectly] accept the root [consequence that blue is the direct perception apprehending blue], it [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, object of knowledge, the Compilation of Valid Cognition is the direct perception apprehending it because of that with regard to blue [that is, because (according to you) blue is the direct perception apprehending blue]. If you [incorrectly] accept [that the Compilation of Valid Cognition is the direct perception apprehending it], it [absurdly] follows that the Compilation of Valid Cognition is a valid cognition because you have [incorrectly] accepted [that the Compilation of Valid Cognition is the direct perception apprehending it]. You have accepted the three spheres.

\[\text{Correcting \textit{rnams} in 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (5a.2) to \textit{rnam} in accordance with 2011 BDRC \textit{bla brang} (6a.1).}\]
Refutation of Others’ Mistakes on the Meaning of the Title

Also, make [arguments] such as: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, the Compilation of Valid Cognition, is both direct perception and inference because of being the apprehended-aspect of both direct perception and inference apprehending it, and so forth.

Also, a certain charioteer of epistemology of snowy Tibet seemingly propounds:

The Commentary on Valid Cognition is an imputed valid cognition, and it [the Commentary on Valid Cognition] is its author’s motivational consciousness.

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5. Also, a certain charioteer of epistemology of snowy Tibet seemingly propounds:

The Commentary on Valid Cognition is an imputed valid cognition, and it [the Commentary on Valid Cognition] is its author’s motivational consciousness.

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a Correcting rnam in 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (5a.4) to rnam in accordance with 2011 BDRC bla brang (6a.3).
b Pioneering scholar.
c bod gangs can gyi tshad ma’i shing rta ba kha cig.
d 2011 BDRC bla brang, 6a.3; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 5a.5.
e kun slong gi shes pa.
Our response: If so, those are internally contradictory. It [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, object of knowledge, the Eight Thousand Stanza [Perfection of Wisdom] Sūtra is the exalted-knower-of-all-aspects [of the Buddha] because it is its author’s mental motivation. You have [incorrectly] accepted [that it is its author’s mental motivation]. If you [incorrectly] accept [that the Eight Thousand Stanza (Perfection of Wisdom) Sūtra is the exalted-knower-of-all-aspects (of the Buddha)], it [absurdly] follows that the Commentary of Valid Cognition is a valid cognition because [according to you] the Eight Thousand Stanza [Perfection of Wisdom] Sūtra is a valid cognition knowing all phenomena. You [incorrectly] have explicitly [asserted] the sign [which is that the Eight Thousand Stanza [Perfection of Wisdom] Sūtra is a valid cognition knowing all phenomena] and the absurd clarification [that is, the absurd consequence which is that the Commentary of Valid Cognition is a valid cognition].

Also, someone says: [Dignāga’s] Compilation of Valid Cognition in the [mental] continuum of a person who is mentally repeating the Compilation of Valid Cognition is a consciousness.

Our response: Well then, it follows that with respect to the subject, such a person, he/she is not a person mentally reciting the Compilation of Valid Cognition.

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a mdo brgyad stong ba.
b rtags gsal dngos.
c Correcting kun slong gi cha she pa in 2011 BDRC bla brang (6a.4) to kun slong gi she pa in accordance with 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (5a.6).
d 2011 BDRC bla brang, 6a.5; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 5a.7.
Cognition because the Compilation of Valid Cognition that is the object he/she is mentally repeating is not the Compilation of Valid Cognition. You have come to assert the sign [which is that the Compilation of Valid Cognition that is the object he/she is mentally repeating is not the Compilation of Valid Cognition].

It [absurdly] follows [that the Compilation of Valid Cognition that is the object he/she is mentally repeating is not the Compilation of Valid Cognition] because [according to you] the Compilation of Valid Cognition that is his/her mental object is not expressive sound. You [incorrectly] have accepted the sign [which is that the Compilation of Valid Cognition that is his/her mental object is not expressive sound], because [according to you] it [the Compilation of Valid Cognition] is a consciousness.

7. About this formulation, someone says: It follows that the Compilation of Valid Cognition that is the object of mental repetition of the Compilation of Valid Cognition is that person’s speech because the Compilation of Valid Cognition in the continuum of a person who is mentally repeating the Compilation of Valid Cognition is that person’s speech.
Our response: [That the Compilation of Valid Cognition in the continuum of a person who is mentally repeating the Compilation of Valid Cognition is that person’s speech] does not entail [that the Compilation of Valid Cognition that is the object of mental repetition of the Compilation of Valid Cognition is that person’s speech]. The sign [which is that the Compilation of Valid Cognition in the continuum of a person who is mentally repeating the Compilation of Valid Cognition is that person’s speech] follows because such a Compilation of Valid Cognition is speech in the continuum of that person.

It follows [that such a Compilation of Valid Cognition is speech in the continuum of that person] because such a Compilation of Valid Cognition is words of speech and is not speech in another’s continuum. The second [part of the sign which is that such a Compilation of Valid Cognition is not speech in another’s continuum] is easy [to establish]. The first [part of the sign which is that such a Compilation of Valid Cognition is words of speech] is established because of being a treatise composed by speech, because of being a Compilation of Valid Cognition.

\[\text{a The Compilation of Valid Cognition that is the object of mental repetition of the Compilation of Valid Cognition is Dignāga’s speech.}\]
If you [incorrectly] accept the root [consequence which is that the Compilation of Valid Cognition that is the object of mental repetition of the Compilation of Valid Cognition is that person’s speech], it [absurdly] follows that whatever is the speech that is the object of mental repetition by that person necessarily is not speech in another’s continuum because you have [incorrectly] accepted [that the Compilation of Valid Cognition that is the object of mental repetition of the Compilation of Valid Cognition is that person’s speech].

If you [incorrectly] accept [that whatever is the speech that is the object of mental repetition by that person necessarily is not speech in another’s continuum], it [absurdly] follows that there is no way for that person to perform mental repetition regarding the exalted body, speech, and mind of Lamas, Buddhas, and Bodhisattvas because you have [incorrectly] accepted [that whatever is speech that is the object of mental repetition by that person necessarily is not speech in another’s continuum].

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a 2011 BDRC bla brang (6b.3) reads brtsum; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (5b.3) reads brtsum.

b The Compilation of Valid Cognition that is the object of mental repetition of the Compilation of Valid Cognition is speech in Dignāga’s continuum.
Furthermore, fling consequences such as: It [absurdly] follows that with regard to meditation upon names,\(^a\) words,\(^b\) and syllables\(^c\) by that person, the two—meditation on expressive sound and meditation on the form [that is, shape] of letters\(^d\)—do not exist, and so forth.

8. About this formulation, a certain linguist says:\(^f\) Well then, it follows that the explanation in Anubhūti’s Sarasvatī’s Sūtra on Grammar:\(^g\)

That in which a vowel has fallen away is a consonant.

is not logically feasible because among consonants an expressive sound without an infused vowel does not exist.

Our response: [That among consonants an expressive sound without an

\(^a\) ming.
\(^b\) tshig, which includes phrases.
\(^c\) yi ge.
\(^d\) sgra’i gzugs.
\(^e\) 2011 BDRC bla brang (6b.4) reads des; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (5b.5) reads de’i.
\(^f\) 2011 BDRC bla brang, 6b.5; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 5b.5.
\(^g\) dbyangs can ma; Anubhūti’s Sarasvatī’s Sūtra on Grammar, sde dge, sgra mdo, se, 1b.4.
\(^h\) 2011 BDRC bla brang (6b.6) reads zhig; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (5b.6) reads gcig.
infused vowel does not exist] does not entail [that this explanation in Sarasvati’s Sūtra is not logically feasible] because the names, words, and syllables of the systems of manifest knowledge and grammar are not the same. Otherwise, it [absurdly] follows that non-manifest sound as [postulated by] the Sāṃkhyas exists because you have [incorrectly] accepted this.

Therefore, as stated in Anubhūti’s Sarasvati’s Sūtra on Grammar:

That which is devoid of a vowel should be connected with the subsequent [items having a vowel].

the explanation above is given mainly in terms of the formation of the writing of the forms of syllables.

\[^{a}\] mngon par mi gsal ba’i sgra.

\[^{b}\] 2011 BDRC bia brang (6b.6) reads zhig; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (5b.6) reads gcig.

\[^{c}\] 2011 BDRC bia brang (6b.6) reads zhig; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (5b.7) reads gcig.

\[^{d}\] Anubhūti’s Sarasvati’s Sūtra on Grammar, sde dge, sgra mdo, se, 2a.2. Jam-yang-shay-pa’s reading of this sūtra differs slightly from the translation in sde dge, sgra mdo, se, 2a.2: dbyangs kyi dman pa pha rol tu yang dag par sbyar rol/; Jam-yang-shay-pa’s citation reads: dbyangs kyi dman pa pha rol tu drangs.

\[^{e}\] yi ge’i gzugs bri sgrub.
9. About this formulation, someone says: It follows that such a Compilation of Valid Cognition that is the object of mental repetition is sound (sgra) because you have accepted [that such a Compilation of Valid Cognition is speech (ngag) in the continuum of that person]. If you accept [that such a Compilation of Valid Cognition that is the object of mental repetition is sound (sgra)], it follows that such a person is [currently] reciting in speech the Compilation of Valid Cognition because you have accepted [that such a Compilation of Valid Cognition that is the object of mental repetition is sound].

Our response: [That such a Compilation of Valid Cognition that is the object of mental repetition is sound] does not entail [such a person is (currently) reciting in speech the Compilation of Valid Cognition].

Well then, it [absurdly] follows that there is no way for such a person to perform mental repetition regarding what oneself and others told last year because [according to you] whatever is speech that is an object of mental repetition of that [person] must necessarily be this [person’s] own utterance on this occasion. You have asserted the three spheres [that is, the sign (rtags khas langs pa), the opposite of “thesis” of the consequence (bsal ba’i bzlog phyogs khas langs pa), and the entailment between them (khyab pa khas langs pa)].

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\(^a\) 2011 BDRC bla brang, 7a.1; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 5b.7.
This also refutes well that there exists a common locus of the *Compilation of Valid Cognition* and consciousness [that is to say, something that is the *Compilation of Valid Cognition* and consciousness].

**10. Also, someone says:**

It follows that on this occasion of the Sūtra School the *Compilation of Valid Cognition* is a nonassociated compositional factor^c^ because Vasubandhu’s *Treasury of Manifest Knowledge* says,^d^ “[A bundle of doctrine] is included among forms or compositional factors.”

*Our response:* [That Vasubandhu’s *Treasury of Manifest Knowledge* says, “(A bundle of doctrine) is included among forms or compositional factors,”] does not entail [that on this occasion of the Sūtra School the *Compilation of Valid Cognition* is a nonassociated compositional factor] because [the passage quoted above] means that:

- Proponents of the Great Exposition assert that the entity of a bundle

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^a^ 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (7a.3) reads 'di’i; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (6a.2) reads de’i.

^b^ 2011 BDRC *bla brang*, 7a.3; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 6a.3.

^c^ ldan min ’du byed.

of doctrine\textsuperscript{a} is form since it is sound, which has a natures of names, words, and syllables,

- but Proponents of Sūtra assert that it is a nonassociated [compositional factor, which is a nominal, imputed existence] since [it has only a secondary existence deriving from] the imputation of “aggregate” to a collection-generalility,\textsuperscript{b} a composite of names, words, and syllables.

Therefore, “name-generalility” (ming spyi)\textsuperscript{c} is not, for instance, generality of names,\textsuperscript{d} or meaning-generalility of name,\textsuperscript{e} [or anything like those]; instead, it is a collection-generalility of names (ming gi tshogs spyi). Hence, nowadays, it appears that grammarians are translating this as “public property” (spyi bungs),\textsuperscript{f} but if [the meanings of] meaning-generalility (don spyi), sound-generalility (sgra spyi), collection-generalility (tshogs spyi), and type-generalility (type spyi) are not individually known, then you will not understand anything more than mere term-generalities on the occasion of the debate about the existence or nonexistence of an ox-generalility\textsuperscript{g} and the explanation that a forest and so forth do not substantially existent due to being a generalility.\textsuperscript{h} Hence, do not make guesses!

\textsuperscript{a} chos phung gi ngo bo, or “entity of a pile of doctrine.”
\textsuperscript{b} tshogs spyi.
\textsuperscript{c} 2011 BDRC bla brang (7a.4) reads bas; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (6a.4) reads ba’i.
\textsuperscript{d} ming gi spyi.
\textsuperscript{e} ming gi don spyi: that is, a generic image of name.
\textsuperscript{f} spyi bungs su bsgyur.
\textsuperscript{g} Or, term-generalility.
\textsuperscript{h} ba spyi. As in, for instance, the contradictory consequence flung by a Buddhist at a Vaisheshika according to Jam-yang-shay-pa (Hopkins, Meditation on Emptiness, 449) :

It follows that the subject, the ox-generalility that is a permanent thing (ba spyi rtag dogos), does not pervade its many particular instances because of being a partless unity.

\textsuperscript{i} That is, a collection-generalility.
11. Also regarding the purpose of the treatise, Tibetan elders versed or not versed in scripture who assert that all conceptuality is demonic say:

Dharmakīrti’s Seven Treatises, such as the Commentary on Valid Cognition and so forth, are not needed for those seeking liberation because since they are treatises on logic, they are outside the scriptural collections of Inner [Buddhist] Knowledge.

Our response: Well then, it [absurdly] follows that whatever is logic must be logic merely posited by conceptual imputation by Outer [non-Buddhist]
teachers such as Dvaipāyana\textsuperscript{a} [alias Vyāsa] and so forth because [according to you] whatever is logic necessarily is not needed for those seeking liberation and whatever is a treatise on logic necessarily is not [a treatise on] Inner [Buddhist] Knowledge. You [incorrectly] have accepted the sign [which is that whatever is logic necessarily is not needed for those seeking liberation and whatever is a treatise on logic necessarily is not (a treatise on) Inner (Buddhist) Knowledge].

If you [incorrectly] accept [that whatever is logic must be logic merely posited by conceptual imputation by Outer (non-Buddhist) teachers such as Dvaipāyana (alias Vyāsa) and so forth], it [absurdly] follows that the subject, each of the three analytical awarenesses [engaged in] hearing, thinking, and meditation that are means of ascertaining the mode of subsistence, emptiness, [attained] at or before the supreme mundane qualities level of the Great Vehicle path of preparation\textsuperscript{d} in those who previously did not have Lesser Vehicle realization, is logic by mere conceptual imputation by Outer [non-Buddhist] teachers because of being logic.

\textsuperscript{a} glung skyes.

\textsuperscript{b} 2011 BDRC \textit{bla brang} (7b.2) reads \textit{rtog pas}; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (6a.7) reads \textit{rtogs}.

\textsuperscript{c} 2011 BDRC \textit{bla brang} (7b.3) reads \textit{rig}; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (6b.1) reads \textit{rigs}.

\textsuperscript{d} \textit{theg chen gyi shyor lam chos mchog}.
It follows [that each of the three analytical awarenesses (engaged in) hearing, thinking, and meditation that are means of ascertaining the mode of subsistence, emptiness, (attained) at or before the supreme mundane qualities level of the Great Vehicle path of preparation in those who previously did not have Lesser Vehicle realization are logic] because of being analytical awarenesses of suchness in the continuum of childish, that is, common beings. You have asserted the three spheres [that is, the reason (rtags khas langs pa), the opposite of “thesis” of the consequence (bsal ba’i bzlog phyogs khas langs pa), and the entailment between them (khyab pa khas langs pa)]. It is easy [to establish] the reason.

[Being analytical awarenesses of suchness in the continuum of childish, that is, common beings] entails [that each of the three analytical awarenesses (engaged in) hearing, thinking, and meditation that are means of ascertaining the mode of subsistence, emptiness, (attained) at or before the supreme mundane qualities level of the Great Vehicle path of preparation in those who previously did not have Lesser Vehicle realization are logic] because all analytical awarenesses dependent upon evidential reason in the continuum of those who have not directly perceived the mode of subsistence, suchness, are logic.
because Maitreya’s *Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras* says:\textsuperscript{a}

> It is asserted that logic is dependent on [scriptures],
> Indefinite, not covering over [all objects],
> Conventional, wearying, and
> The support of childish beings.

and in its commentary, Vasubandhu says:\textsuperscript{c}

> Logic, which is [doctrinal] support for those who do not realize suchness, is indeed dependent on certain scriptures.

and so forth,

and Sthiramati, in his *Explanation of (Vasubandhu’s) “Commentary on the*
'Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes', describes logic as three-fold by saying:①

Logicians② are classified into three types:] those who are capable of conceptual thought, those who are capable of elimination, and those who make erroneous treatises in dependence upon the teachings of the One-Gone-Thus.

and concerning the mention of ‘reasoner’③ in Dignāga’s Autocommentary on the ‘Examination of Objects of Observation,’ Vinītadeva says in his Explanatory Commentary:④

As for those who prefer the convention ‘reasoner,’ reasoner (gtan tshigs pa) is a synonym of logician (rtog ge pa).

