


*Buddhapālita's Refutation of
Production from Self,
Bhāvaviveka's Criticism, and
Avalokitavrata's Commentary*

Jam-yang-shay-pa's *Great Exposition
of the Middle: Chapter Six,
Opposite of the Consequences, 1*



Jeffrey Hopkins

Dual language edition by Craig Preston

UMA INSTITUTE
FOR TIBETAN STUDIES

Buddhapālita's Refutation, Bhāvaviveka's Criticism, and Avalokitavrata's Commentary

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Education in Compassion and Wisdom

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Translating texts from the heritage of Tibetan and Inner Asian Buddhist systems, the project focuses on Great Indian Books and Tibetan commentaries from the Go-mang College syllabus as well as a related theme on the fundamental innate mind of clear light in Tantric traditions. A feature of the Project is the usage of consistent vocabulary and format throughout the translations.

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UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies
7330 Harris Mountain Lane
Dyke, VA 22935-1008
USA

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1. 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa ngag dbang brtson grus, 1648-1722. Dbu ma 'jug pa'i mtha' dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zab don kun gsal skal bzang 'jug ngogs. 2. Dge-lugs-pa (Sect)--Doctrines. 3. Dbu ma chen mo. 4. Wisdom—Religious aspects--Buddhism.

I. II. Title.

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Technical Notes

Please notice that:

- Full bibliographical references are given in the footnotes at first citation.
- For translations and editions of texts, see the Bibliography.
- The names of Indian Buddhist schools are translated into English in an effort to increase accessibility for non-specialists.
- For the names of Indian scholars and systems cited in the body of the text, *ch*, *sh*, and *ṣh* are used instead of the more usual *c*, *ś*, and *ṣ* for the sake of easy pronunciation by non-specialists; however, *cch* is used for *cch*, not *chchh*. In parentheses the usual transliteration system for Sanskrit is used.
- Transliteration of Tibetan is done in accordance with a system devised by Turrell Wylie; see “A Standard System of Tibetan Transcription,” *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 22 (1959): 261-267.
- The names of Tibetan authors and orders are given in “essay phonetics” for the sake of easy pronunciation and internet accessibility.

Preface

This is the first of four volumes presenting Tibetan views on the controversy that arose in Buddhist India over how to refute production from self:

1. *Buddhapālita's Refutation of Production from Self, Bhāvaviveka's Criticism, and Avalokitavrata's Commentary: Jam-yang-shay-pa's Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Opposite of the Consequences*, 1
2. *Chandrakīrti Defends Buddhapālita against Bhāvaviveka: Jam-yang-shay-pa's Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Opposite of the Consequences*, 2
3. *Chandrakīrti Undermines Bhāvaviveka's Assertion of Autonomy: Jam-yang-shay-pa's Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Compatibly Appearing Subjects*, 3
4. *What does it Mean to be a Consequentialist? Tsong-kha-pa's Great Exposition of Special Insight and the Four Annotations: Compatibly Appearing Subjects*, 4.

The controversy revolves around the opening phrase of the first stanza of the first chapter of Nāgārjuna's *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called "Wisdom"*:

Not from self, not from others,
Not from both, not causelessly
Do any things
Ever arise anywhere.

Uncharacteristically, Nāgārjuna says nothing more about the first leg of this reasoning—that things are not produced from self. He immediately proceeds to the reasoning proving that things are not produced from other by examining the four types of conditions. His principal Indian commentators, however, explain the refutation of production from self in varying detail, the differences engendering the split between what came to be called the Autonomy School and the Consequence School.

Buddhapālita's (c. 470-540?) commentary on the refutation of production from self provoked Bhāvaviveka (c. 500-570?) into extensive criticism and hence into a demonstration of his own preferred style of commentary. The present book provides two Tibetan explanations of the controversy, shorter and longer, by the Tibetan scholar Jam-yang-shay-pa Ngag-wang-tson-drü (1648-1721/1722). Included also are translations of Buddhapālita's and Bhāvaviveka's commentaries as well as the first translation into English of Avalokitavrata's (flourishing mid-seventh century)

extensive commentary on Bhāvaviveka's presentation, his minute examination allowing Bhāvaviveka's terse text to be seen in high relief (though, of course, subject to careful scrutiny).

This complex topic is used in Tibetan monastic colleges to draw students into fascinating reflections about how phenomena appear and thereby to explore the nature of the reality behind appearances. These issues have received world-wide attention as has been brilliantly documented in Anne MacDonald's magnificent *In Clear Words: The Prasannapadā, Chapter One*.^a

JAM-YANG-SHAY-PA

Jam-yang-shay-pa Ngag-wang-tsön-drü^b was born in the northeastern Am-do Province of Tibet in the Earth-Mouse year of 1648 east of the Blue Lake. At the age of five he was blessed by the Fifth Dalai Lama, from whom he later received monastic vows. Having studied the alphabet at age seven with his uncle, who was a monk, he mastered reading and writing and six years later became a novice monk, excelling among his fellow students by his ability quickly to understand texts and disputations. He went to Lhasa at age twenty-one to further his studies at the Gomang College of Dre-pung Monastic University. Arriving in Lhasa in 1668, he offered a presentation scarf to an image of Mañjushrī in the Jo-khang Temple, where the statue reportedly favored the young scholar with a smile, due to which he became known as Jam-yang-shay-pa, "Smiled Upon by Mañjushrī." Six years later he received full ordination and at twenty-nine entered Gyumay Tantric College. From age thirty-three he spent two years in meditative retreat in a cave near Dre-pung.

At the age of thirty-eight he authored the first of his major works, *Decisive Analysis of (Tsong-kha-pa's) "Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive": Storehouse of White Lapis-Lazuli of Scripture and Reasoning Free from Mistake, Fulfilling the Hopes of the Fortunate*, commonly called *Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive*. During this same period he also wrote another of his great expositions, the *Treatise on the Presentations of the Concentrative and Formless Absorptions: Adornment Beautifying the Subduer's Teaching, Ocean of Scripture*

^a Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2015.

^b *'jam dbyangs bzhad pa ngag dbang brtson grus*, 1648-1722. For a longer biography of Jam-yang-shay-pa see Derek F. Maher, "Knowledge and Authority in Tibetan Middle Way Schools of Buddhism: A Study of the Gelukba (*dge lugs pa*) Epistemology of Jamyang Shayba (*'jam dbyangs bzhad pa*) In Its Historical Context" (Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, 2003), 169-196.

and Reasoning, *Delighting the Fortunate*, commonly called *Great Exposition of the Concentrative and Formless Absorptions*. He wrote the *Root Text of Tenets: Lion's Roar* in 1689, which is the outline of the present book, and published the *Great Exposition of Tenets*—its prose auto-commentary—ten years later in 1699.

At age fifty-three he became abbot of Go-mang College and in 1710 at sixty-two returned to Am-do Province where he founded a highly influential monastery at Tra-shi-khyil.^a Seven years later he founded a tantric college at the same place. He wrote prolifically on the full range of topics of a typical Tibetan polymath and, having received honors from the central Tibetan government and from the Chinese Emperor, died at the age of seventy-three or -four in 1721/2.^b

Partly because of the close connection between Go-mang College and the Mongolian people's stretching from the Caspian Sea through Siberia, who were predominantly Ge-lug-pa by this time, Jam-yang-shay-pa's influence on the Ge-lug-pa order has been considerable. His life manifests a pattern typical of many influential Tibetan religious figures—child prodigy, learned scholar, disseminator of the religion, politician, priest to political personages, monastery leader, yogi, magician, popular teacher, and prolific writer.

THE GREAT EXPOSITION OF TENETS

Jam-yang-shay-pa's *Root Text of Tenets: Lion's Roar*,^c published in 1689, is written in unusually terse, sometimes opaque nine-syllable lines, largely devoid of customary grammatical endings and particles.^d An oral tradition reports that the stylistic oddness of his root text is due to Jam-yang-shay-pa's composing it in an inspired state hearing the sounds of a lute-like

^a *bkra shis 'khyil*.

^b See Maher, "Knowledge and Authority in Tibetan Middle Way Schools of Buddhism," 164.

^c There are two editions of the *Root Text* in Jam-yang-shay-pa's Collected Works, the second also containing interlinear annotations; on a few occasions it contains material contrary to his commentary in the *Great Exposition of Tenets* and, therefore, may indicate an early commentary or may have been authored by a student.

^d Tag-tshang's root text, on the other hand, contains sufficient grammatical endings and particles to be readily understood. His autocommentary, however, is sometimes difficult to follow because he uses the root text within explanatory sentences but cites it only by a syllable or two and "and so forth" (*sogs*); the difficulty is that the words of the root text are integral parts of the commentary, which, therefore, can be understood only by the reader's supplying the remaining words of that phrase, line, or lines of the root text. In translation, I have supplied the missing words so as to make it accessible.

instrument played by the goddess Svarasvatī. His prose autocommentary called *Explanation of Tenets: Sun of the Land of Samantabhadra Brilliantly Illuminating All of Our Own and Others' Tenets and the Meaning of the Profound [Emptiness], Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning Fulfilling All Hopes of All Beings*, published ten years later in 1699, cites the entire root text section by section, and includes most but not all of the words of the root text within the commentary. Monumental in length, the *Great Exposition of Tenets* expands greatly on the root text through citing sources, unraveling issues, and suggesting other issues.

THE GREAT EXPOSITION OF THE MIDDLE

The second text translated here is a portion of Jam-yang-shay-pa Ngag-wang-tson-drü's^a *Decisive Analysis of (Chandrakīrti's) "Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle,'" Treasury of Scripture and Reasoning, Thoroughly Illuminating the Profound Meaning [of Emptiness], Entrance for the Fortunate*,^b also called *Great Exposition of the Middle*, published in 1695, a commentary on Tsong-kha-pa Lo-sang-drag-pa's^c *Illumination of the Thought, Extensive Explanation of (Chandrakīrti's) "Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle.'"*^d It belongs to the debate-oriented decisive analysis (*mtha' dpyod*) genre and is the textbook (*yig cha*) for the study of Tsong-kha-pa's *The Illumination of the Thought* at Go-mang Monastic College. In most Ge-lug-pa colleges there are a separate general-meaning commentary and a separate decisive analysis commentary for seminal texts such as Chandrakīrti's *Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle,"* but in the Go-mang Monastic College Tsong-kha-pa's *Illumination of the Thought* is taken as the general-meaning commentary on Chandrakīrti's *Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle,"* and Jam-yang-shay-pa composed a very lengthy decisive analysis.

Our topic, nevertheless, is based only partially in Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* but mainly in Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* which is brought into the *Great Exposition of the Middle* because of its crucial role in highlighting the difference between Buddhapālita's and Chandrakīrti's system from Bhāvaviveka's system.

^a 'jam dbyangs bzhad pa'i rdo rje ngag dbang brtson grus, 1648-1721/1722.

^b dbu ma 'jug pa'i mtha' dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zab don kun gsal skal bzang 'jug ngogs/ dbu ma chen mo.

^c Tsong-kha-pa blo bzang grags pa, 1357-1419.

^d dbu ma la 'jug pa'i rgya cher bshad pa dgongs pa rab gsal.

NGAG-WANG-PAL-DAN

The Khalkha Mongolian scholar Ngag-wang-pal-dan was born in Urga—present day Ulaanbaatar, the capitol of Mongolia—in the Fire-Serpent year of 1797.^a He received his monastic training in the Ge-lug-pa monastic college of Dra-shi-chö-pel and at the age of forty in 1836 was appointed to the seat of Doctrine Master^b of Urga, and thus he is more commonly known as Pal-dan-chö-jay.^c He went to Tibet in 1843 in connection with the funeral service of the Fifth Je-tsun-dam-pa, the reincarnation of Tāranātha, the second most important figure of the Jo-nang-pa sect, and in 1847 relinquished the post of Doctrine Master of Urga. It seems that he remained in Tibet at the Go-mang^d College of Dre-pung^e Monastery, west of and at that time outside of the city of Lhasa. He also avidly studied and sometimes wrote about the textbook literature of the Lo-sel-ling^f College of Dre-pung. He composed seven volumes of many works on a wide range of topics.

Ngag-wang-pal-dan's extraordinary depth is exemplified in his extensive commentary^g titled *Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-pa's) "Great Exposition of Tenets": Freeing the Knots of the Difficult Points, Precious Jewel of Clear Awareness*,^h almost as long as Jam-yang-shay-pa's text itself.ⁱ The *Great Exposition of Tenets*,^j despite being monumental in length, is often cryptic in its references and meaning (atypical for Jam-yang-shay-

^a These first two sentences are drawn from Lokesh Chandra, *Eminent Tibetan Poly-maths of Mongolia* (New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1961), 24.

^b *chos rje*.

^c *dpal ldan chos rje*.

^d *sgo mang*.

^e *'bras spungs*.

^f I have a vague memory of being told that Ngag-wang-pal-dan was "removed from the comforts of the community" of the Go-mang College fourteen times, which I speculate was due to his occasional preference for the positions of the Lo-sel-ling College.

^g 505 folios, Guru Deva edition.

^h *grub mtha' chen mo 'i mchan 'grel dka' gnad mdud grol blo gsal gces nor*, Collected Works of Chos-rje ñag-dbañ Dpal-ldan of Urga, vols. 4-5, 1-401 (Delhi: Guru Deva, 1983).

ⁱ 545 folios, *bla brang* edition.

^j *Great Exposition of Tenets / Explanation of "Tenets": Sun of the Land of Samantabhadra Brilliantly Illuminating All of Our Own and Others' Tenets and the Meaning of the Profound [Emptiness], Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning Fulfilling All Hopes of All Beings* (*grub mtha' chen mo / grub mtha' i rnam bshad rang gzhan grub mtha' kun dang zab don mchog tu gsal ba kun bzang zhing gi nyi ma lung rigs rgya mtsho skye dgu' i re ba kun skong*), *Collected Works of 'Jam-dbyaṅs-bzad-pa 'i-rdo-rje*, vol. 14 entire (New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1973).

pa whose style is usually relatively clear); it is also laden with copy-editing problems. Seeing the tremendous value of the *Great Exposition of Tenets*, Ngag-wang-pal-dan sought to make it more accessible through lengthening, explaining, and identifying source materials and through expanding on issues. He also raises qualms about the relevance of certain source quotes and frequently corrects misprints, faulty citations, and other copy-editing problems in the Old Go-mang edition,^a though he forswears trying to make a list of what requires copy-editing.^b His attention to detail manifests the great value he put on the text, bringing tremendous clarity to what otherwise is an unusually abstruse work. His annotations are a necessary key for the *Great Exposition of Tenets* through providing rigorous contextualization and non-partisan critique.

The *Annotations* are invaluable as they reveal the systematic background of Jam-yang-shay-pa's citations which, without this contextualization, sometimes even seem to be proving the opposite of what the author intends. Until one understands that Jam-yang-shay-pa intends his text to in some ways function as lecture notes for a teacher competent in Tsongkha-pa's system, many of his citations are baffling. Undoubtedly, Ngag-wang-pal-dan saw this need and provided contextualization. His annotations do indeed untie the knots of a great many difficult points especially by elaborating the meaning of quotations, and thus I used it extensively for both understanding the meaning and adding bracketed material in my *Meditation on Emptiness* and *Maps of the Profound*.^c

EDITIONS CONSULTED

Two main editions of Jam-yang-shay-pa's *Explanation of Tenets: Sun of*

^a Some of his corrections indicate that he did not have the Tra-shi-khyil edition.

^b He says (*stod, ha*, 179.2):

Since, in general, I have not tried to write down the very many mistakes in wording (*yig nor*) here in Jam-yang-shay-pa's *Great Exposition of Tenets*, I have mostly neglected them.

and (*dnogs, tha*, 215.5):

Although in general there are very many tiny mistakes in wording in all of the omniscient Jam-yang-shay-pa's textbook literature on philosophy and in particular in the *Great Exposition of Tenets*, such as the genitive case where the instrumental case should be and the instrumental case where the genitive case should be, I have not tried here to write [all of] them down, and hence have mostly neglected them.

^c See the Bibliography.

the Land of Samantabhadra Brilliantly Illuminating All of Our Own and Others' Tenets and the Meaning of the Profound [Emptiness], Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning Fulfilling All Hopes of All Beings, also called *Great Exposition of Tenets* were consulted:^a

1. *grub mtha'i rnam bshad rang gzhan grub mtha' kun dang zab don mchog tu gsal ba kun bzang zhing gi nyi ma lung rigs rgya mtsho*. Published at Go-mang College, Lhasa, Tibet, date unknown. Abbreviated reference: "2016 Old Go-mang Lhasa," so named because of being scanned in Mundgod, Karnataka, India, at Go-mang College in December 2016 by Jongbok Yi for the UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies. This version was likely originally printed at Go-mang College, Lhasa, Tibet, while Jam-yang-shay-pa was abbot of Go-mang College. (To be made available at UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, uma-tibet.org.)
2. *grub mtha'i rnam bshad rang gzhan grub mtha' kun dang zab don mchog tu gsal ba kun bzang zhing gi nyi ma lung rigs rgya mtsho*. TBRC W22186.13:35-614 (PDF of *bla brang bkra shis 'khyil: bla brang bkra shis 'khyil dgon*, [n.d.]). Abbreviated reference: "2011 TBRC *bla brang*." This edition, which is a revision of the above edition, was printed in La-brang-tra-shi-khyil monastery founded by Jam-yang-shay-pa after his return to Am-do. In general, it is the preferred edition, though not always.

These two editions are the sources of five other available editions:

- a. *grub mtha'i rnam bshad rang gzhan grub mtha' kun dang zab don mchog tu gsal ba kun bzang zhing gi nyi ma lung rigs rgya mtsho*. In the *Collected Works of 'Jam-dbyaṅs-bzad-pa'i-rdo-rje*: Reproduced from prints from La-brang-tra-shi-khyil blocks, 15 vols, Gedan Sungrab Minyam Gyunphel Series. New Delhi, India: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1973. Tibetan digital reprint edition: In *gsung 'bum ('jam dbyangs bzhad pa'i rdo rje)* TBRC W1KG9409.14:48-625 (PDF of New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1973). Abbreviated reference: "1973 Ngawang Gelek *bla brang*."
- b. *grub mtha'i rnam bshad rang gzhan grub mtha' kun dang zab don mchog tu gsal ba kun bzang zhing gi nyi ma lung rigs rgya mtsho*. Mundgod revision of the 1973 Ngawang Gelek *bla brang* (Mundgod, India: Go-mang College, 1996). Abbreviated reference: "1996 Mundgod revision."

^a The earlier Lhasa Go-mang edition is yet to be acquired.

- c. *grub mtha'i rnam bshad rang gzhan grub mtha' kun dang zab don mchog tu gsal ba kun bzang zhing gi nyi ma lung rigs rgya mtsho*. Codex based on the 1996 Mundgod revision (Mundgod, India: Go-mang Library, 1999). Abbreviated reference: “1999 Mundgod.”
- d. *grub mtha'i rnam bshad rang gzhan grub mtha' kun dang zab don mchog tu gsal ba kun bzang zhing gi nyi ma lung rigs rgya mtsho*. Taipei reprint of 1999 Mundgod (Taiwan: The Corporate Body of the Buddha Educational Foundation, 2000). Abbreviated reference: “2000 Taipei reprint of 1999 Mundgod.”
- e. *grub mtha'i rnam bshad rang gzhan grub mtha' kun dang zab don mchog tu gsal ba kun bzang zhing gi nyi ma lung rigs rgya mtsho*. Musoorie, India: Dalama, 1962. Abbreviated reference: “1962 Dalama.”

Two main editions of Jam-yang-shay-pa's *Decisive Analysis of (Chandrakīrti's) "Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle'": Treasury of Scripture and Reasoning, Thoroughly Illuminating the Profound Meaning [of Emptiness], Entrance for the Fortunate*, also called *Decisive Analysis of the Middle* and *Great Exposition of the Middle* were consulted:

1. *dbu ma la 'jug pa'i mtha' dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zab don kun gsal skal bzang 'jug ngogs*. Published at Go-mang College, Lhasa, Tibet, date unknown. Abbreviated reference: “2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa,” so named because of being acquired in Lhasa, Tibet, at Go-mang College in 2015 by Jongbok Yi and then scanned for the UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies. (To be made available at UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, uma-tibet.org.)
2. *dbu ma la 'jug pa'i mtha' dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zab don kun gsal skal bzang 'jug ngogs*. TBRC W22186-I1KG10676: 1-442a.3, which is a PDF of: *bla brang bkra shis 'khyil*, a mdo.^a Abbreviated reference: “2011 TBRC *bla brang*.” This edition, which is a revision of the above edition, was printed in La-brang-tra-shi-khyil monastery founded by Jam-yang-shay-pa after his return to Am-do. In general, it is the preferred edition, though not always.

These two editions are the sources of four other available editions:

- a. *dbu ma la 'jug pa'i mtha' dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zab don kun*

^a This edition was provided to the UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies by the late E. Gene Smith (1936-2010) in 2010.

- gsal skal bzang 'jug ngogs*. In the *Collected Works of 'Jam-dbyañs-bzad-pa'i-rdo-rje*: Reproduced from prints from Bkra-shis-'khyil Blocks, 15 vols., vol. 9, Gedan Sungrab Minyam Gyun-phe Series. New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1973. Abbreviated reference: “1973 Ngawang Gelek *bla brang*.”
- b. *dbu ma la 'jug pa'i mtha' dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zab don kun gsal skal bzang 'jug ngogs*. TBRC W21503.9: 1-442a.3, a PDF of: Mundgod, South India: Gomang College, 1997 (revision of the 1973 Ngawang Gelek Demo edition). Abbreviated reference: “1997 revision of Ngawang Gelek *bla brang*.”
- c. *dbu ma la 'jug pa'i mtha' dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zab don kun gsal skal bzang 'jug ngogs*. Taipei reprint (published by the Corporate Body of the Buddha Educational Foundation, Taipei, Taiwan, 2007) of the 1999 codex (Mundgod, India: Go-mang Library, 1999) based on the 1995 Mundgod revision (Mundgod, India: Gomang College, 1995) of the 1973 Ngawang Gelek *bla brang* edition (New Delhi, India: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1973). Abbreviated reference: “2007 Taipei codex reprint.”
- d. The digital Tibetan text of Jam-yang-shay-pa's *Great Exposition of the Middle* provided in this book was supplied by the Drepung Gomang Library of Go-mang College in Mundgod, Karnataka State, India. It is likely a slightly revised version of the 1999 codex mentioned in item #c. It has been edited in accordance with the “2011 TBRC *bla brang*” and other sources.

In the body of the book and occasionally in notes Ngag-wang-pal-dan's *Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-pa's) "Great Exposition of Tenets": Freeing the Knots of the Difficult Points, Precious Jewel of Clear Awareness* from any of three editions are cited in indentations with borders on the top, bottom, and right side to demarcate it clearly from Jam-yang-shay-pa's text:

1. *grub mtha' chen mo'i mchan 'grel dka' gnad mdud grol blo gsal gces nor*. Sarnath, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1964. Tibetan digital reprint edition of a typeset edition: In TBRC W5842.1. Abbreviated reference: “*Annotations* Sarnath Edition.”
2. *grub mtha' chen mo'i mchan 'grel dka' gnad mdud grol blo gsal gces nor*. In *Collected Works of Chos-rje nag-dbañ Dpal-ldan of Urga*, vols. 4-5. Delhi: Guru Deva, 1983. Tibetan digital reprint edition of a printing of the Urga blocks: In *gsung 'bum (nga dbang dpal ldan)*. TBRC W5926-3830 Part One and W5926-3831 Part Two. Abbreviated reference: “*Annotations* Urga Edition.”

3. *grub mtha' chen mo'i mchan 'grel dka' gnad mdud grol blo gsal gces nor*, Mundgod, India: Drepung Gomang Library, 2007; rpt. Taipei, Taiwan: The Corporate Body of the Buddha Educational Foundation, n.d. Abbreviated reference: “*Annotations Taipei Edition.*”

PART ONE:
BACKGROUND
OF THE CONTROVERSY

1. Two Schools?

Many Buddhist scholars throughout the world speak of two principal sub-schools of the Middle Way School^a in India—the Consequence School^b founded by Buddhapālita and Chandrakīrti and the Autonomy School^c founded by Bhāvaviveka. However, the names for the subschools were not used in India but were coined in Tibet based on Chandrakīrti’s argument against Bhāvaviveka that it is not suitable to use autonomous inferences^d and that consequences^e are sufficient.^f Since even the names of the subschools were coined in Tibet, one might think that the doctrinal differences

^a *dbu ma pa, mādhyamika / madhyamaka.*

^b *thal ’gyur pa, prāsaṅgika.*

^c *rang rgyud pa, svātantrika.*

^d *rang rgyud kyi rjes dpag, svatantra-anumāna.*

^e *thal ’gyur, prasaṅga.*

^f In both his *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path* and *Middle-Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path*, Tsong-kha-pa says:

The terminology of Autonomist and Consequentialist is used with respect to Proponents of the Middle by scholars of the later dissemination [of Buddhism] in the Land of Snowy Mountains [Tibet]; this accords with Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words*.

In the *Great Exposition* he adds, “Hence you should not think that it is their own fabrication.” See also Tsong-kha-pa, *The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment*, vol. 3, trans. and ed. Joshua W. C. Cutler and Guy Newland (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 2000-2003), 116; Jeffrey Hopkins, *Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 2007), 34, and Elizabeth Napper, *Dependent-Arising and Emptiness* (London: Wisdom Publications, 1989), 166 and 280-281. Tsong-kha-pa is saying not that Chandrakīrti used the terms “Prāsaṅgika” and “Svātantrika,” but that the coining of these terms in Tibet is based on Chandrakīrti’s refutation of autonomous inferences (*rang rgyud kyi rjes dpag, svatantra-anumāna*) and stated preference for consequences (*thal ’gyur, prasaṅga*) in the first chapter of his *Clear Words* (*tshig gsal, prasannapadā*) and hence is not a baseless fabrication.

For discussion of the Tibetan origins of the names of the sub-divisions of the Middle Way School, see:

- Katsumi Mimaki, *Blo gsal grub mtha’* (Kyoto: Université de Kyoto, 1982).
- Katsumi Mimaki, “The *Blo gsal grub mtha’*, and the Proponent of the Middle Classification in Tibetan *grub mtha’* Literature,” in *Contributions on Tibetan and Buddhist Religion and Philosophy*, ed. Ernst Steinkellner and Helmut Tauscher (Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, 1983), 161-167.
- Jeffrey Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness* (London: Wisdom, 1983; rev. ed., Boston, Ma.: Wisdom, 1996), 455-530.
- Peter della Santina, *Madhyamaka Schools in India* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1986).

adduced between these two subschools would be worded in a tentative way; however, in certain scholastic literature within the Ge-lug-pa^a order of Tibetan Buddhism, especially their tenets literature,^b there are hard and fast statements about the respective tenets of these subschools such that one can be left with the impression that these positions were clearly stated as such in Indian works.

As the main difference between these two versions of the Middle Way School, it is often said that:

1. The Autonomy School asserts that all phenomena are established by way of their own character conventionally, but not so ultimately.
2. The Consequence School asserts that no phenomenon is established by way of its own character, either conventionally or ultimately.

For instance, in his *Presentation of Tenets: A Precious Garland* the eighteenth century Ge-lug-pa scholar, Kōn-chog-jig-may-wang-po,^c says about the Autonomy School:^d

They maintain that any established base [that is, object] is necessarily established by way of its own character because they assert that, regarding any phenomenon, if the imputed object is sought, it is findable. Therefore, they assert that inherently established,^e

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- Jeffrey Hopkins, “A Tibetan Delineation of Different Views of Emptiness in the Indian Middle Way School: Tsong-kha-pa’s Two Interpretations of the *Locus Classicus* in Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words* Showing Bhāvaviveka’s Assertion of Compatible Subjects and Inherent Existence,” *Tibet Journal* 14, no. 1 (1989):10-43; the printing contains egregious typographical errors.
 - Tom J.F. Tillemans, “Tsong kha pa *et al.* on the Bhāvaviveka-Candrakīrti Debate” in *Tibetan Studies: Proceedings of the 5th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies*. Monograph Series of Naritasan Institute for Buddhist Studies: Occasional Papers 2. Narita: Narita-san Shinshō-ji, 1992.
 - Kodo Yotsuya, *The Critique of Svatantra Reasoning by Candrakīrti and Tsong-kha-pa: A Study of Philosophical Proof According to Two Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka Traditions of India and Tibet*, Tibetan and Indo-Tibetan Studies 8 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1999).
 - Georges B.J. Dreyfus and Sara L. McClintock, eds., *The Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika Distinction* (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2003).

^a *dge lugs pa*.

^b *grub mtha’, siddhānta*.

^c *dkon mchog ’jigs med dbang po*, 1728-1791.

^d Geshe Lhundup Sopa and Jeffrey Hopkins, *Cutting through Appearances: Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism*, (Ithaca, New York: Snow Lion Publications, 1989), 285-286; see also H. V. Guenther. *Buddhist Philosophy in Theory and Practice* (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin, 1972), .

^e *rang bzhin gyis grub pa, svabhāvasiddha*.

established by way of its own character,^a established by way of its own mode of abiding,^b and established in its own right^c are mutually inclusive.

and about the Consequence School he says:^d

They assert that whatever is an established base [that is, whatever exists] necessarily is not established by way of its own character because they assert that all objects^e are only imputed by conceptuality and that the word “only” in the term “only imputed by conceptuality” eliminates the establishment of objects by way of their own character.

One might think that Bhāvaviveka, considered to be the founder of the Autonomy School, made such unequivocal statements or that Chandrakīrti, considered by most to be the founder of the Consequence School, made explicit delineations using such an unequivocal style. However, neither Bhāvaviveka nor Chandrakīrti nor any of their Indian followers did so.

Rather, as Tsong-kha-pa Lo-sang-drag-pa,^f founder of the Ge-lug-pa order of Tibetan Buddhism, states in his *The Essence of Eloquence*,^g none of the major Indian Autonomists noted that Chandrakīrti, in defending Buddhapālita against Bhāvaviveka’s attacks, had disagreed with Bhāvaviveka over their respective views of emptiness. Given Ge-lug-pa scholars’ emphasis on Chandrakīrti’s supposed delineation of a difference between himself and Bhāvaviveka with regard to emptiness and thus between the two subdivisions of the Middle Way School, one would expect

^a *rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa, svalakṣaṇasiddha.*

^b *rang gi sdod lugs kyī ngos nas grub pa.*

^c *rang ngos nas grub pa, svarūpasiddha.*

^d Sopa and Hopkins, *Cutting through Appearances*, 303.

^e Literally, “whatsoever established bases” (*gzhi grub tshad*). The term *tshad* here does not refer to valid cognition (*tshad ma*) but to “measure” as in “whatsoever measure” or “whatsoever extent.”

^f *tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa*, 1357-1419.

^g *drang ba dang nges pa’i don rnam par phye ba’i bstan bcos legs bshad snying po*; P6142, vol. 153. For an English translation of the Prologue and Mind-Only section, see Jeffrey Hopkins, *Emptiness in the Mind-Only School of Buddhism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999). For an English translation of the complete text, see Robert A. F. Thurman, *Tsong Khapa’s Speech of Gold in the Essence of True Eloquence* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984). A Chinese translation was completed in Lhasa on the day commemorating Buddha’s enlightenment in 1916 by Venerable Fa Zun, “Bian Liao Yi Bu Liao Yi Shuo Cang Lun,” in *Xi Zang Fo Jiao Jiao Yi Lun Ji* (Taipei: Da Sheng Wen Hua Chu Ban She, 1979), vol. 2, 159-276.

that at least one Indian Autonomist would have spoken of just such a difference, but even according to Tsong-kha-pa none did (although, as will be explained below, fn. p.27, one of his students found just such a passage in Kamalashīla's *Illumination of the Middle*). Furthermore, Tsong-kha-pa states that Bhāvaviveka himself not only did not frame his disagreement with Buddhapālita around a divergence of opinion over what the doctrine of emptiness negates but also did not even perceive any such difference.

However, Tsong-kha-pa noticed that Chandrakīrti frames his response to Bhāvaviveka's criticism of Buddhapālita around a perceived disagreement over emptiness, specifically that of which phenomena are empty. Still, since Chandrakīrti did not explicitly say such in those words, even great Indian scholars who followed Bhāvaviveka's school and read Chandrakīrti's criticism did not perceive that Chandrakīrti saw his own view of emptiness as being distinct from that of Bhāvaviveka. In his *The Essence of Eloquence* Tsong-kha-pa by no means hides the inventiveness of his explanation:^a

Although Bhāvaviveka apprehended many faults in the master Buddhapālita's *Commentary on (Nāgārjuna's) "Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called 'Wisdom'"*^b he did not express fault by way of the existence of disagreement with respect to the two

^a This passage occurs at the beginning of the section on the Consequence School in Tsong-kha-pa's *The Essence of Eloquence*; see also Thurman, *Tsong Khapa's Speech of Gold*, 288. All translations provided here are my own. The Tibetan:

སྣོབ་དཔོན་སངས་རྒྱལ་བསྐྱེད་ཀྱིས་རྩ་བ་ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱི་འགྲེལ་བ་མཛད་པ་ལ་ལེགས་ལྡན་གྱིས་སྦྱོན་མང་པོ་བཟུང་ཡང་བདག་མེད་གཉིས་ལ་མི་མཐུན་པ་ཡོད་པའི་སྦོ་ནས་སྦྱོན་མ་བཟོད་ལ། སྤྱོད་རས་གཟིགས་བརྩལ་ཞུགས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱང་། མ་སྣང་དུ་ཕྱི་ནང་གི་རྟོན་འབྲེལ་སྐྱེ་མ་ཙམ་དུ་བྱ་བ་བྱད་རུས་སུ་ཡོད་ཅང་དོན་དམ་པར་ངོ་བོ་ཉིང་མེད་པར་ཤེས་པ་ནི། འཕགས་པ་ཡབ་ཟས་དང་ལེགས་ལྡན་འབྱེད་དང་སངས་རྒྱལ་བསྐྱེད་པ་ལ་སོགས་པ་དབྱེ་མའི་ལམ་སྐྱབ་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱི་པ་རོལ་དུ་ཕྱིན་པའི་ཚུལ་བསྟན་པའོ་ཞེས་འཆད་དེ། མ་སྣང་དུ་སྐྱེ་མ་ཙམ་དུ་ཡོད་པ་དང་དོན་དམ་པར་ངོ་བོ་ཉིང་མེད་ཚུལ་ལ་སྣོབ་དཔོན་གཉིས་འདྲ་བར་བཤད་དོ། ། ཡེ་ཤེས་སྣོད་པོ་དང་ཞི་བ་འཚོ་དང་ཀ་མ་ལ་ཤྲི་ལ་ལ་སོགས་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱང་སངས་རྒྱལ་བསྐྱེད་པ་དང་ལྷ་བ་གྲགས་པའི་ལྷགས་དང་རང་གི་ལྷགས་གཉིས་ལ་བདག་མེད་ཀྱི་ཁྱད་པར་ཡོད་པའི་ཚུལ་མ་བཤད་དོ། །

^b *dbu ma rtsa ba'i 'grel pa buddha pā li ta, buddhapālita mūlamadhyamakavṛtti*, P5254, vol. 95.

selflessnesses; [Bhāvaviveka's commentator] Avalokitavrata also explains [that the thought of all these masters is similar]:^a

The knowledge that conventionally external and internal dependent-arising exist as able to perform functions and as only [like] illusions and without an inherent nature ultimately is the mode of the perfection of wisdom taught by the proponents of the path of the Middle Way—the father, the Superior [Nāgārjuna], and his spiritual son [Āryadeva], as well as Bhāvaviveka, Buddhapālita, and so forth.

Avalokitavrata describes the two masters [Bhāvaviveka and Buddhapālita]^b as similar with respect to the mode of existing conventionally as only [like] illusions and as natureless ultimately. Even Jñānagarbha, Shāntarakṣhita, Kamalashīla, and so forth do not describe a mode of difference concerning selflessness between the two, the system of Buddhapālita and Chandrakīrti and their own systems.

Tsong-kha-pa repeats these points later in *The Essence of Eloquence* when specifically refuting autonomous syllogisms:^c

^a Brackets are from Ta-drin-rab-tan's *Annotations*, 269.4. Avalokitavrata is commenting on Bhāvaviveka's *Lamp for (Nāgārjuna's) "Wisdom," Commentary on the "Treatise on the Middle"* (*dbu ma rtsa ba'i 'grel pa shes rab sgron ma, prajñāpradīpamūlamadhyamakavṛtti*, P5253, vol. 95), which is commenting on Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle* (*dbu ma'i bstan bcos, madhyamakāśāstra*, P5224, vol. 95), XXIV.14.

^b Ta-drin-rab-tan's *Annotations*, 269.5.

^c The Tibetan is:

ལེགས་ལྡན་ལ་ཡང་སངས་རྒྱས་བསྐྱེད་དང་རང་ཉིད་རང་རྒྱུད་ཁས་ལེན་མི་ལེན་མི་
 མཐུན་སྟམ་པ་མི་འདུག་གི་རང་རྒྱུད་ཁས་ལེན་པ་འོས་མེད་དུ་བྱས་པའི་ལུགས་སུ་སྤང་
 འོ།། དེའི་གནད་ཀྱིས་ཀྱང་རང་ཉིད་དང་སངས་རྒྱས་བསྐྱེད་ས་གཉིས་ལ་ཚོས་དང་གང་
 ཟག་ལ་རང་བཞིན་འགོག་པའི་དགག་བྱ་ལ་ཡང་ཁྱད་པར་ཡོད་པར་མི་བཞེད་དོ།།
 ལེགས་ལྡན་གྱི་རྗེས་འབྲང་སྤྱོད་རས་གཟིགས་བརྟུལ་ཞུགས་ལ་འགྲེལ་པ་ཚོག་གསལ་གྱི་
 རྒྱས་འདུག་པས། ཤེས་རབ་སྟོན་མར་སངས་རྒྱས་བསྐྱེད་ས་བཀག་པའི་འགྲེལ་བཤད་གྱི་
 རྟོགས་སུ་ཟླ་བས་ལེགས་ལྡན་ལ་སྟོན་བརྗོད་པ་རྣམས་འཇུག་མི་འཇུག་གི་བཤད་པ་འོང་
 རྒྱུར་སྤང་ཞིང་། ཞི་བ་འཚོ་དཔོན་སྟོན་ལ་སོགས་པས་ཀྱང་ཟླ་བས་རང་རྒྱུད་བཀག་པའི་
 སྟོན་མཚན་རྒྱུར་སྤང་ཡང་མ་མཚན་དོ།།

Even Bhāvaviveka did not think that he differed from Buddhapālita with respect to asserting or not asserting autonomy; his appears to be a system in which it is indispensable to assert autonomy. Due to this essential, he also did not assert that he and Buddhapālita differed even with respect to the object of negation in the refutation of an inherent nature with respect to phenomena and persons. Since Bhāvaviveka's follower, Avalokitavrata,^a had acquaintance with Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words: Commentary on (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle,"* it appears that it would have been appropriate for him, at those points in his explanatory commentary on the refutation of Buddhapālita in Bhāvaviveka's *Lamp for (Nāgārjuna's) "Wisdom,"* to explain whether the faults that Chandrakīrti ascribed to Bhāvaviveka applied or did not apply, and it also would appear that the master Shāntarakṣita and his student [Kamalashīla] and so forth should have dispelled the

See also the translation in Thurman, *Tsong Khapa's Speech of Gold*, 323. Some have contended that in the usual Tibetan debating format there are no syllogisms, most likely because the entailment is not manifestly stated; Daniel Perdue (*Debate in Tibetan Buddhist Education*, 837) points out that this kind of logical statement containing one or more suppressed premises is called an enthymeme.

Dharmakīrti states that a syllogism is composed of an entailment, or pervasion (*khyab pa*), and the property of the subject (*phyogs chos*), that is, minor premise, and indeed in the more formal Tibetan variety both of these are required in a proof statement (*sgrub ngag*) along with an example, but the conclusion is not explicitly stated. For an Aristotelian syllogism, however, all three members of a syllogism are explicitly stated—these being the major premise, the minor premise, and the conclusion. For Dharmakīrti the major and minor premises must be explicitly stated, but the conclusion is not.

In the Tibetan informal version widely used in debating courtyards, the first part, the pervasion, is suppressed, whereas in the formal version the third part, the conclusion, is suppressed. However, since both the pervasion and the conclusion are implicitly present in both the informal and the formal versions, it is suitable to call them "syllogisms" as long as it is understood that a part is suppressed, that is to say, not explicitly stated. Indeed, it is common knowledge among Tibetan scholars that the entailment is implicit or that the conclusion is implicit.

For Dharmakīrti, the conclusion is not stated because it is so obvious that it would be redundant to state it. Chandrakīrti, on the other hand, has a five-membered syllogism in which even more members are explicitly stated; see Jeffrey Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, .

^a Avalokitavrata (P5259, vol. 96, *dbu ma*, vol. *wa*, 85a.8) lists Candrakīrti as one of the eight commentators on Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle*, the others being Nāgārjuna (for Ge-lug-pa scholars' views on the actual author of this commentary as a scholar by the name of Akutobhayā see 51), Buddhapālita, Devasharman, Guṇashrī, Guṇamati, Sthiramati, and Bhāvaviveka. Of these, only five—that attributed to Nāgārjuna and those by Buddhapālita, Bhāvaviveka, Chandrakīrti, and Sthiramati—are presently available.

fallacies [adduced] by Chandrakīrti in his refutation of autonomy, but these were not done.^a

^a Ngag-wang-pal-dan's (*Annotations, dbu ma pa, pha*, 101.4) (1) cites a passage in Khay-drub Ge-leg-pal-sang's *Great Compilation: Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate* in which Kamalashīla defends Bhāvaviveka against a refutation of him by Chandrakīrti and (2) then juxtaposes this to Tsong-kha-pa's claim that Shāntarakṣhita and his student [Kamalashīla] never did such:

On this occasion a little detail is needed as to how these two are not contradictory:
(1) the statement in Khay-drub Ge-leg-pal-sang's *Great Compilation*:

Kamalashīla's *Illumination of the Middle* says:

Moreover, to a certain master's [that is, Bhāvaviveka's] saying, "Ultimately the internal sense-spheres [eye sense, ear sense, and so forth] are not produced from other because of being other" and so forth...someone's [that is, Chandrakīrti's] expressing that [the reason] is indefinite and nonestablished is senseless [literally, unrelated]. With respect to the [non-Buddhist] Forders' calling conventional causes—that are other causes and so forth—only actualities that are actually only othernesses and so forth, the master [Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle* I.2] sets out a repudiation:

The inherent existence of things
Does not exist in conditions and so forth.

and so forth. Therefore, the otherness of their textual system is not established, whereby it is demonstrated that [things] are not produced from other [in that sense].

This clearly explains that "production from other conventionally exists [for Kamalashīla] and that since production from other in accordance with how it is imputed in the textual systems of the Forders and so forth does not exist, production from other does not exist [in that sense]." It is evident that [Kamalashīla] was thinking that "a certain master" is Bhāvaviveka, and that "someone's expressing that [the reason] is indefinite and nonestablished" is Chandrakīrti's expressing in the *Clear Words* fallacies in Bhāvaviveka's syllogism.

and (2) Tsong-kha-pa's *The Essence of Eloquence*:

it also would appear that the master Shāntarakṣhita and his student [Kamalashīla] and so forth should have dispelled the fallacies [adduced] by Chandrakīrti in his refutation of autonomy, but these were not done.

སྐབས་འདིར་སྟོང་ལུན་ལས། ཡང་སྤང་བ་ལས། དེའི་ཕྱིར་སྟོབ་དཔོན་ཁ་ཅིག་གིས། དོན་
དམ་པར་ནང་གི་སྐྱེ་མཚན་གཞན་ལས་མི་སྐྱེ་སྐྱེ། གཞན་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ལ་
སོགས་པ། ཞེས་པ་ནས། ཁ་ཅིག་འདི་ལ་མ་ངེས་པ་དང་མ་གྲུབ་པ་ཉིད་རྗེས་པར་བྱེད་པ་
གང་ཡིན་པ་དེ་འབྲེལ་བ་མེད་པ་ཉིད་ཡིན་ལོ། ། ལུ་སྟེགས་ཅན་རྣམས་རྒྱ་གཞན་ལ་

More bluntly, one might say that the evidence for a difference in the view of emptiness between Chandrakīrti and Bhāvaviveka is so thin that even these great Indian scholars did not notice it. Their lack of response to Chandrakīrti's named attacks on Bhāvaviveka's exposition makes one wonder how seriously these scholars (who in Tibet came to be called Autonomists) took Chandrakīrti's works, though it may be that they deliberately sought to diminish his influence by ignoring him since he came to be in a distinct minority of Proponents of the Middle who challenged the mainstream movement that married Nāgārjuna's Middle Way philosophy with Dignāga's and Dharmakīrti's epistemology and logic.

Nevertheless, it seems clear that during his own time Chandrakīrti was a prominent figure at Nālanda Monastic University where he maintained a debate with Chandragomin, a Proponent of Mind-Only, for seven years, but there is a gap of three centuries after his death in the seventh century when (1) the only follower listed in his lineage is the still untraceable Rig-

སོགས་པའི་ཐ་སྐད་ཀྱི་རྒྱ་དངོས་སུ་གཞན་ཉིད་ལ་སོགས་པའི་དངོས་པོ་དེ་ལྟ་ཡིན་པ་ལོ་
 རྣམ་བཅོམ་པ་དེ་དག་ལ་སློབ་དཔོན་གྱིས། དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་རང་བཞིན་ནི། རྒྱུན་ལ་
 སོགས་པ་ཡོད་མ་ཡིན། ། ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ལ་སོགས་པ་སུན་དབྱུང་བ་བཤད་དེ། དེའི་ཕྱིར་དེའི་
 གཞུང་ལུགས་ཀྱིས་གཞན་ཉིད་མ་གྲུབ་པས་གཞན་ལས་མི་སྐྱེའོ་ཞེས་བསྟན་པར་འགྱུར་
 རོ། ། ཞེས་ཐ་སྐད་དུ་གཞན་སྐྱེ་ཡོད་པ་དང་། ཅུ་སྟོགས་ལ་སོགས་པའི་གཞུང་ལུགས་ཀྱིས་
 བཏགས་པ་ལྟར་གྱི་གཞན་སྐྱེ་མེད་པས་གཞན་ལས་མི་སྐྱེ་བར་བཤད་པ་ཡིན་མོ་ཞེས་
 གསལ་བར་བཤད་ཅིང་། སློབ་དཔོན་ཁ་ཅིག་གིས། ཞེས་པ་ནི་ལེགས་ལྡན་འབྱེད་དང་།
 དེའི་ཕྱིར་ཁ་ཅིག་འདི་ལ་མ་དེས་པ་དང་མ་གྲུབ་པ་ཉིད་རྗེས་བྱེད་པ་གང་ཡིན་པ་
 དེ་ནི། ཞེས་པ་ལྷ་བས་ལེགས་ལྡན་གྱི་རྣམས་སྐྱེར་དེ་ལ་ཚོག་གསལ་དུ་སྐྱོན་བཅོམ་པ་ལ་
 བསམས་པར་མངོན་མོ། ། ཞེས་དང་། ལེགས་བཤད་སྟངས་པོ་ལས། ཞི་བ་འཚོ་དཔོན་སློབ་
 ལ་སོགས་པས་ཀྱང་ལྷ་བས་རང་རྒྱུད་བཀག་པའི་སྐྱོན་སྤོང་མངོན་རྒྱུར་སྣང་ཡང་མ་
 མངོན་དོ། ། ཞེས་གསུངས་པ་གཞིས་མི་འགལ་ཚུལ་ལ་ཞིབ་ཆ་རུང་ཞིག་དགོས་སོ། །

My guess is that since Khay-drub wrote his *Compilation* with Tsong-kha-pa's *The Essence of Eloquence* before him, he merely wanted this contradiction to slip by without emphasis. Of more interest to me is that given Chandrakīrti's intense concentration on Bhāvaviveka's attack against Buddhapālita's refutation of production from self, Kamalashīla did not respond to that. Also, in my translation of Avalokitavratā's commentary on that section in Bhāvaviveka's *Lamp* included in this book, I point out several places where Avalokitavratā's usage of "production-again" (*yang skye ba, punarutpāda*) appears to be in response to Chandrakīrti as well two instances of demonstrating compatible appearance where he appears to be responding to Chandrakīrti.

pay-khu-chug The Greater,^a (2) Chandrakīrti is merely mentioned by only Avalokitavrata among the Proponents of the Middle who came to be called Autonomists, and (3) Chandrakīrti's works are not translated into Tibetan (this occurring not until the eleventh century). Still, the obvious similarity of view between the eighth-century Shāntideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* and Chandrakīrti's works, as is clearly indicated in Tagtshang Shay-rab-rin-chen's^b *Explanation of "Freedom from Extremes through Knowing All Tenets": Ocean of Eloquence*, indicates Chandrakīrti's influence;^c and indeed Chandrakīrti is liberally cited by Prajñākaramati^d (950-1030) in his *Commentary on the Difficult Points of (Shāntideva's) "Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds."*^e Also, Atisha (982-1054) names Chandrakīrti as the most prominent follower of Nāgārjuna in his *Introduction to the Two Truths*].^f

Who realized emptiness?

Nāgārjuna, who was prophesied by the One-Gone-Thus

And saw the noumenal truth;

The student [of Nāgārjuna who realized his thought exactly as it
is] is Chandrakīrti.

Through quintessential instructions transmitted

From him the noumenal truth will be realized.

I conclude that the transmission from Chandrakīrti of which Atisha speaks (though apparently untraceable today) and the prominence of Shāntideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* as well as the fact that Chandrakīrti's

^a Rig-pay-khu-chug The Greater (*rig pa 'i khu phyug che ba*) is listed as one of the previous incarnations of Tsong-kha-pa's student Khay-drub-ge-leg-pal-sang (*mkhas grub dge legs dpal bzang*, 1385-1438) in the latter's *Secret Biography* by Jay-tsun Chö-kyi-gyal-tshan; see H.H. the Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, and Jeffrey Hopkins, *The Kālachakra Tantra: Rite of Initiation for the Stage of Generation* (London: Wisdom Publications, 1985; 2d rev. ed., 1989), 495-496, n. 123.

^b *stag tshang lo tsā ba shes rab rin chen*, born 1405.

^c *grub mtha' kun shes nas mtha' bral grub pa zhes bya ba 'i bstan bcos rnam par bshad pa legs bshad kyi rgya mtsho*. For an excerpt from that text see Jeffrey Hopkins, *Maps of the Profound: Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Buddhist and Non-Buddhist Views on the Nature of Reality* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 2003), 527-575.

^d *shes rab 'byung gnas blo gros*.

^e *byang chub kyi spyod pa la 'jug pa 'i dka' 'grel, bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā*; P5139, vol. 91.

^f *bden gnyis la 'jug pa, satyadvayāvatāra*, stanza 14; P5380, 7b.2-7b.3; Toh. 3902, *dbu ma*, vol. a, 72b.4-72b.5; Tibetan and English in Richard Sherburne, *The Complete Works of Atīśa* (New Delhi: Aditya Prakashan, 2000), 354-355. Brackets are from *Four Interwoven Annotations*, vol. 2, 805.5. See also *Great Treatise*, vol. 3, 353.

works survived over these centuries in the moist heat of India suggests the routes by which his thought survived that period of relative quiet eventually to enter into the religious culture of Tibet during the second dissemination of Buddhism from India in the eleventh century. In Tibet, Chandrakīrti's views on the Middle Way School became of prime importance in dependence upon recommendations from Indian scholars such as Atisha (982-1054) and Jayānanda (c. 1100) as well as Tibetan scholar-translators such as Pa-tshab Nyi-ma-drag (b. 1055).^a

Back to the topic at hand: Since Tsong-kha-pa and his followers hold that Bhāvaviveka did not differentiate between existence and inherent existence, it is no wonder that Bhāvaviveka did not clearly declare that phenomena inherently exist conventionally. According to Tsong-kha-pa's school, for Bhāvaviveka the mere existence of an object means that conventionally the object is established from its own side, established by way of its own character, and inherently exists. Hence, there can only be hints and suggestions in Bhāvaviveka's works that phenomena are established by way of their own character conventionally and are not empty of such establishment.

According to Tsong-kha-pa, there are persuasive reasons in Bhāvaviveka's and Chandrakīrti's writings for coming to the conclusion that they differ with respect to defining emptiness, specifically with respect to identifying the misconceived status of phenomena of which they are empty. In order to appreciate the subtlety of Tsong-kha-pa's exegesis, it is helpful first to notice how thin, subtle, or perhaps even flimsy the evidence is; only then can we see Tsong-kha-pa's skills at work.

In *The Essence of Eloquence*, Tsong-kha-pa proceeds with great care to lay out evidence for differing views of emptiness in the Autonomy and Consequence Schools. First he notes that Chandrakīrti himself sees his explanation to be distinctive, not shared with others who claim to be of the Middle Way School. Immediately following the earlier citation above, Tsong-kha-pa says:^b

^a *spa/pa tshab nyi ma grags*. See Karen Lang, "Spa-tshab Nyi ma grags and the Introduction of Prāsaṅgika Proponent of the Middle into Tibet," in *Reflections on Tibetan Culture: Essays in Memory of Turrell V. Wylie*, ed. Lawrence Epstein & Richard F. Sherburne (Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 1990).

^b See also Thurman, *Tsong Khapa's Speech of Gold*, 288-289. The Tibetan:
 ཟླ་བ་གྲགས་པས་ནི་སངས་རྒྱུས་བརྒྱུངས་གྲིས་འཕགས་པའི་དགོངས་པ་ཇི་ལྟ་བུ་བཞིན་
 དུ་བཀའ་པས་དེ་དང་རང་གི་དོན་དམ་པ་དང་ཀུན་རྫོབ་པའི་འཇོག་ཚུལ་ལྟར་པར་
 མེད་པར་བཞེད་ལ། རང་གི་ལྷགས་ནི་དབྱ་མ་པ་གཞན་གྲིས་བཀའ་པ་དང་མུན་མོང་མ་

[However] Chandrakīrti asserts that since Buddhapālita commented on the thought of the Superior [Nāgārjuna] just as it is, there is no difference between that [commentary by Buddhapālita] and his own mode of positing the ultimate and veilings, and [Chandrakīrti] describes his own system as not shared with the commentaries [on Nāgārjuna's thought]^a by the other Proponents of the Middle. His *Autocommentary on the "Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle'"* says:^b

ཡིན་པར་བཤད་དེ། འཇུག་འགྲེལ་ལས། ཇི་ལྟར་དབྱེ་མའི་བསྟན་བཅོས་མ་གཏོགས་
 པར་བསྟན་བཅོས་གཞན་ལས་སྣང་པ་ཉིད་ཅེས་བྱ་བའི་ཚོས་འདི་ཕྱིན་ཅི་མ་ལོག་པར་
 མི་བརྗོད་པ་དེ་བཞིན་དུ། ཁོ་བོ་ཅག་གིས་འདིར་ལྷགས་གང་ཞིག་བརྒྱལ་ལན་དང་
 བཅས་པར་བསྟན་པའི་ལྷགས་འདི་ནས་འབྱུང་བ་དེ་ཡང་སྟོན་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ཚོས་ལྟར་
 བསྟན་བཅོས་གཞན་ན་མེད་དོ་ཞེས་མཁས་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་ངེས་པར་མཛད་དུ་གསོལ་
 ལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར་ཁ་ཅིག་གིས་མདོ་ལྡེ་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་ལྷགས་དོན་དམ་པར་སྤྲོས་པ་དེ་ཉིད་
 དབྱེ་མ་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་ཀུན་རྫོབ་དུ་འདོད་དོ་ཞེས་སྤྲོས་པ་གང་ཡིན་པ་དེ་ནི་དབྱེ་མའི་
 བསྟན་བཅོས་ཀྱི་དེ་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་མངོན་པར་མི་ཤེས་པ་ཁོ་ནས་སྤྲོས་པ་ཡིན་ལོ་ཞེས་ཤེས་
 པར་བྱའོ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་ཤིང་བྱེ་བྲག་དུ་སྤྲོ་བའི་ལྷགས་ལ་ཡང་དེ་ལྟར་གསུངས་པའི་
 མཐར་འདི་ལྟར་འཇིག་རྟེན་ལས་འདས་པའི་ཚོས་ནི་འཇིག་རྟེན་པའི་ཚོས་དང་
 མཚུངས་པར་མི་རིགས་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། ལྷགས་འདི་ནི་སྤུང་མོང་མ་ཡིན་པའོ་ཞེས་མཁས་
 པ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་ངེས་པར་བྱའོ་ཞེས་གསུངས་སོ། །

^a Ta-drin-rab-tan's *Annotations*, 270.5.

^b *dbu ma la 'jug pa, madhyamakāvatāra*; Toh 3862, *sde dge, dbu ma*, vol. 'a, 347a.3-347a.6; Louis de la Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra par Candrakīrti*, Bibliotheca Buddhica, 9 (Osnabrück, Germany: Biblio Verlag, 1970), 406.9-406.18, commenting on stanzas XIII.1-2. Since Chandrakīrti often refers to Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle* (*dbu ma'i bstan bcos, madhyamakaśāstra*) merely by the appellation *madhyamaka*, the *madhyamaka* of "*madhyamakāvatāra*" is held to refer to a text propounding the middle, specifically Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle*. My translation of *avatāra* (*jug pa*) as "supplement" is controversial; others use "introduction" or "entrance," both of which are attested common translations in such a context. My rendering is based on the explanation by Tsongkha-pa that Chandrakīrti was filling in holes in Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle*; see Tsongkha-pa, Kensur Lekden, and Jeffrey Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism* (London: Rider, 1980; reprint, Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1980), 96-99. Among the many meanings of the Tibetan term for *avatāra*, *jug pa* can mean "to affix" or "to add on." To summarize the oral teachings of the late Ngag-wang-leg-dan:

Avatāra means "addition" in the sense that Chandrakīrti's text is a supplement historically necessary so as to clarify the meaning of Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the*

May scholars ascertain that just as except for Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle*^a this doctrine called "emptiness" is not expressed nonerroneously in other treatises, so the system appearing in this [treatise]^b by me—set out together with objections and answers to any [other]^c system—does not exist, in terms of the doctrine of emptiness, in other treatises. Therefore, it should be understood that a certain [scholar's, that is, Jñānagarbha's]^d propounding that just what are propounded ultimately in the system of

Middle. He wanted to make clear that the *Treatise* should not be explained according to the Mind-Only system or according to the Middle Way Autonomy School (*dbu ma rang rgyud pa, svatantrikamādhyaṃika*), the founding of which is attributed to Bhāvaviveka. During Nāgārjuna's lifetime, Bhāvaviveka had not written his commentary on the *Treatise*, nor had he founded his system; therefore, it was necessary later to supplement Nāgārjuna's text to show why it should not be explained in such a way. Moreover, it is said that Chandrakīrti sought to show that a follower of Nāgārjuna should ascend the ten grounds by practicing the vast paths necessary to do so. This is because some take the Middle Way perspective to be nihilistic. They see it as a means of refuting the general existence of phenomena rather than just their inherent existence and conclude that it is not necessary to engage in practices such as the cultivation of compassion. Therefore, in order to show that it is important to engage in three central practices—compassion, non-dual understanding, and the altruistic mind of enlightenment—and to ascend the ten Bodhisattva grounds, Chandrakīrti wrote this supplementary text in reliance on Nāgārjuna's *Precious Garland*.

See Jeffrey Hopkins, *Buddhist Advice for Living and Liberation: Nāgārjuna's Precious Garland* (Ithaca, New York: Snow Lion, 1998).

This Tibetanized reading of 'jug pa as "supplement" accords with the Tibetan term *rtags 'jug* (*lingāvaṃtāra*) [Sarat Chandra Das, *A Tibetan-English Dictionary* (Calcutta: 1902; reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1969, 1970; compact reprint, Kyoto, Japan: Rinsen Book Company, 1981), 535] "the affixing of gender," referring to the usage of letters—identified by gender in Tibetan grammar—in various positions in a syllable. The rendering as "supplement" also perhaps accords with the fifth meaning given in Vaman Shivaram Apte, *Sanskrit-English Dictionary* (Poona, India: Prasad Prakashan, 1957), 163, "Any new appearance, growth, rise," though it seems that not much of a case can be made from the Sanskrit. Of course, such a supplement also serves as an introduction, or means of entry, to Nāgārjuna's *Treatise*.

^a *Treatise on the Middle* and *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called "Wisdom"* are different names for the same book.

^b Ta-drin-rab-tan's *Annotations*, 271.1.

^c Ibid.

^d Tsong-kha-pa cites Jñānagarbha in *The Essence of Eloquence* below.

the Sūtra School^a are asserted conventionally by the Proponents of the Middle is a proposition only by one who does not know the suchness of Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle*.

At the end of also saying such with respect to the system of Great Exposition School,^b [Chandrakīrti] says:

This is because a supramundane doctrine is not fit to be similar to a mundane doctrine; scholars should ascertain “This system is uncommon.”

Tsong-kha-pa's citation of these passages indicates that he takes seriously Chandrakīrti's claim of uniqueness in terms of both the ultimate and the conventional.

As the fundamental point of divergence between Chandrakīrti and Buddhapālita on the one hand and other Middle Way School masters such as Bhāvaviveka on the other, Tsong-kha-pa posits Chandrakīrti's not asserting that phenomena are conventionally established by way of their own character. He continues:^c

The driving rationale behind [Chandrakīrti] positing—by reason of his own system's not being shared with other Proponents of the Middle—that one who asserts that what are propounded ultimately by the two Proponents of [Truly Existent External] Objects [that is, the Great Exposition School and the Sūtra School] are propounded conventionally by the Proponents of the Middle does not know the Middle Way suchness, is that in his own system even conventionally phenomena that are established by way of their own character are not asserted, whereas those [Proponents of (Truly Established) Things]^d solely posit [all phenomena] in its

^a *mdo sde pa, sautrāntika.*

^b *bye brag smra ba, vaibhāṣika.* For the passage, see La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra*, 407.1; Toh 3862, *sde dge, dbu ma*, vol. 'a, 347a.6-347a.7.

^c See also Thurman, *Tsong Khapa's Speech of Gold*, 289. The Tibetan:

རང་གི་ལུགས་དབུ་མ་པ་གཞན་དང་ཐུན་མོང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཀྱིས་དོན་སྣ་གཞིས་ཀྱིས་དོན་དམ་པར་སྤྲོས་པ་རྣམས་དབུ་མ་པའི་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཏུ་འདོད་པས་དབུ་མའི་དེ་ལོ་ན་ཉིད་མི་ཤས་པར་འཇོག་པའི་རྒྱ་མཚན་ནི་རང་གི་ལུགས་ལ་ཐ་སྣང་ཏུ་ཡང་རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་གྲུབ་པའི་ཚོས་མི་འདོད་ལ་དེ་དག་ནི་དེའི་སྣང་ནས་འཇོག་པ་ཤ་སྟག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ།

^d This and the next two bracketed additions are from Ta-drin-rab-tan's *Annotations*,

context [that is to say, establishment of objects by way of their own character].

It is now necessary for Tsong-kha-pa to prove that Bhāvaviveka and so forth do indeed assert that phenomena conventionally are established by way of their own character.^a He recognizes that this is not an easy task since, as he himself points out, Chandrakīrti and Bhāvaviveka use similar terminology with respect to both what is negated in emptiness and what remains to exist conventionally.

Thus, the differentiation of their views of emptiness cannot be made merely by way of the vocabulary they use when they speak of the conventional existence of phenomena or name the object of negation in the view of emptiness. In this vein, in the section on the Autonomy School in *The Essence of Eloquence* Tsong-kha-pa says:^b

In Consequentialist texts, even existing conventionally is frequently described as a nature (*ngo bo nyid, svabhāvātā*) of that [object], inherent nature (*rang bzhin, svabhāva*), its own character (*rang gi mtshan nyid, svalakṣaṇa*), and so forth, and also in the texts of this master [Bhāvaviveka]^c there are many cases of [his speaking of an object as being] not established by way of its own nature (*rang gi ngo bo nyid kyis ma grub pa*), not produced by way of [its own] nature (*ngo bo nyid kyis ma skyes pa*), not being substantially established (*rdzas su ma grub pa*), and so forth; therefore, it appears to be difficult to differentiate them.

Tsong-kha-pa himself holds that it is difficult, even from the viewpoint of how they use terminology, to determine that one system asserts inherent existence conventionally and that the other one does not.

Given that there is no clear-cut difference in the terminology of what is negated and of the status of what exists, the determination of a difference between Bhāvaviveka (and important followers such as Jñānagarbha,

272.6.

^a *rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa, svalakṣaṇasiddha.*

^b See also Thurman, *Tsong Khapa's Speech of Gold*, 267. The Tibetan:

མ་སྐྱེད་དུ་ཡོད་པ་ལ་ཡང་དེའི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་དང་རང་བཞིན་དང་དེའི་རང་གིས་མཚན་
 ཉིད་སོགས་སུ་ཐལ་འགྱུར་བའི་གཞུང་ནས་བཤད་པ་ཡང་མང་ལ་རང་གི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་
 མ་གྲུབ་པ་དང་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་མ་སྐྱེས་པ་དང་རྗེས་སུ་མ་གྲུབ་པ་ལ་སོགས་པ་སྟོབ་
 དཔོན་འདི་ཡི་གཞུང་ནང་མང་བས་དབྱེ་དཀའ་བར་

^c Ta-drin-rab-tan's *Annotations*, 209.1.

Shāntarakṣhita, and Kamalashīla), and Chandrakīrti on these topics will have to be made by detailed contextual analysis. The hardening of the terminology such that in Ge-lug-pa texts—as in that by Kōn-chog-jig-may-wang-po cited at the beginning of this book—it is said that the Autonomy School asserts inherent existence conventionally whereas the Consequence School does not is built, therefore, not on finding explicit exclusive use of such terminology in those ways in Indian texts but on textual, philosophical analysis of the meanings and implications of statements, which were communicated in Tibet through standard sets of terminology that never were used that way in India.

Among the evidence that Tsong-kha-pa uses to ferret out Bhāvaviveka's position on what is refuted in the view of emptiness are:

1. Bhāvaviveka's calling for a self-powered, or autonomous, inference (*rang dbang du rjes su dpag pa, svatantra-anumāna*) in his *Lamp for (Nāgārjuna's) "Wisdom"*^a when commenting on the beginning of chapter thirteen of Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle* and mainly Chandrakīrti's refutation—in the first chapter of his *Clear Words*^b—of Bhāvaviveka's position on compatibly appearing subjects and hence autonomous inferences as evinced in the first chapter of the *Lamp* when Bhāvaviveka attacks Buddhapālita's commentary on Nāgārjuna's refutation of production from self. Autonomous inferences are taken as meaning syllogisms in which the subject, predicate, reason, example, and so forth are established by way of their own character. Consequentialists do not accept that the subject, reason, example, and so forth, of a syllogism appear similarly to a Proponent of the Middle and a non-Proponent of the Middle because, for Consequentialists, a valid cognition that seems to an opponent to establish the subject and so forth is nonexistent in the way that the opponent asserts it because a non-Proponent of the Middle views a valid cognition as certifying that the phenomenon is inherently existent, but for a Consequentialist nothing inherently exists. In this way, there can be no compatible establishment.
2. Bhāvaviveka's refutation—in the twenty-fifth chapter of his *Lamp for*

^a *dbu ma rtsa ba'i 'grel pa shes rab sgron ma, prajñāpradīpamūlamadhyamakavṛtti*, P5253, vol. 95. For an English translation of chapters 18, 24, and 25, see David Eckel, "A Question of Nihilism: Bhāvaviveka's Response to the Fundamental Problems of Proponent of the Middle Philosophy," unpublished dissertation (Harvard University, 1980).

^b *dbu ma rtsa ba'i 'grel pa tshig gsal ba, mūlamadhyamakavṛttiprasannapadā*, P5260, vol. 98.

(Nāgārjuna's) "Wisdom," *Commentary on the "Treatise on the Middle"*—of the Mind Only School's presentation of character-non-nature with regard to imputational natures,^a in which he states that if imputational natures are said to be character-non-natures, this would involve a deprecation of imputational natures. Here, "character-nature" is taken as meaning establishment by way of their own character; thus Bhāvaviveka seems to be indicating that, for him, all phenomena—even existent imputational natures—are established by way of their own character.

3. Bhāvaviveka's statement in his *Blaze of Reasoning*^b that it need not be proven to him that consciousness (taken as meaning the mental consciousness) is the self, since such is already established for him.^c His stance suggests that something—namely, consciousness—that is the person can be found when sought among the bases of designation of the person, contrary to Chandrakīrti's position that when analyzed, nothing that is that phenomenon can be found either among or separate from its bases of designation.
4. Chandrakīrti's refutation—in the sixth chapter of his *Autocommentary on the "Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle'"*—of Bhāvaviveka's supposed assertion of production from other, in which he indicates that when in Bhāvaviveka's system production is sought in the four ways, it must be found as one of those four conventionally, that is, conventionally established production from other.
5. Chandrakīrti's refutation—in the first chapter of his *Clear Words*—of Bhāvaviveka's mode of positing conventionalities, the topics here being a substratum and its attributes and a definiendum and its definition.

In Ge-lug-pa scholastic literature the first topic, the controversy about compatibly appearing subjects,^d is treated in great detail—fascinating to find how thin the evidence is but more so to be drawn more deeply into the topics in which it is embedded, the meaning of emptiness and thus the middle that is the proper determination of the status of phenomena. In two

^a *kun btags, parikalpita.*

^b *Blaze of Reasoning, Commentary on the "Heart of the Middle" (dbu ma 'i snying po 'i 'grel pa rtoḡ ge 'bar ba, madhyamakahrdayavṛttitarakajāvlā, P5255, vol. 96).* For an English translation of chapter III. 1-136, see Shōtarō Iida, *Reason and Emptiness* (Tokyo: Hokuseido Press, 1980).

^c This is evidence cited by Jam-yang-shay-pa; see Jeffrey Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness* (London: Wisdom, 1983; rev. ed., Boston, Ma.: Wisdom, 1996), 695-696, and Hopkins, *Maps of the Profound*, 890-891.

^d *chos can mthun snang ba.*

books I treat this issue extensively. The present volume treats Buddhapālita's commentary and Bhāvaviveka's criticism of it along with Avalokitavrata's extensive commentary detailing every move in it; the second volume treats Chandrakīrti's defense of Buddhapālita's commentary.

The next background chapter introduces Nāgārjuna's stanza, followed by a short chapter on the Sāṃkhya system that asserts production from self. These are followed by an annotated translation of Jam-yang-shaypa's textbook probing Buddhapālita's commentary and Bhāvaviveka's response to it and improvement on it. At the end are translations of Buddhapālita's, Bhāvaviveka's, and Avalokitavrata's texts.

2. The Issue

Nāgārjuna at the beginning of his renowned *Fundamental Stanzas on the Middle Called "Wisdom"*^a makes an expression of worship to the Buddha who taught dependent-arising as qualified by eight negations.^b

Homage to the perfect Buddha,
The best of propounders,
Who taught that what dependently arises
Has no cessation, no production,
No annihilation, no permanence,
No coming, no going,
No difference, no sameness,
Is free from proliferations, and at peace.

Cessation, production, annihilation, permanence, coming, going, difference, and sameness do not exist in the face of meditative equipoise realizing emptiness. (In Chinese Buddhism these eight negations are called *ba bu*—the Eight No's.) Using Middle Way reasonings to search for objects, they are not found; thus in meditative equipoise, all dependent-arising are seen as without production and so forth, and this shows that in general they lack inherently existent production and so forth.

After the expression of worship, Nāgārjuna presents the first of twenty-seven chapters titled "Analysis of Conditions."^c Although it appears right after the expression of worship, which first mentioned no cessation, Nāgārjuna rather than immediately speaking about no cessation, chooses to show that there is no production because as Avalokitavrata (below, 175) explains:

Earlier [when discussing the order of the eight terms in Nāgārjuna's expression of worship, Bhāvaviveka] explained that there is no fault in [Nāgārjuna's] teaching "no cessation, no production" because cyclic existence has no beginning and because cessation does not depend on the stage of production and because the topics are being examined,^d but here in teaching *the meaning* of those the

^a *mūlamadhyamakakārikāḥ*.

^b Introductory stanzas; Toh 3824, *sde dge, dbu ma*, vol. *tsa*, 1b.2-1b.3; Sanskrit in La Vallée Poussin, *Prasannapadā*, 11.13: *anirodhamanutpādamanucchedamaśāśvataṃ / anekārthamanānārthamanāgamamanirgamaṃ // yaḥ pratīyasanutpādaṃ prapañcōpaśamaṃ śivaṃ / deśayāmāsa sambuddhastam vande vadatām varaṃ //*.

^c *rkyen btag pa, pratyayapariksā*.

^d *don btag pa yin pa 'i phyir*, which literally is "meanings are being examined" but

cause of all of them—that is to say, the cause of cessation and so forth—is production since:

if something has been produced, it will cease, but if it is not produced, it will not cease;

the definition of the cutting of the continuum of something that has been produced is annihilation, but if it is not produced, it will not be annihilated;

due to the nondestruction of something that has been produced, it is permanent, but if it is not produced, it will not become permanent;

due to the coming of something produced from another place, it comes,^a but if it is not produced, it does not come;

due to the going of something produced to another place, it goes, but if it is not produced, it does not go;

something produced is a different character, but if it is not produced, it does not become a different object;

because something produced has the same character, it is the same object, but if it is not produced, it will not become the same object;

and hence:

because when the cause is stopped, its effects also do not arise, and

because it being the case that the world is intensely attached mostly to production and manifestly adheres to production, this treatise is aimed at abandoning intense attachment and manifest adherence, and

because when intense attachment and manifest adherence have been abandoned, nirvāṇa is attained,

here the master [Nāgārjuna] took up the task of initially teaching no production.

Nāgārjuna begins the first chapter with :

Not from self, not from others,

likely means “the topics are being listed” or “the topics are being examined” in contrast to “teaching *the meaning* of those” just below. These latter two reasons quote Bhāvaviveka (Golden Reprint, vol. 107, 128.4).

^a In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 187.2) read *yin* for *ma yin* in accordance with the Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur* (60b.2).

Not from both, not causelessly
 Do any things
 Ever arise anywhere.

*na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyāṃ nāpyahetutaḥ/
 utpannā jātu vidyante bhāvāḥ kvacana kecana//*

*bdag las ma yin gzhan las min/
 gnyis las ma yin rgyu med min/
 dngos po gang dag gang na yang/
 skye ba nam yang yod ma yin//*

Uncharacteristically, Nāgārjuna says nothing more about the first leg of this reasoning, that things are not produced from self. Instead of explaining why things are not produced from self, he immediately proceeds to an offshoot of the reasoning proving that things are not produced from other by examining the four types of conditions. His commentators, however, explain the refutation of production from self in varying detail, and the principal controversy engendering the split between the Autonomy School and the Consequence School revolves around how they frame and explain this refutation.

The stanza contains the famous vajra nodes, in Tibetan *dor-je-seg-ma* (*rdo rje gzegs ma*). *Seg-ma* means “node,” “piece,” “fragment,” or “facet.” *Dor-je* is the Tibetan for “vajra” and also means “diamond” and thus “unbreakable.” I am translating it here not as diamond pieces, chunks, fragments, slivers, or facets as I have elsewhere, but as vajra nodes, *vajra* meaning scepter—specifically referring to a myth about Indra’s striking down mountains with a diamond scepter.

A former abbot of the Tantric College of Lower Lhasa, Ngag-wang-leg-dan,^a said that they are called diamond nodes because a piece of a diamond has the strength of an entire diamond; thus the four reasonings refute inherent existence both together and individually. However, if one of them alone is sufficient, why have all four? Also, is the first reasoning sufficient? It is not because to refute inherent existence it does not suffice merely to refute production from self; otherwise, proponents of Buddhist schools other than the Consequence School absurdly would realize the absence of inherent existence since the lower Buddhist schools are capable of refuting production from self. In any case, the name taken this way means that these reasonings are powerful and can cut through the net of conceptions believing in inherent existence.

The four reasonings are that things are produced “not from self, not

^a *ngag dbang legs ldan, mkhan zur; 1900-1971.*

from other, not from both, and not without cause.” If things are produced, they are produced either from causes or not from causes; thus, the first three nodes are in the category of “from causes,” and the fourth is the category of “not from causes.”

Tsong-kha-pa^a explains in his *Explanation of (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle”*: *Ocean of Reasoning*^b that these four theses are four reasons proving an implicit thesis that things are not inherently produced. Formulated this way, the reasoning reads:

Things are not inherently produced because they are not ever produced anywhere from self, not ever produced anywhere from other, not ever produced anywhere from both, and are not ever produced anywhere causelessly.^c

When Nāgārjuna says that things are **never** produced **anywhere** from self, other, and both, or causelessly, “ever” (*nam yang, jātu*) means “at any time,” and “anywhere” (*gang na yang, kvacana*) means “at any place.” These two qualifications eliminate the qualm that things might simply not be produced in some season but are in another season or not be produced in some place but are produced in another place. The qualifications dramatically eliminate all possibilities. It is said that in meditation one needs a consciousness that will eliminate inherently existent production in absolutely all circumstances.

May I make a personal comment: Despite the fact that this particular meditation is prevalent in Indian literature, I must admit that for a long time it did not work well for me. The sevenfold reasoning worked better, for in that reasoning one is searching for the actual entity of the object and not finding it, whereas searching for a thing’s causes and not finding them did not seem to affect the thing itself (admittedly my own shortcoming). In time, the sevenfold reasoning weakened for me, and so I tried reflecting on this reasoning. Within whatever understanding I had from the viewpoint of the sevenfold reasoning as background, I concentrated on this one—“not produced from self, other, both, or neither” with its sub-reasons—and it as if capped it off and made the sevenfold reasoning stronger;

^a *tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa*; 1357-1419.

^b *dbu ma rtsa ba’i tshig le’ur byas pa shes rab ces bya ba’i rnam bshad rigs pa’i rgya mtsho / rtsa shes tik chen*; Gomang Taipei reprint, 34.16.

^c The Tibetan for this syllogism is:

angos po chos can (rang bzhin gyis) skye ba med de/ bdag las gang na yang skye ba nam yang yod pa ma yin pa dang/ gzhan las gang na yang skye ba nam yang yod pa ma yin pa dang/ gnyis las gang na yang skye ba nam yang yod pa ma yin pa dang/ rgyu med gang na yang skye ba nam yang yod pa ma yin pa’i phyir.

it brought out another potency because the reasoning suddenly had relevance to the status of the entity of the object.

For me, “never” and “anywhere” enhanced the reasoning because they made sure that it is extended to all possibilities. Through the sevenfold reasoning, I was making some progress on the actual entity of the object but not making so much progress on the production of a compounded phenomenon, but I had made enough progress with respect to its entity that, when looking for its production, I discovered that this is a **further** reason why the object itself cannot be found under analysis. What these four diamond nodes are proving, in the end, is that the object cannot be found; it is an examination of compounded phenomena as effects, thereby requiring inquiry into their production, and if their production cannot be found under analysis, compounded phenomena do not inherently exist.

Back to the topic: When Nāgārjuna states that things are never produced *anywhere* from self, other, and so forth, “anywhere” also means “through the force of any system of tenets.” Tsong-kha-pa^a points out that Nāgārjuna is not saying, for example, that “things are not produced in the system of the Proponents-of-True-Existence,” because in the system of the Proponents-of-True-Existence things **are** produced from other.

The Sanskrit, as above, is translated as:

Not from self, not from others,
Not from both, not causelessly
Are any things
Ever produced anywhere.

*na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyāṃ nāpyahetutaḥ
utpannā jātu vidyante bhāvāḥ kvacana kecana*

These negatives that precede the four possibilities—“**not** from self, **not** from other, **not** from both, **not** causelessly”—connect to the verb of existence *vidyante*, which is translated as the verb “are” above; the entire stanza is one unit. The Tibetan, however, has an additional, fifth negative: after “not from self, not from other, not from both, and not causelessly” there is a negative with the verb of existence (*yod ma yin*) and thus should be translated as:

Not from self, not from others,
Not from both, not causelessly—
Whatsoever things are
Never produced anywhere.

^a Gomang Taipei reprint, 34.4.

*bdag las ma yin gzhan las min
gnyis las ma yin rgyu med min
dngos po gang dag gang na yang
skye ba nam yang yod ma yin*

Because the Tibetan has this fifth negative, some have felt that the first two lines, “not from self” and so forth, are the reason clause and the thesis is “things are not ever produced anywhere.” Taken this way, the stanza reads:

Whatsoever things are not ever produced anywhere because of **not** [being produced] from self, **not** [being produced] from other, **not** [being produced] from both, and **not** [being produced] causelessly.

This reading is shown to be wrong based on Chandrakīrti’s commentary,^a where the entire stanza is taken as a single unit, albeit using only one negative. He illustrates this through putting together the first of the four theses as:

Not from self are whatsoever things ever produced anywhere.^b
naiva svata utpannā jātu vidyante bhāvāḥ kvacana kecana

Chandrakīrti adds that the other three theses should be put together this way.

However, Tsong-kha-pa^c cites and rejects a Tibetan translation that puts the last two lines first and does not employ a fifth negative:

*dngos po gang dag gang na yang
skye ba nam yang yod pa lta^d
bdag las ma yin gzhan las min
gnyis las ma yin rgyu med min*

He prefers the additional final negative in reliance on Bhāvaviveka’s *Lamp*

^a Taipei reprint, 10.2.

^b The syntax of the Tibetan translation of this sentence (*bdag las dngos po gang dag gang na yang skye ba nam yang yod ma yin*) puts the negative clearly with the verb and should be translated as, “Whatsoever things are not ever produced anywhere from self.”

^c Gomang Taipei reprint, 34.6.

^d I can only guess that the stanza rendered this way should be translated as:

Consider whether any things are
Ever produced anywhere:
Not from self, not from others,
Not from both, not causelessly.

for (*Nāgārjuna*'s) “*Wisdom*”^a which, in commenting on “not from self,” holds that after declaring, “Not from self,” the second part answers the question, “What is it that is not from self?” The reply is:

Whatsoever things are
Never produced anywhere.

In answering the question, the additional negative is required. *Bhāvaviveka* adds that the other three theses should be put together this way. *Tsong-kha-pa* avers that the earlier and later negatives are clear also in the Sanskrit edition,^b but, as cited above, a fifth negative does not appear in the *Poussin* edition of the Sanskrit.

In any case, *Chandrakīrti* and *Bhāvaviveka* agree that these four theses are nonaffirming negatives (*med dgag, prasajya-pratiṣedha*); they do not affirm anything positive in place of what they negate, not even a negative that suggests something positive such as the corpulent *Devadatta*'s not eating during the day, which suggests that he eats at night. The controversy between *Buddhapālita*, *Bhāvaviveka*, and *Chandrakīrti* on how production from self is refuted is the locus classicus for the Middle Way School discussion about nonaffirming negatives and affirming negatives (*ma yin dgag, paryudāsa-pratiṣedha*), and the locus classicus for our knowing that in the Middle Way School these theses are just nonaffirming negatives. This does not mean that any and all Middle Way reasonings, such as “because of being a dependent-arising” are nonaffirming negatives, but these four (not from self and so forth) and the sevenfold reasoning as well as the other negative reasonings are all nonaffirming negatives.

Tsong-ka-pa's *The Essence of Eloquence* provides a description of the types of negative phenomena:^c

^a Golden reprint, vol. 107, 130.4.

^b *rgya dpe*.

^c The Tibetan:

དེ་ལ་དགག་པ་ནི་སྐྱེས་བཞེད་པ་ན་ཚིག་གིས་ཟེན་པར་དགག་བྱ་བཅད་པའམ་དེའི་
རྣམ་པ་སློལ་འཆར་བ་ན་དགག་བྱ་བཀག་པའི་རྣམ་པ་ཅན་དུ་དངོས་སུ་ཤར་ནས་
རྟོགས་པར་བྱ་བ་ཞིག་སྟེ། དང་པོ་ནི་བདག་མེད་ལྟ་བུའོ། །གཉིས་པ་ནི། ཚིག་ཉིད་ལྟ་བུ་
སྟེ་འདི་ལ་ཚིག་གིས་ཟེན་པར་དགག་བྱ་བཅད་པ་མེད་ཀྱང་དེའི་དོན་འཆར་བ་ན་སློབ་
པ་བཅད་པའི་རྣམ་པ་ཅན་དུ་འཆར་བ་ཡིད་དོ། །དེ་ལྟར་དགག་བྱ་དངོས་སུ་བཅད་
པས་རྟོགས་པར་བྱ་བའི་དོན་དེ་ལ་གཉིས་ལས་མ་ཡིན་དགག་ནི་དགག་བྱ་དངོས་སུ་
བཅད་ནས་ཚིག་གཞན་འཕེན་པ་སྟེ། རྟོག་གི་འབར་བ་ལས། མ་ཡིན་པར་དགག་པ་ནི་

དངོས་པོའི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་དགག་པས་དེ་དང་འདྲ་བ་དེ་ལས་གཞན་པའི་དངོས་པོའི་ངོ་བོ་
 ཉིད་སྐྱབ་པར་བྱེད་པ་སྟེ། དཔེར་ན་འདི་བྲམ་ཟེ་མ་ཡིན་ལོ་ཞེས་དགག་པས་བྲམ་ཟེ་
 འདྲ་བ་དེ་ལས་གཞན་པ་བྲམ་ཟེ་མ་ཡིན་པ་དཀའ་ལྷན་དང་ཐོས་པ་ལ་སོགས་པས་
 དམན་པའི་དམངས་རིགས་ཡིན་པར་སྐྱབ་པ་ལྟ་བུའོ་ཞེས་སོ། །མེད་དགག་ནི་དགག་བྱ་
 དངོས་སུ་བཅད་ནས་ཚོས་གཞན་མི་འཕེན་པ་སྟེ། ཉོག་གི་འབར་བ་ལས། མེད་པར་
 དགག་པ་ནི་དངོས་པོའི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་ཚམ་ཞིག་འགོག་པར་ཟད་ཀྱི་དེ་དང་འདྲ་བ་དེ་མ་
 ཡིན་པ་གཞན་གྱི་དངོས་པོ་སྐྱབ་པར་མི་བྱེད་པ་སྟེ། དཔེར་ན་བྲམ་ཟེས་ཆང་བཏུང་བར་
 མི་བྱའོ། །ཞེས་བྱ་བ་དེ་ཚམ་ཞིག་འགོག་པར་ཟད་ཀྱི་དེ་ལས་གཞན་པའི་བཏུང་བ་
 བཏུང་ངོ་ཞེའམ་མི་བཏུང་ངོ་ཞེས་མི་བརྗོད་པ་ལྟ་བུའོ་ཞེས་སོ། །དེ་ལ་སྐྱབ་མི་སྐྱབ་ནི་
 འཕེན་མི་འཕེན་དང་དོན་གཅིག་ལ་དེ་ལས་གཞན་པ་ནི་དགག་བྱ་བཀག་ཚམ་མིན་
 པའོ། །མ་ཡིན་ཞེས་པ་དང་མེད་ཅེས་པའི་ཚིག་གིས་བཀག་པ་ནི་དེ་གཉིས་ཀྱི་ལྷན་པར་
 མིན་ཏེ། བདག་ལས་མ་ཡིན་ཞེས་བཀག་པ་མེད་དགག་ཏུ་ལྷགས་ལྡན་དང་ཟླ་བ་གཉིས་
 ཀས་བཤད་པའི་ཕྱིར་དང་ཚེ་དཔག་མེད་ཅེས་པ་མ་ཡིན་དགག་ཏུ་བྱ་བའོ་ཞེས་པའི་ཕྱིར་
 རོ། །དེས་ན་དགག་པ་ལ་ཚོས་ཀྱང་ཀྱང་རང་མ་ཡིན་བཀག་པས་དངོས་པོ་ལ་དགག་བྱ་
 བཅད་པས་མི་ཚོག་གི་རང་བརྗོད་པའི་སྐྱས་བཅད་པ་དང་རང་རྟོགས་པའི་སྐོ་ལ་
 དངོས་སུ་དགག་བྱ་བཅད་པའི་རྣམ་པ་ཅན་ཏུ་འཆར་བ་གང་ཅུང་དགོས་སོ། །ལ་ཅིག་
 བདག་མེད་ལྟ་བུ་མེད་དགག་ཡིན་གྱི་གང་ཟག་ལ་བདག་མེད་ཅེས་པ་ལྟ་བུ་གཞི་སྐྱབ་པ་
 དང་ཚོགས་ན་མེད་དགག་མིན་ཞེས་འདོད་ལ་གཞན་དགག་གཞི་དང་ཚོགས་ན་ཚོས་
 གཞན་འཕངས་པས་མེད་དགག་མིན་ཞེས་སྐྱབ་པ་ནི་མི་རིགས་ཏེ། དགག་པ་གཉིས་ཀྱི་
 ལྷན་པར་ནི་ལྡར་བཤད་པ་ལོ་ན་བཞིན་གཞུང་གཞན་ལས་ཀྱང་འབྱུང་ལ་དེའི་ཚེ་བྲམ་
 ཟེས་ཆང་མི་བཏུང་ངོ་ཞེས་པ་ལྟ་བུ་ལ་གཞི་སྐྱབ་པ་དང་ཚོགས་ཀྱང་མེད་དགག་གི་
 མཚན་ཉིད་གནས་པའི་ཕྱིར་དང་། བྲམ་ཟེ་ལྟ་བུ་དེ་དགག་བྱ་བཅད་ནས་ཚོས་གཞན་
 འཕེན་མི་འཕེན་ཅི་བའི་གཞི་ཡིན་གྱི་འཕངས་པའི་ཚོས་གཞན་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །
 དེས་ན་ཚོས་གཞན་འཕངས་ཚུལ་ལ་ཤུགས་དང་དངོས་དང་དེ་གཉིས་ཀ་དང་སྐབས་
 ཀྱིས་འཕངས་པ་བཞི་@109B ཡོད་དེ་ཤེས་རབ་སྒྲོན་མའི་འགྲེལ་བཤད་ཏུ་བྲངས་པ་
 ལས། དགག་པ་དོན་གྱིས་བཟླན་པ་དང་། ཚིག་གཅིག་སྐྱབ་པར་བྱེད་པ་དང་། །དེ་ལྡན་
 རང་ཚོག་མི་སྟོན་པ། །མ་ཡིན་གཞན་པ་གཞན་ཡིན་ལོ། །ཞེས་སོ། །དེ་ལ་དོན་གྱིས་
 བཟླན་པ་ནི་མཚོད་སྒྲིན་ཚོན་པོ་ཉིན་པར་མི་ཟ་བ་ཞེས་པ་ལྟ་བུའོ། །ཚིག་གཅིག་གིས་

Concerning that, a negative^a is **an object of realization (1) that when it is expressed by a term, an object of negation is eliminated in its verbal reading or (2) that explicitly dawns in a manner having the aspect of negating an object of negation when its aspect dawns to an awareness.** The first is, for instance, selflessness (*bdag med, anātman*). The second is, for instance, the noumenon (*chos nyid, dharmatā*); regarding this there is no elimination of an object of negation in the verbal reading, but when its meaning appears, there is an appearance in a manner having the aspect of an elimination of the proliferations [of inherent existence].

Objects that are realized through an explicit elimination of an object of negation in this way are twofold [affirming negatives and non-affirming negatives]. An affirming negative (*ma yin dgag, paryudāsapraṭiṣedha*), upon explicitly eliminating an object of negation, projects another phenomenon; Bhāvaviveka's *Blaze of Reasoning* says:^b

An affirming negative negates the entity of a thing, through which the entity of a thing like this and other than this is affirmed; for example, through the negation, “This

དངོས་པོ་སྐྱབ་པ་ནི་བདག་ལས་མ་སྐྱེས་པ་ཡོད་ཅེས་པ་ལྟ་བུ་དགག་བྱ་གཙོད་པ་དང་
 ཚོས་གཞན་དངོས་སུ་འཕེན་པ་གཉིས་ཀ་ཚོག་གཅིག་གིས་ཟེན་པ་འོ། ། དེ་ལྟར་ནི་དངོས་
 འཁྲུག་ལ་ཚོས་གཞན་འཕངས་པ་དེ་གཉིས་ཀ་ཡོད་པའི་ཚོག་སྟེ་མཚོད་སྐྱིན་ཚོན་པོ་
 ཉིན་པར་མི་ཟ་བ་རིད་པ་མིན་པ་ཡོད་ཅེས་པ་ལྟ་བུ་འོ། ། རང་གི་ཚོག་གིས་མི་སྟོན་པ་ནི་
 སྐྱེས་བྱ་གཅིག་རྒྱལ་རིགས་དང་བྲམ་ཟེ་གང་རུང་གཅིག་ཏུ་ངེས་ཤིང་ལྷུང་པར་མ་ངེས་
 པའི་སྐབས་སུ་འདི་བྲམ་ཟེ་མ་ཡིན་ཞེས་པ་ལྟ་བུ་འོ། ། འཕེན་ཚུལ་བཞི་པོ་དེ་གང་བྱུང་
 ཡང་མ་ཡིན་དགག་ཡིན་ལ་དེ་ལས་གཞན་པ་དེ་བཞི་གང་ཡང་མ་འཕངས་པ་ནི་མ་
 ཡིན་དགག་ལས་གཞན་མེད་དགག་གོ།

See also *drang nges legs bshad snying po: The Essence of Eloquent Speech on the Definitive and Interpretable* (Mundgod, India: SOKU, 1991), ed. by Geshe Palden Drakpa and Damdul Namgyal, 220.4.

^a *dgag pa, pratiṣedha.*

^b Bhāvaviveka, *dbu ma 'i snying po 'i 'grel pa rtog ge 'bar ba (madhyamakahrdayavṛttitarkajvālā)*, in *bstan 'gyur (sde dge 3856)*, TBRC W23703.98:82-660. (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae chodhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985). Commenting on Bhāvaviveka's *Heart of the Middle* stanza III.26; *dbu ma*, vol. *dza*, 59b.4-59b.5; Iida, *Reason and Emptiness*, 84.

is not a brahmin,” it is affirmed that [the person] is a non-brahmin, like a brahmin but other than this, [such as] a menial^a who is lower in terms of asceticism, hearing,^b and so forth.

A non-affirming negative (*med dgag, prasajyapratishedha*), upon explicitly eliminating an object of negation, does not project another phenomenon; Bhāvaviveka’s *Blaze of Reasoning* says:^c

A nonaffirming negative simply refutes the mere entity of a thing and does not affirm another thing like this and other than this; for example, the statement “Brahmins do not drink beer” simply refutes [or forbids] only this and does not express that [brahmins] drink or do not drink a beverage other than this.

In those [statements] “affirming” (*sgrub*) and “not affirming” (*mi sgrub*) have the same meaning as “projecting” (*'phen*) and “not projecting” (*mi 'phen*); “other than this” [refers to] what are not just negations of objects of negations.

Negations through the words “is not” (*ma yin*) and “does not exist”^d (*med*) do not constitute the difference between those two [that is, affirming negations and nonaffirming negations] because both Bhāvaviveka and Chandrakīrti explain that the negation “is not from itself” (*bdag las ma yin, na svataḥ*) is a nonaffirming negative and because Measureless Life (*tshe dpag med, amitāyus*) must be taken as an affirming negative.

Therefore, with respect to negative phenomena, since all phenomena negate what is not themselves [in the sense that they are not what is not themselves], it is not sufficient that an object of negation be eliminated with respect to the thing; rather, either the term expressing it must eliminate [an object of negation], or [the phenomenon] must dawn—to an awareness realizing it—as having the aspect of explicitly eliminating an object of negation.

One [scholar] asserts that selflessness, for instance, is a non-affirming negative, but when there is a composite with a basis

^a *dmangs rigs, śūdra.*

^b That is, learning.

^c Commenting on Bhāvaviveka’s *Heart of the Middle* stanza III.26; sde dge 3856, *sde dge dbu ma*, vol. *dza*, 59b.5-59b.6; Iida, *Reason and Emptiness*, 84.

^d Or “less” as in “measureless.”

that is a positive as in the case of “selflessness with respect to persons,”^a asserts that this is not a nonaffirming negative. Others propound that when there is a composite with a basis, then since another phenomenon is projected, it is not a nonaffirming negative. These are not reasonable because the difference between the two negatives occurs also in other texts only as explained earlier, and in that case although there is a composite with a basis that is a positive in “Brahmins do not drink beer” for instance, the defining characteristic of a nonaffirming negative remains and because brahmins in this case are the basis with respect to which it is being determined whether another phenomenon is projected or not upon the elimination of the object of negation [namely, drinking beer] and are not another phenomenon projected [in place of drinking beer].

Therefore, with respect to how another phenomenon is projected there are four: those of implicit projection, explicit projection, projection both [implicitly and explicitly], and projection by way of context; Avalokitavrata’s *Commentarial Explanation of (Bhāvaviveka’s) “Lamp for (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Wisdom’”* (see also below, 198) quotes:^b

Negations that indicate [another, positive phenomenon]
 through their import,
 Negations that establish through a phrase,
 [Negations] that possess those, and [negations] that do not
 indicate through their own words
 Are affirming [negatives]; others are other [that is, non-
 affirming negatives].

In this:

- That which indicates through its import is, for instance, “Fat Yajñadatta’s not eating in the day.”

^a gang zag la bdag med.

^b 198.1: *dgag pa don gyis bstan pa dang / tshig gcig sgrub par byed pa dang // de ldan rang tshig mi ston pa// ma yin gzhan pa gzhan yin no//*. Jam-yang-shay-pa’s *Great Exposition of Tenets* (Taipei, 216.3) identifies the passage as from *ldog pa bsdus pa*, which is Navidharma’s *Stanzas Demonstrating a Condensation of Exclusions (ldog pa bsdus pa bstan pa’i tshig le’ur byas pa, piṇḍanivartananirdeśakārikā*; P5782). The *sde dge* edition (Toh. 4293; TBRC W23703, 504.7-505.1) reads: *don gyis go bar byed pa dang //tshig gcig sgrub par byed pa dang // de dang ldan pa’i dgag pa dang //rang gi tshig gis mi ston pa’o//*. There is a commentary by Navidharma, *ldog pa bsdus pa bstan pa’i rnam ’grel, piṇḍanivartananirdeśavārttika*; P5783; Toh. 4294.

- That which establishes a thing through one phrase is a case of one phrase's containing both the elimination of an object of negation and an explicit projection of another phenomenon—for instance, “Nonproduction from self exists.”
- That which possesses those is a phrase that has both explicit and implicit projection of other phenomena—for instance, “The non-emaciated fat Yajñadatta who does not eat during the day exists.”^a
- That which does not indicate through its own words is, for instance, “This is not a brahmin,” in a context when it has been ascertained that a person is either of the royal caste or is a brahmin and the specific has not been ascertained.

Whenever any of those four modes of projection occur, [the phenomenon] is an affirming negative, whereas negatives other than those—that do not project any of those four—are other than affirming negatives, that is to say, nonaffirming negatives.

The thesis is not explicitly indicated here in the first stanza of the first chapter of Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle*, but implicitly it is; so these nonaffirming negatives do affirm something. They affirm another nonaffirming negative, the absence of inherently existent production. It is permissible for a nonaffirming negative to imply another nonaffirming negative *of the same variety*. This reasoning could not prove uncompounded space, for example, but it proves the lack of inherently existent production, which in addition proves that things do not inherently exist.

Why is it important that these four theses are nonaffirming negatives? In meditative equipoise what one is perceiving is just emptiness. If these were proving something else, like, for example, that production exists conventionally, then because you use these to realize emptiness and enter meditative equipoise, you would have to be realizing conventionally existent production within meditative equipoise. In one way, since the proof is of a nonaffirming negative, meditative equipoise is just perceiving an absence; in another way, the epistemological fact that nothing except emptiness appears in meditative equipoise requires that the reasoning be oriented around that fact. The reasoning leads one to conclude that meditative equipoise must have as its object a mere negative, and on the other hand adepts report that meditative equipoise is without perception of any other object except emptiness. The point is that the reasons in this stanza are

^a This could also be translated as “the existence of the non-emaciated fat Yajñadatta who does not eat during the day.”

nonaffirming negatives and what they prove is a nonaffirming negative.

Sometimes, especially in other orders of Tibetan Buddhism, the negative is put together with a positive phenomenon, such as the mind of clear light. The mind of clear light is positive (*sgrub pa, vidhi*) and so the combination of the two—the clear light nature of the mind and the absence of inherent existence—is an affirming negative. The present Dalai Lama says that if you realize the nonaffirming negative that is the absence of inherent existence and your understanding qualifies your perception of the luminous nature of the mind, then this is a fully qualified way of meditating on emptiness and of overcoming afflictive emotions. Some scholars, however, say that the object of meditation has to be just a nonaffirming negative for it to be effective in overcoming afflictive emotions. Their criticism seems to be that without stressing elimination of the object of negation, one could just end up with the luminous nature of the mind, which might be like performing calm abiding meditation on the luminous nature of the mind. However, according to the Dalai Lama, if other orders' meditations are done well, the two—emptiness and the luminous nature of the mind—go together. For example, in the Nyingma order, you analyze your mind to find from where it arises (*'byung*), where it abides (*gnas*), and that into which it goes (*'gro*), and through a Middle Way type of reasoning inherent existence is eliminated. Thus when such a practitioner gets ahold of the luminous nature of the mind, it is qualified with, that is to say, endowed with, understanding the absence of inherent existence.

Partly from this stanza and commentary on it, a great division in Tibetan Buddhism involving partisan polemics arose between Ge-lug and the other systems. Some find this nonaffirming negative to be an extreme of nihilism, whereas some Ge-lugs are unable to understand how the nonaffirming negative can go together with reflecting on the luminous light nature of the mind, whereas some others pay no attention to the nonaffirming negative and hold only to the luminous light nature of the mind. This first stanza in Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle* and the commentaries on it are a source for glimpsing crucially different approaches in Indian and other Asian Buddhisms.

The first extant commentary on Nāgārjuna's text is Buddhapālita's, titled *Commentary on (Nāgārjuna's) "Fundamental [Stanzas on the] Middle,"*^a but it is generally called the *Buddhapālita Commentary*—the name of the author being used for the name of the text. In the same manner, the late Go-mang scholar Ge-dün-lo-drö opined that the commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle* called *Akutobhayā (ga las 'jigs med;*

^a *mūlamadhyamakavṛtti*. To date, the Sanskrit version of the text has not been found.

“no fear from anywhere”), generally regarded as being by an unknown author, might be by a person named Akutobhayā. Some attribute it to Nāgārjuna, but it quotes Nāgārjuna’s student Āryadeva, whereas the custom is not to cite one’s own student. Also, the other great Indian commentators do not cite it.

A commentary is required to explain why the chapter was written, why a particular stanza was written, and how the stanza fits into a greater context. Buddhapālita’s commentary provoked Bhāvaviveka, who objected to many points. Chandrakīrti came to Buddhapālita’s defense. This put Buddhapālita and Chandrakīrti on one side, and Bhāvaviveka on the other. Chandrakīrti’s commentary was not written while Bhāvaviveka was still alive; thus Bhāvaviveka never had a chance to respond.

In the first chapter of *Clear Words*, Chandrakīrti presents an elaborate argument defending Buddhapālita against Bhāvaviveka’s charge of his misconstruing the refutation of production in Nāgārjuna’s *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called “Wisdom.”*^a Chandrakīrti’s defense of Buddhapālita culminates in an attack on Bhāvaviveka’s own formulation of Nāgārjuna’s refutation of production. During it, Chandrakīrti indicates that, according to the tenets of the Middle Way School, the subject of Bhāvaviveka’s syllogism refuting production from self as presented in the Sāṃkhya system (that is, production, or manifestation, of an effect that is of the same entity as its cause) is not established compatibly for both parties of the debate. From this, Chandrakīrti concludes that the mode of procedure of Bhāvaviveka’s reasoning is faulty despite the latter’s own supposed presentation of such compatible establishment.

In the syllabus of the Ge-lug-pa monastic universities, the topic of Bhāvaviveka’s assertion of compatibly appearing subjects and Chandrakīrti’s refutation of this surfaces in the Middle Way class during discussion of the refutation of production from self in Chandrakīrti’s *Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle.”*^b Since Chandrakīrti treats the topic in his *Clear Words*, the material from it is brought over to this class although the class is structured around his *Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle.”*

The first phase is called “Opposite of the Consequences”^c; this leads to the second phase called “Compatibly appearing subjects.”^d Then, the class returns to the refutation of production from other, which leads to a

^a See Jeffrey Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, 441-530.

^b *dbu ma la ’jug pa, madhaymakāvatāra*; P5261, P5262, vol. 98.

^c *thal bzlog*.

^d *chos can mthun snang ba*.

third phase called “Two Truths,”^a and so forth. Pertinent here are the first two phases, centrally important in the Ge-lug-pa educational system for understanding the Middle Way Consequence School,^b since they are used for acquiring a working knowledge of the differences between the Autonomy School and the Consequence School. The training program provides highly developed commentaries on this very difficult controversy.^c

The controversy over this stanza is one of the ways that Ge-lug-pa scholars approach the doctrine of emptiness, provoking reflection because, having learned many of the principles of the Middle Way School, you have to use them to figure out what is at issue among these three scholars—you have to toss around and ruminate over the principles of Proponent of the Middle to get a handle on the topics. This period of study does not so much teach you directly about the reasonings; rather, it forces you to use Middle Way principles in trying to figure out what is happening in this controversy such that your continuum becomes imbued with those notions.

Buddhapālita first sets forth the Eight No’s—no cessation, and so

^a *bden pa gnyis.*

^b *dbu ma thal 'gyur pa, prāsaṅgikamādhyaṃika.*

^c My exposition of this topic is drawn almost entirely from Jam-yang-shay-pa’s *Great Exposition of the Middle / Analysis of (Chandrakīrti’s) “Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle’”: Treasury of Scripture and Reasoning, Thoroughly Illuminating the Profound Meaning [of Emptiness], Entrance for the Fortunate (dbu ma chen mo / dbu ma 'jug pa 'i mtha' dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zab don kun gsal skal bzang 'jug ngogs)* (Buxaduor: Gomang, 1967), 224b.5-283a.1, which is Jam-yang-shay-pa’s explanation of the controversy between Buddhapālita, Bhāvaviveka, and Chandrakīrti in their respective commentaries on Nāgārjuna’s *Treatise on the Middle* and especially as recounted by Chandrakīrti in his *Clear Words*. I have also made extensive use of a textbook on the topic from the Jay College of Se-ra Monastery by Gom-day Nam-kha-gyal-tshan, his *Settling Difficult Points in the Opposite of the Consequences: Key to (Chandrakīrti’s) “Clear Words,” Written by Jam-pay-yang Gom-day Nam-kha-gyal-tshan (thal bzlog gi dka' ba 'i gnas gtan la 'bebs pa 'jam pa 'i dbyang sgom sde nam mkha' rgyal mtshan gyis mdzad pa 'i tshig gsal gyi lde mig)* in *The Obligatory Texts (Yig-cha) for the Study of Madhyamika of Byes Grwa-tshan of Se-ra Monastery, Madhyamika Text Series, vol. 4* (New Delhi: Lha-mkhar yons-dzin bstan-pa-rgyal-mtshan, 1973).

Throughout this explanation, my work at the Buddhist School of Dialectics in Dharmasala during April, May, and June of 1982 figures prominently. During that period I attended daily lectures by the Principal, the late Lobsang Gyatso of Lo-sel-ling College which uses the textbooks of Paṅ-chen Sō-nam-drag-pa, and debated with members of the class on an almost daily basis. The experience lifted this important topic out of the textbooks into a living dilemma of explication, requiring a far greater grasp of the movement of the controversy than I had previously.

Also, throughout the explanation, the teachings of late Ken-sur Ngag-wang-leg-dan, abbot emeritus of the Tantric College of Lower Lhasa and ge-shay in the Go-mang College of Dre-pung Monastic University, who first introduced me to the topic, are crucial.

forth. After Nāgārjuna's expression of worship, he constructs the scene by having "the person in the street" say, "Show how this called production is only a convention!"^a This is how Buddhapālita sets the scene for Nāgārjuna's first chapter, the import being, "If you Nāgārjuna want to say that in the face of ultimate analysis there is no production, no cessation, and so forth, then **show me** how production is just a convention."

It is provocative that Buddhapālita has the objector say, "Show how it is a **convention!**" He does not have the objector say "Show how production does not exist in the face of meditative equipoise!" He does not have the questioner say, "Show how production is not found when pursued by reasoning!" He does not have person say, "Show how it does not exist!" (to which Ge-lug scholars would add "**inherently** exist"). Buddhapālita has the framing question read, "Show how production is only a convention!" Does Nāgārjuna's stanza show how production is a convention? It does not. Since the four reasons are nonaffirming negatives, the four reasons do **not** prove that production exists conventionally. This is how Buddhapālita's frame is the source of the controversy.

The Tibetan scholar who brought this understanding of the root of the controversy to the fore is Jam-yang-shay-pa.^b Tsong-kha-pa does not mention this point, although Jam-yang-shay-pa takes it to be the hinge for understanding how Bhāvaviveka's objection arose.

Bhāvaviveka's refutation of Buddhapālita is brief; he gives three reasons why Buddhapālita's presentation is wrong (to be cited below). I feel that, in exploring those three reasons and looking at Buddhapālita's explanation, we **must** say that Bhāvaviveka was upset by Buddhapālita's statement about conventionally existent production—the aforementioned "hinge"—even though Bhāvaviveka himself does not mention it.

Again, this hinge statement by Buddhapālita, which Ge-lug-pa scholars refer to as the "introduction" (*gleng gzhi*) is:

Respectively, [someone] says, "At this point show how this called production is only a convention!"

The term "respectively" implies that our challenger, the person-in-the-street, is *now* asking about production and will continue *later* to ask about the rest of the Eight No's—cessation, annihilation, permanence, difference, sameness, coming, and going.

^a *Buddhapālita's Commentary* was lost in the Sanskrit and only preserved in the Tibetan. The Tibetan for the above is: *re zhig ji ltar skye bar brjod pa tha snyad tsam yin pa de ltar rab tu ston cig.*

^b *Jam dbyangs bzhad pa*; 1648-1721. He is the principal textbook author for the Go-mang (*sgo mang*) College of Dre-pung Monastic University ('*bras spungs*).

To answer this question by discussing the refutation of production, Buddhapālita cites the first stanza in Nāgārjuna's *Treatise*:

Not from self, not from others,
 Not from both, not causelessly
 Are any things
 Ever produced anywhere.

Ge-lug scholars call the next passage in *Buddhapālita's Commentary* the “brief indication” (*mdor bstan*) in which he addresses the first reasoning in Nāgārjuna's stanza. This passage also begins with “respectively” which again indicates that there is a series of refutations—that is to say, he will now consider the first, production from self and later, production from other and so on:

About that, respectively, things are not produced from their own entities because their production [again] would be just senseless and because production would be endless.

*na svata utpadyanti bhāvāḥ/ tadutpadavaiyarthyaṭ/
 atiprasaṅgadoṣacca*^a

*dngos po rnam bdag gi bdag nyid las skye ba med de/ de dag gi
 skye ba don med pa nyid du 'gyur ba 'i phyir dang skye ba thug pa
 med par 'gyur ba 'i phyir ro/*

“From their own entities” could be rendered as “from their own essences.” It means “from causes that are of the same essence as them.” To illustrate, a table is produced, and it is either produced from causes or causelessly. If it is produced from causes, among all the things that exist in the multiverse there are itself and others; so, self and other include everything. Either it is produced from itself or from another. Not many would consider that it is produced from itself—just purely itself, I do not mean causes that are of the same entity as it—but I think it is rather interesting to also consider whether it is produced from itself. Doing so allows getting a handle on this phase of the reasoning.

If it is produced from itself, then that self, which already exists, will have to be produced endlessly; for, if it is there and it has some need to be produced from itself, then it has to be produced and produced and produced. Production would also be senseless because if it is already there, what is the need or purpose for it to be produced again? We are talking not

^a The Sanskrit is from Chandrakīrti's citation of it (La Vallée Poussin, *Prasannapadā*, 14.1).

about its next moment—its next moment is produced from **this** moment—but about its being produced from itself. If it is produced from itself, and itself is already there, what is the use or purpose for a duplicate production? I want to reiterate that I am not talking about its giving rise to another one **like** itself; I am talking about its just being produced from itself. This would be completely absurd.

Putting these two consequences together (that self-production would be senseless and endless): If there were some need for it to be produced, then given that it has been produced, it would need that production endlessly. In other words, first of all it is senseless for it to be produced from itself, but if you maintain that there **is** sense, purpose, or need for its being produced from itself, then it would be produced endlessly because it would always need to be produced from itself.

It is helpful to think this way for the sake of eliminating absolutely all possibilities—even if this is a thoroughly absurd possibility. The other benefit is that it draws you into the reasoning, allowing you to confront the fallacies, for these same fallacies are extended to those who say it is produced from causes that are of the same *entity* as the effect. Of course, the Sāṃkhyas—who are the main Indian proponents of self-production—are not saying that this pot is produced from this pot, but having investigated “pot-from-pot” production, you learn how Buddhists refute the Sāṃkhya position of production from self, that is to say, from causes that are the same *entity* as the effect. A good deal will be said below about why these fallacies apply to the Sāṃkhyas, despite the fact that they are not saying that this pot is produced from this pot.

Let us return to Buddhapālita’s brief indication:

About that, respectively, things are not produced from their own entities because their production [again] would be just senseless and because production would be endless.

We see that it looks like a syllogism (*sbyor ba, prayoga*) rather than a consequence (*thal ’gyur, prasaṅga*) because he does not say, “It [absurdly] follows that...” (*yin par thal, prasajyate*). He gives two reasons:

because their production [again] would be just senseless and production would be endless.

What this has to mean is:

because **if they were produced from themselves**, their production [**again**] would be senseless...

Since they already exist, their existence would be their first production,

and any subsequent production would be re-production, or production-again.

Let me briefly explain why the statement must include the word “again,” which has been added in brackets in the translation. Immediately following this brief indication is what Ge-lug-pa scholars term the “extensive explanation” (*rgyas bshad*) in which Buddhapālita elaborates on this initial brief statement. In the extensive explanation Buddhapālita says:

It is thus: the production-again of things already existing in their own entities is purposeless. If, though existent, they are produced, they would never not be produced.

na hi svātmanā vidyamānānām padārthānām punarutpāde prayojanamasti/ atha sannapi jāyeta/ na kadā cinna jāyeta//

dngos po rnam s bdag gi bdag nyid yod pa rnam la ni yang skye ba la dgos pa med do// ci ste yod kyang skye na nam yang mi skye bar mi 'gyur ro//

Here Buddhapālita specifically qualifies production as being “production-again,” whereas above in the brief indication he did not. Thus, the word “again” needs to be carried from the extensive explanation back to the brief indication.

Suppose you are a Sāṃkhya, and I say to you, “Things are not produced from their own entities because their production would be just senseless.” (Notice that I did not say, “because their production-again would be senseless.”) What would you say to the reason? You would say that the reason is not established; in other words, “It is not established that the production of things would be senseless because, in general, the production of things is sensible.” Even Buddhapālita would say that the reason, without the qualification “again,” is not established, because the production of things is sensible. So, when the brief indication is taken as it is worded in isolation without affixing the word “again” to it, it looks as if you have to reverse the reason in order to understand what Buddhapālita was getting at, thereby turning it into “because their production is sensible.” That is how Bhāvaviveka understood what Buddhapālita was saying—with good enough cause, given Buddhapālita’s wording in the brief indication.

Now, why did Bhāvaviveka not read the reason as, “**if they are** produced from their own entities, their production-again would be just senseless”? The speculation is that he did not read the reason clause this way because otherwise when you realize the reason, you already have realized the thesis—that there is no production from self. If you realize that “If

things are produced from self, their production is senseless,” you would be realizing that things are not produced from self. Because according to the rules of logic, the mind that realizes the reason cannot be the mind that realizes the thesis, Ge-lug scholars speculate that Bhāvaviveka thought that Buddhapālita could not mean this. (Their curiosity about what Bhāvaviveka was thinking beyond what he actually said is indeed stimulating!)

A Middle Way Consequentialist, like Chandrakīrti, reads Buddhapālita’s statements differently. To him, Buddhapālita is just stating a thesis—things are not produced from their own entities—and as his reason he gives two consequences. It is as if Buddhapālita is saying, “I am going to show you that there is no production of things from self, so I will state two full consequences of that position to prove it.” A consequence must have a subject, a predicate, and a reason; so, we will have to find these three in Buddhapālita’s statement of what only looks like a reason.

A Middle Way Consequentialist notices that Buddhapālita uses the words “**would be**”^a when he says, “their production [again] **would be** just senseless and because production **would be** endless,” and thus a Consequentialist sees that Buddhapālita is flinging two consequences at the Sāṃkhya. In the extensive explanation, Buddhapālita makes the first reason into just a statement:

It is thus: the production-again of things already existing in their own entities is purposeless.

Then, as the second reason he says:

If, though existent, they are produced [in other words, if their production-again is purposeful], they would never not be produced.

Buddhapālita concludes the statement with:

Hence, that also is not accepted. Therefore, respectively, things are not produced from self.

In the first reason, “production-again” is the manifestation of an object as the Sāṃkhyas posit it. The first production is the coming into nonmanifest existence of the pot in the clay; the second production is its coming into manifest existence. When the potter gets the clay ready, the pot exists in the clay nonmanifestly at that time. (I am led into wondering whether a nonmanifest pot exists before someone gathers the clay out in the countryside? Does a nonmanifest pot exist before the clay forms geologically, or before the world system forms? I assume that Sāṃkhyas say that a pot

^a In Sanskrit this is conveyed by the optative *jāyeta*; in Tibetan *gyur ba*.

exists nonmanifestly only when some of its main causes come together, maybe as late as when the clay is in the potter's hands?) Its coming into nonmanifest existence is one production, and so re-production is sensible, but just once—from nonmanifest to manifest.

Since the controversy centers around production from self, we can skip over production from other, both, and neither and look at what Gelug scholars call Buddhapālita's conclusion (*mjug sdu ba*):

Since the production of things is thus in all ways not logically feasible, there is no production; therefore, this called production is only a convention.

That he says that “production is only a **convention**” lends credence to the notion provoked by his introductory framing that he holds that Nāgārjuna is demonstrating the existence of conventionally existent production through refuting the four possibilities. It looks as if he takes the existence of production for granted, and thus once it does not inherently exist, it must conventionally exist.

The aim of looking at both the introductory passage and the concluding passage is that if these mentions of conventionally existent production are, as Jam-yang-shay-pa cogently says, the stimulus driving Bhāvaviveka's objection to Buddhapālita's presentation, we need to keep them in mind to understand Bhāvaviveka's response. The fact that Buddhapālita *twice* brings up conventionally existent production as if Nāgārjuna's refutation of production is proving that production conventionally exists is Bhāvaviveka's starting point even if he does not mention it.

This controversy revolves around how one uses this stanza as a way to meditate on the absence of inherently existent production. It is pivotal to Middle Way scholarship that through meditating on the import of this stanza one realizes a negative, an absence, the lack of inherently existent production. Since this realization is initially inferential, the controversy is concerned with how one generates an inferential consciousness realizing emptiness. That inferential consciousness realizing emptiness will then be cultivated such that it turns into wisdom directly realizing emptiness, which at that point is capable of removing afflictive emotions—the obstructions to liberation from cyclic existence—and finally is capable of removing the obstructions to omniscience when enhanced by the altruistic intention to become enlightened and its attendant deeds.

Among the reasonings proving emptiness, there are many different categories: analyses of effects, analyses of causes, analyses of both causes and effects, analyses of entities, and so forth. Here we are analyzing compounded phenomena by way of examining their production from causes—

produced from self, other, both, neither; therefore, this is an analysis of causes. Though we are analyzing the things that are the effects, we are doing so by way of causation—we are analyzing the causes of those effects.

When analysis is done by way of effects, it is examined whether an inherently existent effect is produced, whether an utterly nonexistent effect is produced, an effect that is both existent and nonexistent is produced, or an effect that is neither existent nor nonexistent is produced. As Nāgārjuna's *Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness* says:^a

Because the existent exists, it is not produced.

Because the nonexistent does not exist, it is not [produced].

Because the qualities are incompatible, the existent and nonexistent is not [produced].

Because there is no production, there is no abiding and no ceasing.

When analysis is done by way of both cause and effect, it is examined whether one cause produces one effect, one cause produces many effects, many causes produce one effect, or many causes produce many effects. As Jñānagarbha's *Differentiation of the Two Truths* says:^b

Many do not create one thing,

Many do not create many,

One does not create many things,

One also does not create one.

In all of these, we are analyzing effects but asking different questions about them; they all prove the thesis that compounded phenomena are not inherently produced.

The particular analysis that is our focus in this controversy is called the vajra nodes or the refutation of production from the four extremes. Is an apple, as an effect—and it has to be an effect because it is a functioning thing (*ngos po, bhāva*)—produced from self, other, both, or neither?

Let me mention again that this single stanza:

Not from self, not from others,

Not from both, not causelessly

^a P5227, vol. 95, 13.1.7.

^b The *Satyadvayavibhāṅga* is not included in the Peking Tripiṭaka, but is included in the *sde dge* edition. This is stanza 14; for the Tibetan, see Malcolm David Eckel, *Jñānagarbha on the Two Truths* (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1987), 165. Brackets are from *Annotations, dbu ma pa*, 73b.3ff.

Are any things
Ever produced anywhere.

is the basic explanation Nāgārjuna gives for this method of analysis, followed only by an analysis of production from other by analyzing conditions.

In this work, the *Fundamental Stanzas on the Middle*, Nāgārjuna presents many different analyses for each topic from different points of view often by multiple stanzas. Each one is complete unto itself in the sense that you do not need the others to realize emptiness. That he offers many different types of reasonings is not because one type is not sufficient to get at emptiness, but because Bodhisattvas in their training want to open the mind as vastly as possible to emptiness. As Tsong-kha-pa says:^a

To establish that even a single phenomenon does not truly exist, those of the Great Vehicle use limitless, different reasonings as set forth in Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle*. Hence their minds become greatly broadened with respect to suchness. Those of the Lesser Vehicle use only brief reasoning to establish suchness by valid cognition, and since they do not establish emptiness the way those of the Great Vehicle do, they do not have a mind broadened with respect to suchness. Therefore, Nāgārjuna speaks of a difference of vastness or abbreviation and a difference of fully or not fully meditating on selflessness. This difference arises because:

- Hearers and Solitary Realizers strive to abandon only the afflictive emotions [that is, the obstructions to liberation], and realizing a mere abbreviation of the meaning of suchness is sufficient for that;
- Mahāyānists are intent on abandoning the obstructions to omniscience, and for this it is necessary to have a very broadened mind of wisdom opened to suchness.

Using a vast number of reasoning expands the mind realizing emptiness, even though the emptiness realized is the same. Thus the Great Vehicle mode of procedure for approaching emptiness is to use many different analyses.

^a See my translation of Tsong-kha-pa's *Extensive Explanation of (Chandrakīrti's) "Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle'"*: *Illumination of the Thought (dbu ma la 'jug pa'i rgya cher bshad pa dgongs pa rab gsal)* in Tsong-kha-pa, Kensur Lekden, and Jeffrey Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism* (London: Rider, 1980; reprint, Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1980), 175-176.

The great Sa-kya scholar Ren-da-wa,^a Tsong-kha-pa's teacher, takes the opposite viewpoint, saying that Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle* is a text common to both the Lesser Vehicle path and the Great Vehicle path because both practitioners of the Lesser Vehicle and practitioners of the Great Vehicle need to realize emptiness. Tsong-kha-pa refutes his own teacher, saying that it is a Great Vehicle text because a vast number of reasonings are presented. Both scholars have a point, but Tsong-kha-pa's strikes me as more cogent.

Because of the paucity of Nāgārjuna's explanation of this particular reasoning, we see the importance of the commentaries on his first stanza. How could you meditate on the first stanza without reading a commentary on how to contemplate the vajra nodes? Why are things not produced from self? Why are they not produced from other? Why are they not produced from both? Why are they not produced from neither? Despite the fact that Nāgārjuna expounds at length on other reasonings, he obviously did not feel that it was necessary to say anything more. Many texts are known for their brevity, but frankly I could not make use of this one stanza without commentary. Thus, our concern in considering this controversy between Buddhapālita, Bhāvaviveka, and Chandrakīrti is fundamentally with the means for meditating on the meaning of this stanza.

Buddhapālita's Commentary tells how to do it:

[Brief indication:] About that, respectively, things are not produced from their own entities because their production [again] would be just senseless and because production would be endless. [Extensive explanation:] It is thus: the production-again of things already existing in their own entities is purposeless. If, though existent, they are produced, they would never not be produced. Hence, that also is not accepted. Therefore, respectively, things are not produced from self.

This is how to meditatively reflect on the lack of inherently existent production from self. You think, for example:

The subject, my body, is not inherently produced because of not being produced from itself, not being produced from other, not being produced from both, and not being produced causelessly.

Then, you proceed to investigate production from self in order to start the process of establishing each of the four reasons so that you can realize the initial thesis: "My body is not inherently produced."

^a *red mda' ba*, 1349-1412.

The problem is that given what Buddhapālita says in the brief indication, we would be misled to proceed like this:

The subject, my body, is not produced from its own entity because my body's production is senseless.

However, this is problematic because it is obvious that for Buddhapālita production is **not** senseless! This illustrates the problems in Buddhapālita's presentation—the way he structures it runs into trouble.

One might reword it as follows, but it is still problematic:

The subject, my body, is not produced from its own entity because, if produced from its own entity, its production-again would be senseless.

In this case, there is the fault that when you realize the reason, you would already have realized the thesis. Therefore, let us reword it as a consequence according to the text of the extensive explanation:

With respect to the subject, my body, it follows that its production-again is purposeless because of being already existent in its own entity.

Now it makes supreme sense.

3. Sāṃkhya Tenets

Before going into the controversy among these Buddhist scholars in more detail, let us consider the Sāṃkhya school's tenets, which uphold production from self. The Sanskrit word "Sāṃkhya" is translated into Tibetan as "those who possess enumeration" (*grangs can pa*). They are called Enumerators because they set forth a definite number of categories of phenomena, through the knowledge of which one can be liberated.

Basically, there are twenty-five categories. Within the twenty-five, there are two categories, *puruṣa* ("person," "self," "pure consciousness") and *prakṛti* ("nature," "fundamental nature"). *Prakṛti* is further divided in stages into the remaining twenty-three. First there is *buddhi* (intellect) and then *ahaṃkāra* ("I-maker," "I-principle"). *Ahaṃkāra* is actually made up of three I-makers, which are each dominated by one of the three *guṇas* ("qualities"). The three *guṇas*, or "qualities of nature," are *sattva* (*snying stobs*) which is the quality of lightness, *rajas* (*rdul*) which is the quality of motility, and *tamas* (*mun pa*) which is the quality of darkness. Out of the interaction of the three *guṇas* come all phenomena.

Prakṛti is matter, which means that all twenty-three categories that evolve from it are matter. Even *buddhi*, intellect, is matter. Anything that is an evolute of *prakṛti* is matter. According to Sāṃkhya, we confuse the pure consciousness of *puruṣa* with all our other consciousnesses which are in fact matter. Similarly, in Buddhism Highest Yoga Tantra aims at getting ahold of the mind of clear light—which is somewhat equivalent to *puruṣa*—in the midst of any sort of consciousness and at concentrating on that to the point where all conceptual consciousnesses (*rtog pa*, *kalpanā*) disappear; in this context, "conceptual consciousnesses" include all dualistic consciousnesses—all levels of duality, including even the directly perceiving sense consciousnesses. According to certain Sa-kya teachings, for instance, the six operative consciousnesses^a do not exist in a Buddha.

In chart form, the twenty-five categories are:^b

^a The six operative consciousnesses are the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mental consciousnesses. In this type of system, it is solely through the operative consciousnesses of trainees that Buddhas appear.

^b The chart is adapted from Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, 322-323.

 TWENTY-FIVE PRINCIPLES

CONSCIOUSNESS

1. person (*skyes bu, puruṣa*), or self (*bdag, ātman*), consciousness (*shes pa*), knower (*rig pa*), the sentient (*sems pa can*), knower of the field (*zhing shes pa, kṣetrajñā*)

MATTER

2. fundamental nature (*rtsa ba'i rang bzhin, mūlaprakṛti*), or nature (*rang bzhin, prakṛti*), principal (*gtso bo, pradhāna*), generality (*spyi, sāmānya*), general principal (*spyi'i gtso bo, sāmānyapradhāna*)
3. awareness (*blo, buddhi*), or great one (*chen po, mahat*)
4. I-principle (*nga rgyal, ahaṃkāra*)
 - (a) I-principle dominated by motility (*rdul, rajas*)
 - (b) I-principle dominated by darkness (*mun pa, tamas*)
 - (c) I-principle dominated by lightness (*snying stobs, sattva*)

Five subtle objects, or potencies of objects, which evolve from the I-principle dominated by motility:

5. sounds (*sgra, śabda*)
6. tangible objects (*reg bya, spraṣṭavya*)
7. odors (*dri, gandha*)
8. visible forms (*gzugs, rūpa*)
9. tastes (*ro, rasa*)

Eleven faculties which evolve from the I-principle dominated by lightness:

Five physical faculties, or action faculties

10. speech (*ngag, vāc*)
11. arms (*lag pa, pāṇi*)
12. legs (*rkang pa, pāda*)
13. anus (*rkub, pāyu*)
14. genitalia (*'doms, upastha*)

Five mental faculties

15. ear (*rna ba, śrota*)
16. body or skin (*pags pa, sparśana*)
17. tongue (*lce, rasana*)
18. eye (*mig, cakṣu*)
19. nose (*sna, ghrāṇa*)

One intellectual faculty

20. Intellectual faculty (*gid, manas*), the nature of which is both mental and physical

Five elements:

21. earth (*sa, pṛthivī*), which evolves from the odor potency
 22. water (*chu, āp*), which evolves from the taste potency
 23. fire (*me, tejas*), which evolves from the visible form potency
 24. wind (*rlung, vāyu*), which evolves from the tangible object potency
 25. space (*nam mkha', ākāśa*), which evolves from the sound potency
-

In Sāṃkhya there is a nonmaterial “person”—pure consciousness—and then all other phenomena, including the sense powers, sense consciousnesses, all of our thoughts, tables, chairs, and so forth in the category of matter. In the Buddhist system of Highest Yoga Tantra, all these non-*puruṣa* consciousnesses that the Sāṃkhyas put in the category of matter are put in the category of “coarse” (*rags pa*) consciousness or their objects; the mind of clear light is “subtle” (*phra ba*), and all other consciousnesses are “coarse” and have to be stopped. A difference from Sāṃkhya is that at Buddhahood, within the mind of clear light, one is still able to operate the other consciousnesses and appear in form; this is not shared with Sāṃkhya, which holds that upon liberation one is either in a state of withdrawn, pure consciousness, or appearing to others within a lower state.

According to Sāṃkhya, we are brought into cyclic existence due to confusing pure consciousness with other phenomena. The process of release from cyclic existence is, therefore, to understand fully the enumeration of mind and matter. Through understanding well that reckoning, one develops the divine eye understanding the source of confusion, whereupon matter disappears. In the Buddhist system of Highest Yoga Tantra, the grosser levels of consciousness cease through special concentrative techniques within reflection on emptiness. Buddhists use the vocabulary of dissolving (*thim pa*) which is Sāṃkhya terminology, but Ge-lug-pa scholars add that the meaning of “dissolving” is not that the essence of one phenomenon passes into the essence of another phenomenon, although that is what “dissolving” usually means; rather, the coarser levels *cease*.

In the Sāṃkhya system, *prakṛti* is also called *pradhāna* (“principal”) and *sāmānya* (“generality”). *Prakṛti* is perhaps like Mother Nature; it is the three *guṇas* in balance. The three *guṇas*—*sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*—are associated with the colors white, red, and black, respectively. In Buddhist Highest Yoga Tantra, the three minds that manifest before the mind of clear light—the mind of vivid white appearance, the mind of vivid red increase, and the mind of vivid black near-attainment—are also sometimes called *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*.^a In Buddhism, the goal is to remain only in the fourth and most subtle mind, the mind of clear light, and appear in form within that state through using the very subtle wind that is the mount of the fundamental innate mind of clear light as the basis of emanation. One appears in form by using this very subtle wind as the substantial cause (*nyer len*, *upādāna*) of physical appearance. One stays at the level of clear light and appears in form. In Sāṃkhya, to be liberated one has to separate from *prakṛti*, the basic factors of which are these white, red, and black

^a See Tsong-kha-pa’s *Great Exposition of Secret Mantra*.

“actors,” as it were. These *guṇas* are material, from which one has to separate, whereupon one is in a state of liberation. It seems that Sāṃkhyas do not posit the ability to appear within the state of pure consciousness; what is left is just the *puruṣa* (*skyes bu*) which is their “equivalent” of the mind of clear light. They do not seem to posit the ability to appear within it; when a liberated being dies, that being is incapable of appearance and is just in a spiritual state of withdrawal.

Thus, there are extraordinary similarities and an important difference between Sāṃkhyas and Buddhists, the differentiating factor being the practice of compassion and so forth in the Great Vehicle that draws out potencies for appearance within the most profound state. The practice of compassion is coupled with deity yoga in Tantra and utilization of subtle minds in Highest Yoga Tantra in order to use the wind—that is the mount of the fundamental innate mind of clear light—as the substantial cause for appearance, that is, as the substance from which to emanate appearance. This is a profound difference between Sāṃkhya and Buddhism, and yet I call it just a difference beyond the similarities.

Prakṛti is called the “generality” (*spyi, sāmānya*) because it pervades all secondary phenomena. It seems that the whole of *prakṛti* is present in all of its manifestations, at least according to Buddhist presentations of it. In the *Parmenides*, when Zeno questions Socrates, who here is the fool, he asks about the Ideas—whether the Idea of (let us say) apple is entirely present in this apple and entirely present in that apple over there, or whether only part of the Idea of apple is present in this and part in that apple. He goes on to say that if only part of the Idea of greatness is present in something that is great, then something less than full greatness would make something great. When he cites absurdities this way, Socrates has nothing to say and is quite bothered, admitting that his mind hops to another topic when faced with these questions.

With this background let us turn to two presentations of the controversy among the early Indian Proponents of the Middle by the late seventeenth-century and early eighteenth-century Tibetan scholar Jam-yang-shay-pa. The first is a concise overview, and the second, a challenging look into the details. This book mainly treats Buddhapālita’s commentary on Nāgārjuna’s refutation of self-production and Bhāvaviveka’s critical reaction to it; the second volume addresses Chandrakīrti’s defense of Buddhapālita.

PART TWO:
Jam-yang-shay-pa's
GREAT EXPOSITION
OF TENETS:
What is the right way
to refute production?

Presentation of Tenets: Lion’s Roar Eradicating Error, Precious Lamp Illuminating the Genuine Path to Omniscience

༄༅། །སྐྱུབ་པའི་མཐའི་རྣམ་པར་བཞག་པ་འཇུག་སྐྱོང་གཏོང་
ལྷའི་སྐྱོད་དབྱངས་ཀུན་མཐུན་ལམ་བཟང་གསལ་བའི་རིན་ཆེན་
སྐྱོན་མེ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་བཞུགས་སོ། །

with Jam-yang-shay-pa’s own commentary on the root text:

Explanation of Tenets: Sun of the Land of Samantabhadra Brilliantly Illuminating All of Our Own and Others’ Tenets and the Meaning of the Profound [Emptiness], Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning Fulfilling All Hopes of All Beings

༄༅། །སྐྱུབ་མཐའི་རྣམ་བཤད་རང་གཞན་སྐྱུབ་མཐའ་ཀུན་དང་
ཟབ་དོན་མཚོག་ཏུ་གསལ་བ་ཀུན་བཟང་ཞིང་གི་ཉི་མ་ལྷང་
རིགས་རྒྱ་མཚོ་སྐྱེ་དགའི་རེ་བ་ཀུན་སྐྱོང་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་བཞུགས་སོ། །

and with Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s word-commentary and annotations from his:

Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-pa’s) “Great Exposition of Tenets”: Freeing the Knots of the Difficult Points, Precious Jewel of Clear Awareness

༄༅། །སྐྱུབ་མཐའ་ཆེན་མོའི་མཚན་འགྲེལ་དཀར་གནད་མདུད་
གྲོལ་སྐྱོད་གསལ་གཅེས་ཚོར་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་བཞུགས་སོ། །

Buddhapālita^a commented on the *Fundamental* by way of consequences.

^a 2016 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 8b.5; 2011 TBRC *bla brang, pha*, 11a.1; 2000 Taipei reprint of 1999 Mundgod, 372.14.

ཚ་བ་སངས་རྒྱལ་བ་སྐྱེས་ཀྱིས་ཐལ་འགྲུར་བཀྲལ། །

Ngag-wang-pal-dan's *Word Commentary on Root Text*:^a The master Buddhapālita commented on the thought of Nāgārjuna's *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called "Wisdom"* in the manner of the Consequence School.

ཚ་བ་ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱི་དགོངས་པ་སློབ་དཔོན་སངས་རྒྱལ་
བསྐྱེས་ཀྱིས་ཐལ་འགྲུར་བའི་ལྷགས་སུ་བཀྲལ།

Around just after the master Asaṅga opened the way of the Mind-Only School upon having come to this world, the master Buddhapālita wrote a commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called "Wisdom"* and thereby opened the way of the Consequence School. For:

- in general there are eight commentaries on Nāgārjuna's *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called "Wisdom"*
- and although the other six commentaries^b mostly use syllogistic statements, this master flings many consequences.

སློབ་དཔོན་ཐོགས་མེད་སྤྱིང་འདིར་བྱོན་ནས་སེམས་ཅམ་གྱི་སློལ་
བྱེ་བའི་རྗེས་ཅམ་ལ་སློབ་དཔོན་སངས་རྒྱལ་བ་སྐྱེས་ཀྱིས་དབུ་མ་
ཚ་བ་ཤེས་རབ་ལ་འགྲེལ་བ་མཛད་ནས་ཐལ་འགྲུར་གྱི་སློལ་བྱེ་བ་
ཡིན་ཏེ། སྤྱིར་ཚ་བ་ཤེས་རབ་འགྲེལ་བ་བརྒྱུད་ཡོད་ཅིང་། འགྲེལ་བ་
གཞན་དུག་གིས་ཕལ་ཆེར་སྦྱོར་ངག་མཛད་ཀྱང་སློབ་དཔོན་
འདིས་ཐལ་འགྲུར་མང་པོ་འཕེན་པར་མཛད་པ་ཡིན་པའི་བྱིར།

Most of the explanations in the commentaries by masters [who wrote texts] other than the *Akutobhayā Commentary* and the *Clear Words* that are mentioned in Bhāvaviveka's *Lamp for (Nāgārjuna's) "Wisdom"* are seen to be in the class of syllogisms. Also, Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* says, "*Objection*: However, the extensive expression of syllogistic statements is the system of commentators." This [presents an opponent's position that]

^a Taipei edition, note *tsha*, 573.10.
^b Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words*, like Buddhapālita's commentary, mainly uses consequences.

“Although syllogistic statements are manifest in Nāgārjuna’s *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called ‘Wisdom,’* this is due to its being a root text, but the extensive statement of syllogisms is done by its commentaries, and why did Buddhapālita not also do this?” The master Buddhapālita refutes each of the four extreme types of production through consequences and similarly does commentary within using many consequences. The *Buddhapālita Commentary*^a contains many [statements of consequences] such as, for instance:^b

About that, respectively, things are not produced from their own entities because [if they were,]^c their production [again] would be just senseless and because production would be endless. It is thus: the production again of things already existing in their own entities is purposeless. [Also] if, though existent, they are produced, they would never not be produced; hence, that also is not asserted. Therefore, respectively, things are not produced from self.

They also are not produced from other. Why? For it would [absurdly] follow that everything would be produced from everything.

They also are not produced from both self and other because the fallacies of both [production from self and production from other] would [absurdly] follow.

They also are not produced causelessly because it would [absurdly] follow that everything always would be produced from everything and because there would be the fallacy that all endeavor would be just senseless.

འགྲེལ་པ་ག་ལེས་འཇིགས་མེད་དང་། ཚིག་གསལ་གཉིས་མིན་
 པའི་སློབ་དཔོན་གཞན་གྱི་འགྲེལ་པ་པལ་ཆེར་གྱི་བཤད་པ་ཤེས་
 [G9a]རབ་སློབ་མེར་བཀོད་པ་དག་ཀྱང་སྐྱུར་ངག་གི་ཕྱོགས་སུ་སྤང་
 བེད་། ཚིག་གསལ་ལས་ཀྱང་། འོན་ཏེ་སྐྱུར་བའི་ངག་རྒྱས་པར་
 བརྗོད་པར་བྱེད་པ་འདི་ནི་འགྲེལ་པ་མཐའ་པོ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་ལུགས་
 ཡིན་ཅོད་ཞེས། །འདིས་རྩ་ཤེ་སྐྱུར་ངག་མི་གསལ་ཡང་རྩ་

^a The commentary is called by the name of its author.

^b P5242, vol. 95, 75.1.6ff, commenting on Nāgārjuna’s *Treatise on the Middle*, I.1.

^c This and the next brackets are from Jam-yang-shay-pa’s *Great Exposition of the Middle*, 225a.6ff.

བའི་དབང་གིས་ཡིན་ལ་སྐྱོར་ངག་རྒྱས་པར་འགོད་པ་འདིའི་
 འགྲེལ་པ་དག་གིས་མཛད་ལ་སངས་རྒྱས་བསྐྱེད་སྲིད་ཀྱིས་ཀྱང་ཅིའི་
 ཕྱིར་མ་མཛད་ཅེས་པའོ། །སྐྱོབ་དཔོན་སངས་རྒྱས་བསྐྱེད་སྲིད་ཀྱིས་
 མཐའ་བཞིའི་སྐྱེ་བ་རེ་རེ་ནས་ཐལ་བས་བཀག་ཅིང་། དེ་བཞིན་དུ་
 ཐལ་འགྱུར་མང་པོ་མཛད་ནས་བཀྲལ་བ་ཡིན་ཏེ། བུ་རྒྱ་སྡེ་ལི་ཏ་
 ལས། དེ་ལ་རེ་ཞིག་དངོས་པོ་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་དེ། དེ་དག་གི་
 སྐྱེ་བ་དོན་མེད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར་དང་། ^[L11b]སྐྱེ་བ་ལྷན་གྱིས་
 པ་མེད་པར་འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །འདི་ལྟར་དངོས་པོ་བདག་གི་
 བདག་ཉིད་དུ་ཡོད་པ་རྣམས་ལ་ཡང་སྐྱེ་བ་ལ་དགོས་པ་མེད་དེ།
 གལ་ཏེ་ཡོད་ཀྱང་སྐྱེ་བ་མི་སྐྱེ་བར་མི་འགྱུར་བས་དེ་ཡང་མི་
 འདོད་དེ། དེའི་ཕྱིར་རེ་ཞིག་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་
 མེད་དོ། །གཞན་ལས་ཀྱང་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་དེ། ཅིའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེ་ན། ཐམས་
 ཅད་ལས་ཐམས་ཅད་སྐྱེ་བར་ཐལ་བར་འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །
 བདག་དང་གཞན་དང་གཉིས་ཀ་ལས་ཀྱང་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་དེ་གཉིས་
 ཀའི་སྐྱོན་དུ་ཐལ་བར་འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །རྒྱ་མེད་ལས་ཀྱང་སྐྱེ་
 བ་མེད་དེ། ཏུག་དུ་ཐམས་ཅད་ལས་ཐམས་ཅད་སྐྱེ་བར་ཐལ་བར་
 འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར་དང་། ཚུམ་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་དོན་མེད་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་
 སྐྱོན་དུ་འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །ཞེས་པ་ལྟ་བུ་མང་དོ། །

This master Buddhapālita [yogically] achieved [meeting with] the fore-
 most venerable Mañjuḥoṣha, composed explanations of many treatises,
 and proceeded to an area of knowledge-bearers. Tsong-kha-pa's *Explana-
 tion of (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle"*: *Ocean of Reasoning* says:

The one called Buddhapālita who achieved the word of the fore-
 most venerable Mañjuḥoṣha and proceeded to a place of adept

knowledge-bearers.

and the colophon to the translation of the *Buddhapālita Commentary* says:

Written by one who achieved the word of the youthful Mañjuśrī, composed explanations of many treatises, properly entered the Great Vehicle, and proceeded to a special place of those who have achieved the holding of knowledge-mantra.

སྒྲོབ་དཔོན་སངས་རྒྱས་བསྐྱེད་འདི་ནི་རྗེ་བཙུན་འཇམ་
 དབྱེད་སྲུབ་པ་བཟླ་བཅོས་དུ་མའི་རྣམ་བཤད་མཛད་ཅིང་
 རིག་འཛིན་གྱི་སར་གཤེགས་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ། རྣམ་བཤད་ལས། རྗེ་
 བཙུན་འཇམ་དཔལ་དབྱེད་གྱི་བཀའ་སྲུབ་ཅིང་། །སྲུབ་པའི་
 རིག་འཛིན་གནས་སུ་གཤེགས་གྱུར་པ། །སངས་རྒྱས་བསྐྱེད་ཞེས་
 དང་། འགྲེལ་པའི་འགྱུར་བྱང་ལས། འཇམ་དཔལ་གཞིན་རུའི་
 བཀའ་སྲུབ་པ་བཟླ་བཅོས་དུ་མའི་རྣམ་བཤད་མཛད་པ། ཐེག་
 པ་ཆེན་པོ་ཡང་དག་^[G9b]པར་ཞུགས་པ། རིག་སྲགས་འཆང་སྲུབ་
 པའི་གནས་བྱུང་པར་ཅན་དུ་གཤེགས་པས་མཛད་པ་ཞེས་སོ། །

**Bhavya, apprehending fallacies, opened the way of the Middle Way
Autonomy School.**

ལྷ་བྱས་སྐྱོན་བཟུང་དབུ་མ་རང་རྒྱུད་ཕྱེ།

Ngag-wang-pal-dan's *Word Commentary on Root Text*: The master Bhavyakara^a (*legs ldan 'byed*), apprehending fallacies in those [consequences presented by Buddhapālita], opened the chariot-way of commenting on the thought of Nāgārjuna's *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called "Wisdom"* in the manner of the system of the Middle Way Autonomy School.

དེ་ལ་སྐྱོན་དཔོན་ལྷ་བྱ་ཀ་ར་རྩེ་ལེགས་ལྡན་འབྱེད་ཀྱིས་
 སྐྱོན་བཟུང་ནས་དགག་བ་མཛད་དེ་ཚུ་ཤེའི་དགོངས་པ་
 དབུ་མ་རང་རྒྱུད་པའི་ལུགས་སུ་བགྲལ་བའི་ཤིང་རྟའི་
 རྩོལ་ཕྱེའོ།

The master^b Bhavyakara—that is, *legs ldan 'byed* and in some translations also *skal ldan* and also the master *snang bral*—according to Khay-drub's *Great Exposition of the General Tantra Sets*^c vowed to achieve the vajra seat [Buddhahood] in that lifetime but in his next lifetime became the master Vajraghaṅṭapāda and attained the supreme feat [Buddhahood]. In general, he wrote many treatises, and in particular he composed:

- the *Heart of the Middle*, which is like a condensation of Nāgārjuna's *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called "Wisdom,"* and its auto-commentary, the *Blaze of Reasoning*, setting forth at length our own and others' assertions and mainly teaching both the profound and the vast of the basis, path, and fruit—the mind of enlightenment, calm abiding, special insight, and so forth
- and the *Lamp for (Nāgārjuna's) "Wisdom,"* a commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called "Wisdom."*

^a That is, Bhāvaviveka.
^b Taipei, 373.15.
^c See Ferdinand D. Lessing and Alex Wayman, *Mkhas Grub Rje's Fundamentals of the Buddhist Tantras* (The Hague: Mouton, 1968), rpt., (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978), 89.

དེ་ནས་སློབ་དཔོན་སྣ་བྱ་ཀ་ར་སྟེ་ལེགས་ལྡན་འབྱེད་དང་། འགྲུར་
 ལ་ལར་སྐལ་ལྡན་དུ་འང་བསྐྱུར། སློབ་དཔོན་སྣང་བལ་ཡང་བེར་
 བ་གྱུད་སྡེ་སྡེ་རྣམ་^[L12a]ཆེན་མོ་ལྟར་ན་སྐྱེ་ཆེ་དེ་ལ་དོ་རྗེ་གདན་
 ལྷུབ་པར་དམ་བཅས་ཀྱང་། སྐྱེ་ཆེ་སྡེ་མ་ལ་དོ་རྗེ་དྲིལ་བུ་བར་གྱུར་
 ལས་མཚོག་གི་དངོས་གྲུབ་བརྟེན་པ་དེས་སྡིད་བལྟན་བཅོས་མང་
 པོ་དང་བྱུང་པར་དུ་དབྱུ་མ་རྩ་བ་ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱི་སྡིང་པོ་བསྐྱུས་པ་
 ལྟ་བུ་རང་གཞན་གྱི་འདོད་ཚུལ་རྒྱས་པར་སྟོན་ཅིང་། གཙོ་བོར་
 བྱང་སེམས་དང་འི་སྟག་སོགས་གཞི་ལམ་འབྲས་གསུམ་གྱི་ཟབ་
 རྒྱས་གཉིས་ཆར་སྟོན་པ་དབྱུ་མ་སྡིང་པོ་དང་། དེའི་རང་འགྲུལ་
 རྟོག་གི་འབར་བ་དང་རྩ་བ་ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱི་འགྲུལ་པ་ཤེས་རབ་སྟོན་
 མེ་མཛད།

Apprehending fallacies in the assertions of many masters and in the [state-
 ment of] consequences by the master Buddhapālita when refuting produc-
 tion from the four extremes, he refutes them one by one extensively. Re-
 futing the assertions by the Proponents of Mind-Only that imputational
 natures are not inherently established, and so forth, he newly opened the
 great way of Proponents of the Middle in which although phenomena do
 not ultimately exist, they conventionally exist inherently and by way of
 their own character. Though it is explained that this master followed
 Devasharma's commentary called *Shining White*,^a the opener of the char-
 iot-way of the Middle Way Autonomy School is only Bhāvaviveka be-
 cause he is the first master who, subsequent to the Superior [Nāgārjuna]
 and his spiritual son [Āryadeva], extensively opened the way [of the sys-
 tem in which it is demonstrated that] the Mind-Only School is not logically
 feasible and the Middle Way School is logically feasible. This is also
 known from the statement by the master Ye-shay-day:^b

After them, the master Bhāvaviveka repudiated the system of
 Cognition-Only and presented a system in which external objects

^a *dkar po rnam par 'char ba.*

^b *ye shes sde*; fl. c. 800.

exist conventionally.

And moreover because the master Shāntarakṣhita made [the format of] nonexistence ultimately and inherent existence in conventional terms in accordance with the system of this master [Bhāvaviveka] and also citing it as sources.