② rtag ge ba dag.
③ gtan tshigs pa dag.
④ Dignāga’s Autocommentary on the “Explanation of Objects of Observation,” sde dge, tshad ma, ce, 87a.3-4. Jam-yang-shay-pa’s citation considerably differs from the sde dge edition, which reads: gtan tshigs yod pa dang med pa dag ni [...] Jam-yang-shay-pa’s citation reads: gtan tshigs pa dag ni [...].
⑤ Vinītadeva’s Explanation of (Dignāga’s) “Autocommentary on the Explanation of Objects of Observation,” sde dge, tshad ma, zhe, 184b.3-4.
⑥ Jam-yang-shay-pa’s citation reads: gang dag gtan tshigs kyi tha snyad ’dod pa de dag ni; sde dge edition reads: gang dag gtan tshigs kyi tha snyad ’dugs pa de dag ni, which means “those who use a logical terminology.”
If you [incorrectly] accept [that each of the three analytical awarenesses (engaged in) hearing, thinking, and meditation that are means of ascertaining the mode of subsistence, emptiness, (attained) at or before the supreme mundane qualities level of the Great Vehicle path of preparation in those who previously did not have Lesser Vehicle realization are logic by mere conceptual imputation by Outer [non-Buddhist] teachers], it absurdly follows that Other-Schools’ Dvaipāyana and so forth have the capability of teaching the presentation of hearing, thinking, and meditating on the profound reality of emptiness of duality!a Because [according to you] those are posited by their own wish. You have asserted the three spheres [that is, the reason \( \text{rtags khas langs pa} \), the opposite of “thesis” of the consequence \( \text{bsal ba' i bzlog phyogs khas langs pa} \), and the entailment between them \( \text{khyab pa khas langs pa} \)].

\[\text{[That those are posited by their own wish] entails [that Other-Schools’ Dvaipāyana and so forth have the capability of teaching the presentation of hearing, thinking, and meditating on the profound reality of emptiness of duality] but you cannot accept [that Other-Schools’ Dvaipāyana and so forth have the capability of teaching the presentation of hearing, thinking, and meditating on the profound reality of emptiness of duality] because the meaning of the following passages is established:}\]

\(\text{a gnyis stong gi zab mo'i de nyid.}\)
Maitreya’s *Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras* says:

Therefore, it [that is, the Great Vehicle] is not its object.

and its commentary [by Vasubandhu] says:

Therefore, it [that is, the Great Vehicle] is not an object of logic.

and Dharmakīrti’s *Commentary on Valid Cognition* says:

Since what arises from method and its causes are hidden phenomena,

It is difficult to explain those [four noble truths].

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**12. Furthermore, someone says:** Whoever is a logician (*rtog ge pa*) necessarily is not a yogin (*rnal ’byor pa*), and thinks: Whatever is logic (*rtog ge*) necessarily is not yoga (*rnal ’byor*).
Our response: It follows that these assertions, in accordance with those assertions [mentioned] earlier (61) [that Dharmakīrti’s Seven Treatises are not needed for those seeking liberation], are not logically feasible because the term “logic” (rtog ge) is used for both “reason” (gtan tshigs) and “conceptual consciousness” (rtog pa), and also “logicians” (rtog ge pa) have two—those dwelling only on the level of logic (rtog ge’i sa tsam) and those dwelling on the level of meditation (sgom pa’i sa). It follows [that the term “logic” (rtog ge) is used for both “reason” (gtan tshigs) and “conceptual consciousness” (rtog pa), and also “logicians” (rtog ge pa) have two—those dwelling only on the level of logic (rtog ge’i sa tsam) and those dwelling on the level of meditation (sgom pa’i sa)] because Vasubandhu’s Commentary on the Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes says, “Logicians, that is, those who are engaged in investigation.”

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a Vasubandhu’s Commentary on the Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes, sde dge, sms tsam, bi, 12b.4. Jam-yang-shay-pa’s citation differs slightly from the sde dge edition, which reads: rtog ge pa sphyod yul can dag; Jam-yang-shay-pa’s citation reads: rtog ge dpvyod pa can dag ste. The Sanskrit found in Pandeya (97.17-18) reads: yat satāṃ yuk-tārthhapānditānām tārākānām pramanatrayāṃ nīśrītvopapatītsādhanyāvyā prasiddham vastu/. As noted by Pandeya (97, n. 1), mīmāṃsakānām may be added after tārākānām in accordance with the Tibetan version.
b 2011 BDRC bla brang (8a.4) reads de; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (7a.2) reads dang.
c 2011 BDRC bla brang (8a.5) reads sgo; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (7a.3) reads bsgo.
Refutation of Others’ Mistakes on the Meaning of the Title

[That Vasubandhu’s Commentary on (Maitreya’s) “Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes” says,] “Logicians, that is, those who are engaged in investigation” entails [that the term “logic” (rtog ge) is used for both “reason” (gtan tshigs) and “conceptual consciousness” (rtog pa), and also “logicians” (rtog ge pa) have two—those dwelling only on the level of logic (rtog ge ‘i sa tsam) and those dwelling on the level of meditation (sgom pa ’i sa)] because the [Tibetan] dual particle dag indicates such, and it is reasonable to take “logicians” as a brief indication, and “those who are engaged in investigation” as an extensive explanation, because that very text also says: b

Also, because [some logicians] dwell on the level of logic, and [others] dwell on the level of meditation, they are of two aspects; therefore, [Vasubandhu] says “logicians” [in the plural, not in the singular].

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a Vasubandhu’s Commentary on (Maitreya’s) “Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes,” sde dge, sems tsam, bi, 12b.4. Jam-yang-shay-pa’s citation differs slightly from the sde dge edition, which reads: rtog ge pa spyod yul can dag; Jam-yang-shay-pa’s citation reads: rtog ge dpyod pa can dag ste. The Sanskrit found in Pandeya (97.17-18) reads: yat satāṃ yuktārthapāṇḍitānām tārıkānām pramanatrayām niśrityopatisādhanayuktā prasiddhām vastu/. As noted by Pandeya (97, n. 1), mīmāṃsakānām may be added after tārıkānām in accordance with the Tibetan version.

b Not Vasubandhu’s Commentary on (Maitreya’s) “Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes” as Jam-yang-shay-pa’s “that very text” suggests, but actually Sthiramati’s Explanation of (Vasubandhu’s) “Commentary on (Maitreya’s) ‘Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes’,” sde dge, sems tsam, bi, 251b.2-3. The Sanskrit is found in Pandeya (98.6-7): tārıkā ye mīmāṃsakāḥ/ pūrvasya vyākhyānā[śayasya paścān nirdeśoktīḥ]/ (*Sanskrit restoration suggested by Pandeya).

c 2011 BDRC bla brang (8a.6) reads pa’s; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (7a.4) reads pas.

d As is indicated two notes above, the quote is found in Sthiramati’s Explanation of
Sthiramati’s Explanation of (Vasubandhu’s) “Commentary on (Maitreyā’s) ‘Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes’” says:\(^a\)

> Logicians are those who are engaged in investigation; with the intention of speaking of the former, the latter phrase [alone] is mentioned.

And furthermore, since the word tarka—the [Sanskrit] equivalent for rtog ge (“logic”)—is used for both conceptual consciousness (rtog pa) and reason (gtan tshigs), the assertion that whatever is logic is not necessary for seeking liberation is a spoon removing the eyes of liberation\(^b\) because the four retentions\(^c\) that are [attained at the level of] forbearance of Great Vehicle path of preparation,\(^d\) and moreover the five hundred meditative stabilizations and so forth described on the occasion of the [Great Vehicle] path of preparation all are of the nature of conceptual consciousnesses.

\(^a\) Sthiramati’s Explanation of [Vasubandhu’s] Commentary on the Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes, sde dge, sems tsam, bi, 251b.5-6. The Sanskrit is found in Pandeya (98.12-13): te ca tarkabhūmaḥ bhāvanabhūmaḥ ca vyavasthitatvād [dvividhāḥ/tasmā tārkikā ity ucyanta iti]*/(*Sanskrit restoration suggested by Pandeya).

\(^b\) thar pa’i mig ‘byin pa’i thur ma.

\(^c\) gzungs bzhi.

\(^d\) theg chen gyi shyor lam bzod pa.
13. Furthermore, someone says: It follows that whoever is a Superior does not depend on even any logic because Maitreya’s Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras says:

[Logic] is asserted as to be depended upon, for childish beings.\(^b\)

Our response: [That Maitreya’s Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras says, “[Logic] is asserted as to be depended upon, for childish beings;’’] does not entail [that whoever is a Superior does not depend on even any logic] because it means that whoever depends [solely] on logic analyzing the ultimate is necessarily a childish being.

If you [incorrectly] accept the root [consequence that whoever is a Superior does not depend on even any logic], it [absurdly] follows that it is

\(^a\) 2011 BDRC bla brang, 8a.4; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 7b.1.
\(^b\) That is, “Logic is asserted as a support for childish beings.”
\(^c\) At the end of this debate in this same statement 2011 BDRC bla brang (9a.3) reads brten; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (7b.7) reads rten, whereas here both read rten.
\(^d\) The dpe bsdur ma edition lists brten in the snar thang, which accords with Jamyang-shay-pa’s explanation of the meaning below.
\(^e\) 2011 BDRC bla brang (8b.4) reads ces; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (7b.1) reads zhes.
\(^f\) 2011 BDRC bla brang (8b.4) reads dpyad; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (7b.1) reads bshad.
\(^g\) 2011 BDRC bla brang (8b.4) reads brten; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (7b.2) reads rten.
not that even Hearer Superiors, except for some who simultaneously [abandon objects of abandonment], a in most cases rely on spiritual instructions of a master even in their final lifetime in mundane existence as is said in sūtra. b

The thorough release of Hearers proceeds in accordance with [a master’s] words.

because [according to you] they do not depend on evidential reasons based on believable [that is to say, authoritative] scriptures and so forth. You have come to accept the sign [which is that they do not depend on evidential reasons based on believable (that is to say, authoritative) scriptures and so forth].

If [you correctly say that the reason which is that they do not depend on evidential reasons based on believable (that is to say, authoritative) scriptures and so forth] is not established, it [absurdly] follows that those [Hearer Superiors do not depend on evidential reasons based on believable (that is to say, authoritative) scriptures and so forth] because [according to you] they do not depend on reasoning. It [absurdly] follows [that they do

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a cig car ba.
c Correcting sgra spyir ’gro in 2011 BDRC bla brang (8b.4) and 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (7b.2) to sgra phyir ’gro in accordance with Jam-yang-shay-pa’s dbu ma chen mo 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (13b.3); see the previous note for the preferable sgra rjes ’gro in the zhol bka’ ’gyur par khang edition of the sūtra.
d 2011 BDRC bla brang (8b.5) reads cig; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (7b.2) reads gcig.
not depend on reasoning] because of being Superiors. You have asserted the three spheres of self-contradiction.

Furthermore, it [absurdly] follows that:

1. the explanation that even on the occasion of the fifth [Bodhisattva] ground they learn calculation, logic, and so forth
2. the explanation in Maitreya’s Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras (XII.60ab) that without having become skilled in the five branches of science [that is, internal science, science of reason, grammar, medicine, and mechanical arts], it is impossible, even for the highest Superior, to attain omniscience
3. the explanation in Shāntideva’s Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds, a “There is nothing that is not to be learned by the children of the Victor,” and
4. the explanation that all ten Bodhisattva Superiors on the ten grounds listen to doctrine from many Buddhas

are not logically feasible because despite being Bodhisattva Superiors even though they do not need to rely on logic, reasons, to comprehend the ultimate, [according to you] they do not need to depend on correct evidential reasons [that are gained by] hearing and thinking in order to comprehend the limitless stages of the path. It [absurdly] follows [that despite being Bodhisattva Superiors even though they do not need to rely on logic, reasons, to comprehend the ultimate, they do not need to depend on correct evidential reasons (that are gained by) hearing and thinking in order to comprehend the limitless stages of the path] because [according to you] whoever is a Superior does not depend on even any logic. You have asserted the three spheres of self-contradiction.

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a Shāntideva’s Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds, sde dge, dbu ma, la, 14a.4. The Sanskrit is found in P. L. Vaidya, Bodhicaryāvatāra of Śāntideva with the Commentary Pañjikā of Prajñākaramati (Darbhanga: The Mithila Institute, 1960), 76.20: na hi tad vidyate kiṃcid yan na sīksyam jñātmajaiḥ/ (V.100ab).
14. Furthermore, someone says: The five branches of science [that is, internal science, science of reason, grammar, medicine, and mechanical arts] are within each other mutually exclusive, and among the five, internal science [that is, Buddhist philosophy] and science of reason are mutually exclusive.

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a 2011 BDRC bla brang (8b.6) reads rig; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (7b.4) reads rigs.
b 2011 BDRC bla brang (9a.1) reads kyi; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (7b.5) reads kyi.
c 2011 BDRC bla brang (9a.3) reads bren; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (7b.7) reads rten.
d 2011 BDRC bla brang, 9a.3; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 7b.7.
Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subjects, Nāgārjuna’s Collections of Reasonings such as the *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called “Wisdom”* and so forth, and Maitreya’s *Great Vehicle Treatise on the Sublime Continuum* and *Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras* as well, are not internal science because of being treatises on the science of reason. You have asserted [that being treatises on the science of reason] entails [not being internal science].

The reason [which is that Nāgārjuna’s Collections of Reasonings such as the *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called “Wisdom”* and so forth, and Maitreya’s *Great Vehicle Treatise on the Sublime Continuum* and *Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras* as well are treatises on reason] is established because of being treatises that prove selflessness and the stages of the path from the approach of reasons for proof and repudiation.

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a 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (9a.3) reads rig; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (7b.7) reads rigs.
b 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (9a.4) reads rig; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (8a.1) reads rigs.
c 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (9a.4) reads rig; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (8a.1) reads rigs.
d *rtsa she*.
e *rgyud bla ma*.
f 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (9a.4) reads rig; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (8a.1) reads rigs.
g 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (9a.4) reads rig; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (8a.1) reads rigs.
h 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (9a.4) reads rig; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (8a.1) reads rigs.
Since Nāgārjuna’s Collections of Reasonings are renowned as such, there is no need to prove the point; and also, Maitreya’s *Great Vehicle Treatise on the Sublime Continuum* says:\(^b\)

> Because [Buddhahood] has a nature without beginning, Middle, or end, it is said to be uncompounded.
> Because of having the quiescent body of attributes, It is said to be spontaneous.

and so forth,

> ..

and furthermore, the same text explains plenty of reasons from beginning to end, like:\(^c\)

> Because of being vast, without number, Not an object of logic, Unique, and having abandoned predispositions, Respectively [the Nature Body] is unfathomable and so forth.

proving by means of five reasons respectively that the good qualities of

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\(^a\) Correcting 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (9a.4) which is missing *rtags grub ste* in accordance with 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (8a.2).


\(^c\) Maitreya’s *Great Vehicle Treatise on the Sublime Continuum* (1.48), *sde dge, sems tsam, phi*, 64a.7. The Sanskrit is found in Jonston (87.5-6): *udāratvād aganyatvāt tarkasyāgocaratvataḥ/ kaivalyād vāsanocchitter aprameyādayāh kramāḥ//*. 
the Nature Body are unfathomable, uncountable, inconceivable, unequalled, and completely pure,

and this statement in Maitreya’s *Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras* proves by means of signs and so forth, together with dispelling objections, that the *One Hundred Thousand Stanza [Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra]* and so forth are the word of the Buddha and, starting with this, makes explanations by means of reasons from beginning to end:\(^{d}\)

Because of (1) not being prophesied beforehand, (2) arising together,
(3) Not being in the sphere of activity [of logicians], (4) being established,
(5) If existent, existing but if not existing, [both] not existing,
(6) Being an antidote, and (7) being other than literal.\(^{e}\)

\(^{a}\) 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (9a.6) reads *rgya che’i phyir dang bgrang med phyir*; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (8a.2-3) reads *rgya che’i rang grangs med pa’i phyir*.

\(^{b}\) 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (9b.1) reads *zhes*; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (8a.4) reads *zhes sog*.

\(^{c}\) 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (9b.1) reads *mthar*; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (8a.5) reads *mtha’*.

\(^{d}\) Maitreya’s *Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras*, sde dge, sems tsam, phi, 2a.4. The Sanskrit is found in Lévi (3.5-6): ādāvādvyākaranaḥ samaprayṛtter agocarāḥ siddheḥ/bhāvabhāve bhāvāt pratipakṣatvād rutānyatvāt// (I.7).

\(^{e}\) Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s *Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-pa’s) “Great Exposition of Tenets”* (BDRC W5842.1, dngos, cha, 7.4) comments:

Maitreya’s *Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras* says that the Great Vehicle was spoken by Buddha:
because, for example, on this occasion with “not prophesied beforehand,”

1. because if that were not the case and some later ones interfered with the holy doctrine [by putting forward a fake Great Vehicle], Buddha would have prophesied this beforehand, but he did not, and
2. because the Great Vehicle and Lesser Vehicle arose simultaneously and were not newly made by some later beings, and
3. because since the profound and vast doctrine is not in the sphere of activity of logicians, it is not possible for some later logicians to have newly set it forth, and
4. because if some later ones set it forth upon having become fully enlightened, that perforce establishes that this is Buddha word, and
5. because if the Great Vehicle exists, it is perforce established that the Great Vehicle scriptural collections are Buddha’s word since there is no Great Vehicle other than this, but if the Great Vehicle does not exist, the Lesser Vehicle also would not exist, whereby it is not suitable to make a differentiation between Great Vehicle and Lesser Vehicle scriptural collections as to being or not being Buddha’s word, and
6. because when this Great Vehicle is meditatively cultivated, transformation into non-conceptual pristine wisdom serves as an antidote to all affective emotions, and
7. because it is not suitable, upon having taken [Buddha’s word] to be literal, to say that [a particular sūtra] is not Buddha’s word by reason of not being literal.

Adapted from Hopkins, Maps of the Profound, 197-198.
by means of the sign that [the Buddha] did not prophesy beforehand that they will cause damage to his teachings, it sets out a nature sign\(^a\) for establishing that the *One Hundred Thousand Stanza [Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra]* and so forth do not damage the [Buddha’s] teachings, and similarly, it makes explanations from the beginning to the end from the approach of [signs that are] nonobservations of a pervader,\(^b\) observations of what is contradictory with a pervader,\(^c\) and so forth, because in commentary on this, Vasubandhu says:\(^d\)

For those wrongly oriented [about this], in order to establish that it is the word of the Buddha, [Maitreya composes] a stanza with distinct reasons: “Because of not being prophesied beforehand,” and so forth.

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\(^a\) *rang bzhin gyi rtags*.

\(^b\) *khyab byed ma dmigs pa*.

\(^c\) *khyab byed 'gal dmigs*.

\(^d\) Vasubandhu’s *Commentary on (Maitreya’s) “Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras,” sde dge, sems tsam, phi*, 130b.3-4. The Sanskrit is found in Lévi (3.4-5): *vipratipannaḥ tasya buddhavacanatva-prasādhanārtham kāraṇavibhāyam ārabhya śīlokāḥ/ ādāv avyākaraṇāt [...]*.
Regarding the manner in which signs are demonstrated, see Cha-pa Chö-kyi-seng-ge's^a Commentary on (Maitreya's) Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras, Illumination of Sunshine,^b if though [a text] makes explanation in this manner, you still do not posit it as a text on the science of reason, then there would no way of positing [a text on the science of reason].

Furthermore, it is very easy to realize not only that the assertion that the five branches of science are included within mechanical arts and that the five branches of science are mutually exclusive is internally contradictory, but also that the assertion that [the five branches of science] are treatises teaching the categories of logic and that internal science [that is, Buddhist philosophy] is not contained in them is internally contradictory.

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^a phywa pa chos kyi seng ge, 1109–1169.
^b 'grel pa nyi 'od snang ba.
^c 2011 BDRC bla brang (9b.6) reads rig; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (8b.2) reads rig.
^d 2011 BDRC bla brang (9b.6) reads rig; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (8b.2) reads rigs.
^e 2011 BDRC bla brang (9b.6) reads rig; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (8b.2) reads rigs.
15. **Furthermore, certain older Tibetans say:** Since Dignāga’s *Aphorisms* [that is, his *Compilation of Valid Cognition*] and Dharmakīrti’s Seven Treatises were composed for the sake of overcoming objections by [non-Buddhist] Forders, they are not needed in a region where there are no Forders because the *Introduction to the Two Truths* by the Elder [Atisha] says:

> Debate about direct perception and inference is not needed. It was done by learned scholars For the sake of overcoming objections by others.

*Our response:* [That the *Introduction to the Two Truths* says this] does not entail [that Dignāga’s *Compilation of Valid Cognition* and Dharmakīrti’s Seven Treatises are not needed in a region where there are no Forders] because this [statement that these texts are not needed] has the purpose of being for the sake of abandoning the timidity of some having low intelligence [causing them to shy away from engaging in these topics], and has as its thought that in the Consequence School the two valid cognitions comprehending the own-character of this [Sūtra School] are not needed. 

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a 2011 BDRC *bla brang*, 10a.1; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 7b.7.

b Atisha’s *Introduction to the Two Truths*, sde dge, dbu ma, a, 72b.3. Jam-yang-shay-pa’s reading differs slightly from the canonical translation found in sde dge, dbu ma, a, 72b.3: mngon sum rjes dpag dgos pa med// mu stegs rgol ba bzlog pa'i phyir// mkhas pa rnams kyis byas pa yin//; Jam-yang-shay-pa reads pha rol (“others”) for mu stegs (“Forders”).

c 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (10a.2) reads bzlog phyir; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (8b.4) reads bzlog pa'i phyir.

d 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (10a.2) reads dpag; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (8b.4) reads ’phags.

e Establishment by way of the object’s own character.

f ’di'i rang mISHAN 'jal ba'i ishad ma gnyis.
If you [incorrectly] accept the root [consequence that Dignāga’s Compilation of Valid Cognition and Dharmakīrti’s Seven Treatises are not needed in a region where there are no Forders], this is a powerful abandonment of the doctrine. And, well then, it [absurdly] follows that in a region where there are no Forders it is not necessary to repudiate the conceived objects of the sixteen artificial views\(^b\) apprehending the opposites of the sixteen [aspects of the four truths] such as impermanence and so forth because artificial views are superimposed by tenets. You have asserted [that that artificial views are superimposed by tenets] entails [that in a region where there are no Forders it is not necessary to repudiate the conceived objects of the sixteen artificial views apprehending the opposites of the sixteen (aspects of the four truths) such as impermanence and so forth].

\(^a\) Correcting *dgongs pa* in 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (10a.3) to *dgos pa* in accordance with 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (8b.5).

\(^b\) *lta ba kun biags*.

\(^c\) 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (10a.3-4) reads *chos spong rlabs can*; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (8b.5) reads *chos spongs brlabs can*. 
If you [incorrectly] accept [that in a region where there are no Forders it is not necessary to repudiate the conceived objects of the sixteen artificial views apprehending the opposites of the sixteen (aspects of the four noble truths) such as impermanence and so forth], it follows that it is not necessary to abandon those sixteen artificial views because you have [incorrectly] accepted [that in a region where there are no Forders it is not necessary to repudiate the conceived objects of the sixteen artificial views apprehending the opposites of the sixteen (aspects of the four noble truths) such as impermanence and so forth]. That in a region where there are no Forders it is not necessary to repudiate the conceived objects of the sixteen artificial views apprehending the opposites of the sixteen (aspects of the four noble truths) such as impermanence and so forth] entails [that it is not necessary to abandon those sixteen artificial views] because without repudiating the conceived objects of these there is no way to overcome those [artificial views] in the manner of removing an external thorn, because Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on Valid Cognition says:a

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Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on Valid Cognition, II.222a-c. The Sanskrit is found in Miyasaka (32.10-11): adiṣṭe ’ṣya viṣaye na sākyam tasya varjanam// prahāṇir ic-chādeśāder gunadośāna-bandhinah//. Cited in Great Treatise, vol. 3, 335; Napper, Dependent-Arising and Emptiness, 169 and 290. With brackets from Four Interwoven Annotations, vol. 2, 756.1, Jeffrey Hopkins’ translation of II.222-223ab is:

Without repudiating [through reasoning] the [conceived] object [of the apprehension of self] This [apprehension of self] cannot be abandoned [by meditating on the self as having defects and so forth]. The abandonment of desire, hatred, and so on Which are [generated due to being] related with [perceived] advantages [of happiness] and disadvantages [of unhappiness] Is through not seeing those [advantages and disadvantages] in objects [in accordance with how they are apprehended by desire, hatred, and so forth, that is, through properly seeing that those do not exist]. Not through external ways [as when removing a thorn that has pierced the body].

Tsong-kha-pa comments:
Without repudiating the objects of these,  
It is impossible to abandon those.  
[The method of abandoning desire, anger and so forth] that are  
associated with good qualities and bad qualities  
[Consists in not seeing its object having such qualities in that  
way].

When an external object of abandonment such as a thorn that has pierced oneself  
is removed, it can be removed from the root with a needle, for instance, without  
depending on [a process of] repudiating [that is, realizing the non-existence of]  
the object as it is apprehended. However, when an internal mental object of aban-
donment is abandoned, it is not done this way. Rather, it must be abandoned  
through seeing the nonexistence of the object as it is apprehended by, for in-
stance, the apprehension of self.

Adapted from Jeffrey Hopkins, *Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom* (Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications, 2008), 54.

a 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (10a.6) reads spong; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (9a.1) reads spongs.

b 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (10a.6) reads zhes sogs; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (9a.1) reads
If you [incorrectly] accept [that it is not necessary to abandon those sixteen artificial views]:

1. it [absurdly] follows that it is not necessary to attain the path of seeing of any of the three vehicles, and

2. it [absurdly] follows that the detailed explanations of the sixteen aspects, such as impermanence and so forth, in many sūtras and treatises such as Āryadeva’s *Four Hundred Stanzas* and so on are purposeless, and

3. it [absurdly] follows that it is reasonable to abandon the explanations in the *Teachings of Akśhayamati Sūtra* and so forth that if, delineating the path to liberation and omniscience even every day by means of hundreds of pure reasonings, you think upon them, you will have irreversible, firm predispositions to attain liberation and omniscience and will accumulate limitless collections of merit and wisdom, and

4. it [absurdly] follows that it is not that even if foolish ones, not knowing the meaning, practice asceticism for an eon for the sake of the mistaken liberation and path like the Nirgranthas (Jainas), the merit and predispositions of those with sharp faculties in each moment thinking [about the path] in such a manner does not come, and

5. it [absurdly] follows that in consideration of such a difference even Dharmakīrti was not intent on analytical meditation on the path and the reasoning for liberation and omniscience as explained in the *Commentary*

because you have [incorrectly] accepted [that it is not necessary to abandon those sixteen artificial views].

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zhes.

a  *bzhi brgya*.
b  *blo gros mi zad pa*.
c  *geer bu pa*.
d  2011 BDRC *bla brang* (10b.1) reads *bzhi brgya*; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (9a.1) reads *bzhi brgya pa*. 
If you [incorrectly] accept [those consequences], you will contradict many such as:

- the explanations in Maitreya’s *Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras* of the mode of release by hearing and so forth the twelve branches of high sayings and the differences between Great and Lesser Vehicles,
- the explanation about the purpose of Dharmakīrti’s treatises,

and so forth.

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a 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (10b.2) reads *la*; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (9a.3) reads *las*.
b 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (10b.2) reads *miha’ yas sog*; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (9a.3) reads *miha’ yas pa sogs*.
c 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (10b.3) reads *bskal*; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (9a.4) reads *skal*.
d 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (10b.4) reads *tha’i*; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (9a.5) reads *tha’i lo*. 
By these we have refuted also the idea expressed by many Tibetans, sagacious and foolish, that although it helps in investigating high sayings, there is no great purpose in studying this treatise [Dharmakirti’s *Commentary on Valid Cognition*].

The meaning of these [points] should be known at length in the high sayings of Tsong-kha-pa and his spiritual sons such as Khay-drub-ge-leg-pal-sang’s *Commentary on the Difficult Points in (Dharmakirti’s) Seven Treatises: Clearing Away Mental Darkness* and so forth.

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*a* 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (10b.4) reads *gyis*; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (9a.6) reads *gyi.*

*b* 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (10b.4) reads *theg pa che chung gi khyad par*; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (9a.6) reads *theg pa che chung khyad par.*
b. Our own system {5 parts}

This has five parts: the body of the treatise, its subject matter, its purpose, its essential purpose, and the relationship [among these].

1) THE BODY OF THE TREATISE

Both “valid cognitions” that are part of the titles “Compilation of Valid Cognition” and “Commentary on Valid Cognition” are imputed [or metaphorical] “valid cognition” because both are taken to be a treatise on valid cognition. It follows [that both are taken to be a treatise on valid cognition] because “valid cognition” in the former [Dignāga’s Compilation of Valid Cognition] is taken as treatises on valid cognition such as the Gate of Reasoning and so forth, and “valid cognition” in the latter [Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on Valid Cognition] is taken as Dignāga’s Compilation of Valid Cognition.

Furthermore, in the “valid cognitions” that are explicitly indicated by these two [“valid cognitions” that are part of the titles “Compilation of Valid Cognition” and “Commentary on Valid Cognition”] there are also the

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a rigs sgo; Shankarasvāmin’s Gate of Reasoning (Tibetan tradition attributes it to Dignāga), Peking, mdo ’grel, ce.

b 2011 BDRC bla brang (11a.1) reads btags; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (9b.1) reads brtags.
two, the [Buddha’s] word and the treatises that are it [that is, means of valid cognition] because—the treatises have already been explained—the [Buddha’s] word third turning of the wheel of doctrine is the root text, and [these two works] are commentaries on it, because Gyal-tshab Dar-ma-rin-chen’s Explanation says:¹

Valid cognition is a consciousness newly realizing the two truths [that is, ultimate and conventional truths]. Also, the term “valid cognition” indicates the high sayings and Dignāga’s Compilation in which it [valid cognition] is discussed. Because of commenting on their thought, [Dharmakīrti’s text] is called Commentary.

“Logic” includes both conceptual awarenesses and reasons because both reasons and conceptual awarenesses analyzing in dependence upon reasons are logic.

“Treatises on logic” (rtog ge’i bstan bcos) and “treatises on the science of

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¹ Gyal-tshab Dar-ma-rin-chen’s Explanation of (Dharmakīrti’s) “Commentary on (Dignāga’s) ‘Compilation of Valid Cognition’”: Unerring Illumination of the Path to Liberation, Zhol, cha, 3a.1-2.

² 2011 BDRC bla brang (11a.4) reads brten; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (9b.4) reads rten.
reason” (gtan tshigs rig pa’i bstan bcos) are equivalent. There are four possibilities as regards those [treatises on logic or treatises on the science of reason] and the treatises on Inner [Buddhist] science (nang rig pa’i bstan bcos) because:

1. that which is a treatise on Inner [Buddhist] science alone is, for instance, Guṇaprabha’s Root Aphorisms on Discipline, and
2. that which is both is, for instance, Nāgārjuna’s Collections of Reasonings, Dharmakīrti’s Seven Treatises, and Maitreya’s Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras, and
3. that which is a treatise on logic alone is, for instance, Akṣhapāda’s teachings on the sixteen categories of logic, and
4. that which is neither [a treatise on logic nor a treatise on Inner (Buddhist) science] is, for instance, Vāgbhaṭa’s Eight Branches of Medical Treatment.

2) THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE TREATISE

The subject matter of this treatise [the Commentary on Valid Cognition] exists because it delineates all topics upon including all the high sayings.
of the Victor in the two, the interpretable and the definitive, and in the paths to liberation and omniscience, because in its second chapter it explains all topics upon inclusion in the paths to liberation and omniscience; in the third chapter, it explains [all topics] upon inclusion in the interpretable and definitive; the former [first] chapter explains those topics differentiating between the two—correct reasons, the means of ascertaining those topics by oneself, and quasi-reasons, and the fourth chapter explains the correct way to teach those topics to others, and the quasi-way to teach those topics to others.

It follows [that in its second chapter it explains all topics upon inclusion in the paths to liberation and omniscience; in the third chapter, it explains (all topics) upon inclusion in the interpretable and definitive; the former (first) chapter explains those topics differentiating between the two—correct reasons, the means of ascertaining those topics by oneself, and quasi-reasons, and the fourth chapter explains the correct way to teach those topics to others, and the quasi-way to teach those topics to others], because it chiefly explains the four correct categories of logic as means of ascertaining those topics by oneself and others, and explains the four quasi-categories of logic, upon treating them as opposing positions, in order to eliminate places of deviance,\(^b\) that is, oneself and others making mistakes about those topics.

\(^a\) 2011 BDRC \textit{bla brang} (11b.2) reads \textit{gis}; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (10a.1) reads \textit{gi}.