སྒོལ་དཔོན་མང་པོའི་འདོད་ཚུལ་དང་སྒོལ་དཔོན་སངས་རྒྱལ་
 བརྒྱུངས་ཀྱིས་མཐའ་བཞིའི་སྐྱེ་འགོག་གི་སྐབས་ལ་སོགས་པའི་
 ཐལ་བ་རྣམས་ལ་རེ་རེ་ནས་སྐྱོན་བབུང་ནས་དགག་པ་རྒྱས་པར་
 བརྗོད་པར་མཛད་དེ། སེམས་ཅམ་པས་ཀུན་བཏགས་རང་བཞིན་
 གྱིས་མ་གྲུབ་པར་འདོད་པ་སོགས་བཀག་ནས་དོན་དམ་པར་མེད་
 ཀྱང་། ཐ་སྐད་དུ་རང་བཞིན་དང་རང་མཚན་གྱིས་གྲུབ་པའི་དབུ་
 མའི་སྒོལ་ཆེན་པོ་གསར་དུ་བཏོད་དེ། སྒོལ་དཔོན་འདི་དེ་བ་ཤར་
 མའི་འབྲེལ་བ་དཀར་པོ་རྣམ་པར་འཆར་བའི་རྗེས་སུ་འབྲང་བར་
 བཤད་ཀྱང་དབུ་མ་རང་རྒྱུད་པའི་ཤིང་རྟའི་སྒོལ་འབྱེད་འདི་ལོ་
 ར་ཡིན་ཏེ། སྒོལ་དཔོན་འཕགས་པ་ཡབ་ཟས་ཀྱི་རྗེས་སུ་སེམས་
 ཅམ་པ་མི་འཐད་ལ། དབུ་མའི་ཚུལ་འཐད་ཚུལ་རྒྱས་པར་སྒོལ་
 འབྱེད་པ་སྒོལ་དཔོན་འདི་ལྔ་བའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། སྒོལ་དཔོན་ཡེ་ཤེས་
 རྗེས་ཀྱང་། དེའི་འོག་དུ་སྒོལ་དཔོན་ལེགས་ལྡན་འབྱེད་ཀྱིས་རྣམ་
 པར་རིག་པ་ཅམ་གྱི་ལྷགས་སུན་སྤུང་སྟེ། ཐ་སྐད་དུ་ཕྱིའི་དོན་ཡོད་
 པའི་ལྷགས་རྣམ་པར་^[L12b]བཞག་པ་མཛད་དེ། ཞེས་གསུངས་པས་
 ཀྱང་ཤེས་སོ། ། སྒོལ་དཔོན་ཞི་འཚོ་ཡང་དོན་དམ་པར་མེད་པ་ཐ་
 སྐད་དུ་རང་བཞིན་གྱིས་གྲུབ་པ་སྒོལ་དཔོན་^[G10a]འདིའི་ལྷགས་
 ལྟར་བྱས་ཤིང་ཤེས་བྱེད་ཀྱང་སྐྱངས་པས་སོ། །

[Refuting Production from Self]

With respect to the way [Bhāvaviveka] apprehends fallacies in [Buddhapālita's] individual consequences, Bhāvaviveka's *Lamp for (Nāgārjuna's) "Wisdom"* says about [Buddhapālita's] consequences establishing the nonexistence of production from self:

That is not reasonable:

1. because [Buddhapālita] does not express a reason [capable of proving that there is no production from self] as well as an example, and
2. because [the reasoning as Buddhapālita states it] does not avoid the fallacies adduced by another [that is, the fallacies that a Sāṃkhya would be expected to adduce].
3. Since^a these are phrases of consequences, they [must] be reversed from the meaning put forward, and hence what becomes evident is the meaning of the opposite of the thesis and the reasons,^b due to which it would be that things are produced

^a The Sanskrit, as Chandrakīrti cites it (La Vallée Poussin, *Prasannapadā*, 15.1), rather than presenting this as three points as the Tibetan in Bhāvaviveka's text does (*dnegos po rnams gzhan las skye ba 'gyur ba dang / skye ba 'bras bu dang bcas pa nyid du 'gyur ba dang /skye ba thug pa yod par 'gyur ba'i phyir*: P5253, vol. 95, 155.5.1; Golden Reprint, vol. 107, 132.5; Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur*, vol. 96, 97.7, as well as in Avalokitavrata's commentary, Golden Reprint, vol. 109, 234.2; Peking P5259, 191.1.5; Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur*, vol. 98, 148.3), reframes Buddhapālita's syllogism in its opposite form:

parasmādutpannā bhāvā janmasāphalyāt janmanirodhāceti (Things are produced from other because production has effects and because production has an end.)

The Tibetan of Chandrakīrti's text, nevertheless, as above presents this as three points: *dnegos po rnams gzhan las skye ba 'gyur ba dang / skye ba 'bras bu dang bcas pa nyid du 'gyur ba dang /skye ba thug pa yod par 'gyur ba'i phyir* (Golden Reprint, vol. 112, 13.4; Tibetan Publishing House 1968 edition, 10.19). I would render the Sanskrit into Tibetan, however, as:

dnegos po rnams gzhan las skye ba yin te/ skye ba don yod pa nyid yin pa'i phyir dang skye ba thug pa yod pa yin pa'i phyir ro/

Because of the unanimity of the Tibetan versions on this point (except for mine) and because Tsong-kha-pa and Jam-yang-shay-pa speak to these versions, I use their casting of the meaning as three points but cite the Sanskrit version throughout.

^b *de'i chos*. Avalokitavrata says:

the property of that (*de'i chos, taddharma*): the property of that thesis, that is to say, [the reason which is] the property of the subject of that thesis (*bsgrub par bya ba de'i phyogs kyi chos*), "Things are not

from other, production has effects, and production has an end, whereby [Buddhapālita] would contradict tenets [of the Middle Way School].^a

ཐལ་འགྱུར་སོ་སོ་ལ་སྐྱོན་བཟུང་ཚུལ་ནི། བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་
 པར་གྲུབ་པའི་ཐལ་བ་ལ་ཤེས་རབ་སྐྱོན་མེ་ལས། དེ་ནི་རིགས་པ་
 མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། གཏན་ཚིགས་དང་དཔེ་མ་བརྗོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་དང་།
 གཞན་གྱིས་སྐྱས་པའི་ཉེས་པ་མ་བསལ་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། ། ཐལ་བར་
 འགྱུར་བའི་ཚིག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་སྐབས་གྱི་དོན་ལས་བརྗོད་པས་
 བརྗོད་པར་བྱ་བ་དང་། དེའི་ཚོས་བརྗོད་པའི་དོན་མངོན་པས་
 དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་གཞན་ལས་སྐྱེ་བར་འགྱུར་བ་དང་། སྐྱེ་བ་འབྲས་
 བྱ་དང་བཅས་པ་ཉིད་དུ་འགྱུར་བ་དང་། སྐྱེ་བ་ཐུག་པ་ཡོད་པར་
 འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར་གྲུབ་པའི་མཐའ་དང་འགལ་བར་འགྱུར་
 རོ། །ཞེས་སོ། །

These are widely renowned. Their meaning is:

produced from self” (*dnegos po rnam bdag gi bdag nyid las skye ba med de, na svata utpadyanti bhāvāḥ*), namely, “because their production would be just senseless and because production would be endless” (*de dag gi skye ba don med pa nyid du 'gyur ba'i phyir dang skye ba thug pa med par 'gyur ba'i phyir ro, tadutpadavaiyarthī/ atiprasaṅgadoṣācca*).

what becomes evident is the meaning of the opposite of that (*de bzlog pa'i don mngon pas, viparītartha...vyakta*): what becomes evident is the meaning of the opposite of “because their production would be just senseless” (*de dag gi skye ba don med pa nyid du 'gyur ba'i phyir, tadutpadavaiyarthī*), namely, “because production has effects” (*skye ba 'bras bu dang bcas pa nyid du 'gyur ba'i phyir, janmasāphalyāt*)—and the opposite of “because production would be endless” (*skye ba thug pa med par 'gyur ba'i phyir ro, atiprasaṅgadoṣācca*)—namely, “because production has an end” (*skye ba thug pa yod pa yin pa'i phyir, janmanirodhāt*).

^a As mentioned two notes above, at the end of the second reason Jam-yang-shay-pa’s citation (374.12) reads *ro*—the equivalent of a period—which might seem to terminate the list of reasons, making it look as if there are only two reasons. In other versions, there is an “and” clearly denoting that there is a third, additional reason.

1. It does not express a reason and an example capable of proving that there is no production from self.
2. It does not avoid fallacies [adduced by Sāṃkhyas] questioning whether this is conventional or ultimate [in the Sāṃkhyas’ own system].
3. Since the thesis—the nonexistence of production from self—is not a nonaffirming negative, it contradicts the tenet, or system, of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras and Nāgārjuna’s *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called “Wisdom.”*^a

འདི་གྲགས་ཆེ་ལ། དོན་བདག་སྐྱེ་མེད་པར་སྐྱབ་ལུས་གྱི་གཏན་
 ཚིགས་དང་དཔེ་མ་བཟོན་ཅིང་། གཞན་གྱི་ཀུན་རྫོབ་དང་དོན་
 དམ་གང་ཡིན་འདྲི་བའི་ཉེས་པ་མ་བསལ་བ་དང་། བསྐྱབ་བྱ་
 བདག་སྐྱེ་མེད་པ་མེད་དགག་ཏུ་འགྱུར་པས་ཤེར་མདོ་དང་། ཚུ་
 ཤེས་གྱི་གྲུབ་མཐའ་འམ་ལུགས་དང་འགལ་བའི་དོན་ལོ།

Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s *Annotations*:^b With respect to the three fallacies:

1. Since [Buddhapālita’s commentary] does not express a reason and an example capable of proving that there is no production from self, it is reduced to a mere thesis.
2. [Buddhapālita’s commentary] does not avoid criticism by Sāṃkhyas upon examining the thesis:

About the meaning of your “from their own entities,” if you are saying “from the entities of manifest effects,” [you] are proving what is already established [for us] because we also do not assert that [things] are produced from the entities of already manifest effects. If you are saying “from potential entities that are non-manifest causes, the entailment is opposite because all that have production are only produced from those [non-manifest causes].

^a According to Tsong-kha-pa and his followers, the tenet being contradicted is that the reasonings prove a nonaffirming negative.

^b *dbu ma pa, pha*, 6.3.

3. These are phrases affording an opportunity for censure^a by another party.

The syllogism of the verbal reading (*tshig zin gyi sbyor ba*) of the first commentary [by Buddhapālita] is:

The subjects, things, are not produced from self because production is senseless and endless.

The syllogism constructed by Bhāvaviveka as being what Buddhapālita was intending (*dgongs tshod blangs pa'i sbyor ba*) is:

With respect to the subjects, things, production from self is not just eliminated because production is sensible and has an end.

[Bhāvaviveka] expresses the first two fallacies with respect to the syllogism of the verbal reading and expresses the fallacy of affording an opportunity for censure mainly with respect to the syllogism constructed as what [Buddhapālita] was intending.

ཁོ་ལོ་དེའི་སྐྱོན་གསུམ་ནི། བདག་སྐྱེ་མེད་པར་སྐྱབ་ལུས་
 པའི་རྟགས་དང་དཔེ་གང་ཡང་མ་བཟོད་པས་དམ་བཅའ་
 ཚམ་དུ་བྱད་པ་དང་། གངས་ཅན་གྱིས་བདག་ལས་ཞེས་
 པའི་དོན་འབྲས་བུ་གསལ་བའི་བདག་ཉིད་ལས་ཡིན་ན་
 བྱི་སྐྱབ་ཟེན་སྐྱབ་པ་དང་རྒྱ་མི་གསལ་བ་ལུས་པའི་བདག་

^a The translation of Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* in which Chandrakīrti cites Bhāvaviveka's criticisms of Buddhapālita, by Mahāsumati and Pa-tshab-nyi-ma-drag (*pa tshab nyi ma grags*), that Jam-yang-shay-pa uses just above reads "because these are phrases of consequences" (*thal bar 'gyur ba'i tshig yin pa'i phyir, prasāṅgavākyatvāc ca*), whereas the translation of Bhāvaviveka's *Lamp for "Wisdom,"* by Jñānagarbha and Lui-gyal-tshan (*glu'i rgyal mtshan*), that Ngag-wang-pal-dan uses reads "because there are phrases affording an opportunity for censure" (*glags yod pa'i tshig yin pa'i phyir te, sāvakāśavacanatvāc ca*). The first version seems to be merely pointing out that Buddhapālita's refutation uses consequences, whereas the second version indicates the Buddhapālita's explanation is subject to another's censure. The first version could also mean that Buddhapālita's explanation is subject to another's drawing out consequences as is suggested by Avalokitavrata's commentary on Bhāvaviveka that clearly supports the second translation. Nevertheless, the second translation does not appear to be the meaning of the same phrases, cited below, from Chandrakīrti's renditions of Bhāvaviveka's objections to Buddhapālita's refutations of production from other and of causeless production.

ཉེད་ལས་ཡིན་ན་ནི་སྐྱེ་ལྡན་ཐམས་ཅད་དེ་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་ལོ་
 ན་ཡིན་པས་བྱབ་པ་འགལ་བར་འགྱུར་རོ་ཞེས་དམ་
 བཅའ་ལ་བརྟགས་ནས་སྐྱོན་བརྗོད་པ་མ་བསལ་བ་དང་།
 སྐྱོན་བ་གཞན་གྱི་སྐྱོན་ཀའི་སྐྱགས་ཡོད་པའི་ཚོག་ཡིན་པ་
 དང་གསུམ་མོ། ། འགྲེལ་ངག་དང་པོའི་ཚོག་ཟེན་གྱི་སྐྱོར་
 བ་ནི། དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་ཚོས་ཅན། བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་
 དེ། སྐྱེ་བ་དོན་མེད་དང་ཐུག་མེད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་
 པའོ། ། ལེགས་ལྡན་གྱིས་སངས་རྒྱས་བསྐྱུངས་ཀྱི་དགོངས་
 ཚོད་སྐྱུངས་པའི་སྐྱོར་བ་ནི། དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་ཚོས་ཅན།
 བདག་སྐྱེ་རྣམ་པར་བཅད་པ་ཅམ་མིན་ཏེ། སྐྱེ་བ་དོན་
 བཅས་དང་ཐུག་བཅས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་པའོ། ། དེ་ལ་
 སྐྱོན་དང་པོ་གཉིས་ནི་དངོས་ཟེན་གྱིས་སྐྱོར་བ་ལ་བརྗོད་
 ཅིང་། སྐྱགས་ཡོད་པའི་སྐྱོན་ནི་གཙོ་ཆེར་དགོངས་ཚོད་
 སྐྱུངས་པའི་སྐྱོར་བ་ལ་བརྗོད་དོ། །

The way in which these become an opportunity for censure [by another party] is as Tsong-kha-pa's *Great Commentary on (Nāgārjuna's) "Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called 'Wisdom'"* says:

How does it become an opportunity for censure? It becomes so because it [must] be reversed from the syllogism put forward.... That [production] is senseless and endless is not the reason, and that "if produced from self, [their production] would be senseless and endless," is also not suitable as the reason because when [the reason] is established upon the subject, the proposition would be established. Therefore, the two reverse meanings are the sign [or reason]. If the sign of the explicit rendering must be reversed, then the thesis of the ex-

PLICIT rendering also must be reversed because of being parallel. About this, since [the reversal of the thesis of the explicit rendering] is not doable in accordance with how the signs are reversed, that production from self is not just eliminated is the reverse meaning [of the original thesis “Things are not produced from their own entities.”]

and:

Then, it is being said, “Because production is sensible and has an end, that things are produced from self is not just eliminated,” whereby it becomes that they are produced from other. In that case, the meaning of “is not from self” contradicts the tenet of being a mere elimination of production from self.

སྐྱུ་ལས་ཡོད་པར་འགྱུར་ཚུལ་ནི་ཙ་ཤེའི་རྟེན་ཆེན་ལས།
 སྐྱུ་ལས་ཡོད་པར་རི་ལྟར་འགྱུར་ན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་དོན་སྦྱོར་
 བ་དེ་ལས་བསྐྱོད་པས་འགྱུར་རོ། །ཞེས་པ་ནས། དོན་
 དང་ཐུག་མེད་ཀྱང་ཉལ་མེད་ལ་བདག་སྐྱེ་ཡོད་ན་
 དོན་དང་ཐུག་མེད་ཀྱང་ཉལ་མེད་སྐྱེ་ལྟར་ཉལ་མེད་ལྟར་
 གཞིའི་སྐྱེ་བ་ལྟར་བསྐྱོད་ལྟར་བསྐྱོད་དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར་
 རོ། །དེས་ན་བསྐྱོད་དོན་གཞིས་ཉལ་མེད་སྐྱེ་བ་དང་
 ཟེན་གྱི་ཉལ་མེད་བསྐྱོད་དགོས་ན་དངོས་ཟེན་གྱི་དམ་
 བཅའ་ཡང་བསྐྱོད་དགོས་ཏེ་མཚུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །
 དེ་ལ་ཉལ་མེད་བསྐྱོད་པ་ལྟར་བྱུང་མེད་པས་བདག་སྐྱེ་
 རྣམ་པར་བཅད་ཅམ་མིན་པ་བསྐྱོད་པའི་དོན་ནོ། །
 ཞེས་དང་། དེ་ཡི་ཆེ་སྐྱེ་བ་དོན་དང་ཐུག་བཅས་ཡིན་
 པའི་ཕྱིར་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་བདག་སྐྱེ་རྣམ་པར་བཅད་
 པ་ཅམ་མིན་ནོ་ཞེས་པས་གཞན་ལས་སྐྱེ་བར་འགྱུར་
 རོ། །དེ་ལྟར་བདག་ལས་མིན་ཞེས་པའི་དོན་བདག་སྐྱེ་

རྣམ་པར་བཅད་ཅམ་ཡིན་པའི་གྲུབ་མཐའ་དང་
འགལ་ལོ། །ཞིས་གསུངས་པ་ལྟར་རོ། །

[REFUTING PRODUCTION FROM OTHER]

[Bhāvaviveka]^a also speaks of fallacies in [Buddhapālita's] refutation of production from other; Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* says:^b

About this the master Buddhapālita explains:

They also are not produced from other. Why? For it would [absurdly] follow that everything would be produced from everything.

The master Bhāvaviveka repudiates this, saying:

Therefore, because this is speech of consequences, when the thesis and the means of proof are reversed, things would be produced from self, both, or causelessly and some would be produced from some, whereby the earlier position is contradicted. Also, in another way, it is because [things] would be produced from everything. Hence, since in that [commentary by Buddhapālita] there are no proof and refutation, it is senseless.

གཞན་སྐྱེ་འགོག་པའི་ཐལ་བའང་སྐྱོན་བརྗོད་དེ། ཚོག་གསལ་ལས།
འདི་ལ་སློབ་དཔོན་ལེགས་ལྡན་འབྱེད་ནི། དེས་ན་དེ་ལ་ཐལ་བར་
འགྱུར་བའི་ངག་ཡིན་པའི་སྤྱིར་བསྟར་པར་བྱ་བ་དང་སྟར་པར་
བྱེད་པ་བསྟོག་པར་བྱས་ན། དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་བདག་གམ་གཉིས་
སམ་རྒྱ་མེད་པ་ལས་སྐྱེ་བར་འགྱུར་བ་དང་། འགའ་ཞིག་ལས་
འགའ་ཞིག་སྐྱེ་བར་འགྱུར་བའི་སྤྱིར་སྟོགས་གོང་མ་དང་
[L13a]འགལ་བར་འགྱུར་རོ། །གཞན་དུ་ནའང་ཐམས་ཅད་ལས་སྐྱེ་

^a Taipei, 374.19.

^b I have lengthened Jam-yang-shay-pa's citation of Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* to include his quotation of Buddhapālita's refutation.

བར་འགྱུར་བའི་སྱིར་རྟོག་། དེ་བས་ན་དེ་ལ་བསྐྱབ་པ་དང་སྲུན་
 འབྱེན་པ་ཉིད་མེད་པའི་སྱིར་དེ་ནི་དོན་འབྲེལ་མེད་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ།
 ཞེས་སྲུན་འབྱེན་སྐྱེའོ། །ཞེས་སོ། །

The meaning is:

- If the thesis and means of proof of the explicit rendering are not reversed, then since that all are produced from all is not suitable as the reason, one's own position is not proven, and since [Buddhapālita] does not demonstrate any damage by direct perception and so forth to the assertion of production from other, the other's position is also not repudiated, whereby [his commentary] is senseless.
- If the explicit thesis and means of proof are reversed, the opposite of the reason is: some are produced from some; and the opposite of the nonexistence of production from other is: production from other exists. However, these are not suitable because this is an occasion of demonstrating that ultimately those do not exist.
- Therefore, it must be that, having turned away from a mere negation of production from other, [Buddhapālita] is proving that [things] are produced from self, both, or causelessly, whereby this contradicts the earlier position, that is, that the assertion that "[things] are not produced from other" in [Nāgārjuna's] root text is a nonaffirming negative.

དོན་ནི་དངོས་ཟིན་གྱི་བསྐྱབ་བྱ་སྐྱབ་བྱེད་མི་བསྐྱོག་ན་ཐམས་
 ཅད་ཐམས་ཅད་ལས་སྐྱེ་བར་འགྱུར་བ་རྟགས་སུ་མི་རུང་བས་
 རང་ཕྱོགས་སྐྱབ་པ་མེད་ལ། གཞན་སྐྱེ་ཁས་སྐྱངས་པ་ལ་མངོན་
 སུམ་ལ་སོགས་པའི་གཞོན་པ་གང་ཡང་^[G10b]མ་བཟུན་པས་
 གཞན་ཕྱོགས་སུན་འབྱེན་པའང་མེད་པས་འབྲེལ་མེད་ལ་བསྐྱོག་
 ན་ནི་རྟགས་ཀྱི་བསྐྱོག་དོན་འགའ་ཞིག་ལས་འགའ་ཞིག་སྐྱེ་བ་
 ཡིན་ལ་གཞན་སྐྱེ་མེད་པའི་བསྐྱོག་དོན་གཞན་སྐྱེ་ཡོད་པ་ལ་མི་
 རུང་སྟེ་དོན་དམ་པར་དེ་མེད་པར་སྟོན་པའི་སྐབས་ཡིན་པས་སོ། །
 དེས་ན་འགའ་ཞིག་ལས་འགའ་ཞིག་སྐྱེ་བའི་རྟགས་ཀྱིས་གཞན་སྐྱེ་

བཀའ་ཅོམ་ལོག་ནས་བདག་གམ་གཉིས་སམ་རྒྱ་མེད་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་
 རྒྱབ་དགོས་པས། ལྷོགས་གོང་མ་རྩ་བའི་གཞན་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མིན་
 ཞེས་པའི་མེད་དགག་ཏུ་འདོད་པ་དང་འགལ་ཞེས་པའོ། །

[Refuting Causeless Production]

[Bhāvaviveka] also speaks of fallacies in [Buddhapālita's] refutation of causeless production. Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* says:^a

The master Buddhapālita explains:

They also are not produced causelessly because it would [absurdly] follow that everything always would be produced from everything [and because there would be the fallacy that all endeavor would be just senseless].

The master Bhāvaviveka repudiates this, saying:

If this is asserted as speech manifesting a thesis and proof, then it comes to indicate that things are produced from causes because at some times some are produced from some and endeavor just has effects. However, that is not reasonable due to incurring the above-mentioned fallacy.

རྒྱ་མེད་པས་སྐྱེ་བ་འགོག་པའི་ཐལ་བ་ཡང་སྐྱོན་བརྗོད་དེ། ཚོག་
 གསལ་ལས། འདི་ལ་ཡང་སྐྱོབ་དཔོན་ལེགས་ལྷན་འབྱེད། དེ་ལ་
 ཡང་ཐལ་བར་འགྱུར་བའི་ངག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། གལ་ཏེ་བསྐྱབ་
 པར་བྱ་བ་དང་རྒྱབ་པར་བྱེད་པ་གསལ་བ་ངག་གི་དོན་ཏུ་མངོན་
 པར་འདོད་ན། དེའི་ཚེ་འདི་སྐད་ཏུ་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་རྒྱ་ལས་སྐྱེ་
 བར་འགྱུར་བ་དང་། ལན་འགའ་ཁ་ཅིག་ལས་ཁ་ཅིག་སྐྱེ་བར་
 འགྱུར་བ་དང་། ^[L13b]རྩོམ་པ་འབྲས་བུ་དང་བཅས་པ་ཉིད་ཏུ་
 འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར་མོ། ཞེས་བསྟན་པར་འགྱུར་ན། བཤད་པ། དེ་ནི་

^a Ibid.

མི་རིགས་ཏེ་སྐྱར་སྐྱོན་པའི་སྐྱོན་ཏུ་འགྱུར་བའི་སྤྱིར་རོ། ། ཞེས་
 སྐྱོན་འབྱེན་པ་སྤྱོད། ། ཞེས་སོ། །

The meaning is:

- It is not suitable to reverse the literal reading,^a and thus production from causes is implicitly indicated as the opposite meaning of the thesis of that consequence—[the thesis being] the nonaffirming negative that [things] are not produced causelessly.
- The opposite meaning of the two signs that are the proofs must be stated as “because at some times some are produced from some and endeavor has effects.”
- Hence, this has the fallacies of contradicting the assertion that the non-existence of production from the four extremes is a nonaffirming negative.

དོན་ནི་དངོས་ཟེན་ལ་བསྐྱོག་པ་མི་རུང་ལ་ཐལ་བ་དེའི་བསྐྱུ་བ་བྱ་
 རྒྱུ་མེད་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པའི་མེད་དགག་གི་བསྐྱོག་དོན་རྒྱུ་ལས་སྐྱེ་
 བ་བྱུགས་ལ་སྐྱོན་ཅིང་། སྐྱུ་བ་བྱེད་ཏུགས་གཉིས་ཀྱི་བསྐྱོག་དོན་
 རིམ་བཞིན་ལན་འགའ་ཞིག་ཁ་ཅིག་ལས་ཁ་ཅིག་སྐྱེ་བ་དང་།
 ཚུམ་པ་འབྲས་བུ་དང་བཅས་པར་འགྱུར་བའི་སྤྱིར། ཞེས་འགོད་
 དགོས་པའི་མཐའ་བཞིའི་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་མེད་དགག་ཏུ་འདོད་པ་
 དང་། འགལ་བའི་སྐྱོན་ཡོད་ཅེས་པའོ། །

*BHĀVAVIVEKA'S OWN AUTONOMOUS SYLLOGISMS [REFUTING THE FOUR
 TYPES OF PRODUCTION]*

1. The subjects, eyes and so forth, are not ultimately produced from self because of existing—as is the case, for example, with an existent consciousness.
2. The subjects, causes and effects such as semen and blood, which are causes of an eye, and the eye, which is their effect, respectively

^a The literal reading of Buddhapālita's thesis is “Things are not produced causelessly.” The opposite of that is, “Things are produced causelessly.” Bhāvaviveka's point is that this is obviously not what Buddhapālita is proving.

empty,^a inherently are not ultimately produced from other because of being other—as is the case, for example, with woolen cloth from clay.

3. Those subjects also are not ultimately produced from both [self and other] because of incurring the fallacies described for both.
4. The subject, eyes, are not causelessly produced adventitiously because of possessing general characteristics and a specific characteristic—as is the case, for example, with a pot.

Through such approaches Bhāvaviveka extensively refutes [production from the four extremes]. Below, these will be explained a little, together with sources.

ལེགས་ལྡན་རང་ཉིད་གྱིས་རང་རྒྱུད་གྱི་སྦྱོར་བ་མིག་ཚེས་ཅན།
 དོན་དམ་པར་བདག་ལས་མི་སྐྱེ་སྐྱེ། ཡིད་པའི་སྦྱིར། དཔེར་ན་བུམ་
 པ་བཞིན། མིག་གི་རྒྱ་བྱ་བྲག་དང་། འབྲས་བུ་མིག་སོགས་རྒྱ་
 འབྲས་གང་དང་གང་གིས་སྦྱོང་བ་དེ་དག་ཚེས་^[G11a]ཅན། རོ་བོ་
 ཉིད་གྱིས་དོན་དམ་པར་གཞན་ལས་མི་སྐྱེ་སྐྱེ། གཞན་ཡིན་པའི་
 སྦྱིར། དཔེར་ན་འཇིམ་པ་ལས་སྐྱམ་བུ་བཞིན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། དོན་
 དམ་པར་གཉིས་ཀ་ལས་ཀྱང་མི་སྐྱེ་སྐྱེ་གཉིས་ཀ་ལ་སྦྱོན་བཤད་པ་
 དེ་འོང་བའི་སྦྱིར། མིག་ཚེས་ཅན། རྒྱ་མེད་པར་སྦྱོར་བུ་སྦྱེ་བ་
 མིན་ཏེ། སྦྱིའི་མཚན་ཉིད་དང་བྱུང་བར་གྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་དག་དང་
 ལྡན་པའི་སྦྱིར། དཔེར་ན་བུམ་པ་བཞིན། ཞེས་པ་ལྟ་བུའི་སྦོས་རྒྱ་
 ཚེར་འགོག་སྟེ་ཤེས་བྱེད་དང་བཅས་ཅུང་ཟད་འོག་ཏུ་འཁད་དོ། །

Bhāvaviveka's opening the way in this manner occurred after Asaṅga and his [half-]brother [Vasubandhu] widely spread the system of the Mind-Only School; the fifth chapter of his *Heart of the Middle* says:

Due to pride in their own system
 Others who boasted of being wise
 Propounded that entry into the ambrosia of suchness
 Is taught well by the Yogic Practitioners.

^a gang dang gang gis stong pa de dag, translation doubtful.

and his autocommentary [the *Blaze of Reasoning*] says:

Other masters of the Great Vehicle itself—Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, and so forth—interpreted otherwise the systematic meanings thoroughly realized by Superiors who were prophesied by the One-Gone-Thus and who gained [Bodhisattva] grounds. Without shame and embarrassment, taking pride in knowing the meaning while they did not know it and taking pride in being wise, they propounded the following.

ལེགས་ལྷན་གྱིས་འདི་ལྟར་སློབ་བྱེ་བ་འདི་ཐོགས་མེད་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་
 གྱི་རྗེས་སེམས་ཅན་པའི་ལྷགས་རྒྱ་ཆེར་དར་བའི་^[L14a]སྐབས་ཡིན་
 ཏེ། དུས་མ་སྟོང་པོའི་ལེའུ་ལྲ་བ་ལས། རང་གི་ལྷགས་གྱི་ང་རྒྱལ་
 གྱིས། །མཁས་པར་རྫོམ་གཞན་འདི་སྐད་སྟུ། །དེ་ཉིད་བདུད་ཅིར་
 འཇུག་པ་ཡང་། །རྣལ་འབྱོར་སྟོན་པས་ལེགས་པར་བསྟན། །ཞེས་
 དང་། དེའི་རང་འགེལ་ལས། ཐེག་པ་ཆེན་པོ་ཉིད་གྱི་སློབ་དཔོན་
 ཐོགས་མེད་དང་། དབྱིག་གཉེན་ལ་སོགས་པ་གཞན་དག་ནི་དེ་
 བཞིན་གཤེགས་པས་ལུང་བསྟན་ཞིང་། ས་རབ་ཏུ་བརྟེན་པའི་
 འཕགས་པ་རྣམས་གྱིས་ཡང་དག་པར་རྟོགས་པའི་དོན་གྱི་ལྷགས་
 གཞན་ཏུ་འདྲན་པར་བྱེད་ཅིང་། རོ་ཚ་དང་ཁྲིལ་མེད་པ་དོན་
 རྣམ་པར་མི་ཤེས་བཞིན་ཏུ་རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་ཤིང་། མཁས་པར་ང་
 རྒྱལ་བྱེད་པ་དག་འདི་སྐད་སྟུས་ཏེ། ཞེས་སོ། །

Hence, it is evident that the master [Nāgārjuna] composed the *Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment*^a and so forth after Proponents of Mind-Only had appeared, whereby:

- the two—the master Bhāvaviveka and the master Chandrakīrti—are feasibly [Nāgārjuna's] later-phase students

^a Gung-tang (*Explanation*, 6a.5) says, “This book is called *Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment* because it explains the meaning of a stanza on the mind of enlightenment spoken by Vairochana in the second chapter of the *Guhyasamāja Tantra*.”

• and [Nāgārjuna's] living for six hundred years is also well established.
 དེས་ན་བྱང་ཆུབ་སེམས་འགྲེལ་སོགས་སྟོབ་དཔོན་གྱིས་སེམས་
 ཅམ་པ་བྱང་ནས་བརྩམ་པར་མངོན་པས། སྟོབ་དཔོན་ལེགས་ལྡན་
 དང་སྟོབ་དཔོན་ལྷ་བ་གཉིས་ཕྱི་ཚར་གྱི་སྟོབ་མར་འཐད་ཅིང་ལོ་
 སྟལ་བརྒྱར་བཞུགས་པའང་ལེགས་པར་གྲུབ་པོ། །

Jam-yang-shay-pa's *GREAT EXPOSITION OF THE MIDDLE:* Debate about opposite of the consequences within the Middle Way School

Decisive Analysis of (Chandrakīrti's) "Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle'": Treasury of Scripture and Reasoning, Thoroughly Illuminating the Profound Meaning [of Emptiness], Entrance for the Fortunate / Great Exposition of the Middle

༄༅། །དབུ་མ་འཇུག་པའི་མཐའ་དཔྱོད་ལུང་རིགས་གཉེར་མཛོད་
ཟབ་དོན་གྲུན་གསལ་སྐལ་བཟང་འཇུག་དོགས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་
བཞུགས་སོ། །

Key to the colorization: The Tibetan text and the translation are highlighted in three colors: black, blue, and red. Blue colored statements represent what Jam-yang-shay-pa considers to be right positions, while red colored statements represent what Jam-yang-shay-pa considers to be wrong positions. Black words mostly are merely neutral information or function structurally. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight indicates material added in place of ellipses, and magenta highlight sets off the ellipsis indicator when it has been filled in.

In discussing the controversy between Buddhapālita and Bhāvaviveka, Jam-yang-shay-pa first explains the Sāṃkhya position of production from self and then gives an account of Buddhapālita's refutation of that position. Jam-yang-shay-pa's text is at the margin; comments by others are indented in a three-sided box and named to clearly distinguish them from Jam-yang-shay-pa's text.

I. REFUTATION OF PRODUCTION FROM SELF
 THROUGH THE REASONING IN (NĀGĀRJUNA’S)
 “FUNDAMENTAL TREATISE ON THE MIDDLE
 CALLED ‘WISDOM’”

གཉིས་པ་རྩ་ཤེས་ཀྱི་རིགས་པས་བདག་སྐྱེ་དགག་པ་ནི།

One stanza occurs in Chandrakīrti’s root text [*Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle”*] (VI.13) and commentary:

If it is asserted that [effects] are produced from self, then if the
 produced and the producer
 And the object and the agent also become just one, then since
 those
 Those are not just one, it is not to be asserted that those are pro-
 duced from self

Because of the consequence of fallacies extensively explained.^a

རྩ་བར། བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བར་འདོད་ན་བསྐྱེད་པར་བྱ་དང་སྐྱེད་
 བྱེད་དང་། [ལས་དང་བྱེད་པ་པོ་ཡང་གཅིག་ཉིད་འགྱུར་ན་དེ་དག་ནི། གཅིག་
 ཉིད་མ་ཡིན་པས་ན་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བར་ལས་སྐྱེད་བར། བྱ་མིན་རྩ་ཆེར་བཤད་པའི་

^a Tsong-kha-pa’s commentary in the *Illumination of the Thought* says:

If it is asserted that effects are produced from self, then if the produced effects
 and the producer causes
 And the objects acted upon and the agents that are the means of acting also be-
 come just one, then since those
 Those are not just one, it is not to be asserted that those [effects] are produced
 from self

Because of the consequence of fallacies extensively explained in this treatise
 and in Nāgārjuna’s *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called “Wisdom.”*

འབྲས་བུ་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བར་འདོད་ན། བསྐྱེད་བར་བྱ་བ་འབྲས་བུ་དང་། སྐྱེད་བར་བྱེད་
 པ་རྩ་བ་དང་། གང་ཞིག་བྱ་བའི་ལས་དང་། གང་གིས་བྱེད་པའི་བྱེད་པ་པོ་ཡང་གཅིག་ཉིད་
 ཏུ་འགྱུར་ན། དེ་དག་ནི་གཅིག་ཉིད་མ་ཡིན་པས་ན། བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བར་ལས་སྐྱེད་བར་
 བྱ་བ་མིན་ཏེ། བརྟན་བཅོས་འདི་དང་རྩ་ཤེས་རྩ་ཆེར་བཤད་པའི་ཉེས་པར་ཐལ་བར་
 འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ།

ཉེས་པར་ཐལ་བར་འགྱུར་བྱེད་རྟོ།། ཞེས་སོགས་ཚོགས་བཅད་གཅིག་རྩ་
 འགྲེལ་བྱུང་།^[G150b/L204b]

This has two parts: the general meaning and a decisive analysis.

འདི་ལ་སློལ་དོན་དང་མཐའ་དཔྱད་པ་གཉིས།

A. THE GENERAL MEANING [OF THE REFUTATION OF PRODUCTION FROM SELF THROUGH THE REASONING IN (NĀGĀRJUNA’S) “FUNDAMENTAL TREATISE ON THE MIDDLE CALLED ‘WISDOM’”]

This has three parts: how Buddhapālita refutes production from self, how Bhāvaviveka criticizes that [refutation by Buddhapālita of production from self], and how Chandrakīrti explains that Buddhapālita does not have those fallacies.^a

དང་པོ་[སློལ་དོན་]ལ། སངས་རྒྱས་བསྐྱེད་སྐྱེ་བའི་བཞག་སྐྱེ་བཞག་
 ཚུལ། དེ་ལ་ལེགས་ལྷན་གྱིས་སློལ་བཟོད་ཚུལ། སངས་རྒྱས་
 བསྐྱེད་སྐྱེ་མེད་པར་ཟླ་བས་བཤད་ཚུལ་གསུམ་ལས།

1. How Buddhapālita refutes production from self

དང་པོ་[སངས་རྒྱས་བསྐྱེད་སྐྱེ་བའི་བཞག་སྐྱེ་བཞག་ཚུལ་]ལ་

A Sāṃkhya says:

It follows that a seed that is the cause of one effect, for instance, a barley stalk, and the water and manure that are conditions [for the stalk’s production] have a single partless generality (*spyi, sāmānya*)—or principal (*gtso bo, pradhāna*) or nature (*rang bzhin, prakṛti*)—having the concomitance of mutually being [the nature of the cause and of the conditions] because a common effect is observed with respect to the cause and conditions. All that

^a The first two parts are presented in this book; the third begins in the next volume.

have production exist from the time of their causes because at the time of their causes they dwell in the nature of the causes, just as, for example, a clay pot exists in the nature of the clay at the time of the clay.

གངས་ཅན་པ་ན་རེ། བས་རྒྱལ་ལྟ་བུའི་འབྲས་བུ་གཅིག་གི་རྒྱ་ས་
 བོན་དང་རྒྱུན་རྒྱ་ལྷན་ནམས་ལ་སྦྱིའམ་གཙོ་བོའམ་རང་བཞིན་ཆ་
 མེད་གཅིག་པར་ཡིན་ཚུར་ཡིན་གྱི་བྱུང་བའི་རྗེས་སོ་འགྲོ་བ་ཡོད་
 པར་ཐལ། རྒྱ་རྒྱུན་དེ་དག་ལ་འབྲས་བུ་བྱུན་མོང་བ་དམིགས་པའི་
 ཕྱིར། རྒྱེ་ལྡན་ཐམས་ཅད་རང་རྒྱུའི་དུས་ནས་ཡོད་དེ། དེ་དག་
 རང་རྒྱུའི་དུས་སུ་རྒྱུའི་རང་བཞིན་དུ་གནས་པའི་ཕྱིར། དཔེར་ན་
 རྩ་བུམ་རྒྱ་འཛིམ་པའི་དུས་སུ་འཛིམ་པའི་རང་བཞིན་དུ་ཡོད་པ་
 བཞིན།

Hopkins: The Sāṃkhyas' idea is this: The barley stalk is the effect, the barley seed is the cause, and water and manure are conditions. The causes and conditions have one partless nature such that the nature of the causes is the nature of the conditions, and the nature of the conditions is the nature of the causes. Why is the nature of the causes the nature of the conditions and vice versa? Because they both give rise to one effect. If they did not have something molding them together—some nature binding them to manifest a barley stalk—then they could not produce it. Something has to pull them all together so that they work in unison.

Here is a question about their assertion: What does the nature (*prakṛti*, *rang bzhin*) involved in a particular causation have to do with the general or “big” nature (*prakṛti*) that contains all matter? Are the big nature (*prakṛti*) containing all matter and a small nature (*prakṛti*), such as a nature shared among the cause and conditions in a particular causal sequence, the same or different? Maybe it is to avoid such a problem that they say nature (*prakṛti*) is partless.

With respect to the Sāṃkhya position that the effect exists at the time of its causes, the late Go-mang scholar Ge-dün-lo-drö said that Buddhists hold the nuance that “At the time of the seed

the stalk exists as the *entity* of the seed, but at the time of the seed the stalk does not exist.”^a This illustrates that often the differences between Sāṃkhya and Buddhism are subtle. In response to Gedün-lo-drö's statement, a Sāṃkhya might set forth the following:

It follows that the subject, a stalk, exists at the time of its causes because at the time of its causes it exists as the entity of the seed.

To this a Buddhist could say:

The fact that a stalk exists as the entity of a seed at the time of its cause, the seed, does not entail that it exists at the time of its cause, the seed.

In this lack of entailment lies the difference between Buddhism and Sāṃkhya on causation. The difference is not merely that for the Buddhist the stalk does not exist at the time of the seed; the actual difference lies in the Buddhist nuance, or refinement—that the stalk exists as the entity of the seed at the time of the seed but does not exist at the time of the seed.

We need to explore why the stalk has to exist as the entity of the seed at the time of the seed since it might seem that this would be unnecessary. It may be that the consequence of **not** holding this position is that otherwise the stalk could not be produced from the seed. To a Sāṃkhya if it exists **in** the entity of the seed, then it would have to exist; and we might think that if it exists **as** the entity of the seed, then it still has to exist, but the Buddhists say not necessarily!

Another question for a Sāṃkhya is: When does the effect exist in the cause? When does the pot exist in the clay? For instance, if you take clay from many different places, does the pot exist in that clay only when you have brought it all together? Or does it exist before the portions are brought together? Or, by extension, even pre-geologically before this world system? Does it exist in the cosmic soup? Does it exist in the former world system? If so, are Sāṃkhyas saying that everything exists at all times in every place? No, they say that an effect exists only when the conditions come together at some point; but at **what** point? I heard a debater in

^a *sa bon gyi dus su myug gu sa bon gyi ngo bor yod kyang sa bon gyi dus su myug gu med.*

Dharmśāla answer this by saying that the clay has to exist manifestly before the pot can exist there nonmanifestly.

In this vein, Dharmakīrti states an absurd consequence to a Sāṃkhya:

It follows that the place on a blade of grass where a worm is, there are a hundred elephants because this particular worm will take rebirth as an elephant in the next one hundred lifetimes.

Also, is there a pot wherever there is clay, or does a pot exist there only if someone starts making it? Seems hard to answer.

Therefore, [the Sāṃkhyas] assert that the nature of the cause and the conditions and the nature of the effect are also a partless unity and hence are mutually inclusive; for, Tsong-kha-pa's *Illumination of the Thought* says:

About this, the Sāṃkhyas say that:

- mutually individual and different causes and conditions have a single common effect, and
- since it would not be suitable if that also did not have a single concomitant principal of the same nature with the causes and conditions, that which is the nature of the cause, the barley [seed], also is the nature of the conditions, the water, manure, and so forth;
- similarly the nature of the stalk and the natures of its causes and conditions are mutually each other.

Therefore, since they assert that seed and stalk are only mutually different, they do not assert that a stalk is produced from a stalk, but they propound that a stalk is produced from the nature of the seed and that [sprout], whereupon since the two natures are one, production from its own nature and production of a nonmanifest stalk existent at the time of its causes is the mode of assertion of self-production [or production from self].

དེས་ན་རྒྱ་རྒྱུ་གྱི་རང་བཞིན་དང་འབྲས་བུའི་རང་བཞིན་ཡང་
 ཚེད་གཅིག་ཡིན་པས་པན་ཚུན་ཡིན་ཀྱང་མཉམ་དུ་འདོད་དེ།
 རྣམ་བཤད་ལས། འདི་ལ་གྲངས་ཅན་རྣམས། [རྒྱ་རྒྱུ་པན་ཚུན་སོ་སོ་ཐ་
 དང་པ་རྣམས་ལ་འབྲས་བུ་ཐུན་མོང་བ་གཅིག་ནི་ཡོད་ལ། དེ་ཡང་རྒྱ་རྒྱུ་རྣམས་ལ་
 རང་བཞིན་གཅིག་པའི་གཙོ་བོ་གཅིག་རྗེས་སུ་འགྲོ་བ་མེད་ན་མི་རུང་བས། རྒྱ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་

རང་བཞིན་གང་ཡིན་པ་ཡང་། རྒྱུ་ཚུ་ལྟ་སོགས་ཀྱི་རང་བཞིན་ཡིན་ལ། དེ་བཞིན་དུ་
 རྒྱུ་གུའི་རང་བཞིན་དང་དེའི་རྒྱ་རྒྱུ་གྱི་རང་བཞིན་རྣམས་པར་ཡིན་ཚུར་ཡིན་དུ་
 འདོད་དེ། རྣམ་འགྲུར་ཐམས་ཅད་ཀྱི་རང་བཞིན་རྣམས་དེ་ལྟར་དུ་འདོད་དོ། དེའི་
 ཕྱིར་ས་རྒྱལ་པན་ཚུན་ཐ་དང་པ་ཁོ་ནར་འདོད་པས་རྒྱུ་གུ་རྒྱུ་གུ་ལས་སྐྱེ་བར་མི་འདོད་
 ཀྱང་། རྒྱུ་གུ་ནི་ས་བོན་དང་དེའི་རང་བཞིན་ལས་སྐྱེ་བར་སྐྱ་བ་ན། རང་བཞིན་གཉིས་
 གཅིག་ཡིན་པས་རང་གི་རང་བཞིན་ལས་ཀྱང་སྐྱེ་བ་དང་རྒྱུ་གུ་མི་གསལ་བ་རྒྱ་དུས་ན་
 ཡོད་པ་སྐྱེ་བ་ནི་བདག་སྐྱེའི། ཞེས་པ་ནས། འདོད་ཚུལ་ཞེས་སོ། །

Moreover, some Sāṃkhyas do not assert **production** (*skye ba, utpāda*) of [a stalk] from the generality [that is, the nature] but assert **manifestation** (*gsal ba*) because these Sāṃkhyas assert a mode of oneness of entity of the two, generality and manifestation, and a mode of establishment of the two, generality and manifestation, as explained above.

ཡང་གངས་ཅན་ཁ་ཅིག་སྐྱེ་ལས་དེ་སྐྱེ་བར་མི་འདོད་ལ་གསལ་
 བར་འདོད་དེ། འདིས་ཀྱང་སྐྱེ་གསལ་གཉིས་ངོ་བོ་གཅིག་ཚུལ་
 དང་གྲུབ་ཚུལ་སྐྱ་མ་ལྟར་འདོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །

Hopkins: Some Sāṃkhyas do not use the vocabulary of production; they use the vocabulary of manifestation. Buddhists reply that the same faults hold because whatever Buddhists challenge about production will apply to manifestation; thus the change in vocabulary does not mitigate the attack.

How generality and manifestation are one entity is easy to understand, but what does “mode of establishment” mean? The generality, also called the nature, is the nonmanifest, and the manifestation is the manifest, but are these cause and effect? In other words, just as in the assertion as explained earlier the Sāṃkhyas said that “all that have production exist from the time of their causes,” so do these other Sāṃkhyas say that “all **manifestations** exist from the time of their causes.” Do Sāṃkhyas in fact assert that all manifestations are present at the time of their causes? Let us look at it formally:

The subject, a manifestation, exists at the time of its nonmanifest state.

If the Sāṃkhya says, “No,” a Buddhist could say:

Then it is not the case that the subject, produced things, exist at the time of their causes—that is to say, at the time of their nonmanifest state.

Buddhists claim that at this point Sāṃkhya are forced to accept a contradiction with their own tenets. However, to maintain the Sāṃkhya position here it would have to be held that the vocabulary of existence has no applicability to manifestation, for, if it did, then everything would have to be manifest. Only if somehow manifestation is not included in “produced things” could it be outside the context of the discussion, but how could a manifestation be outside “produced things”? For it is by certain causes and conditions—the main topics of production—that things become manifest.

There is a way that the master Buddhapālita flings consequences at such an assertion because upon Buddhapālita's setting the thesis, “Things are not produced from their own entities,” someone wonders, “What fault is there if [things] are produced from self?” and he briefly indicates, in a nominal way, damage by two [unwanted] consequences:

Because there come to be the fallacies that their production [again] would be just senseless and, not only that, would also be endless.^a

དེ་སྣང་འདོད་པ་ལ་སློབ་དཔོན་སངས་རྒྱས་བསྐྱེད་སྐྱེས་ཀྱིས་ཐལ་
འགྱུར་འཕངས་ཚུལ་ཡོད་དེ། སངས་རྒྱས་བསྐྱེད་སྐྱེས་དངོས་པོ་
རྣམས་བདག་གི་བདག་ཉིད་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་ཅེས་དམ་བཅའ་
བཞག་པ་ལ་ཁོ་ན་རེ། བདག་ལས་^[L205a]སྐྱེ་ན་ཅི་ཉེས་སྣང་པ་ལ།

^a Jam-yang-shay-pa's phrase “would also be endless” (*thug med du yang 'gyur ba*) renders the Sanskrit *atiprasaṅgadoṣa* as found in Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words*, which is translated into Tibetan there as *shin tu thal bar 'gyur ba'i skyon*, which literally means “the fallacy of great absurdity” but has a secondary meaning of endlessness. Jam-yang-shay-pa renders *atiprasaṅgadoṣa* as *thug pa med pa 'gyur ba* to convey this latter meaning and to accord with the Tibetan translation of Buddhapālita's text (P5242, vol. 95, 75.1.6) as well as the Tibetan translation of Bhāvaviveka's rendition (P5253, vol. 95, 155.4.7) of Buddhapālita's statement and Avalokitavrata's commentary on Bhāvaviveka (P5259, vol. 96, 190.3.1) as well as Tsong-kha-pa's commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle* (Varaṅsī, 1973, 52.4). Thus, I use it throughout. Also, we know that this Tibetan rendition is an accurate reflection of the Sanskrit because later in Chandrakīrti's text he cites *atiprasaṅga* as the opposite of *utpādanirodha* which means “limit to production.”

དེ་དག་གི་སྐྱེ་བ་དེ་དོན་མེད་དུ་འགྱུར་བ་དང་། དེར་མ་ཟེན་ལུག་
 མེད་དུ་ཡང་འགྱུར་བའི་སྐྱོན་འོང་བའི་སྤྱིར། ཞེས་ཐལ་འགྱུར་
 གཉིས་ཀྱིས་གཞོན་བྱེད་མིང་གི་སྐོར་མདོར་བསྟན་པའི་སྤྱིར།

Hopkins: Jam-yang-shay-pa has carefully structured Buddhapālita's brief indication so that it is a general thesis (*dam bca'*, *pratijñā*), "Things are not produced from their own entities," separate from an expression of faults that come if things are produced from self: "Their production [again] would be just senseless and, not only that, would also be endless." Buddhapālita himself did not spell it out quite so clearly.

Buddhapālita's Commentary says:^a

Things are not produced from their own entities because their production [again] would be just senseless and because production would be endless. (*na svata utpadyante bhāvāḥ/ tadutpada-vaivarthyāt atiprasaṅgdoṣācca*;^b *ngos po rnam bdag las skye ba med de de dag gi skye ba don med par 'gyur ba'i phyir dang/ shin tu thal bar 'gyur ba'i phyir*)

བྱུང་བ་ལེ་ཏུ་ལས། དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་བདག་གི་བདག་ཉིད་ལས་སྐྱེ་
 བ་མེད་དེ། དེ་དག་གི་སྐྱེ་བ་དོན་མེད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་འགྱུར་བའི་སྤྱིར་
 དང་། ཤིན་ཏུ་ཐལ་བར་འགྱུར་བའི་སྤྱིར་རོ། ། ཞེས་སོ། །

There is a way that Buddhapālita flings the consequence that production would be senseless because he flings this:

It follows with respect to the subject, a stalk, that its production-again is senseless because of already existing in its own entity.

Hopkins: "Because of already existing in its own entity" (*bdag gi bdag nyid du yod pa'i phyir*) is replaced in Jam-yang-shay-pa's text as "because of existing at the time of its causes" (*rang gi rgyu dus nas yod pa'i phyir*) which is like Tsong-kha-pa's rendition quoted near the end of this section, "Also, if the manifestation

^a See Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, 818 note 374.

^b The Sanskrit is as cited by Chandrakīrti (La Vallée Poussin, *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās avec la Prasannapadā*, 14.1).

does not exist previously, [the Sāṃkhya] has fallen from the position that only what previously exists in [its] causes is produced.” Jam-yang-shay-pa later rejects a reading very similar to this on the grounds that in his “extensive explanation” Buddhapālita says “things that already exist in their own entities” and not “existing at the time of their causes.”

སྐྱེ་བ་དོན་མེད་དུ་ཐལ་བ་འཕངས་ཚུལ་ཡོད་དེ། ལྷུ་གུ་ཚེས་ཅན།
སྐྱེ་བ་དོན་མེད་དུ་ཐལ། རང་གི་རྐྱེན་དུས་ནས་ཡོད་པའི་
སྐྱེ་བ་ཞེས་འཕངས་པའི་སྐྱེ་བ།

To this, the Sāṃkhya says that something's already existing in its own entity does not entail that its production-again is senseless. There is a way that [Buddhapālita] flings at that the second consequence of endlessness because he flings this:

It follows with respect to the subject, a stalk, that its production is endless because though it already exists in its own entity, there is sense in, or a need for, its production-again.

དེ་ལ་གངས་ཅན་གྱིས་[རང་གི་རྐྱེན་དུས་ནས་ཡོད་ན་སྐྱེ་བ་དོན་མེད་
པས་]མ་ཁྱབ་ཟེར་བ་ལ། ^[G151a]ཐལ་འགྱུར་གཉིས་པ་ལྷུ་གུ་མེད་དུ་
ཐལ་བ་འཕངས་ཚུལ་ཡོད་དེ། ལྷུ་གུ་ཚེས་ཅན། བྱོད་ཀྱི་སྐྱེ་བ་ལ་
ལྷུ་གུ་པ་མེད་པར་ཐལ། རང་གི་རྐྱེན་དུས་ནས་གྲུབ་ཟེན་གྱང་སྐྱེ་
ཡང་སྐྱེ་བ་ལ་དགོས་པའམ་དོན་ཡོད་པའི་སྐྱེ་བ་ཞེས་འཕངས་
པའི་སྐྱེ་བ།

For, *Buddhapālita's Commentary* says:

There is no need for production-again (*yang skye ba*, *punarutpāda*) of things that already exist in their own entities. If, though existent, they are produced, they would never not be produced. (*na hi svātmanā vidamānām padārthānām panarutpāde prayoga-namasti/ atha sannapi jāyayeta/ na kadā cinna jāyeta, dngos po bdag gi bdag nyid du yod pa rnam la ni yang skye ba la dgos pa med do// ci ste yod kyang skye na nam yang mi skye bar mi 'gyur ro*)

བྱུང་བ་ལི་ཏ་ལས། དངོས་པོ་བདག་གི་བདག་ཉིད་དུ་ཡོད་པ་
 རྣམས་ལ་ནི་ཡང་སྐྱེ་བ་ལ་དགོས་པ་མེད་དོ། ། ཅི་སྐྱེ་ཡོད་ཀྱང་སྐྱེ་
 བ་ལ་ཡང་མི་སྐྱེ་བར་མི་འགྱུར་རོ། ། ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

To this also, [the Sāṃkhya] says that the fact that though something already exists in its own entity, there is sense in its re-production does not necessitate that production of that thing is endless because [the Sāṃkhya] thinks that what is existent but nonmanifest requires production into a manifest [state] and thus [holds] that there is no entailment in the earlier consequence, and [also] thinks that this consequence is not entailed by the reason, since what has already manifested does not require production. For Tsong-kha-pa’s *Ocean of Reasoning* says:

The other party propounds that the two consequences, former and latter, have no logical entailment, since what exists nonmanifestly in a potential entity requires production and what is already manifest does not require production. However, they cannot dispel the faults [adduced by Buddhapālita].

Hopkins: The Sāṃkhya, maintaining that there is sense in re-production, states, “What is existent but nonmanifest does indeed require production in manifest form.”

འདི་ལ་འང་། [རང་གི་རྐྱེད་ལ་ལྷན་སྐྱབ་ཟེན་ཀྱང་སྐྱེ་བ་ལ་དགོས་པ་འཇམ་
 དོན་ཡོད་ན་ཚུད་ཀྱི་སྐྱེ་བ་ལ་ཐུག་པ་མེད་པས་]མ་འབྲུག་ཟེར་བ་ཡིན་ཏེ། ཡོད་
 ཀྱང་མི་གསལ་བ་གསལ་བར་སྐྱེ་དགོས་པས་འགྱུར་སྐྱེ་མར་མ་
 འབྲུག་ལ། གསལ་ཟེན་ནས་སྐྱེ་མི་དགོས་པས་ཐལ་འགྱུར་འདི་ལ་མ་
 འབྲུག་སྐྱེ་བའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། རིགས་པའི་རྒྱ་མཚོ་ལས། དེ་ལ་པ་རོལ་
 པོས་རྣམས་པའི་ངོ་བོར་མི་གསལ་བར་^[L205b]ཡོད་པ་གསལ་བར་སྐྱེ་
 དགོས་པ་དང་། གསལ་ཟེན་ནས་སྐྱེ་མི་དགོས་པས་ཐལ་བ་སྐྱེ་
 གཉིས་ལ་འབྲུག་པ་མེད་ཅེས་སྐྱེ་མོད་ཀྱང་སྐྱེ་བའི་རྣམས་ཏེ། ཞེས་
 གསུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

It follows that although [Sāṃkhyas] plant the response, “No entailment,” to those two consequences, they have not planted a correct response [because of the following absurd consequences:] It [absurdly] follows that the subject, a manifestation, is not produced again because of existing from the time of its causes [or because of existing in its own entity]. If [Sāṃkhyas answer that] it is not established that a manifestation exists from the time of its causes [or in its own entity], then it follows that it is not the case that all things having production are things that, existing previously, are produced into the manifest [entities] by conditions because this is not the case with respect to a manifestation. If earlier [Sāṃkhyas] say that something's existing from the time of its causes [or in its own entity] does not necessitate that it is not produced again, then it [absurdly] follows about the subject, a manifestation, that its production is endless because though it exists from time of unmanifest state, it has a need for production-again. Tsong-kha-pa's *Ocean of Reasoning* says:

However, they cannot dispel the faults [adduced by Buddhapālita], for if a manifestation exists from before, it does not need to be produced into that [manifest state], but if—though existent from before—it is produced, [its production] would be endless. [Hence, the fallacies] remain as before. Also, if the manifestation does not exist previously, [the Sāṃkhya] has fallen from the position that only what previously exists in [its] causes is produced.

ཐལ་འགྲུར་དེ་གཉིས་ལ་མ་བྱུང་གི་ལན་བཏབ་ཀྱང་ལན་རྣམ་
 དག་མི་ཐེབ་པར་ཐལ། དེ་ལ་གསལ་བ་ཚོས་ཅན། སྐར་ཡང་མི་སྐྱེ་
 བར་ཐལ། རྒྱ་དུས་ནས་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར། [རྒྱ་དུས་ནས་ཡོད་པ་]མ་གྲུབ་
 བ། འོ་ན། སྐྱེ་ལྡན་ཐམས་ཅད་སྐར་ཡོད་རྒྱལ་གྱིས་གསལ་བར་
 སྐྱེ་བ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། གསལ་བ་ལ་དེའི་ཕྱིར། ལོང་དུ་[རྒྱ་དུས་ནས་
 ཡོད་ན་སྐར་ཡང་མི་སྐྱེ་བས་]མ་བྱུང་ན། གསལ་བ་ཚོས་ཅན། ལྷོད་གི་སྐྱེ་
 བ་ཐུག་མེད་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ལྷོད་རང་རྒྱའི་དུས་ནས་ཡོད་ཀྱང་
 སྐར་སྐྱེ་བ་དགོས་པ་དང་བཅས་པའི་ཕྱིར། རིགས་པའི་རྒྱ་མཚོ་
 ལས། སྐྱ་མོད་ཀྱང་སྐྱོན་སྤོང་མི་བུས་ཏེ། གསལ་བ་ལྟ་ནས་ཡོད་ན་
 དེར་སྐྱེ་མི་དགོས་ལ་ལྟ་ནས་ཡོད་ཀྱང་སྐྱེ་ན་ཐུག་མེད་སོ་ན་

གནས་ཤིང་གསལ་བ་སྣར་མེད་ན་རྒྱལ་སྣར་ཡོད་ཁོ་ན་སྐྱེ་བའི་
 ལྷོགས་ཉམས་སོ། ། ཞིས་སོ། །

Hopkins: Let us summarize by going back to Buddhapālita's first consequence and re-enacting the debate.

Buddhist: With respect to the subject, a stalk, its re-production is senseless because of existing from the time of its causes.

Sāṃkhya: Something's existing from the time of its causes does not entail that its re-production is senseless. (*ma khyab*)

Now, instead of proceeding to the second consequence of endlessness, let us introduce the topic of manifestation as it comes to bear on this first consequence of senselessness:

Buddhist: Show me that there is no entailment. (*ma khyab te*)

Sāṃkhya: There is purpose in what is nonmanifest being produced into manifest [form].

Buddhist: It follows with respect to the subject, a manifest stalk, that its re-production does not exist because of existing from the time of its causes.

Sāṃkhya: It is not established that a manifest stalk exists from the time of its causes.

Buddhist: You have contradicted your root thesis (*rtsa ba'i dam bca' 'gal*) that all things having production are previously existent and produced into manifest form by conditions.

Wherever the Buddhist's responses are put—after the Sāṃkhya's response to the first consequence or the second one—the conclusion is the same.

2. How Bhāvaviveka criticizes this [refutation by Buddhapālita of production from self]

There is a way that Bhāvaviveka criticizes this [refutation of production of self by Buddhapālita] because the basis of his criticism is that [Bhāvaviveka] did not consider the brief indication [of refutation of production from self given in the first sentence] of Buddhapālita’s commentary to be as the [more] extensive explanation is [in the next two sentences], and therefore he did not think that Buddhapālita was flinging [the consequences] that production-again would be senseless and endless, and thus he criticized only the text of the brief indication,

གཉིས་པ་[སངས་རྒྱལ་བསྐྱེད་ཀྱིས་བདག་སྐྱེ་བཀག་ཚུལ་]དེ་ལ་ལེགས་ལྡན་
 གྱིས་སྐྱེན་བརྗོད་ཚུལ་ཡོད་དེ། སྐྱེན་བརྗོད་ཀྱི་གཞི་སངས་རྒྱལ་
 བསྐྱེད་ཀྱི་འགྲེལ་པའི་མདོར་བཟུང་རྒྱལ་བཤད་དེ་ལྟར་ཡིན་
 པར་མ་དགོངས་ཤིང་། དེས་ན་མདོར་བཟུང་གྱིས་སྐྱེན་ཡང་སྐྱེ་བ་
 དོན་མེད་དང་^[G151b]ལྷན་མེད་དུ་འཕངས་པར་མ་དགོངས་ནས་
 མདོར་བཟུང་གྱི་གཞུང་ཁོ་ན་ལ་སྐྱེན་བརྗོད་མཚན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ།

Hopkins: Buddhapālita’s brief indication is, “Things are not produced from their own entities because their production would be just senseless and because production would be endless.” However, his extensive explanation is: “There is no need for production-again (*yang skye ba, punarutpāda*) of things that already exist in their own entities. If, though existent, they are produced, they would never not be produced.”

Jam-yang-shay-pa maintains that even Buddhapālita’s brief indication flings the two consequences of senselessness and endlessness because one must see the brief indication in the context of the extensive explanation.^a

^a The Tibetan makes it clearer than the Sanskrit that these statements in the brief indication could be consequences. Tibetan: *de dag gi skye ba don med pa nyid du 'gyur ba'i phyir dang/ skye ba thug pa med par 'gyur ba'i phyir ro*; Sanskrit: *tadutpādavaiyarthyaṭ atiprasaṅgadoṣācca*. The presence of 'gyur ba in the Tibetan facilitates reading these statements as consequences rather than as syllogisms, whereas the Sanskrit is ambiguous in that

because Bhāvaviveka's *Lamp for (Nāgārjuna's) "Wisdom"* says:

About this, another^a [namely, Buddhapālita] makes the explanation, "Things are not produced from their own entities because their production would be just senseless and because production would be endless."

That is not reasonable^b (1) because [Buddhapālita] does not express a reason [capable of proving that there is no production from self] as well as an example; (2) because [the reasoning as Buddhapālita states it] does not avoid the fallacies adduced by another [that is, the fallacies that a Sāṃkhya would be expected to adduce]; and (3) because [Buddhapālita's] words afford an oppor-

regard. The difference in English is between "because their production *would be* senseless" which contains the consequence-style reading as opposed to "because their production *is* senseless" for the syllogistic reading. The term *atiprasaṅga* in the Sanskrit of the second fallacy indicates "endless," not "consequence."

^a That is, other than Bhāvaviveka himself.

^b The Sanskrit of this paragraph, as Chandrakīrti cites it (La Vallée Poussin, *Prasannapadā*, 14.4), is:

*tadayuktam/ hetudṛṣṭāntānabhīdhānāt/ paroktadoṣāparihārācca/
prasaṅgavākyatvācca prakṛtārthaviparyayeṇa viparītarthasādhyataddhar-
mavyaktau parasmādutpannā bhāvā janmasāphalyāt/ janmanirodhāceti kṛtān-
tavirodhaḥ syāt//*

The Tibetan as it appears in Bhāvaviveka's text (Golden Reprint, vol. 107, 132.4) is:

*de ni rigs pa ma yin te/gtan tshigs dang dpe ma brjod pa'i phyir dang / gzhan
gyis smras pa'i nyes pa ma bsal ba'i phyir ro// glags yod pa'i tshig yin pa'i phyir
te/ skabs kyi don las bzlog pas sgrub par bya ba dang /de'i chos bzlog pa'i don
mngon pas dngos po rnam's gzhan las skye bar 'gyur ba dang / skye ba 'bras bu
dang bcas pa nyid du 'gyur ba dang / skye ba thug pa yod par 'gyur ba'i phyir
mdzad pa'i mtha' dang 'gal bar 'gyur ro//*

A slightly different Tibetan translation is found in Avalokitavrata's commentary on Bhāvaviveka (P5259, vol. 96, 190.3.8):

*de ni rigs pa ma yin te/gtan tshigs dang dpe ma brjod pa'i phyir dang / gzhan
gyis smras pa'i nyes pa ma bsal ba **dang** // glags yod pa'i tshig **yang** yin pa'i
phyir te/ skabs kyi don las bzlog pas sgrub par bya ba dang /de'i chos bzlog pa'i
don mngon pas dngos po rnam's gzhan las skye bar 'gyur ba dang / skye ba 'bras
bu dang bcas pa nyid du 'gyur ba dang / skye ba thug pa yod par 'gyur ba'i phyir
mdzad pa'i mtha' dang 'gal bar 'gyur ro//*

See also the next two footnotes.

tunity [to an opponent to expose contradiction within his own system].^a

ཤེས་རབ་སྐྱོན་མེ་ལས། འདི་ལ་གཞན་གྱིས་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་
 བདག་གི་བདག་ཉིད་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་དེ། དེ་དག་གི་སྐྱེ་བ་དོན་
 མེད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་^[L206a]འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར་དང་། ལུག་པ་མེད་པར་

^a The third fault *prasaṅgavyatvacca* is translated in the Peking edition of Bhāvaviveka's text (vol. 95 155.5.1, trans. by Jñānagarbha and Lui-gyal-tshan [*glu'i rgyal mtshan*]) as *glags yod pa'i tshig yin pa'i phyir te* but in the Peking edition of the *Clear Words* (vol. 98 4.4.4, and in the *Shes rig par khang* edition, 10.17, trans. by Mahāsumati and Pa-tshab Nyi-ma-drag [*pa tshab nyi ma grags*]) as *thal bar 'gyur ba'i tshig yin pa'i phyir*, and in Avalokitavrata's commentary on Bhāvaviveka (P5259, vol. 96 190.3.8) as *glags yod pa'i tshig yin pa'i yang phyir te*. Only in the last is the final *ca* of the Sanskrit represented by *yang*, allowing it to be read as a third reason for the unsuitability of Buddhapāli's refutation. In his commentary on the *Treatise* Tsong-kha-pa (1973 Varanasi edition, 52.12) points out the discrepancy in translation, indicating that he favors *glags yod pa'i tshig yin pa'i yang phyir te* as it is in the edition of Bhāvaviveka he had before him and in Avalokitavrata, in the sense of meaning, "[Buddhapāli's exposition] is also unsuitable because of having words that afford an opportunity [to an opponent to expose contradiction within his own system]." Tsong-kha-pa identifies that this is Avalokitavrata's explanation, and it indeed is as can be seen in his text. The Tibetan of that, in vol. 96 190.4.7 is:

གནས་བརྟན་བརྟུག་སྐྱོན་ལེ་ཉས་རྣམ་པར་བཤད་པ་དེ་ནི་ཚོལ་བ་གཞན་གྱི་ལྟན་ཀའི་
 སྐྱགས་ཡོད་པའི་ཚོག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཡང་རིགས་པ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། ། ཡང་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་སྐྱེ་ནི་
 གཏུ་ཚོགས་དང་དབེ་མ་བརྗོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་དང་གཞན་གྱིས་སྐྱེ་བའི་ཞེས་པ་མ་བསལ་
 བའི་ཕྱིར་རིགས་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་འབའ་ཞིག་ཏུ་མ་ཟད་ཀྱི། དེ་ནི་སྐྱགས་ཡོད་པའི་ཚོག་
 ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཡང་རིགས་པ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བར་སྐྱུར་རོ། །

In this explanation *prasaṅgavyatvacca* has the sense of “because of being a statement that is *susceptible* to [absurd] consequences” in the sense of affording an opportunity to an opponent to find holes in one’s argument, rather than just meaning “because of being a statement of [absurd] consequences.” Thus, this is not a description of Buddhapāli’s commentary as containing consequences but an indication that it is susceptible to the absurd consequence of contradicting a basic Madhyamika tenet. The remainder of the passage then spells out what that inner contradiction is. In this reading, the phrase is taken as a third reason, not as a reason beginning the next sentence. This is also Jam-yang-shay-ba’s opinion (*Great Exposition of the Middle*, 264b.2-6), based on Avalokitavrata. Thus although the Tibetan of this paragraph here should read: *de ni rigs pa ma yin te, gtan tshigs dang bpe ma brjod pa'i phyir dang/ gzhan gyis smras pa'i nyes pa ma gsal ba'i phyir dang/ glags yod pa'i tshig yin pa'i phyir*, Jam-yang-shay-pa here has *ro* instead *dang* though he later makes the correction. This discrepancy in his own versions is incomprehensible.

འགྱུར་བའི་སྐྱུར་རོ། ། ཞེས་རྣམ་པར་འཆད་པར་བྱེད་དོ། ། དེ་ནི་
 རིགས་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། གཏན་ཚིགས་དང་དཔེ་མ་བརྗོད་པའི་སྐྱུར་
 དང་། གཞན་གྱིས་སྐྱུར་བའི་ཉེས་པ་མ་བསལ་བའི་སྐྱུར་རོ། །
 སྐྱུར་ཡོད་པའི་ཚིག་ཡིན་པའི་སྐྱུར།

Hopkins: With regard to the first reason why Buddhapālita's statement is not acceptable—[Buddhapālita] does not express a reason as well as an example—we should note that, even from Bhāvaviveka's perspective, Buddhapālita **tried** to give a reason. “Things are not produced from their own entities” is the thesis, and “because their production would be just senseless and because production would be endless” is the reason. Hence, even from Bhāvaviveka's perspective, Buddhapālita did try to express a reason; thus, what Bhāvaviveka means is that Buddhapālita did not express a **proper** reason capable of refuting production from self. Bhāvaviveka probably thought that Buddhapālita tried to state a reason but only gave a bogus one, which then means he did not state a reason. Still, he most likely thought that Buddhapālita did not offer an example of any sort.

The third fault means that Buddhapālita's statement is unsuitable because it is susceptible to somebody else pointing out that he is contradicting his own tenets—it provides an opportunity for refutation.

Bhāvaviveka continues his indictment of Buddhapālita:

[His explanation affords such an opportunity] because since [the thesis and the reason must] be reversed from the meaning put forward, and hence what becomes evident is the meaning of the opposite of the thesis and the property of that [that is, the opposite of the reason]—things are produced from other and production has effects and production has an end^a—due to which [Buddhapālita]

^a The Sanskrit, as Chandrakīrti cites it (La Vallée Poussin, *Prasannapadā*, 15.1), rather than presenting this as three points as the Tibetan in Bhāvaviveka's text does (*ngos po rnams gzhan las skye ba 'gyur ba dang / skye ba 'bras bu dang bcas pa nyid du 'gyur ba dang / skye ba thug pa yod par 'gyur ba 'i phyir*: P5253, vol. 95, 155.5.1; Golden Reprint, vol. 107, 132.5; Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur*, vol. 96, 97.7, as well as in Avalokitavrata's commentary, Golden Reprint, vol. 109, 234.2; Peking P5259, 191.1.5; Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur*, vol. 98, 148,3), reframes Buddhapālita's syllogism in its opposite form:

would contradict tenets [of the Middle Way School].

སྐབས་ཀྱི་དོན་ལས་བསྐྱོག་པར་འགྱུར་བ་དང་། དེའི་ཚོས་བསྐྱོག་
 པའི་དོན་མངོན་པས་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་གཞན་ལས་སྐྱེ་བར་འགྱུར་
 བ་དང་། སྐྱེ་བ་འབྲས་བུ་དང་བཅས་པ་ཉིད་དུ་འགྱུར་བ་དང་། སྐྱེ་
 བ་སྐྱུག་པ་ཡོད་པར་འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར་མཛད་པའི་མཐའ་དང་
 འགལ་བར་འགྱུར་རོ། ། ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Hopkins: That is all that Bhāvaviveka says; he does not elaborate further. That is left for his successors right up to the present day to determine, as Jam-yang-shay-pa now does.

The meaning. The master Bhāvaviveka is saying:

The words of Buddhapālita's commentary refuting production from self are not reasonable because they incur three faults:

1. The fault that the syllogism indicated by that [brief commentary] does not express a reason and an example capable of proving that there is no production from self.
2. The fault that it does not avoid criticism by Sāṃkhyas that either it is proving what is already established [for them] or it lacks entailment, [proving] the opposite.
3. The fault that it affords an opportunity for censure by another party.

parasmāduppannā bhāvā janmasāpalyāt janmanirodhāceti (Things are produced from other because production has effects and because production has an end.)

The Tibetan of Chandrakīrti's text, nevertheless, is as above: *dnegos po rnams gzhan las skye ba 'gyur ba dang / skye ba 'bras bu dang bcas pa nyid du 'gyur ba dang /skye ba thug pa yod par 'gyur ba'i phyir* (Golden Reprint, vol. 112, 13.4; Tibetan Publishing House 1968 edition, 10.19). I would render the Sanskrit into Tibetan, however, as:

dnegos po rnams gzhan las skye ba yin te/ skye ba don yod pa nyid yin pa'i phyir dang skye ba thug pa yod pa yin pa'i phyir ro/

Because of the unanimity of the Tibetan versions on this point (except for mine) and because Tsong-kha-pa and Jam-yang-shay-pa speak to these versions, I use their casting of the meaning as three points but cite the Sanskrit version throughout.

འདིའི་དོན་ནི་སྐྱོབ་དཔོན་ལེགས་ལྡན་གྱིས་སངས་རྒྱས་བསྐྱེད་སྐྱོབ་བྱས་པའི་འགྲེལ་པའི་ཚིགས་དེ་ནི་མི་རིགས་ཏེ།
 དེས་བསྟན་པའི་སྐྱོར་བ་དེས་བདག་སྐྱེ་མེད་པ་སྐྱབ་ལུས་གྱི་
 ཉུགས་དང་དཔེ་མ་བརྗོད་པའི་སྐྱོན་དང་། གངས་ཅན་གྱིས་གྲུབ་
 ཟེན་སྐྱབ་པའམ་བྱུང་བ་འགལ་བའི་སྐྱོན་བརྗོད་ཡོད་པ་མ་བསལ་
 བའི་སྐྱོན་དང་། རྣོལ་བ་གཞན་གྱི་སྐྱོན་ཀའི་སྐྱགས་ཡོད་པའི་སྐྱོན་
 གསུམ་འབྱུང་བའི་ཕྱིར།

Hopkins: Why does Bhāvaviveka feel that Buddhapālita's brief indication cannot prove that there is no production from self? He does not explain this; however, Avalokitavrata,^a Chandrakīrti, and so forth, probe what Bhāvaviveka thought about this as will be detailed later. Here Jam-yang-shay-pa continues spelling out what Bhāvaviveka was thinking:

The first [part of the reason which is that the syllogism indicated by that (brief commentary) does not express a reason and an example capable of proving that there is no production from self] is established because although Buddhapālita's commentary in its verbal reading (*thig zin la*) states:

The subjects, things, are not produced from their own entities because production would be senseless and endless,

what Buddhapālita actually intended (*bsam tshod la*) to state was “because production is sensible and has an end.” The reason [that is, “although...end”] is easy [to establish].