\(^b\) \textit{gol sa}.
It follows [that the first chapter chiefly explains the four correct categories of logic as means of ascertaining those topics by oneself and others, and explains the four quasi-categories of logic, upon treating them as opposing positions, in order to eliminate places of deviance, that is, oneself and others making mistakes about those topics] because in accordance with the statement in (Dignāga’s) Gate of Reasoning:\footnote{Shaṅkarasvāmin’s Gate of Reasoning (Tibetan tradition attributes it to Dignāga), Peking, mdo ’grel, ce, 180b.3. The Sanskrit is found in M. Tachikawa, “A sixth-century manual of Indian logic (A Translation of the Nyāyapraveśa),” in Journal of Indian Philosophy 1 (1971): 140: sādhanam dīṣanam caiva sābhāsaṃ parasaṃvide/ pratyaksam anumānan ca sābhāsaṃ tv ātmasaṃvide//.}

Direct perception and inference
Together with their quasi-categories are for the sake of one’s
own understanding.
Proof and refutation
Together with their quasi-categories are for the sake of others’
understanding.

from among the eight categories of logic:

• the first two lines (“Direct perception and inference together with their
quasi-categories are for the sake of one’s own understanding”) speak
of the two, correct direct perception and correct inference: (1) valid
inference, an awareness ascertaining an obscure object as its object of

\footnote{Shaṅkarasvāmin’s Gate of Reasoning (Tibetan tradition attributes it to Dignāga), Peking, mdo ’grel, ce, 180b.3. The Sanskrit is found in M. Tachikawa, “A sixth-century manual of Indian logic (A Translation of the Nyāyapraveśa),” in Journal of Indian Philosophy 1 (1971): 140: sādhanam dīṣanam caiva sābhāsaṃ parasaṃvide/ pratyaksam anumānan ca sābhāsaṃ tv ātmasaṃvide//.}
comprehension and (2) valid direct perception, an awareness ascertaining a manifest object; and [these lines] accordingly say that in order to eliminate places of deviance two quasi-categories need to be known: (3) quasi-inference such as quasi-inference generated in dependence upon a sign for proving a permanent self by others’ schools and (4) quasi-direct perception.

• Furthermore, the last two lines (“Proof and refutation together with their quasi-categories are for the sake of others’ understanding”) speak of the two, (5 and 6) correct proof statement and correct refutation, branches generating realization in others of that which has been ascertained by oneself; and [these lines] accordingly say that in order to eliminate places of deviance two quasi-categories are explained: others’ schools’ (7) quasi-proof-statement and (8) quasi-refutation.

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\[\text{(11b.4) reads dpag; (10a.3) reads dpags.}\]

\[\text{(11b.4) reads kyi; (10a.4) reads kyi.}\]

\[\text{(11b.5) reads dpag; (10a.5) reads dpags.}\]
[A] EIGHT CATEGORIES OF LOGIC

Let us summarize these topics and explain clearly. It follows that with respect to the subject, objects of knowledge, the eight categories of logic are needed as means for ascertaining objects of comprehension for oneself and others because:

1. as means for ascertaining objects of comprehension for oneself the four—correct direct perception and correct inference and quasi-direct perception and quasi-inference—are needed, and
2. as branches generating realization in others the two, correct proof statement and correct refutation, and in order to eliminate places of deviance the two, quasi-proof-statement and quasi-refutation, need to be known.

\[\text{[a] 2011 BDRC bla brang (11b.5) reads dpag; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (10a.5) reads dpags.}\]
The first sign [which is that as means for ascertaining objects of comprehension for oneself the four—correct direct perception and correct inference and quasi-direct perception and quasi-inference—are needed] is established because realization by oneself of two hidden phenomena is contingent on correct inference, and that also is contingent on its support, a valid reason, and the three modes of a correct sign also are established by direct perception or must finally meet back to what is established by direct perception.

It follows [that the three modes of a correct sign also are established by direct perception or must finally meet back to what is established by direct perception] because if it were not so and the [three] modes of the [sign] were entirely reliant on reasons as a means of proof, then having become endless, there would be the fallacies of (1) the nonestablishment of any object of proof and means of proof and (2) the correspondence of the means of proof and the object to be proved, because of being like, for example, the nonstatement of a proof for the proof of fire as existing on a smoky pass by means of the sign “smoke,” and the nonstatement of a proof for most cases of signs of nonobservation.

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a The fallacy of resorting to a means of proof that itself is an object to be proved.
It follows [that if it were not so and the (three) modes of the (sign) were entirely reliant on reasons as a means of proof, then having become endless, there would be the fallacies of (1) the nonestablishment of any object of proof and means of proof and (2) the correspondence of the means of proof and the object to be proved] because correct direct perception and inference are thus necessary for realizing hidden phenomena that are one’s own object of comprehension, and when one follows after those two, one is not deceived, whereas, that being so, since when one follows after an awareness that is quasi-direct perception or quasi-inference, which are not correct awarenesses, one is deceived, the two—quasi-direct perception and quasi-inference—are set forth in order to eliminate places of deviance in the path, because there are many statements of this, such as, for example, Khay-drub Ge-leg-pal-sang’s *Commentary on Difficult Points of the Seven Treatises: Clearing Away Mental Darkness* which says:

Furthermore, whether [topics] abide or do not abide in fact in accordance with how they are delineated by oneself is contingent upon whether the delineating awareness has or has not become correct. Concerning this, the nondefective awareness ascertaining hidden phenomena is inference, and the nondefective awareness ascertaining manifest phenomena is valid direct perception; hence, it is said that valid cognition is twofold, direct perception and inference, and also if one follows after other awarenesses, one will be deceived, due to which the two, quasi-direct perception and quasi-inference, are set forth as branches eliminating places of deviance in the path.

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a. sde bdun gyi dka’ ‘grel yid kyi mun sel, also called tshad ma sde bdun gyi rgyan yid kyi mun sel.
b. Zhol, tha, 8b.2-4 (sde dge 5501).
c. mngon gyur.
Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Decisive Analysis of (Dharmakīrti’s) “Commentary”

[དེ་དི་མ་ཡིན་པར་དེའི་འལ་མཐའ་དག་ཐོན་པའི་དོན་ལ་ཐོན་པོས་ན་བོག་མེད་
སོང་ནས་བོད་བེད་ལ་མི་འབོད་པ་དང་བོད་བེད་དང་མངོན་པའི་དོན་གྱི་ཐལ།
རང་གིས་གཞལ་ཁྲོག་ཆར་བ། འགས་པ་ལ་མོང་ེས་ཡང་དག་དེ་དི་དགོས་ཤིང་དེ་གཉིས་
ཀྱི་ེས་བེ་འང་ན་མི་བཟ་ལ། དེ་དི་དགོས་བཟའ་ཡང་དག་མ་ཡིན་པའི་མོང་ེས་དེར་ཐལ།
རང་གིས་གཞལ་ཁྲོག་ཆར་བ། འགས་པ་ལ་མོང་ེས་ཡང་དག་དེ་དི་
ཕབ་པ་དོན་ལ་གནས་མི་གནས་ནི་གཏན་ལ་འབེབ་
ཀྱི་བཟའ་ཡང་དག་སོང་མ་སོང་ལ་རག་ལས་པ་ཡིན་ཞིང་
ཆོག་ཆར་ངེས་ཀྱི་འགས་མེད་ེས་དཔག་
དང་། མོང་ེས་ངེས་ཀྱི་འགས་དང་མངོན་རིམ་ཚད་མ་ཡིན་པས་
མངོན་ེས་ཀྱི་ཚད་མ་གཉིས་ར་གྲངས་ལ། ངེས་གཞན་གི་ེས་འངས་ན་བཟ་
བར་འཆེར་བས་ལམ་གྱི་གོལ་ས་པ་ཅད་པའི་ཡན་
ལག་པ་དེར་ཐལ། རང་གིས་གཞལ་ཁྲོག་ཆར་བ། འགས་པ་ལ་མོང་ེས་
དཔག་མ་ཡོད་པའི་འིར།

a 2011 BDRC bla brang (12a.6) reads 'brang; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (10b.4) reads 'brangs.
b 2011 BDRC bla brang (12a.6) reads de ltar; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (10b.4) reads de ltar na.
c 2011 BDRC bla brang (12b.1) reads la; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (10b.5) reads las.
d 2011 BDRC bla brang (12b.1) reads 'beb; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (10b.5) reads 'bebs.
e 2011 BDRC bla brang (12b.2) reads dpag; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (10b.5) reads dpags.
As for the second root sign [which is that as branches generating realization in others the two, correct proof statement and correct refutation, and in order to eliminate places of deviance the two, quasi-proof-statement and quasi-refutation, need to be known], it follows that not only from the approach of debate but also from the approach of exposition, it is necessary to know also as branches generating realization in others the two, correct proof statement and correct refutation, and in order to eliminate places of deviance those two, quasi-proof-statements and quasi-refutations because whether in the context of exposition or debate:

1. in order to clear away unidirectional wrong conceptualizations in another’s [mental] continuum it is necessary to demonstrate refutations or consequences showing contradictions in those [places of deviance], and
2. in order to clear away doubt having qualms in two possibilities—regarding the similar class and the dissimilar class\(^a\)—it is necessary to demonstrate correct proof statements, and in order to eliminate places of deviance regarding those two it is necessary to know the two, quasi-refutations and quasi-proof-statements.

\(^a\) The right and wrong positions.
It follows [that whether in the context of exposition or debate:

1. in order to clear away unidirectional wrong conceptualizations in another’s (mental) continuum it is necessary to demonstrate refutations or consequences showing contradictions in those (places of deviance), and

2. in order to clear away doubt having qualms in two possibilities—regarding the similar class and the dissimilar class—it is necessary to demonstrate correct proof statements, and in order to eliminate places of deviance regarding those two it is necessary to know the two, quasi-refutations and quasi-proof-statements]

because:

• as long as one cannot see contradictions in one’s assertions, one cannot eliminate unidirectional superimpositions,

• and also without ascertaining the positive and negative concomitances between the sign and the predicate of the proposition, doubt suspecting that the sign is present in the dissimilar class, and so forth, is not overcome, whereby the two correct [that is, correct refutations and correct proof statements, are needed,

• and if the two quasi [that is, quasi-refutations and quasi-proof-statements] are not ascertained, the two correct [that is, correct refutations and correct proof statements] are not ascertained as proper, because it is like if, for example, these two [that is, quasi-refutations and quasi-proof-statements] for establishing sound’s permanence are not ascertained as quasi, the two correct [that is, correct refutations and correct proof statements] that are stated wishing to prove sound as impermanent will not serve as proper.

\[\text{a 2011 BDRC } \text{bla brang} (12b.5) \text{ reads } \text{shing}; \text{ 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa} (11a.2) \text{ reads } \text{zhing.} \]

\[\text{b 2011 BDRC } \text{bla brang} (12b.5) \text{ reads } \text{gcad}; \text{ 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa} (11a.2) \text{ reads } \text{gcd.} \]
For, Khay-drub Ge-leg-pal-sang’s Commentary on Difficult Points of the Seven Treatises: Clearing Away Mental Darkness says:

The latter four—the correct and the quasi—are set out as branches of generating realization in another upon having ascertained it by oneself. Among them:

• [proper] refutations are demonstrated in order to diminish the grandeur (dpal) of unidirectional wrong conceptualizations [in another’s mental continuum],
• [proper] proof statements are set out in order to remove doubt having qualms in two possibilities, and
• the two quasi [quasi-refutations and quasi-proof-statements] are set out in order to eliminate places of deviance.

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a Zhol, tha, 8b.4-6.
b 2011 BDRC bla brang (13a.1) reads gis; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (11a.5) reads gi.
[B) THE SEQUENCE OF DIRECT PERCEPTION AND INFEERENCE]

With respect to the sequence [of direct perception and inference], since the explanation here in Dharmakīrti’s Commentary [initially of reasons, the basis of inference,] and the explanation in Dharmakīrti’s Ascertainment of Valid Cognition a and Drop of Reasoning b and in Dignāga’s Compilation of Valid Cognition initially of direct perception differ, one might think that one of these two modes of explanation is not logically feasible.

However, it follows that the fallacies:

- that one of these two [(1) the explanation here in Dharmakīrti’s Commentary (initially of reasons, the basis of inference,) and (2) the explanation in Dharmakīrti’s Ascertainment of Valid Cognition and Drop of Reasoning and in Dignāga’s Compilation of Valid Cognition initially of direct perception] is not logically feasible, and

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a 2011 BDRC bla brang (13a.3) reads bsal; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (11a.6) reads gsal.

b 2011 BDRC bla brang (13a.3) reads shing; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (11a.6) reads zhing.

c rnam nges.

d rigs thigs.

e 2011 BDRC bla brang (13a.3) reads thig; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (11a.7) reads thig.

f 2011 BDRC bla brang (13a.4) reads zhig; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (11b.1) reads gcig.
that they are mutually contradictory
do not exist because that the initial explanation of direct perception [in Dharmakīrti’s *Ascertainment of Valid Cognition* and *Drop of Reasoning*, and in Dignāga’s *Compilation of Valid Cognition*] is the order of the mode of generation, and the initial explanation [here in Dharmakīrti’s *Commentary*] is for the sake of easily understanding valid cognition that is the means of delineation from the approach of having extensively eliminated wrong conceptualization.

Concerning the sequence, in accordance with the mode of generation and in terms of delineation [of an object], the sequence of teaching first manifest phenomena, then hidden phenomena, and then very obscure phenomena is logically feasible because:

- after realizing—from a sign in which the property of the subject is established by direct perception or by a manifest phenomenon that meets back to it [that is, direct perception]—with valid cognition a hidden phenomenon like the four truths which are the principal topics for those who wish to be liberated,
- one must realize with valid cognition very obscure phenomena like the cause and effect relationships generating the various sufferings of bad migrations and the relationships generating the specific particularities

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a 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (13a.4) reads *dpag*; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (11b.1) reads *dpags*.
b 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (13a.5) reads *bsal*; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (11b.2) reads *gsal*.
c *shin tu lkg dyur*. 
It follows [that after realizing—from a sign in which the property of the subject is established by direct perception or by a manifest phenomenon that meets back to it (that is, direct perception)—with valid cognition a hidden phenomenon like the four truths which are the primary topics for those who wish to be liberated, one must realize with valid cognition very obscure phenomena like the cause and effect relationships generating the various sufferings of bad migrations and the relationships generating the specific particularities of gods] because a scripture teaching the four truths is a correct concordant example—possessing the two, the sign and the predicate of the proposition—for proving, by a sign of [being] a scripture passing a threefold analysis, that a scripture teaching very obscure objects

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a An inferential sign in which the property of the subject should be either what is established by perception or a manifest phenomenon resulting from that which is established by perception; through this inferential sign one can understand by means of a valid cognition the four noble truths and so forth, which are hidden phenomena, and which are the principal topics for those who wish to be liberated; and it is only after this that one can understand by means of a valid cognition the causal relationship between various sufferings of bad migrations and their causes and the causal relationship between rebirth as a particular god and its causes and so forth, which are very obscure phenomena.

b 2011 BDRC bla brang (13a.6) reads bsal; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (11b.3) reads rims.

c mthun dpe yang dag.
Our Own System: Subject Matter of the Treatise, Sequence of the Chapters

is non-deceptive with respect to what it teaches,\(^a\) because Dharmakīrti’s *Commentary [on Valid Cognition]* says:\(^b\)

Through thorough ascertainment of just these [teachings]
On adoption [of true cessations] and discarding [true sufferings]
as well as [their respective] methods [or causes, that is, true
paths and true origins of suffering respectively,
It is established that Buddha’s word] is non-deceptive with re-
spect to the principal meaning [the four noble truths].
Therefore, [due to similarity] it is to be inferred that [Buddha’s
word is non-deceptive] also with respect to other [very obscure
topics as well].\(^c\)

and Āryadeva’s *Four Hundred Stanzas* says:\(^d\)

Whoever has generated doubt
Toward the [very] obscure in Buddha’s sayings,
Will believe only Buddha about these
Based on [his teaching of the ultimate reality of] emptiness.

because although in practice one initially engages in realizing the doctrines on [the attainment of] high status,\(^e\) the cycle on faith, and then engages in realizing the doctrines on [attainment of] definite goodness,\(^f\) the two self-

\(^a\) A sūtra passage that explicitly teaches what is to be discarded and what is to be adopted with respect to the four truths (sufferings and their origins are to be discarded, and cessations and paths are to be adopted) is a correct concordant example that possesses the reason and the predicate in a proof that a sūtra passage teaching very obscure topics is non-deceptive with respect to what it teaches by reason of the fact that it is a scripture devoid of contradiction.

\(^b\) Dharmakīrti’s *Commentary on Valid Cognition*, I.217. The Sanskrit is found in Miyasaka (146.22-23): heypādeyatattvasya sopāayasya prasiddhitaḥ/ pradhūnārthāvīśaṃvādād anumāṇaṃ paratra vā/.

\(^c\) The bracketed material in the last two lines is drawn from Khay-drub Ge-leg-pal-sang’s commentary, 135b.6. The Fourteenth Dalai Lama cites the last two lines in his *The Buddhism of Tibet and The Key to the Middle Way* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1975; reprint, Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1987), 83.

\(^d\) Āryadeva’s *Four Hundred Stanzas*, sde dge, dbu ma, tsha, 13a.7-b.1. The Sanskrit is found in Suzuki, *Sanskrit Fragments and Tibetan Translation of Candrakīrti’s Bodhisattvayogācāracaturākṣatakaṭī* (Tokyo: The Sankibo Press, 1994), 248.7-8: buddhokteṣu paroñkeṣu jāyate yasya sāṁśayaḥ/ ihaiva pratayayastena kartavyaḥ śūnyatāṁ prati//.

\(^e\) mgon mtho.

\(^f\) nges legs.
lessnesses [of persons and of phenomena], it is, as explained above, opposite the order of [philosophical] delineation.

It follows [that although in practice one initially engages in realizing the

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\(a\) 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (13b.1) reads *ston*; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (11b.5) reads *bston.*

\(b\) 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (13b.2) reads *dpag*; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (11b.6) reads *dpags.*

\(c\) 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (13b.3) reads *gyur pa*; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (11b.7) reads *'gyur ba.*
doctrines on (the attainment of) high status, the cycle on faith, and then engages in realizing the doctrines on (attainment of) definite goodness, the two selflessnesses (of persons and of phenomena), it is, as explained above, opposite the order of (philosophical) delineation] because whoever is a correct disputant\(^a\) for the proof—by a sign of [being] a scripture passing a threefold analysis—that a scripture teaching very obscure objects is non-deceptive with respect to what it teaches must necessarily be a person who has already completed analysis of the first two categories objects of comprehension [that is, manifest phenomena and hidden phenomena], because Dharmakīrti’s *Commentary on Valid Cognition* says:\(^b\)

That treatise which is not invalidated
By what is established by reasoning with regard to perceptible objects
And what is not invalidated by its own words with regard to imperceptible objects,
Is to be accepted. And thereby analysis occurs.

and it says:\(^c\)

When the two [types of] objects are [ascertained to be] flawless in this manner,
Then for one who wishes to adopt the treatise,
This indeed would be the occasion [to adopt it].

and the Supramundane Victor [Buddha] also says that as in the case of gold that is attested by the three—scorching, cutting, and rubbing—the meanings of his word on very obscure phenomena are to be adopted upon being analyzed and verified by means of the three—direct perception, inference through the power of the fact, and inference through belief:\(^d\)

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\(^a\) phyi rgo\_\_yang dag.

\(^b\) Dharmakīrti’s *Commentary on Valid Cognition*, IV.108. The Sanskrit is found in Miyasaka (178.17-18): śāstram yat siddhayā yuktiya svavāca ca na bhādyate/ dṛṣṭe dṛṣṭe 'pi tad grāhyam iti cintā pravartate //.

\(^c\) Dharmakīrti’s *Commentary on Valid Cognition*, IV.50a-c'. The Sanskrit is found in Miyasaka (170.20-21): tathā viśuddhe viśayadvaye śāstraparigrahaṃ/ cikīrṣoḥ sa hi kālah svāt [...]/.

\(^d\) The stanza is cited in Shāntarakṣhita’s *Compendium of Principles* (de kho na nyid bsdus pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa, tattvasamgrahakārikā), XXVI.3343 and 3587. The Sanskrit is found in Dwarikadas Shastri, *Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Shāntarakṣita, with the Commentary ‘Pañjikā’ of Shri Kamalashīla* (Varanasi, India: Bauddha Bharati, 1968), vol. 2, 1115:

tāpācchedācca niśāṣṭi suvarṇam iva paṇḍitaiḥ/
Like gold [that is acquired] upon being scorched, cut, and rubbed,
My word is to be adopted by monastics and scholars
Upon analyzing it well,
Not out of respect [for me].

This version accords with that by the Translator of Dro, Shay-rab-drag, which has dge slong dag (bhikṣavo) in the vocative. For a translation into English, see G. Jha, The Tattvasamgraha of Śāntirakṣita, with the Commentary of Kamalaśīla, Gaekwad’s Oriental Series, 80 and 83 (Baroda, India: Oriental Institute, 1937-1039), XXVI.3344 (p. 1485) and XXVI.3588 (p. 1558). The first citation occurs at the point of discussing the word of Buddha and how it is not annulled by direct perception, inference, and scriptural inference; the second citation occurs at the point of discussing identifying Buddha’s “lion’s roar” that brings about “the lowering of the arrogance of the maddened elephants in the shape of the False Philosophers” (Jha, Tattvasamgraha, 1558). Drawn from Jeffrey Hopkins, Emptiness in the Mind-Only School of Buddhism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 366-367.

a 2011 BDRC bla brang (13b.4) reads phyi; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (12a.2) reads phyir.
b 2011 BDRC bla brang (13b.5) reads gnod med; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (12a.3) reads gnod byed.
c Read dpyod.
Our Own System: Subject Matter of the Treatise, Sequence of the Chapters

[C] THE STRUCTURE OF THE CHAPTERS

The entire body of the treatise is included in three chapters because although it is included in the three chapters—the Chapter of Direct Perception, the Chapter of Inference for Oneself, and the Chapter of Inference for Others, it has additionally the Chapter of Establishment of Valid Cognition, which teaches the flawlessness of the Teacher and the teaching and thereupon explains that only the attainment of Buddhahood is the final refuge.

\[a\] 2011 BDRC bla brang (14a.1) reads blang bar; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (12a.5) reads blangs par.
\[b\] 2011 BDRC bla brang (14a.2) reads dpag; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (12a.6) reads dpags.
\[c\] 2011 BDRC bla brang (14a.2) reads dpag; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (12a.6) reads dpags.
\[d\] mthar thug gi skyabs.
Hence, the four—Dignāga’s Compilation of Valid Cognition and Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on Valid Cognition, Ascertainment of Valid Cognition, and Drop of Reasoning—are the treatises resembling a body, since they teach the words and [main] topics completely, and the four—Dharmakīrti’s Drop of Reasons, Analysis of Relations, the Proof of Other Continuums, the Reasoning for Debate, are the treatises resembling limbs.

For:

1. the Drop of Reasons, having refuted [the possibility of valid reasons] with one mode, two modes, four modes, and six modes, teaches that [a valid reason] has only three modes, being an offshoot from this [Commentary on Valid Cognition where it says]:

   A [valid] reason is a property of the subject. It is pervaded by a factor of the [subject].

---

a. gtan tshigs thigs pa.
b. ‘brel ba brtags pa.
c. rgyud gzhan sgryub pa.
d. rtsod rigs.
e. 2011 BDRC bla brang (14a.4) reads thigs; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (12b.1) reads brtsod.
f. Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on Valid Cognition, I.1ab’.
g. 2011 BDRC bla brang (14a.5) reads tshigs; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (12b.2) reads tshig.
h. 2011 BDRC bla brang (14a.5) reads ‘phrod; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (12b.2) reads ‘phrad.
2. the **Analysis of Relations** is a branch [treatise] that having refuted (1) that relations are the two—possession [as in the case of fire and smoke]\(^a\) and inherence [as in the case of an ox and a horn]—and (2) that relations are substantially existent, teaches that relations are necessarily only the relations of one essence\(^b\) and of provenance,\(^c\) being an offshoot from this [Commentary on Valid Cognition where it says]:\(^d\)

> [A valid reason is precisely of three types]

> Because the inseparability [of the reason from what is to be established] is restricted to [the three types].

3. the **Proof of Other Continuums** is an offshoot of the Chapter on Direct Perception, since it establishes the existence of other continuums in [the system of] Mind-Only.

4. and the **Reasoning for Debate** is an offshoot of the fourth chapter, since it teaches the ways to benefit others from the approach of proof statements and refutations.

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\(^a\) The examples are from Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s *Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-pa’s) “Great Exposition of Tenets”* (BDRC W5842.1, stod, ya, 202.1.

\(^b\) *bdag gcig 'brel, tadāmya-sambandha*; related in the sense of one essence/ entity/ nature.

\(^c\) *de byung 'brel, tadupatti-sambandha*; related in the sense of arising from that.

\(^d\) Dharmakīrti’s *Commentary on Valid Cognition*, I.1c. The Sanskrit is found in Miyasaka (114.6): *avinābhāvaniyamād [...]*.
3) THE PURPOSE OF THE TREATISE

It has the purpose of joining to goodness not only the trainees of the three lineages [Hearer, Solitary Realizer, and Great Vehicle], but also those whose lineage is [temporarily] severed, merely seeking worldly pleasures, and even those who have entered greatly wrong paths like the Lokāyata. For, the statement in Dharmakīrti’s Commentary saying:

Speech that expresses relationship,
Concordant means, and the aims of beings
Is [indicated to be valid scripture] in terms of being thoroughly analyzed.
Those in other terms are not.

indicates by the three—“aims of beings,” “excellent means,” and “relationship”—that scriptural teaching (lung gi bstan pa) taught relatedly from the approach of hearing, thinking, and meditation is endowed with the three attributes in order:

1. the aims sought by beings wanting release,
2. the excellent means concordantly capable of achieving those,
3. the relationship of positive and negative concomitance such that if one employs the excellent means concordantly capable of achieving those aims, those aims are attained, but if one does not employ the excellent means and adopts wrong means, those aims are not attained,

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a 2011 BDRC bla brang (14b.1) reads sgrub; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (12b.5) reads sgrub ngag.
b Literally, “Diverged Afar from the World”; Bodhichodra’s Connected Explanation of (Aryadeva’s) “Compilation of the Essence of Wisdom” (sde dge 3852, 40a.1) says, “Since they have gone apart from the correct view of the world, they are ‘Diverged Afar,’” Thanks to William Magee for the note.
c Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on Valid Cognition, I.214. The Sanskrit is found in Miyasaka (146.16-17): sambaddhānarūpakāraṃ parusārthābhādhyāvakaṃ/ pariśādhikrāt vākyam ato ‘nadhiṃ kṛtām param//.
these being in accordance with Dignāga’s *Praise Called the One Hundred Fifty:*

Through the division into three time periods [of hearing, thinking, and meditation]
It does not exist in other than your teaching.

\[
\text{བོད་དང་། རང་གི་དོན་ནི་བསམ་པ་དང༌།}
\]

\[
\text{བོམ་དང་གུས་པར་མཉན་པ་ཡི།}
\]

\[
\text{ཤེས་རབ་ȷམས་ཀྱི་བོན་པ་ཡོད་དེ།}
\]

\[
\text{དེ་ȷ་ȷ་ནི་ཚིགས་ȷ་བཅད་པ་འདིས་བཤད་དོ།}
\]

\[
\text{(sangs rgyas kyi bstan pa kho na la thos pa dang bsam pa dang bsgom pa'i rang bzhin gyi shes rab ruams kyi bstan pa yod de/ gzhon la ni ma yin no)}
\]

a Dignāga’s / Ashvaghoṣha’s *Śatapañcāśataka* v. 90cd (Bailly 1951: 101):

\[
kālatrayavibhāgo 'sti nāṇyatra tava śāsanāt /
\]

\[
sde dge, bstod tshogs, ka, 113b.3; the stanza is also found in Dignāga’s / Ashvaghoṣha’s and Mātṛceṭa’s *Interwoven Praise* (spel mar bstod pa, miśrakastotra; sde dge, bstod tshogs, ka, 188b.1). The complete stanza is:
\]

The meaning of scripture—through the division
Into three time periods
Of hearing, thinking, and meditation—
Does not exist in other than your teaching.

\[
\text{དེ་Ե་ȷ་ནི་གཞན་ལ་ནི་མ་ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེས་ȷ་བ་ȷེ།}
\]

\[
\text{(sangs rgyas kyi bstan pa kho na la thos pa dang bsam pa dang bsgom pa'i rang bzhin gyi shes rab ruams kyi bstan pa yod de/ gzhon la ni ma yin no)}
\]

Nandipriya’s (*dga’ ba'i snyan pa*) Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Praise Called the One Hundred and Fifty” (brgya lnga bcu pa zhes bya ba'i bstod pa'i 'grel pa, śatapañcāśatakā-nāma-stotraṭīka; 153b.7ff.) says:

This stanza explains that only the Buddha’s teaching has the teaching of wisdoms having the nature of hearing, thinking and meditating, not others.

\[
\text{(sangs rgyas kyi bstan pa kho na la thos pa dang bsam pa dang bsgom pa'i rang bzhin gyi shes rab ruams kyi bstan pa yod de/ gzhon la ni ma yin no)}
\]

b 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (14b.2) reads *mishol*; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (12b.6) reads *tshol.* Read *tshol.*
The purposes of individual trainees exist [in scriptural teaching] because concerning how that scripture endowed with three attributes is proved to be flawless:

- scripture is established as flawless from its manifest and hidden objects of expression\(^a\) being established by valid cognition, and its very obscure objects of expression being purified by the three analyses,\(^c\)

\(^a\) 2011 BDRC bla brang (14b.1) reads rjod; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (12b.6) reads brjad.

\(^b\) 2011 BDRC bla brang (14b.4) reads sphyad; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (13a.1) reads dpyad.

\(^c\) 2011 BDRC bla brang (14b.5) reads zhes; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (13a.2) reads shes.

\(^d\) Its subject matter.

\(^e\) Being purified by way of three analyses means that (1) what the scripture teaches about manifest objects is not contradicted by direct perception, (2) what the scripture teaches about slightly hidden objects is not contradicted by usual inference (called inference by the
and

- the realizational teaching is well established as flawless from the approach of specification of nature, specification of number, and specification of order of the paths as well as the fruits of the three vehicles [Hearer, Solitary Realizer, and Great Vehicle],
- whereupon through this sign, the Teacher [Buddha] uniquely is established as the consummate valid person,
- at which point the spiritual community who achieve the doctrines taught are also established as flawless,
- and when such is established, it comes that for individual trainees their real purposes in accordance with their respective situations are each achieved.

power of the fact), and (3) with respect to what the scripture teaches about very obscure objects, inaccessible to either direct perception or usual inference, there are no internal contradictions on those topics.

a 2011 BDRC bla brang (15a.1) reads grangs; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (13a.4) reads drang.

b 2011 BDRC bla brang (15a.2) reads 'tsham; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (13a.5) reads mtshams.
It follows [that when such is established, it comes that for individual trainees their real purposes in accordance with their respective situations are each achieved], because the purpose of this treatise is that when these are established this way:

(1) those having the Great Vehicle lineage wanting to bring about the aims of all having lineage find pure\(^a\) ascertainmmt with respect to the fact that nobody other than a Buddha has the capacity to bring about the aims of all having lineage, whereupon they generate the Great Vehicle [altruistic] mind-generation\(^b\) thinking, “[I] will attain that Buddhahood,” generating what has not been previously generated and serving as a cause of the irreversibility of what has been generated,

(2) and when those having the Hearer lineage and Solitary Victor lineage also realize such, they understand that the Buddha alone is the Teacher for those seeking release, whereupon they attain clear faith in the Teacher, his doctrine, and the spiritual community; and they generate definite knowledge—that cannot be led astray by others—of the absence of release

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\(^a\) rnam dag; “pure” has the sense of “thorough” or “complete.”

\(^b\) theg chen sems bskyed.

\(^c\) 2011 BDRC bla brang (15a.2) reads theg chen; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (13a.6) reads theg chen gyi.

\(^d\) 2011 BDRC bla brang (15a.3) reads bskyed; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (13a.7) reads skyed de.
in the paths of Others’ Schools, such as the Kāpilas [Sāṃkhya] and so forth,

(3) and when even trainees with [temporarily] severed lineage who seek the mere worldly pleasures of the next life realize such, they hold that the Buddha uniquely is the Teacher of refuge and that the doctrine explains high status as the entrance [to their attainment], ascertaining that Īshvara, Brahman and others, who themselves are not released from the bondage of flaws, are not the refuge, and realize that all propositions that:

• one attains the status of good transmigrations\(^c\) by means of the sacrifice of cattle and so forth, and
• one attains release by receiving an initiation of Īshvara without realization of the profound meaning [of emptiness] or by mere physical torment

are the babblings of an infant and great non-methods, like someone panged by heat entering into fire,

\(^{a}\) 2011 BDRC bla brang (15a.4) reads dang ba 'thob; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (13b.1) reads dad pa thob.
\(^{b}\) 2011 BDRC bla brang (15a.4) reads bkrir; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (13b.1) reads bkri bar.
\(^{c}\) bde 'gro.
(4) and when even those blinded by bad explanations [formulated by those such as Lokāyatas, engaging in whatever they like, such as taking life and so forth, for the sake of worldly pleasures of just this present lifetime, realize such, they realize that to propound and hold that only the present lifetime is enough is like propounding that only enjoyment for one day in the present lifetime is enough, and upon ascertaining that nonvirtuous actions such as killing and so forth, which harm self and others, are just like a road of razors, they abstain from those [actions] and eagerly take up the paths of wholesome actions of this and future [lives].

\[\text{\textcopyright 2011 BDRC bla brang (15a.6) reads shing; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (13b.3) reads cing.}\]
\[\text{\textcopyright 2011 BDRC bla brang (15a.6) reads phyugs kyi; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (13b.3) reads dbang phyug gi.}\]
\[\text{\textcopyright 2011 BDRC bla brang (15a.6) reads 'phang; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (13b.3) reads 'phangs.}\]
\[\text{\textcopyright 2011 BDRC bla brang (15b.1) reads phan; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (13b.4) reads pan.}\]
\[\text{\textcopyright 2011 BDRC bla brang (15b.1) reads nyes bshad, 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (13b.4) reads nyad chad.}\]
\[\text{\textcopyright 2011 BDRC bla brang (15b.1) reads long ba, 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (13b.4) reads longs pa.}\]
Dharmakīrti’s second chapter [of the *Commentary on Valid Cognition*] says:\(^b\)

> From [the reason] “[being] the Protector,” it is established that [the Buddha]
> Knows suchness, knows stably, and knows features entirely,
>
> For [the *gata* (of *sugata*) is derived from the verbal root] *gam*,
> which means “to realize.”
> Therefore, since [the Buddha] surpasses Outsiders, learners, and non-learners,
> [It is concluded that the Buddha has been instilled with] teaching concerning trainings in knowledge for others.