དང་པོ་[དེས་བསྟན་པའི་སྐྱོར་བ་དེས་བདག་སྐྱེ་མེད་པ་སྐྱབ་ལུས་གྱི་ཉུགས་དང་དཔེ་
 མ་བརྗོད་པར་]གྲུབ་སྟེ། བྱིད་ཀྱི་འགྲེལ་པས་སྐྱོར་བ་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་
 ཚོས་ཅན། བདག་གི་བདག་ཉིད་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་དེ། སྐྱེ་བ་དོན་
 མེད་དང་སྐྱུག་མེད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་ཚིག་ཟེན་ལ་བཀོད་ཀྱང་།

^a Avalokitavrata was in Bhāvaviveka's lineage but not his student.

བསམ་ཚིང་ལ་དོན་བཅས་དང་ལྷག་བཅས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེས་
 བཀོད་པ་དེའི་ཕྱིར། [ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་འགྲེལ་པས་སྐྱོར་བ་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་ཚོས་ཅན།
 བདག་གི་བདག་ཉིད་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་དེ། སྐྱེ་བ་དོན་མེད་དང་ལྷག་མེད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།
 ཞེས་ཚིག་ཟིན་ལ་བཀོད་ཀྱང་བསམ་ཚིང་ལ་དོན་བཅས་དང་ལྷག་བཅས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་
 ཞེས་བཀོད་པ་དེའི་] ཉུགས་སྒྲ།

[That Buddhapālita states such] necessitates [his being subject to the first fault] because in that case [his commentary] is reduced to a mere thesis and this syllogism cannot prove that there is no production from self. It follows [that in that case (his commentary) is reduced to a mere thesis and that this syllogism cannot prove that there is no production from self] because it does not express a reason and an example that can refute production from self as in [my own—that is, Bhāvaviveka's own—commentary]:

The subjects, the inner sense-spheres such as an eye, are not ultimately produced from self because of existing—like, for example, intelligence.

[ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་འགྲེལ་པས་སྐྱོར་བ་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་ཚོས་ཅན། བདག་གི་བདག་ཉིད་ལས་སྐྱེ་
 བ་མེད་དེ། སྐྱེ་བ་དོན་མེད་དང་ལྷག་མེད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་ཚིག་ཟིན་ལ་བཀོད་ཀྱང་
 བསམ་ཚིང་ལ་དོན་བཅས་དང་ལྷག་བཅས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེས་བཀོད་ན་དེས་བསྟན་
 པའི་སྐྱོར་བ་དེས་བདག་སྐྱེ་མེད་པ་སྐྱབ་ལུས་ཀྱི་ཉུགས་དང་དབེ་མ་བརྗོད་པས་] ལྷག་
 རྟེ། དེ་ལྟར་ན་དམ་བཅའ་^[L206b] ཅམ་དུ་ཟད་ཀྱི་སྐྱོར་བ་དེས་
 བདག་སྐྱེ་མེད་པར་སྐྱབ་མི་ལུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར། [དེ་ལྟར་ན་དམ་བཅའ་ཅམ་
 དུ་ཟད་ཀྱི་སྐྱོར་བ་དེས་བདག་སྐྱེ་མེད་པར་སྐྱབ་མི་ལུབ་པ་] དེར་ཐལ། མིག་
 སོགས་ནང་གི་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་རྣམས་ཚོས་ཅན། དོན་དམ་པར་བདག་
 ལས་མི་སྐྱེ་ཞེ། ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར། དབེར་ན་ཤེས་པ་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་
 བཞིན་ཞེས་པ་ལྟ་བུའི་བདག་སྐྱེ་འགོག་ལུས་ཀྱི་གཏན་ཚིགས་དང་
 དབེ་མ་བརྗོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Hopkins: The crux of Bhāvaviveka's complaint is: "You did not

put forth a good reasoning like mine.” Since Bhāvaviveka says so little, it is left to the debating courtyard to figure out what there is about Bhāvaviveka's reasoning that is different from Buddhapālita's reasoning; this means that a complete treatment of this first fault is not to be found in Bhāvaviveka or Jam-yang-shay-pa, even though Jam-yang-shay-pa's is the most extensive treatment among the major Ge-lug-pa textbook authors. Bhāvaviveka lived around the sixth century, and Jam-yang-shay-pa lived in the late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries; so eleven hundred years later, someone in Tibet is figuring out what Bhāvaviveka had in mind. Nearly three hundred years later we are still working on it. It is a lively matter.

Bhāvaviveka's *Lamp for (Nāgārjuna's) "Wisdom"* says:

because [Buddhapālita] does not express a reason [capable of proving that there is no production from self] as well as an example

and Tsong-kha-pa's *Ocean of Reasoning* says:

Bhāvaviveka is saying, “That is not reasonable because this syllogism does not express a reason proving there is no production from self or any example and hence is reduced to a mere setting of a thesis.”

ཤེས་རབ་སྒྲོན་མེ་ལས། གཏན་ཚིགས་དང་དབེ་མ་བརྗོད་པའི་
 ཟྱུར་དང་། ཞེས་^[G152a]དང་། རིགས་པའི་རྒྱ་མཚོ་ལས། ལེགས་ལྡན་
 གྱིས་དེ་ནི་མི་རིགས་ཏེ། ཟྱུར་བ་དེས་བདག་སྐྱེ་མེད་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་
 ཏྱགས་དང་དབེ་གང་ཡང་མ་བརྗོད་པས་དམ་བཅས་པ་ཅམ་དུ་
 ཟད་པའི་ཟྱུར་དང་། ཞེས་སོ། །

Hopkins: If you do not have a *good* reason and example, you are left with just a thesis. Now Jam-yang-shay-pa continues with his explanation of Bhāvaviveka's criticism:

The second [part of the reason which is that (the reasoning refuting production from self as Buddhapālita states it) does not avoid criticism by Sāṃkhyas that either it is proving what is already established (for them) or it lacks entailment, (proving) the opposite] is established because it does

not avoid the fallacies of a Sāṃkhya's saying:

About the meaning of your “from their own entities,” are you saying “from the entities of manifest effects” or “from the entity of the causal nonmanifest principal (*gtso bo, pradhāna*)?” If it is the first, [you] are proving what is already established [for us] because we also do not assert that [things] are produced from the entities of already manifest effects.

གཉིས་པ་ [གངས་ཅན་གྱིས་གྲུབ་ཟིན་སྐྱབ་པ་འཇ་ཁྱབ་པ་འགལ་བའི་སྐྱོན་བརྗོད་
 ཡོད་པ་མ་བསལ་བར་] གྲུབ་སྟེ། གངས་ཅན་གྱིས་སྟོང་གྱིས་བདག་ཉིད་
 ལས་ཞེས་པའི་དོན་འབྲས་བུ་མངོན་གསལ་གྱི་བདག་ཉིད་ལས་
 ཟེར་རམ། ལྷ་མི་གསལ་བ་གཙོ་བོའི་བདག་ཉིད་ལས་འདོད། དང་
 བོ་ [གངས་ཅན་གྱིས་སྟོང་གྱིས་བདག་ཉིད་ལས་ཞེས་པའི་དོན་འབྲས་བུ་མངོན་གསལ་
 གྱི་བདག་ཉིད་ལས་] ལྷ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་སྐྱབ་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ། ཁོ་བོ་ཡང་
 འབྲས་བུ་མངོན་པར་གསལ་ཟིན་པའི་བདག་ཉིད་ལས་སྐྱེ་བར་མི་
 འདོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Hopkins: We must keep the Sāṃkhyas' position in mind: causation means that a thing passes from a nonmanifest to a manifest state. They hold the “view of existent effects” (*satkāryadrṣṭi*), meaning that effects exist in their causes. When they say above that they “do not assert that [things] are produced from the entities of already existent effects,” they mean that a pot is not produced from the entity of an already *manifest pot*. The clay is, of course, an “already manifest effect,” but they are not saying that the pot is not produced from the entity of already manifest clay.

If it is the second, the entailment is opposite because all that have production are produced from that [nonmanifest principal].

གཉིས་པ་ [ལྷ་མི་གསལ་བ་གཙོ་བོའི་བདག་ཉིད་ལས་] ལྷ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་སྐྱབ་པ་འགལ་
 བར་འགྱུར་ཏེ། སྐྱེ་ལྡན་ཐམས་ཅད་དེ་ལས་སྐྱེ་བའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་སྐྱེ་
 བའི་ཉེས་པ་མ་བསལ་བའི་ཕྱིར།

Hopkins: For the Sāṃkhyas, because production is sensible and has an end, things are necessarily produced from the unmanifest principal—all production works this way. Kamalashīla^a explains that by means of five reasons [Sāṃkhyas] prove that the effect exists at the time of the cause before its production. Those five reasons are:

1. The nonexistent cannot be acted upon. That is: If the effect does not exist in the nature of the cause through a potential entity, the effect cannot be acted upon by means of any cause, because it is entityless, like a sky-lotus. “Existing through potential entity” means existing nonmanifestly.
2. Beings take up causes individually. That is: If *śālistamba* rice was equally nonexistent [in all seeds], why do those who seek *śālistamba* rice take up *śālistamba* seeds but do not take up others, such as millet^b seeds? If just as millet seeds are devoid of *śālistamba* rice, so *śālistamba* seeds are also empty of *śālistamba* rice; thus, by reason of the presence of what features are individually distinct seeds chosen, given that they do not differ? That those who want yogurt get ahold of milk, and not water, is due to the fact that yogurt exists in milk and does not exist in water.
3. Nothing would be produced. That is: Because all existents would not differ in lacking the nature [of the effect], all that are subject to production would be produced from all things [but since this is not assertable, nothing would be produced at all].
4. Potencies create the potentialized. That is: Buddhists say:

Because the potencies of the causes are individually distinct,

(1) though the effect does not preexist, it is produced

(2) causes with potencies are used

(3) and all is not produced from everything,

whereby the above-mentioned fallacies are not incurred.

To this, the Sāṃkhyas say:

That is not suitable as a response because potentialized

^a Paraphrasing Ngag-wang-pal-dan's *Annotations, stod, tsha*, 109.3.

^b *ko tra pa*.

causes create only potentialized effects. That potentialized causes create only potentialized effects entails that the response is not suitable because if the nonpre-existent is created, only the nonpotentialized would be made, because the nonexistent is not created into anything different—as is the case with the horns of a rabbit—since the nonexistent is entityless and does not change, and since if it did change, that it has a nature of nonexistence would be dropped. Thus, how could those causes create previously nonexistent effects? They do not.

5. Causes exist. That is: The above four reasons have proven that the creation of a formerly nonexistent effect is not suitable; therefore, if [causes] do not create an effect, by doing what are seeds and so forth called causes? Hence, seeds and so forth would not be causes because [according to you] effects do not exist [in causes], like a sky-lotus. Since [that effects do not preexist in causes] can be refuted, [the actual fact is that] pre-existent effects are produced.

Bhāvaviveka's *Lamp for (Nāgārjuna's) "Wisdom"* says:

because [the reasoning as Buddhapālita states it] does not avoid the fallacies adduced by another [that is, the fallacies that a Sāṃkhya would be expected to adduce]

and Tsong-kha-pa's *Ocean of Reasoning* says:

because it does not avoid a Sāṃkhya's criticism upon examining the thesis [that things are not produced from self]:

If the meaning of "from self" is from the entities of manifest effects, then [you] are proving what is already established [for us] and if it is from entities of causal unmanifest potency, then since all that have production are only produced from that, the entailment is opposite.

ཤེས་རབ་སྐྱོན་མེ་ལས། གཞན་གྱིས་སྐྱེས་པའི་ཉེས་པ་མ་བསལ་
 བའི་ཕྱིར་དང་། ཞེས་དང་། རིགས་པའི་རྒྱ་མཚོ་ལས། བྱངས་ཅན་
 གྱིས་བདག་ལས་ཞེས་པའི་དོན་འབྲས་བུ་གསལ་བའི་བདག་ཉིད་
 ལས་ཡིན་ན་ནི་གྲུབ་ཟིན་སྐྱབ་པ་དང་། རྒྱ་མི་གསལ་བ་ལུས་

[L207a]པའི་བདག་ཉིད་ལས་ཡིན་ན་ནི་སྐྱེ་ལྡན་ཐམས་ཅད་དེ་ལས་
 སྐྱེ་བ་ཁོ་ན་ཡིན་པས་ན་བྱུང་བ་འགལ་བར་འགྱུར་རོ། ། ཞེས་དམ་
 བཅའ་ལ་བརྟགས་ནས་སྐྱོན་བརྗོད་པ་མ་བསལ་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །
 ཞེས་སོ། །

Hopkins: The phrase “the entailment is opposite” (*gal khyab*) means that for Sāṃkhyas, Buddhapālita’s statement proves just the opposite for them. If, as Bhāvaviveka claims, Buddhapālita statement means:

Things are not produced from self—the causal nonmanifest principal—because their production is sensible and finite.

then the reason proves just the opposite for Sāṃkhyas because, for them, whatever has sensible and finite production is necessarily produced from the causal nonmanifest principal.

The third root reason [which is that it affords an opportunity for censure by another party] is established because since the syllogism on this occasion, in which what is explicitly stated as the reason is that [production] is senseless and endless, is not logically feasible [since production is in fact sensible and finite], the syllogism of the commentary’s explicit rendering (*dnegos zin*) must be reversed, whereby there is the fault of being liable to censure by another party.

[ཚིལ་བ་གཞན་གྱི་སྐྱེ་བ་ཀའི་སྐྱགས་ཡོད་པ་]ཅུ་རྟགས་གསུམ་པ་གྲུབ་སྟེ།
 སྐབས་ཀྱི་དོན་དངོས་བསྟན་དོན་མེད་ལྷག་མེད་རྟགས་སུ་བཀོད་
 པའི་སྐྱོར་བ་མི་འཐད་པས་འགྲེལ་པའི་དངོས་ཟིན་གྱི་སྐྱོར་བ་དེ་
 ལས་བརྗོད་དགོས་བརྗོད་པས་གཞན་གྱི་སྐྱེ་བ་ཀའི་སྐྱགས་ཡོད་
 པའི་སྐྱོན་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Bhāvaviveka’s *Lamp for (Nāgārjuna’s) “Wisdom”* says:

because [Buddhapālita’s] words afford an opportunity [to an opponent to expose contradiction within his own system] since [the thesis and the reason must] be reversed from the meaning put for-

ward, and hence what becomes evident is the meaning of the opposite of the thesis and the property of that [that is, the opposite of the reason]

and Tsong-kha-pa's *Ocean of Reasoning* says, "it is also not reasonable because of being a statement that allows an opportunity of censure by another party," and "How does it come to allow an opportunity? The syllogism is to be reversed from what is explicitly stated."

ཤེས་རབ་སྐྱོན་མེ་ལས། སྐབས་ཡོད་པའི་ཚོག་ཡིན་པའི་སྤྱིར་
 སྐབས་ཀྱི་དོན་ལས་བསྐྱོག་པར་འགྱུར་བ་དང་ཞེས་དང་། རིགས་
 པའི་རྒྱ་མཚོ་ལས། རྒྱལ་བ་གཞན་གྱི་སྐྱོན་ཀའི་སྐབས་ཡོད་པའི་
 ཚོག་ཡིན་པའི་སྤྱིར་ཡང་མི་རིགས་སོ། ། ཞེས་དང་། སྐབས་ཡོད་
 པར་ཇི་ལྟར་འགྱུར་ན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་དོན་སྐྱོར་བ་དེ་ལས་བསྐྱོག་པས་
 འགྱུར་རོ། ། ཞེས་སོ། །

There is a way that [Buddhapāli's remarks] come to be a statement that affords an opportunity [of censure] through reversing the explicitly indicated syllogism because through reversing the explicit thesis—"things are not produced from their own entities"—it becomes "[things] are produced from other" and through reversing the phenomenon proving such, that is to say, the reason—the two, "[production] is senseless and endless"—he is stating that [production] is sensible and finite, whereby he comes to contradict the Proponent of the Middle's own tenet that nonproduction of the four extreme types is a nonaffirming negative.

སྐབས་ཀྱི་དོན་དངོས་བསྐྱོན་གྱི་སྐྱོར་བ་ལས་བསྐྱོག་པས་སྐབས་
 ཡོད་ཀྱི་ཚོག་ཏུ་འགྱུར་ཚུལ་ཡོད་དེ། དངོས་^[G152b]ཟིན་གྱི་དངོས་
 བོ་རྣམས་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་དེ་ཞེས་པའི་བསྐྱབ་བྱ་བསྐྱོག་
 པས་གཞན་ལས་སྐྱེ་བར་འགྱུར་བ་དང་། དེ་ལྟར་བསྐྱབ་པའི་ཚོས་
 ཉེ་ཉུགས་དོན་མེད་ཐུག་མེད་གཉིས་བསྐྱོག་པས་དོན་བཅས་ཐུག་
 བཅས་བཀོད་པས་དབྱུ་མ་རང་གི་གྲུབ་མཐའ་མཐའ་བཞིའི་སྐྱེ་

མེད་མེད་དགག་བྱེད་པའི་གྲུབ་མཐའ་དང་འགལ་བར་འགྱུར་
བའི་ཕྱིར།

Hopkins: Why does Bhāvaviveka determine that the thesis as well as the reason have to be reversed? Jam-yang-shay-pa explains this point clearly; he tells us later in his text that the reason why in this particular instance Bhāvaviveka feels that the thesis must be reversed is Buddhapālita's introductory statement:^a

Respectively, [someone] says: At this point show how this called production is only a convention!

Answer: That is shown first [in the first stanza of the first chapter of Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle*]:

Not from self, not from others,
Not from both, not causelessly
Are any things
Ever produced anywhere.

And that the thesis must be reversed is also shown by Buddhapālita's concluding statement:^b

Since the production of things is thus in all ways not logically feasible, there is no production; therefore, this called production is only a convention.

In these passages, you can see the sense behind Bhāvaviveka's assumption that Buddhapālita thinks that Nāgārjuna's refutation of the four extreme types of production proves that production is merely conventionally existent. Once these reasonings prove that production is merely conventionally existent, the reasoning that things are not produced from self is not just an elimination of production from self and therefore not a nonaffirming negative. Also, since this reasoning is an affirming negative and not just an elimination of production from self, it must imply some other type of production; therefore, if things are not produced from self, then they must be produced from other. (Things could not be produced from both self and other, since the faults of self-production would

^a See below, 155.

^b See below, 157.

still be incurred; and causeless production incurs the fault of production of everything from everything.) This is why Bhāvaviveka thinks that Buddhapālita’s thesis must be reversed in this instance.

Bhāvaviveka’s *Lamp for (Nāgārjuna’s) “Wisdom”* says:

since [the thesis and the reason must] be reversed from the meaning put forward, and hence what becomes evident is the meaning of the opposite of the thesis and the property of that [that is, the opposite of the reason]—things are produced from other and production has effects and production has an end^a—due to which [Buddhapālita] would contradict tenets [of the Middle Way School].

ཤེས་སྐྱོན་ལས། [སྐབས་གྱི་དོན་ལས་བསྐྱོག་པས་] བསྐྱབ་པར་བྱ་བ་དང་
 [L207b] ལས། [དེའི་ཚོས་བསྐྱོག་པའི་དོན་མངོན་པས་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་གཞན་ལས་སྐྱེ་
 བར་འགྱུར་བ་དང་། སྐྱེ་བ་འབྲས་བུ་དང་བཅས་པ་ཉིད་དུ་འགྱུར་བ་དང་། སྐྱེ་བ་ཐུག་
 པ་ཡོད་པར་འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར་མཛད་པའི་མཐའ་དང་།] འགལ་བར་འགྱུར་རོ། །
 ཞེས་དང་།

^a The Sanskrit, as Chandrakīrti cites it (La Vallée Poussin, *Prasannapadā*, 15.1), rather than presenting this as three points as the Tibetan in Bhāvaviveka’s text does (*ngos po rnams gzhan las skye ba ’gyur ba dang / skye ba ’bras bu dang bcas pa nyid du ’gyur ba dang /skye ba thug pa yod par ’gyur ba’i phyir*: P5253, vol. 95, 155.5.1; Golden Reprint, vol. 107, 132.5; Karmapa *sde dge bstan ’gyur*, vol. 96, 97.7, as well as in Avalokitavratā’s commentary, Golden Reprint, vol. 109, 234.2; Peking P5259, 191.1.5; Karmapa *sde dge bstan ’gyur*, vol. 98, 148,3), reframes Buddhapālita’s syllogism in its opposite form:

parasmāduppannā bhāvā janmasāphalyāt janmanirodhāceti (Things are produced from other because production has effects and because production has an end.)

The Tibetan of Chandrakīrti’s text, nevertheless, is as above: *ngos po rnams gzhan las skye ba ’gyur ba dang / skye ba ’bras bu dang bcas pa nyid du ’gyur ba dang /skye ba thug pa yod par ’gyur ba’i phyir* (Golden Reprint, vol. 112, 13.4; Tibetan Publishing House 1968 edition, 10.19). I would render the Sanskrit into Tibetan, however, as:

ngos po rnams gzhan las skye ba yin te/ skye ba don yod pa nyid yin pa’i phyir dang skye ba thug pa yod pa yin pa’i phyir ro/

Because of the unanimity of the Tibetan versions on this point (except for mine) and because Tsong-kha-pa and Jam-yang-shay-pa speak to these versions, I use their casting of the meaning as three points but cite the Sanskrit version throughout.

Hopkins: From looking at what Bhāvaviveka says, you might think that what contradicts tenets of the Middle Way School would be these three factors: 1) things are produced from other because 2) production has effects and because 3) production has an end. You would think that Bhāvaviveka is saying that since Buddhapālita asserts these three, he would be contradicting tenets of the Middle Way School. You might think, “Yes! Proponents of the Middle have no tenets!”

What Ge-lug-pa scholars say is that these three are not the tenet that Buddhapālita is contradicting; rather, these show that he is contradicting some other tenet, namely, that the reasonings must be nonaffirming negatives. And indeed, Bhāvaviveka has a long section on nonaffirming negatives before this in chapter one of the *Lamp for (Nāgārjuna's) "Wisdom."*

Tsong-kha-pa's *Explanation of (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle": Ocean of Reasoning* says:

With respect to how [Buddhapālita's refutation] becomes words affording an opportunity [to an opponent to expose contradiction within his own system] since [the thesis and the reason must] be reversed from the meaning put forward, the proposition “Things are not produced from their own entities” evinces the opposite meaning, whereby “Things are produced from other” and the opposite meanings of the signs that are the phenomena of proof—that production is meaningful and has an end—become evident, whereby it has the fallacy of contradicting his own tenets.

འྲིག་ཆེན་ལས། སྐབས་ཀྱི་དོན་ལས་བསྐྱོག་པས། ཞེས་སོགས་ནས་
 [སྐྱགས་ཡོད་པའི་ཚིག་ཏུ་འགྱུར་ཚུལ་ནི། དངོས་པོ་བདག་གི་བདག་ཉིད་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་
 མིན་དེ་ཞེས་པའི་བརྒྱབ་པར་བྱ་བ་བསྐྱོག་པའི་དོན་མངོན་པས་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་གཞན་
 ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་དང་རྒྱབ་པའི་ཚིག་རྟགས་བསྐྱོག་པའི་དོན་མངོན་པས་སྐྱེ་བ་དོན་བཅས་དང་
 རྟགས་བཅས་སུ་འགྱུར་བས་རང་གི་གྲུབ་མཐའ་དང་འགལ་བར་འགྱུར་བའི་སྐྱོན་ཡོད་
 ཅས་]ཟེར་རོ་ཞེས་དང་།

Hopkins: This topic is called “Opposite of the Consequences” (*thal bzlog*). To explain: Bhāvaviveka saw a syllogism in Buddhapālita's statements. Is it “Things are not produced from their own entities because their production is sensible and has an end”?

Or, “Things are produced from other because production is sensible and has an end”? The second would be a big jump, and thus “Things are produced from other” is called the **implicit** thesis. The explicit thesis that Bhāvaviveka saw in Buddhapālita's statement, according to Jam-yang-shay-pa, is, “That things are produced from their own entities is not just eliminated.” Calling this the *explicit* thesis indicates that something else is being implied, namely, “Things are produced from other.”

I speculate that Bhāvaviveka is saying that Buddhapālita has to accept the opposite of the consequences; since the consequences are “Their production would be senseless and endless because of being produced from its own entity,” the opposite that Bhāvaviveka feels Buddhapālita has to accept is “Things are produced from other because their production is sensible and has an end.”

Chandrakīrti says that the opposite of the consequence is asserted by the opponent, the Sāṃkhya, and he says that the Proponent of the Middle does not accept it. This is where the topic, “Opposite of the Consequences,” gets its name. Of course, when Chandrakīrti says that the opposite of the consequence is asserted by the Sāṃkhya, he is referring to the consequences as he sees them (as Jam-yang-shay-pa will explain in the second volume), not as Bhāvaviveka sees them.

Khay-drub's *Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate* says:

How [according to Bhāvaviveka] does [Buddhapālita's refutation of self-production] come to afford an opportunity [for censure]? It is thus: It comes to afford an opportunity since the verbal rendering of the syllogism must be reversed. If, according to the verbal rendering of the syllogism, that “things are not produced from self” is the thesis and that “production is senseless and endless” is the reason, the reason would not be established as a property of the subject [since it is not the case that the production of things is senseless and endless]. Even if the reason is that “if [things] are produced from self, [their production] would be senseless and endless,” when [the reason] is established as a property of the subject, the thesis would [also] be established [and one would not have to proceed to realizing the thesis, and hence the syllogistic statement is faulty]. Therefore, [the syllogism] in its explicit rendering is not logically feasible, and Bhāvaviveka—saying that it is evident that Buddhapālita himself asserts the opposite meaning

of these two—constructs Buddhapālita's assertion.

སྐལ་བཟང་མིག་འབྱེད་ལས། སྐགས་ཇི་ལྟར་ཡོད་ན། འདི་ལྟར་
 ལྷོར་བའི་ཚིག་ཟིན་ལས་བསྐྱོག་དགོས་པས་སྐགས་ཡོད་པར་
 འགྱུར་ཏེ། ལྷོར་བའི་ཚིག་ཟིན་ལྟར་ན་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་བདག་
 ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་བསྐྱབ་བྱ་དང་སྐྱེ་བ་དོན་མེད་སྐྱག་མེད་གཏན་
 ཚིགས་ཡིན་ན་ཏྟགས་ཕྱོགས་ཚོས་མ་གྲུབ་པར་འགྱུར་ཞིང་།
 བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་ན་དོན་མེད་དང་སྐྱག་མེད་དུ་འགྱུར་བ་གཏན་
 ཚིགས་ཡིན་ན་ཡང་ཕྱོགས་ཚོས་གྲུབ་ན་བསྐྱབ་བྱ་གྲུབ་པར་འགྱུར་
 བའི་ཕྱིར་དངོས་ཟིན་ལྟར་མི་འཐད་ཅིང་འདིའི་བསྐྱོག་དོན་
 གཉིས་སངས་རྒྱས་བསྐྱུངས་རང་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་འདོད་པར་མངོན་
 ཞེས་ལེགས་ལྡན་གྱིས་སངས་རྒྱས་བསྐྱུངས་ཀྱི་འདོད་སྐྱུངས་སོ། །
 ཞེས་སོ། །

Hopkins: Buddhapālita's refutation of self-production indeed seems to be poorly stated: "Things are not produced from their own entities because if produced from self, their production would be senseless and endless." If you understand the reason ("if produced from self, their production would be senseless and endless"), the thesis "Things are not produced from their own entity" has already understood. Chandrakīrti does not defend Buddhapālita by saying that this is what he meant; he has to reform the statement.

About the tenet that is being contradicted Jam-yang-shay-pa holds that the three points themselves are not the tenet that is contradicted; rather, the three points show that, according to Bhāvaviveka, Buddhapālita has contradicted the tenet of the Middle Way School that the refutation of production from self is a non-affirming negative. However, Bhāvaviveka's commentator Avalokitavrata, however, merely repeats the three points as what Buddhapālita is contradicting:

It would contradict the tenets in the master [Nāgārjuna's]

scriptures that it is not asserted that things are produced from other, it is not asserted that production^a has effects, and it is not asserted that production has an end.

Since Avalokitavrata follows Bhāvaviveka's clear statements that Nāgārjuna refutes production *ultimately*, perhaps he means that Buddhapālita asserts these three *ultimately* and that this is the tenet that Buddhapālita contradicts. Whatever the case—whether he is referring to just these three or these three ultimately—Tsong-kha-pa and his followers do not agree that the tenet that Bhāvaviveka thinks Buddhapālita contradicts is these three; they say that the tenet that Bhāvaviveka thinks Buddhapālita contradicts is that the refutation of production is a mere nonaffirming negative.

[a. Discussion of terminology]

At this point, it is necessary to know the many conventions [that is, terms or vocabulary] that occur for reason, predicate of the proposition, and so forth, for, if these are known, it helps with many points to be explained below, and you will become skilled in differentiating the terminology of the Proponents of the Middle and the Epistemologists (*tshad ma pa*, **prāmāṇika*). Let us explain these in connection with [Bhāvaviveka's] syllogism proving that a stalk is not ultimately produced through the reason of [its] existing.

སྐབས་འདིར་རྟགས་ཚོས་སོགས་རེ་རེ་ལ་ཡང་ཐ་སྟོན་དུ་མ་སྒྲུབ་
 བ་ཤེས་དགོས་ཏེ། དེ་ཤེས་ན་འོག་གི་འཆད་འགྱུར་དུ་མ་ལ་ཕན་
 པ་དང་། དབུ་ཚད་ཀྱི་སྟོན་མི་འདྲ་བའི་རྣམ་དབྱེ་ལ་མཁས་པར་
 འགྱུར་བའི་བྱིར་རོ། ཡོད་པའི་རྟགས་ཀྱིས་སྐྱུ་གུ་དོན་དམ་པར་
 མི་སྐྱེ་བར་སྐྱབ་པའི་སྐྱོར་བ་དང་སྐྱར་ནས་བཤད་ན།

Hopkins: “Epistemologists” include the Proponents of Sūtra and Proponents of Mind-Only,^b here they do not include the Autonomists because Avalokitavrata is an Autonomist and he is being

^a Correcting *skye bas* in the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 234.6) and in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, 191.2.1) to *skye ba* in accordance with the Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur*, vol. 98, 148.6.

^b Proponents of Sūtra are a Lesser Vehicle School; Proponents of Mind-Only are a

contrasted to the Epistemologists.

Position in the proof of that (*de sgrub kyi phyogs*), proposition in the proof of that (*de sgrub kyi sgrub bya*), and thesis in the proof of that (*de sgrub kyi dam bca'*) are equivalent because the Proponents of the Middle and the Epistemologists agree that the composite of the subject and the predicate in the proof of that (*de sgrub kyi chos can dang chos*) are the position (*phyogs*), and so forth. "Position" (*phyogs, pakṣa*) is that used for the two [that is, the combination of subject and predicate].

དེ་སྐབས་ཀྱི་ཕྱོགས་དང་བསྐབས་བྱ་དང་དམ་བཅའ་རྣམས་དོན་
གཅིག་ལྟེ། དེ་སྐབས་ཀྱི་ཚོས་ཅན་དང་ཚོས་ཀྱི་ཚོགས་དོན་ཕྱོགས་
སོགས་ཡིན་པར་དབུ་ཚད་མཐུན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཕྱོགས་ཞེས་པ་ནི་
པགྱི་ཞེས་པ་གཉིས་ལ་འཇུག་པ་དེ་ཡིན་ལོ། །

Hopkins: Both groups agree that "position," "proposition," and "thesis" equally mean the combination of the subject and the predicate. The word *chos*, which here means predicate in "the predicate in the proof of that" (*de sgrub kyi chos*), has many meanings. Generally it means "property"; the reason is sometimes called "that which is a property (*chos*) of the subject" (*phyogs chos*), with *phyogs* ("position") referring only to the subject, which is a part of the position that is a combination of the subject and the predicate—the subject.

They agree that predicate in the proof of that (*de sgrub kyi chos*) and predicate of the proposition in the proof of that (*de sgrub kyi bsgrub bya'i chos*) are equivalent because it is the predicate being proven with respect to whatsoever basis [that is, subject]. They also agree that basis of inference (*rjes su dpag par bya ba'i gzhi*), position in "property of the position" (*phyogs chos zhes pa'i phyogs*), basis of debate (*rtsod gzhi*), and basal subject (*gzhi'i chos can*) are equivalent because, having taken [the term] "attributes" in "possessor of the attributes" [*chos can*, usually translated

Great Vehicle school; Autonomists are a subdivision of Proponents of the Middle who are contrasted with Consequentialists, the other subdivision of Proponents of the Middle. These are listed according to the general Tibetan schema of the ascending subtlety of the understanding of selflessness, emptiness.

^a 2016 Old Go-mang Lhasa misreads *yang*.

as “subject”) as the two, the sign and the predicate, they explain [“possessor of the attributes”] as the subject possessing those two attributes [that is, possessing the predicate of the proposition and the reason],

དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་ཚོས་དང་བསྐབ་བྱི་ཚོས་རྣམས་^[L208a]དོན་གཅིག་
 པར་མཐུན་ཏེ། གཞི་གང་གི་སྟེང་དུ་བསྐབ་པར་བྱ་བའི་བྱད་པར་
 བྱི་ཚོས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། རྗེས་སུ་དཔག་པར་བྱ་བའི་གཞི་དང་
 ཕྱོགས་^[G153a]ཚོས་ཞེས་པའི་ཕྱོགས་དང་ཚུད་གཞི་དང་གཞིའི་
 ཚོས་ཅན་རྣམས་དོན་གཅིག་པར་མཐུན་ཏེ། ཚོས་ཅན་ཞེས་པའི་
 ཚོས་རྟགས་ཚོས་གཉིས་ལ་བྱས་ནས་དེ་གཉིས་དང་ལྡན་པའི་ཚོས་
 ཅན་ཞེས་བཤད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ།

Hopkins: In other words, the subject possesses both the predicate that is being proven and the reason proving it.

because Avalokitavrata's *Commentary on (Bhāvaviveka's) Lamp for (Nāgārjuna's) "Wisdom"* (below, 223) says:

[Just that (substratum) is called the “subject” (*chos can, dharmin*; literally, “attribute-possessor”);] with respect to the term “subject,” the substratum of inference that possesses the two, (1) the attribute [that is, the predicate] that is being proven and (2) the attribute [or reason] that is the means of proof is the subject.

Hopkins: The Sanskrit for *chos*, “attribute,” is *dharma*, and a common meaning of these two terms is “phenomenon”; the predicate and the reason are phenomena of the subject. So “attribute that is the means of proof” (*sgrub pa'i chos*) could be considered somewhat literally as “the proof-phenomenon,” the reason.

འགྲེལ་བཤད་བརྟུལ་ལྷགས་ལས། ཚོས་ཅན་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་རྗེས་སུ་
 དཔག་པར་བྱ་བའི་གཞི་གང་ལ་བསྐབ་པར་བྱ་བ་དང་། སྐབ་པའི་
 ཚོས་གཉིས་ཡོད་པ་དེ་ནི་ཚོས་ཅན་ཏེ། ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Therefore, they agree that the attribute that is the means of proof (*sgrub pa'i chos*), property of the position (*phyogs chos*) [usually translated as

“property of the subject”], reason (*gtan tshigs*, *hetu*), sign (*rtags*, *līṅga*), and evidence (*rgyu mtshan*) are equivalent. Avalokitavrata's *Commentary on (Bhāvaviveka's) "Lamp for (Nāgārjuna's) "Wisdom"'* (below, 192) says:

“Attribute that is the means of proof” (*sgrub pa'i chos*) is the attribute proving “not produced,” the reason.

and (below, 226):

“because of existing” is the attribute [or property] that is the reason^a of that position comprising predicate and subject, and hence is called “property of the position” (*phyogs kyi chos*).

Hopkins: For Dharmakīrti (see chapter one of his *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime Cognition"*), “position” in “property of the position” refers only to the subject, it being a part of the whole position, whereas for Avalokitavrata the term seems to mean a combination of both the subject and the predicate.

དེས་ན་རྒྱུ་བ་པའི་ཚོས་དང་སྟོན་པ་ཚོས་དང་གཏན་ཚིགས་དང་
 ཏྲགས་དང་རྒྱ་མཚན་རྣམས་དོན་གཅིག་པར་མཐུན་ཏེ། འགྲེལ་
 བཤད་དེ་ཉིད་ལས། རྒྱུ་བ་པའི་ཚོས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པའི་
 རྒྱུ་བ་པའི་ཚོས་ཏེ་གཏན་ཚིགས་སོ་ཞེས་དང་། དེའི་སྤྱིར་ཡོད་པའི་
 སྤྱིར་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་ཚོས་དང་ཚོས་ཅན་བསྐྱེས་པའི་སྟོན་པ་དེའི་
 གཏན་ཚིགས་ཀྱི་ཚོས་ཡིན་པས་སྟོན་པ་ཀྱི་ཚོས་ཞེས་བྱའོ། ། ཞེས་
 གསུངས་པའི་སྤྱིར།

Autonomous reason (*rang rgyud kyi gtan tshigs*, **svatantrahetu*), autonomous sign (*rang rgyud kyi rtags*, **svatantraliṅga*), and autonomous inference (*rang rgyud kyi rjes su dpag pa*, **svatantrānumāna*) are equivalent because these are asserted as that which produces an inference in the other party by way of the three modes [of the reason] being established through their own power in compatible appearance for both disputants. It follows [that these are asserted as that which produces an inference in the other party by way of the three modes (of the reason) being established

^a *gtan tshigs kyi chos*.

through their own power in compatible appearance for both disputants] because the meaning of autonomy must be taken as establishment under its own power,

རང་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་གཏན་ཚིགས་དང་རང་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་རྟགས་དང་རང་
 རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་རྗེས་སུ་དབག་པ་དོན་གཅིག་སྟེ། ཚོལ་ཕྱི་ཚོལ་ལ་ཚུལ་
 གསུམ་མཐུན་སྣང་དུ་རང་དབང་གིས་གྲུབ་པའི་སྐོ་ནས་ཕྱི་ཚོལ་
 ལ་རྗེས་དབག་སྐྱེད་པ་གཅིག་ལ་འདོད་པའི་ཕྱིར། [རང་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་གཏན་
 ཚིགས་དང་རང་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་རྟགས་དང་རང་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་རྗེས་སུ་དབག་པ་དོན་གཅིག་སྟེ། ཚོལ་
 ཕྱི་ཚོལ་ལ་ཚུལ་གསུམ་མཐུན་སྣང་དུ་རང་དབང་གིས་གྲུབ་པའི་སྐོ་ནས་ཕྱི་ཚོལ་ལ་རྗེས་
 དབག་སྐྱེད་པ་གཅིག་ལ་འདོད་པ་]དེར་ཐལ་རང་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་དོན་རང་
 དབང་དུ་གྲུབ་པ་ལ་བྱེད་དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Hopkins: The three modes (*tshul gsum*) are the presence of the reason in the subject, the pervasion, and the counter-pervasion. The Autonomists are said to assert a type of reasoning in which the three modes are established by way of their own power; the key phrase here is “under their own power.” If two Consequentialists are debating together, they can have the three modes established in compatible appearance; the distinguishing factor in the Autonomy School and below is that the three modes are established **by way of their own power** in compatible appearance. According to Ge-lug-pa scholars, this is what makes a reason autonomous.

Autonomous, literally “own-continuum,” (*rang rgyud, svatantra*) might seem to mean that something exists in your own continuum (*rang* “own”; *rgyud* “continuum”) or that you accept from your own viewpoint, but Ge-lug-pa scholars hold that it means that the three modes are established by way of their own power in the reason. Whatever the case, the term “autonomous” is seldom used by Autonomists. Bhāvaviveka seems to call for self-powered, or autonomous, inferences (*rang dbang du rjes su dpag pa, *svatantra-anumāna*) in his *Lamp for (Nāgārjuna’s) “Wisdom”* when commenting on the beginning of chapter thirteen of

Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle*:^a

Now [Nāgārjuna] composed the thirteenth chapter in order to teach the naturelessness of compositional phenomena through the force of setting forth (1) answers to refutations and (2) own-powered [or autonomous] inferences (*rang dbang du rje su dpag pa*).

Here, the word “inferences” does not refer to a consciousness realizing a hidden or obscure object of knowledge in dependence on a correct reason but to syllogistic statements themselves.

Bhāvaviveka's statement may not mean anything more than that Nāgārjuna will give some of his own inferences under his own power (*rang dbang du rje su dpag pa*). Since Ge-lug-pa scholars hold that Nāgārjuna does indeed have his own inferences, Bhāvaviveka's statement, when taken this way, would not indicate that he, Bhāvaviveka, accepts autonomous inferences. Also, when Chandrakīrti uses the term “autonomous inference” (*rang rgyud kyī rjes dpag*), he does not in so many words say what it means—he does not say that it means an inference induced by way of the three modes that are established by way of their own power in compatible appearance for both disputants. You have to notice by context that he himself uses proof statements and hence uses inference, and thus “autonomous inference” cannot just mean an argument that the presenter believes in. However, many Indians and Tibetans have thought that Chandrakīrti's declaration that he himself does not have autonomous inferences just means that he does not have anything from his own side to offer, that is, he does not believe in stating syllogisms.

“Established by way of their own power” means “established from its own side” (*rang ngos nas grub pa*), “established by way of their own character” (*rang gi mtshan nyid gyis grub pa*), “established inherently” (*rang bzhin gyis grub pa*), and so forth. It is complicated to explain the meaning of “established by way of their own character” in the four schools of Buddhist tenets, but when Ge-lug-pa scholars say that Autonomists hold that there is

^a Cited in Jang-kya Rol-pay-dor-jay (*lcang skya rol pa'i rdo rje*, born 1717), *Presentation of Tenets* (*grub mtha'i rnam bzhag*), (Sarnath: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1970), 325.12, and Jam-yang-shay-pa, *Great Exposition of Tenets*, (Musoorie: Dalama, 1962), ca 61a.7: *da ni sun 'byin pa'i lan btab pa dan rang dbang du rjes su dpag pa'i mthus 'du byed rnam rnam pa las ngo ba nyid bstan pa'i don gyi dbang gis rab tu byed pa bcu gsum pa btsams so*.

“establishment by way of their own character,” it means that “there is something to be found upon searching for the object imputed” (*btags don btsal nas brnyed rgyu yod pa*). Correspondingly, when Consequentialists say there is **no** establishment by way of their own power, it means that there is **nothing** to be found upon searching for the object imputed.

However, when Proponents of Mind-Only say that other-powered natures are “established by way of their own character,” this cannot mean there is something to be found upon searching for the object imputed because Proponents of Mind-Only say that imputational natures are not established by way of their own character, and thus “established by way of its own character” cannot mean that the object is not found upon searching for the object imputed, since then Proponents of Mind-Only would understand emptiness as described by the Consequence school with respect to one object, imputational natures, and hence would understand emptiness with respect to all objects. For, Āryadeva says that the viewing consciousness of one object knows, or is capable of knowing, the status of all objects:^a

That which is the viewer of one thing
Is explained to be the viewer of all.
That which is the emptiness of one
Is the emptiness of all.

Thus, the meaning of “established by way of its own character” in the Mind-Only School is a topic of tremendous debate.

Given that “established by way of its own character” cannot mean established from its own side in the Mind-Only School, what does it mean? It is a conundrum with many nuances multiple aspects of which I have treated in chapters 5-8 in *Absorption in No External World*.^b

because Avalokitavratā's *Commentary on (Bhāvaviveka's) "Lamp for (Nāgārjuna's) "Wisdom"* (below, 223) says:

On this occasion, “the internal sense-spheres” [that is, the internal

^a Stanza 191 (VIII.16); see also Karen Lang, *Āryadeva's Catuḥśataka: On the Bodhisattva's Cultivation of Merit and Knowledge*, Indistudier, 7 (Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, 1986), 83; and *Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas: Gyal-tsab on Āryadeva's Four Hundred*, commentary by Geshe Sonam Rinchen, translated and edited by Ruth Sonam (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1994), 194.

^b Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 2005.

sense organs]—which are the substrata possessing the two:

- the attribute [or predicate] of the proposition, “are not produced from self,” which is approved by both disputants, and
- the attribute proving nonproduction from self, that is, “just existing,” which is approved by both disputants—

are called the “subject” (*chos can, dharmin*) [literally, that which possesses the attributes,” that is to say, that which is endowed with the predicate and the reason”].

འགྲེལ་བཤད་དེ་ཉིད་ལས། སྐབས་འདིར་ནི་ནང་གི་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་
 རྣམས་^[L208b]ཞེས་བྱ་བ་གཞི་གང་ལ་བསྐྱབ་པར་བྱ་བ། ཚོས་
 བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ཚོལ་བ་དང་ཕྱིར་ཚོལ་བ་
 གཉིས་ཀ་ལ་གྲགས་པ་དང་། བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་དེ་སྐྱབ་
 པའི་ཚོས་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ཅེས་བྱ་བ་ཚོལ་བ་དང་ཕྱིར་ཚོལ་བ་གཉིས་
 ཀ་ལ་གྲགས་པ། དེ་གཉིས་ཡོད་པ་དེ་ནི་ཚོས་ཅན་ཞེས་བྱའོ། །
 ཞེས་དང་།

Hopkins: When Avalokitavrata speaks of the predicate being approved by both disputants, this means that it is approved by oneself and approved by the other party. Does this indicate that Avalokitavrata accepts establishment from its own side? It might. Once he says that “are not produced from self” is something the other person knows about and something the Proponent of the Middle knows—that it is something both can recognize—then for both of them these are established by valid cognition, and if *in the systems of both disputants* the mode of being established by valid cognition is the same, that is to say, if their knowledge of “are not produced from self” affirms not just this but also its being inherently existent, then Avalokitavrata’s statement indicates that he accepts establishment from its own side.

Also, the insistence on the statement of syllogisms without allowing the mere statement of consequences suggests that he holds that things appear in a common way to both parties, that *in the systems of the two parties* the mode of establishment of the sub-

ject, predicate, reason, and example are similarly set forth. Avalokitavrata's adding in this "approved by both disputants" is potent.

The difficulty in investigating this development in the Middle Way School is that the evidence is thin; such points are a window into other assertions, just as a casual remark can be a window into someone's ideas.

and Amarasinha's^a *Treasury* says,^b "Autonomous (*rang rgyud*, *svatantra*), own-powered (*rang dbang*), and self-powered (*bdag dbang*)."

འཆི་མེད་མཚོན་ལས། རང་རྒྱུད་རང་དབང་བདག་དབང་དང་།
ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་བྱིར།

Hopkins: Turning to a renowned Sanskrit dictionary, the *Amarakośha*, Jam-yang-shay-pa establishes lexigraphically that there is a connection between "autonomous" (*rang rgyud*) and "own-power" (*rang dbang*). You see how pressed he is; he does not have a source from any of these Indian Buddhist scholars explicitly saying this; he has to turn to a dictionary to say that **somebody** made a connection between "autonomous" (which might just mean "own-continuum," that is, an inference in one's own continuum) and "own-powered." Still, it is interesting that the Sanskrit word *tantra*, which usually comes into Tibetan as *rgyud*, does occasionally come out as *dbang*, for example in the word *gzhan dbang*, other-powered, which is the Tibetan for *para-tantra*.

Self-renowned (or self-approved) sign (*rang grags kyi rtags*, *svasiddhalinga*); self-renowned (or self-approved) inference (*rang grags kyi rjes dpag*, *svasiddhānumāna*); other-renowned (or other-approved) sign (*gzhan grags kyi rtags*, *parasiddhalinga*); and other-renowned (or other-approved) inference (*gzhan grags kyi rjes dpag*, *parasiddhānumāna*) are equivalent, but those [stated] by non-Consequentialists are not asserted to be correct. [These are equivalent] because, when a Proponent of the Middle, the former party, proves that things are without true existence for an

^a 'chi med seng ge.

^b 'chi med mdzod, *amarakośa*; *Amarakośa* 3.1.32: *svatantra* 'pāvṛtaḥ svairī svacchando niravagrahaḥ. Among these five, *svatantra* is *rang rgyud*; *svairī* is *rang dbang*; *svacchanda* is *rang 'dod*. In his *Great Exposition of Tenets* (Gomang 1999, 481.19) Jam-yang-shay-pa says that *svairī* is also *bdag dbang*. The other two words, *apāvṛta* and *niravagraha* both mean "self-willed" and the like.

opponent who is a Proponent of [Truly Established] Things, since [the sign] is approved by the latter party himself/herself, it is called “self-approved,” and since it approved by the latter party who is other than the former party, it is [also] called “other-approved.”

རང་གྲགས་ཀྱི་རྟགས་དང་དེའི་རྗེས་དབག་དང་གཞན་གྲགས་ཀྱི་
 རྟགས་དང་དེའི་རྗེས་སུ་དབག་པ་རྣམས་དོན་གཅིག་ལ་ཐལ་
 འགྱུར་བ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཡང་དག་མི་འདོད་དེ། རྩ་རྟོག་དབུ་མ་
 པས་སྤྱི་རྟོག་དངོས་སྣ་ལ་དངོས་པོ་བདེན་མེད་སྐབ་ཚེ་སྤྱི་རྟོག་
 རང་ཉིད་ལ་གྲགས་པས་ན་རང་གྲགས་དང་རྩ་རྟོག་ལས་
 [G153b]གཞན་པའི་སྤྱི་རྟོག་ལ་གྲགས་པས་ན་གཞན་གྲགས་ཞེས་
 བཤད་པའི་སྤྱིར། །

Hopkins: The opponent from his or her own viewpoint is “self” and from the viewpoint of the Proponent of the Middle is “other”; hence, self-approved sign and other-approved sign mean the same thing—the opponent being both self and other from different points of view. Such a sign is also a self-approved inference and an other-approved inference because in this case “inference” refers, not to a consciousness, but to a reason. Calling a sign an “inference” is a case of giving the name of the effect to the cause because the sign generates the inferential consciousness.

It follows [that when a Proponent of the Middle, the former party, proves that things are without true existence for a Proponent of (Truly Established) Things, the latter party, since (the sign) is approved by the latter party himself/herself, it is called “self-approved,” and since it approved by the latter party who is other than the former party, it is (also) called “other-approved”] because **until the view of the middle is found**, [logical] signs and so forth as they are approved by Proponents of the Middle cannot be shown to, or cannot be approved by the awareness of, the latter party, by reason of which it is asserted that it is impossible for there to be the three modes [of a logical sign] commonly appearing to both parties.

[རྩ་རྟོག་དབུ་མ་པས་སྤྱི་རྟོག་དངོས་སྣ་ལ་དངོས་པོ་བདེན་མེད་སྐབ་ཚེ་སྤྱི་རྟོག་རང་
 ཉིད་ལ་གྲགས་པས་ན་རང་གྲགས་དང་རྩ་རྟོག་ལས་གཞན་པའི་སྤྱི་རྟོག་ལ་གྲགས་པས་

ན་གཞན་གྲགས་ཞེས་བཤད་པ་]དེར་ཐལ། དབྱ་མའི་ལྷ་བ་མ་རྙེད་བར་
 དུ་དབྱ་མ་པ་ལ་གྲགས་པ་ལྷར་གྱི་རྟགས་སོགས་ཕྱི་རྒྱུ་ལ་བརྟན་
 པའམ་རྒྱུ་ལ་གྲགས་མ་ཐུབ་པའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་གྱིས་རྒྱུ་ལ་གཉིས་
 ཀར་མཐུན་སྤང་གི་རྒྱུ་གསུམ་མི་ཡོང་བར་འདོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །

Hopkins: A sign and so forth as they are renowned to, or approved by, a Consequentialist cannot be shown to the opponent until that person generates the Consequentialist view because the two sides have a different opinion about what the consciousness certifying the reason affirms. Opponents cannot separate existing and existing from its own side, whereas once they have the Consequentialist view and thus have realized emptiness, they can.

Jam-yang-shay-pa now returns to explicating Bhāvaviveka's ideas in criticizing Buddhapālita.

There is a way that [from Bhāvaviveka's viewpoint, Buddhapālita's explanation of the refutation of production from self] contradicts the tenet of the Middle Way School that they are proving a nonaffirming negative (*med dgag, prasajyapratishedha*) because:

1. When, upon reversing the sign of the explicit rendering, one states [as the reason of the implied syllogism that the production of things] is sensible and is finite, the explicit thesis also is reversed, whereupon one must be proving that things are produced from other, due to which one contradicts the tenet [of the Middle Way School that the refutation of the four extreme types of production proves only a nonaffirming negative].
2. The distinction must be made that although in general all whatsoever consequences and signs are not parallel in having to be reversed in this way, on this occasion of Buddhapālita's refuting production from the four extremes such is necessary.

མེད་དགག་བརྒྱབ་བྱར་བྱེད་པའི་དབྱ་མའི་གྲུབ་མཐའ་དང་
 འགལ་རྒྱུ་ལ་ཡོད་དེ། དངོས་ཟིན་གྱི་རྟགས་བརྒྱུ་གས་ནས་དོན་
 བཅས་ཐུག་བཅས་འགོད་ན་དངོས་ཀྱི་དམ་བཅའ་ཡང་བརྒྱུ་གས་
 རས་དངོས་པོ་གཞན་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་བརྒྱབ་པར་བྱེད་དགོས་པས་གྲུབ་

མཐའ་དང་འགལ་བ་གང་ཞིག་སྐྱེར་ཐལ་འགྱུར་དང་རྟགས་གང་
 བཀོད་ཀྱི་དེ་ལྟར་བསྐྱོག་དགོས་^[L209a]པ་མཚུངས་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཡང་
 སངས་རྒྱལ་བསྐྱེད་སྐྱོད་ཀྱིས་མཐའ་བཞིའི་སྐྱེ་བ་འགོག་པའི་སྐབས་
 འདིར་དེ་ལྟར་དགོས་ཞེས་ཞིབ་ཆ་འབྱེད་དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Hopkins: When such a reversal is done to the reason, you do not necessarily have to reverse the thesis. The reason why in this instance it has to be reversed is to be found Buddhapālita's introductory and concluding remarks, where he indicates that Nāgārjuna is proving that production is just a convention.

The first [part of the reason which is that when, upon reversing the sign of the explicit rendering, one states (as the reason of the implied syllogism that the production of things) is sensible and is finite, the explicit thesis also is reversed, whereupon one must be proving that things are produced from other, due to which one contradicts the tenet (of the Middle Way School that the refutation of the four extreme types of production proves only a nonaffirming negative)] is established because:

1. Just as the sign of the explicit rendering is reversed, so the proposition of the literal rendering also is reversed, whereupon although it is not suitable to state “Things are produced from other,” as the [explicitly indicated] proposition, such becomes the implicitly indicated proposition.
2. In that case, an affirming negative comes to be the explicit proposition, whereby there is the fault of contradicting the tenet [of the Middle Way School that the refutation of the four extreme types of production proves only a nonaffirming negative].

དང་པོ་[དངོས་ཟིན་གྱི་རྟགས་བསྐྱོགས་ནས་དོན་བཅས་སྤྱད་བཅས་འགོད་ན་དངོས་
 ཀྱི་དམ་བཅའ་ཡང་བསྐྱོགས་ནས་དངོས་པོ་གཞན་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་བསྐྱེད་པར་བྱེད་དགོས་
 པས་གྲུབ་མཐའ་དང་འགལ་བར་]གྲུབ་སྟེ། དངོས་ཟིན་གྱི་རྟགས་བསྐྱོགས་
 པ་ལྟར། དངོས་ཟིན་གྱི་བསྐྱེད་བྱ་ཡང་བསྐྱོགས་ནས་དངོས་པོ་
 རྣམས་གཞན་ལས་སྐྱེ་སྟེ་ཞེས་བསྐྱེད་བྱར་འགོད་པ་མི་རུང་ཡང་
 རྟགས་བསྐྱེད་གྱི་བསྐྱེད་བྱར་འགྱུར་བ་གང་ཞིག་དེ་ལྟར་བྱས་ན་མ་

ཡིན་དགག་དངོས་ཀྱི་བསྐྱབ་བྱུང་སོང་བས་གྲུབ་མཐའ་དང་
 འགལ་བའི་སྐྱོན་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Hopkins: If the reversed, explicit thesis were that things are produced from other, then it would not be a nonaffirming negative, but as Jam-yang-shay-pa indicates above, the reversed explicit thesis is “That things are produced from their own entities is not just eliminated.”

In fact, Bhāvaviveka knows that Buddhapālita does not **want** to prove that there is production from other because right in the next section Buddhapālita proves that phenomena are not produced from other, but, from Bhāvaviveka’s perspective, Buddhapālita has put himself into this spot. Wouldn’t it have been more straightforward if Bhāvaviveka and Avalokitavrata had said that Buddhapālita was just proving conventionally existent production rather than production from other? Their point perhaps is that if in the context of ultimate analysis conventionally existent production is being proving, then it would have to be conventionally existent production from other.

The first [part of the reason which is that just as the sign of the explicit rendering is reversed, so the proposition of the literal rendering also is reversed, whereupon although it is not suitable to state “Things are produced from other,” as the (explicitly indicated) proposition, such becomes the implicitly indicated proposition] is established because Tsong-kha-pa’s *Explanation of (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle”*: *Ocean of Reasoning* says:

Therefore, the two reverse meanings are the sign. If the sign of the explicit rendering must be reversed, the thesis of the explicit rendering also must be reversed because of being parallel. About this, [the reversal of the thesis of the explicit rendering] is not doable in accordance with how the signs are reversed, that production from self is not just eliminated is the reverse meaning [of the original thesis “Things are not produced from their own entities.”]

དང་པོ་[དངོས་ཟིན་གྱི་རྟགས་བསྐྱབ་པ་ལྟར། དངོས་ཟིན་གྱི་བསྐྱབ་བྱུང་ཡང་
 བསྐྱབ་ནས་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་གཞན་ལས་སྐྱེ་ལྡེ་ཞེས་བསྐྱབ་བྱུང་འགོད་པ་མི་རུང་ཡང་
 ལྷགས་བསྐྱབ་གྱི་བསྐྱབ་བྱུང་འགྲུང་བར་]གྲུབ་སྟེ། རིགས་པའི་རྒྱ་མཚོ་ལས།

དེས་ན་བསྐྱོག་དོན་གཉིས་ཏྟགས་སོ། ། དངོས་ཟིན་གྱི་ཏྟགས་
 བསྐྱོག་དགོས་ན་དངོས་ཟིན་གྱི་དམ་བཅའ་ཡང་བསྐྱོག་དགོས་ཏེ་
 མཚུངས་པའི་སྟེང་། དེ་ལ་ཏྟགས་བསྐྱོག་པ་ལྟར་བྱུང་མེད་པས་
 བདག་སྐྱེ་རྣམ་པར་བཅས་ཅམ་མ་ཡིན་པ་བསྐྱོག་པའི་དོན་ནོ། །
 ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་སྟེང་།

Hopkins: Jam-yang-shay-pa, just above, points out that “although in general all whatsoever consequences and signs are not parallel (*mtshung pa ma yin*) in having to be reversed in this way,” in this case they both need to be changed. Bhāvaviveka’s point is that **from context** one can see that Buddhapālita wants to prove that production is merely a convention.

By saying “production from self is not just eliminated” Tsongkha-pa improves on Bhāvaviveka’s statement that Buddhapālita is proving that “things are produced from other.”

The second [part of the reason which is that in that case, an affirming negative comes to be the explicit proposition, whereby there is the fault of contradicting the tenet (of the Middle Way School that the refutation of the four extreme types of production proves only a nonaffirming negative)] is established because since Nāgārjuna’s *Treatise on the Middle* is for the sake of eliminating all proliferation (*spros pa, prapañca*), on this occasion a nonaffirming negative is needed, but if an affirming negative is used, one contradicts the tenet of the Supramundane Victor’s saying not to course in signs.

གཉིས་པ་[དེ་ལྟར་བྱས་ན་མ་ཡིན་དགག་དངོས་གྱི་བསྐྱབ་བྱུང་སོང་བས་ཀྱུབ་མཐའ་
 དང་འགལ་བའི་སྐྱོན་ཡོད་པར་]ཀྱུབ་སྟེ། དབུ་མའི་བསྟན་བཅོམ་གྱིས་
 སྐྱོས་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་གཅོད་པའི་ཆེད་ཡིན་པས་སྐབས་འདིར་མེད་
 དགག་གཅིག་དགོས་ཀྱི་མ་ཡིན་དགག་བྱས་ན་བཅོམ་ལྡན་འདས་
 ཀྱིས་མཚན་མ་ལ་མི་སྐྱོད་པར་གསུངས་པའི་ཀྱུབ་མཐའ་དང་
 འགལ་བའི་སྟེང་།

Hopkins: To solve the problem of to just what Bhāvaviveka is objecting, we are pulled into thinking about affirming negatives, non-affirming negatives, emptiness, and so forth; by using these principles to tackle this problem, we thereby become familiar with fundamental principles. This is the genius of this system of education. Even if you get into a total mess—"Did Bhāvaviveka really mean that? Is there really any difference between the Autonomy School and the Consequence School?"—it comes that you are studying the principles of Tsong-kha-pa's system; you are getting used to a structure.

Here Jam-yang-shay-pa just says "treatise on the middle"^a which is another name for Nāgārjuna's *Fundamental Stanzas on the Middle*^b but could be taken to mean Middle Way treatises in general. Chandrakīrti refers to this text with the phrase "from Madhyamaka," which some people mistake as meaning any of Nāgārjuna's Six Collections of Reasoning,^c but in Chandrakīrti's same text when he refers to others among the Six Collections of Reasonings, he gives their specific names; thus it can be seen that the term "Madhyamaka" in "from Madhyamaka" refers to the specific text *Madhyamakashāstra* (*Treatise on the Middle*) which is another name for the *Fundamental Stanzas on the Middle*. Similarly, some confusion arises with regard to Chandrakīrti's *Supplement to Nāgārjuna's "Treatise on the Middle"* (*dbu ma la 'jug pa, madhyamakāvatāra*). The title is literally be translated as "Supplement to the Middle" or "Introduction to the Middle"; the question arises about what exactly is the Middle that is to be supplemented or introduced? What does "Middle"/ "Madhyamaka" mean here in Chandrakīrti's title? It is just Nāgārjuna's *Madhyamakashāstra* (*Treatise on the Middle*). When Chandrakīrti uses the word "Madhyamaka" in this context, it refers to this particular work by Nāgārjuna.

Returning to Jam-yang-shay-pa's passage, it says that the "*Treatise on the Middle* is for the sake of eliminating all proliferation." There are two different kinds of proliferation: the proliferation of true existence (*bden 'dzin kyi spros pa*) and the prolifera-

^a *dbu ma 'i bstan bcos, madhyamakashastra.*

^b *dbu ma rtsa ba 'i tshig le'ur byas pa shes rab ces bya ba, mūlamadhyamaka-kārikāprajñānāma.*

^c See the Bibliography under "Nāgārjuna" for a list of the six.

tion of dualistic appearance (*gnyis snang gi spros pa*). Proliferations of dualistic appearance are 1) the appearance of conventionalities, 2) the appearance of subject and object, 3) the appearance of difference, 4) the appearance of inherent existence, and 5) the appearance of meaning-generalities, that is, conceptual images. Though Ge-lug-pa scholars call all these “proliferations of dualistic appearance,” they are not all what you would call dual; the appearance of subject and object is dual, but take, for example, the appearance of a table as inherently existent—in a sense there is no duality, for it is just a single table. It is interesting to ponder why this appearance is called dual.

The appearance of a conventionality is not dual—there is no **two**; it does not openly speak of dualism. It is the same with the appearance of a meaning-generality. It can be seen that the word “dualistic” does not necessarily refer to what we tend to immediately think of when we hear the term: good and evil, subject and object, and so forth and then suggest a nondualistic state beyond them.

Given its multiple meanings, the word “proliferation” is often hard to pin down as to what it means. Some people translate it as “verbal elaboration,” “the phenomenal world” (Mūrti), “constructions of thought” (Della Santina), “phenomenal extension” (Streng), multiplications, and so forth

Here, Jam-yang-shay-pa says that “Nāgārjuna’s *Treatise on the Middle* is for the sake of eliminating all proliferations (*spros pa, prapañca*), due to which on this occasion a nonaffirming negative is needed.” What evidence is in the *Treatise on the Middle* itself that Nāgārjuna is proving a nonaffirming negative? The word “nonaffirming negative” is not in the *Treatise*, but is in Bhāvaviveka’s commentary, *Lamp for (Nāgārjuna’s) “Wisdom”* and Chandrakīrti’s commentary, the *Clear Words*.

Jam-yang-shay-pa then says, “If an affirming negative is used, one contradicts the tenet of Buddha’s saying not to course in signs.” In the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras, Buddha says that anyone who courses in signs is not practicing the proper path, and what one needs is signlessness. What does “signs” mean? “Apprehending signs” seems to mean “mistakenly apprehending inherent existence.” Ge-dün-lo-drö identified that it means “apprehending a mistaken reality or nature.”

Now Jam-yang-shay-pa makes a citation about affirming negatives that is difficult to understand.

Bhāvaviveka’s *Lamp for (Nāgārjuna’s) “Wisdom”* (below, 162) says:

When an affirming negation is employed, due to its principally being an affirmation, it is being affirmed that “phenomena are not produced,” whereby nonproduction is indicated, and hence one separates from a tenet because scripture says, “If one courses in the nonproduction of form, one is not coursing in the perfection of wisdom.”

Though various things are propounded [about this by others,] not understanding it this way, they are mistaken.

ཤེས་རབ་སྟོན་མེལ་ས། མ་ཡིན་པར་དགག་པ་ཡོངས་སོ་བརྒྱུང་ན་
 བོ་དེ་སྐྱབ་པ་གཙོ་ཆེ་བའི་ཕྱིར། ཆོས་རྒྱུས་མ་སྐྱེས་སོ་ཞེས་སྐྱབ་
 པས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་སྟོན་པའི་^[G154a]ཕྱིར། མཛོད་པའི་མཐའ་དང་
 བལ་བར་འགྱུར་ཏེ། ལྷང་ལས་གཟུགས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་ལ་སྟོན་ན་
 ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱི་པ་རོལ་ཏུ་^[L209b]ཕྱིན་པ་ལ་སྟོན་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཅོ་ཞེས་
 གསུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་སོ། ། འདི་ལྟར་མ་གོ་བར་སྣ་ཚོགས་སྐྱེས་
 ཀྱང་འཁྲུལ་ལོ། །

Hopkins: An affirming negative “is predominantly a positive” because it implies a positive phenomenon in place of its object of negation. On the other hand, in the phrase “Brahmins do not drink beer,” the object of negation is “beer”; negating “beer” does not imply anything in its place even if “brahmins” is positive. Here Bhāvaviveka says that since what one is proving “is predominantly positive, one is proving, ‘Phenomena are not produced.’” As Jam-yang-shay-pa is about to say, an affirming negative has to involve the intent of the speaker to imply something in its place. Maybe Bhāvaviveka is thinking of the *existence* of the absence of truly existent production, as when Tsong-kha-pa says,^a “Therefore, [Jñānagarbha’s] explanation that a negative of ultimately existent production and so forth is conventional means that it *exists* conventionally; it does not indicate that such is a conventionality.”

^a Hopkins, *Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom*, Medium Exposition of Special Insight, 146.

The second [part of the reason which is that the distinction must be made that although in general all whatsoever consequences and signs are not parallel in having to be reversed in this way, on this occasion of Buddhapālita's refuting production from the four extremes such is necessary] because (1) Buddhapālita, on the occasion of refuting production from the four extremes, wishes to prove, not just the absence of production, but that production exists conventionally, like an illusion, (2) and in that case, since production is meaningful and finite, his saying "not produced from self" implicitly suggests production from other.

གཉིས་པ་ [སྐྱུར་ཐལ་འགྱུར་དང་རྟགས་གང་བཤོད་ཀྱི་དེ་ལྟར་བརྗོད་དགོས་པ་
 མཚུངས་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཡང་སངས་རྒྱས་བསྐྱེད་ཀྱིས་མཐའ་བཞིའི་སྐྱེ་བ་འགོག་པའི་
 སྐབས་འདྲར་དེ་ལྟར་དགོས་ཞེས་ཞིབ་ཆ་འབྲེད་དགོས་པར་] གྲུབ་སྟེ། སངས་
 རྒྱས་བསྐྱེད་ཀྱིས་མཐའ་བཞིའི་སྐྱེ་བ་འགོག་སྐབས་སྐྱེ་མེད་ཅེས་
 མ་ཡིན་པར་སྐྱེ་བ་ཐ་སྙད་དུ་ཡོད་པ་སྐྱེ་མ་ལྟར་བྱུང་སྐབས་འདྲོད་
 ལ། དེ་ལྟར་ན་སྐྱེ་བ་ནི་དོན་བཅས་ཐུག་བཅས་ཡིན་པས། བདག་
 ལས་མི་སྐྱེ་སྐྱེས་པས་ཤུགས་ལ་གཞན་སྐྱེ་འཕེན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Hopkins: Bhāvaviveka knows that Buddhapālita does not hold that the refutation of production from self does not imply production from other, but Buddhapālita has ended up in this mess because of his faulty introductory and concluding statements that the refutation of production from self establishes conventionally existent production. This is Jam-yang-shay-pa's key to explaining the controversy!

The first corner of the reason [which is that Buddhapālita, on the occasion of refuting production from the four extremes, wishes to prove, not just the absence of production, but that production exists conventionally, like an illusion] is established because it is evident that this is what Bhāvaviveka was thinking since *Buddhapālita's Commentary* says:

Respectively, [someone] says: At this point show how this called production is **only a convention!**

Answer: That is shown first [in the first stanza of the first chapter of Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle*]:

Not from self, not from others,

Not from both, not causelessly
 Are any things
 Ever produced anywhere.

Concerning this, if something is produced, consider whether the production of that thing is from self, from other, from both self and other, or causelessly. Upon examination, it is not logically feasible in all ways.

How? "From self" (*bdag las, svataḥ*) is the equivalent of saying "from [its own] entity" (*bdag nyid las*). About that, respectively, things are not produced from self because their production would be just senseless and because production would be endless.^a

^a This and the next two sentences are cited in Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* (La Vallée Poussin, *Prasannapadā*, 14.1):

na svata utpadyante bhāvāḥ/ tadutpādavaiyarthiyā/ atiprasaṅgadoṣacca/ na hi svātmanā vidyamānānām padārthānām punarutpāde prayojanamasti/ atha san-napi jāyeta/ na kadā cinna jāyeta//

The Tibetan translation of Chandrakīrti's text (Golden Reprint, vol. 112, 13.2) is:

*ngos po rnam **bdag las skye ba** med de de dag gi skye ba don med pa nyid du 'gyur ba'i phyir dang / **shin tu thal bar** 'gyur ba'i phyir ro // ngos po bdag gi bdag nyid yod pa rnam la ni yang skye ba la dgos pa med do// **ci ste** yod kyang skye na nam yang mi skye bar mi 'gyur ro/*

The Tibetan translation of Buddhapālita's text (Golden Reprint, vol. 106, 493.5) reads:

*ngos po rnam **bdag gi bdag nyid las* skye ba** med de/ de dag gi skye ba don med pa nyid du 'gyur ba'i phyir dang **skye ba thug pa med par** 'gyur ba'i phyir ro/ **'di ltar** ngos po bdag gi bdag nyid yod pa rnam la yang skye ba la dgos pa med do// **gal te** yod kyang skye na nam yang mi skye bar mi 'gyur bas//*

In the latter edition, *svataḥ* is translated into Tibetan as *bdag gi bdag nyid las* instead of *bdag las* (as would be expected) most likely because Buddhapālita in the previous sentence glosses *bdag las* (*svataḥ*) as *bdag nyid las* and in the next sentence uses *bdag gi bdag nyid* (*svātmanā*).

The Sanskrit of the second fallacy, *atiprasaṅgadoṣacca* ("and because of the fault of great absurdity") is rendered in the Tibetan of Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* (P5260, vol. 98, 4.4.3; Golden Reprint, vol. 112, 13.2) as *dang shin tu thal bar 'gyur ba'i phyir* ("and because it would be very absurd"). The Tibetan of Buddhapālita's text (P5242, vol. 95, 75.1.6; Golden Reprint, vol. 106, 493.6; Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur*, vol.), however, differs due, most likely, to providing a meaning translation spelling out the actual absurdity, *dang skye ba thug pa med par 'gyur ba'i phyir* ("and because production would be endless"). Since the latter is more to the point and is also the reading in the Tibetan of Bhāvaviveka's text (P5253, vol. 95, 155.4.7; Golden Reprint, vol. 107, 132.4; Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur*, vol. 96, 97.6) and Avalokitavrata's commentary on Bhāvaviveka

It is thus: the production-again (*yang skye ba, punarutpāda*) of things already existing in their own entities is purposeless. If, though existent, they are produced, they would never not be produced. Hence, that also is not accepted. Therefore, respectively, things are not produced from self.

They also are not produced from other. Why? For it would [absurdly] follow that everything would be produced from everything.

They also are not produced from both self and other because [such] would [absurdly] entail the fallacies of both [production from self and production from other].

They also are not produced causelessly because it would [absurdly] follow that everything always would be produced from everything and because there would be the fallacy that all endeavor would be just senseless.

Because the production of things is thus in all ways inadmissible, there is no [inherently existent] production; therefore, this called production is **only a convention**.

[སངས་རྒྱལ་བསྐྱེད་ཀྱིས་མཐའ་བཞིའི་སྐྱེ་བ་འགོག་སྐབས་སྐྱེ་མེད་ཙམ་མ་ཡིན་པར་
 སྐྱེ་བ་ཐ་སྐྱད་ཏུ་ཡོད་པ་སྐྱེ་མ་ཉར་བུར་སྐྱབ་འདོད་པའི་]རྟགས་ཟུར་དང་པོ་
 ཡུབ་ཤེ། བྱུང་བ་ལི་ཏུ་ལས། འདིར་སྐྱེས་པ་རེ་ཞེས་སྐྱེ་བར་བརྗོད་
 པ་ཐ་སྐྱད་ཙམ་ཡིན་པ་དེ་ཉར་རབ་ཏུ་སྟོན་ཅིག་བཤད་པ་དེ་དང་
 པོར་བསྟན་པར་བྱའོ། །བདག་ལས་མ་ཡིན་གཞན་ལས་མིན། ཞེས་
 པ་ནས། [གཉིས་ལས་མ་ཡིན་རྒྱ་མེད་མིན། །དངོས་པོ་གང་དག་གང་ན་ཡང་། །སྐྱེ་
 བ་ནམ་ཡང་ཡོད་མ་ཡིན། །འདི་ལ་གལ་ཏེ་དངོས་པོ་འགའ་ཞེས་སྐྱེ་བར་གྱུར་ན།
 དངོས་པོ་དེའི་སྐྱེ་བ་དེ་བདག་ལས་སམ། གཞན་ལས་སམ། བདག་དང་གཞན་གཉིས་
 ལས་སམ། རྒྱ་མེད་པ་ལས་འགྱུར་གང་ན། བརྟགས་ནས་རྣམ་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་ལས་མི་
 འཐད་དོ། །རྟོག་ཞེ་ན། བདག་ལས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་བདག་ཉིད་ལས་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་ཐ་

(P5259, vol. 96, 190.3.1; Golden Reprint, vol. 109, 229.2, which for *thug* reads *thugs*; Kar-
 mapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur*, vol. 98, 145.3) I have translated it this way throughout.

It is unsuitable to translate this fallacy as “infinite regress” since the reference is not to the past but to the future, that is to say, an object would be produced over and over again. Also, each cause has a cause, thereby requiring an infinite regress, which is not a fallacy since there is infinite time for a string of infinite causes.