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\(^a\) 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (15b.3) reads ‘di phyi’; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (13b.6) reads ‘di dang phyi ma’i’.

\(^b\) Dharmakīrti’s *Commentary on Valid Cognition*, II.280c-281. The Sanskrit is found in Miyasaka (40.2-4):

\[
\text{tāyā tattvasthirāvāśviśeṣajñānasādhanam/ bodhaarthvād gamer bāhyaśaiksā-saiksādhikas tataḥ/ parārthajñānaghatanaṃ tasmāt tacchāsanam […]/.}
\]

\(^c\) 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (15b.3) reads skyob; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (13b.7) reads skyobs.

\(^d\) 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (15b.3) reads bṛtan; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (13b.7) reads ldan.
and,a

When there is [a notion of] self, there occurs a notion of others.  
From the factors of self and other, attachment and hatred [arise].  
From the connections of these  
All defects arise.

and,b

Even though—toward one—owing to her defects  
His attitude of desire reverses for a moment,  
He does not become devoid of desire,  
As do the desirous toward another woman.

and,c

Because of having abandoned what is to be adopted and what is to be discarded  
Having equality toward all—  
[Whether anointed with] sandalwood or [destroyed with] an axe—  
[A Foe Destroyer] is said to be “devoid of desire.”

and says:d

When an antidote [to desire] increases, [desire] decreases;  
And when its own class increases, [desire] increases.

I will expound at length on how to explain these in the Chapter of Establishment of Valid Cognition.

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a Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on Valid Cognition, II.219a; Jam-yang-shay-pa cites the first line and adds “and so forth”; the remaining three lines have been filled in. The Sanskrit is found in Miyasaka (32.5): ātmani sati parasaṃjñāṃ...

b Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on Valid Cognition, II.239a; Jam-yang-shay-pa cites the first line and adds “and so forth”; the remaining three lines have been filled in. The Sanskrit is found in Miyasaka (34.16): yady apy ekatra doṣena tat kṣanam ca...matiḥ/

c Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on Valid Cognition, II.251b; Jam-yang-shay-pa cites the second line and adds “and so forth”; the other three lines have been filled in. The Sanskrit is found in Miyasaka (36.7): audāśīṇyaṁ tu sarvatra hānopādānāhānitaḥ/

d Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on Valid Cognition, II.266a; Jam-yang-shay-pa cites the first line and adds “and so forth”; the second line has been filled in. The Sanskrit is found in Miyasaka (38.6): nirhrāśātiṣayāṁ puṣṭau pratipakṣasvapakṣayoh/.
For, these are like what is stated by Kamalashīla in his *Commentary on (Shāntarakṣita’s) “Compendium of Principles”*. a

[The expression of worship by way of (his) qualities] teaches that the Supramundane Victor is endowed with a superior essence of greatness. Upon hearing this, respectively, followers of faith b generate faith toward the Supramundane Victor immediately without doubt. Moreover, followers of fact c also generate the faith of clarity toward the Supramundane Victor upon definite determination—not seeing damage [contradicting possession] of such [qualities] and thereupon through familiarization enhancing the qualities of wisdom and so forth and becoming skilled in such aspects through valid cognition of accomplishment for the sake of transcending the senses, as will be explained. Those who, from the faith

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a tshad chen 'grel pa; Kamalashīla’s *Commentary on the Compendium of Principles, sde dge, tshad ma, ze*, 138a.6-b.2. The Sanskrit is found in Dwarikadas Shastri, *Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Shāntarakṣita, with the Commentary “Pañjikā” of Śrī Kamalashīla* (Varanasi: Baudhā Bharati, 1968), 8.9-16: tathā hi guṇaṇākhyānaśiśvināśunā bhagavato māhātyam udhāhīyate, tadupasrayata ca śraddhānusārimanasaṃ tāvad asamśayam bhagavati jñātī citoṇapādaḥ samudeoti ye 'pi prajñānusārinas [te 'pi tathāvidhēṣu bādhām apiṣṭeṣaḥ prajñānāśnāṃ ca guṇānām abhivyāśa prakāraṇam avagacchante vakṣyaṁānād api atiṃdriyārthādṛkādhrāhāt pramanān nūnāṃ jagati saṃbhāvyanta eva tathāvidhāḥ sāraya ity avadhyāya bhagavatī prasādam upajñayat eva/ tatiṣṭādāc ca tadgūnās tatpravacanena tadāśīte ca śāśrīdānā pariṣṭāprahārānam udgrahanārtham ardhyante, tātāh śrutamāvayādiṣṭaḥāvadhyakramena yāvat param śreyo 'dhigacchanti mahatsa prasādah sarvasvadīśityodhibgateḥ pradhānāṃ kāraṇaṃ/.

b dad pa'i rjes su 'brangs pa rnams.

c chos kyi rjes su 'brangs pa.
of clarity in him, desire his good qualities, after having understood his high sayings and the treatises based on them and so forth, are intent so as to hold [the teachings]. Through those by generating the wisdoms arisen from hearing and so forth […]

\[\text{Translation Note:} \text{The quotation continues in the next section.}\]

\[\text{a} \quad \text{The quotation continues in the next section.}\]

\[\text{b} \quad \text{2011 BDRC bla brang (15b.6) reads byed do; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (14a.2) reads bya'oo.}\]

\[\text{c} \quad \text{2011 BDRC bla brang (16a.1) reads brten; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (14a.4) reads rten.}\]

\[\text{d} \quad \text{2011 BDRC bla brang (16a.2) reads lta bus so; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (14a.5) reads lta bu'oo.}\]
4) THE ESSENTIAL PURPOSE OF THE TREATISE

With respect to the subject, this treatise [Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on Valid Cognition], its essential purpose exists because the gradual attainment of:

- the consummate valid cognition that is the omniscience perceiving all phenomena like olives in the palm of the hand,\(^a\) and
- the consummate authoritative being\(^b\)

for the sake of trainees through hearing, thinking, and meditating is that [essential purpose]. Kamalashīla’s Commentary on (Shāntarakṣīta’s) “Compendium of Principles” says:\(^c\)

> Through those by generating the wisdoms arisen from hearing and so forth, they gradually attain the supreme goodness.

According to the proponents of Mind-Only who assert three final vehicles, the paths of no-more-learning\(^e\) of the three vehicles and three liberations of the three vehicles also are taken to be the essential purpose.

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\(^a\) lag mthil gyi syu ru ra ltar.
\(^b\) tshad ma’i skyes bu mthar thug; literally, “consummately person who is a means of valid cognition.”
\(^c\) Kamalashīla’s Commentary on the Compendium of Principles, sde dge, tshad ma, ze, 138b.2-3. The Sanskrit is found in Shastri (8.15): tataḥ śrutamātātiprajñodayakramena yāvat paraṁ śreyo ’dhigacchantī [...]/
\(^d\) 2011 BDRC bla brang (16a.2) reads pas; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (14a.5) reads pa’i.
\(^e\) mi slob lam.
5) THE RELATIONSHIP

The relationship of this treatise exists because the omniscience and Enjoyment Body that are its essential purpose are [causally] related to the ten grounds that are its purpose, and these are [causally] related to the hearing and so forth that are the contents of this [treatise].

The meaning of the title has been explained well!

Transitional stanza

The white components [the full moon] of the topics, the eight categories [of logic], are complete.
The darkness obscuring the three types of objects\(^a\) is completely dispelled.
A hundred thousand ambrosias for exposition, debate, and composition drip down [from the moon],
Eliciting the glory of smiles of the totality of the intelligent, jasmine flowers.

\(^{a}\text{gzhal bya'i gnas gsun; the three categories of objects of comprehension—manifest objects, slightly hidden objects, and very obscure objects.}\)
གནས་གཉིས་ཐེག་པའི་ཐུན་ཐོབ་མཚན་པར་བསྟོད་པར།

འཆད་བོད་ལོ་བི་བར་བཤད་པའི་དཔལ།

ཞེས་བར་གནས་ཀྱི་ཚིགས་ར་བཅད་པའོ།།

\[a\] 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (16a.6) reads *zhes*; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (14b.2) reads *ces*. 
B. THE TRANSLATORS’ HOMAGE

The translators’ homage is:\footnote{\textit{a} Dharmakīrti’s \textit{Commentary on Valid Cognition}, sde dge, tshad ma, ce, 94b.1.}

Homage to the Superior, the youthful Mañjushrī (\textit{\'{j}am dpal gzhon nur gyur pa, mañjuṣṭikumāraḥbhūta}).

The meaning of the text is: The subject, the homage by the three translators—Ma Ge-way-lo-drö (\textit{rmab dge ba'i blo gros}), Ngog Lo-dan-she-rab (\textit{rngog blo ldan shes rab}), and (\textit{sa lo pa nyi kun dga' rgyal mtshan})—to the Superior Mañjushrī at the beginning of translating Dharmakīrti’s \textit{Commentary on Valid Cognition}, has a purpose because it is for the sake of finishing the translation, completing the collections [of merit and wisdom], and making known that this is a commentary on the thought of Manifest Knowledge.\footnote{\textit{b} mngon pa'i dgongs 'grel.}

1. Brief decisive analysis

\footnote{\textit{\'{j}am dpal gzhon nur gyur pa, mañjuṣṭikumāraḥbhūta}.}
[a. Refutation of others’ mistakes]

16. Someone who mistakes [the meaning of] an old text\(^a\) says:\(^b\) The three trainings [of ethics, meditative stabilization, and wisdom] are not mutually exclusive.

Our response: Well then, it follows that the three—ethics,\(^c\) calm abiding,\(^d\) and special insight\(^e\)—are not mutually exclusive because [according to you] your thesis [that the three trainings are not mutually exclusive] is logically feasible. You have asserted the sign [which is that the three trainings are not mutually exclusive].

[That the three trainings of ethics, meditative stabilization, and wisdom are not mutually exclusive] entails [that the three—ethics,\(^f\) calm abiding,\(^g\) and special insight,\(^h\) are not mutually exclusive] because the omniscient Khay-drub\(^i\) asserts that if it is the training in ethics, ethics is needed, and for the training in mind, calm abiding is needed, and for the training in wisdom, special insight is needed.

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\(^a\) yig rnying.
\(^b\) 2011 BDRC bla brang, 16b.2; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 14b.5.
\(^c\) tshul khrims.
\(^d\) zhi gnas.
\(^e\) lhag mthong.
\(^f\) tshul khrims.
\(^g\) zhi gnas.
\(^h\) lhag mthong.
\(^i\) mkhas grub.
If you [incorrectly] accept the root [consequence which is that the three—ethics, calm abiding, and special insight—are not mutually exclusive], then it follows that there exists a common locus of the three—ethics, meditative stabilization, and wisdom because you have [incorrectly] accepted [that the three—ethics, calm abiding, and special insight—are not mutually exclusive].

[That the three—ethics, calm abiding, and special insight—are not mutually exclusive] entails [that there exists a common locus of the three—ethics, meditative stabilization, and wisdom] because the Foremost Lama [Tsong-kha-pa] says in his *Reply to the Questions of Gyal-wang-chö-jay*\(^a\) that meditative stabilization is necessary for calm abiding, and wisdom for special insight, because the *Reply to the Questions of Gyal-wang-chö-jay* says:\(^b\)

> As stated in Maitreya’s *Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras* with respect to both similitudes and the fully qualified, calm abiding is posited as one-pointed meditative stabilization,\(^c\) and special insight must be taken as wisdom thoroughly differentiating phenomena.\(^d\)

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\(^a\) *rgyal dbang chos rje'i dris lan.*

\(^b\) Tsong-kha-pa’s *Reply to Gyal-wang-chö-je*, Zhol, kha, 143a.6-143b.1.

\(^c\) *sems rtse gcig pa'i ting ne' byed.*

\(^d\) *chos rab tu rnam 'byed kyi shes rab.*
Therefore, within considering including the associated factors, the three trainings [of ethics, meditative stabilization, and wisdom] are not mutually exclusive because otherwise it would contradict the explanation in Asaṅga’s Summary of the Great Vehicle that there are four possibilities between “ethics” and “the perfection of ethics” and so forth. Also, this is

\[\text{a By way of email, Lo-sang-gyal-tshan explained:}\]

Factors associated with the training in ethics are the [main] mind and mental factors that exist in parallel association with ethics. Therefore, since the [mental factor of] stabilization (ting nge 'dzin) that exists in parallel association with ethics is both (1) a factor associated with the training in ethics and (2) stabilization, this is the meaning of those two [ethics and stabilization] being not mutually exclusive.

However, a stabilization that exists in parallel association with ethics is something that (1) is a perfection of ethics and (2) is not an ethics; therefore, although it is an achieving through armor (go sgrub, sannāhāpratipatti), it is not an ethics because of being a stabilization. [Being a stabilization] entails [not being an ethics] because the fifty-one mental factors are just mutually exclusive among themselves. Jam-yang-shay-pa’s textbook on the Concentrations and Formless Absorptions (Treatise on the Presentations of the Concentrative and Formless Absorptions, Adornment Beautifying the Subduer’s Teaching, Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning, Delighting the Fortunate; bsam gzugs chen mo/bsam gzugs kyi snyoms 'jug rnams gyi rnam par bzhag pa'i bstan bcos thub bstan mdzes rgyan lung dang rigs pa'i rgya mtsho skal bzang dga' byed) says:

It [absurdly] follows that the subjects, the stabilizations of the first eight mental abidings taken individually, are mental engagements because [according to you your] thesis is logically feasible. You have asserted the sign [which is that your thesis is logically feasible]. You cannot accept [that the stabilizations of the first eight mental abidings individually are mental engagements (yid byed) because of being stabilizations. [Being stabilizations] entails [not being mental engagements] because the fifty-one mental factors are just mutually exclusive among themselves.

and his textbook on the Perfection of Wisdom (Decisive Analysis of (Maitreya’s) “Ornament for the Clear Realizations”: Precious Lamp Illuminating All the
not the system of the Great Vehicle.

Topics of the Perfection of Wisdom (bstan bcos mgon par rtogs pa’i rgyan gyi mtha’ dpyod shes rab kyi pha rol tu phrin pa’i don kun gsal ba’i rin chen sgron me) says:

[…] because a [main] mind and mental factors [as they are classified in] the variety of [seven types of] Awareness and Knowledge abide like the petals of a lotus. It follows [that a (main) mind and mental factors (as they are classified in) the variety of (seven types of) Awareness and Knowledge abide like the petals of a lotus] because even the five determining [mental factors—aspiration, belief, mindfulness, stabilization, and wisdom] that are in parallel association with that [main mind] are mutually exclusive.

a 2011 BDRC bla brang (16b.6) reads 'brang; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (15a.3) reads 'brangs.
b 2011 BDRC bla brang (16b.6) reads bslab; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (15a.3) reads slab.
17. Also, someone asserts: A lucid exposition that mainly takes as its subject matter the training of ethics alone is a scriptural collection of discipline. A lucid exposition that mainly takes as its subject matter the training of meditative stabilization alone is a scriptural collection of sets of discourses. A lucid exposition that mainly takes as its subject matter the training of wisdom alone is a scriptural collection of manifest knowledge.

and another asserts: That which mainly takes as its subject matter the three trainings [that is, ethics, meditative stabilization, and wisdom] is a common locus of the three scriptural collections.

These two assert that the three scriptural collections are to be distinguished by only subject matter.

and also, someone explains: Maitreya’s *Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras* explains that the three scriptural collections are in terms of four distinguishing features [that each of the three possesses]; therefore, if the

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a 2011 BDRC *bla brang*, 16b.2; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 14b.5.
b ’dul ba’i sde snod.
c mdo sde’i sde snod.
d mngon pa’i sde sdod.
e 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (17a.3) reads *gsum po*; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (15a.5) reads *gsum.*
four distinguishing features explained there are not complete in an individual [scriptural collection], it is not a scriptural collection of manifest knowledge, and so forth.