ཚོག་གོ། དེ་ལ་རེ་ཞིག་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་བདག་གི་བདག་ཉིད་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་དེ། དེ་
 དག་གི་སྐྱེ་བ་དོན་མེད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར་དང་། སྐྱེ་བ་ལྷན་པ་མེད་པར་འགྱུར་
 བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། ། འདི་ལྟར་དངོས་པོ་བདག་གི་བདག་ཉིད་དུ་ཡོད་པ་རྣམས་ལ་ཡང་སྐྱེ་བ་
 དགོས་པ་མེད་དོ། ། གལ་ཏེ་ཡོད་ཀྱང་ཡང་སྐྱེ་ན་ནམ་ཡང་མི་སྐྱེ་བར་མི་འགྱུར་བས་དེ་
 ཡང་མི་འདོད་དེ། དེའི་ཕྱིར་རེ་ཞིག་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་

དོ། །]གཞན་ལས་ཀྱང་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་དེ། ཅིའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེ་ན། ཐམས་ཅད་
 ལས་ཐམས་ཅད་སྐྱེ་བར་ཐལ་བར་འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། ། བདག་
 དང་གཞན་གཉིས་ལས་ཀྱང་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་དེ། གཉིས་ཀའི་སྐྱོན་དེ་
 ཐལ་འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། ། རྒྱ་མེད་པ་ལས་ཀྱང་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་དེ།
 ཏྲག་དུ་ཐམས་ཅད་ལས་ཐམས་ཅད་སྐྱེ་བར་ཐལ་བར་འགྱུར་བའི་
 ཕྱིར་དང་། ཚུམ་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་དོན་མེད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་འགྱུར་བའི་
 ཕྱིར་རོ། ། དེ་ལྟར་གང་གི་ཕྱིར་དངོས་པོ་སྐྱེ་བ་རྣམས་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་
 དུ་མི་འཐད་པ་དེའི་ཕྱིར། སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པས་སྐྱེ་བར་བརྗོད་པ་ནི་ཐ་
 ལྷན་ཅོམ་ཡིན་ཅོ། ། ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར་སྣམ་དུ་ལེགས་ལྡན་
 གྲིས་དགོངས་པར་མངོན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Hopkins: The reason is “because the production of things is thus in all ways inadmissible”; then the thesis is “there is no [inherently existent] production.” This somehow further implies that “this called production is only a convention.” Such a sequence certainly seems to be Buddhapālita’s intention, and so his reasonings come to prove a positive and are hence affirming-negations. This is how Jam-yang-shay-pa’s clear presentation of why Bhāvaviveka criticism of Buddhapālita is based on Buddhapālita’s own words.

Though [what Bhāvaviveka said] is a great basis of analysis [that is, provides serious points of challenge to Buddhapālita’s presentation], there is no fault [in Buddhapālita’s presentation] because [Buddhapālita’s] brief indication of the explanation in Nāgārjuna’s *Treatise on the Middle* that nothing exists ultimately and that everything is feasible within the context of only name and terminology must [be taken as] explaining that:

Here also, although the absence of production from the four extremes is a nonaffirming negative, [Nāgārjuna] treated production as existing name-only, due to which [his explanation] is very good.

དམུང་གཞི་ཆེ་མོང་ཀྱང་སྐྱོན་མེད་དེ། ཚུ་ཤེས་གྱིས་དོན་དམ་པར་
 མེད་པ་དང་། མིང་བརྟེན་ཅིང་ལ་ཐམས་^[L210a]ཅད་དུ་རུང་བར་
 བཤད་པའི་མདོར་བསྟན་ལ། འདིར་ཡང་མཐའ་བཞི་ལས་མི་སྐྱེ་
 བ་མེད་དགག་ཡིན་ཡང་སྐྱེ་བ་མིང་ཅིང་ཡོད་པར་མཛད་པས་
 ཤིན་ཏུ་ལེགས་སོ་ཞེས་བཤད་དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ།

Hopkins: Jam-yang-shay-pa's statement above that that Bhāvaviveka's criticism indicates that Buddhapālita's refutation of production from self is a great basis for analysis means that it calls for examination. Jam-yang-shay-pa is not saying that the refutation of inherently existent production establishes that production is only conventionally existent, but it is indeed the case that production is conventionally existent and that this is the point that Buddhapālita is trying to convey. Does Nāgārjuna's *Treatise* anywhere speak of merely conventional existence? It does, for it says (XXIV.18) that "dependent imputation" and "middle path" are compatible, and in chapter twenty-four it clearly sets forth how everything is possible within an absence of inherent existence and impossible without it.

Khay-drub's *Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate* says:

It is not that [Bhāvaviveka] propounds such in general with respect to all whatsoever consequences and signs, but here when Buddhapālita states that production is meaningful and has an end as the sign proving that there is no production from self, this is equal also to having to assert—as the proposition—the opposite of the nonaffirming negative that production from self is not just eliminated. For, the way it is equal to having to having to assert this does not mean that "it is equal to having to state 'production from other'"; rather, the meaning is:

The meaning of the reverse of taking—as the proposition—the nonaffirming negative that production from self

is not just eliminated is that an affirming negative becomes the proposition because when that production is meaningful and has an end is stated as the sign, the words of the thesis “There is no production from self” implicitly project the proposition that things are produced from other; moreover, by explicitly propounding that the production of things is meaningful and has an end, it is propounded that things are produced, and by stating that “there is no production from self” production from self is refuted; since within taking production as the basic context, it is limited to the two, production from self and production from other, by just saying that things are produced and are not produced from self it is projected that [things] are produced from other. [Bhāvaviveka] was thinking that this is like the fact that through the force of speaking of the fat Devadatta and that he does not eat during the day, eating at night is implied.

ལྷོང་ལྷོན་ལས། ཐལ་འགྱུར་དང་རྟགས་གང་ཡིན་ཐམས་ཅད་ལ་
ལྷོར་དེ་ལྷོར་སྐྱེ་བ་མ་ཡིན་གྱི། ཞེས་བ་ནས། [འདིར་སངས་རྒྱས་བསྐྱེངས་
གྱིས་བདག་སྐྱེ་མེད་པར་བསྐྱབ་པའི་རྟགས་སུ་སྐྱེ་བ་དོན་བཅས་ཐུག་བཅས་འགོད་ན་
བདག་སྐྱེ་ནམ་པར་བཅད་ཅམ་གྱི་མེད་དགག་ལས་བསྐྱོག་པའི་བསྐྱོག་དོན་བསྐྱབ་བྱས་
ལས་ལེན་དགོས་པར་ཡང་མཚུངས་ཞེས་བ་སྟེ། དེ་ལས་ལེན་དགོས་པར་མཚུངས་ཚུལ་
ནི་གཞན་ལས་སྐྱེ་སྟེ། ཞེས་འགོད་དགོས་པར་མཚུངས་ཅམ་པའི་དོན་མིན་གྱི། བདག་སྐྱེ་
ནམ་པར་བཅད་ཅམ་གྱི་མེད་དགག་བསྐྱབ་བྱས་བྱེད་པ་ལས་བསྐྱོག་པའི་དོན་མ་ཡིན་
དགག་བསྐྱབ་བྱས་འགྱུར་ཏེ། སྐྱེ་བ་དོན་བཅས་དང་ལྷོན་བཅས་རྟགས་སུ་བཀོད་ན་
དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་དེ་ཞེས་པའི་དམ་བཅའི་ཚིག་གིས་བསྐྱབ་ཚེས་
དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་གཞན་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་ལྷོན་ལ་འཕེན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་དོན་ཏེ། དེ་
ཡང་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་སྐྱེ་བ་དོན་བཅས་ཐུག་བཅས་སུ་དངོས་སུ་སྐྱས་པས་དངོས་པོ་
རྣམས་སྐྱེ་བར་སྐྱས་ཤིང་། བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་དེ་ཅམ་པས་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་བཀག་
ལ།]སྐྱེ་བ་གཞིར་བྱས་ལ་བདག་སྐྱེ་གཞན་སྐྱེ་གཉིས་སུ་ཁ་ཚོན་ཚོད་
[G154b]པས་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་སྐྱེ་བ་ཡིན་ཞིང་བདག་ལས་མི་སྐྱེ་ཞེས་
སྐྱས་བ་ཉིད་གྱིས་གཞན་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་འཕེན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ལྷོན་བྱིན་

ཚོན་པོ་དང་ཉིན་པར་མི་བར་སྐྱེས་པའི་ཤུགས་ཀྱིས་མཚན་མོ་
བར་འཕེན་པ་བཞིན་ལོ་སྐྱེས་དུ་བསམ་ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Hopkins: Does Bhāvaviveka himself assert production from other? He clearly does not accept *ultimately existent* production from other.

In the Consequentialist system as Tsong-kha-pa lays it out, conventionally existent production is not one of the four extremes; it is neither production from self nor production from other. If it is not one of those four, then the refutation of the four extremes of production does not refute all possibilities of production because there is this possibility—conventionally existent production—that is outside of those four. Many wonder how this reasoning refutes inherently existent production if it does not refute all possibilities of production? Tsong-kha-pa responds that it refutes all possibilities of *inherently existent* production.

If ultimate valid cognition found production to be nonexistent, then to say that production is conventionally existent would be contradictory; and thus the two types cognition—ultimate and conventional—would contradict each other. However, in Tsong-kha-pa's system, it is said that although ultimate valid cognition does not find production, it does not find production to be nonexistent; its not finding production means that it finds inherently existent production to be nonexistent. It is by making this sort of distinction that it is possible to posit conventional existence within the rubric of valid cognition and yet not denude the rational consciousness realizing the ultimate of its force.

If you look for something and come back reporting that you did not find it and claim that therefore it does not exist, that depends on whether your search was competent—whether your mode of search was competent for that particular object. If you bring in an incompetent exterminator and he/she tells you that he/she did not find cockroaches, it does not mean that cockroaches do not exist there. It is like contemporary science not finding certain categories of things; you cannot conclude that it finds them to be nonexistent. Similarly, ultimate valid cognition is competent with regard to inherent existence but not with regard to mere existence.

Furthermore, if a speaker has no desire to project [that is, suggest] such, it

is not projected because no one asserts that (1) when [the *Questions of Anavatapta, the King of Nāgas*,] *Sūtra* says,^a “Those which are produced from conditions are not produced,” and (2) when even Bhāvaviveka himself says, “The subject, form, does not ultimately exist because of existing, like a magical illusion,” these implicitly project in conventional terms production and existence.

འདི་ཡང་སྐྱེ་བ་པོ་ལ་འཕེན་འདོད་མེད་ན་མི་འཕེན་ཏེ། མདོ་
ལས། གང་ཞིག་སྐྱེ་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་དེ་མ་སྐྱེས། ། ཞེས་དང་། ལེགས་
ལྡན་རང་ཉིད་ཀྱང་གཟུགས་ཚོས་ཅན། དོན་དམ་པར་མེད་དེ།
ཡོད་པའི་སྤྱིར། སྐྱེ་མ་བཞིན་ཞེས་བ་དག་གིས་ཐ་སྐྱོད་སྐྱེ་བ་
དང་ཡོད་པར་བྱགས་ལ་འཕེན་པར་སྐྱེ་ཡང་མི་འདོད་པའི་སྤྱིར་
རྟོ། །

Hopkins: This is the key to Chandrakīrti's attempt to defend Buddhapālita from the apparent impact of his own words introducing and concluding his presentation of Nāgārjuna's stanza refuting production from the four extremes: “If the speaker does not desire to suggest such, it is not suggested.” It is not mere words that provide the meaning; thus, as will be discussed in the next book in this series, it will be crucial for Chandrakīrti to contextualize Buddhapālita's remarks if the claim that he did not intend to indicate that this reasoning proves conventionally existent production. For, Buddhapālita puts Nāgārjuna's stanza itself in the context of demonstrating conventionally existent production twice, and it indeed seems he is saying that Nāgārjuna is trying to show this by means of ultimate reasoning, but Chandrakīrti claims that Buddhapālita actually did not intend such. This is Chandrakīrti's admission that Buddhapālita's words are faulty.

The *Questions of Anavatapta, the King of Nāgas, Sūtra* says:^b

Those which are produced from conditions are not produced.

^a *klu'i rgyal po ma dros pas zhus pa'i mdo, anavataptanāgarājaparipṛchāsūtra*; P823, vol. 33; D156, vol. *pha*.

^b *klu'i rgyal po ma dros pas zhus pa'i mdo, anavataptanāgarājaparipṛchāsūtra*; P823, vol. 33; D156, vol. *pha*.

They do not have an inherent nature of production.
 Those that depend on conditions are said to be empty.
 Those who know emptiness are aware.

The sūtra passage itself establishes that phenomena “are not produced,” but remember that Bhāvaviveka's *Lamp for (Nāgārjuna's) “Wisdom”* made the case (above, 140, and also below, 162) that such would be proving an affirming negative :

When an affirming negation is employed, due to its principally being an affirmation, it is being affirmed that “phenomena are not produced,” whereby nonproduction is indicated, and hence one separates from a tenet because scripture says, “If one courses in the nonproduction of form, one is not coursing in the perfection of wisdom.”

However, this citation from the *Questions of Anavatapta, the King of Nāgas, Sūtra* indicates that proving “Phenomena are not produced,” since Buddha himself says in the above-cited sūtra passage, “Those which are produced from conditions are not produced.” Also, in the next line of that sūtra Buddha says, “They do not have an inherent nature of production”—the sūtra itself specifies the object of negation with “inherent nature of production.”

It seems that Bhāvaviveka's objection here is that one would be implicitly proving something positive; hence it would have to be “Phenomena **exist as** not produced,” meaning by extension that they are conventionally produced.^a

^a My explanation is based on Tsong-kha-pa's explanation—in his *Medium Exposition of Special Insight*—of a similar statement by Jñānagarbha:

In connection with the explanation of the negative of production and so forth as a concordant ultimate, Jñānagarbha's *Commentary on the “Differentiation of the Two Truths”* says:

Others [Proponents of Mind-Only] hold [that emptiness is] only real; thus, “also” [in the root text] has the meaning of a conjunction. [However] when analyzed with reasoning it is only conventional. Why? Since the object of negation [a self of phenomena] does not exist, it is clear that the negative does not exist in reality.

Thus, he says that others—Proponents of Mind-Only—assert that an emptiness which is a negative of the self of phenomena in a base of negation is established in [that is, as its own] reality, whereas his own system [asserts] that since the self of phenomena which is the object of negation does not exist, the negation which is the negative of that is not established in [that is, as its own] reality. Therefore, the explanation that a negative of ultimately existent production and so forth is

In the second example, Bhāvaviveka himself says that things do not “ultimately exist because of existing.” Even though once something is existent and is not ultimately existent, then, perforce, it must be conventionally existent, but Bhāvaviveka does not hold that he is proving conventional existence.

Also, Ge-lug-pa scholars emphasize that although emptiness and dependent-arising are compatible in that the understanding of the one helps the understanding of the other, yet if you establish that something lacks inherent existence, you are not establishing that it conventionally exists, even though it does conventionally exist. The fact that they so strongly stress that the proof does not imply that things conventionally exist shows what a powerful place meditative equipoise—that is, just perceiving emptiness—has in the system because if the proof were implying something such as conventional existence in place of negating inherent existence, the meditator would have to move on to paying attention to conventional existence and could not just stay in meditative equipoise perceiving a mere absence.

You immediately would have to pass beyond this experience of emptiness, a mere negative of true existence, which might not last more than a moment. You would have a moment of perceiving the absence of inherent existence and then would be reflecting on a conventionally existent phenomenon. Hence, the philosophical presentation is structured around the epistemological and meditative fact that the content of meditative equipoise does not imply anything.

It seems to me that it is not the reasoning that is the ground in the sense of totally driving the argument about the content of meditative equipoise, but an experience of meditative equipoise itself. If things did exist inherently, meditative equipoise would have to find them, but since it is known that it does not find them, then we know that things do not inherently exist. This approach puts the perceptual situation, the meditative situation, in front of or parallel to the reasoning. When reading this type of Tibetan literature on wisdom, one keeps coming up against the fact that meditative equipoise is a state in which nothing appears except emptiness. Since this is an experience confirmed over the ages, this position is held

conventional means that it exists conventionally; it does not indicate that such is a conventionality.

at all costs, just as those who have experienced meditative equipoise as fused in clear light qualified by emptiness hold that position at all costs. What is being investigated here is certain Indian evidence for the former position. It needs to be remembered that it also suffuses the latter position.

PART THREE: THE SOURCE TEXTS

Translations of those portions of three texts in chronological order relevant to the controversy around the refutation of production from self in Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle*:

1. Buddhapālita's commentary, also including his refutations of production from other, both, and neither to provide the context of his concluding statement
2. Bhāvaviveka's commentary
3. Avalokitavrata's explanation of Bhāvaviveka's commentary.

1. Buddhapālita’s Refutation of Production from Self, Other, Both, and Neither

Buddhapālita Commentary on (Nāgārjuna’s) “Fundamental Treatise on the Middle”

དབུ་མ་རྩ་བའི་འགྲེལ་བ་བུ་རྒྱ་ལྷ་ལི་།

Here^a [someone] says: At this point show how this called production is only a convention!

Answer: That is shown first [in the first stanza of the first chapter of Nāgārjuna’s *Treatise on the Middle*]:

Not from self, not from others,
Not from both, not causelessly
Are any things
Ever produced anywhere.

*na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyāṃ nāpyahetutaḥ/
utpannā jātu vidyante bhāvāḥ kvacana kecana//*

*bdag las ma yin gzhan las min//
gnyis las ma yin rgyu med min//
dngos po gang dag gang na yang //
skye ba nam yang yod ma yin//*

འདིར་སྐྱུས་པ། རེ་ཞིག་རི་རྩེ་བར་བཅོད་པ་ཐ་སྟངས་ཅམ་ཡིན་
པ་དེ་རྩེ་རབ་ཏུ་སྟོན་ཅིག ། བཤད་པ། དེ་དང་པོར་བསྟན་པར་
བྱའོ། ། བདག་ལས་མ་ཡིན་གཞན་ལས་མིན། ། གཉིས་ལས་མ་ཡིན་
རྒྱ་མེད་མིན། ། དངོས་པོ་གང་དག་གང་ན་ཡང་། ། རྩེ་བ་ནམ་ཡང་
ཡོད་མ་ཡིན། །

^a Three editions were used: Golden Reprint, vol. 106, 493.3-494.4; P5242, vol. 95, 75.1.3-75.2.2; Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur*, vol. . See also the annotated translation and edited Tibetan text in the Ph.D. thesis by Akira Saito, *A Study of the Buddhapālita-mūlamadhyamaka-vṛtti*, Australian National University, 1984.

Concerning this, if something is produced, consider whether the production of that thing is from self, from other, from both self and other, or causelessly. Upon examination, it is not logically feasible in all ways.

འདི་ལ་གལ་ཏེ་དངོས་པོ་འགའ་ཞིག་སྐྱེ་བར་གྱུར་ན། དངོས་པོ་
 དེའི་སྐྱེ་བ་དེ་བདག་ལས་སམ། གཞན་ལས་སམ། བདག་དང་
 གཞན་གཉིས་ལས་སམ། རྒྱ་མེད་པ་ལས་འགྱུར་གྲང་ན། བརྟགས་
 རྣམ་རྣམ་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་ལས་མི་འཐད་དོ། །

How? “From self” (*bdag las*, *svataḥ*) is the equivalent of saying “from [its own] entity” (*bdag nyid las*). About that, respectively, things are not produced from self because their production would be just senseless and because production would be endless.^a It is thus: the production-again

^a This and the next two sentences are cited in Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* (La Vallée Poussin, *Prasannapadā*, 14.1):

*na svata utpadyante bhāvāḥ/ tadutpādavaivaryarthyāt/ atiprasaṅgadoṣācca/ na hi
 svātmanā vidyamānānām padārthānām punarutpāde prayojanamasti/ atha san-
 napi jāyeta/ na kadā cinna jāyeta//*

The Tibetan translation of Chandrakīrti's text (Golden Reprint, vol. 112, 13.2) is:

*dnegos po rnam bdag las skye ba med de de dag gi skye ba don med pa nyid du
 'gyur ba'i phyir dang / shin tu thal bar 'gyur ba'i phyir ro // dnegos po bdag gi
 bdag nyid yod pa rnam la ni yang skye ba la dgos pa med do// ci ste yod kyang
 skye na nam yang mi skye bar mi 'gyur ro/*

The Tibetan translation of Buddhapālita's text (Golden Reprint, vol. 106, 493.5) reads:

dnegos po rnam bdag gi bdag nyid las skye ba med de/ de dag gi skye ba don
 med pa nyid du 'gyur ba'i phyir dang skye ba thug pa med par 'gyur ba'i phyir
 ro/ 'di ltar dnegos po bdag gi bdag nyid yod pa rnam la yang skye ba la dgos pa
 med do// gal te yod kyang skye na nam yang mi skye bar mi 'gyur bas//*

In the latter edition, *svataḥ* is translated into Tibetan as *bdag gi bdag nyid las* instead of *bdag las* (as would be expected) most likely because Buddhapālita in the previous sentence glosses *bdag las* (*svataḥ*) as *bdag nyid las* and in the next sentence uses *bdag gi bdag nyid* (*svātmanā*).

The Sanskrit of the second fallacy, *atiprasaṅgadoṣācca* (“and because of the fault of great absurdity”) is rendered in the Tibetan of Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* (P5260, vol. 98, 4.4.3; Golden Reprint, vol. 112, 13.2) as *dang shin tu thal bar 'gyur ba'i phyir* (“and because it would be very absurd”). The Tibetan of Buddhapālita's text (P5242, vol. 95, 75.1.6; Golden Reprint, vol. 106, 493.6; Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur*, vol. 96), however, differs due, most likely, to providing a meaning translation spelling out the actual absurdity, *dang skye ba thug pa med par 'gyur ba'i phyir* (“and because production would be

(*yang skye ba, punarutpāda*) of things already existing in their own entities is purposeless. If, though existent, they are produced, they would never not be produced. Hence, that also is not accepted. Therefore, respectively, things are not produced from self.

རི་སྣར་ཞེ་ན། བདག་ལས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་བདག་ཉིད་ལས་ཞེས་བྱ་
 བའི་ཐ་ཚོག་གོ། དེ་ལ་རེ་ཞེས་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་བདག་གི་བདག་
 ཉིད་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་དེ། དེ་དག་གི་སྐྱེ་བ་དོན་མེད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་
 འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར་དང་། སྐྱེ་བ་ཐུག་པ་མེད་པར་འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར་
 རོ། །འདི་སྣར་དངོས་པོ་བདག་གི་བདག་ཉིད་དུ་ཡོད་པ་རྣམས་
 ལ་ཡང་སྐྱེ་བ་དགོས་པ་མེད་དོ། །གལ་ཏེ་ཡོད་ཀྱང་ཡང་སྐྱེ་ན་
 རྣམ་ཡང་མི་སྐྱེ་བར་མི་འགྱུར་བས་དེ་ཡང་མི་འདོད་དེ། དེའི་
 ཕྱིར་རེ་ཞེས་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་དོ། །

They also are not produced from other. Why? For it would [absurdly] follow that everything would be produced from everything.

They also are not produced from both self and other because [such] would entail the fallacies of both [production from self and production from other].

They also are not produced causelessly because it would [absurdly] follow that everything always would be produced from everything and because there would be the fallacy that all endeavor would be just senseless.

Because the production of things is thus in all ways not logically feasible, there is no production; therefore, this called production is only a convention.

endless"). Since the latter is more to the point and is also the reading in the Tibetan of Bhāvaviveka's text (P5253, vol. 95, 155.4.7; Golden Reprint, vol. 107, 132.4; Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur*, vol. 96, 97.6) and Avalokitavrata's commentary on Bhāvaviveka (P5259, vol. 96, 190.3.1; Golden Reprint, vol. 109, 229.2, which for *thug* reads *thugs*; Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur*, vol. 98, 145.3) I have translated it this way throughout.

It is unsuitable to translate this fallacy as "infinite regress" since the reference is not to the past but to the future, that is to say, an object would be produced over and over again. Also, each cause has a cause, thereby requiring an infinite regress, which is not a fallacy since there is infinite time for a string of infinite causes.

གཞན་ལས་ཀྱང་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་དེ། ཅིའི་སྤྱིར་ཞེ་ན། ཐམས་ཅད་ལས་
 ཐམས་ཅད་སྐྱེ་བར་ཐལ་བར་འགྱུར་བའི་སྤྱིར་རོ། ། བདག་དང་
 གཞན་གཉིས་ལས་ཀྱང་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་དེ། གཉི་གའི་སྦྱོན་དུ་ཐལ་བར་
 འགྱུར་བའི་སྤྱིར་རོ། ། ལྷ་མེད་པ་ལས་ཀྱང་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་དེ། ཏྲ་ག་དུ་
 ཐམས་ཅད་ལས་ཐམས་ཅད་སྐྱེ་བར་ཐལ་བར་འགྱུར་བའི་སྤྱིར་
 དང་། ཚྱོམ་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་དོན་མེད་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་སྦྱོན་དུ་འགྱུར་
 བའི་སྤྱིར་རོ། ། དེ་ལྟར་གང་གི་སྤྱིར་དངོས་པོ་སྐྱེ་བ་རྣམ་པ་ཐམས་
 ཅད་དུ་མི་འཐད་པས་དེའི་སྤྱིར་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པས་སྐྱེ་བར་བརྗོད་པ་
 བློ་ཐ་སྐྱད་ཅམ་ཡིན་ནོ། །

2. Bhāvaviveka's Criticism of Buddhapālita's Refutation of Production from Self

Lamp for (Nāgārjuna's) "Wisdom"

ཤེས་རབ་སྒྲོན་མེད་ཀྱི་ཆེར་འགྲེལ་བ།

The master^a [Nāgārjuna], having manifestly praised the Supramundane Victor due to teaching just that dependent-arising having the unique attributes of no production and so forth, thought that after teaching no production, the attributes of no cessation and so forth would easily be taught; thereupon he took up the task of initially teaching no production, bringing to the fore conceptions about production imputed by others. When the statements from proponents of production:

some saying, "Things are produced from self,"
others saying, "Things are produced from other,"
some saying, "Things are produced from both," and
others saying, "Things are produced causelessly,"

are analyzed with reasoning and scripture, production does not withstand logical feasibility in any way. Having ascertained this in himself, through the force of this [Nāgārjuna] said:

Not from self, not from others,
Not from both, not causelessly
Are any things
Ever produced anywhere.

*na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyāṃ nāpyahetutaḥ/
utpannā jātu vidyante bhāvāḥ kvacana kecana//*

*bdag las ma yin gzhan las min/
gnyis las ma yin rgyu med min/
dngos po gang dag gang na yang/
skye ba nam yang yod ma yin//*

This is a general [statement of] theses.

^a Four editions were used: Golden reprint, vol. 107, 64b.1-65b.6/129.6-132.6; *sde dge*, vol. 97, 48b.1-49b.1; P5253, vol. 95, 155.2.3-155.5.2; Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur*, vol. 96, 96.1-98.1.

ལྷོ་བ་དཔོན་གྱིས་རྟེན་ཅིང་འབྲེལ་པར་འབྱུང་བ་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་ལ་
 སོགས་པ་བྱུན་མོང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་བྱུང་པར་དང་ལྡན་པ་དེ་ཁོ་ན་
 ལྷོན་པར་མཛད་པ་ཉིད་གྱིས་བཅོམ་ལྡན་འདས་ལ་མངོན་པར་
 བསྟོན་ནས། སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་བསྟན་ནས་འགག་པ་མེད་པ་ལ་སོགས་
 པ་བྱུང་པར་བསྟན་སྐྱབས་བར་དགོངས་པ་ན་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་དང་པོར་
 བསྟན་པར་བཞེད་ནས། གཞན་གྱིས་ཡོངས་སུ་བརྟགས་པའི་སྐྱེ་བ་
 རྣམ་པར་རྟོག་པ་མངོན་སུམ་དུ་མཛད་དོ། །འདི་ལྟར་སྐྱེ་བར་སྐྱབས་
 དག་ལས་ཁ་ཅིག་ནི་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེའོ་ཞེས་ཟེར།
 གཞན་དག་ནི་གཞན་ལས་སོ་ཞེས་ཟེར། ཁ་ཅིག་ནི་གཉིས་ལས་སོ་
 ཞེས་ཟེར། གཞན་དག་ནི་རྒྱ་མེད་པ་ལས་སོ་ཞེས་ཟེར་བ་དག་
 རིགས་པ་དང་ལྷུང་དག་གིས་བརྟགས་པ་ན་སྐྱེ་བ་རྣམ་པ་ཐམས་
 ཅད་དུ་འཐད་པ་མི་བཟོད་པར་རང་ལ་ངེས་པའི་དབང་གིས།
 བདག་ལས་མ་ཡིན་གཞན་ལས་མིན། །གཉིས་ལས་མ་ཡིན་རྒྱ་
 མེད་མིན། །དངོས་པོ་གང་དག་གང་ན་ཡང་། །སྐྱེས་བ་ནམ་ཡང་
 ཡོད་མ་ཡིན། །ཞེས་བྱ་བ་གསུངས་ཏེ། འདི་ནི་དམ་བཅས་པའི་སྐྱེ་
 བའོད་པ་ཡིན་ཅོ། །

Concerning that, respectively, what is “not from self”? “Production never exists” and so forth, which is to be applied to each. “From self” (*bdag las*) is synonymous with “from [its own] entity” (*bdag nyid las*).

The intended meaning of the words is not established^a merely by having made a thesis.^b Hence, the property of the position^c is held to be just existence (*yod pa nyid, vidyamāna*) as follows: because “from self” is designated^d to an existent entity. An example is by virtue of the predicate of the proposition and the attribute that is the means of proof [that is to say, the probans]^e because it is an example of a subject that is endowed with renowned predicate of the proposition and attribute that is the means of proof.

དེ་ལ་རེ་ཞིག་བདག་ལས་མ་ཡིན་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ཅི་ཞིག་ཅེ་ན། རྟེན་པ་
 རྣམ་ཡང་ཡོད་མ་ཡིན། ། ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ལ་སོགས་པ་སྟེ། རེ་རེ་དང་
 རྒྱར་བར་བྱའོ། ། བདག་ལས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་བདག་ཉིད་ལས་ཞེས་
 བྱ་བའི་ཐ་ཚོག་གོ། ། དམ་བཅས་པ་ཙམ་གྱིས་བསམས་པའི་ཚོག་
 གི་དོན་མི་འགྲུབ་པས། འདིར་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་ཚོས་ནི་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ཡིན་
 པར་གཟུང་སྟེ། འདི་ལྟར་བདག་ལས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་བདག་ཉིད་
 ཡོད་པ་ལ་སྟོད་གདགས་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། ། དཔེ་ནི་བསྐྱབ་པར་བྱ་བ་
 དང་། རྒྱབ་པའི་ཚོས་ཀྱི་དབང་གིས་ཏེ་བསྐྱབ་པར་བྱ་བ་དང་།
 རྒྱབ་པའི་ཚོས་གྲགས་པ་དང་ལྷན་པའི་ཚོས་ཅན་གྱི་དཔེ་ཡིན་
 པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །

This negation, “not from self” (*bdag las ma yin, na svataḥ*), is to be viewed as meaning a nonaffirming negation because of principally being

^a In the Golden Reprint (vol. 107, 130.6) read *mi 'grub pas/ de'i phyir* for *mi 'grub pa/dir phyar* in accordance with the Peking of Avalokitavrata (vol. 96, 184.5.4).

^b Nāgārjuna has provided only a thesis that things are not produced from self; so Bhāvaviveka now begins to describe the syllogism through which the thesis of no production from self will be proven. Thus, he speaks about the reason, the example, and the status of the thesis, after which he presents his syllogism.

^c *phyogs kyi chos, pakṣadharmā*; this is the reason (property or sign) that is present in the subject of a syllogism.

^d *snyad gdags pa* or *tha snyad gdags pa*.

^e *bsgrub par bya ba dang sgrub pa'i chos*; Avalokitavrata (see below, 191), seeing *chos* as distributed to both, takes this as “predicate of the proposition and attribute that is the means of proof.”

a negation and because of intending^a to establish “nonconceptual pristine wisdom” endowed with the entirety of objects through refuting the entirety of the net of conceptions. When an affirming negation is employed, due to its principally being an affirmation, it is being affirmed that “phenomena are not produced,” whereby nonproduction is indicated, and hence one would separate from a tenet because scripture says, “If one courses in the nonproduction of form, one is not coursing in the perfection of wisdom.” Here it is to be delimited that “Things are only not produced from self.” If it is delimited otherwise, then it would be determined as, “[Things] are not produced from only self. Well, what then? They are produced from other,” and likewise it would be determined as, “[Things] are not produced from only self. Well, what then? They are produced from self and other.” Hence, those also are not asserted because of separating from a tenet.

བདག་ལས་མ་ཡིན་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་དགག་པ་འདི་ནི་མེད་པར་
 དགག་པའི་དོན་དུ་ལྟ་བར་བྱ་སྟེ་དགག་པ་གཙོ་ཆེ་བའི་སྤྱིར་དང་།
 འདི་ལྟར་རྟོགས་པ་མ་ལུས་པའི་དྲ་བ་དགག་པས་རྣམ་པར་མི་
 རྟོག་པའི་ཡེ་ཤེས་ཤེས་བྱའི་ཡུལ་མ་ལུས་པ་དང་ལྡན་པ་འགྲུབ་
 པར་དགོངས་པའི་སྤྱིར་རོ། ། མ་ཡིན་པ་དགག་པ་ཡོངས་སུ་བརྒྱུང་
 བ་ནི་དེ་རྒྱུབ་པ་གཙོ་ཆེ་བའི་སྤྱིར་ཚོས་རྣམས་མ་སྐྱེས་སོ་ཞེས་རྒྱུབ་
 པས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་སྟོན་པའི་སྤྱིར་མཛད་པའི་མཐའ་དང་བྲལ་
 པར་འགྲུར་ཏེ། ལྷང་ལས་གཟུགས་ཀྱི་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་ལ་སྦྱོད་ན་ཤེས་
 རབ་ཀྱི་པ་རོལ་དུ་སྤྱོད་པ་ལ་སྦྱོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེས་འབྱུང་བའི་
 སྤྱིར་རོ། ། འདིར་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་ཁོ་
 བའོ་ཞེས་ངེས་པར་གཟུང་བར་བྱའོ། ། གཞན་དུ་ངེས་པར་གཟུང་
 བ་བདག་ཁོ་ན་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་དེ། འོ་ན་ཅི་ཞེ་ན། བདག་དང་
 གཞན་ལས་སྐྱེའོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བར་ངེས་པར་འགྲུར་བས་དེ་ཡང་མི་
 བཞིན་དེ། མཛད་པའི་མཐའ་དང་བྲལ་བའི་སྤྱིར་རོ། །

^a *dgongs pa.*

Here those serving as the words of a syllogism are:

Ultimately the internal sense-spheres [eye sense, ear sense, and so forth] are not produced from self^a because of existing, like intelligence.^b

na paramārthata ādhyātmikānyāyatanāni svata utpannāni vidyamānatvāt caitanyavad//

don dam par nang gi skye mched rnams bdag las skye ba med par nges te yod pa'i phyir shes pa yod pa nyid bzhin no//

འདིར་སྐྱུར་བའི་ཚིག་ཏུ་འགྱུར་བ་ནི་དོན་དམ་པར་ནང་གི་སྐྱེ་
མཚེད་རྣམས་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པར་ངེས་ཏེ། ཡོད་པའི་སྐྱེར་
དཔེར་ན་ཤེས་པ་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་བཞིན་ལོ། །

If it is objected: The reason, “existing” (*yod pa nyid, vidyamānatva*) has not been shown to be absent from the dissimilar class; hence, this is not a veritable reason.

གལ་ཏེ་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ནི་མི་མཐུན་པའི་སྐྱེགས་ལས་
སྐྱེག་པ་མ་བསྟན་པས། གཏན་ཚིགས་ཉིད་མ་ཡིན་ལོ་ཞེས་གྲོ་

Answer: Because [the dissimilar class] is just nonexistent, absence from that does not exist, due to which there is no fallacy in this or anything else.

^a The Tibetan reads “are **delimited** as not being produced from self” (*bdag las skye ba med par nges te*), but “delimited” is not represented in the Sanskrit. It perhaps has been added in the Tibetan in accordance with Bhāvaviveka’s earlier (above, 162) usage of the term and Avalokitavratā’s discussion of it (below, 209). Also, the reason could be translated as “because of presently existing” since *vidyamāna* is the present middle participle; however, later Chandrakīrti (La Vallée Poussin, *Prasannapadā*, 33.4) cites the reason as *sattvād*, suggesting that the particular form makes little difference, this perhaps being why it is translated into Tibetan merely as *yod pa'i phyir* instead of *da lta bar yod pa'i phyir*.

^b The Tibetan of the example *shes pa yod pa nyid bzhin* is a translation of the Sanskrit *caitanya* and is not an extension of the example to include the reason (“existing”). The reference of “intelligence” is, for a Sāṃkhya, to the *puruṣa*—the person, that is to say, pure consciousness, the spirit. According to Avalokitavratā (230), for Bhāvaviveka it is “conventionally ‘consciousness’ (*rnam par shes pa nyid*).”

^c The Sanskrit is from La Vallée Poussin, *Prasannapadā*, 25.7-26.2.

མེད་པ་ཁོ་ནའི་ཕྱིར་དེ་ལ་སློག་པ་མེད་པས་འདི་དང་ཐམས་ཅད་
ལ་ཉེས་པ་མེད་དོ།

Here from among the Sāṃkhyas certain ones object: What is the meaning of this thesis? Does “from self” [mean] “from the entity of the effect” or “from the entity of the cause”? Which of those is it? If it is from the entity of the effect, then [you have the fallacy of] proving what is already established. Otherwise, if it is from the entity of the cause, then [your reasoning] is an object of contradiction because [according to us Sāṃkhyas] all that have production are produced only within the context of existing in the entities of [their] causes.^a

འདིར་གྲངས་ཅན་དག་ལས་ཁ་ཅིག་ཕྱིར་སློག་པར་བྱེད་དེ། དམ་
བཅས་པ་འདིའི་དོན་གང་ཡིན། ཅི་བདག་ལས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་འབྲས་
བུའི་བདག་ཉིད་ལས་སམ། འོན་ཏེ་རྒྱུའི་བདག་ཉིད་ལས་དེས་
ཅིར་འབྱུང། གལ་ཏེ་འབྲས་བུའི་བདག་ཉིད་ལས་ན་ནི་གྲུབ་པ་
བརྒྱབ་བོ། འོན་ཏེ་རྒྱུའི་བདག་ཉིད་ལས་ན་ནི་དོན་འགལ་བ་
ཉིད་དེ། རྒྱེ་བ་ཅན་ཐམས་ཅད་ནི་རྒྱུའི་བདག་ཉིད་དུ་ཡོད་པ་ཁོ་
ན་ལས་རྒྱེ་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ་ཞེ་ན།

Answer: Those are not good because mere production from self is refuted.^b For, even if it is from the entity of a cause, production even from what is self and what is other is eliminated. Because intelligence is held to be endowed with a character of potential, there also is no fallacy.

^a The Sanskrit of this objection, as Chandrakīrti repeats it (La Vallée Poussin, *Prasana-padā*, 14.4), is:

ko 'yam pratijñārthaḥ/ kiṃ kāryātmakāt svata uta kāraṇātmakāditi/ kiṃ cātaḥ/ kāryātmakāccet siddhasādhanam/ kāraṇātmakācced viruddhārthatā/ kāraṇāt-manā vidyamānasyaiva sarvasyotpattimata utpādāditi//

^b In the Golden Reprint (vol. 107, 132.2) for *rgyu'i bdag nyid las na yang bdag nyid las na yang dag dang gzhan* read *rgyu'i bdag nyid las na yang bdag dang gzhan* in accordance with the Peking (P5259, vol. 95, 155.4.5) and the Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur*, vol. 96, 97.4.

དེ་ནི་བཟང་པོ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་ཙམ་དགག་པའི་སྤྱིར་
 རོ། ། རྒྱུའི་བདག་ཉིད་ལས་ན་ཡང་བདག་དང་གཞན་དུ་གྱུར་པ་
 ལས་ཀྱང་སྐྱེ་བསེལ་བའི་སྤྱིར་རོ། ། ཤེས་པ་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ནི་རྣམས་
 པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་དང་ལྡན་པ་ཡོངས་སུ་གཟུང་བའི་སྤྱིར་ཡང་ཉེས་
 པ་མེད་དོ། །

About that,^a another [namely, Buddhapālita] makes the explanation, “Things are not produced from self because their production would be just senseless and because production would be endless.”

འདི་ལས་གཞན་ནི་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་བདག་གི་བདག་ཉིད་ལས་སྐྱེ་
 བ་མེད་དེ། དེ་དག་གི་སྐྱེ་བ་དོན་མེད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་འགྱུར་བའི་སྤྱིར་
 དང་། སྐྱེ་བ་ཐུག་པ་མེད་པར་འགྱུར་བའི་སྤྱིར་རོ་ཞེས་རྣམ་པར་
 བཤད་པར་བྱེད་དོ། །

That is not reasonable^b (1) because [Buddhapālita] does not express a

^a The Golden Reprint (vol. 107, 65b.3), the Peking (P5253, vol. 95, 155.4.7), and the Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur* (vol. 96, 97.5) have 'di las gzhan (“One other than this”) whereas Avalokitavrata (Golden Reprint, vol. 109, 228.6, Peking, vol. 96, 190.2.5, and Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur*, vol. 98, 145.3) has 'di la gzhan (“About this, another”), as does Jam-yang-shay-pa's *Great Exposition of the Middle* (262a.6). I prefer the reading in Avalokitavrata since he comments on 'di la and gzhan as individual items; see 263.

^b The Sanskrit of this paragraph, as Chandrakīrti cites it (La Vallée Poussin, *Prasanna-padā*, 14.4), is:

*tadayuktam/ hetudṛṣṭāntānabhīdhānāt/ paroktadoṣāparihārācca/
 prasaṅgavākyatvācca prakṛtārthaviparyayeṇa viparītarthasādhyataddhar-
 mavyaktau parasmādutpannā bhāvā janmasāphalyāt/ janmanirodhāceti kṛtān-
 tavirodhaḥ syāt//*

The Tibetan as it appears in Bhāvaviveka's text (Golden Reprint, vol. 107, 132.4) is:

*de ni rigs pa ma yin te/gtan tshigs dang dpe ma brjod pa'i phyir dang / gzhan
 gyis smras pa'i nyes pa ma bsal ba'i phyir ro// glags yod pa'i tshig yin pa'i phyir
 te/ skabs kyi don las bzlog pas sgrub par bya ba dang /de'i chos bzlog pa'i don
 mngon pas dngos po rnamz gzhān las skye bar 'gyur ba dang / skye ba 'bras bu
 dang bcas pa nyid du 'gyur ba dang / skye ba thug pa yod par 'gyur ba'i phyir
 mdzad pa'i mtha' dang 'gal bar 'gyur ro//*

reason [capable of proving that there is no production from self] as well as an example, and (2) because [the reasoning as Buddhapālita states it] does not avoid the fallacies adduced by another [that is, the fallacies that a Sāṃkhya would be expected to adduce], and (3) because [Buddhapālita's] words afford an opportunity [to an opponent to expose contradiction within his own system] since [the thesis and the reason must] be reversed from the meaning put forward, and hence what becomes evident is the meaning of the opposite of the thesis and the property of that [that is, the opposite of the reason]—things are produced from other and production has effects and production has an end^a—due to which [Buddhapālita] would contradict tenets [of the Middle Way School].

A slightly different Tibetan translation is found in Avalokitavrata's commentary on Bhāvaviveka (P5259, vol. 96, 190.3.8):

de ni rigs pa ma yin te/gtan tshigs dang dpe ma brjod pa'i phyir dang / gzhan gyis smras pa'i nyes pa ma bsal ba dang // glags yod pa'i tshig yang yin pa'i phyir te/ skabs kyi don las bzlog pas sgrub par bya ba dang /de'i chos bzlog pa'i don mngon pas dngos po rnam gzhān las skye bar 'gyur ba dang / skye ba 'bras bu dang bcas pa nyid du 'gyur ba dang / skye ba thug pa yod par 'gyur ba'i phyir mdzad pa'i mtha' dang 'gal bar 'gyur ro//

See also the next two footnotes.

^a The Sanskrit, as Chandrakīrti cites it (La Vallée Poussin, *Prasannapadā*, 15.1), rather than presenting this as three points as the Tibetan in Bhāvaviveka's text does (*dngos po rnam gzhān las skye ba 'gyur ba dang / skye ba 'bras bu dang bcas pa nyid du 'gyur ba dang /skye ba thug pa yod par 'gyur ba'i phyir*: P5253, vol. 95, 155.5.1; Golden Reprint, vol. 107, 132.5; Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur*, vol. 96, 97.7, as well as in Avalokitavrata's commentary, Golden Reprint, vol. 109, 234.2; Peking P5259, 191.1.5; Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur*, vol. 98, 148.3), reframes Buddhapālita's syllogism in its opposite form:

parasmādupannā bhāvā janmasāphalyāt janmanirodhāceti (Things are produced from other because production has effects and because production has an end.)

The Tibetan of Chandrakīrti's text, nevertheless, is as above: *dngos po rnam gzhān las skye ba 'gyur ba dang / skye ba 'bras bu dang bcas pa nyid du 'gyur ba dang /skye ba thug pa yod par 'gyur ba'i phyir* (Golden Reprint, vol. 112, 13.4; Peking ; and Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur*, ; Tibetan Publishing House 1968 edition, 10.19). I would render the Sanskrit into Tibetan, however, as:

dngos po rnam gzhān las skye ba yin te/ skye ba don yod pa nyid yin pa'i phyir dang skye ba thug pa yod pa yin pa'i phyir ro/

Because of the unanimity of the Tibetan versions on this point (except for mine) and because Tsong-kha-pa and Jam-yang-shay-pa speak to these versions, I use their casting of the meaning as three points but cite the Sanskrit version throughout.

དེ་ནི་རིགས་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། གཏན་ཚིགས་དང་དཔེ་མ་བརྗོད་པའི་
 ཕྱིར་དང་། གཞན་གྱིས་སྐྱེས་པའི་ཉེས་པ་མ་བསལ་པའི་ཕྱིར་དང་།
 སྐབས་ཡོད་པའི་ཚིག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། སྐབས་ཀྱི་དོན་ལས་
 བརྗོད་པས་བསྐྱབ་པར་བྱ་བ་དང་། དེའི་ཚོས་བརྗོད་པའི་དོན་
 མདོན་པས་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་གཞན་ལས་སྐྱེ་བར་འགྱུར་བ་དང་།
 སྐྱེ་བ་འབྲས་བུ་དང་བཅས་པ་ཉིད་དུ་འགྱུར་བ་དང་། སྐྱེ་བ་ཐུག་
 པ་ཡོད་པར་འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར་མཛད་པའི་མཐའ་དང་འགལ་བར་
 འགྱུར་རོ། །

3. Avalokitavrata’s Explanation of Bhāvaviveka’s Criticism

*Explanatory Commentary on (Bhāvaviveka’s)
“Lamp for (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Wisdom’”*

ཤེས་རབ་སྒྲོན་མེད་རྒྱ་ཚེར་འབྲེལ་པ།

[Bhāvaviveka]^a utters:

- The master [Nāgārjuna], having manifestly praised the Supramundane Victor due to teaching just that dependent-arising having the unique attributes of no production and so forth,^b thought that after teaching no production, the attributes of no cessation and so forth would easily be taught; thereupon he took up the task of initially teaching no production, bringing to the fore conceptions about production imputed by others. When the statements from proponents of production:

some saying, “Things are produced from self,”
others saying, “Things are produced from other,”
some saying, “Things are produced from both,” and
others saying, “Things are produced causelessly,”

are analyzed with reasoning and scripture, production does not withstand logical feasibility in any way. Having ascertained this in himself, through the force of this [Nāgārjuna] said:

Not from self, not from others,
Not from both, not causelessly
Are any things
Ever produced anywhere.

སྒྲོན་བ་དཔོན་གྱིས་རྟེན་ཅིང་འབྲེལ་པར་འབྱུང་བ་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་ལ་
སོགས་པ་སྐྱུན་མོང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་བྱུང་པར་དང་ལྡན་པ་དེ་ཁོ་ན་

^a Three editions were used: Golden reprint, vol. 109, 92b.1-122a.4/184.1-243.4; *sde dge*, 118.3-153.7/ 59b.3-77a.7; P5259, vol. 96, 183.3.7-192.3.3.

^b Avalokitavrata (Golden Reprint, vol. 109, 92b.2/184.2) merely adds another “and so forth;” I have filled in the remainder of the statement.

ལྟོན་པར་མཛད་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་བཅོམ་ལྡན་འདས་ལ་མངོན་པར་
 བསྟོན་ནས། སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་བསྟན་པས་འགག་པ་མེད་པ་ལ་སོགས་
 པ་བྱུང་པར་བསྟན་པ་སྣ་བར་དགོངས་ནས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་དང་
 པོར་བསྟན་པར་བཞེས་ནས། གཞན་གྱིས་ཡོངས་སུ་བརྟགས་པའི་
 སྐྱེ་བར་རྣམ་པར་རྟོག་པ་མངོན་སུམ་དུ་མཛད་དེ། འདི་ལྟར་སྐྱེ་
 བར་སྣ་བ་དག་ལས། ཁ་ཅིག་ནི་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེའོ་
 ཞེས་ཟེར། གཞན་དག་ནི་གཞན་ལས་སོ་ཞེས་ཟེར། ཁ་ཅིག་ནི་གཉི་
 ག་ལས་སོ་ཞེས་ཟེར། གཞན་དག་ནི་རྒྱ་མེད་པ་ལས་སོ་ཞེས་ཟེར་
 བ་དག་རིག་པ་དང་ལྷུང་དག་གིས་བརྟགས་པ་ན་སྐྱེ་བ་རྣམ་པ་
 ཐམས་ཅད་དུ་འཐད་པ་མི་བཟོད་པར་རང་ལ་ངེས་པ་དེའི་
 དབང་གིས་བདག་ལས་མ་ཡིན་གཞན་ལས་མིན། གཉིས་ལས་མ་
 ཡིན་རྒྱ་མེད་མིན། དངོས་པོ་གང་དག་གང་ན་ཡང་། སྐྱེ་བ་ནམ་
 ཡང་ཡོད་མ་ཡིན། ། ། ཞེས་བྱ་བ་གསུངས་ཏེ°

^a The Peking edition of Bhāvaviveka's text (vol. 95, 155.2.4) and the Golden Reprint of Bhāvaviveka's text (vol. 107, 130.2) read *dgongs pa na*.

^b Or *rigs*.

^c The Peking edition of Bhāvaviveka's text (vol. 95, 155.2.4) and the Golden Reprint of Bhāvaviveka's text (vol. 107, 130.4) read *skyes pa*, which reflects the Sanskrit *utpannā...bhāvāḥ*. The stanza, therefore, could also be rendered as:

Not from self, not from others,
 Not from both, not causelessly
 Are any produced things
 Ever existent anywhere.

^d The Sanskrit, as cited earlier: *na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyāṃ nāpyahetutah/ utpannā jātu vidyante bhāvāḥ kvacana kecana//*

^e The Tibetan is presented in accordance with Avalokitavratā's citation (starting at vol. 109, 184.1) except where noted.

[དེའི་རྒྱུར་]སྒྲོབ་དཔོན་གྱིས་རྟེན་ཅིང་འབྲེལ་པར་འབྱུང་བ་སྐྱེ་བ་
 མེད་པ་ལ་སོགས་པ་ཐུན་མོང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་བྱུང་པར་དང་ལྡན་པ་
 དེ་ལོ་ན་སྟོན་པར་མཛད་པ་ཉིད་གྱིས་བཙམ་ལྡན་འདས་ལ་
 མངོན་པར་བསྟོད་ནས་[སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་བཟུན་པས་འགག་བ་མེད་པ་ལ་སོགས་
 པ་བྱུང་པར་བཟུན་པ་སྐྱབ་བར་དགོངས་ནས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་དང་པོར་བཟུན་པར་བཞེས་
 བསུ་གཞན་གྱིས་ཡོངས་སུ་བརྟགས་པའི་སྐྱེ་བར་རྣམ་པར་རྟོག་པ་མངོན་སུམ་དུ་
 མཛད་དེ། འདི་རྣམ་སྐྱེ་བར་སྐྱབ་བ་དག་ལས། ཁ་ཅིག་ནི་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་བདག་ལས་
 སྐྱེའོ་ཞེས་ཟེར། གཞན་དག་ནི་གཞན་ལས་སོ་ཞེས་ཟེར། ཁ་ཅིག་ནི་གཉི་ག་ལས་སོ་ཞེས་
 ཟེར། གཞན་དག་ནི་རྗེ་སྐྱེ་མེད་པ་ལས་སོ་ཞེས་ཟེར་བ་དག་རིག་པ་དང་ལུང་དག་གིས་
 བརྟགས་པ་ན་སྐྱེ་བ་རྣམ་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་དུ་འཐད་པ་མི་བཟོད་པར་རང་ལ་ངེས་པ་དེའི་
 དབང་གིས་བདག་ལས་མ་ཡིན་གཞན་ལས་མིན། གཉིས་ལས་མ་ཡིན་རྗེས་མེད་མིན།
 དངོས་པོ་གང་དག་གང་ན་ཡང་། སྐྱེ་བ་རྣམ་ཡང་ཡོད་མ་ཡིན། ། །ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ལ་
 སོགས་པ་སྐྱས་ཏེ།

This indicates the beginning of the explanation of the text itself of [Nāgārjuna's] *Treatise*. Moreover, it is to be put together this way:

Having in that way manifestly praised the Supramundane Victor, the master [Nāgārjuna], thinking to teach others the suchness of all phenomena in accordance with how he comprehended it, takes up the task of initially teaching no production, and he, bringing to the fore conceptions about production imputed by others, composes the first chapter "Analyzing Conditions" from the viewpoint of teaching that production does not exist—through the force of his ascertainment that when the statements that things are produced from self, other, both, and causelessly are analyzed with reasoning and scripture, production does not withstand logical feasibility in all ways.

འདི་དག་གིས་ནི་བཟུན་བཙམ་གྱི་གཞུང་ཉིད་བཤད་པར་རྩོམ་
 པའི་མགོ་འདྲེན་པ་སྟོན་ཏོ། ། དེ་ཡང་སྒྲོབ་དཔོན་གྱིས་དེ་རྣམ་
 བཙམ་ལྡན་འདས་ལ་མངོན་པར་བསྟོད་ནས། ཉིད་གྱིས་ཚེས་

ཐམས་ཅད་ཀྱི་དེ་ལོ་ན་རི་ལྷ་ར་ཐུགས་སུ་ཚུད་པ་དེ་བཞིན་དུ་
 གཞན་ལ་བསྟན་པར་དགོངས་པ་ན། རྗེ་བ་མེད་པ་དང་པོར་
 བསྟན་པར་བཞིན་ནས། གཞན་གྱིས་ཡོངས་སུ་བརྟགས་པའི་རྗེ་
 བར་རྣམ་པར་རྟོག་པ་མངོན་སུམ་དུ་མཛད་དེ། དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་
 བདག་དང་གཞན་དང་གཉིས་ཀ་དང་རྗེ་མེད་པ་ལས་རྗེ་འོ་ཞེས་
 ཟེར་བ་དག། རིགས་པ་དང་ལྷུང་དག་གིས་བརྟགས་པ་ན། རྗེ་བ་
 རྣམ་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་དུ་འཐད་པ་མི་བཟོད་པར་རང་ལ་ངེས་པའི་
 དབང་གིས་རྗེ་བ་མེད་པར་བསྟན་པའི་སློ་ནས། རྗེ་བརྟག་པའི་
 རབ་ཏུ་བྱེད་པ་དང་པོའི་སྐབས་བརྩམ་པ་མཛད་དོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བར་
 རྗེ་རོ། །

In [Bhāvaviveka's statement]:

- **the master** (*slob dpon gyis*): the Superior Nāgārjuna.

དེ་ལ་སློབ་དཔོན་གྱིས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་འཕགས་པ་རྗེ་བ་ཀྱིས་སོ། །

- **having manifestly praised the Supramundane Victor due to teaching just that dependent-arising having the unique attributes of no production and so forth** (*rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba skye ba med pa la sogs pa thun mong ma yin pa'i khyad par dang ldan pa de kho na ston par mdzad pa nyid kyis bcom ldan 'das la mngon par bstod nas*): having manifestly praised the Supramundane Victor due to teaching in the *Perfection of Wisdom [Sūtras]* just the above-indicated^a terms and meanings of the substratum, dependent-arising, which has the unique attributes of no production, no cessation, and so forth, saying:

Homage to the perfect Buddha,
 The best of propounders,
 Who taught that what dependently arises

^a That is to say, earlier in connection with the commentary on Nāgārjuna's expression of worship but not included here.

Has no cessation, no production,

No annihilation, no permanence,

No coming, no going,

No difference, no sameness,

Is free from proliferations, and at peace.

རྟེན་ཅིང་འབྲེལ་བར་འབྱུང་བའི་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་ལ་སོགས་པ་སྐྱུན་
 མོང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་བྱུང་པར་དང་ལྡན་པ་དེ་ཁོ་ན་སྟོན་པར་མཛད་
 པ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་བཅོམ་ལྡན་འདས་ལ་མངོན་པར་བསྟོན་ནས་ཞེས་བྱ་
 བ་ནི་ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱི་པ་རོལ་ཏུ་སྐྱེན་པ་ལས་འབྱུང་བ་བྱུང་པར་གྱི་
 གཞི་རྟེན་ཅིང་འབྲེལ་བར་འབྱུང་བ། བྱུང་པར་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་དང་།
 འགག་པ་མེད་པ་ལ་སོགས་པ་སྐྱུན་མོང་མ་ཡིན་པ་དང་ལྡན་པ་
 ལྟར་ཇི་སྐད་བསྟན་པའི་སྐྱེ་དང་དོན་དེ་ཁོ་ན་སྟོན་པར་མཛད་པ་
 ཉིད་ཀྱིས། བཅོམ་ལྡན་འདས་ལ། གང་གི་རྟེན་ཅིང་འབྲེལ་བར་
 འབྱུང་། ། འགག་པ་མེད་པ་སྐྱེ་མེད་པ། ། ཆད་པ་མེད་པ་རྟག་མེད་
 པ། ། འོང་བ་མེད་པ་འགོ་མེད་པ། ། ཐ་དད་དོན་མིན་དོན་གཅིག་
 མིན། ། སྐྱོས་པ་ཉེར་ཞི་ཞི་བསྟན་པ། ། རྗེགས་པའི་སངས་རྒྱས་སྐྱེ་
 རྣམས་ཀྱི། ། དམ་པ་དེ་ལ་ཕྱག་འཚལ་ལོ། ། ཞེས་མངོན་པར་
 བསྟོན་ནས་སོ། །

- **thought that after teaching no production, the attributes of no cessation and so forth would easily be taught;** (*skye ba med pa bstan pas 'gag pa med pa la sogs pa khyad par bstan pa sla bar dgongs nas*): The master, pondering, "I will also teach to sentient beings the suchness of all phenomena in accordance with how I comprehended it," thought that—through initially teaching here no production from the body of the treatise, which is presented by way of^a eight meanings of

^a In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 185.5) read *brgyad po dag gis for brgyad po dag gi* in accordance with the Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur* (60a.3).

terms: no cessation, no production, no annihilation, no permanence, no coming, no going, no difference, and no sameness—the other attributes of no cessation and so forth would easily be taught.

སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་བསྟན་པ་ས་འགག་པ་མེད་པ་ལ་སོགས་པ་བྱུང་པར་
 བསྟན་སྐྱེ་བར་དགོངས་པ་ན་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི། སྐྱེ་བ་དཔོན་གྱིས་ངས་
 ཚོས་ཐམས་ཅད་ཀྱི་དེ་ལོ་ན་རི་ལྟར་རྟོགས་པ་དེ་ལོ་ན་བཞིན་དུ་
 སེམས་ཅན་རྣམས་ལ་ཡང་བསྟན་པར་བྱའོ་སྐྱེ་བ་ནས། འགག་པ་
 མེད་པ་སྐྱེ་མེད་པ། ཆད་པ་མེད་པ་རྟག་མེད་པ། འོང་བ་མེད་
 པ་འགྲོ་མེད་པ། ཐ་དད་དོན་མིན་དོན་གཅིག་མིན། ། ཞེས་བྱ་བ་
 ཚོག་གི་དོན་བརྒྱུད་པོ་དག་གིས་བསྟན་བཅོས་ཀྱི་ལུས་རྣམ་པར་
 གཞག་པར་མཇེད་པ་དེ་ལས་འདིར་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་དང་པོར་
 བསྟན་པས། འགག་པ་མེད་པ་ལ་སོགས་པ་བྱུང་པར་གཞན་
 བསྟན་སྐྱེ་བར་དགོངས་ནས་སོ། །

- **thereupon he took up the task of initially teaching no production** (*skye ba med pa dang por bstan par bzhes nas*): Indeed, earlier on the occasion of teaching the body of the treatise he placed the meaning of the term “no cessation” first, but if here on the occasion of teaching those, he taught no production first, it would be easier to teach no cessation, no annihilation, no permanence, no coming, no going, no difference, and no sameness; therefore, he took up the task of initially teaching no production.

སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་དང་པོར་བསྟན་པར་བཞིན་ནས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་འདི་
 རྒྱུད་ཅེས་བསྟན་ཏེ། འདི་ལྟར་བསྟན་བཅོས་ཀྱི་ལུས་རྣམ་པར་
 གཞག་པ་ལྟར་བསྟན་པའི་སྐབས་སུ་འགག་པ་མེད་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་
 བའི་ཚོག་གི་དོན་དང་པོར་རྣམ་པར་གཞག་མོད་ཀྱི། འདིར་དེ་

དག་བསྟན་པའི་སྐབས་སུ་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་དང་པོར་བསྟན་ན།
 འགག་པ་མེད་པ་དང་། ཚད་པ་མེད་པ་དང་། ཏྱག་པ་མེད་པ་
 དང་། འོང་བ་མེད་པ་དང་། འགྲོ་བ་མེད་པ་དང་། རྟོན་ཐ་དད་པ་
 མ་ཡིན་པ་དང་། རྟོན་གཅིག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་དག་བསྟན་སྐབས།
 དེའི་ཕྱིར་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་དང་པོར་བསྟན་པར་བཞིན་ནས་སོ། །

About this others object: Earlier^a when [you, Bhāvaviveka,] answered a statement [challenging the order of the eight no's in the expression of worship in which cessation is first, followed by production]: "It would have been reasonable [for Nāgārjuna] to refute cessation *after* production because [production] is earlier [than cessation], just as [he refutes] annihilation [*after* production]," you [Bhāvaviveka] said,^b "Because cyclic existence has no beginning, production and cessation do not have a definite order; hence, there is no fallacy in [Nāgārjuna's] teaching these [with the order of] 'no cessation, no production.'" If in that case it was reasonable according to that order [for Nāgārjuna] to teach no cessation first, why does he want [here] to teach no production first?

འདིར་གཞན་དག་ན་རེ། སྐར་ཡང་སྐྱེ་བའི་འོག་ཏུ་འགག་པ་
 དགག་པར་རིགས་ཏེ། དེ་སྟོན་ཏུ་འགྲོ་བ་ཅན་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཚད་
 པ་བཞིན་ལོ་ཞེས་སྐྱེངས་པའི་ཚེ་བྱེད་ན་རེ།

Answer: Earlier [when discussing the order of the eight terms in Nāgārjuna's expression of worship, Bhāvaviveka] explained that there is no fault in [Nāgārjuna's] teaching "no cessation, no production" because cyclic existence has no beginning and because cessation does not depend on the stage of production and because the topics

^a This is quoted from Bhāvaviveka's *Lamp for (Nāgārjuna's) "Wisdom"* (Golden Reprint, vol. 107, 128.2).

^b This paraphrases Bhāvaviveka's response (Golden Reprint, vol. 107, 128.3).

are being examined,^a but here in teaching *the meaning* of those the cause of all of them—that is to say, the cause of cessation and so forth—is production since:

if something has been produced, it will cease, but if it is not produced, it will not cease;

the definition of the cutting of the continuum of something that has been produced is annihilation, but if it is not produced, it will not be annihilated;

due to the nondestruction of something that has been produced, it is permanent, but if it is not produced, it will not become permanent;

due to the coming of something produced from another place, it comes,^b but if it is not produced, it does not come;

due to the going of something produced to another place, it goes, but if it is not produced, it does not go;

something produced is a different character, but if it is not produced, it does not become a different object;

because something produced has the same character, it is the same object, but if it is not produced, it will not become the same object;

and hence:

because when the cause is stopped, its effects also do not arise,
and

because it being the case that the world is intensely attached mostly to production and manifestly adheres to production, this treatise is aimed at abandoning intense attachment and manifest adherence, and

because when intense attachment and manifest adherence have been abandoned, nirvāṇa is attained,

here the master [Nāgārjuna] took up the task of initially teaching no production.

^a *don brtag pa yin pa'i phyir*, which literally is “meanings are being examined” but likely means “the topics are being listed” or “the topics are being examined” in contrast to “teaching *the meaning* of those” just below. These latter two reasons quote Bhāvaviveka (Golden Reprint, vol. 107, 128.4).

^b In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 187.2) read *yin* for *ma yin* in accordance with the Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur* (60b.2).

འཁོར་བ་ལ་ཐོགས་མ་མེད་པའི་སྲིར་སྐྱེ་བ་དང་འགག་པ་ལ་གོ་
 རིམས་ངེས་པ་མེད་པའི་སྲིར། འགག་པ་མེད་པ་སྐྱེ་མེད་པ། ། ཞེས་
 བསྟན་པ་ལ་ཉེས་པ་མེད་དོ་ཞེས་ཟེར་ན། འདྲིར་ཡང་དེའི་གོ་
 རིམས་བཞིན་དུ་འགག་པ་མེད་པ་དང་པོར་བསྟན་པའི་རིགས་ན།
 ཅིའི་སྲིར་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་དང་པོར་བསྟན་པར་འདོད་ཅེ་ན། དེའི་
 ལན་དུ་འདི་སྐད་ཅེས་བརྗོད་པར་བྱ་སྟེ། ལྷན། འགག་པ་མེད་པ་
 སྐྱེ་མེད་པ། ། ཞེས་བསྟན་པ་ལ་ཉེས་པ་མེད་དོ་ཞེས་བཤད་པ་ནི་
 འཁོར་བ་ལ་ཐོགས་མ་མེད་པའི་སྲིར་དང་། འགག་པ་ནི་སྐྱེ་བའི་
 རིམ་པ་ལ་མི་སྟོས་པའི་སྲིར་དང་། དོན་བརྟག་པ་ཡིན་པའི་སྲིར་
 དེ་སྐད་བཤད་པ་ཡིན་གྱི། འདྲིར་དེ་དག་གི་དོན་བསྟན་པ་ལ་ནི་
 སྐྱེས་ན་འགག་པར་འགྱུར་གྱི། མ་སྐྱེས་ན་འགག་པར་མི་འགྱུར་བ་
 དང་། སྐྱེ་བ་རྒྱན་ཆད་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ནི་ཆད་པ་ཡིན་གྱི། མ་སྐྱེས་
 ན་ཆད་པར་མི་འགྱུར་བ་དང་། སྐྱེས་པ་མ་ཞིག་པས་རྟག་པ་ཡིན་
 གྱི། མ་སྐྱེས་ན་རྟག་པར་མི་འགྱུར་བ་དང་། སྐྱེས་པ་ཡུལ་གཞན་
 ནས་འོང་བས་འོང་བ་ཡིན་གྱི། མ་སྐྱེས་པ་ན་འོང་བར་མི་འགྱུར་
 བ་དང་། སྐྱེས་པ་ཡུལ་གཞན་དུ་འགོ་བས་འགོ་བ་ཡིན་གྱི། མ་སྐྱེས་
 ན་འགོ་བར་མི་འགྱུར་བ་དང་། སྐྱེས་པ་མཚན་ཉིད་ཐ་དད་པས་
 དོན་ཐ་དད་པ་ཡིན་གྱི། མ་སྐྱེས་ན་དོན་ཐ་དད་པར་མི་འགྱུར་བ་
 དང་། སྐྱེས་པ་མཚན་ཉིད་གཅིག་པས་དོན་གཅིག་པ་ཡིན་གྱི་མ་
 སྐྱེས་ན་དོན་གཅིག་པར་མི་འགྱུར་བས་དེའི་སྲིར་འགག་པ་ལ་
 ཐོགས་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་ཀྱི་རྒྱ་ནི་སྐྱེ་བ་ཡིན་པའི་སྲིར། རྒྱ་བཀག་ན་
 དེའི་འབྲས་བུ་རྣམས་ཀྱང་མི་འབྱུང་བའི་སྲིར་དང་། འཇིག་རྟེན་

ཡང་པལ་ཆེར་སྐྱེ་བ་ལ་ཤིན་ཏུ་སྣག་པར་ཆགས་པ་དང་། སྐྱེ་བ་ལ་
 མངོན་པར་ཞེན་པ་ཡིན་ན། བསྟན་བཅོས་འདི་ནི་སྣག་པར་
 ཆགས་པ་དང་མངོན་པར་ཞེན་པ་སྣོང་བའི་སྤྱིར་ཞུགས་པ་ཡིན་
 པའི་སྤྱིར་དང་། སྣག་པར་ཆགས་པ་དང་མངོན་པར་ཞེན་པ་
 སྤངས་ན་སྐྱེ་བ་ལས་འདས་པ་ཐོབ་པར་འགྱུར་བའི་སྤྱིར།
 འདིར་སློབ་དཔོན་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་དང་པོར་བསྟན་པར་བཞེད་དོ། །

- **bringing to the fore conceptions about production imputed by others.** (*gzhan gyis yongs su brtags pa'i skye bar rnam par rtog pa mngon sum du mdzad de*): In that:
 - **imputed by others** (*gzhan gyis yongs su brtags pa'i*): Since thoughts of ultimate production do not exist in his mind, he brings to the fore those conceptions about production in which others impute and conceive that production ultimately exists.

དེའི་སྤྱིར་གཞན་གྱིས་ཡོངས་སུ་བརྟགས་པའི་སྐྱེ་བར་རྣམ་པར་
 རྟོག་པ་མངོན་སུམ་དུ་མཛད་དེ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་སྤྲུམ་ཏེ། དེ་ལ་གཞན་
 གྱིས་ཡོངས་སུ་བརྟགས་པའི་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་དོན་དམ་པར་ན་ཉིད་
 གྱི་སློབ་སྐྱེ་བ་རྣམ་པར་རྟོག་པའི་དགོངས་པ་ཉིད་མི་མངའ་བས།
 འདི་ལྟར་གཞན་དག་གིས་དོན་དམ་པར་སྐྱེ་བ་ཡོད་པར་ཡོངས་
 སུ་བརྟགས་པའི་སྐྱེ་བར་རྣམ་པར་རྟོག་པ་གང་དག་ཡིན་པ་དེ་
 དག་མངོན་སུམ་དུ་མཛད་དེ་ཞེས་བྱ་བར་སྐྱུར་རོ། །

- **conceptions about production** (*skye bar rnam par rtog pa*): those conceptions that impute and conceive of production are called “conceptions about production,” which is synonymous with “aspects of production” (*skye ba'i rnam pa*).

སྐྱེ་བར་རྣམ་པར་རྟོག་པར་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི། རྣམ་པར་རྟོག་པ་གང་
 དག་གིས་སྐྱེ་བར་རྣམ་པར་བརྟགས་ཤིང་གཟུང་བ་གང་དག་ཡིན་
 པ་དེ་དག་ནི་སྐྱེ་བར་རྣམ་པར་རྟོག་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་སྟེ། སྐྱེ་བའི་རྣམ་པ་
 ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་ཐ་ཚོག་གོ།

- **bringing to the fore** (*mngon sum du mdzad de*): placing in front of the mind, this being synonymous with “observes” (*dmigs par mdzad*). What are those conceptions about production? Hence, [Bhāvaviveka] utters:

མངོན་སུམ་དུ་མཛད་དེ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་སེམས་ཀྱི་མདུན་དུ་བཞག་
 པ་མཛད་པ་སྟེ་དམིགས་པར་མཛད་དེ་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་ཐ་ཚོག་གོ། སྐྱེ་
 བར་རྣམ་པར་རྟོག་པ་དེ་དག་གྲང་གང་ཞེ་ན། དེའི་སྐྱེར་འདི་
 ལྟར་སྐྱེ་བར་སྐྱ་བ་དག་ལས།

- **When the statements from proponents of production:**

some saying, “Things are produced from self,”
 others saying, “Things are produced from other,”
 some saying, “Things are produced from both,” and
 others saying, “Things are produced causelessly,”

(*'di ltar skye bar smra ba dag las/ kha cig ni dngos po
 rnam s bdag las skye 'o zhes zer/ gzhan dag ni gzhan las so
 zhes zer/ kha cig ni gnyi ga las so zhes zer/ gzhan dag ni
 rgyu med pa las so zhes zer ba dag*)

[Nāgārjuna] brings to the fore those conceptions about production.

ཁ་ཅིག་ནི་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེའོ་ཞེས་ཟེར། གཞན་
 དག་ནི་གཞན་ལས་སོ་ཞེས་ཟེར། ཁ་ཅིག་ནི་གཉི་ག་ལས་སོ་ཞེས་
 ཟེར། གཞན་དག་ནི་རྐྱེམ་པར་ལས་སོ་ཞེས་ཟེར་བ་དག་ཅིས་བྱ་
 བ་སྐྱས་སོ། ། སྐྱེ་བར་རྣམ་པར་རྟོག་པ་དེ་དག་མངོན་སུམ་དུ་
 མཛད་དེའོ། །

- **are analyzed with reasoning and scripture** (*rig* [or *rigs*] *pa dang lung dag gis brtags pa na*): Having brought to the fore those conceptions about production, he analyzes them with reasoning and scripture.
 - **reasoning** (*rig* [or *rigs*] *pa*): reasons and example that are renowned in the world and in scripture.
 - **scripture** (*lung*):^a all sūtras such as the *Perfection of Wisdom* and so forth, those in which the Supramundane Victor says:

Subhūti, this “form” is imputed as a phenomenon; that imputed as a phenomenon has no production, also no cessation; it is exhausted as only conventionally verbalized by name and terminology.

and so forth. Those scriptures are stated as being the One-Gone-Thus's because others do not have the character of scripture, as it is said for instance:

Scriptures are believable words;
Those in which defects are extinct are to be known
as scriptures.
Those who have extinguished defects do not utter
False words because of being without the cause.

Hence, he analyzes with those reasonings and scriptures.

རིགས་པ་དང་ལུང་དག་གིས་བརྟགས་པ་ན་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་སྐྱེ་བར་
 རྣམ་པར་རྟོག་པ་ད་དག་མངོན་སུམ་དུ་མཛད་དེ་རིགས་པ་དང་
 ལུང་དག་གིས་བརྟགས་པ་ན་ལོ། ། དེ་ལ་རིགས་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་
 གཏན་ཚིགས་དང་། དཔེ་འཇིག་རྟེན་དང་ལུང་ལ་གྲགས་པ་དག་
 ལོ། ལུང་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱི་པ་རོལ་ཏུ་ཕྱིན་པ་ལ་སོགས་
 པའི་མདོ་སྡེ་མཐའ་དག་སྟེ། དེ་ལས་ཀྱང་བཅོམ་ལྡན་འདས་ཀྱིས།
 རབ་འབྱོར་གཟུགས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་དེ་ནི་ཚོས་སུ་བཏགས་པ་ཙམ་སྟེ།
 ཚོས་སུ་བཏགས་པ་དེ་ལ་སྐྱེ་བ་ཡང་མེད། འགག་པ་ཡང་མེད་དེ།

^a āgama.

མིང་དང་བརྒྱུ་ཅམ་གྱི་ཐ་སྐད་དུ་བརྗོད་པ་འབའ་ཞིག་ཏུ་བྱེད་དོ་
 ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ལ་སོགས་པ་ཇི་སྐད་གསུངས་པ་དག་ཡིན་ཅོ། ། ལྷུང་དེ་
 ཡང་དེ་བཞིན་གསེགས་པའི་ཡིན་པར་བརྗོད་པར་བྱའི་གཞན་
 དག་ལ་ནི་ལྷུང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་མེད་དེ། ཇི་སྐད་དུ་ལྷུང་ནི་ཡིད་
 ཚེས་ཚོག་ཡིན་ཏེ། ། ཉེས་བྱེད་ལྷུང་དུ་སྐྱེས་པར་བྱ། ཉེས་པ་བྱེད་
 པས་བརྗོད་གྱི་ཚོག། ལྷུང་བར་མི་འགྱུར་རྒྱུ་མེད་ཕྱིར། ། ཞེས་བཤད་
 པ་དེ་ལྷ་བྱ་སྟེ། དེའི་ཕྱིར་རིགས་པ་དང་ལྷུང་དེ་དག་གིས་བརྟགས་
 པ་ནའོ། །

- **production does not withstand logical feasibility in any way.** (*skye ba rnam pa thams cad du 'thad pa mi bzod par*):
 - **production** (*skye ba*): this is limited to conceptions of production imputed by others.
 - **in any way** (*rnam pa thams cad du*): in all the aspects of the four poles—"from self, from other, from both, and causelessly."
 - **does not withstand logical feasibility** (*'thad pa mi bzod par*): the reasons for the logical feasibility of production do not stand as existing.

སྐྱེ་བ་རྣམ་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་དུ་འཐད་པ་མི་བཟོད་པར་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ལ།
 སྐྱེ་བ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་གཞན་གྱིས་ཡོངས་སུ་བརྟགས་པའི་སྐྱེ་བར་
 རྣམ་པར་རྟོག་པ་གང་ཡིན་པ་དེས་སོ། ། རྣམ་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་དུ་
 ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི། བདག་ལས་དང་། གཞན་ལས་དང་། གཉི་ག་ལས་
 དང་། རྒྱུ་མེད་པ་ལས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ལྷུང་བའི་རྣམ་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་
 དུ་འོ། ། འཐད་པ་མི་བཟོད་པར་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་སྐྱེ་བ་འཐད་པའི་
 གཏན་ཚོགས་ཡོད་པར་མི་བཟོད་པར་རོ། །

- **Having ascertained this in himself,** (*rang la nges pa*): When the master [Nāgārjuna] realized that the production of things

is illogical and unreasonable in those aspects, ascertainment understanding the very fact that “ultimately all phenomena are not produced” was generated in the master himself.

- **through the force of that** (*de'i dbang gis*): through the force of that generation of ascertainment in the master himself. Thinking, through the force of that, “I will also teach other sentient beings in accordance with how I realized the suchness of all phenomena,”
- [Nāgārjuna] said:

**Not from self, not from others,
Not from both, not causelessly
Are any things
Ever produced anywhere.**

(*bdag las ma yin gzhan las min/ gnyis las ma yin rgyu
med min/ dngos po gang dag gang na yang/ skye
ba nam yang yod ma yin^a// zhes bya ba gsungs te*)

རང་ལ་ངེས་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི། སློབ་དཔོན་གྱིས་གང་གི་ཚེ་དངོས་
པོ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་སྐྱེ་བ་རྣམས་པ་དེ་དག་གིས་མི་འབྲང་མི་རིགས་པར་
རྟོགས་པ་དེའི་ཚེ་ན། སློབ་དཔོན་ཉིད་ལ་དོན་དམ་པར་ཚོས་
ཐམས་ཅད་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་དོ་ཞེས་དེ་ཁོ་ན་སྤྱགས་སུ་ཚུད་པའི་ངེས་
པ་སྐྱེས་པར་གྱུར་པའོ། ། དེའི་དབང་གིས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་སློབ་
དཔོན་རང་ལ་ངེས་པ་སྐྱེས་པ་དེའི་དབང་གིས་ཏེ། དེའི་དབང་
གིས་རི་རྩུབ་བདག་གིས་ཚོས་ཐམས་ཅད་ཀྱི་དེ་ཁོ་ན་རྟོགས་པ་ད་
རྩུབ་སེམས་ཅན་གཞན་དག་ལ་ཡང་བཟུན་པར་བྱའོ་སྟེ་སྟེ་
དགོངས་ནས། ། བདག་ལས་མ་ཡིན་གཞན་ལས་མིན། ། གཉིས་
ལས་མ་ཡིན་སྐྱེ་མེད་མིན། ། དངོས་པོ་གང་དག་གང་ན་ཡང་། །

^a The Sanskrit, as cited earlier: *na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyāṃ nāpyahetutaḥ/ ut-
pannā jātu vidyante bhāvāḥ kvacana kecana//*

སྐྱེས་པ་ནམ་ཡང་ཡོད་མ་ཡིན། ། ཞེས་བྱ་བ་གསུངས་ཏེ་ཞེས་བྱ་
བར་སྐྱུར་རོ། །

That is how [Bhāvaviveka's statement] is to be put together. It indicates this:

Just as when I [Nāgārjuna] examined with reasoning and scripture, I did not see the production of things as real and realized suchness, so sentient beings also will comprehend suchness through these very aspects of meditation, and hence I will set out this *Treatise on the Middle* teaching the aspects of meditation.

སེམས་ཅན་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱང་བསྐྱོམ་པའི་རྣམ་པ་འདི་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་དེ་
ཁོ་ན་ཁོང་དུ་ཚུད་པར་བྱས། དེའི་སྤྱིར་བསྐྱོམ་པའི་རྣམ་པ་བཟླ་ན་
པ་དབྱུ་མའི་བཟླ་ན་བཅོས་འདི་བཟླ་ན་པར་བྱའོ་ཞེས་གསུངས་པ་
ཡིན་ལོ། །

• **This is a general [statement of] theses.** (*'di ni dam bcas pa'i spyi yin no*): In that:

• **This** (*'di ni*): This stanza in which [Nāgārjuna] says:

Not from self, not from others,
Not from both, not causelessly
Are any things
Ever produced anywhere.

• **theses** (*dam bcas pa*): "Things are not produced from self" is one thesis. "Things are not produced from other" is a second thesis. "Things are not produced from both" is a third thesis. "Things are not produced causelessly" is a fourth thesis.

འདི་ནི་དམ་བཅས་པའི་སྤྱི་བཀོད་པ་ཡིན་ལོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ལ། འདི་
ནི་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི། བདག་ལས་མ་ཡིན་གཞན་ལས་མིན། ། གཉིས་
ལས་མ་ཡིན་རྒྱ་མེད་མིན། ། དངོས་པོ་གང་དག་གང་ན་ཡང་། །
སྐྱེས་པ་ནམ་ཡང་ཡོད་མ་ཡིན། ། ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་ཚོག་ལེན་རུ་
བྱས་པ་འདི་ནི་ལོ། ། དམ་བཅས་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་

བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་དོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་འདི་ནི་དམ་བཅས་པ་གཅིག་གོ།

གཞན་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་དོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་འདི་ནི་དམ་བཅས་པ་གཉིས་པའོ། །གཉིས་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་དོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་འདི་ནི་དམ་བཅས་པ་གསུམ་པའོ། །རྒྱ་མེད་པ་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་དོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་འདི་ནི་དམ་བཅས་པ་བཞི་པའོ། །

- **general [statement] of those theses** (*dam bcas pa de dag gi spyi*): they are put together or shown.^a

Question: Why are only four thesis-aspects treated and not more?

Answer: It is as follows: When the 964 amazing [views] are divided [into groups], they are [included] in the 363 disputants, and all of those are included among these four positions, and there is no fifth aspect other than these; hence, only four theses are treated.

དམ་བཅས་པ་དེ་དག་གི་སྐྱེ་བའི་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་ཉེ་བར་སྦྱར་བའམ་བརྟན་པའོ། །དེ་ལ་ཅིའི་སྦྱར་དམ་བཅས་པ་རྣམ་པ་བཞི་ཁོ་ན་བྱས་ཤིང་མང་དུ་མ་བྱས་ཤི་ན། འདི་ལྟར་ཡ་མཚན་ཅན་དགུ་བརྒྱ་ཅ་དུག་པོ་དག་གྲེས་པ་ན་ཚོལ་བུ་སྤུམ་བརྒྱ་དུག་ཅ་ཅ་གསུམ་དུ་གྱུར་པ་དེ་དག་ཐམས་ཅད་ཀྱང་སྦྱོགས་བཞི་པོ་འདིའི་ཁོངས་སུ་འདུས་ཤིང་། འདི་ལས་གཞན་པའི་རྣམ་པ་ལྔ་པ་མེད་པས་དེའི་སྦྱར་དམ་བཅས་པ་རྣམ་པ་བཞི་པོ་ཁོ་ན་མཛད་དོ། །

- **Concerning that, respectively, what is “not from self”?** (*de la re zhid bdag las ma yin zhes bya ba ci zhid ce na*^b): This is a question by

^a In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 187.2) read *dam bcas pa de dag gi spyi zhes bya ba ni nye bar sbyar ba 'am bstan pa'o* for *dam bcas pa de dag gi ci zhes bya ba ni nye bar sbyar ba 'am bstan pa'o* in accordance with the Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur* (61b.5).

^b In the Golden Reprint edition of Bhāvaviveka's text (vol. 107, 130.5) read *de la re*

the commentator [Bhāvaviveka] himself: "What is not from self?"
 དེ་ལ་རེ་ཞིག་བདག་ལས་མ་ཡིན་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ཅི་ཞིག་ཅེ་ན་ཞེས་བྱ་
 བ་ནི་བདག་ལས་ཅི་ཞིག་མ་ཡིན་ཞེ་ན་ཞེས་འགྲོལ་བར་བྱེད་པ་
 ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ངོ་བའི་ཚིག་ཡིན་ནོ། །

- **“Production never exists’ and so forth”** (*skyes pa nam yang yod ma yin zhes bya ba la sogs pa ste*): This is what the commentator [Bhāvaviveka] himself says in answer to that question. It is to be put together as: “What is not from self? Production from self never exists.”

- **and so forth** (*sogs pa ste*): The phrase includes “whatsoever things anywhere” (*dnegos po gang dag gang na yang*); therefore, it indicates “What is not from self? Not from self are whatsoever things ever produced anywhere” (*bdag las dngos po gang dag gang na yang /skyes pa nam yang yod ma yin*).

དེའི་ལན་དུ་འགྲོལ་བ་བྱེད་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས། རྐྱེས་པ་ནམ་ཡང་ཡོད་
 མ་ཡིན། ། ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ལ་སོགས་པ་སྟེ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་སྣམ་ཏེ། བདག་
 ལས་ཇི་ཞིག་མ་ཡིན་ཞེ་ན། བདག་ལས། རྐྱེས་པ་ནམ་ཡང་ཡོད་མ་
 ཡིན། ། ཞེས་བྱ་བར་སྐྱར་རོ། ། སོགས་པ་སྟེ་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་སྣམ་ནི།
 དངོས་པོ་གང་དག་གང་ན་ཡང་། ། ཞེས་བྱ་བ་བསྐྱེ་སྟེ། དེས་ན་
 བདག་ལས་ཅི་ཞིག་མ་ཡིན་ཞེ་ན། བདག་ལས། དངོས་པོ་གང་
 དག་གང་ན་ཡང་། ། རྐྱེས་པ་ནམ་ཡང་ཡོད་མ་ཡིན། ། ཞེས་བྱ་བ་
 ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེས་བསྟན་ཏོ། །

- **which is to be applied to each.** (*re re dang sbyar bar bya'o*): What does this indicate? These [terms] are to be applied to each [thesis] in this way:

Not from self are whatsoever things ever produced any-
 where. (*bdag las dngos po gang dag gang na yang
 skyes pa nam yang yod ma yin*)

Not from others are whatsoever things ever produced anywhere. (*gzhan las dngos po gang dag gang na yang skyes pa nam yang yod ma yin*)

Not from both are whatsoever things ever produced anywhere. (*gnyis las dngos po gang dag gang na yang skyes pa nam yang yod ma yin*)

Not causelessly are whatsoever things ever produced anywhere. (*rgyu med las dngos po gang dag gang na yang skyes pa nam yang yod ma yin*)

རེ་རེ་དང་སྐྱུར་བར་བྱའོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བས་རི་རྒྱུད་བསྟན་ཞེ་ན། བདག་
ལས། དངོས་པོ་གང་དག་གང་ན་ཡང་། ། རྐྱེས་པ་ནམ་ཡང་ཡོད་
མ་ཡིན། ། ཞེས་བྱ་བ་དང་། གཞན་ལས། དངོས་པོ་གང་དག་གང་
ན་ཡང་། ། རྐྱེས་པ་ནམ་ཡང་ཡོད་མ་ཡིན། ། ཞེས་བྱ་བ་དང་།
གཉིས་ལས། དངོས་པོ་གང་དག་གང་ན་ཡང་། ། རྐྱེས་པ་ནམ་ཡང་
ཡོད་མ་ཡིན། ། ཞེས་བྱ་བ་དང་། རྐྱེས་པ་ལས། དངོས་པོ་གང་
དག་གང་ན་ཡང་། ། རྐྱེས་པ་ནམ་ཡང་ཡོད་མ་ཡིན། ཞེས་བྱ་བ་
དང་། དེ་སྐྱུར་རེ་རེ་དང་སྐྱུར་བར་བྱའོ། །

- **“From self” is synonymous with “from [its own] entity.”** (*bdag las zhes bya ba ni bdag nyid las zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go*): Why does a qualm arise such that here [Bhāvaviveka] explains, “‘From self’ (*bdag las*) is synonymous with ‘from [its own] entity’ (*bdag nyid las*)”? It is as follows: “Self” is used for five types of meanings: entity (*bdag nyid*), ownership (*bdag gi*), consciousness (*shes pa*), lord (*dbang phyug*), and kinfolk (*nye du*); hence, in order to eliminate ownership,^a consciousness, lord, and kinfolk he explains, “‘From self’ (*bdag las*) is synonymous with ‘from [its own] entity’ (*bdag nyid las*).” It is the equivalent of saying, “Things are not produced from [their own] entity.”

^a The Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 192.6), the Peking (vol. 96, 184.5.1), and the Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur* (123.4) read *bdag gis* here but read *bdag gi* above; I am following the above reading.

བདག་ལས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་བདག་ཉིད་ལས་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་ཐ་ཚོག་གོ་
 ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ལ། གལ་ཏེ་གང་ལས་དོགས་པ་སྐྱེ་ན་འདྲིར་བདག་ལས་
 ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་བདག་ཉིད་ལས་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་ཐ་ཚོག་གོ་ཞེས་བཤད་
 ཅེ་ན། འདི་ལྟར་བདག་ཅེས་བྱ་བའི་དོན་རྣམས་པ་ལྔ་ལ་སྦྱོར་ཏེ།
 བདག་ཉིད་དང་། བདག་གི་དང་། ཤེས་པ་དང་། དབང་ལྷན་
 དང་། ཉེ་དུ་དག་ལ་སྦྱོར་བས། དེའི་ཕྱིར་བདག་གིས་དང་། ཤེས་
 པ་དང་། དབང་ལྷན་དང་། ཉེ་དུ་དག་རྣམས་པར་གཅད་པའི་ཕྱིར།
 འདྲིར་བདག་ལས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་བདག་ཉིད་ལས་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་ཐ་
 ཚོག་གོ་ཞེས་བཤད་དེ། དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་བདག་ཉིད་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་
 མེད་དོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་ཐ་ཚོག་གོ།

- The intended meaning of the words is not established merely by having made a thesis.** (*dam bcas pa tsam gyis bsam pa'i tshig gi don mi 'grub pas*): If the master's [that is, Nāgārjuna's] intended meaning of the words that production does not exist were established^a by the mere words, then even others' intended meaning of the words that production [exists] would be established. However, since it is not established, the intended meaning of words is not established merely by having made a thesis. This is as the holy presence Āryadeva states:

If by the mere word "exists"
 Things would exist,
 Then by the mere words "not exists"
 Why is it not that things would not exist?

Hence meanings that are well expressed
 With scripture and reasoning
 And are without internal contradiction
 Are thoroughly upheld by the excellent.

^a Reading *don 'grub pas* for *don mi 'grub pas* in the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 193.2), the Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur* (123.7), and the Peking, vol. 95, 184.5.3.

དམ་བཅས་པ་ཙམ་གྱིས་བསམས་པའི་ཚོག་གིས་དོན་མི་འགྲུབ་
 པས་ཞེས་བྱ་བས་ནི་འདི་སྐད་བསྟན་ཏེ། གལ་ཏེ་ཚོག་ཙམ་གྱིས་
 སློབ་དཔོན་གྱིས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པར་བསམས་པའི་ཚོག་གིས་དོན་མི་
 འགྲུབ་ན་ནི་གཞན་དག་གིས་ཀྱང་སྐྱེ་བར་བསམས་པའི་ཚོག་གིས་
 དོན་འགྲུབ་པར་འགྱུར་བ་ཞིག་ན། མི་འགྲུབ་པས་དེའི་སྤྱིར་དམ་
 བཅས་པ་ཙམ་གྱིས་བསམས་པའི་ཚོག་གིས་དོན་མི་འགྲུབ་སྟེ།
 སློབ་དཔོན་འཕགས་པ་སྣའི་ཞལ་སྔ་ནས་གྱིས། གལ་ཏེ་ཡོད་པའི་
 ཚོག་ཙམ་གྱིས། ། དངོས་པོ་ཡོད་པར་འགྱུར་ན་ནི། ། མེད་ཅེས་བྱ་
 བའི་ཚོག་ཙམ་གྱིས། ། ཅི་སྤྱིར་མེད་པར་འགྱུར་བ་མིན། ། དེའི་སྤྱིར་
 དོན་གང་ལྷུང་དང་རིགས་པ་ཡིས། ། ལེགས་པར་མངོན་པར་
 བརྗོད་པ་དང་། ། སྔ་སྤྱི་འགལ་བ་མེད་པ་དེ། ། དམ་པ་རྣམས་གྱིས་
 ཡོངས་སུ་བབྱུང་། ། ཞེས་ཇི་སྐད་གསུངས་པ་སྟེ་བྱའོ། ། མདོར་
 བསྟན་པ་ཇི་སྟེ་བ་བཞིན་དུ་རྒྱས་པར་བཤད་དགོས་པས། སྤར་
 བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་དོ་ཞེས་གསུངས་པ་དེའི་སྤྱིར། འདིར་དེ་
 ཉིད་དང་པོར་བསྐྱབ་པར་བྱ་སྟེ།

- Hence, the property of the position^a is held to be existence (*de'i phyir phyogs kyi chos ni yod pa nyid gzung ste*): What was briefly indicated must be extensively explained; therefore, because it was stated earlier that production from self does not exist, here just that is initially proven; [hence, Bhāvaviveka] utters this. It is the equivalent of saying:

Since the validity itself that is asserted as validation is reasoning, here in the position [or thesis] “Things are not produced from self,” that which is held as the property of the

^a *phyogs kyi chos, pakṣadharmā*; this is the reason, or sign, that is present in the subject of the syllogism.

position, that is to say, the reason, is existent entity (*bdag nyid yod pa nyid*).

དེའི་ཕྱིར་འདིར་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་ཚེས་ནི་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ཡིན་པར་གཟུང་
 རྟེ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་སྣམ་ཏེ། ཚད་མ་བྱེད་པར་འདོད་པའི་ཚད་མ་ཉིད་
 ནི་རིགས་པ་ཡིན་པས། འདིར་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་
 མེད་ཅོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་ཚེས་གཏུན་ཚོགས་སུ་བཟུང་བ་ནི་
 བདག་ཉིད་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ཡིན་ཅོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་ཐ་ཚོགས་གོ། །

In answer to the question, "How is 'existent entity' (*bdag nyid yod pa nyid*) the property of the position?" [Bhāvaviveka] utters:

- **as follows: because "from self" is designated to an existent entity.**" (*'di ltar bdag las zhes bya ba ni bdag nyid yod pa la tha snyad gdags pa'i phyir ro*): [In that:]
- **as follows: ('di ltar):** This phrase means "because" (*gang gi phyir*).^a It indicates:

Because it is fitting to designate the convention "from self" (*bdag las, svatas*) to whatsoever thing whose own self-entity exists (*bdag nyid kyi rang gi ngo bo yod pa*), [existent entity (*bdag nyid yod pa nyid*)] is a reason that is the property of the position that production-again^b (*yang skye ba, punarutpāda*) does not exist.

གལ་ཏེ་བདག་ཉིད་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ཇི་ལྟར་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་ཚེས་ཡིན་ཞེ་ན།
 དེའི་ལན་དུ། འདི་ལྟར་བདག་ལས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་བདག་ཉིད་ཡོད་
 པ་ལ་སྐྱད་གདགས་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཅོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་སྣམ་ཏེ། འདི་ལྟར་ཞེས་
 བྱ་བའི་སྐྱ་ནི་གང་གི་ཕྱིར་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་དོན་ཏོ། ། གང་གི་ཕྱིར་
 དངོས་པོ་གང་ལ་བདག་ཉིད་ཀྱི་རང་གི་ཅོ་ཅོ་ཡོད་པ་དེ་ལ་

^a This is the first part of the correlatives *gang gi phyir...de'i phyir*, which often is *yatas...tatas* in Sanskrit.

^b The usage of "production-again" (*yang skye ba, punarutpāda*) appears to be in response to Chandrakīrti.

བདག་ལས་ཞེས་སྐད་གདགས་སུ་རུང་བའི་ཕྱིར། ཡོད་པ་ལ་ནི་
 ཡང་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ནི་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པའི་སྐྱགས་
 གྱི་ཚོས་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཡིན་ཅོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བར་སྟོན་དོ། །

- because “from self” is designated to an existent entity.” (*bdag las zhes bya ba ni bdag nyid yod pa la tha snyad gdags^a pa'i phyir ro*): because whatsoever thing in which selfness exists is an existent entity (*bdag nyid yod pa*) and it is suitable to designate “from self” (*bdag las, svatas*) to that. Like for example, the statement by speakers even in the world “from Devadatta himself” (*lhas byin bdag las*) to Devadatta whose selfness exists, here also if things are just existent entities, it is suitable to designate “from self,” and if things are existent entities suitable to be designated “from self,” then since the existent (*yod pa nyid, vidyamāna*) are without production-again^b (*yang skye ba, punarutpāda*), existing (*yod pa nyid, vidyamāna*) is taken as a reason that is the property of the position that production-again does not exist.

བདག་ལས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་བདག་ཉིད་ཡོད་པ་ལ་སྐད་གདགས་
 པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི། དངོས་པོ་གང་ལ་བདག་ཉིད་ཡོད་པ་
 དེ་ནི་བདག་ཉིད་ཡོད་པ་སྟེ། དེ་ལ་བདག་ལས་ཞེས་སྐད་གདགས་
 སུ་རུང་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། ། དཔེར་ན་འཇིག་རྟེན་དག་ན་ཡང་སྐྱེ་བ་པོ་
 དག་ན་རེ། ལྷས་བྱིན་བདག་ཉིད་ཡོད་པ་ལ་ལྷས་བྱིན་བདག་ལས་
 ཞེས་ཟེར་བ་དང་འདྲ་བར། འདིར་ཡང་དངོས་པོ་བདག་ཉིད་
 ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ཡིན་ན་བདག་ལས་ཞེས་སྐད་གདགས་སུ་རུང་ལ།
 བདག་ལས་ཞེས་སྐད་དུ་གདགས་སུ་རུང་བའི་དངོས་པོ་བདག་

^a Reading *yod pa la tha snyad gdags* for *yod pa las snyad gdags* in the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 194.3), for *yod pa la snyad gdags* in the Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur* (124.3), and the Peking, vol. 95, 185.1.3, in accordance with the statement just above.

^b The usage of “production-again” (*yang skye ba, punarutpāda*) here and at the end of the sentence appears to be in response to Chandrakīrti.

ཉིད་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ཡིན་ན། ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ལ་ནི་ཡང་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པས་
 དེའི་ཕྱིར་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ནི་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་ཚོས་གཏན་
 ཚིགས་ཡིན་པར་གཟུང་ངོ། །

- **An example is by virtue of the predicate of the proposition and the attribute that is the means of proof [that is to say, the probans] (*dpe ni bsgrub par bya ba dang sgrub pa'i chos kyi dbang gis*):** That is the equivalent of saying:

An example must be demonstrated by virtue of the existence of (1) the predicate of the proposition (“are not produced from self^a”) and (2) the attribute that is the means of proof^b (“existing”) in the subject (“internal sense-spheres and so forth”).

དཔེར་ན་བསྐྱེ་བ་པར་བྱ་བ་དང་སྐྱེ་བའི་ཚོས་ཀྱི་དབང་གིས་ཏེ་
 ཞེས་བྱ་བས་ནི་འདི་སྐད་བསྟན་ཏེ། ཚོས་ཅན་ནང་གི་སྐྱེ་མཚེད་ལ་
 སོགས་པ་གང་ལ་བསྐྱེ་བ་པར་བྱ་བ་ཚོས་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་
 དང་། སྐྱེ་བའི་ཚོས་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་དག་ཡོད་པ་དེའི་དབང་གིས་
 དཔེ་བསྟན་དགོས་སོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་ཐ་ཚིག་གོ།

In that:

- **example (*dpe ni*):** this is the example occurring below in [the syllogism that Bhāvaviveka will state]:

Ultimately the internal sense-spheres [eye sense, ear sense, and so forth] are not produced from self^b because of existing, like intelligence.^c (*don dam par nang gi skye*

^a *sgrub pa'i chos*; that is to say, the proof, or probans.

^b The Tibetan reads “are **certain** as not being produced from self” (*bdag las skye ba med par nges te*), but “certain” is not represented in the Sanskrit.

The reason could also be translated as “because of presently existing” since *vidyamāna* is the present middle particle; however, later Chandrakīrti (La Vallée Poussin, *Prasannapadā*, 33.4) cites the reason as *sattvād*, suggesting that the particular form makes little difference, this perhaps being why the reason was translated into Tibetan merely as *yod pa'i phyir* instead of *da lta bar yod pa'i phyir*.

^c It seems to me that the Tibetan of the example *shes pa yod pa nyid bzhin* must be a

*mched rnams bdag las skye ba med par nges te yod pa'i
phyir shes pa yod pa nyid bzhin no; na paramārthata
ādhyātmikānyāyatanāni svata utpannāni vidyamānatvāt
caitanyavad)*

དེ་ལ་དཔེ་ནི་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་འོག་ནས་དོན་དམ་པར་ནང་གི་སྐྱེ་
མཚེད་རྣམས་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པར་ངེས་ཏེ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།
དཔེར་ན་ཤེས་པ་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་བཞིན་ལོ་ཞེས་འབྱུང་བའི་དཔེ་
དེའོ། །

- **the predicate of the proposition** (*bsgrub par bya ba chos*): Since the proposition itself (*bsgrub par bya ba nyid*) is an attribute (*chos*), it is the predicate of the proposition^a (*bsgrub par bya ba chos*). Or, it both is the proposition and also is an attribute, whereby it is the predicate of the proposition^b (*bsgrub par bya ba chos*). Thus, it is not to be elided (?).^c Also, what is the predicate of the proposition? On this occasion, it is to be taken as “not produced” (*skye ba med pa, na...utpanna*).

བསྐྱེབ་པར་བྱ་བ་ཚོས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་བསྐྱེབ་པར་བྱ་བ་ཉིད་ཚོས་
ཡིན་པས་བསྐྱེབ་པར་བྱ་བ་ཚོས་སོ། ། ཡང་ན་དེ་ནི་བསྐྱེབ་པར་བྱ་
བ་ཡང་ཡིན་ལ་ཚོས་ཀྱང་ཡིན་པས་བསྐྱེབ་པར་བྱ་བ་ཚོས་ཞེས་
བསྐྱེབ་པར་བྱའོ།

- **the attribute that is the means of proof** (*sgrub pa'i chos*): This is the reason—the attribute proving “not produced” [in] “not produced from self.” What is the attribute that is the

mere translation of the Sanskrit *caitanya* and is not an extension of it to include the reason (“existing”). In any case, for a Sāṃkhya the reference of “intelligence” is to the *puruṣa*—the person, or pure spirit, pure consciousness. I have translated it as “intelligence” to allow for a Buddhist meaning also, as Avalokitavrata indicates below () when he indicates that the example is established compatibly for both parties in the debate.

^a Perhaps “proposition that is the attribute/predicate.”

^b Perhaps “attribute/predicate that is to be proven.”

^c *bsdu bar mi bya'o*; meaning unclear.

means of proof^a? On this occasion it is to be taken as “existing” (*yod pa nyid, vidyamānatva*).

བསྐྱུབ་པར་བྱ་བའི་ཚོས་ཞེས་ནི་བསྐྱུབ་པར་མི་བྱའོ། ། བསྐྱུབ་པར་
བྱ་བ་ཚོས་དེ་ཡང་གང་ཞེ་ན། སྐབས་འདིར་ནི་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་ཞེས་
བྱ་བ་ཡིན་པར་སྐྱར་རོ། ། སྐྱུབ་པའི་ཚོས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་བདག་ལས་
སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་སྐྱུབ་པའི་ཚོས་ཏེ་གཏན་ཚིགས་སོ། །
སྐྱུབ་པའི་ཚོས་དེ་གང་ཞེ་ན། སྐབས་འདིར་ནི་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ཅེས་བྱ་
བ་ཡིན་པར་སྐྱར་རོ། །

- **by virtue of** (*dbang gis*): Examples (“intelligence and so forth”) of the subject must be demonstrated by virtue of the existence of (1) the predicate of the proposition (“are not produced from self”) and (2) the attribute that is the means of proof (“existing”) in the subject (“internal sense-spheres and so forth”). To indicate this, [Bhāvaviveka] utters:

དབང་གིས་ཏེ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་ཚོས་ཅན་ནང་གི་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་ལ་སོགས་
པ་གང་ལ་བསྐྱུབ་པར་བྱ་བ་ཚོས་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་ཡོད་
པའི་དབང་དང་སྐྱུབ་པའི་ཚོས་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ཡོད་པའི་དབང་གིས་
ཚོས་ཅན་དེའི་དཔེ་ཤེས་པ་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ལ་སོགས་པ་བསྟན་
དགོས་པའོ། །

- **because it is an example of a subject that is endowed with renowned predicate of the proposition and attribute that is the means of proof** (*bsgrub par bya ba dang sgrub pa'i chos grags pa dang ldan pa'i chos can gyi dpe yin pa'i phyir*): A subject (“internal sense-spheres and so forth”)—in which exist (1) a predicate of the proposition (“are not produced from self”) renowned to both the disputant and opposing disputant^b and (2) an attribute that is the means of proof (“existing”) renowned to both the disputant and opposing disputant—is called “a subject that is endowed with renowned predicate

^a *sgrub pa'i chos*; that is to say, the proof, or probans.

^b *phyir rgol ba*; literally, “latter disputant.”

of the proposition and attribute that is the means of proof.”^a This is to be put together as: “Because of being an example of that subject, the example must be demonstrated by virtue of the predicate of the proposition and (2) the attribute that is the means of proof.” In that:

དེ་བཟུང་པའི་ཕྱིར་བརྟུན་པར་བྱ་བ་དང་རྟུན་པའི་ཚོས་གྲགས་
 པ་དང་ལྷན་པའི་ཚོས་ཅན་གྱི་དཔེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་
 རྟུན་ཏེ། ཚོས་ཅན་ནང་གི་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་ལ་སོགས་པ་གང་ལ་བརྟུན་
 པར་བྱ་བ་ཚོས་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་ཚོལ་བ་དང་ཕྱིར་ཚོལ་བ་
 གཉི་ག་ལ་གྲགས་པ་དང་། རྟུན་པའི་ཚོས་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ཚོལ་བ་
 དང་། ཕྱིར་ཚོལ་བ་གཉི་ག་ལ་གྲགས་པ་ཡོད་པ་དེ་ནི་བརྟུན་པར་
 བྱ་བ་དང་རྟུན་པའི་ཚོས་གྲགས་པ་དང་ལྷན་པའི་ཚོས་ཅན་ཞེས་
 བྱའོ། ། ཚོས་ཅན་དེའི་དཔེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་དཔེ་ནི་བརྟུན་པར་བྱ་
 བ་དང་། རྟུན་པའི་ཚོས་གྱི་དབང་གིས་བཟུན་དགོས་སོ་ཞེས་བྱ་
 བར་སྐུར་རོ། །

- **renowned predicate of the proposition** (*bsgrub par bya ba chos grags pa*): “are not produced from self” that is renowned to both the disputant and opposing disputant.

^a Kodo Yotsuya makes reference to Dignāga's *Compilation of Prime Cognition* (*PSK P.c.c.7a.3*) (my translation):

Since the convention [of a proof statement] is used
 By way of the property [that is, the logical sign] (*chos*) being established for
 both,
 The property is not acceptable if by both or one [of the parties]
 It is refused or doubted or the substratum [that is, the subject] is not established.

See Kodo Yotsuya, *The Critique of Svatantra Reasoning by Chandrakīrti and Tsong-kha-pa: A Study of Philosophical Proof According to Two Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka Traditions of India and Tibet*, Tibetan and Indo-Tibetan Studies 8 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1999), 73 n. 1.

དེ་ལ་བསྐྱབ་པར་བྱ་བ་ཚོས་གྲགས་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི། བདག་ལས་
སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ཚོལ་བ་དང་ཕྱིར་ཚོལ་བ་གཉི་གལ་
གྲགས་པའོ། །

- **renowned attribute that is the means of proof** (*sgrub pa'i chos grags pa*): “existing” (*yod pa, vidyamāna*), the attribute that is the means of proof that is renowned to both the disputant and opposing disputant.

སྐྱབ་པའི་ཚོས་གྲགས་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་སྐྱབ་པའི་ཚོས་
ཕོད་པ་ཉིད་ཅེས་བྱ་བ་ཚོལ་བ་དང་ཕྱིར་ཚོལ་བ་གཉི་གལ་
གྲགས་པའོ། །

- **subject that is endowed with those two** (*de gnyis dang ldan pa'i chos can*): “internal sense-spheres and so forth” that is endowed with the two, renowned predicate of the proposition and renowned attribute that is the means of proof.

དེ་གཉིས་དང་ལྡན་པའི་ཚོས་ཅན་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་བསྐྱབ་པར་བྱ་བ་
ཚོས་གྲགས་པ་དང་སྐྱབ་པའི་ཚོས་གྲགས་པ་དེ་གཉིས་དང་ལྡན་
པའི་ཚོས་ཅན་ནང་གི་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་ལ་སོགས་པའོ། །

- **an example of that subject** (*chos can de'i dpe*): “intelligence and so forth.” [Bhāvaviveka] is indicating that just as the predicate of the proposition (“are not produced from self”) renowned to both the disputant and opposing disputant and the attribute that is the means of proof (“existing”) renowned to both the disputant and opposing disputant exist in that subject [“internal sense-spheres and so forth”], so the predicate of the proposition (“are not produced from self”) renowned to both the disputant and opposing disputant and the attribute that is the means of proof (“existing”) renowned to both the disputant and opposing disputant exist also here in “for example, intelligence and so forth;” therefore, he says, “because it is an example of a subject that is endowed with renowned predicate of the proposition and attribute that is the means of proof.” It is like the explanation, “An example in which pervasion by

the concomitance of the [predicate of] the proposition and the reason exists is a similar example.”^a

ཚོས་ཅན་དེའི་དཔེ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་ཤེས་པ་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ལ་སོགས་པ་
 ཉེ། དཔེར་ན་ཤེས་པ་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ཅེས་བྱ་བ་ཚོས་ཅན་དེ་ལ་
 བརྒྱབ་པར་བྱ་བ་ཚོས་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ཚོལ་བ་
 དང་། ཕྱིར་ཚོལ་བ་གཉི་ག་ལ་གྲགས་པ་དང་། ལྷུབ་པའི་ཚོས་ཡོད་
 པ་ཉིད་ཅེས་བྱ་བ་ཚོལ་བ་དང་ཕྱིར་ཚོལ་བ་གཉི་ག་ལ་གྲགས་པ་
 ཡོད་པ་དེ་བཞིན་དུ། འདིར་ཡང་ཚོས་ཅན་ནང་གི་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་ལ་
 སོགས་པ་ལ་བརྒྱབ་པར་བྱ་བ་ཚོས་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་ཞེས་
 བྱ་བ་ཚོལ་བ་དང་ཕྱིར་ཚོལ་བ་གཉི་ག་ལ་གྲགས་པ་དང་། ལྷུབ་
 པའི་ཚོས་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ཅེས་བྱ་བ་དང་ཕྱིར་ཚོལ་བ་གཉི་ག་ལ་
 གྲགས་པ་ཡོད་པར་རྟོན་པས། དེའི་ཕྱིར་དཔེ་ནི་བརྒྱབ་པར་བྱ་བ་
 དང་། ལྷུབ་པའི་ཚོས་གྲགས་པ་དང་ལྷན་པའི་ཚོས་ཅན་གྱི་དཔེ་
 ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ་ཞེས་སྒྲས་ཏེ། རི་སྐད་དུ་དཔེ་གང་ལ་བརྒྱབ་པར་
 བྱ་བ་དང་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཀྱི་རྗེས་སུ་འགོ་བས་བྱུབ་པར་བྱེད་པ་དེ་
 བྱི་ཚོས་མཐུན་པའི་དཔེ་ཡིན་ཅོ་ཞེས་བཤད་པ་ལྟ་བུའོ། །

- This negation, “not from self” (*bdag las ma yin, na svataḥ*), is to be viewed as meaning a nonaffirming negation (*bdag las ma yin zhes bya ba 'i dgag pa 'di ni med par dgag pa 'i don du blta bar bya ste*): In whom is a qualm generated such that [Bhāvaviveka] explains that “This negation, ‘is not from self’ (*bdag las ma yin, na svataḥ*), is to be viewed as meaning a nonaffirming negation”? It is as follows: it occurs among the Grammarians^b that “negations are twofold, nonaffirming negations and affirming negations;” hence, in order to eliminate

^a *chos mthun pa'i dpe.*

^b *brda' sprod pa, vaiyākaraṇa.* These two types of negations, nonaffirming negations and affirming negations, are used by Mimāṃsakas for two types of injunctions—when something is just forbidden and when something positive is implied in place of what is

that this is an affirming negation, here he explains that "This negation, 'is not from self,' is to be viewed as meaning a nonaffirming negation," which is the equivalent of saying:

This is to be viewed as meaning the nonaffirming negation "Things are not produced from self," but is not to be viewed as meaning the affirming negation, "Nonproduction from self exists."^a

བདག་ལས་མ་ཡིན་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་དགག་པ་འདི་ནི་དཔེ་མེད་པར་
 དགག་པའི་དོན་དུ་བཟླ་བར་བྱ་སྟེ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ལ། གལ་ཏེ་གང་
 ལས་དོགས་པ་སྐྱེ་ན། འདིར་བདག་ལས་མ་ཡིན་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་དགག་
 པ་འདི་ནི་མེད་པར་དགག་པའི་དོན་དུ་བཟླ་བར་བྱ་སྟེ་ཞེས་
 བཤད་ཅེ་ན། འདི་ལྟར་བརྗོད་པ་ལས་དགག་པ་ལྟ་བུ་ནི་རྣམ་
 པ་གཉིས་ཏེ། མེད་པར་དགག་པ་དང་། མ་ཡིན་པར་དགག་གོ་
 ཞེས་འབྱུང་བའི་དེའི་ཕྱིར་མ་ཡིན་པར་དགག་པ་རྣམ་པར་གཅད་
 པའི་ཕྱིར། འདིར། བདག་ལས་མ་ཡིན་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་དགག་པ་འདི་
 ནི་མེད་པར་དགག་པའི་དོན་དུ་བཟླ་བར་བྱ་སྟེ་ཞེས་བཤད་དེ།
 དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པར་དགག་པའི་དོན་དུ་
 བཟླ་བར་བྱའི། བདག་ལས་མ་སྐྱེས་པ་ཡོད་དོ་ཞེས་མ་ཡིན་པར་
 དགག་པའི་དོན་དུ་ནི་བཟླ་བར་མི་བྱའོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་ཐ་ཚོགས་གོ།

Concerning this the definitions of these two negations are described as:^b

forbidden. See J.F. Staal, "Negation and the Law of Contradiction in Indian Thought," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* XXV, Part 1 (1962): especially 56-66.

^a In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 197.6) for *ngos po rnams bdag las skye ba med do zhes med par dgag pa'i don du ni blta bar mi bya'o zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go* read *ngos po rnams bdag las skye ba med do zhes med par dgag pa'i don du blta bar bya yi/ bdag las ma skyes pa yod do zhes ma yin par dgag pa'i don du ni blta bar mi bya'o zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go* in accordance with the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, 185.3.6).

^b 198.1: *dgag pa don gyis bstan pa dang / tshig gcig sgrub par byed pa dang // de ldan*

Negations that indicate through import,
 That establish through a phrase,
 That possess those, and that do not indicate through their
 own words
 Are affirming [negations]; others are other [that is, non-
 affirming negations].

What this indicates is the equivalent of saying:

Negations that:

1. indicate understanding through import
2. establish an actuality through a phrase
3. possess those—understanding through import and estab-
 lishing an actuality
4. and do not indicate through their own words—for exam-
 ple, concerning a person of the royal lineage^a not indicat-
 ing this through the phrase “royal lineage” but indicating
 it through the phrase, “[He] is not a brahmin”—

are to be viewed as affirming negations; others are other
 [that is, non-affirming negations].^b

rang tshig mi ston pa// ma yin gzhan pa gzhan yin no//. Jam-yang-shay-pa's *Great Exposition of Tenets* (Taipei, 216.3) identifies the passage as from *ldog pa bsdus pa*, which is Navidharma's *Stanzas Demonstrating a Condensation of Exclusions* (*ldog pa bsdus pa bstan pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa, piṇḍanivartananirdeśakārikā*; P5782). The *sde dge* edition (Toh. 4293; TBRC W23703, 504.7-505.1) reads: *don gyis go bar byed pa dang //tshig gcig sgrub par byed pa dang // de dang ldan pa 'i dgag pa dang //rang gi tshig gis mi ston pa 'o//*. There is a commentary by Navidharma, *ldog pa bsdus pa bstan pa'i rnam 'grel, piṇḍanivartananirdeśavārttika*; P5783; Toh. 4294.

^a In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 198.3) for *rgyal rigs zhes la* read *rgyal rigs la* in accordance with the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, 185.4.3).

^b In the section of Consequence School in *The Essence of Eloquence* (Drakpa and Damdul Namgyal, 220.4) Tsong-kha-pa explains:

In this:

- That which indicates through its import is, for instance, “The corpulent Devadatta does not eat during day-time.”
- That which establishes a thing through one phrase is a case of one phrase's containing both the elimination of an object of negation and an explicit suggestion of another phenomenon—for instance, “Non-production from self exists.”
- That which possesses those is a phrase that has both explicit and implicit suggestion of other phenomena—for instance, “The non-emaciated fat Devadatta who does not eat during the day exists”
- That which does not indicate through its own words is, for instance, “This

དེ་ལས་དགག་པ་འདི་གཉིས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་ནི་ཇི་སྐད་དུ། དགག་
 པ་དོན་གྱིས་བསྟན་པ་དང་། ། ཚིག་གཅིག་སྐྱབ་པར་བྱེད་པ་
 དང་། ། དེ་ལྟར་རང་ཚིག་མི་སྟོན་པ། ། མ་ཡིན་གཞན་པ་གཞན་
 ཡིན་ལོ། ། ཞེས་བཤད་པ་ཡིན་ལོ། ། འདི་སྐད་བསྟན་ཏེ། དགག་པ་
 གང་དོན་གྱིས་གོ་བ་སྟོན་པ་དང་། ཚིག་གཅིག་གིས་དངོས་པོ་སྐྱབ་
 པར་བྱེད་པ་དང་། དོན་གྱིས་གོ་བ་དང་། དངོས་པོ་སྐྱབ་པ་དེ་
 དང་ལྟར་པ་དང་། རང་གི་ཚིག་གིས་མི་སྟོན་པ། དཔེར་ན་རྒྱལ་
 རིགས་ལ་རྒྱལ་རིགས་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་ཚིག་གིས་མི་སྟོན་པར། བྲམ་ཟེ་
 མ་ཡིན་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་ཚིག་གིས་སྟོན་པ་དེ་ནི་མ་ཡིན་པར་
 དགག་པ་ཡིན་པར་བསྟན་བར་བྱའོ། །

The statement “Others are other”^a is the equivalent of saying, “Whatever negations are other than those are nonaffirming negations.” “Others”^b are whatever are:

- other than indicating understanding through import
- other than establishing an actuality through a phrase
- other than possessing those—understanding through import and establishing an actuality
- other than not indicating through their own words.

one is not a Brahmin,” at a time when it has been ascertained that a person is either of the royal lineage or a Brahmin and has not ascertained the specific.

Whenever any of those four modes of suggestion occur, [the phenomenon] is an affirming negative, whereas those negatives that are other than those—that do not suggest [in] any of those four [ways]—are non-affirming negatives, which are other than affirming negatives.

^a In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 198.4) and in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, 185.4.4) for *gzhan bzhin no* read *gzhan pa gzhan yin no* in accordance with their respective citations of the stanza and explanations just below.

^b *gzhan pa*.

གཞན་པ་གཞན་ཡིན་ཅོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་དེ་ལས་གཞན་པའི་དགག་
 པ་གང་ཡིན་པར་དགག་པ་ལས་གཞན་པ་མེད་པར་དགག་པ་
 ཡིན་ཅོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་ཐ་ཚིག་གོ། གཞན་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་དོན་གྱིས་
 གོ་བ་བསྟན་པ་ལས་གཞན་པ་དང་། ཚིག་གཅིག་གིས་དངོས་པོ་
 རྒྱབ་པར་བྱེད་པ་ལས་གཞན་པ་དང་། དོན་གྱིས་གོ་བ་དང་དངོས་
 པོ་རྒྱབ་པ་དེ་དང་ལྡན་པ་ལས་གཞན་པ་དང་། རང་གི་ཚིག་གིས་
 མི་སྟོན་པ་ལས་གཞན་པ་གང་ཡིན་པའོ། །

“Are other”^a is the equivalent of saying, “Those are nonaffirming negations, which are other than affirming negations”:

- not indicating a character understood through its import
- being intent on negation, that is to say, having the purpose only of negation and making only negation of what the other [party] asserts
- not affirming^b the suchness of effective things or the suchness of noneffective things
- not possessing understanding through import and also not possessing effective things but possessing negation
- and indicating through its own words, for example, regarding a nonbrahmin to make a limited^c mere negation, “[He] just is not a brahmin.”

གཞན་ཡིན་ཅོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་དེ་ནི་མ་ཡིན་པར་དགག་པ་ལས་
 གཞན་པ་མེད་པར་དགག་པ་ཡིན་ཅོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་ཐ་ཚིག་སྟེ། དེ་
 ནི་དོན་གྱིས་གོ་བའི་མཚན་ཉིད་སྟོན་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་དང་། དགག་
 པ་རྒྱུར་ལེན་ཏེ་དགག་པ་ཁོ་ན་དའི་དགོས་པ་ཡིན་ཞིང་གཞན་
 གྱིས་ཁས་བླངས་པ་གང་ཡིན་པ་དེ་དགག་པ་ཅོ་མ་བྱེད་ལ། དངོས་

^a *gzhan yin no.*

^b *sgrub par mi byed pa.*

^c In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 199.3) for *nyi ma tshé* read *nyi tshé* in accordance with the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, 185.5.1).

པོའི་དེ་ཁོ་འམ་དངོས་པོ་མེད་པའི་དེ་ཁོ་ན་སྐྱབ་པར་མི་བྱེད་པ་
 དང་། དོན་གྱིས་གོ་བ་དང་ལྡན་པ་ཡང་མ་ཡིན། དངོས་པོ་དང་
 ལྡན་པ་ཡང་མ་ཡིན་ཞིང་དགག་པ་དང་ལྡན་པ་དང་། རང་གི་
 ཚིག་གིས་སྟོན་ཏེ་དཔེར་ན་བྲམ་ཟེ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ཉིད་ཅེས་དགག་པ་
 ཅམ་ཉིད་ཚོ་བྱེད་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །

- **because of principally being a negation** (*dgag pa gtso che ba 'i phyir dang*): Why is a nonaffirming negation abandoned and an affirming negation employed? Hence, [Bhāvaviveka] utters “because of principally being a negation.” This is to be put together as, “Because a nonaffirming negation is principally a negation, here it is employed, but because an affirming negation is principally an affirmation,^a here it is not^b employed.”

ཅེའི་ཕྱིར་མ་ཡིན་པར་དགག་པར་སྤངས་ཏེ་མེད་པར་དགག་པ་
 གཟུང་ཞེ་ན། དེའི་ཕྱིར་དགག་པ་གཙོ་ཆེ་བའི་ཕྱིར་དང་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་
 ལྷན་ཏེ། མེད་པར་དགག་པ་དེ་ནི་དགག་པ་གཙོ་ཆེ་བའི་ཕྱིར་
 འདྲིར་གཟུང་གི། མ་ཡིན་པར་དགག་པ་ནི་སྐྱབ་པ་གཙོ་ཆེ་བའི་
 ཕྱིར་འདྲིར་མི་གཟུང་ངོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བར་སྐྱར་རོ། །

- **principally being a negation** (*dgag pa gtso che ba*): That nonaffirming negation which is mainly a negation and has capacity without affirmation through thought and assertion is principally a negation.^c

^a *sgrub pa*.

^b In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 199.4) and in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, 185.5.3) for *ming gzung* read *mi gzung* in accordance with the Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur*, vol. 98, 127.6.

^c The translation here follows Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 199.4) and the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, 185.5.3) which read: *med par dgag pa gang las dgag pa gtso che ba dang / bsam pa dang 'dod pas sgrub par med par nus pa yod pa de ni dgag pa gtso che ba'o//*. The Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur* (vol. 98, 127.6) reads differently but equally cogently: *med par dgag pa gang las dgag pa gtso che ba dang / bsam pa dang 'dod pas sgrub par nus pa yod pa de ni dgag pa gtso che ba'o//*, which translates as: That nonaffirming negation which

དགག་པ་གཙོ་ཆེ་བ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་མེད་པར་དགག་པ་གང་ལས་
 དགག་པ་གཙོ་ཆེ་བ་དང་། བསམ་པ་དང་། འདོད་པས་སྐྱབ་པར་
 ལུས་པ་ཡོད་པ་དེ་ནི་དགག་པ་གཙོ་ཆེ་བའོ། །

- **because of principally being a negation** (*dgag pa gtso che ba'i phyir dang*): This is the equivalent of saying, “Due to the cause of principally being a negation, here [I] will rely on a nonaffirming negation.” Or: Because [Nāgārjuna’s] *Treatise on the Middle* is principally negations, here nonaffirming negations will be employed, and affirming negations will not be employed. Why are only mere negations employed in [Nāgārjuna’s] *Treatise on the Middle* and things not affirmed? Hence, [Bhāvaviveka] utters:

དགག་པ་གཙོ་ཆེ་བའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་དགག་པ་གཙོ་ཆེ་བའི་
 ལྟུང་འདིར་ཕྱིར་འདིར་མེད་པར་དགག་པ་ལ་བརྟེན་པར་བྱའོ་ཞེས་
 བྱ་བའི་ཐ་ཚོག་གོ། ཡང་ན་དགག་པ་གཙོ་ཆེ་བའི་ཕྱིར་དང་ཞེས་
 བྱ་བ་ནི་དབྱུ་མའི་བརྟན་བཅོས་ནི་དགག་པ་གཙོ་ཆེ་བའི་ཕྱིར་
 འདིར་མེད་པར་དགག་པ་གཟུང་བར་བྱའོ། མ་ཡིན་པར་དགག་
 པ་གཟུང་བར་མི་བྱའོ། ། ཅིའི་ཕྱིར་དབྱུ་མའི་བརྟན་བཅོས་ལ་
 དགག་པ་ཚམ་ཁོ་ན་བྱེད་ཅིང་དངོས་པོ་སྐྱབ་པར་མི་བྱེད་ཅེ་ན།

- **and because of intending to establish “nonconceptual pristine wisdom” endowed with the entirety of objects through refuting the entirety of the net of conceptions.** (*'di ltar rtog pa ma lus pa'i dra ba^a dgag pas rnam par mi rtog pa'i ye shes shes bya ba yul ma lus pa dang ldan par 'grub par^b dgongs pa'i phyir ro*): The term *'di ltar*

is mainly a negation and has the capacity of proof through thought and assertion is principally a negation.

^a In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 200.1) for *dra bas* read *dra ba* in accordance with the Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur* (vol. 98, 128.1) and in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, 185.5.6).

^b In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 200.2) and in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, 185.5.7) for *'grub dgongs* read *'grub par dgongs* in accordance with the Karmapa *sde dge bstan*

means *gang gi phyir*.^a This is to be put together as, "Because of intending—through refuting the entirety of the net of conceptions—to establish nonconceptual pristine wisdom endowed with the entirety of objects known, only mere negations are employed in Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle*, and things are not affirmed."^b

དེའི་སྐྱིར་འདི་ལྟར་རྟོགས་པ་མ་ལུས་པའི་དྲ་བ་དགག་པས་རྣམ་
 པར་མི་རྟོག་པའི་ཡེ་ཤེས་ཤེས་བྱ་ཡུལ་མ་ལུས་པ་དང་ལྡན་པར་
 འགྲུབ་པར་དགོངས་པའི་སྐྱིར་རོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་སྣམ་ཏེ། འདིར་ལྟར་
 ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་སྣ་ནི་གང་གི་སྐྱིར་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་དོན་ཏེ། གང་གི་སྐྱིར་
 རྟོག་པའི་དྲ་བ་མ་ལུས་པ་དང་ལྡན་པ་འགྲུབ་པར་དགོངས་པ་
 དེའི་སྐྱིར། དབུ་མའི་བསྟན་བཅོས་ལ་དགག་པ་ཅམ་ཁོ་ན་བྱེད་
 ཅིང་དངོས་པོ་སྐྱབ་པར་མི་བྱེད་དོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བར་སྦྱར་རོ། །

- **entirety of conceptions** (*rtog pa ma lus pa'i*): Those conceptions that effective things are produced from self, other, both, and causelessly are called "entirety of conceptions."

རྟོག་པ་མ་ལུས་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་བདག་དང་
 གཞན་དང་གཉིས་དང་རྒྱ་མེད་པ་ལས་སྐྱེ་བར་རྟོག་པ་དེ་དག་ནི་
 རྟོག་པ་མ་ལུས་པ་ཞེས་བྱའོ། །

- **the net** (*dra ba*): Those very conceptions without remainder are a net, for when covered by this net of the entirety of conceptions, one cannot proceed to "the liberation in which all phenomena are unapprehendable,"^c and hence the entirety of

^a *'gyur* (vol. 98, 128.1) and Avalokitavrata's own commentary below.

^b The first member of a reason correlative such as *yasmāt...tasmāt* or *yatas...tatas*.

^c In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 200.3) and in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, 185.5.8) for *dgag pa tsam khong na byed pa'i dngos pos sgrub par mi byed do* read *dgag pa tsam kho na byed cing dngos po sgrub par mi byed do* in accordance with the Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur* (vol. 98, 128.2) and the material just preceding.

^c In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 200.5) for *dmigs med pa'i* read *dmigs su med pa'i* in accordance with the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, 186.1.2) and the Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur* (vol. 98, 128.3).

those very conceptions, being like a net, is a net.

དྲ་བ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་རྟོག་པ་མ་ལུས་པ་དེ་དག་ཉིད་དུ་དྲ་བ་སྟེ།
 འདི་ལྟར་རྟོག་པ་མ་ལུས་པའི་དྲ་བ་འདིས་གཡོགས་ན་ཚོས་
 ཐམས་ཅད་དམིགས་སུ་མེད་པའི་ཐར་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བར་འགྲོ་བར་
 མི་རུས་པས་དེའི་སྤྱིར། རྟོག་པ་མ་ལུས་པ་དེ་དག་ཉིད་དུ་བ་དང་
 འདྲ་བས་དྲ་བའོ།།

- **refuting** (*dgag pa[s]*): refuting the entirety of the net of conceptions is to refute^a the entirety of the net of conceptions, [and thus Bhāvaviveka says] “through refuting the entirety of the net of conceptions.”

དགག་པས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་རྟོག་པ་མ་ལུས་པའི་དྲ་བ་དེ་དགག་པ་
 རི་རྟོག་པ་མ་ལུས་པའི་དྲ་བ་དགག་པ་སྟེ། རྟོག་པ་མ་ལུས་པའི་དྲ་
 བ་དགག་པ་དེས་སོ།།

- **“nonconceptual pristine wisdom” endowed with the entirety of objects** (*rnam par mi rtog pa'i ye shes shes bya ba yul ma lus pa dang ldan pa[r]*): That nonconceptual pristine wisdom—endowed with the entirety of objects, that is to say, what is known, what is realized, and what is thoroughly distinguished (“objects” being the entirety of objects of activity, objects apprehended, and objects observed)—is called [by Bhāvaviveka] “‘nonconceptual pristine wisdom’ endowed with the entirety of objects.”

རྣམ་པར་མི་རྟོག་པའི་ཡེ་ཤེས་ཤེས་བྱ་ཡུལ་མ་ལུས་པ་དང་ལྡན་
 པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་རྣམ་པར་མི་རྟོག་པའི་ཡེ་ཤེས་གང་ལ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་
 ཤེས་པར་བྱ་བ་དང་། རྟོགས་པར་བྱ་བ་དང་། ཡོངས་སུ་གཅད་
 པར་བྱ་བ་མ་ལུས་པ་དང་། ཡུལ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་སྤྱོད་ཡུལ་དང་།

^a The Sanskrit likely uses a synonym for this “refute” (*dgag pa*) where the Tibetan uses the same term.

གཟུང་བ་དང་། དམིགས་པ་མ་ལུས་པ། ཡོད་པ་དེ་ནི་རྣམ་པར་མི་
 རྟོག་པའི་ཡེ་ཤེས་ཤེས་བྱ་ཡུལ་མ་ལུས་པ་དང་ལྡན་པ་ཞེས་བྱའོ། །

- **to establish it** (*de 'grub par*): to establish this “nonconceptual pristine wisdom” endowed with the entirety of objects.

དེ་འགྲུབ་པར་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་རྣམ་པར་མི་རྟོག་པའི་ཡེ་ཤེས་ཤེས་བྱ་
 ཡུལ་མ་ལུས་པ་དང་ལྡན་པ་དེ་འགྲུབ་པར་རོ། །

- **because of intending** (*dgongs pa'i phyir ro*): This is the equivalent of saying, “because of asserting.”^a Or, it is the equivalent of saying, “Because of intending, that is to say, having affinity^b for, establishing nonconceptual pristine wisdom endowed with the entirety of objects through refuting the entirety of conceptions by means of this nonaffirming negation.” Here, “establishing nonconceptual pristine wisdom endowed with the entirety of objects” is a positing of it in the aspect of a supramundane conventionality, but is not asserted as ultimately establishing pristine wisdom in a character of transformation; for instance, the *Supramundane Victorious Mother, the Perfection of Wisdom* says, “If one courses in the production of pristine wisdom, this is not a coursing in the perfection of wisdom.”

དགོངས་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་བཞེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ་ཞེས་བྱ་
 བའི་ཐ་ཚིག་གོ། ཡང་ན་མེད་པར་དགག་པ་འདིས་འདི་ལྟར་རྟོག་
 པ་མ་ལུས་པའི་བྱ་བ་དགག་པས། རྣམ་པར་མི་རྟོག་པའི་ཡེ་ཤེས་
 ཤེས་བྱ་ཡུལ་མ་ལུས་པ་དང་ལྡན་པ་དེ་འགྲུབ་པར་དགོངས་པའི་
 ཕྱིར་ཏེ་རྗེས་སུ་མཐུན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་ཐ་ཚིག་གོ། འདིར་
 རྣམ་པར་མི་རྟོག་པའི་ཡེ་ཤེས་ཤེས་བྱ་ཡུལ་མ་ལུས་པ་དང་ལྡན་
 པ་འགྲུབ་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་འཇིག་རྟེན་ལས་འདས་པའི་ཀུན་རྫོབ་

^a *bzhed pa'i phyir.*

^b *rjes su mthun pa.*

གྱི་རྣམ་པར་གཞག་པ་ཡིན་གྱི། གནས་གྱུར་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ལ་ནི་
 དོན་དམ་པར་ཡི་ཤེས་འགྲུབ་པར་མི་བཞིན་དེ། བཅོམ་ལྷན་
 འདས་མ་ཤེས་རབ་གྱི་པ་རོལ་ཏུ་སྤྱིན་པ་ལས། ཡི་ཤེས་གྱི་སྐྱེ་བ་ལ་
 སྐྱོད་ན་ཤེས་རབ་གྱི་པ་རོལ་ཏུ་སྤྱིན་པ་ལ་སྐྱོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ལོ་ཞེས་
 རི་སྐད་གསུངས་པ་ལྟ་བུའོ། །

- **When an affirming negation is employed, due to its principally being an affirmation, it is being affirmed that “phenomena are not produced,” whereby nonproduction is indicated, and hence one would separate from a tenet (*ma yin par dgag pa yongs su gzung na ni de sgrub pa gtso che ba’i phyir chos rnam ma skyes so zhes sgrub^a pas skye ba med pa ston pa’i phyir mdzad pa’i mtha’ dang bral bar ’gyur te*):**
 This indicates that:

When an affirming negation is solely employed and a non-affirming negation is not employed, then because an affirming negation is principally an affirmation, just a mere negation would not be established, since an affirming negation, “Phenomena are not produced,” would be affirmed, whereby that nonproduction exists would be indicated. However, that also is not asserted since one would separate from a tenet.

མ་ཡིན་པར་དགག་པ་ཡོངས་སུ་གཟུང་ན་ནི་དེ་སྐྱབ་པ་གཙོ་ཆེ་
 བའི་སྤྱིར་ཚོས་རྣམས་མ་སྐྱེས་སོ་ཞེས་བསྐྱབས་པས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་
 ལྟོན་པའི་སྤྱིར་མཚན་པའི་མཐའ་དང་བྲལ་བར་འགྱུར་ཏེ་ཞེས་བྱ་
 བས་ནི་འདི་སྐད་བཟུན་ཏེ། གལ་ཏེ་མ་ཡིན་པར་དགག་པ་ཡོངས་
 སུ་གཟུང་བ་ཁོ་ན་བྱེད་ཅིང་། མེད་པར་དགག་པ་ཡོངས་སུ་གཟུང་
 བ་མི་བྱེད་ན་ནི་དེས་ན་མ་ཡིན་པར་དགག་པ་དེ་སྐྱབ་པ་གཙོ་ཆེ་
 བའི་སྤྱིར། དགག་པ་ཁོ་ན་ཅོམ་འགྲུབ་པར་མི་འགྱུར་ཏེ། འདི་ལྟར་

^a The Karmapa *sde dge bstan ’gyur* (vol. 98, 129.2) reads *bsgrubs*.

མ་ཡིན་པར་དགག་པ་ནི་ཚོས་རྣམས་མ་སྐྱེས་སོ་ཞེས་བསྐྱབས་
 པས་དེས་ན་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་ཉིད་ཡོད་པར་སྟོན་པའི་སྲིད་དེ་ཡང་མི་
 བཞེད་དེ། འདི་ལྟར་མཛད་པའི་མཐའ་དང་བྲལ་བའི་སྲིད་རོ་
 ཞེས་བྱ་བར་སྟོན་རྟོ། །

- **due to its principally being an affirmation** (*de sgrub pa gtso che ba'i phyir*): because an affirming negation is principally an affirmation, since "Nonproduction exists" would be affirmed by way of refuting that "Things are not produced." To indicate just this, [Bhāvaviveka] utters:
- **it is being affirmed that "phenomena are not produced," whereby nonproduction is indicated** (*chos rnam ma skyes so zhes sgrub^a pas skye ba med pa ston pa'i phyir*): That nonaffirming negation is principally an affirmation because by way of affirming that "phenomena are not produced," it is indicated that nonproduction exists. Why is that not asserted here?

དེ་སྐྱབ་པ་གཙོ་ཆེ་བའི་སྲིད་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་མ་ཡིན་པར་དགག་པ་
 དེ་ནི་སྐྱབ་པ་གཙོ་མེད་པའི་སྲིད་ཏེ། འདི་ལྟར་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་སྐྱེ་
 བ་མེད་དོ་ཞེས་དགག་པའི་སྟོན་ནས་མ་སྐྱེས་པ་ཡོད་དོ་ཞེས་སྐྱབ་
 པའི་སྲིད་རོ། ། དེ་ཉིད་བསྟན་པའི་སྲིད་ཚོས་རྣམས་མ་སྐྱེས་སོ་
 ཞེས་བསྐྱབས་པས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་སྟོན་པའི་སྲིད་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་སྐྱེས་ཏེ།
 མ་ཡིན་པར་དགག་པ་དེ་ནི་ཚོས་རྣམས་མ་སྐྱེས་སོ་ཞེས་བསྐྱབ་
 པའི་སྟོན་དེ་ནས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་ཉིད་ཡོད་པར་སྟོན་པའི་སྲིད་སྐྱབ་པ་
 གཙོ་ཆེ་བ་ཡིན་རོ། ། དེ་ནི་འདིར་མི་བཞེད་དེ་ཅིའི་སྲིད་ཞེ་ན།

- **[and hence] one would separate from a tenet** (*mdzad pa'i mtha' dang bral bar 'gyur te*): In this:
 - **a tenet** (*mdzad pa'i mtha'*)^b: an established conclusion

^a The Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur* (vol. 98, 129.4) reads *bsgrubs*.

^b *kṛtānta*; literally, a made conclusion.

(*grub pa 'i mtha'*),^a because of being a definite conclusion of meaning made by great beings.

- **one would separate from a tenet** (*de dang bral bar 'gyur te*): this is the equivalent of saying, “one would contradict a tenet.” To indicate how one would separate from a made conclusion [Bhāvaviveka] says:

འདི་སྐར་མཛད་པའི་མཐའ་དང་བྲལ་བར་འགྱུར་ཏེ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་
 ལྷན་སོ། ། དེ་ལ་མཛད་པའི་མཐའ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་གྲུབ་པའི་མཐའ་
 ལྷ། བདག་ཉིད་ཆེན་པོ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་མཛད་པའི་དོན་གྱི་མཐའ་
 དེས་བ་ཡིན་པའི་སྤྱིར་སོ། ། དེ་དང་བྲལ་བར་འགྱུར་ཏེ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་
 བེ་དེ་དང་འགལ་བར་འགྱུར་ཏེ་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་ཐ་ཆོག་སོ། ། མཛད་
 པའི་མཐའ་དང་ཇི་སྐར་བྲལ་བར་འགྱུར་བ་དེ་ཉིད་བསྟན་པའི་
 སྤྱིར།

- **because scripture says, “If one courses in the nonproduction of form, one is not coursing in the perfection of wisdom.”** (*lung las/ gzugs kyi skye ba med pa la spyod na shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod pa ma yin no// zhes 'byung ba 'i phyir ro*): because the *Supramundane Victorious Mother, the Perfection of Wisdom* says:

Others asked the Supramundane Victor, “How is it that when Bodhisattvas course in the perfection of wisdom, they are not coursing in the perfection of wisdom?” and the Supramundane Victor pronounced, “If one courses in the nonproduction of form, one is not coursing in the perfection of wisdom. If one courses in the production of form, one is not coursing in the perfection of wisdom.

and so forth. What does this indicate? It indicates that since the perfection of wisdom is devoid of the entirety of conceptions of production, nonproduction, and so forth, then when bodhisattvas do not course even in conceptions of nonproduction, they are coursing in the

^a For Jam-yang-shay-pa's discussion of the etymology of *grub pa 'i mtha'* and related terms, see Hopkins, *Maps of the Profound*, 65ff.

perfection of wisdom. Consequently, if an affirming negation is thoroughly employed, such contradicts scripture, and hence here one is to rely only on a nonaffirming negation.

ལྷང་ལས། གཟུགས་ཀྱི་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་ལ་སྐྱོད་ན་ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱི་ཕ་
 རོལ་ཏུ་ཕྱིན་པ་ལ་སྐྱོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེས་འབྲུང་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ་ཞེས་
 བྱ་བ་སྐྱེས་ཏེ། བཅོམ་ལྡན་འདས་མ་ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱི་ཕ་རོལ་ཏུ་ཕྱིན་
 པ་ལས། བཅོམ་ལྡན་འདས་ལ་གཞན་དག་གིས་བྱང་ཆུབ་སེམས་
 དཔའ་ཇི་ལྟར་ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱི་ཕ་རོལ་ཏུ་ཕྱིན་པ་ལ་སྐྱོད་ན། ཤེས་
 རབ་ཀྱི་ཕ་རོལ་ཏུ་ཕྱིན་པ་ལ་སྐྱོད་པ་མ་ལགས་ཞེས་ཞུས་པ་དང་།
 བཅོམ་ལྡན་འདས་ཀྱིས་བཀའ་སྩལ་པ། གཟུགས་ཀྱི་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་
 ལ་སྐྱོད་ན་ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱི་ཕ་རོལ་ཏུ་ཕྱིན་པ་ལ་སྐྱོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །
 གཟུགས་ཀྱི་སྐྱེ་བ་ལ་སྐྱོད་ན་ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱི་ཕ་རོལ་ཏུ་ཕྱིན་པ་ལ་
 སྐྱོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ལ་སོགས་པ་གསུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །
 ཇི་སྐད་བཟུན་ཞེ་ན། ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱི་ཕ་རོལ་ཏུ་ཕྱིན་པ་ནི་སྐྱེ་བ་དང་
 སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་ལ་སོགས་པའི་རྟོག་པ་མ་ལྟས་པ་དང་བྲལ་བ་ཡིན་
 པས། གང་གི་ཚེ་བྱང་ཆུབ་སེམས་དཔའ་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པའི་རྣམ་པར་
 རྟོག་པ་ལ་ཡང་མི་སྐྱོད་པ་དེའི་ཚེ་ན་ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱི་ཕ་རོལ་ཏུ་ཕྱིན་
 པ་ལ་སྐྱོད་པ་ཡིན་པར་བཟུན་ཏོ། ། དེ་ལྟ་བུས་ན་མ་ཡིན་པར་
 དགག་པ་ཡོངས་སུ་གཟུང་ན་ལྷང་དང་འགལ་བས་འདིར་ནི་མེད་
 པར་དགག་པ་ཁོ་ན་ལ་བརྟེན་པར་བྱའོ། །

- Here it is to be delimited that “Things are only not produced from self.” (*'dir dngos po rnam bdag las skye ba med pa kho na'o zhes nges par gzung bar bya'o*):
 - **delimited** (*nges par gzung ba*): this term involves the meaning of “just that” (*de kho na*). Here the delimitation also is of

three aspects: that “Things are only not produced from self” (*bdag las skye ba med pa kho na'o*) is the first delimitation; that “Things are not produced from only self” (*bdag kho na las skye ba med de*) is the second delimitation;^a that “Things are not produced from only self” (*bdag kho na las skye ba med de*) is the third delimitation. With respect to those, this statement [by Bhāvaviveka] “Here it is to be delimited that ‘Things are only not produced from self’” is the first delimitation: the meaning here is to be delimited as “Things are only not produced from self.”

འདིར་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་ཁོ་ནའོ་ཞེས་
 དེས་པར་གཟུང་བར་བྱའོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ལ། དེས་པར་གཟུང་བ་ཞེས་
 བྱ་བའི་སྐྱེ་བའི་དེ་ཁོ་ན་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་དོན་ལ་སྟེགས་སོ། ། འདིར་
 དེས་པར་གཟུང་བ་དེ་ཡང་རྣམ་པ་གསུམ་སྟེ། བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་
 མེད་པ་ཁོ་ནའོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་དེས་པར་གཟུང་བ་དང་པོ་འོ། །
 བདག་ཁོ་ན་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་དེ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་དེས་པར་གཟུང་བ་
 གཉིས་པའོ། ། བདག་ཁོ་ན་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་དེ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་དེས་
 པར་གཟུང་བ་གསུམ་པའོ། ། དེ་ལ་འདིར་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་བདག་
 ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་ཁོ་ནའོ་ཞེས་དེས་པར་གཟུང་བར་བྱའོ་ཞེས་བྱ་
 བ་འདི་ནི་དེས་པར་གཟུང་བ་དང་པོ་སྟེ། དོན་འདིར་ནི་དངོས་པོ་
 རྣམས་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་ཁོ་ནའོ་ཞེས་དེས་པར་གཟུང་
 བར་བྱ་བ་ཡིན་ནོ། །

- **If it is delimited otherwise**, (*gzhan du nges par gzung na*): This indicates that if it delimited in accordance with the second and the third delimitations, as appears below, even both are fallacious and hence unsuitable. To indicate the second delimitation, [Bhāvaviveka] utters:

^a The second delimitation is missing in the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 204.3) and in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, 186.4.1) but appears in the Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur* (vol. 98, 130.4). The difference between the second and third is clarified below.

- **then it would be determined as,**^a “[Things] are not produced from only self. Well, what then? They are produced from other,” (*bdag kho na las skye ba med de/ 'o na ci zhe na/ gzhan las skye'o zhes bya bar nges par 'gyur ba dang*): This is the second delimitation: If it delimited that “Things are not produced from only self,” then [in answer to] “Well, what then?” there would be the fallacy that “They are produced from other,” and hence this is not suitable. To indicate the third delimitation, [Bhāvaviveka] utters:
- **and likewise it would be determined as,**^b “[Things] are not produced from only self. Well, what then? They are produced from self and other.” (*de bzhin du bdag kho na las ni skye ba med de/ 'o na ci zhe na/ bdag gzhan las skye'o zhes bya bar nges par 'gyur bas*): This is the third delimitation: If it delimited that “Things are not produced from only self,” then [in answer to] “Well, what then?” there would be the fallacy that “They are produced from self and other,” and hence this also is not suitable. Why are those two, the second and third delimitations, unsuitable?

གཞན་དུ་ངེས་པར་གཟུང་ན་ཞེས་བྱ་བས་ནི་ངེས་པར་གཟུང་བ་
 གཉིས་པ་དང་གསུམ་པ་འོག་ནས་འགྲུང་བ་དག་ལྟར་གཟུང་ན་
 གཉི་ག་ཡང་སློན་དུ་འགྲུར་པས་མི་རུང་ངོ་ཞེས་བསྟན་ཏོ། ། ངེས་
 པར་གཟུང་བ་གཉིས་པ་བསྟན་པའི་སྤྱིར། བདག་ཁོ་ན་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་
 མེད་དེ། འོ་ན་ཅི་ཞེ་ན། གཞན་ལས་སྐྱེ་འོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བར་ངེས་པར་
 འགྲུར་བ་དང་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་སྐྱེས་ཏེ། འདི་ནི་ངེས་པར་གཟུང་བ་
 གཉིས་པ་སྟེ། དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་བདག་ཁོ་ན་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་ངོ་ཞེས་
 ངེས་པར་གཟུང་ན། འོ་ན་ཅི་ཞེ་ན། གཞན་ལས་སྐྱེ་འོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བར་
 ངེས་པར་འགྲུར་བའི་སློན་དུ་འགྲུར་བས་འདི་ནི་མི་རུང་ངོ། །
 ངེས་པར་གཟུང་བ་གསུམ་པ་བསྟན་པའི་སྤྱིར་དེ་བཞིན་དུ་བདག་
 ཁོ་ན་ལས་ནི་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་དེ། འོ་ན་ཅི་ཞེ་ན། བདག་དང་གཞན་

^a Avalokitavrata omits this initial phrase.

^b Avalokitavrata omits this initial phrase.