Our response: Concerning the first [assertion]: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, the One Hundred Thousand [Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra], is not a lucid exposition mainly explaining the three higher trainings [of ethics, meditative stabilization, and wisdom] because of being a lucid exposition mainly explaining the higher training of meditative stabilization alone [according to you]. You have asserted [that being a lucid exposition mainly explaining the higher training of meditative stabilization alone] entails [not being a lucid exposition mainly explaining the three higher trainings [of ethics, meditative stabilization, and wisdom]. The sign [which is that the One Hundred Thousand [Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra] is a lucid exposition mainly explaining the higher training of meditative stabilization alone] is established [according to you] because of being a scriptural collection of sets of discourses. You have asserted [that being a scriptural collection of sets of discourses] entails [being a lucid exposition mainly explaining the higher training of meditative stabilization alone]. You have asserted the three spheres [of self-contradiction].

a That is:

1. you have asserted the sign (rtags khas langs pa): you have [correctly] asserted that the One Hundred Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra is a scriptural collection of sets of discourses
2. you (should) have asserted the opposite of “thesis” of the consequence (bsal ba’i bzlog phyogs khas langs pa): you (should) have asserted that the One Hundred Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra is a lucid exposition mainly explaining the three higher trainings of ethics, meditative stabilization, and wisdom, and
3. you have asserted the entailment (khyab pa khas langs pa): you have asserted that whatever is a scriptural collection of sets of discourses is necessarily not a lucid exposition mainly explaining the three higher trainings of ethics, meditative stabilization, and wisdom.
You cannot accept the root [consequence that the One Hundred Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra is not a lucid exposition mainly explaining the three higher trainings (of ethics, meditative stabilization, and wisdom)] because:

- [the scriptural collection of] sets of discourses mainly explains all three [that is, ethics, meditative stabilization, and wisdom],
- the scriptural collection of discipline mainly explains individual liberation\(^b\) [the code of precepts],
- the scriptural collection of manifest knowledge mainly explains the objects of higher wisdom and so forth.

It follows [that the sets of discourses mainly explains all three, the scriptural collection of discipline mainly explains individual liberation, and the
scriptural collection of manifest knowledge mainly explains the objects of higher wisdom and so forth] because such an explanation accords with the thoughts of the Foremost Holy Maitreya, Asaṅga and his [half-]brother [Vasubandhu], Jinamitra, and so forth. It follows [that such an explanation accords with the thoughts of the venerable Maitreya, Asaṅga and his (half-)brother Vasubandhu, Jinamitra, and so forth] because with respect to the reasons for positing the scriptural collections as three from the viewpoint of nine reasons:

1-3 the three scriptural collections are posited as antidotes to objects of abandonment—doubt, behavior in the two extremes, and bad view;

4-6 the three trainings [of ethics, meditative stabilization, and wisdom];

7-9 the three topics to have become skilled in.

because Maitreya’s *Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras* (XI.1a) says:¹

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¹ 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (17a.6) reads *spang*; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (15b.3) reads *spangs*.

² 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (17b.1) reads *spyod*; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (15b.3) reads *dpyod*.

³ Maitreya’s *Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras, sde dge, sems tsam, phi*, 13a.5. The Sanskrit is found in Lévi (53.15) (XI.1ab): *piṣṭakatrayaṃ dvayaṃ vā sangrahataḥ kāraṇaīr navabhir iṣṭaṁ //.*
The scriptural collections are three.

and (XI.1b):

Nine reasons are asserted [for including them in three].\(^a\)

\(^a\) The Fourteenth Dalai Lama cites these lines and gives an explanation in his *Opening the Eye of New Awareness*, translated by Donald S. Lopez, (London: Wisdom Publications, 1985), 49-51, that is helpful for understanding this section:

There are nine reasons for positing three scriptural collections: three reasons in terms of objects of abandonment, three reasons in terms of trainings, and three reasons in terms of objects to be known.

**Three Scriptural Collections and Three Objects of Abandonment**

The three objects of abandonment are the secondary afflictions of (1) doubt, (2) extreme behavior, and (3) holding one’s own view to be supreme. The antidote to secondary afflictions of doubt is the scriptural collection of the sets of discourses; the antidote to secondary afflictions of extreme behavior is the scriptural collection of the discipline, and the antidote to the secondary affliction of holding one’s own [mistaken or low] view to be supreme is the scriptural collection of manifest knowledge. \(^{[24]}\)

In the scriptural collection of the sets of discourses, the aggregates, constituents, sources, dependent-arising, the four truths, the grounds (*sa, bhūmi*), the perfections, and so forth are delineated well, primarily in the context of the training in meditative stabilization. Thus, the scriptural collection of the sets of discourses was set forth as an antidote to the secondary affliction of doubt because it removes doubts—qualms in two directions—concerning the specific and general characteristics of those categories of objects of knowledge. \(^{[24]}\)

In the scriptural collection of the discipline, engagement in all unseemly faults such as attachment to internal desires for impure behavior, etc., and external desires for good food, clothing, residence, furnishings, etc., are prohibited, thereby [avoiding] the extreme of indulgent desires. Also, the use of even very good food, clothing, residence, and so forth is allowed for those who have pure ethics of renunciation, who need not acquire possessions and so forth through hardship and toil, and who, when making use of them, have antidotes capable of stopping strong attachment. \(^{[25]}\) Thereby, the extreme of fatiguing and wearying asceticism [is avoided. In this way] the scriptural collection of discipline was set forth as an antidote to the secondary afflictions of the two extremes of behavior in that it teaches antidotes to the extremes of indulgent desire and of fatiguing asceticism.

To summarize: If one makes use of good food, clothing, residence, and furnishings without producing afflictions such as attachment, pride, and arrogance, it is seemly behavior and, therefore, was permitted by the Buddha. Even though one has mediocre food and used clothing, if attachment and so forth to them increase, it is unseemly behavior and, therefore, was not permitted by Buddha. Thus the important points in permission and prohibition are just the decrease and increase of internal afflictions such as desire; external factors are not of prime
importance.

In the scriptural collection of manifest knowledge, the specific characteristics of phenomena and their general characteristics such as impermanence, suffering, and selflessness are clearly and unerringly delineated. [26] If one becomes immersed in these through hearing and thinking about them, (1) the afflictions of mistaken views conceiving [what is unclean, painful, impermanent, and selfless] to be pure, pleasant, permanent, and having a self are extinguished of their own accord, as are (2) ethics motivated by those [misconceptions], and (3) conceptions of bad modes of behavior to be good. For that reason, the scriptural collection of manifest knowledge was set forth as the antidote for conceiving one’s own [mistaken] view to be supreme.

Three Scriptural Collections and Three Trainings

The second set of three reasons for positing the scriptural collections as three is as follows. The scriptural collection of the sets of discourses is posited from the viewpoint of taking the three trainings as its subject matter. The scriptural collection of discipline is posited for the purpose of achieving the trainings in ethics and in meditative stabilization, and the scriptural collection of manifest knowledge is posited for the purpose of achieving the training in wisdom. The three scriptural collections are posited with those three reasons.

Furthermore, regarding the manner in which the scriptural collection of the sets of discourses takes the three trainings as its subject matter, from the viewpoint of the Lesser Vehicle, it [teaches] the ethics of personal restraint with the vows of individual liberation, of completely pure spheres of activity and duties, and of viewing even the slightest unseemliness with concern. [27] It teaches the meditative stabilizations of the concentrations and formless absorptions in the Lesser Vehicle mode, and it teaches the training in wisdom—the special insight knowing the four truths just as they are—from the viewpoint of the Lesser Vehicle. From the viewpoint of the Great Vehicle, it teaches the training in ethics, such as the restraint of ill-deeds, etc., the training in meditative stabilizations, such as the “sky-treasury,” “heroic travel,” etc., and it teaches the training in wisdom—the non-conceptual exalted wisdom realizing the ultimate mode of being. Thus the scriptural collection of the sets of discourses takes all three trainings of the higher and lower vehicles as its subject matter.

Regarding the way in which the scriptural collection of discipline provides training in both ethics and meditative stabilization, it unerringly teaches the things to be adopted and discarded, engaged in and opposed, and thereby explicitly purifies ethics. When ethics are purified in that way, mental pangs and regret [for mis-deeds] disappear, and when those are absent, one attains physical lightness or pliancy. [28] Consequently, mental joy and bliss increase, through the power of which the mind comes to abide one-pointedly. Thereby, both ethics and meditative stabilization are established through the scriptural collection of discipline.

Regarding the way in which the training in wisdom is established through the scriptural collection of manifest knowledge, because [that scriptural collection] delineates and differentiates well the characteristics of phenomena, the wis-
and in commentary on this, Vasubandhu says:

Why are there three [scriptural collections]? There are nine reasons. As antidotes to doubt [the scriptural collection of] sets of
dom that unerringly knows the characteristics of phenomena is produced by listening to the scriptural collection of manifest knowledge. Through that, the training in higher wisdom is established and manifestly attained.

Three Scriptural Collections and Three Objects To Be Known
The three final reasons for positing three scriptural collections are: The sets of discourses are for the purpose of expounding doctrines and their meanings. The discipline is posited from the viewpoint of establishing doctrines and their meanings [in practice], and manifest knowledge is for the purpose of becoming skilled in discourse relating doctrines and their meanings.

Three Scriptural Collections and Three Objects To Be Known
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The way in which the sets of discourses expound doctrines and meanings is that they extensively explain doctrines—letters, stems, and words—and meanings—the aggregates, constituents, sources, etc. that are expressed by them. [29] Or, they explain doctrines such as the aggregates, constituents, etc. and meanings—the four thoughts [behind them] (dgongs pa, abhipräya), the four intentions (idem dgongs, abhisandhi). Or, they explain the doctrines of the ten virtuous paths bringing about attainment of high status [within cyclic existence] and the meaning of the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment (byang chub kyi phyogs, bodhipakṣa)—the paths bringing about the attainment of the qualities of definite goodness [liberation from cyclic existence and omniscience]. From that point of view, the sets of discourses train one in words and meanings.

The way in which doctrines and meanings are established through the scriptural collection of the discipline is that the afflictions are subdued through the teaching of the application of pure ethics as well as through teaching meditation on the impure and so forth; thereby, the doctrines and meanings propounded earlier are understood and realized through becoming manifest in the mental continuum. As a result, doctrines and meanings are established through the scriptural collection of the discipline. Through the scriptural collection of manifest knowledge, one becomes skilled in discourse relating doctrines and their meanings.

All the pronouncements of the Victor that teach the essentials of method and wisdom in the practice of the three vehicles [of Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and Bodhisattvas] are included in the three scriptural collections by way of these nine reasons.

a Vasubandhu’s Commentary on the Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras, sde dge, sms tsam, phi, 164a.4-6. The Sanskrit is found in Lévi (53.19-54.1): kena kāraṇaṃ trayaṃ / navabhikā kāraṇaś vicikitśaptapakṣaṇa sūtraṃ [...] punaḥ śiṣṭārayadeśanā sūtraṇa [...]/.
discourses...Furthermore, the sets of discourses explain the three trainings [of ethics, meditative stabilization, and wisdom].

and so forth,

and Asaṅga’s Summary of Manifest Knowledge⁵ also says:

Why did the One-Gone-Thus present three scriptural collections? The scriptural collection of sets of discourses was presented as an antidote to doubt, a secondary affliction....Furthermore, the scriptural collection of sets of discourses was presented in order to express the three trainings [of ethics, meditative stabilization, and wisdom].

and so forth,

and the commentary on it by Jinaputra says:⁶

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⁵ Asaṅga’s Summary of Manifest Knowledge, sde dge, sems tsam, ri, 101b.6-102a.1. The Sanskrit is found in Pradhan (79.17-21): kim upāddāya tathāgatasya piṭakaratrayavyavasthānam/ vicitrīkṣapakleṣapratipakṣakāmatān upāddāya śūtrapiṭakavyavasthānām/ [...] punah śikṣātryavyuttikāmatān upāddāya śūtrapiṭakavyavasthānām/.

Furthermore, trainees learn the three trainings [of ethics, meditative stabilization, and wisdom] in dependence upon the scriptural collection of sets of discourses since they are expressed there extensively.

and so forth.

18. Also, someone asserts: the three scriptural collections are not mutually exclusive.

Our response: This is indeed good if it is being asserted that Bodhisattvas’ own uncommon scriptural collections are not mutually exclusive; however, it is not logically feasible to assert that the Mother One Hundred Thousand Stanza [Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra] is a scriptural collection of discipline.

It follows that the subject, the One Hundred Thousand Stanza [Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra], is not a scriptural collection of discipline in the division into the three scriptural collections because it is not a scriptural collection mainly teaching as its object of expression any of the two—the individual liberation of Hearers or the individual liberation of Bodhisattvas.

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a 2011 BDRC bla brang (17b.4) reads pa; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (15b.7) reads par.
b 2011 BDRC bla brang, 17b.4; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 16a.1.
c byang sems kyi thun mong ma yin pa'i sde snod.
It is entailed [that if it is not a scriptural collection mainly teaching as its
object of expression any of the two—the individual liberation of Hearers
or the individual liberation of Bodhisattvas, it is necessarily not a scriptural
collection of discipline in the division into the three scriptural collections]
because a scriptural collection of discipline must mainly set forth any of
these two [the individual liberation of Hearers or the individual liberation
of Bodhisattvas], because in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought in reply to
this question:b

Supramundane Victor, what are sets of discourses? What are the
discipline? What are schematizations (mātrkā, ma mo) [that is, 
manifest knowledge]?

the sūtra says:c

Those in which I thoroughly taught the individual liberations of
Hearers and of Bodhisattvas or what is associated with the indi-
vidual liberations are the category of the discipline.

and because the explanation of the discipline in Maitreya’s Ornament for
the Great Vehicle Sūtras also is expounded in accordance with the four sets
of scripturesd [on discipline].

a 2011 BDRC bla brang (17b.6) reads gang rung; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (16a.1) reads
gang rung gi.
b The Sūtra Unraveling the Thought, sde dge, mdo sde, ca, 49b.3-4.
c The Sūtra Unraveling the Thought, sde dge, mdo sde, ca, 50a.7-b.1.
d lung sde bzhi.
e 2011 BDRC bla brang (17b.6) reads gang rung; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (16a.3) reads
At the above juncture [where I said] no entailment [namely, that if it is not a scriptural collection mainly teaching as its object of expression any of the two—the individual liberation of Hearers or the individual liberation of Bodhisattvas, it is necessarily not a scriptural collection of discipline in the division into the three scriptural collections], it follows that the sign [which is that the One Hundred Thousand Stanza (Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra) is not a scriptural collection mainly teaching as its object of expression any of the two, the individual liberation of Hearers or the individual liberation of Bodhisattvas,] is established because of (1) not being a means of explaining as its main object of expression the individual liberation of Hearers and (2) not being also such of Bodhisattvas.

gang rung gi.

a 2011 BDRC bla brang (17b.6) reads zhiig; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (16a.3) reads cti.
b 2011 BDRC bla brang (18a.1) reads mdo de; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (16a.4) reads mo 'di.
c 2011 BDRC bla brang (18a.2) reads mtshams; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (16a.5) reads mo tshams.
The second sign [which is that the One Hundred Thousand Stanza (Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra) is not a scriptural collection mainly teaching as its object of expression the individual liberation of Bodhisattvas] is established because it is a very extensive scriptural collection\(^a\) within the twelve branches of high sayings.

It is entailed [that if it is a very extensive scriptural collection\(^b\) within the twelve branches of high sayings, it is necessarily not a scriptural collection mainly teaching as its object of expression the individual liberation of Bodhisattvas] because Asaṅga’s Summary of Manifest Knowledge says:\(^c\)

> These which are the very extensive scriptural collection and the marvelous scriptural collection\(^d\) are the scriptural collection of sets of discourses of Bodhisattvas.

and because Asaṅga’s Hearer Grounds\(^e\) explains that the introductory section\(^f\) is the scriptural collection of discipline, that the set of delineations\(^g\) is the scriptural collection of manifest knowledge, and that the remaining ten are the scriptural collection of sets of discourses, because Asaṅga’s Hearer Grounds says:\(^h\)

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\(^a\) shin tu rgyas pa’i sde snod.  
\(^b\) shin tu rgyas pa’i sde snod.  
\(^c\) Asaṅga’s Summary of Manifest Knowledge, sde dge, sems tsam, ri, 101b.6. The Sanskrit is found in Pradhan (79.14-15): vaipulyam abhutadharma\(\text{ca ete dve bodhisattvapi}\) tākaṣya sūtra\(\text{ajake samgrhīte bhavatah/}\).  
\(^d\) rmad du byung ba’i sde.  
\(^e\) nyan sa.  
\(^f\) gleng gzhi’i sde.  
\(^g\) gtan la dbab pa’i sde.  
\(^h\) Asaṅga’s Hearer Grounds, sde dge, sems tsam, dzi, 56b.6-57a.1. The Sanskrit is found in Śrāvakabhūmi Study Group, Śrāvakabhūmi, Revised Sanskrit Text and Japanese Translation, The First Chapter (Tokyo: The Sankibo Press, 1998), 232.12-15: tatra yat tāvad āha, sūtram geyam vākaraṇam gāthodānāvadānavrīttakajātakavaipulyādbhutadharma\(i\) iti, idāṃ tāvat sūtram/ yat punar āha, nidānāṃ iti, ayam ucyate vinayāḥ/ yat punar āha,
Concerning those respectively the sets of discourses [in its narrow sense], the sets of proclamations in song, the sets of prophecies, the sets of poetry, the sets of purposeful expressions, the sets of narratives, the sets of parables, the sets of life stories, the sets of very extensive [doctrine], and the sets of marvelous doctrine that were expounded are the set of discourses [in its broad sense]. The sets of introductions that were expounded are called the discipline. The sets of delineations are called the manifest knowledge.

upadeśā iti, ayam ucyate 'bhidharmah'.

a rtogs pa brjod pa'i sde.
b de lta bu byung ba'i sde.
c 2011 BDRC bla brang (18a.4) reads sde; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (16a.7) reads sde snod.
d 2011 BDRC bla brang (18a.5) reads phyir; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (16b.1) reads phyir te.
e 2011 BDRC bla brang (18a.5) reads zhes; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (16b.1) reads ces.
19. About this formulation, someone says: Well then, it follows that through Asaṅga’s *Summary of Manifest Knowledge* saying:

The sets of introductions, the sets of narratives, the sets of parables, and the sets of life stories together with their supplements are the scriptural collection of discipline.

the explanation that these three—the sets of narratives and so forth—are the discipline is not logically feasible because in Asaṅga’s *Hearer Grounds* these three are described as [scriptural collections of] sets of discourses, but not as [scriptural collections of] discipline.