ལས་སྐྱེའོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བར་ངེས་པར་འགྱུར་བས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་སྐྱེས་ཏེ།
 འདི་ནི་ངེས་པར་གཟུང་བ་གསུམ་པ་སྟེ། དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་བདག་
 ཁོ་ན་ལས་ནི་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་དོ་ཞེས་ངེས་པར་གཟུང་ན། འོ་ན་ཅི་ཞེ་
 ར།བདག་དང་གཞན་ལས་སྐྱེའོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བར་ངེས་པར་འགྱུར་བའི་
 སྐྱོན་དུ་འགྱུར་བས་འདི་ཡང་མི་རུང་ངོ་། ། ངེས་པར་གཟུང་བ་
 གཉིས་པ་དང་གསུམ་པ་དེ་གཉིས་ཅིའི་ཕྱིར་མི་རུང་ཞེ་ན།

- **Hence, those also are not asserted** (*de yang mi bzhed de*): The master [Bhāvaviveka] furthermore does not assert the second and third delimitations because even both of those accrue the fallacy of asserting production. Why are they not asserted? Hence, he utters:
- **because of separating from a tenet.** (*mdzad pa'i mtha' dang bral ba'i phyir ro*): How does one separate from a tenet? It is because earlier on the occasion of stating the general thesis it was asserted that things are not produced from self, not produced from other, not produced from both, and not produced causelessly, but here these two—the indication of production from other by the second delimitation and the indication of production from self and other by the third delimitation—contradict the earlier thesis.^a

དེའི་ཕྱིར་དེ་ཡང་མི་བཞེད་དེ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་སྐྱེས་ཏེ། ངེས་པར་གཟུང་
 བ་གཉིས་པ་དང་གསུམ་པ་དེ་ཡང་སློབ་དཔོན་མི་བཞེད་དེ། གཉི་
 ག་དེ་ཡང་སྐྱེ་བར་ཁས་ལེན་པའི་སྐྱོན་ཆགས་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། ། ཅིའི་
 ཕྱིར་མི་བཞེད་ཅེ་ན། དེའི་ཕྱིར་མཇོང་པའི་མཐའ་དང་བྲལ་བའི་
 ཕྱིར་རོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་སྐྱེས་ཏེ། ཇི་ལྟར་མཇོང་པའི་མཐའ་དང་བྲལ་ཞེ་
 ར། ལྟར་དམ་བཅས་པའི་སྐྱི་བཞོན་པའི་སྐབས་སུ་དངོས་པོ་
 རྣམས་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་དང་གཞན་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་

^a In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 205.6) for *sngar dam pa dang* read *sngar dam bcas pa dang* in accordance with the Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur* (vol. 98, 130.4) and the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, 186.5.4).

དང་། གཉིས་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་དང་། ལྷ་མེད་པ་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་
 པར་ཁས་སྒྲུངས་ལ། འདིར་ངེས་པར་གཟུང་བ་གཉིས་པས་གཞན་
 ལས་སྐྱེ་བར་བརྟན་པ་དང་། ངེས་པར་གཟུང་བ་གསུམ་པ་དང་
 བདག་དང་གཞན་ལས་སྐྱེ་བར་བརྟན་པ་འདི་གཉིས་ལྟར་དམ་
 བཅས་པ་དང་འགལ་བའི་སྤྱིར་རོ། །

- **Here those serving as the words of a syllogism** (*'dir sbyor ba'i tshig tu 'gyur ba*): This is to be put together as “On this occasion of indicating that things are not produced from self, those serving as words containing a syllogism are the below application of subject, predicate of the proposition, means of proof, and example.” In that:

- **words of a syllogism** (*sbyor ba'i tshig*): words containing a syllogism. This is the equivalent of saying, “an inference endowed with a reason and an example.”

འདིར་སྐྱོར་བའི་ཚིག་ཏུ་འགྱུར་བ་ནི་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་དངོས་པོ་
 རྣམས་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པར་བརྟན་པའི་སྐབས་འདིར་སྐྱོར་
 བ་དང་སྐྱོར་བ་དང་བཅས་པའི་ཚིག་ཏུ་འགྱུར་བ་ནི། འོག་ནས་
 ཚིག་ཅན་དང་། བསྐྱབ་པར་བྱ་བ་ཚིག་དང་། སྐྱབ་པའི་ཚིག་དང་།
 དཔེ་ཉེ་བར་སྐྱར་བ་རྣམས་ཡིན་ཅོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བར་སྐྱར་རོ། ། དེ་ལ་
 སྐྱོར་བའི་ཚིག་ཅེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་སྐྱོར་བ་དང་བཅས་པའི་ཚིག་སྟེ། རྗེས་
 སྲུ་དཔག་པ་གཏན་ཚིགས་དང་དཔེ་དང་ལྡན་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་ཐ་
 ཚིག་གོ།

- **Ultimately the internal sense-spheres [eye sense, ear sense, and so forth] are not produced from self because of existing—like, for example, intelligence.** (*don dam par nang gi skye mched rnams bdag las skye ba med par nges te yod pa'i phyir shes pa yod pa nyid bzhin no, na paramārthata ādhyātmikānyāyatanāni svata utpannāni vidyamānatvāt caitanyavad*): In that:

- **Ultimately** (*don dam par, paramārthata*): Earlier [on the occasion of discussing the mode of negation in the expression of worship in Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle*,^a Bhāvaviveka] uttered:^b

^a Golden Reprint (vol. 107, 129.5; Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur* (vol. 96, 93.6) and Peking (P5259, vol. 95, 154.4.1).

^b This is Bhāvaviveka's response to an unnamed opponent; Bhāvaviveka first lays out the opponent's position:

Concerning those, someone says: The refutations of cessation, production, difference, and oneness are ultimately. The refutations of annihilation and permanence are in conventional terms. The refutations of going and coming are both." (*de la kha cig na re/ 'gag pa dang / skye ba dang / tha dad pa nyid dang / gcig pa nyid bkag pa ni don dam par ro// chad pa dang rtag pa bkag pa ni tha snyad du'o// 'ong ba dang 'gro ba bkag pa ni gnyi gar ro zhe'o*)

དེ་ལ་ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། འགག་པ་དང་། རྐྱེན་བྱ་དང་། ཐ་དང་པ་ཉིད་དང་། གཅིག་པ་ཉིད་
བཀག་པ་ནི་དོན་དམ་པར་རོ། ། རྐྱེན་བྱ་དང་རྟག་པ་བཀག་པ་ནི་ཐ་སྐད་དུ་འོ། ། འོང་བ་
དང་འགྲོ་བ་བཀག་པ་ནི་གཉི་གར་རོ་ཞེས། །

Avalokitavrata's commentary on the opponent's position (Golden Reprint, vol. 109, 128.3; Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur*, vol. 98, 84.1; Peking, P5259, vol. 96, 175.5.4) is:

- **Concerning those**, (*de la*): Concerning those negations as indicated [in the expression of worship in Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle*—the negation of cessation through “no cessation,” the negation of production through “no production,” the negation of annihilation through “no annihilation,” the negation of permanence through “no permanence,” the negation of coming through “no coming,” the negation of going through “no going,” the negation of difference through “no difference,” the negation of sameness through “no sameness.”

དེ་ལ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་འགག་པ་མེད་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བས་འགག་པ་བཀག་པ་དང་། རྐྱེན་བྱ་མེད་
པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བས་རྐྱེན་བྱ་བཀག་པ་དང་། རྐྱེན་བྱ་མེད་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བས་རྐྱེན་བྱ་བཀག་པ་
དང་། རྟག་པ་མེད་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བས་རྟག་པ་བཀག་པ་དང་། འོང་བ་མེད་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བས་
འོང་བ་བཀག་པ་དང་། འགྲོ་བ་མེད་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བས་འགྲོ་བ་བཀག་པ་དང་། ཐ་དང་
དོན་མིན་ཞེས་བྱ་བས་ཐ་དང་པ་ཉིད་བཀག་པ་དང་། དོན་གཅིག་མིན་ཞེས་བྱ་བས་
དོན་གཅིག་པ་ཉིད་བཀག་པ་རི་སྐད་བཟུན་པ་དེ་ལོ། །

- **someone** (*kha cig na re*) [says]: a certain proponent of Middle Way tenets [says].
ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་དབུ་མ་པའི་གྲུབ་པའི་མཐའ་སྐྱོབ་པ་ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེས། །

- **The refutations of cessation, production, difference, and oneness are ultimately.** (*'gag pa dang / skye ba dang / tha dad pa nyid dang / gcig pa nyid bkag*)

pa ni don dam par ro//): With respect to the refutations of the cessation, the production, the difference, and the oneness of things, these are refuted ultimately, but are not refuted conventionally because conventionally all things have cessation and also have production in the conventional terms of the world and because pots, cloths, and so forth have difference, and Devadatta is described as a sameness [or singularity] (*gcig pa nyid*) due to not having the otherness of Yajñadatta and so forth.

འགག་པ་དང་སྐྱེ་བ་དང་ཐ་དད་པ་ཉིད་དང་གཅིག་པ་ཉིད་བཀག་པ་ནི་དོན་དམ་པར་
རོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་འགག་པ་དང་སྐྱེ་བ་དང་ཐ་དད་པ་ཉིད་དང་
མཚན་ཉིད་གཅིག་པ་ཉིད་ནི་དོན་དམ་པར་བཀག་གོ། ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཏུ་ནི་མ་བཀག་སྟེ།
འདི་ལྟར་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཏུ་ནི་འཇིག་རྟེན་གྱི་ཐ་སྐྱད་ཏུ་དངོས་པོ་ཐམས་ཅད་ལ་འགག་པ་
ཡང་ཡོད། སྐྱེ་བ་ཡང་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་དང་། ལུས་པ་དང་སྣམ་བུ་ལ་སོགས་པ་ཐ་དད་པ་
ཉིད་ཀྱང་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་དང་། ལྷས་བྱིན་ནི་མཚན་སྦྱོན་ལ་སོགས་པ་གཞན་མེད་པས་
གཅིག་པ་ཉིད་དོ་ཞེས་བརྗོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ།

- **The refutations of annihilation and permanence are in conventional terms.**

(chad pa dang rtag pa bkag pa ni tha snyad du'o//): With respect to the refutations of annihilation and permanence, these are not reduced to only being refutations ultimately; rather, they are also refuted in conventional terms (*kun rdzob kyi tha snyad du*), for even conventionally things do not have annihilation and permanence because from the first eon onward those that have the relation of a continuum, such as grass and so forth, still do not have an annihilation of continuum and because in the world all things—due to being impermanent¹—do not appear to be permanent.

ཆད་པ་དང་རྟག་པ་བཀག་པ་ནི་ཐ་སྐྱད་ཏུ་ལོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་ཆད་པ་
དང་རྟག་པ་བཀག་པ་ནི་དོན་དམ་པར་བཀག་པ་འབའ་ཞིག་ཏུ་མ་ཟད་ཀྱི། ཀུན་རྫོབ་
གྱི་ཐ་སྐྱད་ཏུ་ཡང་བཀག་པ་སྟེ། འདི་ལྟར་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཏུ་ཡང་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་ལ་ཆད་པ་
དང་རྟག་པ་མེད་དེ། བསྐལ་པའི་དང་པོ་ཚུན་ཆད་ནས་སྣ་ལ་སོགས་པའི་རྒྱན་འབྲེལ་པ་
དག་ད་ཏུང་ཡང་རྒྱན་ཆད་པ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་དང་། འཇིག་རྟེན་ན་དངོས་པོ་ཐམས་ཅད་
མི་རྟག་པས་རྟག་པ་འགའ་ཡང་མི་སྤང་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ།

- **The refutations of going and coming are both.** (*'ong ba dang 'gro ba bkag pa ni gnyi gar ro*): With respect to the refutations of the going and the coming of things, these are refuted both conventionally and ultimately because it is said in the established conclusions [that is, tenets] that since conventionally all compounded phenomena have a nature of disintegrating even instantaneously, they do not have coming and going and because also the master himself² [Nāgārjuna] ultimately refuted coming and going on the occasion of [the second chapter of the *Treatise on the Middle* in the] Analysis of Coming and Going. In that way

One who is not other [namely, Bhāvaviveka myself,] says: Here all are refuted ultimately because of being determinative. It is also not contradictory in other ways because there is no contradiction with the aforementioned indication of the attributes of the substratum and because of being the supreme intention by the teaching by the agent. (*gzhan ma yin pa ni 'dir thams cad don dam par bkag ste nges par gzung ba'i phyir ro// gzhan du yang mi 'gal te/ khyad par gyi gzhi'i khyad par ji skad bstan pa la 'gal ba med pa'i phyir dang / mdzad pa pos bstan pa nyid kyis bzhed pa mchog yin pa'i phyir ro//*)^a

this explanation that some things are refuted ultimately, some are refuted conventionally, and some are refuted both ways is given [by the opponent] for the sake of avoiding contradiction with the world and for the sake of avoiding contradiction with scripture, since with regard to certain [of the eight things] the assertion that things are conventionally refuted contradicts the world, and with regard to certain [other of the eight things] it contradicts scripture that asserts that things are ultimately refuted.

འོང་བ་དང་འགྲོ་བ་བཀག་པ་ནི་གཉི་གར་རོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་འོང་བ་
 དང་འགྲོ་བ་བཀག་པ་ནི་ཀུན་རྫོབ་དང་དོན་དམ་པ་གཉི་གར་བཀག་སྟེ། འདི་ལྟར་ཀུན་
 རྫོབ་ཏུ་ཡང་འདུས་བྱས་ཐམས་ཅད་སྐད་ཅིག་གཅིག་ལ་འཇིག་པའི་དང་ཅན་ཡིན་པས་
 འོང་བ་དང་འགྲོ་བ་མེད་དོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་པའི་མཐའ་ལས་གསུངས་པའི་སྤྱིར་དང་། དོན་
 དམ་པར་ཡང་སྟོབ་དཔོན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་འོང་བ་དང་འགྲོ་བ་བཟག་པའི་སྐབས་ནས་འོང་
 བ་དང་འགྲོ་བ་དགག་པ་མཛད་པའི་སྤྱིར་རོ།

¹ In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 129.5) for *mi rtag pa 'ga yang mi snang* read *mi rtag pas rtag pa 'ga yang mi snang* in accordance with the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, 176.1.2) and the Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur* (vol. 98, 84.7).

² In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 129.6) for *slob dpon nyid kyi* read *slob dpon nyid kyi* in accordance with the Peking (P5259, vol. 96,) and the Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur* (vol. 98, 85.1).

^a Avalokitavrata's commentary on this (continuing from the above footnote) is:

- **One who is not other** (*gzhan ma yin pa ni*): Due to not being other, it is he himself, the commentator [Bhāvaviveka]. Therefore, this is to be put together as, "The commentator says that here the refutations of all—cessation, production, and so forth—are done ultimately."

གཞན་མ་ཡིན་པ་ནི་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་གཞན་མ་ཡིན་པས་རང་ཉིད་ཡིན་ཏེ། འགྲོལ་བ་བྱེད་
 བ་ཉིད་ཡིན་ལོ། ། དེའི་སྤྱིར་འགྲོལ་བ་བྱེད་པ་ཉིད་ནི་འདིར་འགག་པ་དང་། རྟེན་བལ་

སོགས་པ་དགག་པ་ནི་ཐམས་ཅད་དོན་དམ་པར་བགག་པ་པ་ཡིན་ཅོ་ཞེས་ཟེར་བར་
སྐྱར་རྟོ།

- **Here** ('dir): Here on the occasion of refuting cessation, production, and so forth.
- **all** (thams cad): all, namely, cessation, production, and so forth.

འདིར་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་འགག་པ་དང་སྐྱེ་བ་ལ་སོགས་པ་དགག་པའི་སྐབས་འདིར་རྟོ།
ཐམས་ཅད་ཅེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་འགག་པ་དང་སྐྱེ་བ་ལ་སོགས་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་དོ།

- **are refuted ultimately** (*don dam par bkag ste*): ultimately cessation, production, and so forth do not exist. Why? It is because when the master [Nāgārjuna] causes realization of the character of the ultimate, in this teaching of the mode of the perfection of wisdom he takes up the task of refuting things' "cessation, production, annihilation, permanence, coming, going, difference, and sameness." Why are all those refuted ultimately? Hence, [Bhāvaviveka] utters:

དོན་དམ་པར་བགག་སྐྱེ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་དོན་དམ་པར་འགག་པ་དང་སྐྱེ་བ་ལ་སོགས་པ་
མེད་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ། ཅིའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེ་ན། གང་གི་ཚེ་སློབ་དཔོན་དོན་དམ་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་
རྟོགས་པར་མཛད་པ་དེའི་ཚེ་ན་ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱི་པ་རོལ་ཏུ་ཕྱིན་པའི་ཚུལ་བསྟན་པ་འདིར་
དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་འགག་པ་དང་། སྐྱེ་བ་དང་། མང་བ་དང་། རྟག་པ་དང་། འོང་བ་
དང་། འགྲོ་བ་དང་། དོན་ཐ་དད་པ་དང་། དོན་གཅིག་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་དག་དགག་པར་
བཞེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ་ཞེས་ཟེར་རྟོ། ཅིའི་ཕྱིར་དེ་དག་ཐམས་ཅད་དོན་དམ་པར་དགག་
ཅེ་ན།

- **because of being determinative.** (*nges par gzung ba'i phyir ro//*): because all the phrases (*tshig*) are unquestionably determinative, and that determinativeness also is only in the sphere of the ultimate (*don dam pa'i yul kho na*) but not in the sphere of the conventional (*kun rdzob kyi yul*).

དེའི་ཕྱིར་ངེས་པར་གཟུང་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་སྐྱེས་ཏེ། འདི་ལྟར་ཚིག་ཐམས་ཅད་ནི་
གདོན་མི་ཟ་བར་ངེས་པར་གཟུང་བར་བྱ་བ་ཡིན་ལ། ངེས་པར་གཟུང་བར་བྱ་བ་དེ་ཡང་
དོན་དམ་པའི་ཡུལ་ཁོ་ན་ལ་ཡིན་གྱི། ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཀྱི་ཡུལ་ལ་ནི་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ།

- **It is also not contradictory in other ways** (*gzhan du yang mi 'gal te*): Things' cessation, production, and so forth are determinatively not only refuted ultimately, for in other ways this is also not contradictory with the world and also not contradictory with scripture, and also all those—cessation, production, and so forth—are refuted ultimately. What are those other ways? Hence, [Bhāvaviveka] utters:

གཞན་ཏུ་ཡང་མི་འགལ་ཏེ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་འགག་པ་དང་། སྐྱེ་བ་ལ་
སོགས་པ་དེ་དག་ངེས་པར་གཟུང་བ་ལས་དོན་དམ་པར་དགག་པ་འབའ་ཞིག་ཏུ་ཡང་

མ་ཟད་དེ། འདི་ལྟར་རྣམ་པ་གཞན་དུ་ཡང་འཇིག་རྟེན་དང་ཡང་མི་འགལ་ཞིང་། ལྷང་
དང་ཡང་མི་འགལ་ལ། འགག་པ་དང་སྐྱེ་བ་ལ་སོགས་པ་དེ་དག་ཐམས་ཅད་དོན་དམ་
པར་བཀག་པ་ཡང་ཡིན་ནོ། ། རྣམ་པ་གཞན་ཡང་གང་ཞེ་ན།

- **because there is no contradiction with the aforementioned indication of the attributes of the substratum and** (*khyad par gyi gzhi'i khyad par ji skad bstan pa la 'gal ba med pa'i phyir dang /*): What has no contradiction with the world and no contradiction with scripture? Hence, [Bhāvaviveka] utters:
 - **with the attributes of the substratum as indicated** (*khyad par gyi gzhi'i khyad par ji skad bstan pa la*): with those attributes of no cessation, no production, and so forth that exist in the substratum, dependent-arising, the mode of the perfection of wisdom, as indicated earlier, which are “the attributes of the substratum as indicated.”
 - **because there is no contradiction with them** (*de la 'gal ba med pa'i phyir*): because there is no contradiction with the world and no contradiction with scripture; since there are no fallacies of meaning regarding those, others cannot object, “There is contradiction with the world and contradiction with scripture. Or:

དེའི་ཕྱིར་ལྷང་པར་གྱི་གཞི་ལྷང་པར་ཇི་སྐད་བསྟན་པ་ལ་འགལ་བ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་དང་
ཞེས་བྱ་བ་སྤྲུལ་སོ། ། གང་ལ་འཇིག་རྟེན་དང་འགལ་བ་དང་ལྷང་དང་འགལ་བ་མེད་ཅེ་
ན། དེའི་ཕྱིར་ལྷང་པར་གྱི་གཞིའི་ལྷང་པར་ཇི་སྐད་བསྟན་པ་ལ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་སྤྲུལ་ཏེ། ལྷང་
པར་གྱི་གཞི་ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱི་པ་རོལ་ཏུ་ཕྱིན་པའི་ཚུལ་རྟེན་ཅིང་འབྲེལ་པར་འབྱུང་བ་གང་
ལ་ལྷང་པར་འགག་པ་མེད་པ་དང་། སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་ལ་སོགས་པ་ཡོད་པ་སྤར་ཇི་སྐད་
བསྟན་པ་དེ་ནི་ལྷང་པར་གྱི་གཞིའི་ལྷང་པར་ཇི་སྐད་བསྟན་པ་སྟེ་དེ་ལོ། །

- **It is also not contradictory in other ways** (*gzhan du yang ni 'gal te/*): It is not only that this is not contradictory due to being determinative and not contradictory due to being fallacies of meaning, for it is also not contradictory,
- **because of being the supreme assertion by the teaching by the agent.** (*mdzad pa pos bstan pa nyid kyiis bzhed pa mchog yin pa'i phyir ro/*): all those—cessation, production, and so forth—are refuted ultimately.

དེ་ལ་འགལ་བ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི། དེ་ལ་འཇིག་རྟེན་དང་འགལ་བ་དང་།
ལྷང་དང་འགལ་བ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། གང་གི་ཕྱིར་དེ་ལ་དོན་གྱིས་ཞེས་པ་མེད་པ་དེའི་
ཕྱིར། གཞན་གྱི་འཇིག་རྟེན་དང་འགལ་བ་དང་། ལྷང་དང་འགལ་བ་ཡོད་དོ་ཞེས་སྐལ་
བར་མི་རུས་སོ། །

- **by the teaching by the agent.** (*mdzad pa pos bstan pa nyid kyiis*): Since in the definitions of grammar treatises it is said, “An agent’s supreme intention is action,” here also the agent enacting display in exalted activities of teach-

དོན་དམ་པར་ནང་གི་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་རྣམས་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་
 པར་ངེས་ཏེ། ཡོད་པའི་སྤྱིར་དཔེར་ན་ཤེས་པ་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་བཞིན་
 རོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ལ། དོན་དམ་པར་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་སྤྱིར་གཞན་མ་ཡིན་
 པ་ནི་འདྲིར་ཐམས་ཅད་དོན་དམ་པར་བཀག་སྟེ་ངེས་པར་གཟུང་
 བའི་སྤྱིར་རོ། །གཞན་དུ་ཡང་མི་འགལ་ཏེ། བྱུང་པར་གྱི་གཞིའི་
 བྱུང་པར་རྗེ་སྤྱད་བསྟན་པ་ལ་འགལ་བ་མེད་པའི་སྤྱིར་དང་།

ing dependent-arisings as the two truths is the Supramundane Victor [Bud-
 dha], and [thus it] is by way of the teaching by' the Supramundane Victor
 of both obscurational truths and ultimate truths.

- **because of being the supreme intention** (*bzhed pa mchog yin pa'i phyir ro//*): from between the intentions by the agent, the Supramundane Victor, to teach obscurational truths and also to teach ultimate truths, here the Supramundane Victor's supreme intention is ultimate truths, and hence it is to be known that since the exalted activity that is the agent's supreme intention is the ultimate, all these—"cessation, production, annihilation, permanence, coming, going, difference, and sameness"—are only refuted ultimately. This is because in that way the Supramundane Victor says in the *Victorious Mother, Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra*, "Subhūti, all these are taught in conventional terms, but not ultimately."

ཡང་ན་གཞན་དུ་ཡང་མི་འགལ་ཏེ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི། ངེས་པར་གཟུང་བའི་སྤྱིར་མི་འགལ་
 བ་དང་། དོན་གྱིས་ཉེས་པ་མེད་པའི་སྤྱིར་མི་འགལ་བ་འབའ་ཞིག་ཏུ་ཡང་མ་ཟད་དེ།
 འདི་ལྟར་མཛད་པ་པོས་བསྟན་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་བཞེད་པ་མཚོག་ཡིན་པའི་སྤྱིར་ཡང་མི་
 འགལ་ཏེ། འགག་པ་དང་སྐྱེ་བ་ལ་སོགས་པ་དེ་དག་ཐམས་ཅད་དོན་དམ་པར་བཀག་པ་
 ཡིན་རོ། །མཛད་པ་པོས་བསྟན་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་སྤྱིར་བསྟན་བཅོས་ཀྱི་མཚན་
 ཉིད་ལས་བྱེད་པ་པོའི་འདོད་པ་མཚོག་ནི་ལས་ཡིན་རོ་ཞེས་འབྱུང་བས། འདྲིར་ཡང་
 རྟོན་ཅིང་འབྲེལ་བར་འབྱུང་བ་བདེན་པ་གཉིས་སུ་བསྟན་པའི་སྤྱིར་ལས་ལ་སྟོན་པར་
 མཛད་པའི་མཛད་པ་པོ་ནི་བཅོམ་ལྷན་འདས་ཡིན་ལ། བཅོམ་ལྷན་འདས་ཀྱིས་ཀུན་
 རྗེས་ཀྱི་བདེན་པ་དང་། དོན་དམ་པའི་བདེན་པ་གཉི་ག་བསྟན་པའི་སྐོ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་སོ། །

¹ The Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 132.5) and the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, 176.3.3) read *bcom ldan 'das kyi* whereas the Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur* (vol. 98, 86.7) reads *bcom ldan 'das kyis*.

མཛད་པ་པོས་བསྟན་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་བཞིན་པ་མཚོག་ཡིན་པའི་སྤྱིར་
རོ་ཞེས་ཟེར་རོ་ཞེས་སྒྲུབ་པས།

Hence, here it is to be put together that the refutation—that is, that production does not exist—is also a refutation ultimately. In this, “ultimately” [means that] production is refuted ultimately by way of substance (*rdzas*), thing (*dnngos po*), and basis (*gzhi*); moreover, within abiding in obscurational truths it is to be refuted as an ultimate object; ultimately even the convention of refutation does not exist, since [ultimately] there is no verbalization. In that:

- **the internal sense-spheres [eye sense, ear sense, and so forth]** (*nang gi skye mched rnams, ādhyātмикānyāyatanāni*): this is the object-inferred-position^a (*rjes su dpag par bya ba phyogs*), that is to say, the subject (*chos can, dharmin*).
- **are not produced from self** (*bdag las skye ba med par nges te, na svata...utpannāni*): this is the being-inferred-position^b (*rjes su dpag pa phyogs*), that is to say, the predicate of the proposition.
- **because of existing** (*yod pa'i phyir, vidyamānatvāt*): this is the attribute that is the means of proof, the reason, that is to say, the property of the position (*phyogs kyi chos*).
- **like, for example, intelligence.** (*dper na shes pa yod pa nyid bzhin no, caitanyavad*): This is the example, that is, a qualitatively similar example (*chos mthun pa'i dpe*).

དེ་ལ་དོན་དམ་པར་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་དོན་དམ་པར་སྐྱེ་བ་རྗེས་དང་
དངོས་པོ་དང་གཞིའི་སྐོར་ནས་དགག་པ་སྟེ། དེ་ཡང་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཀྱི་
བདེན་པ་ལ་གནས་ནས་དོན་དམ་པའི་ཡུལ་ལ་དགག་པར་བྱ་བ་
ཡིན་ཀྱི། དོན་དམ་པ་ཉིད་དུ་ནི་བརྗོད་པ་མེད་པའི་སྤྱིར་དགག་
པའི་ཐ་སྐྱད་ཀྱང་མེད་དོ། ། དེ་ལ་ནང་གི་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་རྣམས་ཞེས་བྱ་

^a Or, “position in the sense of the object about which something is being inferred.” The position comprises a subject and predicate, and thus the “object-inferred-position” is that part of the position which is the subject, about which the predicate is being inferred.

^b Or, “position in the sense of what is being inferred.”

བ་འདི་ནི་རྗེས་སུ་དཔག་པར་བྱ་བ་སྟོགས་ཏེ་ཚོས་ཅན་ཡིན་ལོ། །
 བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པར་ངེས་ཏེ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་འདི་ནི་རྗེས་སུ་
 དཔག་པ་སྟོགས་ཏེ་བསྐྱབ་པར་བྱ་བ་ཚོས་ཡིན་ལོ། ། ཡོད་པའི་
 སྤྱིར་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་འདི་ནི་སྐྱབ་པའི་ཚོས་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཏེ་སྟོགས་ཀྱི་
 ཚོས་ཡིན་ལོ། ། དབུར་ན་ཤེས་པ་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་བཞིན་ལོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་
 འདི་ནི་དབུ་སྐྱེ། ཚོས་མཐུན་པའི་དབུ་ཡིན་ལོ། །

In that [syllogism]:

- **internal** (*nang gi, ādhyātmikāni*): that which is under the influence of and taken as an abode by the self (*bdag gi^a byin gyis brlabs shing gnas su byas pa*). “Self” is that which, at certain points,^b takes [things] as “mine” (*bdag gir byas pa*); since it takes articles ranging from the excellent and the vast to the bad and the diminutive to be “mine,” it is called “self.” That which is under the influence of and taken as an abode by that mentating self^c is called “internal.”

དེ་ལ་ནང་གི་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་བདག་གིས་བྱིན་གྱིས་བརྒྱབས་ཤིང་
 གནས་སུ་བྱས་པའོ། ། བདག་ཅེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་མཚམས་ལ་བདག་གིར་
 བྱེད་པ་སྐྱེ། ཡོ་བྱེད་གྱུ་ལོ་མ་པ་དང་། རྒྱ་ཆེན་པོ་དག་དང་པོར་
 བྱས་ནས། ཡོ་བྱེད་ངན་པ་དང་སྟོན་ཆུང་ལུའི་བར་དག་ལ་བདག་
 གིར་བྱེད་པས་བདག་ཅེས་བྱའོ། ། བདག་དེས་བྱིན་གྱིས་བརྒྱབས་
 ཤིང་གནས་སུ་བྱས་པ་ནི་ནང་གི་ཞེས་བྱའོ། །

- **sense-spheres** (*skye mched rnams, āyatanāni*): They are sense-spheres [or, literally, producer-increasers] because they produce, give rise to, increase, and further minds and mental

^a The Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur* (vol. 98, 132.3) reads *gis*, whereas the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, 187.1.5) reads *gi*.

^b *mtshams la*; translation conjectured.

^c *bdag sems pa des*; the Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur* (vol. 98, 132.4) merely reads *bdag des*.

factors—those [sense-spheres] called eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mentality.

སྐྱེ་མཆེད་རྣམས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་སེམས་དང་སེམས་ལས་འབྱུང་བ་
 རྣམས་སྐྱེ་ཞིང་འབྱུང་བ་དང་། མཆེད་ཅིང་རྒྱས་པར་བྱེད་པས་སྐྱེ་
 མཆེད་རྣམས་ཏེ་འདི་ལྟ་སྟེ། མིག་དང་ན་བ་དང་སྣ་དང་སྟེ་དང་
 ལྷས་དང་ཡིད་ཅེས་བྱ་བ་རྣམས་སོ། །

- **the internal sense-spheres** (*nang gi skye mched rnams, ādhyātmikānyāyatanāni*): this is the object-inferred-position (*rjes su dpag par bya ba phyogs*), that is to say, the subject (*chos can, dharmin*). In that, [in general] “object-inferred” (*rjes su dpag par bya ba*) is the substratum with respect to which nonexistence (*dnegos po med pa*) is inferred from not being observed,^a or an impermanent thing is inferred from nature, or a cause is inferred from an effect; on this occasion it is the substratum (the internal sense-spheres) with respect to which no production from self is being inferred. It itself is called the “position.”

ནང་གི་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་རྣམས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་འདི་ནི་རྗེས་སུ་དཔག་པར་བྱ་
 བ་ཕྱོགས་ཏེ་ཚོས་ཅན་ཡིན་ནོ། ། དེ་ལ་རྗེས་སུ་དཔག་པར་བྱ་བ་
 ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་གང་ལ་མི་དམིགས་པ་ལས་དངོས་པོ་མེད་པར་རྗེས་
 སུ་དཔག་པ་དང་། རོ་བོ་ཉིད་ལས་མི་རྟག་པར་རྗེས་སུ་དཔག་པ་

^a In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 207.6) and in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, 187.1.8) for *gang la ma dmigs pa zhes bya ste phyogs las read gang la mi dmigs pa las* accordance with the Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur*, vol. 98, 127.6.

This is the first of three types of reasons, or signs: nonobservation signs (as in “With respect to the subject, here in this place in front, there does not exist a factually concordant subsequent cognition—that ascertains a flesh-eater—in the continuum of a person for whom a flesh-eater is a supersensory object because there does not exist a prime cognition—that observes a flesh-eater—in the continuum of a person for whom a flesh-eater is a supersensory object”); nature signs (as in “The subject, the sound of a conch, is impermanent because of being arisen from exertion”); and effect signs (as in “With respect to the subject, on a smoky pass, fire exists because smoke exists.) For extensive discussion of these, see Katherine Manchester Rogers, *Tibetan Logic* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 2009).

དང་། འབྲས་བུ་ལས་རྒྱ་རྗེས་སུ་དཔག་པའི་གཞི་སྟེ། སྐབས་འདིར་
 བྱི་གང་ལ་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་དེ་རྗེས་སུ་དཔག་
 པར་བྱ་བའི་གཞི་ནང་གི་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་རྣམས་སོ། ། དེ་ཉིད་ཕྱོགས་
 ཞེས་བྱ་སྟེ།

[In general] the “position” is the position [or thesis] comprising the attribute [that is, the predicate] and the subject; on this occasion the position comprising the two—the predicate of the proposition (“not produced from self”) and the subject (“the internal sense-spheres”) that is the substratum with respect to which this is being proven—is called the “position.” Just that [substratum] is called the “subject” (*chos can, dharmin*; literally, “attribute-possessor”); with respect to the term “subject,” the substratum of inference that possesses the two, (1) the attribute [that is, the predicate] that is being proven and (2) the attribute [or reason] that is the means of proof is the subject. On this occasion, “the internal sense-spheres,” which are the substrata possessing the two:

- the attribute [or predicate] of the proposition, “are not produced from self,” renowned to both disputants, and
- the attribute proving nonproduction from self (“existing”), renowned to both disputants

are called the “subject” (*chos can, dharmin*) [literally, “that which possesses the attributes,” that is to say, that which is endowed with the predicate and the reason”].

ཕྱོགས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་ཚོས་དང་ཚོས་ཅན་བསྐྱུས་པའི་ཕྱོགས་ཏེ།
 སྐབས་འདིར་བྱི་བསྐྱུབ་པར་བྱ་བ་ཚོས་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་
 ཞེས་བྱ་བ་དང་། གང་ལ་དེ་བསྐྱུབ་པར་བྱ་བའི་གཞིའི་ཚོས་ཅན་
 ནང་གི་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་རྣམས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་དེ་གཉིས་བསྐྱུས་པའི་ཕྱོགས་
 ལ་ཕྱོགས་ཞེས་བྱའོ། ། དེ་ཉིད་ཚོས་ཅན་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་སྟེ། ཚོས་ཅན་
 ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་རྗེས་སུ་དཔག་པར་བྱ་བའི་གཞི་གང་ལ་བསྐྱུབ་པར་
 བྱ་བ་དང་། སྐྱུབ་པའི་ཚོས་གཉིས་ཡོད་པ་དེ་ནི་ཚོས་ཅན་ཏེ།

སྐབས་འདིར་ནི་ནང་གི་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་རྣམས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་གཞི་གང་ལ་
 བརྒྱབ་པར་བྱ་བ་ཚོས་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ཚོལ་བ་
 དང་། སྤྱིར་ཚོལ་བ་གཉིས་ལ་གྲགས་པ་དང་། བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་
 མེད་པ་དེ་རྒྱབ་པའི་ཚོས་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ཅེས་བྱ་བ་ཚོལ་བ་དང་སྤྱིར་
 ཚོལ་བ་གཉིས་ཀ་ལ་གྲགས་པ་དེ་གཉིས་ཡོད་པ་དེ་ནི་ཚོས་ཅན་
 ཞེས་བྱའོ། །

- **from self** (*bdag las, svata*): from [their own] existent entity (*bdag nyid yod pa nyid las*).

བདག་ལས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་བདག་ཉིད་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ལས་སོ། །

- **are not produced from self** (*skye ba med par nges te, na svata...utpannāni*): things are not produced from [their own] existent entity (*bdag nyid yod pa nyid las skye ba med par nges pa*). This “are not produced from self” is the being-inferred-position (*rjes su dpag pa phyogs*), that is to say, the predicate of the proposition. Concerning that, [in general] “the being-inferred” (*rjes su dpag pa*)^a is (1) inference as non-existent (*dnogs po med pa*) from not being observed, or (2) inference as impermanent from nature, or (3) inference of a cause from an effect; and on this occasion it is the inference that the substratum that is the object inferred,^b that is to say, the internal sense-spheres, is without production from self.^c It itself is called the “position.” [In general] the “position” is the position [or thesis] comprising the attribute [or predicate] and the subject; on this occasion the position comprising the two—the predicate of the proposition (“not produced from self”) and the subject (“the internal sense-spheres”) that is the substratum with respect to which this is being proven—is

^a Usually translated as “inference.”

^b *Rjes su dpag par bya ba'i gzhi*.

^c In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 209.2) and in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, 187.3.1) for *bdag la* read *bdag las* in accordance with the Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur*, vol. 98, 133.4.

called the "position." Just that [predicate] is called the "predicate of the proposition" (*bsgrub par bya ba chos, sādhyadharmā*); [in general] the "predicate of the proposition" is (1) nonexistence (*dnegos po med pa*), or (2) impermanence, or (3) a cause; on this occasion the nonexistence of production from self, the predicate of the proposition, in the internal sense-spheres, the subject, is the proposition.

སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པར་ངེས་ཏེ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་བདག་ཉིད་
 ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པར་ངེས་པའོ། །བདག་ཉིད་ལས་སྐྱེ་
 བ་མེད་པར་ངེས་ཏེ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་འདི་ནི་རྗེས་སུ་དཔག་པ་སྟོགས་
 ཏེ་བསྐྱབ་པར་བྱ་བ་ཚོས་ཡིན་ནོ། །དེ་ལ་རྗེས་སུ་དཔག་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་
 བ་ནི་མི་དམིགས་པ་ལས་དངོས་པོ་མེད་པར་རྗེས་སུ་དཔག་པ་
 དང་། རོ་བོ་ཉིད་ལས་མི་རྟག་པར་རྗེས་སུ་དཔག་པ་དང་འབྲས་
 བྱ་ལས་རྒྱ་རྗེས་སུ་དཔག་པ་སྟེ། སྐབས་འདིར་ནི་རྗེས་སུ་དཔག་
 པར་བྱ་བའི་གཞི་ནང་གི་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་རྣམས་ལ་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་
 མེད་པ་རྗེས་སུ་དཔག་པའོ། །དེ་ཉིད་སྟོགས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་སྟེ། སྟོགས་
 ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་ཚོས་དང་ཚོས་ཅན་བསྐྱུས་པའི་སྟོགས་ཏེ་སྐབས་
 འདིར་ནི་བསྐྱབ་པར་བྱ་བ་ཚོས་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་
 བ་དང་གང་ལ་དེ་བསྐྱབ་པར་བྱ་བའི་གཞི་ཚོས་ཅན་ནང་གི་སྐྱེ་
 མཆེད་རྣམས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་དེ་གཉིས་བསྐྱུས་པའི་སྟོགས་ལ་སྟོགས་
 ཞེས་བྱའོ། །དེ་ཉིད་བསྐྱབ་པར་བྱ་བ་ཚོས་ཞེས་བྱ་སྟེ། བསྐྱབ་པར་
 བྱ་བ་ཚོས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་དངོས་པོ་མེད་པ་དང་། མི་རྟག་པ་དང་།
 རྒྱ་སྟེ། སྐབས་འདིར་ནི་ཚོས་ཅན་ནང་གི་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་རྣམས་ལ་
 བསྐྱབ་པར་བྱ་བ་ཚོས་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་དེ་བསྐྱབ་པར་བྱ་
 བའོ། །

- **because of existing** (*yod pa'i phyir, vidyamānatvāt*): because of the existence of [their] entity, as follows: because “from self” is designated to an existent entity.^a This “because of existing” is the attribute that is the means of proof (*sgrub pa'i chos*), the reason; it is the property of the position (*phyogs kyi chos*). Concerning that, “attribute that is the means of proof” (*sgrub pa'i chos*) is [in general] the attribute proving (1) non-existence, or (2) impermanence, or (3) a cause—namely, non-observation, nature, or effect [respectively]. On this occasion the attribute proving the predicate of the proposition (“no production from self”) is “because of existing.”

ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་བདག་ཉིད་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ་
 འདི་སྐར་བདག་ལས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་བདག་ཉིད་ཡོད་པ་ལ་སྐར་
 གདགས་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། ། ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་འདི་ནི་བསྐྱབ་
 པའི་ཚོས་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཏེ། ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་ཚོས་ཡིན་ལོ། ། དེ་ལ་བསྐྱབ་
 པའི་ཚོས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་དངོས་པོ་མེད་པ་དང་མི་རྟག་པ་དང་སྐྱེ་
 སྐྱབ་པའི་ཚོས་མི་དམིགས་པ་དང་། རོ་བོ་ཉིད་དང་འབྲས་བུ་སྟེ།
 སྐབས་འདིར་ནི་བསྐྱབ་པར་བྱ་བ་ཚོས་པ་དག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་
 ཞེས་བྱ་བ་དེ་སྐྱབ་པའི་ཚོས་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་སྟེ།

It is thus: If “from self” is suitable to be designated to an existent entity and the internal sense-spheres are suitable to be designated as “from self,” then the existent does not have production-again^b (*yang skye ba, punarutpāda*), and, therefore, “because of existing” is an attribute [or property] proving no production from self. Just that is called a “reason” (*gtan tshigs*); with respect to “reason” [in general] the reasons proving (1) nonexistence, (2) impermanence, and (3) cause are nonobservation, nature, and effect [respectively]; on this occasion the reason proving the predicate of the proposition (“no

^a This final phrase repeats what Bhāvaviveka said earlier but is not marked here as a quotation.

^b The usage of “production-again” (*yang skye ba, punarutpāda*) appears to be in response to Chandrakīrti.

production from self") is "because of existing."

འདི་སྣང་བདག་ལས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་བདག་ཉིད་ཡོད་པ་ལ་སྣང་གསལ་སྤྱད་པ་དང་། བདག་ལས་ཞེས་སྣང་གསལ་སྤྱད་པ་བའི་ནང་གི་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་རྣམས་བདག་ཉིད་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ཡིན་ལོ། ། ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ལ་ནི་ཡང་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པས་དེའི་ཕྱིར་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི། བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་བསྐྱབ་པའི་ཚེས་ཡིན་ལོ། ། དེ་ཉིད་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་སྟེ། གཏན་ཚིགས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ཡང་དངོས་པོ་མེད་པ་དང་། མི་རྟག་པ་དང་། རྒྱ་སྐྱབ་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་མི་དམིགས་པ་དང་། རོ་བོ་ཉིད་དང་འབྲས་བུ་སྟེ། སྐབས་འདིར་མི་བསྐྱབ་པར་བྱ་བ་ཚེས་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་དེ་སྐྱབ་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་སྟེ།

Why are the internal sense-spheres not produced from self? Because of existing. If the internal sense-spheres are existent entities, then since the existent does not have production-again,^a "because of existing" is a reason proving no production from self. Just that is called the property of the position (*phyogs kyi chos*). Furthermore, the "property of the position" is the property of the position that comprises the predicate and the subject,^b [the property] which [in general] is (1) nonobservation, (2) nature, and (3) effect; on this occasion the property of the position that comprises the predicate of the proposition ("no production from self") and the subject ("the internal sense-spheres") is "because of existing."

ནང་གི་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་རྣམས་ཅེའི་ཕྱིར་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་ཅེ་ན། ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། རང་གི་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་རྣམས་བདག་ཉིད་ཡོད་པ་

^a The usage of "production-again" (*yang skye ba, punarutpāda*) appears to be in response to Chandrakīrti.

^b In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 210.6) and in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, 187.4.3) for *yang chos can* read *yang chos dang chos can* in accordance with the Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur*, vol. 98, 134.4.

ཉིད་ཡིན་ན་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ལ་ནི་ཡང་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པས་དེའི་སྤྱིར་
 ཡོད་པའི་སྤྱིར་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི། བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པར་སྐྱེ་བ་པའི་
 གཏན་ཚིགས་ཡིན་ཅོ། ། དེ་ཉིད་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་སྟེ།
 གཏན་ཚིགས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ཡང་དངོས་པོ་མེད་པ་དང་། མི་རྟག་པ་
 དང་། རྒྱ་སྐྱེ་བ་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་མི་དམིགས་པ་དང་། རོ་བོ་ཉིད་
 དང་འབྲས་བུ་སྟེ། སྐབས་འདིར་མི་བསྐྱེ་བ་པར་བྱ་བ་ཚོས་བདག་
 ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་དེ་སྐྱེ་བ་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཡོད་པའི་
 སྤྱིར་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་སྟེ། རང་གི་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་རྣམས་ཅིའི་སྤྱིར་བདག་ལས་
 སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་ཅེ་ན། ཡོད་པའི་སྤྱིར་ཏེ།

Why are the internal sense-spheres not produced from self? Because of existing. If the internal sense-spheres are existent entities, then since the existent does not have production-again,^a “because of existing” is the attribute [or property] that is the reason^b of that position comprising predicate and subject, and hence is called “property of the position” (*phyogs kyi chos*).

རང་གི་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་རྣམས་ཅིའི་སྤྱིར་བདག་ལ་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་ཅེ་ན།
 ཡོད་པའི་སྤྱིར་ཏེ། རང་གི་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་རྣམས་བདག་ཉིད་ཡོད་པ་
 ཉིད་ཡིན་ན་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ལ་ནི་ཡང་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པས་དེའི་སྤྱིར་
 ཡོད་པའི་སྤྱིར་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་ཚོས་དང་ཚོས་ཅན་བསྐྱེ་བ་པའི་
 ལྷོགས་དེའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཀྱི་ཚོས་ཡིན་པས་ལྷོགས་ཀྱི་ཚོས་ཞེས་
 བྱའོ། །

- like, for example, intelligence. (*dper na shes pa yod pa nyid*)

^a The usage of “production-again” (*yang skye ba, punarutpāda*) appears to be in response to Chandrakīrti.

^b *gtan tshigs kyi chos*.

bzhin no, caitanyavad): With respect to “intelligence” (*shes pa yod pa, caitanya*), the nature of the person (*skyes bu, puruṣa*) is called “intelligence” in the texts of the Sāṃkhyas and so forth; it is a variant^a of the proposition of self. With respect to *nyid* [in *shes pa yod pa nyid*] the thingness of intelligence (*shes pa yod pa'i dngos po*) is intelligence (*shes pa yod pa nyid*). This phrase “like, for example, intelligence” is an example, namely, a qualitatively similar example (*chos mthun pa'i dpe*). In that, “example” is an example of the existence—in the subject^b—of the attribute [or predicate] of the proposition and the attribute that is the means of proof. Here the example is to be put together as being the object-inferred-position, that is to say, the subject (*rjes su dpag par bya ba phyogs chos can*) “intelligence” (*shes pa yod pa nyid, caitanya*), in which exist the two:

1. the being-inferred-position, that is to say, the predicate of the proposition (*rjes su dpag pa phyogs bsgrub par bya ba chos*) “not produced from self” (*skye ba med pa, na...utpanna*) which is renowned to both disputants, and
2. the attribute that is the means of proof, the reason, that is to say, the property of the position (*sgrub pa'i chos gtan tshigs phyogs kyi chos*) “existing” (*yod pa nyid, vidyamānatva*) which is renowned to both disputants.

Just that is a “qualitatively similar example.”

དཔེར་ན་ཤེས་པ་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་བཞིན་ལོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ལ། ཤེས་པ་
 ཡོད་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་གྲངས་ཅན་ལ་སོགས་པའི་གཞུང་ལ་སྐྱེས་
 བའི་རང་བཞིན་ནི་ཤེས་པ་ཡོད་པའོ་ཞེས་ཟེར་བ་སྟེ། བདག་ཏུ་སྐྱེ་
 བའི་རྣམ་གྲངས་ཡིན་ལོ། ། ཉིད་ཅེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་ཤེས་པ་ཡོད་པའི་
 དངོས་པོ་ནི་ཤེས་པ་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་དོ། ། དཔེར་ན་ཤེས་པ་ཡོད་པ་
 ཉིད་བཞིན་ལོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་འདི་ནི་དཔེ་སྟེ་ཚོས་མཐུན་པའི་དཔེ་

^a *rnam grangs.*

^b *chos can, dharmin*; literally, the possessor of the attributes, namely, the predicate of the proposition and the reason.

ཡིན། དེ་ལ་དབེ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་ཚོས་ཅན་གང་ལ་བསྐྱབ་པར་བྱ་བ་
 དག་སྐྱབ་པའི་ཚོས་ཡོ་པའི་དབེ་སྟེ། འདིར་དབེ་ནི་རྗེས་སུ་དཔག་
 པར་བྱ་བ་ཚུགས་ཚོས་ཅན་ཤེས་པ་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ཅེས་བྱ་བ་གང་ལ་
 རྗེས་སུ་དཔག་པ་ཚུགས་བསྐྱབ་པར་བྱ་བ་ཚོས་བ་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་
 པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་རྒྱལ་བ་དང་ཕྱིར་རྒྱལ་བ་གཉི་ག་ལ་བྱགས་པ་དང་།
 སྐྱབ་པའི་ཚོས་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཚུགས་ཀྱི་ཚོས་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ཅེས་བྱ་
 བ་རྒྱལ་བ་དང་ཕྱིར་རྒྱལ་བ་གཉི་ག་ལ་བྱགས་པ་དེ་གཉིས་ཡོད་
 པ་ཡིན་པར་སྐྱར་རོ། །

With respect to “qualitatively similar example” (*chos mthun pa'i dpe*), [in general] a qualitatively similar example in the inference of a nonexistence (*dngos po med pa*) from not being observed^a is “in this area [a pot] does not exist because a pot that would be an object of observant knowing is not observed;”^b a qualitatively similar example in the inference of an impermanent thing from nature is “This is a tree because of being a *shimshapā* tree;”^c and a qualitatively similar example in the inference of a cause from an effect is “Here in the kitchen there is fire because smoke is billowing.”^d On this occasion with respect to “for example, the subject, intelligence,”^e “intelligence” (*shes pa yod pa nyid, caitanya*) is renowned to the opposing party as just existent (*yod pa nyid, vidyamāna*), and conventionally “consciousness” (*rnam par shes pa nyid*) is renowned to the latter party^f as just existent

^a In the Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur* (vol. 98, 135.2) for *ni dmigs pa las* read *ni mi dmigs pa las* in accordance with the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 212.1) and the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, 187.5.2).

^b *phyogs 'di na dngos po med de dmigs pa'i rig byar gyur pa'i bum pa mi dmigs pa'i phyir ro.*

^c *'di ni shing yin te shing sha pa yin pa'i phyir ro.* A *shimshapā* (*śimśapā*) is a kind of tree.

^d *tshang mang 'di na me yod de du ba 'thul ba'i phyir ro.*

^e *dper na chos can shes pa yod pa nyid.*

^f *phyir rgol ba*, the Proponent of the Middle.

(*yod pa nyid, vidyamāna*),^a and in this subject exist the two:

1. the predicate of the proposition (*bsgrub par bya ba chos*) “not produced from self” (*skye ba med pa, na...utpanna*), which is renowned to both disputants, and
2. the attribute that is the means of proving no production from self (*sgrub pa'i chos*), “existing” (*yod pa nyid, vidyamānatva*), which is renowned to both disputants,

and hence it is called the subject.^b Just as in the subject, intelligence, there is no production from self because of existing, so here also these “internal sense-spheres” are renowned to the opposing party as just existent as “empowered and sustained by the self”^c and renowned to the latter party [namely, the Proponent of the Middle]^d as just existent as “conventionally able to apprehend an object,”^e like, for example, sound is renowned as just existent, that is, just arising immediately upon exertion, and in this^f subject exist the two:

1. the predicate of the proposition (*bsgrub par bya ba chos*) “not produced from self” (*skye ba med pa, na...utpanna*), which is renowned to both disputants, and
2. the attribute that is the means of proving no production from self (*sgrub pa'i chos*), “existing” (*yod pa nyid, vidyamānatva*), which is renowned to both disputants,

and hence it is called the subject. It is to be put together as “In the subject, the internal sense-spheres, also there is no production from self^g because of existing—like, for example, intelligence.” Therefore, [the syllogism is]:

Whatever exists is without production—like, for example, intelligence. Because the internal sense-

^a I take the sentence until here to be stated in response to Chandrakīrti.

^b *chos can, dharmin*; literally, the possessor of the attributes, which are the attribute (predicate) of the proposition and the attribute that is the means of proof (the reason).

^c *bdag gis byin gyis brlabs shing gnas su byas pa nyid*.

^d Again, I take it that Avalokitavrata is responding to Chandrakīrti.

^e *kun rdzob tu yul 'dzin nus pa nyid*.

^f In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 213.2) and in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, 188.1.1) for *de las* read *de la* in accordance with the Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur*, vol. 98, 135.7.

^g In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 213.4) and in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, 188.1.2) for *bdag la* read *bdag las* in accordance with the Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur*, vol. 98, 136.1.

spheres also are just existent, they also are without production.

དེ་ཉིད་ཚོས་མཐུན་པའི་དབེ་ཞེས་བྱ་སྟེ། ཚོས་མཐུན་པའི་དབེ་
 ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་དམིགས་པ་ལས་སྡོ་བོ་མེད་པར་རྗེས་སུ་དཔག་པའི་
 ཚོས་མཐུན་པའི་དབེ་སྟོགས་འདི་ན་དངོས་པོ་མེད་དེ་དམིགས་
 པའི་རིགས་བྱར་བྱུར་པའི་བྱམ་པ་མི་དམིགས་པའི་སྤྱིར་རོ་ཞེས་
 བྱ་བ་དང་། རོ་བོ་ཉིད་ལས་མི་རྟག་པར་རྗེས་སུ་དཔག་པའི་ཚོས་
 མཐུན་པའི་དབེ་འདི་ནི་ཤིང་ཡིན་ཏེ། ཤིང་ཤ་པ་ཡིན་པའི་སྤྱིར་
 རོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་དང་། འབྲས་བུ་ལས་རྒྱ་རྗེས་སུ་དཔག་པའི་ཚོས་
 མཐུན་པའི་དབེ། ཚང་མང་འདི་ན་མེ་ཡོད་དེ་དུ་བ་འབྱུང་བའི་
 སྤྱིར་རོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་སྟེ། སྐབས་འདིར་ནི་དབེར་ན་ཚོས་ཅན་ཤེས་པ་
 ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ཅེས་བྱ་བ་དེ་ཚོལ་བའི་སྟོགས་ལ་ནི་ཤེས་པ་ཡོད་པ་
 ཉིད་ཅེས་བྱ་བ་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་གྲགས་ལ། སྤྱིར་ཚོལ་བའི་སྟོགས་ལ་
 བྱི་ཀུན་རྫོབ་དུ་རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ་ཉིད་ཅེས་བྱ་བར་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་
 དུ་གྲགས་པ་དེ་ལ་བརྒྱབ་པར་བྱ་བ་ཚོས་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་
 ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ཚོལ་བ་དང་། སྤྱིར་ཚོལ་བ་གཉི་ག་ལ་གྲགས་པ་དང་།
 བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་དེ་སྐྱབ་པའི་ཚོས་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ཅེས་བྱ་བ་
 ཚོལ་བ་དང་སྤྱིར་ཚོལ་བ་གཉི་ག་ལ་གྲགས་པ་དེ་གཉིས་ཡོད་པས་
 དེ་ནི་ཚོས་ཅན་ཞེས་བྱ་སྟེ། ཚོས་ཅན་ཤེས་པ་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་དེ་ལ་
 བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་དེ་ཡོད་པའི་སྤྱིར་རོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་དེ་བཞིན་དུ།
 འདིར་ཡང་ཚོས་ཅན་ནང་གི་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་རྣམས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་འདི་
 ཡང་ཚོལ་བའི་སྟོགས་ལ་ནི་བདག་གིས་བྱིན་གྱིས་བརྒྱབས་ཤིང་
 གནས་སུ་བྱས་པ་ཉིད་ཅེས་བྱ་བར་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་གྲགས་ལ། སྤྱིར་

ཚོལ་བའི་སྟོགས་ལ་ནི་ཀུན་རྗེས་ཏུ་ཡུལ་འཛིན་རྣམས་པ་ཉིད་ཅེས་
 བྱ་བར་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ཏུ་གྲགས་པ། དཔེར་ན་སྐྱེ་ལ་བརྟུན་མ་ཐག་
 ཏུ་འབྱུང་བ་ཉིད་ཏུ་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ཏུ་གྲགས་པ་དང་འདྲ་བ་དེ་ལ་
 བརྟུན་པར་བྱ་བ་ཚོས་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ། ཚོལ་
 བ་དང་སྤྱིར་ཚོལ་བ་གཉི་ག་ལ་གྲགས་པ་དང་། བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་
 མེད་པ་དེ་སྐྱེ་བ་པའི་ཚོས་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ཅེས་བྱ་བ་ཚོལ་བ་དང་སྤྱིར་
 ཚོལ་བ་གཉི་ག་ལ་གྲགས་པ་དེ་གཉིས་ཡོད་པས་དེ་ཡང་ཚོས་ཅན་
 ཞེས་བྱ་སྟེ། ཚོས་ཅན་ནང་གི་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་རྣམས་ལ་ཡང་བདག་ལས་
 སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པར་ངེས་ཏེ་ཡོད་པའི་སྤྱིར། དཔེར་ན་ཤེས་པ་ཡོད་པ་
 ཉིད་བཞིན་ནོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བར་སྐྱུར་རོ། ། དེའི་སྤྱིར་གང་དང་གང་
 ཡོད་པ་དེ་ལ་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་དེ། དཔེར་ན་ཤེས་པ་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་བཞིན་
 རོ། ། རང་གི་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་ཉིད་རྣམས་ཀྱང་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ཡིན་པས་
 དེའི་སྤྱིར་དེ་དག་ལ་ཡང་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་དོ། །

If despite being similar in being just existent, you assert that the internal sense-spheres have production but assert that intelligence does not have production, then you must express the reasons for the distinction for asserting that due to such-and-such a reason you assert that the internal sense-spheres have production but due to such-and-such a reason you assert that intelligence does not have production. Because those who propound production from self do not assert that intelligence is produced in its state of existing, it is established that the internal sense-spheres also do not have production due to the existence of their entity.

གལ་ཏེ་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ཏུ་འདྲ་བ་ལས་ནང་གི་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་རྣམས་ལ་
 བྱི་སྐྱེ་བ་ཡོད་པར་འདོད་ལ། ཤེས་པ་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ལ་བྱི་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་
 པར་འདོད་ན་ནི་དེའི་ཚོ་སྐྱེ་འདིས་ནང་གི་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་རྣམས་ལ་སྐྱེ་

བ་ཡོད་པར་འདོད་ལ། རྒྱ་འདི་ནི་ཤེས་པ་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ལ་སྐྱེ་བ་
 མེད་པར་འདོད་དོ་ཞེས་བྱུང་པར་ཉིད་དུ་བྱ་བའི་བྱུང་པར་གྱི་
 གཏན་ཚིགས་བརྗོད་པར་བྱ་དགོས་སོ། ། གང་གི་ཕྱིར་བདག་ལས་
 སྐྱེ་བར་སྐྱེ་བ་དག་ལ་ཤེས་པ་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ཡོད་པའི་གནས་སྐབས་
 ལ་སྐྱེ་བར་མི་འདོད་པ་དེའི་ཕྱིར། རྣང་གི་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་རྣམས་ཀྱང་
 བདག་ཉིད་ཡོད་པ་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པར་འགྱུར་བོ། །

Moreover, why is the production of things asserted? If it is that production is asserted in order to attain an unattained entity of selfhood,^a then if the internal sense-spheres have an entity of selfhood prior to production, what is the use of imputing production from those! For, it is said that the produced do not have production-again.^b

གཞན་ཡང་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་སྐྱེ་བ་ཅིའི་ཕྱིར་འདོད་ཅེ་ན།
 བདག་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་མ་ཐོབ་པ་ཐོབ་པར་བྱ་བའི་ཕྱིར་སྐྱེ་བར་
 འདོད་པ་ཡིན་ན། གལ་ཏེ་རྣང་གི་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་དེ་དག་ལ་སྐྱེ་བའི་སྐྱེ་
 རོལ་ན་བདག་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་ཡོད་པར་གྱུར་ན་དེ་དག་ལས་
 སྐྱེ་བར་བརྟགས་པས་ཅི་ཞེས་བྱ་སྟེ། སྐྱེས་པ་ལ་ཡང་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་དོ་
 ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །

Furthermore, cessation would also be discordant; if it exists, it would not be produced, whereas if it is produced, it does not exist. Moreover, production of the existent is contradictory in the world because in the world a pot that manifestly exists with the capacity to perform the functions of holding honey, water, and milk and so forth is not seen to be produced

^a *bdag nyid kyi ngo bo nyid.*

^b The usage of “production-again” (*yang skye ba, punarutpāda*) appears to be in response to Chandrakīrti.

again.^a

གཞན་ཡང་དགག་པ་མི་མཐུན་པར་ཡང་འགྱུར་ཏེ། གལ་ཏེ་ཡོད་
 ན་ནི་སྐྱེ་བར་མི་འགྱུར་ལ། ཅི་སྐྱེ་སྐྱེ་ན་ནི་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །
 གཞན་ཡང་འཇིག་རྟེན་ན་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་སྐྱེ་བ་ནི་འགལ་ཏེ། འདི་
 ལྟར་འཇིག་རྟེན་ན་བུམ་པ་སྤྱང་ཅི་དང་ཚུ་དང་འོ་མ་འཇོན་པ་
 ལ་སོགས་པའི་བྱ་བ་བྱེད་རྣམས་པ་གསལ་བར་ཡོད་པ་ནི་ཡང་སྐྱེ་
 བར་མི་མཐོང་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །

If ultimately all external and internal things are refuted as not produced from self,^b why here are the internal sense-spheres posited as a limited subject? About this, through the reasoning [in Āryadeva's *Four Hundred*]:

What is seen with regard to one thing
 Is also asserted as seen in all.
 Just what is the emptiness of one
 Is the emptiness of all.

when it is established that the internal sense-spheres are not produced from self,^c all phenomena, such as the external sense-spheres, are also established as just not produced from self, and when the internal sense-spheres are posited as the subjects, others—such as the external sense-spheres and so forth—are fit for the positing of reasons and examples. Hence, the internal sense-spheres are posited as limited subjects.

དོན་དམ་པར་བྱི་ནང་གི་དངོས་པོ་ཐམས་ཅད་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་
 མེད་པར་འགག་པ་ཡིན་ན་ཅིའི་ཕྱིར་འདིར། རང་གི་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་

^a The usage of “production-again” (*yang skye ba, punarutpāda*) appears to be in response to Chandrakīrti.

^b *bdag las skye ba med par 'gag pa yin na*; it seems to me that the passage would read more easily as *bdag las skye ba yod par 'gag pa yin na*, but all three editions have the first reading; in any case, the point is clear by now.

^c In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 214.6) and in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, 188.2.3) for *bdag la* read *bdag las* in accordance with the Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur*, vol. 98, 136.7.

རྣམས་ཉི་ཚེ་ཚོས་ཅན་དུ་གཞག་ཅེ་ན། དེ་ནི། དངོས་པོ་གཅིག་ལ་
 གང་མཐོང་བ། ། དེ་ནི་ཀུན་ལའང་མཐོང་བར་འདོད། ། གཅིག་གི་
 ལྟོང་ཉིད་གང་ཡིན་པ། ། དེ་ཉིད་ཀུན་གྱི་ལྟོང་པ་ཉིད། ། ཅེས་
 གསུངས་པའི་རིགས་པས། རྣང་གི་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་རྣམས་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་
 བ་མེད་པར་གྲུབ་ན་སྤྱི་རྣམས་ཀྱི་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་ལ་སོགས་པ་ཚོས་ཐམས་
 ཅད་ཀྱང་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་འགྲུབ་པའི་སྤྱིར་དང་།
 རྣང་གི་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་རྣམས་ཚོས་ཅན་དུ་བཞག་ན་སྤྱི་རྣམས་ཀྱི་སྐྱེ་
 མཆེད་ལ་སོགས་པ་གཞན་དག་གཏན་ཚིགས་དང་དབེར་གཞག་
 ཏུ་རུང་བས་དེའི་སྤྱིར་རྣང་གི་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་རྣམས་ཉི་ཚེ་ཚོས་ཅན་དུ་
 གཞག་གོ། །།

- **If it is objected:** The reason, “existing” (*yod pa nyid, vidyamānatva*), has not been shown^a to be absent from the dissimilar class; hence, this is not a veritable reason. (*gal te gtan tshigs yod pa nyid ni mi mthun pa'i phyogs las ldog pa ma bstan^b pas gtan tshigs nyid ma yin no zhe na*): This is a drawing forth of qualm in which logicians object to the commentator [Bhāvaviveka] with the fallacy of indefiniteness. In that:
 - **If it is objected** (*gal te*): This is a term [indicating] that the commentator [Bhāvaviveka] himself is [hypothetically] drawing forth a qualm of logicians.
 - **the reason, “existing,”** (*gtan tshigs yod pa nyid ni*): This is the earlier statement by the commentator [Bhāvaviveka] of “because of existing” (*yod pa'i phyir, vidyamānatvāt*) as a reason for the nonexistence of production from self.

^a In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 215.3) and in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, 188.2.5) for *ma stan pas* read *ma bstan pas* in accordance with the Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur*, vol. 98, 137.2.

^b In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 215.3) and in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, 188.3.5) for *stan* read *bstan* in accordance with the Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur*, vol. 98, 137.2.

གལ་ཏེ་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ནི་མི་མཐུན་པའི་སྟོགས་ལས་
 ལྷོག་པ་མ་བསྟན་པས་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཉིད་མ་ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེ་ན་ཞེས་བྱ་
 བ་ནི། རྟོག་གི་པ་དག་འབྲེལ་བ་བྱེད་པ་ལ་གཏན་ཚིགས་མ་ངེས་
 པའི་སྐྱོན་གྱིས་ཚོལ་བའི་དོགས་པ་བསུ་བ་ཡིན་ནོ། ། དེ་ལ་གལ་ཏེ་
 ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་སྐྱ་ནི་འབྲེལ་བ་བྱེད་པ་ཉིད་གྱིས་རྟོག་གི་པ་དག་གི་
 དོགས་པ་བསུ་བའི་ཚིག་ཡིན་ནོ། ། གཏན་ཚིགས་ཡོད་པ་ནི་ཞེས་
 བྱ་བ་ནི། འབྲེལ་བ་བྱེད་པས་ལྷུང་ནང་གི་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་རྣམས་བདག་
 ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་སུ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེས་བཤད་
 པ་གང་ཡིན་པ་དེ་ཉིད་དོ། །

- **has not been shown to be absent from the dissimilar class; hence, this is not a veritable reason.** (*mi mthun pa'i phyogs las ldog pa ma bstan^a pas gtan tshigs nyid ma yin no*): In that:
 - **has not been shown to be absent from the dissimilar class; hence,** (*mi mthun pa'i phyogs las ldog pa ma bstan pas*): The meaning of the words of the class contrary^b to the attributes and the subject is the dissimilar class (*mi mthun pa'i phyogs, vipakṣa*).
 - **to be absent from the dissimilar class** (*mi mthun pa'i phyogs las ldog pa*): The nonexistence of the two attributes—the predicate of the proposition (*bsgrub par bya ba chos*) and the attribute that is the means of proof (*sgrub pa'i chos*)—in the dissimilar class is called “to be absent from the dissimilar class” (*mi mthun pa'i phyogs las ldog pa*).
 - **has not been shown...hence,** (*ma bstan pas*): this absence from the dissimilar class has not been shown, that is to say, has not been explained; hence.

^a In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 215.3) and in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, 188.2.5) for *stan* read *bstan* in accordance with the Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur*, vol. 98, 137.2.

^b *mi 'dra ba 'i phyogs*.

མི་མཐུན་པའི་སྟོགས་ལས་ལྗོག་པ་མ་བཟུན་པས་གཏན་ཚིགས་
 ཉིད་མ་ཡིན་ཅོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ལ། མི་མཐུན་པའི་སྟོགས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་
 ཚོས་དང་ཚོས་ཅན་གྱི་མི་འདྲ་བའི་སྟོགས་ཀྱི་ཚིག་གི་དོན་མི་
 མཐུན་པའི་སྟོགས་སོ། ། མི་མཐུན་པའི་སྟོགས་དེ་ལས་ལྗོག་པ་ཞེས་
 བྱ་བ་ནི་མི་མཐུན་པའི་སྟོགས་ལ་བསྐྱབ་པར་བྱ་བ་དང་སྐྱབ་པའི་
 ཚོས་གཉིས་མེད་པ་ནི་མི་མཐུན་པའི་སྟོགས་ལས་ལྗོག་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་
 བའོ། ། དེ་མ་བཟུན་པས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་མི་མཐུན་པའི་སྟོགས་ལས་
 ལྗོག་པ་དེ་མ་བཟུན་མ་བཤད་པས་སོ། །

- **this is not a veritable reason** (*gtan tshigs nyid ma yin no*): the reason for the internal sense-spheres' nonexistence of production from self—"because of existing" (*yod pa'i phyir, vidyamānatvāt*)—that the commentator [Bhāvaviveka] earlier set forth is not a veritable reason. Why? It is as follows: since absence from the dissimilar class has not been shown, the reason "because of existing" is indefinite and hence is not a veritable reason. This is the equivalent of saying, "Because it is not a veritable reason, it also does not prove the predicate of the proposition."

གཏན་ཚིགས་ཉིད་མ་ཡིན་ཅོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་འགྲེལ་པ་བྱེད་པས་
 རྩར་ནང་གི་སྐྱེ་མཚེད་ནམས་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པའི་གཏན་
 ཚིགས་སུ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེས་བཤད་པ་གང་ཡིན་པ་དེ་གཏན་
 ཚིགས་ཉིད་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། ཅིའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེ་ན། འདི་ལྟར་མི་མཐུན་པའི་
 སྟོགས་ལས་ལྗོག་པ་མ་བཟུན་པས་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་
 གཏན་ཚིགས་དེ་མ་ངས་པའི་ཕྱིར་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཉིད་མ་ཡིན་ཅོ། །
 དེ་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཉིད་མ་ཡིན་པས་དེ་བསྐྱབ་པར་བྱ་བ་ཚོས་ཀྱང་
 མི་འགྲུབ་པོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་ཐ་ཚིག་གོ། །

Moreover, the definition of a reason is this: that which evinces a sign endowed with the three modes (*tshul gsum dang ldan pa 'i rtags bstan pa*). For it is said [in Dignāga's *Compilation of Prime Cognition*/Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on Dignāga's "Compilation of Prime Cognition"*]:

That which evinces a sign endowed with the three modes

Abides as the property of the position.^a

The remainder, those imputed with two modes,^b

Are revealed by the example.

དེ་ཡང་འདི་སྟར་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་ནི་འདི་ཡིན་ཏེ།
 ཚུལ་གསུམ་ལྡན་པའི་རྟགས་བསྟན་པ། ལྷོགས་ཀྱི་ཚོས་ལ་གནས་
 པ་ཡིན། ། ལྷག་མ་ཚུལ་གཉིས་བཏགས་པ་ནི། ། དཔེ་ཡིས་རབ་ཏུ་
 བསྟན་པ་ཡིན། ། ཞེས་བྱ་བས་ཚུལ་གསུམ་དང་ལྡན་པའི་རྟགས་
 བསྟན་པ་ཡིན་ལོ། །

About this, the three modes are definiteness as existing in the object of inference,^c existing in the similar class, and just not existing in the dissimilar class. Also, with respect to those having the three modes, signs are threefold—nonobservation, nature, and effect. Concerning them,^d the three signs in terms of the mode of definiteness as just existing in the object of inference [that is, in the subject] are:

Inferring the nonexistence of a thing^e from nonobservation: “Here a thing does not exist because of not being

^a *phyogs kyi chos, pakṣadharmā*; this is the reason, or sign, that is present in the subject of the syllogism.

^b In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 216.4) and in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, 188.3.5) for *tshul gnyis rtags pa* read *tshul gnyis btags pa* in accordance with the Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur*, vol. 98, 137.7.

^c *rjes su dpag par bya ba*; that is to say, the subject.

^d The Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur*, vol. 98, 138.1, reads *des*, and the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 216.6) and the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, 188.3.7).

^e In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 217.41) and in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, 188.3.8) for *mi dmigs pa las dngos po med pas* read *mi dmigs pa las dngos po med par* in accordance with the Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur*, vol. 98, 138.2.

observed.”

Inferring an impermanent thing from nature: “Sound is impermanent because of being a product.”

Inferring a cause from an effect: “With respect to this a cause exists because an effect is observed.”

དེ་ལ་ཚུལ་གསུམ་ནི་རྗེས་སྲུ་དཔག་པར་བྱ་བ་ལ་ཡོད་པ་དང་།
 མཐུན་པའི་སྟོགས་ལ་ཡོད་པ་དང་། མི་མཐུན་པའི་སྟོགས་ལ་མེད་
 པ་ཉིད་དུ་ངེས་པའོ། ། ཚུལ་གསུམ་པོ་དག་ལ་རྟགས་ཀྱང་གསུམ་
 ཉེ། མི་དམིགས་པ་དང་། རྩ་བོ་ཉིད་དང་། འབྲས་བུའོ། ། དེས་རྗེས་
 སྲུ་དཔག་པར་བྱ་བ་ལ་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་ངེས་པའི་ཚུལ་གྱི་རྟགས་
 གསུམ་ནི། མི་དམིགས་པ་ལས་དངོས་པོ་མེད་པར་རྗེས་སྲུ་དཔག་
 པར་བྱ་བ་ལ་ནི། འདི་ན་དངོས་པོ་མེད་དེ་མི་དམིགས་པའི་སྟོན་
 རོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་དང་། རྩ་བོ་ཉིད་ལས་མི་རྟག་པར་རྗེས་སྲུ་དཔག་
 པར་བྱ་བ་ལ་ནི་སྐྱ་མི་རྟག་པ་སྟེ་བྱས་པའི་སྟོན་རོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་དང་།
 འབྲས་བུ་ལས་རྒྱ་རྗེས་སྲུ་དཔག་པར་བྱ་བ་ལ་ནི་འདི་ལ་རྒྱ་ཡོད་
 དེ་འབྲས་བུ་དམིགས་པའི་སྟོན་རོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ཡིན་ནོ། །

The three signs in terms of the mode of definiteness as just existing in the similar class are:

Qualitatively similar example for inferring the nonexistence of a thing from nonobservation: “In this quarter a thing does not exist because a pot that would be an object of observant knowing^a is not observed.”^b

^a In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 217.1), the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, 188.3.8), and the Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur*, vol. 98, 138.4 for *dmigs pa'i reg byar gyur* read *dmigs pa'i rig byar gyur* in accordance the earlier occurrence in the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 212.2), the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, 187.5.3), and the Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur*, vol. 98, 135.2. The original reading also seems admissible *dmigs pa'i reg byar gyur*, in which case it would read “because a pot that would be an object of observant touch is not observed.”

^b In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 217.3) and in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, 188.4.2) for *'bras bu dmigs su med pa'i phyir* read *'bras bu dmigs pa'i phyir* in accordance with the Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur*, vol. 98, 138.2.

Qualitatively similar example for inferring an impermanent thing from nature: “This is a tree because of being a *shimshapā* tree.”

Qualitatively similar example for inferring a cause from an effect: “Here in the kitchen there is fire because smoke is billowing.”