Our response: [That in Asaṅga’s *Hearer Grounds* these three are described
as (scriptural collections of) sets of discourses, but not as (scriptural collections of) discipline does not entail [that the explanation that these three—the sets of narratives and so forth—are the discipline is not logically feasible] because:

- in general, the scriptural collection of discipline and the set of discourses are not mutually exclusive, but
- although the life stories within the twelve branches of high sayings are the discipline of Bodhisattvas, they are not the scriptural collection of Hearers, due to which the Hearer Grounds does not describe [the life stories as the scriptural collection of discipline],
- and [the Hearer Grounds] merely describes the other two [the sets of narratives and the sets of parables] individually since they teach some portions of both the discourses and the discipline.

Furthermore, it very absurdly follows that with respect to the subject, the One Hundred Thousand [Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra], in it are contained the meanings in accordance with the statements in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought:

“Supramundane Victor, by way of how many aspects is the individual liberation of Bodhisattvas understood to be comprised?”

“Mañjushrī, it is comprised by way of seven aspects: (1)

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a 2011 BDRC bla brang (18b.2) reads la; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (16b.4) reads ba.
b 2011 BDRC bla brang (18b.3) reads de ltar; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (16b.5) reads de.
c 2011 BDRC bla brang (18b.3) reads pas; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (16b.5) reads nas.
d The Sūtra Unraveling the Thought, sde dge, mdo sde, ca, 50b.1-2.
teachings concerning rites of correct adoption [of codes of ethics],
(2) teachings concerning sources of defeat [of codes of ethics], (3)
teachings concerning the category of sources of infractions, (4)
teachings concerning the nature of infractions, (5) teachings con-
cerning the nature of non-infraction, (6) teachings concerning
emerging from infractions; and (7) teachings concerning forsaking
vows.

because [according to you] it [that is, the One Hundred Thousand Stanza
Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra] is a scriptural collection of the discipline of
Bodhisattvas.

If you [incorrectly] accept [that the One Hundred Thousand contains the
meanings in accordance with this statement in the Sūtra Unraveling the
Thought], it very absurdly follows that it is not feasible that the two “great
chariots” [namely, Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga] and their followers of the coun-
try of Superiors [India] and the Foremost Father [Tsong-kha-pa] and his
spiritual sons and so forth on any and all occasions of explaining the rites
of Bodhisattva vows, defeats, and so forth do not in the least cite the One
Hundred Thousand but cite the Akāshagarbha Sūtra, a the Ratnakūṭa

a nam snying.
Sūtra, a the Avatamsaka Sūtra and so forth, because [according to you] it [that is, the One Hundred Thousand] fulfills those characteristics [of the scriptural collection of discipline of Bodhisattvas as set forth in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought]. Thus many such impeccable damages [to that position] are seen.

Also, since Cha-pa Chö-kyi-seng-ge’s commentary and so forth [explain that the term] “discipline” in Maitreya’s Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras says:

Because of being manifest in its own discipline, indicates the training of ethics, the explanation that putting together the passage so that it just expounds that [Great Vehicle doctrine] is manifest

a) dkon rtsegs.
b) phal chen.
c) 2011 BDRC bla brang (18b.6) reads 'brang; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (17a.2) reads 'brangs.
d) 2011 BDRC bla brang (19a.1) reads rtsegs; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (17a.2) reads rtags.
e) cha ŋik, Cha-pa Chö-kyi-seng-ge’s (phywa pa chos kyi seng ge, 1109–1169) Commentary on (Maitreya’s) Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras, Illumination of Sunshine (’grel pa nyi’ od snang ba).
f) Maitreya’s Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras, sde dge, sams tsam, phi, 2b.1. The Sanskrit is found in Lévi (5.3): [...] svasyaiva vinaye darsanādi api / (1.12’a-b).
in the scriptural collection of discipline is not logically feasible, for otherwise:

Well then, it [absurdly] follows that the “discipline” that is explicitly indicated in this [passage from Maitreya’s Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras “Because of being manifest in its own discipline,”] is just a scriptural collection because [according to you] it is taken as the scriptural collection of discipline. You have come to accept the sign [which is that the “discipline” that is explicitly indicated in this passage “Because of being manifest in its own discipline,” is taken as the scriptural collection of discipline]. If you [incorrectly] accept [that the “discipline” that is explicitly indicated in this passage “Because of being manifest in its own discipline,” is taken as just the scriptural collection of discipline], it [absurdly] follows the subject, the discipline for [eliminating] the apprehension of the self of phenomena by means of calm abiding and special insight realizing the selflessness of phenomena, is [to be taken as just a scriptural collection] because [(according to you) the “discipline” that is explicitly indicated in this passage “Because of being manifest in its own discipline,” is taken as just the scriptural collection of discipline].

You have [incorrectly] asserted the entailment [that if the “discipline” that is explicitly indicated in this passage “Because of being manifest in its own discipline,” is to be taken as just the scriptural collection of discipline, the discipline for (eliminating) the apprehension of the self of phenomena by means of calm abiding and special insight realizing the selflessness of phenomena, is to be taken as just a scriptural collection]. The sign is established because Vasubandhu in his commentary on that passage in the Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras says:  

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a ’dul ba.
b chos kyi bdag ’dzin.
c It is difficult to identify the referent of “the sign”; in any case, it is apparent that by citing this passage in Vasubandhu’s commentary Jam-yang-shay-pa is seeking to present support for the just mentioned “the discipline for [eliminating] the apprehension of the self of phenomena by means of calm abiding and special insight realizing the selflessness of phenomena,” and specifically this mention of “the affliction of Bodhisattvas is conceptuality,” which Jam-yang-shay-pa takes to be “the apprehension of the self of phenomena.”
d Vasubandhu’s Commentary on the Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras, sde dge, sems tsam, phi, 132a.3. The Sanskrit is found in Lévi (5.5-7): vinayāḥ sandrīṣyate/ yo mahāyāne bodhisatvāṃ klesā uktaḥ/ vikalpāklesāḥ hi bodhisatvāḥ.
The discipline [for eliminating] the arising of Bodhisattvas’ afflictions is manifest [in Great Vehicle doctrine]; the afflictions of Bodhisattvas are conceptuality.

Through this, it is easy to realize that the latter and so forth are not logically feasible; though there is much to be elaborated about these, I fear it would take too many letters.

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a 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (19a.3) reads *lhag*; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (17a.5) reads *lhags*.

b 2011 BDRC *bla brang* (19a.3) reads *'brang*; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (17a.5) reads *bden*. 
b. Our own system

The subjects, the twelve branches of high sayings, are posited as the three scriptural collections because of being posited, as indicated above (135ff.), from the viewpoint of nine reasons.

Although the three scriptural collections of the Lesser Vehicle are mutually exclusive, the three [scriptural collections] of the Great Vehicle are not mutually exclusive because a common locus of the two, (1) a scriptural collection of discipline that exclusively belongs to the Great Vehicle and (2) the other two scriptural collections [that is, a scriptural collection of the sets of discourses and a scriptural collection of manifest knowledge], exists—for example, the likes of the Ratnakūṭa Sūtra, the Avatamsaka Sūtra, the King of Meditative Stabilizations Sūtra\(^b\) and so forth.

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\(^a\) 2011 BDRC bla brang (19a.5) reads rgyu; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (17a.7) reads rgyu mtshan.

\(^b\) mdo ting’dzin rgyal po.
Abbreviations

“2015 Old Lhasa Go-mang” = chos thams cad rigs pas gtan la 'bebs pa'i gtan tshigs kyi rnam bzhag legs par bshad pa bzhugs so (Elegant Explanation of the Presentation of Reasons Delineating All Phenomena by Reasoning). Named “2015” because of being acquired in Lha-sa, Tibet, at Go-mang College in 2015 by Jongbok Yi for the UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies; originally published at Go-mang College, date unknown; called “old” because it was written prior to being edited upon Jam-yang-shay-pa’s return to Am-do Province. (Complete edition, to be made available at UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, uma-tibet.org.)

“2011 BDRC bla brang” = rtags rigs kyi rnam bzhag nyung gsal legs bshad gser gyi phreng mdzes zhes bya ba bzhugs so. Named so because of being acquired by E. Gene Smith for the Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center in 2010 and added to BDRC in 2011; originally published in La-brang-tra-shi-khyil monastery, date unknown.

“co ne” = co ne bstan 'gyur. BDRC W1GS66030. co ne dgon chen: co ne, 1926.


“BDRC” = Buddhist Digital Resource Center, the umbrella organization of the Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center (http://www.tbrc.org).
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Sarasvatī’s Sūtra on Grammar

sarasvatīvyākaraṇasūtra


Āryadeva (’phags pa lha, second to third century C.E.)

Four Hundred Stanzas
catuḥśatakaśāstrakārikā


Asaṅga (thogs med, fourth century)

Compendium of Ascertainments
yogacārābhūmīvinicayasamgrahaṇī


Summary of Manifest Knowledge
abhidharmasamuccaya


Atisha (alias Dīpankaraśrīnā, mar me mdzad ye shes, 982-1054)

Introduction to the Two Truths
satyadvayāvātāvātara


Bodhibhadra (byang chub bzang po)

Connected Explanation of (Āryadeva’s) Compilation of the Essence of Wisdom
ye shes snying po kun las btus pa zhabs bya ba’i bshad sbyar

jñānasārasmuccayanāmanibandhana
Seven Treatises on Valid Cognition


Bhāmatīrti (chos kyi grags pa, seventh century)

Three resembling a body

1. Commentary on Valid Cognition / Commentary on (Dignätga’s) “Compilation of Valid Cognition”

pramāṇavārttikakārikā


Peking 5709, vol. 130.


2. Ascertainment of Valid Cognition

pramāṇavinnīcaya


Peking 5710, vol. 130.

3. Drop of Reasoning

nyāyābinduprakaranā

Peking 5711, vol. 130.


Four resembling limbs

4. *Drop of Reasons*
hetubindunāmaprakaraṇa
gtan thigs kyi thigs pa zhes bya ba rab tu byed pa
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Peking 5712, vol. 130.

5. *Analysis of Relations*
sambhandhaparīkṣā
’brel pa brtag pa
(PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985).
Peking 5713, vol. 130.

6. *Proof of Other Continuums*
saṃtānāntarasiddhināmaprakaraṇa
rgyud gzhan grub pa zhes bya ba’i rab tu byed pa
Tibetan digital reprint edition: In *bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4219). BDRC W23703.175:712719*
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tshad ma rnam ’grel gyi ’grel pa
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tshad ma rnam par nges pa’i ’grel bshad / ’thad ldan / ’thad ldan che ba
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Dharmottara (chos mchog, 8th century)
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Gate of Reasoning [also ascribed to Śaṅkarasvāmin in Indian and Chinese traditions]
nīyānapraveśa-nāma-pramāṇaprakaraṇa
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Wheel of Reasonings
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bstan bcos mgon par rtags pa'i rgyan gyi mtha' dpyod shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i don kun gsal ba'i rin chen sgrom me

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Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras
mahāyānasūtrasūtramāndūkārka

teg pa chen po mdo sde’i rgyan


Mātṛceṭa [also ascribed to Asvaghoṣa and Dignāga in Tibetan tradition]

Interswoven Praise

misrakastrotā
spel mar bstod pa,

Praise Called the One Hundred and Fifty
śatapañcāśatakā
bṛgya lnga bcu pa shes bya ba’i bstod pa


Nandipriya (dga’ byed snyan pa)
Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Praise Called the One Hundred and Fifty”
śatapañcāśatakānaṁastātraṇkā
bṛgya lnga bcu pa zhes bya ba’i bstod pa’i ’grel pa

Ngag-wang-pal-dan (ngag dbang dpal ldan, b. 1797)
Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-pa’s) “Great Exposition of Tenets”: Freeing the Knots of the Difficult Points, Precious Jewel of Clear Thought grub mtha’ chen mo’i mchan ’grel dka’ gnad mdud grol blo gsal gces nor

Shāṅtideva (ṭha ba lha, eighth century)
Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds bodhi[sv]a[caryāvatāra
byang chub sems dpa’i spyod pa la ’jug pa


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Explanation of (Vasubandhu’s) Commentary on the Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā
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dbus dang mtha’ rnam par ’byed pa’i ’grel bshad


Commentary on the Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras sūtra[laṃkārayākhyā]
mdo sde’i rgyan gyi bshad pa

3. OTHER WORKS


Hiroshi Nemoto is a Professor of Indian Philosophy at Hiroshima University, Japan. He received a B.A. degree in 2001, an M.A. degree in 2004, and a Ph. D in 2009 from Hiroshima University, where he specialized in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism and learned Sanskrit, Pāli, and Tibetan. He studied Buddhism with Geshe Lobsang Tsultrim (Blo bzang tshul khrims, 1959–2016) at Drepung Gomang Monastic University (Mundgod, India) from 2004 to 2006, and has been studying with many other Tibetan Geshes from Drepung Gomang Monastic University at Mañjuśrī Mahāyāna Buddhist Association (Hiroshima, Japan) from 2007. He also studied Tibetan poetics at Qinghai Normal University, Xining, from 2013–2014. He is the author of two books written in Japanese: A Study of the dGe lugs pa’s View of Time (Geruku-ha ni okeru jikan-ron no kenkyu, Kyoto: Heirakuji-Shoten, 2011), and Tsong kha pa’s Philosophy and Poetry: A Study of the Rten 'brel bstod pa (Tson-kha-pa no shiso to bungaku: Engisan wo yomu, Kyoto: Heirakuji-Shoten, 2016). He has also written numerous articles written in both English and Japanese, including “Who is a Proper Opponent? The Tibetan Buddhist Concept of phyi rgol yang dag” (Journal of Indian Philosophy 41-2: 151–165, 2013) and “The Myth of Maitreya in Tibet” (Journal of Tibetology 10: 99–110, 2015). Since 2014, he has been teaching at Hiroshima University.
The text translated here is the first part of the Decisive Analysis of the Commentary on Valid Cognition by Jam-yang-shay-pa-ngag-wang-tson-drud (1648–1721). The Decisive Analysis is a large commentary on Dhar-makīrti’s (ca. 600–660) Commentary on Valid Cognition, a masterpiece of Buddhist logic and epistemology. Up to the present day, the Decisive Analysis has been used as a textbook at Drepung Gomang, Labrang Tashi-khyil, and other allied institutes of the Ge-lug-pa sect throughout Inner Asia.

The title of Dharmakīrti’s text is “Pramāṇavārttika,” which is translated here as Commentary on Valid Cognition. According to Jam-yang-shay-pa, “valid cognition” stands for “a commentary on the treatises of valid cognition.” The most relevant treatise is Dignāga’s (ca. 480–540) Compilation of Valid Cognition, and Jam-yang-shay-pa also indicates that the Dharmakīrti’s text is also intended as a commentary on the Buddha’s words that reveal the nature of valid cognition.

Thus the subject matter is the entire doctrine of the Buddha. Jam-yang-shay-pa says that in Dharmakīrti’s second chapter the Buddha’s doctrine is elaborated in terms the path to liberation and omniscience, and in the third chapter it is discussed in terms of the interpretable and definitive. The first chapter explains reasons serving as means of determining such topics by oneself, and that the fourth chapter explains the correct way to teach these to others.

The purpose of the text is to help each reader to comprehend the flawlessness of the Buddha, his doctrine—which consists of scripture and realization—and the spiritual community who achieve what is taught by the Buddha, thereby leading the reader to achieve supreme goodness.

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