མཐུན་པའི་སྟོགས་ལ་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་ངེས་པའི་ཚུལ་གྱི་རྟགས་
གསུམ་ནི། མི་དམིགས་པ་ལས་དངོས་པོ་མེད་པར་རྗེས་སུ་དཔག་
པའི་ཚོས་མཐུན་པའི་དབེ་སྟོགས་འདི་ན་དངོས་པོ་མེད་དེ།
དམིགས་པའི་རེག་བྱར་གྱུར་པའི་བྱམ་པ་མི་དམིགས་པའི་སྟུར་རོ་
ཞེས་བྱ་བ་དང་། རོ་བོ་ཉིད་ལས་མི་རྟག་པར་རྗེས་སུ་དཔག་པའི་
ཚོས་མཐུན་པའི་དབེ་འདི་ནི་ཤིང་ཡིན་ཏེ། ཤིང་ཤ་བ་ཡིན་པའི་
སྟུར་རོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་དང་། འབྲས་བུ་ལས་རྒྱ་རྗེས་སུ་དཔག་པའི་
ཚོས་མཐུན་པའི་དབེ་ཚད་མང་འདི་ན་མི་ཡོད་དེ་དུ་བ་འབྲུལ་
བའི་སྟུར་རོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་འདི་ཡིན་ནོ། །

The three signs in terms of the mode of definiteness as just not existing in the dissimilar class are:

Qualitatively dissimilar example for inferring the nonexistence of a thing from nonobservation: “In this quarter a thing exists because a pot that would be an object of observant knowing^a is observed.”

Qualitatively dissimilar example for inferring an impermanent thing from nature: “Space is permanent because of not being a product.”

Qualitatively dissimilar example for inferring a cause from an effect:^b “Here in this well fire does not exist because frost exists.”

^a In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 217.6), the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, 188.4.1), and the Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur*, vol. 98, 138.5 for *dmigs pa'i reg byar gyur* read *dmigs pa'i rig byar gyur* in accordance the earlier occurrence in the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 212.2), the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, 188.4.5), and the Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur*, vol. 98, 135.2.

^b In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 218.1) and in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, 188.4.6)

མི་མཐུན་པའི་སྟོགས་ལ་མེད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་ངེས་པའི་ཚུལ་གྱི་རྟགས་
 གསུམ་ནི་མི་དམིགས་པ་ལས་དངོས་པོ་མེད་པར་རྗེས་སུ་དཔག་
 པའི་ཚོས་མི་མཐུན་པའི་དབེ། སྟོགས་འདི་ན་དངོས་པོ་ཡོད་དེ་
 དམིགས་པའི་རེག་བྱར་གྱུར་པའི་བྱམ་པ་དམིགས་པའི་སྟེར་རོ་
 ཞེས་བྱ་བ་དང་། རོ་བོ་ཉིད་ལས་མི་རྟག་པར་རྗེས་སུ་དཔག་པའི་
 ཚོས་མི་མཐུན་པའི་དབེ། རྣམ་མཁའ་རྟག་སྟེ་མ་བྱས་པའི་སྟེར་རོ་
 ཞེས་བྱ་བ་དང་། འབྲས་བུ་ལས་རྒྱ་རྗེས་སུ་དཔག་པའི་ཚོས་མི་
 མཐུན་པའི་དབེ། འཕྲོ་བ་འདི་ན་མེ་མེད་དེ་བ་མོ་ཡོད་པའི་སྟེར་
 རོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ཡིན་ནོ། །

Thus the objection is: When in that way a sign endowed with the three modes must evince the defining characteristics^a of a reason, here:

1. since Bhāvaviveka indicates “The internal sense-spheres are not produced from self because of existing” (*nang gi skye mched rnam s bdag las skye ba med par nges te yod pa 'i phyir, na...ādhyātmikānyāyatanāni svata utpannāni vidyamānatvāt*), there exists a sign in the mode of definiteness as just existing in the object of inference [that is, in the subject], and
2. since Bhāvaviveka indicates “like, for example, intelligence” (*shes pa yod pa nyid bzhin no, caitanyavad*) there exists a sign in the mode of definiteness as just existing in the similar class, but
3. [Bhāvaviveka] does not indicate a sign in the mode of definiteness as just not existing in the dissimilar class.

Therefore, the defining characteristics of a reason are not

for 'bras bu **la** read 'bras bu **las** in accordance with the Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur*, vol. 98, 138.6.

^a In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 218.2) and in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, 188.4.8) for *gtan tshigs kyi mtshan* read *gtan tshigs kyi mtshan nyid* in accordance with the Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur*, vol. 98, 138.7.

complete; hence, because the reason, "existing" (*yod pa nyid, vidyamānatva*), is indefinite, it is not a [veritable] reason.

དེ་ལྟར་ཚུལ་གསུམ་དང་ལྡན་པའི་རྟགས་གྲིས་གཏན་ཚིགས་གྲི་
 མཚན་ཉིད་བསྟན་དགོས་ན། འདིར་ནང་གི་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་རྣམས་
 བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པར་ངེས་ཏེ་ཡོད་པའི་སྐྱེ་ཞེས་བསྟན་
 པས། རྗེས་སུ་དབག་པར་བྱ་བ་ལ་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་ངེས་པའི་ཚུལ་
 གྲིས་རྟགས་ཀྱང་ཡོད། དཔེར་ན་ཤེས་པ་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་བཞིན་ཅོ་
 ཞེས་བསྟན་པས་མཐུན་པའི་སྐྱོགས་ལ་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་ངེས་པའི་
 ཚུལ་གྲིས་རྟགས་ཀྱང་ཡོད་ན། འདི་ལྟར་མི་མཐུན་པའི་སྐྱོགས་ལ་
 མེད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་ངེས་པའི་ཚུལ་གྲིས་རྟགས་མ་བསྟན་པས་དེའི་
 སྐྱེར་གཏན་ཚིགས་གྲི་མཚན་ཉིད་མ་ཚང་ནས། གཏན་ཚིགས་
 ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ཅེས་བྱ་བ་དེ་མ་ངེས་པའི་སྐྱེར་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཉིད་མ་
 ཡིན་ཅོ་ཞེས་ན།

In response to this, here the commentator [Bhāvaviveka] utters:

- **Answer:** Because [the dissimilar class] is just nonexistent, absence from that does not exist, due to which there is no fallacy in this or anything else. (*med pa kho na 'i phyir de la ldog pa med pas/ 'di dang thams cad la nyes pa med do*): In that:
 - **Because it is just nonexistent,** (*med pa kho na 'i phyir*): Because the dissimilar class is just nonexistent; that is to say, because for us Proponents of the Middle the dissimilar class of the internal sense-spheres not being produced from self—"production from other"—is just nonexistent.

དེའི་ལན་དུ་འདིར་འགྲེལ་བ་བྱེད་པ་ཉིད་གྲིས་མེད་པ་ཁོ་ནའི་
 སྐྱེར་དེ་ལ་སྐྱོག་པ་མེད་པས་འདི་དང་ཐམས་ཅད་ལ་ཉེས་པ་མེད་

དོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་སྐྱུ་མོ། ། དེ་ལ་མེད་པ་ལོ་ནའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་མི་
 མཐུན་པའི་སྟོགས་མེད་པ་ལོ་ནའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། འདི་ལྟར་ལོ་བོ་ཅག་
 དབུ་མ་བ་ལ་ནི་ནང་གི་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་རྣམས་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་
 པའི་མི་མཐུན་པའི་སྟོགས་གཞན་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་མེད་པ་ལོ་
 ནའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །

- **absence from that does not exist**, (*de la ldog pa med pas*): absence of the two—the predicate of the proposition (*bsgrub par bya ba chos*) and the attribute that is the means of proof (*sgrub pa'i chos*)—from that nonexistent dissimilar class does not exist. This is the equivalent of saying:

If the dissimilar class of nonproduction from self—“production from^a other”—existed, the predicate of the proposition and the attribute that is the means of proof would be absent from and nonexistent in it,^b and hence it would also be suitable to demonstrate the sign^c in the mode of definiteness as just not existing in the dissimilar class, but because for us the dissimilar class of nonproduction from self—“production from other”—is just nonexistent, absence from it of the predicate of the proposition and the attribute that is the means of proof does not exist, whereby it is not necessary to demonstrate the sign in the mode of definiteness as just not existing in the dissimilar class.

དེ་ལ་ལྷོག་པ་མེད་པས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་མི་མཐུན་པའི་སྟོགས་མེད་པ་
 དེ་ལ་བསྐྱབ་པར་བྱ་བ་དང་སྐྱབ་པའི་ཚོས་གཉིས་ལྷོག་པ་མེད་

^a In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 219.1) and in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, 188.5.4) for *gzhan la skye ba* read *gzhan las skye ba* in accordance with the Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur*, vol. 98, 139.4.

^b In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 219.2) for *yod na ni la* read *yod na ni de la* in accordance with the Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur*, vol. 98, 139.4, and in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, 188.5.4).

^c In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 219.2) and in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, 188.5.5) for *rtag kyang* read *rtags kyang* in accordance with the Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur*, vol. 98, 139.4.

བས་ཏེ། གལ་ཏེ་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པའི་མི་མཐུན་པའི་སྟོགས་
 གཞན་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ཡོད་ན་ནི་དེ་ལ་བསྐྱབ་པར་བྱ་བ་
 དང་སྐྱབ་པའི་ཚོས་དེ་གཉིས་ལྷོག་ཅིང་མེད་པར་འགྱུར་བས་མི་
 མཐུན་པའི་སྟོགས་ལ་མེད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་ངེས་པའི་ཚུལ་གྱིས་ཏྟགས་
 ཀྱང་བསྟན་དུ་བྱང་བ་ཞེས་ན། ཁོ་བོ་ཅག་ལ་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་
 མེད་པའི་མཐུན་པའི་སྟོགས་གཞན་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་དེ་མེད་
 བ་ཁོ་ནའི་ཕྱིར། དེ་ལ་བསྐྱབ་པར་བྱ་བ་དང་སྐྱབ་པའི་ཚོས་ལྷོག་
 བ་མེད་པས་འདྲིར་མི་མཐུན་པའི་སྟོགས་ལ་མེད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་ངེས་
 པའི་ཚུལ་གྱིས་ཏྟགས་བསྟན་མི་དགོས་སོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་ཐ་ཚོག་གོ། །

- **due to which there is no fallacy in this or anything else.** (*'di dang thams cad la nyes pa med do*): in these syllogistic words there is no fallacy that is the faultiness^a of an indefinite reason, and not only that but also this fallacy does not exist in any of the other proofs that occur below in this treatise. This indicates that if the dissimilar class existed, absence from it of the predicate of the proposition and the attribute that is the means of proof should be shown; for example, when the dissimilar class of "Sound is impermanent because of being a product" exists as in the likes of "Space is permanent because of not being a product," the two, the predicate of the proposition and the attribute that is the means of proof in "[is] impermanent because of being a product," are absent from and nonexistent in that dissimilar class, but it is being said that absence of the predicate of the proposition and the attribute that is the means of proof does not exist in a nonexistent dissimilar class. Therefore, when the dissimilar class of our position, "no production from self," is delineated as "production from other," then since we assert nonproduction in any and all aspects, for us the dissimilar class is just nonexistent, and hence since absence from it does not exist, there is no fallacy in the reason.

^a In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 219.4) and in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, 188.5.7) for *rkyen* read *skyon* in accordance with the Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur*, vol. 98, 139.6.

Furthermore, the characteristics of a reason are not incomplete because since for us the dissimilar class is just nonexistent, the nonoperation of a reason in its full nature^a is also absent, whereby there exists even a sign^b in the mode of definiteness as just not existing in the dissimilar class.

འདི་དང་ཐམས་ཅད་ལ་ཉེས་པ་མེད་དོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་སྐྱུར་བའི་
ཚིག་འདི་ལ་ཡང་གཏན་ཚིགས་མ་ངེས་པའི་སྐྱེན་གྱི་ཉེས་པ་མེད་
ལ། འདི་འབའ་ཞེས་ཏུ་ཡང་མ་ཟད་དོ། ། འདི་ལྟར་བཟུན་བཅོས་
འདི་ལ་འོག་ནས་འབྱུང་བའི་རྒྱབ་པ་གཞན་ཐམས་ཅད་ལ་ཡང་
ཉེས་པ་འདི་མེད་དོ། ། འདི་རྒྱད་བཟུན་ཏེ་མི་མཐུན་པའི་སྟོགས་
ཡོད་ན་ནི་དེ་ལ་བརྒྱབ་པར་བྱ་བ་དང་རྒྱབ་པའི་ཚོས་ཚྲོག་པ་ཡང་
བཟུན་པར་བྱ་སྟེ། དཔེར་ན་སྐྱ་མི་ཏྟག་སྟེ་བྱས་པའི་སྤྱིར་རོ་ཞེས་
བྱ་བའི་མི་མཐུན་པའི་སྟོགས་ནམ་མཁའ་འོ་ཏྟག་སྟེ་མ་བྱས་པའི་
སྟོགས་དེ་ལ་བརྒྱབ་པར་བྱ་བ་དང་། རྒྱབ་པའི་ཚོས་མི་ཏྟག་སྟེ་
བྱས་པའི་སྤྱིར་རོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་དེ་གཉེས་ནི་ཚྲོག་ཅིང་མེད་པར་
འགྱུར་བ་ཞེས་ན། རྒྱས་པ། གང་ལ་མི་མཐུན་པའི་སྟོགས་ཉིད་མེད་
པ་དེ་ལ་བརྒྱབ་པར་བྱ་བ་དང་རྒྱབ་པའི་ཚོས་ཚྲོག་པ་མེད་དོ། །
དེའི་སྤྱིར་ཁོ་བོའི་སྟོགས་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་
འདིའི་མི་མཐུན་པའི་སྟོགས་ནི་གཞན་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་ཞེས་བྱ་བར་
བཏྟག་གང་ན། ཁོ་བོས་ནི་རྣམ་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་ཁོ་ན་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་
པར་ཁས་སྐྱེངས་པས་དེའི་སྤྱིར་ཁོ་བོ་ལ་མི་མཐུན་པའི་སྟོགས་
མེད་པ་ཁོ་ནའི་སྤྱིར། དེ་ལ་ཚྲོག་པ་མེད་པས་གཏན་ཚིགས་གྱི་

^a *gtan tshigs rang bzhin gyis mi 'jug pa.*
^b In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 220.4) and in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, 189.1.4) for *rtag* read *rtags* in accordance with the Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur*, vol. 98, 140.3.

སྐྱོན་མེད་དོ། །གཏན་ཚིགས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་མ་ཚང་བར་ཡང་མི་
 འགྱུར་ཏེ། འདི་ལྟར་ཁོ་བོ་ལ་མི་མཐུན་པའི་སྐྱོགས་མེད་པ་ཁོ་
 བའི་ཕྱིར། དེ་ལ་གཏན་ཚིགས་རང་བཞིན་གྱིས་མི་འཇུག་པ་ཉིད་
 ལྟོག་པ་ཡང་ཡིན་པས་མི་མཐུན་པའི་སྐྱོགས་ལ་མེད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་
 ངེས་པའི་ཚུལ་གྱིས་རྟགས་ཀྱང་ཡོད་པ་ཡིན་ལོ། །

- **Here from among the Sāṃkhyas certain ones object:** What is the meaning of this thesis? Does “from self” [mean] “from the entity of the effect” or “from the entity of the cause”? Which of those is it? If it is from the entity of the effect, then [you have the fallacy of] proving what is already established. Otherwise, if it is from the entity of the cause, then [your reasoning] is an object of contradiction because [according to us Sāṃkhyas] all that have production are produced only within the context of existing in the entities of [their] causes. (*'dir grangs can dag las kha cig phyr bzlog par byed de^a/ dam bcas pa 'di'i don gang yin/ ci bdag las zhes bya ba 'bras bu bdag nyid las sam/ 'on te rgyu'i bdag nyid las/ des cir 'gyur/ gal te 'bras bu bdag nyid las na ni grub pa la^b sgrub bo// 'on te rgyu'i bdag nyid las na ni 'gal ba'i don nyid de/ skye ba can thams cad^c ni rgyu'i bdag nyid du yod pa kho na las skye ba'i phyr ro zhe na*).^d Here in order to clear away such fallacies of reasoning, certain ones from among the Sāṃkhyas who propound natures of effects, causes, and both place themselves—for the sake of proving the production of

^a The Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur*, vol. 98, 140.3, reads *byed do*.

^b Throughout this section the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 220.5, and so forth) and in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, 189.1.5, and so forth) variously read *grub pa las sgrub* and *grub pa la sgrub* whereas the Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur* (vol. 98, 140.4, and so forth) consistently reads *grub pa la sgrub*, which I prefer.

^c In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 220.6) and in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, 189.1.5) for *thams cad tu* read *thams cad* in accordance with the Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur*, vol. 98, 140.4.

^d The Sanskrit of this objection, as Chandrakīrti repeats it (La Vallée Poussin, *Prasannapadā*, 14.4), is:

ko 'yam pratijñārthaḥ/ kiṃ kāryātmakāt svata uta kāraṇātmakāditi/ kiṃ cātaḥ/ kāryātmakāccet siddhasādhanam/ kāraṇātmakāccet viruddhārthatā/ kāraṇātmānā vidyamānasyaiva sarvasyotpattimata utpādāditi//

things—as opponents through [adopting] the aspect of expressing fallacies in the master [Bhāvaviveka's] proving that things are not produced from self.

འདིར་གྲངས་ཅན་དག་ལས་ཁ་ཅིག་སྤྱིར་སྐྱོག་པར་བྱེད་དོ། དམ་
 བཅས་པ་འདིའི་དོན་གང་ཡིན། ཅི་བདག་ལས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་འབྲས་
 འཁྲུང་བདག་ཉིད་ལས་སམ། འོན་ཏེ་རྒྱུའི་བདག་ཉིད་ལས། དེས་
 ཅིར་འབྱུང། གལ་ཏེ་འབྲས་འཁྲུང་བདག་ཉིད་ལས་ན་ནི་གྲུབ་པ་ལ་
 རྒྱབ་པོ། འོན་ཏེ་རྒྱུའི་བདག་ཉིད་ལས་ན་ནི་འགལ་བའི་དོན་
 ཉིད་དེ། རྒྱུ་བ་ཅན་ཐམས་ཅད་ནི་རྒྱུའི་བདག་ཉིད་ཏུ་ཡོད་པ་ཁོ་
 ན་ལས་རྒྱུ་བའི་སྤྱིར་རོ་ཞེ་ན་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི། འདིར་དེ་རྣམ་གཏན་
 ཚིགས་ཀྱི་སྐྱོན་བསལ་བ་ལ་གྲངས་ཅན་དག་ལས་འབྲས་བུ་དང་
 རྒྱ་དང་གཉི་གའི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་སྐྱེ་བ་ཁ་ཅིག་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་སྐྱེ་
 བ་རྒྱབ་པའི་སྤྱིར། སྐྱོབ་དཔོན་གྱི་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་
 བ་མེད་པར་རྒྱབ་པ་ལ་དམ་བཅས་པའི་སྐྱོན་བརྗོད་པའི་རྣམ་
 པས་སྤྱིར་སྐྱོལ་བ་ཉིད་ཏུ་གནས་པར་བྱེད་པ་ཡིན་ལོ། །

In that:

- **Here** ('dir): On this occasion of clearing away the fallacies of reasoning in that way.
- **from among the Sāṃkhyas** (grangs can dag las): from among those renowned^a in the statement “There are twenty-five factions among the Sāṃkhyas.”
- **certain ones** (kha cig): certain ones from among them who propound effects, causes, and both.
- **object**: (phyir bzlog par byed de): In order to prove the production of things those [Sāṃkhyas] place themselves as opponents through [adopting] the aspect of expressing fallacies

^a In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 221.3) and in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, 189.2.1) for **grang can dag las** so read **grags pa de dag las** so in accordance with the Karmapa sde dge bstan 'gyur, vol. 98, 140.6.

in the thesis in the master^a [Bhāvaviveka's] proof that things are not produced from self.

- **What is the meaning of this thesis?** (*dam bcas pa 'di'i don gang yin*): These are words seeking an argument, saying, "What is the meaning of 'from self' in the thesis by the Proponent of the Middle, "Things are not produced from self."

དེ་ལ་འདིར་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་དེ་ལྟར་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཀྱི་སྐོན་བསལ་
 བའི་སྐབས་འདིར་རོ། ། གངས་ཅན་དག་ལས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་གངས་
 ཅན་དག་ལས་གྲུས་པ་ཉི་ཤུ་ཚུ་ལྡོད་དོ་ཞེས་གཤམ་པ་དེ་དག་
 ལས་སོ། ། ཁ་ཅིག་ཅེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་དེ་དག་ལས་རྒྱ་དང་འབྲས་བུ་
 དང་གཉི་ག་སྐྱབ་གང་དག་དག་ཡིན་པ་ཁ་ཅིག་གོ། ལྷིང་སྐྱོག་
 པར་བྱེད་དེ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་དེ་དག་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་སྐྱེ་བ་རྒྱབ་
 པའི་ལྷིང་སྐྱོབ་དཔོན་གྲུས་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་
 མེད་པར་རྒྱབ་པ་ལ་དམ་བཅས་པའི་སྐྱོན་བརྗོད་པའི་རྣམ་པས་
 ལྷིང་སྐྱོལ་བ་ཉིད་དུ་གནས་པར་བྱེད་པའོ། ། དམ་བཅས་པ་འདིའི་
 དོན་གང་ཡིན་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་དབྱུ་མ་པས་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་བདག་
 ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་དོ་ཞེས་དམ་བཅས་པ་དེ་ལ་བདག་ལས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་
 འདིའི་དོན་གང་ཡིན་ཞེས་ཀླན་ཀ་ཚོལ་བའི་ཚིག་ཡིན་རོ། །

- **Does "from self"** (*ci bdag las zhes bya ba*): This indicates:

Concerning this, the natures of all things are two-fold—the nature of the effect and the nature of the cause. With respect to them, the nature of an effect is existence in the manner of a manifest effect. The nature of a cause is that it is seen that [effects] are produced only from the existent entity of a cause endowed with the capacity of the effect. If [effects] were

^a In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 221.4) and in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, 189.2.2) for *slob dpon gyi* read *slob dpon gyis* in accordance with the Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur*, vol. 98, 140.7.

produced from causes not having the capacity of the effect, then it would be reasonable for a stalk of barley even to be produced from a rice seed, but it is not, due to which [an effect] is produced from a cause in which the nature of that effect exists. Hence, our statement that “things are produced from self” is that there is production due to [the effect’s] existing in the entity of the cause, self. This being the case, what is this “from self” in your thesis, “The internal sense-spheres are not produced from self?”

ཅི་བདག་ལས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ཞེས་བྱ་བས་ནི་འདི་སྐད་བསྟན་ཏེ། འདི་
 ལ་དངོས་པོ་ཐམས་ཅད་ཀྱི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་རྣམ་པ་གཉིས་ཏེ།
 འབྲས་བུའི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་དང་། རྒྱུའི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་དོ། ། དེ་ལ་འབྲས་
 བུའི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་ནི་འབྲས་བུ་གསལ་བའི་རྣམ་གྱིས་ཡོད་པའོ། །
 རྒྱུའི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་ནི་འབྲས་བུའི་རྣམ་པ་དང་ལྡན་པའི་རྒྱུའི་བདག་
 ཉིད་ཡོད་པ་ཁོ་ན་ལས་སྐྱེ་བར་མཐོང་བ་སྟེ། གལ་ཏེ་འབྲས་བུའི་
 རྣམ་པ་མེད་པའི་རྒྱུ་ལས་སྐྱེ་ན་ནི་འབྲས་ཀྱི་ས་བོན་ལས་ཀྱང་ནས་
 ཀྱི་ལྷ་བུ་སྐྱེ་བའི་རིགས་ན་མི་སྐྱེ་བས་དེའི་སྤྱིར་རྒྱ་གང་ལས་འབྲས་
 བུ་གང་གི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་ཡོད་པ་དེ་རྒྱ་དེ་ལས་སྐྱེས་པས། ཁོ་བོས་
 དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེའོ་ཞེས་བརྗོད་པ་གང་ཡིན་པ་དེ་
 ནི་བདག་རྒྱུའི་བདག་ཉིད་དུ་ཡོད་པས་སྐྱེས་པ་ཡིན་ན། བྱིད་ཀྱི་
 རྣང་གི་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་རྣམས་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་དོ་ཞེས་དམ་
 བཅས་པའི་བདག་ལས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་དེ་གང་ཡིན་ཞེས་སྐྱེང་བ་ཡིན་
 འོ། །

This is what they are saying.

- [mean] “from the entity of the effect” (*’bras bu bdag nyid*)

las sam): This asks,^a “Are you saying, ‘There is no production from an entity in which the effect exists as a manifest nature’?”

- or “**from the entity of the cause**”? (*’on te rgyu’i bdag nyid las*): Are you holding the contrary,^b “There is no production from what exists as an entity of a cause endowed with the capacity of the effect”?

འབྲས་སྐྱེ་བ་དང་ཉིད་ལས་སམ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་འབྲས་སྐྱེ་གསལ་
བའི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་དུ་ཡོད་པའི་བདག་ཉིད་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་ཡིན་
ནམ་ཞེས་འདྲི་བ་ཡིན་ལོ། ། འོན་ཏེ་རྒྱུའི་བདག་ཉིད་ལས་ཞེས་བྱ་
བ་ནི་འབྲས་སྐྱེའི་རྣམ་པ་དང་ལྡན་པའི་རྒྱུའི་བདག་ཉིད་དུ་ཡོད་
པ་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་ཡིན་ཞེས་གཤམ་གཟུང་བ་ཡིན་ལོ། །

- **Which of those is it?** (*des cir ’gyur*): This is the equivalent of saying, “Even both those positions are fallacious.” To indicate just this [Bhāvaviveka] utters:
- **If it is from the entity of the effect, then [you have the fault of] proving what is already established [for us].** (*gal te ’bras bu bdag nyid las na ni grub pa las sgrub bo/*). [In that:]
- **If it is from the entity of the effect,** (*gal te ’bras bu bdag nyid las na ni*). If you are proving, “There no production [of an effect] from an entity in which the effect exists in a manifest nature,”
- **then [you have the fallacy of] proving what is already established.** (*grub pa la sgrub bo/*). In that way you incur the fallacy that the reasoning proves what is already established. It is as follows: here since it is already established for all the world that there is no production of sense-spheres such as eyes and so forth that exist in the nature of manifest sense-spheres able to apprehend objects, if you are proving that there is no

^a The Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 222.4) and the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, 189.2.8) read *yin nam zhes bya ba yin no* whereas the Karmapa *sde dge bstan ’gyur* (vol. 98, 141.4) reads *yin nam zhes ’dri ba yin no*, which I prefer.

^b The Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 222.5) and the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, 189.3.1) read *’gal gzung ba* whereas the Karmapa *sde dge bstan ’gyur* (vol. 98, 141.4) reads *gal gzung ba*.

production from that, you are proving what is already established. In that case, those words—in which you are proving that there is no production of internal sense-spheres from an entity in which internal sense-spheres exists as entities of manifest effects able to apprehend objects—incur the fallacy of proving [that is to say, establishing] what is already established like the words of the insane or those affected by demons saying, “[I] will make an already made pot.”

དེས་ཅིར་འགྱུར་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི། ལྷོགས་དེ་གཉི་ག་ཡང་སྐྱོན་ཆགས་
 པ་ཡིན་ལོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་ཐ་ཚོགས་གོ། དེ་ཉིད་བརྟན་པའི་ཕྱིར། གལ་
 ཉེ་འབྲས་བུའི་བདག་ཉིད་ལས་ན་ནི་གྲུབ་པ་ལ་སྐྱབ་པོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་
 རྣམས་སོ། ། གལ་ཉེ་འབྲས་བུའི་བདག་ཉིད་ལས་ན་ནི་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་
 འབྲས་བུ་གསལ་བའི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་དུ་ཡོད་པའི་བདག་ཉིད་ལས་སྐྱེ་
 བ་མེད་པ་ཞེས་བརྟུན་ན་ནི་ལོ། ། གྲུབ་པ་ལ་སྐྱབ་པོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་
 དེ་ལྟར་ན་བྱིད་གྱི་གཏན་ཚིགས་དེ་གྲུབ་པ་ལ་སྐྱབ་པའི་སྐྱོན་དུ་
 འགྱུར་ཉེ། འདི་ལྟར་འདི་ན་མིག་ལ་སོགས་པ་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་ཡུལ་
 འཛིན་ན་རུས་པ་གསལ་བའི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་དུ་ཡོད་པ་དག་ལ་ཡང་
 སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་ནི་འཛིག་རྟེན་ཐམས་ཅད་ལ་གྲུབ་ཟིན་པ་ཡིན་པས་
 དེ་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པར་བརྟུན་ན་ནི་གྲུབ་པ་ལ་སྐྱབ་པ་ཡིན་ལོ། །
 དེ་ལྟར་ན་བྱིད་ནང་གི་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་ཡུལ་འཛིན་རུས་པ་འབྲས་བུ་
 གསལ་བའི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་དུ་ཡོད་པའི་བདག་ཉིད་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་
 པར་བརྟུན་པའི་ཚིག་དེ་ནི་དཔེར་ན་སྐྱོན་པའམ་གདོན་གྱིས་ཟིན་
 པ་དག་བྱམ་པ་བྱས་ཟིན་པ་ཡང་བྱའོ་ཞེས་ཟེར་བའི་ཚིག་བཞིན་
 དུ་གྲུབ་པ་ལ་སྐྱབ་པའི་སྐྱོན་དུ་འགྱུར་རོ། །

- **Otherwise, if it is from the entity of the cause, then [your reasoning] is an object of contradiction** (*'on te rgyu'i bdag nyid las na ni 'gal ba'i don nyid de/*). [In that:]

- **Otherwise, if it is from the entity of the cause,** (*'on te rgyu'i bdag nyid las na ni*): If you are proving "There is no production from an existent entity of the causes endowed with capacity of the effect,"
- **then it is an object of contradiction** (*'gal ba'i don nyid de/*): In that case, your reason incurs the fallacy of being contradicted, as follows. If whereas it is renowned in the world that internal sense-spheres, effects, are produced into manifest natures from causes endowed with the capacity of the effects, existent entities of the oval embryo and so forth, you are proving that effects are not produced [this way], then [your reasoning] becomes an object of contradiction with renown in the world.

འོན་ཏེ་རྒྱུའི་བདག་ཉིད་ལས་ན་ནི་འགལ་བའི་དོན་དེ་ཉིད་དེ་
 ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ལ། འོན་ཏེ་རྒྱུའི་བདག་ཉིད་ལས་ན་ནི་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་
 འབྲས་བུའི་རྣམ་པ་དང་ལྡན་པའི་རྒྱུའི་བདག་ཉིད་ཡོད་པ་ལས་
 རྒྱུ་བ་མེད་པ་ཞེས་བརྒྱབ་ན་ནི་འོ། ། འགལ་བའི་དོན་ཉིད་དེ་ཞེས་
 བྱ་བ་ནི་དེ་ལྟར་ན་བྱིད་ཀྱི་གཏན་ཚིགས་དེ་འགལ་བའི་སྐྱོན་དུ་
 འགྱུར་ཏེ། འདི་ལྟར་འཇིག་རྟེན་ན་འབྲས་བུའི་རྣམ་པ་དང་ལྡན་
 པའི་རྒྱུ་མེར་མེར་པོ་ལ་སོགས་པ་བདག་ཉིད་ཡོད་པ་ལས་འབྲས་
 བུ་ནང་གི་རྒྱེ་མཆེད་རྣམས་གསལ་བའི་དོ་བོ་ཉིད་དུ་རྒྱེ་བར་
 གྲགས་པ་ལས་འབྲས་བུ་རྒྱེ་བ་མེད་པར་རྒྱབ་ན་ནི་འཇིག་རྟེན་ལ་
 གྲགས་པ་དང་འགལ་བའི་དོན་ཉིད་དུ་འགྱུར་རོ། །

To indicate this, [Bhāvaviveka] utters:

- **because [according to us Sāṃkhyas] all that have production are produced only within the context of existing in the entities of [their] causes.** (*skye ba can thams cad ni rgyu'i bdag nyid du yod pa kho na las skye ba'i phyir ro*): [In that:]
 - **because all that have production** (*skye ba can thams cad*): those things in which production exists are "those

having production”^a—all internal and external sense-spheres.

དེ་ཉིད་བསྐྱེད་པའི་སྐྱེ་བ་ཅན་ཐམས་ཅད་ནི་རྒྱུའི་བདག་ཉིད་དུ་ཡོད་པ་ཁོ་ན་ལས་སྐྱེ་བའི་སྐྱེར་རོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་སྐྱེས་ཏེ། སྐྱེ་བ་ཅན་ཐམས་ཅད་ཅེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་དངོས་པོ་གང་ལ་སྐྱེ་བ་ཡོད་པ་དེ་ནི་སྐྱེ་བ་ཅན་ཏེ་ནང་དང་སྐྱེ་རོལ་གྱི་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་ཐམས་ཅད་དོ། །

- **are produced only within the context of existing in the entities of [their] causes.** (*rgyu 'i bdag nyid du yod pa kho na las skye ba 'i phyir ro*): because it is renowned in the world that all those having production are produced only within the context of existing in the entities of causes having the capacity of [those] effects, since in the world it is seen that all internal sense-spheres are produced only within the context of existing in the entities of causes such as the oval embryo and so forth, and it is seen that stalks also are produced only within the context of existing in the entities of seeds that pots too are produced only within the context of existing in the entities of clay. Hence, if you are proving effects are not produced from entities existing as causal natures, this is contradictory with the renown in the world that all things having production are produced only within the context of existing in the entities of causes.'

རྒྱུའི་བདག་ཉིད་དུ་ཡོད་པ་ཁོ་ན་ལས་སྐྱེ་བའི་སྐྱེར་རོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་སྐྱེ་བ་ཅན་དེ་དག་ཐམས་ཅད་ནི་འབྲས་བུའི་རྣམས་པའི་རྒྱུའི་བདག་ཉིད་དུ་ཡོད་པ་ཁོ་ན་ལས་སྐྱེ་བར་འཇིག་རྟེན་ན་གྲགས་པའི་སྐྱེར་ཏེ། འདི་ལྟར་འཇིག་རྟེན་ནང་གི་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་ཐམས་ཅད་ཀྱང་མེར་མེར་བོ་ལ་སོགས་པ་རྒྱུའི་བདག་ཉིད་དུ་ཡོད་པ་ཁོ་ན་ལས་སྐྱེ་བར་མཐོང་ལ། ལྷུ་གུ་ཡང་ས་བོན་གྱི་བདག་ཉིད་དུ་ཡོད་པ་ཁོ་ན་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་དང་། ལུ་མ་པ་ཡང་འཇིག་པའི་བདག་ཉིད་དུ་

^a The Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 224.1) and the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, 189.3.1) read *skye ba yang can* whereas the Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur* (vol. 98, 142.3) reads *skye ba can*; the former appears to be aberrant.

ཡོད་པ་ཁོ་ན་ལས་སྐྱེ་བར་མཐོང་བའི་སྤྱིར་རོ། ། དེ་ལྟ་བུས་ན་
གལ་ཏེ་རྒྱུའི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་དུ་ཡོད་པའི་བདག་ཉིད་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་
པར་སྐྱབ་ན་ནི་འཇིག་རྟེན་ན་དངོས་པོ་སྐྱེ་བ་ཅན་ཐམས་ཅད་
རྒྱུའི་བདག་ཉིད་དུ་ཡོད་པ་ཁོ་ན་ལས་སྐྱེ་བར་གྲགས་པ་དང་
འགལ་བར་འགྱུར་རོ།།

- (*zhe na*): Here if in order to clear away such fallacies of reasoning, certain ones from among the Sāṃkhyas who propound natures of effects, causes, and both—placing themselves, for the sake of proving the production of things, as opponents through [adopting] the aspect of expressing fallacies in the master [Bhāvaviveka's] proving that things are not produced from self—say... In response to that statement, here the commentator [Bhāvaviveka] himself utters:

ཞེ་ན་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་འདིར་དེ་ལྟར་གང་ཞེ་གས་ཀྱི་སྐྱོན་བསལ་བ་
ལ། གངས་ཅན་དག་ལས་འབྲས་བུ་དང་རྒྱ་དང་གཉི་གའི་ངོ་བོ་
ཉིད་སྐྱེ་བ་ཁ་ཅིག་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་སྐྱེ་བ་སྐྱབ་པའི་སྤྱིར། སྐྱོབ་
དཔོན་གྱིས་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་སྐྱེ་བ་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པར་
བསྐྱབ་པ་ལ་དམ་བཅས་པའི་སྐྱོན་བརྗོད་པའི་རྣམ་པས་སྤྱིར་ཚོལ་
བ་ཉིད་དུ་གནས་པ་དག་དེ་སྐད་ཅིས་ཟེར་ནསོ། ། དེ་སྐད་ཟེར་བ་
དེའི་ལན་དུ། འདིར་འགྲེལ་བ་བྱེད་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས།

- **Those are not good because mere production from self is refuted. For, even if it is from the entity of a cause, production even from what is self and what is other is eliminated. Because intelligence is held to be endowed with a character of potential, there also is no fallacy.** (*de ni bzang po ma yin te bdag las skye ba tsam dgag pa'i phyir ro// rgyu'i bdag nyid las na yang bdag dang gzhan du gyur pa las kyang skye bar sel ba'i phyir ro// shes pa yod pa nyid ni nus pa'i mtshan nyid dang ldan pa yongs su gzung ba'i phyir yang nyes pa med do*): In that:

- **Those are not good** (*de ni bzang po ma yin te*): Since even both those aspects of disproof are quasi-disproofs,^a they are not good, because of not proving what is already established and because of not being an object of contradiction. How is it not proving what is already established? Therefore, [Bhāvaviveka utters]:

དེ་ནི་བཟང་པོ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་ཙམ་དགག་པའི་ཕྱིར་
 རོ། ། རྒྱུའི་བདག་ཉིད་ལས་ན་ཡང་བདག་དང་གཞན་དུ་གྱུར་པ་
 ལས་ཀྱང་སྐྱེ་བ་སེལ་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། ། ཤེས་པ་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ནི་རུས་
 པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་དང་ལྡན་པ་ཡོངས་སུ་གཟུང་བའི་ཕྱིར་ཡང་ཉེས་
 པ་མེད་དོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་སྐྱེས་སོ། ། དེ་ལ་དེ་ནི་བཟང་པོ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ་
 ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་སྐྱེན་དབྱུང་བའི་རྣམ་པ་གཉི་ག་ཡང་སྐྱེན་དབྱུང་བ་
 ཉམས་སྤང་བ་ཡིན་པས་བཟང་པོ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། འདི་ཉམས་གྲུབ་པ་ལ་
 རྒྱུ་བ་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་དང་། འགལ་བའི་དོན་ཉིད་མ་ཡིན་
 པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། ། ཇི་ཉམས་ན་གྲུབ་པ་ལ་རྒྱུ་བ་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཞེ་ན།

- **because mere production from self is refuted.** (*bdag las skye ba tsam dgag pa 'i phyir ro//*): Here it being the case that “proving what is already established” is to prove^b with another reasoning even a meaning agreeable in mind for both the opponent and the other party, [Bhāvaviveka] did not utter, “There is no production from^c what exists as an entity of the effect.” [Rather] it is as follows: only within not specifying “from the entity of the effect or from the entity of the cause,” he refuted mere production mere production from self, whereas you specify “from the entity of the effect or from the entity of the cause,” and hence we are not agreeable in mind,

^a *sung dbyung ltar snang.*

^b The Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 225.4) and the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, 189.5.1) read *bsgrubs* whereas the Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur* (vol. 98, 143.3) reads *sgrub*.

^c In the Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur* (vol. 98, 143.3) read *yod pa las* for *yod pa la* in accordance with the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 225.4) and the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, 189.5.2).

and, therefore, this refutation by us, namely, that things are not produced from self, is not a proving what is already established. How is it not an object of contradiction? Therefore, [Bhāvaviveka] utters:

དེའི་ཕྱིར་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་ཙམ་འགག་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་
 ལྷན་ཏེ། འདི་ལ་གྲུབ་པ་ལ་སྐྱབ་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་ཚོལ་བ་དང་ཕྱིར་
 ཚོལ་བ་གཉི་གའི་སློ་མཐུན་པའི་དོན་ལ་ཡང་གཏུན་ཚིགས་
 གཞན་གྱིས་སྐྱབ་པ་ཡིན་ན། ཁོ་བོས་ནི་འབྲས་བུའི་བདག་ཉིད་དུ་
 ཡོད་པ་ལ་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་དོ་ཞེས་མ་ལྷན་ཏེ། འདི་ལྟར་འབྲས་བུའི་
 བདག་ཉིད་ལས་སམ། རྒྱུའི་བདག་ཉིད་ལས་ཞེས་བྱེ་བྲག་དུ་
 བརྗོད་པ་མ་བྱས་པ་ཁོ་ནར་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེས་པ་ཙམ་ཁོ་ནར་
 འགོག་པར་བྱེད་ལ། བྱིས་ནི་འབྲས་བུའི་བདག་ཉིད་ལས་
 སམ། འོན་ཏེ་རྒྱུའི་བདག་ཉིད་ལས་ཞེས་བྱེ་བྲག་དུ་བརྗོད་པ་བྱས་
 པས་དེས་ན་འུ་བུ་ཅག་སློ་མཐུན་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཁོ་བོས་
 དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པར་བཀག་པ་འདི་གྲུབ་
 པ་ལ་སྐྱབ་པ་མ་ཡིན་ལོ། ། ཇི་ལྟར་ན་འགལ་བའི་དོན་ཉིད་མ་
 ཡིན་ཞེ་ན།

- **For, even if it is from the entity of a cause, production even from what is self and what is other is eliminated.** (*rgyu'i bdag nyid las na yang bdag dang gzhan du gyur pa las kyang skye bar sel ba'i phyir ro*/):^a Even if it is being proven that things are not produced from the entity of a cause, it does not become an object of contradiction with what is renowned in the world. It is as follows: Your statement that "All that have production are produced only within the context of existing in the entities of [their] causes" is being examined here, so listen!

^a I have filled in Avalokitavrata's abridged citation *rgyu'i bdag nyid las na yang zhes bya la sogs pa* (Golden Reprint, vol. 109, 226.1).

If it is considered whether this called “the seed that is the cause of a stalk” is the entity of the stalk itself or is another entity, this does not become an object of contradiction because production even from what is self and what is other is eliminated. This indicates that if it is the case that the seed that is the cause of a stalk is the entity of [the stalk] itself, then if whatever the seed is itself is the stalk, it has already been stated well that there consequently is no production from self. If it is the case that the seed is another entity from the entity of the stalk, this, therefore, will be examined only below on the occasion of demonstrating that things are not produced from other. Wait a little!

དེའི་ཕྱིར་རྒྱུའི་བདག་ཉིད་ལས་ན་ཡང་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ལ་སོགས་པ་
 ལྷན་ཏེ། དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་རྒྱུའི་བདག་ཉིད་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པར་
 བརྒྱབ་ན་ཡང་འཇིག་རྟེན་ལས་གྲགས་པ་དང་འགལ་བའི་དོན་
 ཉིད་དུ་མི་འགྱུར་ཏེ། འདི་རྣམ་ཁྱོད་ན་རེ། སྐྱེ་བ་ཅན་ཐམས་ཅད་
 བོ་རྒྱུའི་བདག་ཉིད་དུ་ཡོད་པ་ཁོ་ན་ལས་སྐྱེ་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ་ཞེས་ཟེར་
 བ་གང་ཡིན་པ་དེ་འདྲིར་བརྟག་གི་ཉོན་ཅིག། ཅི་སྐྱུ་གུའི་རྒྱུའི་ས་
 པོན་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་དེ་སྐྱུ་གུའི་རང་གི་བདག་ཉིད་ཡིན་ནམ། འོན་ཏེ་
 བདག་ཉིད་གཞན་ཡིན། གང་ཡང་རུང་བ་ཞེས་ཏུ་བརྟག་གང་ན།
 དེ་ལ་ཁོ་བོ་ནི་བདག་དང་གཞན་དུ་གྱུར་པ་ལས་ཀྱང་སྐྱེ་བ་སེལ་
 བའི་ཕྱིར་འགལ་བའི་དོན་ཉིད་དུ་མི་འགྱུར་རོ། ། འདི་རྒྱུད་བརྟན་
 ཏེ། གལ་ཏེ་སྐྱུ་གུའི་རྒྱུའི་ས་པོན་དེ་རང་གི་བདག་ཉིད་ཡིན་ཏེ། ས་
 པོན་གང་ཡིན་པ་དེ་ཉིད་སྐྱུ་གུ་ཡིན་ན་ནི་དེའི་ཕྱིར་བདག་ལས་
 སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་དེ་ལགས་པར་གསུངས་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། ། ཅི་སྐྱེ་
 སྐྱུ་གུའི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་ལས་ས་པོན་བདག་ཉིད་གཞན་ཡིན་ན་ནི་དེའི་

སྤྱིར་འོག་ཁོ་ན་ནས་དངོས་པོ་རྒྱམས་གཞན་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པར་
སྤྱོད་པའི་སྐབས་སུ་བརྟག་གི། ཅུང་ཟད་སྤོང་ཅིག།

Thus, to avoid a fallacious reason/the fallacies of a reason, here from among the Sāṃkhyas themselves another proposition—one propounding potentialities—imputes a fallacy with regard to the example:

On the occasion of your earlier propounding the words of a syllogism, “The internal sense-spheres are not produced from self,^a because of existing—like, for example, intelligence (*nang gi skye mched rnam s bdag las skye ba med par nges te yod pa’i phyir shes pa yod pa nyid bzhin no, na...ādhyātmikānyāyatanāni svata utpannāni vidyamānatvāt caitanyavad*),” it is not suitable to have used “intelligence” (*shes pa yod pa nyid, caitanya*) as an example; intelligence is the very self-entity of the person—like, for example, the fact that warmth is the self-entity of fire. That, moreover, does not exist at all times, for it is said:

[When] awareness^b has made an object dwell,
The person is made sentient.

When awareness (*blo, buddhi*) makes objects such as sounds and so forth dwell in the continuum and offers them to the person, intelligence is generated, but as long as awareness does not make objects such as sounds and so forth dwell in the continuum and does not offer them to the person, intelligence is not generated; hence, although intelligence always exists with a character of potentiality, it does not always exist

^a The Tibetan reads “are **delimited** as not being produced from self” (*bdag las skye ba med par nges te*), but “delimited” is not represented in the Sanskrit. Also, the reason could be translated as “because of presently existing” since *vidyamāna* is the present middle particle; however, later Chandrakīrti (La Vallée Poussin, *Prasannapadā*, 33.4) cites the reason as *sattvād*, suggesting that the particular form makes little difference, this perhaps being why it is translated into Tibetan merely as *yod pa’i phyir* instead of *da lta bar yod pa’i phyir*.

^b *blo, buddhi*, also called the great one (*chen po, mahat*) in the Sāṃkhya’s list of twenty-five categories of objects of knowledge.

with a character of manifestation. Therefore, the characteristics of the example—"intelligence" (*shes pa yod pa nyid, caitanya*)—that [you] have used for the reason, "existing" (*yod pa, vidyamāna*) are not complete. Consequently, there comes to be a fallacy in the proof.

དེ་སྣང་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཀྱི་སྐྱོན་བསལ་བ། འདིར་གྲངས་ཅན་དག་
 ཁོ་ན་ལས་རྒྱས་པ་སྐྱབ་བ་གཞན་ཁ་ཅིག་དཔེ་ལ་སྐྱོན་འདོགས་པར་
 བྱེད་པ་དག་ན་རེ། བྱེད་ཀྱིས་ལྡར་ནང་གི་སྐྱེ་མཚེད་རྣམས་
 བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པར་ངེས་ཏེ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར། དཔེར་ན་ཤེས་
 པ་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་བཞིན་ལོ་ཞེས་སྐྱོར་བའི་ཚིག་སྐྱབས་པའི་སྐབས་སྟུ།
 ཤེས་པ་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ལ་དཔེ་སྐྱབས་པ་དེ་ནི་མི་རྩལ་སྟེ། ཤེས་པ་
 ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ནི་སྐྱེས་བུའི་རང་གི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་དེ། དཔེར་ན་དྲོ་བ་ནི་
 མའི་རང་གི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་ཡིན་པ་དང་འདྲའོ། ། དེ་ཡང་དུས་ཐམས་
 ཅད་དུ་མེད་དེ་འདི་སྟར། རྫོ་ཡིས་དོན་ནི་གནས་བྱས་པ། ། སྐྱེས་
 བུས་སེམས་པར་བྱེད་པ་ཡིན། ། ཞེས་འབྲུང་བས། གང་གི་ཚོ་རྫོས་
 སྐྱེ་ལ་སོགས་པའི་དོན་རྒྱུད་ལ་གནས་པར་བྱས་ཤིང་སྐྱེས་བུ་ལ་
 འབྲུལ་བར་བྱེད་པ་དེའི་ཚོ་ན་ཤེས་པ་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་སྐྱེའི། ཇི་སྲིད་
 དུ་རྫོས་སྐྱེ་ལ་སོགས་པ་དོན་རྒྱུད་ལ་གནས་པར་མ་བྱས་ཤིང་སྐྱེས་
 བུ་ལ་འབྲུལ་བར་མི་བྱེད་པ་དེ་སྲིད་དུ་ཤེས་པ་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་མི་སྐྱེ་
 བས་དེའི་ཕྱིར་ཤེས་པ་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ནི་རྒྱས་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་
 ཏྲག་ཏུ་ཡོད་ཀྱང་། གསལ་བའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ཏྲག་ཏུ་མེད་པས་
 གཏན་ཚིགས་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་དཔེ་ཤེས་པ་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ལས་

མངས་པ་དེའི་མཚན་ཉིད་མ་ཚང་བས་སྐྱབ་པའི་སྐྱོན་དུ་འགྱུར་
རྒྱུ་།།

To answer this opposing point that has been [hypothetically] drawn, [Bhāvaviveka] utters:

- **Because intelligence is held to be endowed with a character of potential, there also is no fallacy.** (*shes pa yod pa nyid ni nus pa'i mtshan nyid dang ldan pa yongs su gzung ba'i phyir yang nyes pa med do*): This indicates, "We [that is, Bhāvaviveka] as an example intelligence during the state having the character of potential when intelligence has not been generated by the exertion of awareness (*blo, buddhi*); hence, there is no defect with regard to the example." In that:
 - **intelligence** (*shes pa yod pa nyid, caitanya*): the intelligence that earlier was indicated as an example for the reason "existing" (*yod pa, vidyamāna*) in "The internal sense-spheres are not produced from self, because of existing—like, for example, intelligence (*nang gi skye mched rnams bdag las skye ba med par nges te yod pa'i phyir shes pa yod pa nyid bzhin no, na...ādhyātmikānyāyatanāni svata utpannāni vidyamānatvāt caitanyavad*)."

ཞེས་ཟེར་བའི་སྐྱོགས་སྣ་མ་ཚང་ནས་དབྱུང་བ་དེའི་ལན་དུ། ཤེས་
པ་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ནི་རྣམས་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་དང་ལྡན་པ་ཡོངས་སུ་
གཟུང་བའི་ཕྱིར་ཡང་ཉེས་པ་མེད་དོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་སྐྱབས་སོ། ། འདི་
རྒྱུ་བརྟན་ཏེ། གང་གི་ཚོ་སྤོའི་རྩོལ་བས་མ་སྐྱེས་པའི་ཤེས་པ་ཡོད་
པ་ཉིད་རྣམས་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱི་གནས་སྐབས་ན་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་
གང་ཡིན་པ་དེ་ཁོ་བོས་དབེ་ཉིད་དུ་བརྟན་པར་བྱས་པས་དེའི་
ཕྱིར་དབེའི་སྐྱོན་མེད་དོ། ། དེ་ལ་ཤེས་པ་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ནི་ཞེས་བྱ་
བ་ནི་སྤར་ནང་གི་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་རྣམས་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པར་
ངེས་ཏེ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར། དབེར་ན་ཤེས་པ་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་བཞིན་ལོ་

ཞེས་གཏམ་ཚིགས་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་དཔེར་བརྟན་པའི་ཤེས་པ་ཡོད་
པ་ཉིད་དོ།

- **endowed with a character of potential**, (*nus pa'i mtshan nyid dang ldan pa*): the intelligence which has the character of potential is that which is endowed with a character of potential; moreover, since it is asserted as existing at all times, it is existent (*yod pa nyid, vidyamāna*).

རྣམ་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་དང་ལྡན་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་ཤེས་པ་ཡོད་པ་
ཉིད་གང་ལ་རྣམ་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་པ་དེ་ནི་རྣམ་པའི་མཚན་
ཉིད་དང་ལྡན་པ་སྟེ། དེ་ཡང་གངས་ཅན་གྱི་སྟེས་བྱ་ལ་དུས་
ཐམས་ཅད་དུ་ཡོད་པར་ཁས་སྐྱབས་པས་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ཡིན་ཅོ།

- **Because [intelligence] is held to be** (*yongs su gzung ba'i phyir*): Because we hold this possessing the character of potential as an example of existing (*yod pa nyid, vidyamāna*), there is not fallacy in the example of the reason.

ཡོངས་སུ་གཟུང་བའི་སྤྱིར་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་རྣམ་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་
དང་ལྡན་པ་དེ་ཁོ་བོས་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་དཔེར་ཡོངས་སུ་གཟུང་
བའི་སྤྱིར་གཏམ་ཚིགས་ཀྱི་དཔེ་ལ་སྟོན་མེད་དོ།

- **also** (*yang*): this term means “Not only is there no defect with regard to the example of the reason because just that possessing the character of potential is used, but there is not defect with regard to the example of the reason also because that possessing the character of manifestation is used.

ཡང་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་སྤྱི་ནི་རྣམ་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་དང་ལྡན་པ་འབའ་
ཞིག་ཡོངས་སུ་གཟུང་བའི་སྤྱིར་གཏམ་ཚིགས་ཀྱི་དཔེ་ལ་སྟོན་མེད་
པར་མ་ཟད་ཀྱི། གསལ་བའི་མཚན་ཉིད་དང་ལྡན་པ་ཡོངས་སུ་

གཟུང་བའི་ཕྱིར་ཡང་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཀྱི་དབེལ་སྐྱོན་མེད་དོ་ཞེས་
བྱ་བའི་དོན་རྟོ།

- **there is no fallacy.** (*nyes pa med do*): Hence, in the indication of intelligence (*shes pa yod pa nyid, caitanya*) as an example of the reason "existing" (*yod pa nyid, vidyamānatva*) there is no such fallacy.

ཉེས་པ་མེད་དོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་དེའི་ཕྱིར་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་
ཀྱི་དབེལ་གྲེས་པ་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་བསྟན་པ་ལ་དབེལ་སྐྱོན་གྱིས་ཉེས་
པ་མེད་པའོ།

- **About that, another makes the explanation, "Things are not produced from their own entities because their production would be just senseless and because production would be endless."** (*'di la gzhan ni dngos po rnams bdag gi bdag nyid las skye ba med de/ de dag gi skye ba don med pa nyid du 'gyur ba 'i phyir dang skye ba thug pa med par 'gyur ba 'i phyir ro/ zhes rnam par bzhad par byed do*): This indicates, "Also on this occasion of proving that things are not produced from self the commentator, the master Buddhapālita, makes such and such an explanation." In that:

འདི་ལ་གཞན་ནི་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་བདག་གི་བདག་ཉིད་ལས་སྐྱེ་
བ་མེད་དེ། དེ་དག་གི་སྐྱེ་བ་དོན་མེད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར་
དང་། སྐྱེ་བ་ཐུག་པ་མེད་པར་འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། ། ཞེས་རྣམ་པར་
བཤད་པར་བྱེད་དོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་
བ་མེད་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་སྐབས་འདི་ལ་འགྲེལ་བ་བྱེད་པ་སློབ་
དཔོན་བུལ་པ་ལི་ཏ་ནི་འདི་སྐད་དུ་རྣམ་པར་བཤད་པར་བྱེད་དོ་
ཞེས་བསྟན་པ་ཡིན་ཅོ།

- **About that,** (*'di la*): On this occasion of proving that things are not produced from self.

དེ་ལ་འདི་ལ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་
 པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་སྐབས་འདི་ལོ།

- **another** (*gzhan ni*): Among the many commentators on this *Treatise [on the Middle]*—ranging from the holy master [Nāgārjuna],^a the Elder Buddhapālita,^b Chandrakīrti, Devasharma, Guṇashrī, Guṇamati, and Sthiramati through to the master Bhāvaviveka—this term refers to the Elder Buddhapālita who is other than most of the many commentators on this *Treatise [on the Middle]*. The Elder Buddhapālita makes the explanation:

གཞན་ནི་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་སྐྱེ་བ་སྟན་བཅོས་འདིའི་འགྲེལ་བ་བྱེད་
 པ་མང་སྟེ། འདི་རྩ་སྟེ། སློབ་དཔོན་གྱི་ཞལ་སྡེ་ནས་དང་། གནས་
 བརྟན་བྱུང་བ་ལྷི་ཏ་དང་། ཙུ་ཏུ་གྱི་ཏི་དང་། དེ་བ་ཤམ་དང་། ལུ་ཏ་
 སྟེ་དང་། ལུ་ཏ་མ་ཏི་དང་། སྐྱི་ར་མ་ཏི་དང་། སློབ་དཔོན་ལེགས་
 རྒྱན་འབྱེད་ཉིད་ལ་ཐུག་པའི་བར་དག་ཡོད་པ་ལས་དེ་དག་པལ་
 ལས་གཞན་པས་ཏི་གནས་བརྟན་བྱུང་བ་ལྷི་ཏ་དང་སྐྱར་རོ། །
 གནས་བརྟན་བྱུང་བ་ལྷི་ཏ་ནི་

- **“Things are not produced from self because their production would be just senseless and because production would be endless.”** (*ngos po rnam bdag gi bdag nyid las skye ba med de/ de dag gi skye ba don med pa nyid du 'gyur ba 'i phyir dang skye ba thug pa med par 'gyur ba 'i phyir ro/, na svata*

^a Avalokitavrata is referring to the commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle* called *Akutobhayā* (*ga las 'jigs med*; “no fear from anywhere”) which he clearly accepts as authored by Nāgārjuna. Tsong-kha-pa and his followers disagree, pointing to the facts that this commentary quotes Nāgārjuna's student Āryadeva, whereas the custom is not to cite one's own student and that none of the other great Indian commentators cite. The late Go-mang scholar Ge-dün-lo-drö opined that this commentary might be by a person named *Akutobhayā* and thus the text is called the *Akutobhayā*, much as the commentary by Buddhapālita is called the *Buddhapālita Commentary*.

^b *sthavīra, gnas rtan*.

*utpadyanti bhāvāḥ/ tadutpadavaiyarthiyāt/ atiprasaṅgado-
sācca*^a): In that:

དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་བདག་ཉིད་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་དེ། དེ་དག་གི་སྐྱེ་བ་
དོན་མེད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར་དང། སྐྱེ་བ་ལྷན་པ་མེད་པ་
ཉིད་དུ་འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ་ཞེས་རྣམ་པར་བཤད་པར་བྱེད་དོ། །

- **“Things** (*dnegos po rnam, bhāvāḥ*): The external and internal sense-spheres (*skye mched, āyatana*).
- **from self** (*bdag gi bdag nyid las, svataḥ*): This is the same as “from [their own] entities (*bdag nyid las*);” from them.
- **are not produced** (*skye ba med, na ... utpadyanti*): “[are not produced] ultimately (*don dam par*). Why are things not produced from their own entities?”
- **because their production would be just senseless** (*de dag gi skye ba don med pa nyid du 'gyur ba'i phyir, tadutpadavaiyarthiyāt*):^c [In that:]

དེ་ལ་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་ཕྱི་དང་ནང་གི་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་
རྣམས་སོ། ། བདག་གི་བདག་ཉིད་ལས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་བདག་ཉིད་
ལས་བྱ་བའི་ཐ་ཚོགས་སྟེ་དེ་ལས་སོ། ། སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་དེ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་
དོན་དམ་པར་རོ། ། ཅིའི་ཕྱིར་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་བདག་གི་བདག་
ཉིད་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་ཅེ་ན། དེ་དག་གི་སྐྱེ་བ་དོན་མེད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་
འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། དེ་དག་གི་སྐྱེ་བ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་དངོས་པོ་དེ་
དག་གི་སྐྱེ་བའོ། ། དོན་མེད་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་དོན་དང་བྲལ་བ་ནི་
དོན་མེད་པ་སྟེ་འབྲས་བུ་མེད་པའོ། ། ཉིད་ཅེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་དེ་དག་

^a The Sanskrit for Buddhapālita's statement is taken from Chandrakīrti's citation of it (La Vallée Poussin, *Prasannapadā*, 14.1).

^b This is rendered into English above as “from their own entities” after the Tibetan which is following this very gloss by Avalokitavrata; here the translation as “from self” follows the Sanskrit *svataḥ*, which in Tibetan would be *bdag las*, so that Avalokitavrata's gloss is not redundant.

^c Literally, “because of the senselessness of their production.”

གི་སྐྱེ་བ་དོན་མེད་པའི་དངོས་པོ་ནི་དེ་དག་གི་སྐྱེ་བ་དོན་མེད་པ་
ཉིད་དོ།

- **their production** (*de dag gi skye ba, tadutpāda*): the production of those things.
- **senseless** (*don med pa, vaiyarthya*): devoid of sense (*don dang bral ba*) is to be senseless, fruitless (*'bras bu med pa*).
- **ness** (*nyid, ya[?]*): the fact of their production being without sense,^a the senselessness of their production. By saying “because their production would be just senseless” [Buddhapālita] is indicating that if things were produced from an existent [state], their production would be just senseless because there would nothing different from what had already been produced, nothing that had not arisen earlier. Also:’

དེ་དག་གི་སྐྱེ་བ་དོན་མེད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་འགྱུར་བའི་སྤྱིར་ཞེས་བྱ་བས་
ནི་འདི་སྐད་བསྟན་ཏེ། གལ་ཏེ་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་ཡོད་པ་ལས་སྐྱེ་
ན་དེ་དག་གི་སྐྱེ་བ་དོན་མེད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་འགྱུར་ཏེ། འདི་ལྟར་སྐྱེས་
ཟེན་པ་ལས་བྱུང་པར་སློན་མ་བྱུང་བ་འགའ་ཡང་མེད་པའི་སྤྱིར་
རོ།

- **[and] because their production would be endless** (*skye ba thug pa med par 'gyur ba'i phyir*,^b *atiprasaṅgadoṣāt*): If, though existent, something were produced, then it would be produced in that aspect without cessation; therefore, [its repeated] production would just not finish.
- **makes the explanation** (*zhes rnam par bzhad par byed do*): the Elder Buddhapālita makes that explanation on this occasion of proving that things are not produced from self.

^a *de dag gi skye ba don med pa'i dngos po.*

^b This is also rendered into Tibetan as *shin tu thal bar 'gyur ba'i phyir*; see .

གཞན་ཡང་སྐྱེ་བ་ལྷན་པ་མེད་པར་འགྱུར་བའི་སྤྱིར་ཏེ། གལ་ཏེ་
 ཡོད་ཀྱང་སྐྱེ་བར་འགྱུར་ན་ཡང་སྐྱེ་བར་འགྱུར་བས། རྣམ་པ་དེས་
 མ་གྱི་བའི་བར་དུ་སྐྱེ་བར་འགྱུར་ཏེ། དེས་ན་སྐྱེ་བ་ཡོངས་སུ་
 རྫོགས་པ་མེད་པ་ལོ་ནར་འགྱུར་རོ་ཞེས་རྣམ་པར་བཤད་པ་བྱེད་
 འོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི། གནས་བརྟན་བྱུང་བུ་ལི་ཏ་ནི། དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་
 བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པར་བསྐྱབ་པའི་སྐབས་འདིར་དེ་སྐད་ཅེས་
 རྣམ་པར་བཤད་པར་བྱེད་དོ། །

- That is not reasonable (1) because of not expressing a reason and an example, and (2) because of not avoiding the fallacies adduced by another, [and] (3) also because the words afford an opportunity since it [must] be reversed from the meaning put forward and hence what becomes evident is the meaning of the opposite of the thesis and the property of that [that is, the reason]—things are produced from other and production has effects and production has an end^a—due to which it would contradict tenets.^b (*de ni rigs pa ma yin te/gtan tshigs dang dpe ma brjod pa'i phyir dang / gzhan gyis smras pa'i nyes pa ma bsal ba'i phyir ro// glags yod pa'i tshig yin pa'i yang phyir te/ skabs kyi don las bzlog pas bsgrub par bya ba dang de'i chos bzlog pa'i don mngon pas dngos po rnam gzhān las skye ba*)

^a Or, following the Sanskrit: "Things are produced from other because production has effects and because production has an end." (*parasmādutpannā bhāvā janmasāphalyāt janmanirodhāceti*, which in Tibetan would be *dngos po rnam gzhān las skye ba yin te/ skye ba don yod pa nyid yin pa'i phyir dang skye ba thug pa yod pa yin pa'i phyir ro/*)

^b Fleshed out a little, this reads:

That is not reasonable (1) because [Buddhapālita] does not express a reason [capable of proving that there is no production from self] as well as an example, and (2) because [the reasoning as Buddhapālita states it] does not avoid the fallacies adduced by another [that is, the fallacies that a Sāmkhya would be expected to adduce], and (3) because [Buddhapālita's] words also afford an opportunity [to an opponent to expose contradiction within his own system] since [the thesis and the reason must] be reversed from what is explicitly stated and hence what becomes evident is the meaning of the opposite of the thesis and the reason—"Things are produced from other because production has effects and because production has an end"—due to which [Buddhapālita] would contradict tenets [of the Middle Way School].

'gyur ba dang / skye ba 'bras bu dang bcas pa nyid du 'gyur ba dang / skye ba thug pa yod par 'gyur ba 'i phyir mdzad pa 'i mtha' dang 'gal bar 'gyur ro//,^a tadayuktaṃ/ hetuḍṛṣṭāntānabhīdhanāt/ paroktadoṣāparihārācca/ prasaṅgavākyatvācca prakṛtārthaviparyayena viparītarthasādhyataddharmavyaktau parasmādutpannā bhāvā janmasāphalyāt/ janmanirodhāceti kṛtāntavirodhaḥ syāt/^b): In this passage the commentator [Bhāvaviveka] himself proves that the explanation by the Elder Buddhapālita is not reasonable. In that:

དེ་ནི་རིགས་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། གཏན་ཚིགས་དང་དབེ་མ་བརྗོད་པའི་
 ཕྱིར་དང་། གཞན་གྱིས་སྐྱེས་པའི་ཉེས་པ་མ་བསལ་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །
 སྐབས་ཡོད་པའི་ཚིག་ཡིན་པའི་ཡང་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། སྐབས་ཀྱི་དོན་ལས་
 བརྗོད་པས་བསྐྱབ་པར་བྱ་བ་དང་དེའི་ཚོས་བརྗོད་པའི་དོན་
 མངོན་པས་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་གཞན་ལས་སྐྱེ་བར་འགྱུར་བ་དང་།
 སྐྱེ་བ་འབྲས་བུ་དང་བཅས་པ་ཉིད་དུ་འགྱུར་བ་དང་། སྐྱེ་བ་ལྷན་
 པ་ཡོད་པར་འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར་མཛད་པའི་མཐའ་དང་འགལ་བར་
 འགྱུར་རོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི། འགྲེལ་བ་བྱེད་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་གནས་བརྟན་
 བརྗོད་པའི་ཉེས་རྣམས་པར་བཤད་པ་དེ་རིགས་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་
 ལྟུང་བའི་ཚིག་ཡིན་ལོ། །

- **That is not reasonable** (*rigs pa ma yin te, tadayuktaṃ*): This is [Bhāvaviveka's] thesis that the explanation by the Elder Buddhapālita is not reasonable. Why is it not reasonable?

དེ་ལ་དེ་ནི་རིགས་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ན། གནས་བརྟན་བརྗོད་
 པའི་ཉེས་རྣམས་པར་བཤད་པ་དེ་ནི་རིགས་པ་མ་ཡིན་ལོ་ཞེས་
 དམ་བཅས་པ་ཡིན་ལོ། ། ཅིའི་ཕྱིར་རིགས་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཞེ་ན།

^a The Tibetan follows Avalokitavrata's text; for other versions and comments see the notes in the preceding three chapters.

^b The Sanskrit is from Chandrakīrti's citation in his *Clear Words* (La Vallée Poussin, *Prasannapadā*, 14.4).

- **(1) because of not expressing a reason and an example,** (*gtan tshigs dang dpe ma brjod pa'i phyir, hetuḍṣtāntānabhidhānāt*): This indicates that in [Buddhapālita's] explanation he is reduced to having only proclaimed a mere thesis, "Things are not produced from self" (*ngos po rnam bdag gi bdag nyid las skye ba med de, na svata utpadyanti bhāvāḥ*) but has not expressed a reason why they are not produced from self such as [Bhāvaviveka did in his syllogism when he gave as the reason] "because of existing" (*yod pa 'i phyir, vidyamānatvāt*) and has not expressed an example of the nonproduction of the existent from self such as [Bhāvaviveka did when he said] "like, for example, intelligence" (*dper na shes pa yod pa nyid bzhin no, caitanyavad*), and therefore [Buddhapālita's explanation] is not reasonable. Furthermore, [it is not reasonable]:

གཏམ་ཚིགས་དང་དཔེ་མ་བཟོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། འདི་སྐད་བསྟན་
 ཏེ། རྣམ་པར་བཤད་པ་དེ་ལ་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་
 མེད་དོ་ཞེས་དམ་བཅས་པ་དེ་ཙམ་ཁོ་ན་ཞིག་གྲགས་པར་ཟད་གྱི།
 ཇི་ལྟར་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པའི་གཏམ་ཚིགས་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་
 ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ལྟ་བུ་དང་། ཡོད་པ་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པའི་དཔེ། །
 དཔེར་ན་ཤེས་པ་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་བཞིན་ལོ། ། ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ལྟ་བུ་མ་
 བཟོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་དེ་ནི་རིགས་པ་མ་ཡིན་ལོ། །

- **(2) because of not avoiding the fallacies adduced by another,** (*gzhan gyis smras pa'i nyes pa ma bsal ba'i phyir, paroktadoṣāparihārācca*): Even if he had fully expressed the expression and proof of a reason and an example, it would, without question, have the fallacies adduced by another who propounds production, but you^a [Buddhapālita] did not avoid them; hence, because of not avoiding the fallacies adduced by another, [your explanation] is not reasonable. For what further [reason] is it not reasonable?

^a In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 231.6) and in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, 190.4.7) for *khyod kyi* read *khyod kyis* in accordance with the Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur*, vol. 98, 147.1.

གཞན་ཡང་གཞན་གྱིས་སྐྱེས་པའི་ཉེས་པ་མ་བསལ་བའི་སྤྱིར་དེ།
 གལ་དེ་དེ་ལ་གཏན་ཚིགས་དང་དབེ་དག་བརྗོད་ཅིང་སྐྱབ་པ་
 རྗོད་པར་བརྗོད་དུ་ཟེན་ཀྱང་དེ་ལ་སྐྱེ་བར་སྐྱ་བ་གཞན་གྱིས་
 སྐྱེས་པའི་ཉེས་པ་གདོན་མི་ཟ་བར་འབྱུང་བར་འགྱུར་ན། དེ་ཡང་
 བྱོད་གྱིས་མ་བསལ་བས། དེའི་སྤྱིར་གཞན་གྱིས་སྐྱེས་པའི་ཉེས་པ་
 མ་བསལ་བའི་སྤྱིར་དེ་ནི་རིགས་པ་མ་ཡིན་ལོ། ། གཞན་ཡང་དེ་རྗེ་
 ལྟར་རིགས་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཞེ་ན།

- **(3) also because the words afford an opportunity** (*glags yod pa 'i tshig yin pa 'i yang phyir te/, prasāṅgavākyatvācca*). The explanation by the Elder Buddhapālita is also unreasonable because of being words affording an opportunity for censure by another party.
 - **also** (*yang, ca*): This term is to be taken as [indicating] “Not only is [his explanation] unreasonable because of not expressing a reason and an example and because of not avoiding the fallacies adduced by another, but also it is unreasonable because of affording an opportunity [for censure]. To indicate just that [Bhāvaviveka] utters:
 - **it [must] be reversed from the meaning put forward**, (*skabs kyi don las bzlog pa, prakṛtārthaviparyaya*): What is the meaning put forward? It is that very explanation by Buddhapālita himself, “Things are not produced from self because their production would be just senseless and because production would be endless”^a (*dngos po rnam s bdag gi bdag nyid las skye ba med de/ de dag gi skye ba don med pa nyid du 'gyur ba 'i phyir dang skye ba thug pa med par 'gyur ba 'i phyir ro, na svata utpadyanti bhāvāḥ/ tadutpadavaiyarthiyāt/ atiprasāṅgadoṣācca*).

སྐྱགས་ཡོད་པའི་ཚིག་ཡིན་པའི་ཡང་སྤྱིར་དེ། གནས་བརྟན་བརྟུག་
 ལྷ་ལི་ཏས་རྣམ་པར་བཤད་པ་དེ་ནི་ཚོལ་བ་གཞན་གྱི་སྐྱེས་པའི་

^a The Peking (P5259, vol. 96, 190.5.3) mistakenly repeats the last two sentences.

སྐབས་ཡོད་པའི་ཚོག་ཡིན་པའི་སྤྱིར་ཡང་རིགས་པ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །
 ཡང་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་སྐྱེ་བའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་དང་དཔེ་མ་བརྗོད་པའི་
 སྤྱིར་དང་གཞན་གྱིས་སྐྱས་པའི་ཉེས་པ་མ་བསལ་བའི་སྤྱིར་རིགས་
 པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་འབའ་ཞིག་ཏུ་མ་བཟང་གྱུ། དེ་ནི་སྐབས་ཡོད་པའི་
 ཚོག་ཡིན་པའི་སྤྱིར་ཡང་རིགས་པ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བར་སྦྱར་
 རོ། ། དེ་ཉིད་བསྟན་པའི་སྤྱིར། སྐབས་ཀྱི་དོན་ལ་སྐྱོག་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་
 སྐྱས་ཏེ། སྐབས་ཀྱི་དོན་གང་ཞེ་ན། གནས་བརྟན་བརྩམས་པའི་ཏ་
 ཉིད་གྱིས་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་བདག་གི་བདག་ཉིད་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་
 དེ། དེ་དག་གི་སྐྱེ་བ་དོན་མེད་པ་ཉིད་ཏུ་འགྱུར་བའི་སྤྱིར་དང་།
 སྐྱེ་བ་ལྷན་པ་མེད་པར་འགྱུར་བའི་སྤྱིར་རོ་ཞེས་རྣམ་པར་བཤད་
 པ་ཉིད་ཡིན་ནོ། །

- since it [must] be reversed from that, (*de las bzlog pas, prakṛtārthaviparyayeṇa*): since it [must] be reversed from the meaning put forward.^a The opposite of “Things are not produced from their own entities” (*dnegos po rnams bdag gi bdag nyid las skye ba med de, na svata utpadyanti bhāvāḥ*) is “Things are produced from other” (*dnegos po rnams gzhan las skye bar 'gyur ba, parasmādutpannā bhāvā*); the opposite of “because their production would be just senseless” (*de dag gi skye ba don med pa nyid du 'gyur ba'i phyir, tadutpadavaiyarthiyāt*) is “because their production has effects” (*skye ba 'bras bu dang bcas pa nyid du 'gyur ba, janmasāphalyāt*), and the opposite of

^a In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 232.5) and in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, 190.5.3) for *de las bzlog pas zhes bya ba ni skabs kyi don de las zlog pa zhes bya ba smras te/ skabs kyi don gang zhes na/ gnas brtan bu ddha pā li ta nyid kyi dnegos po rnams bdag gi bdag nyid las skye ba med de de dag gi skye ba don med pa nyid du 'gyur ba'i phyir dang skye ba thug pa med par 'gyur ba'i phyir ro/ zhes rnam par bshad pa nyid yin no// de las bzlog pas zhes bya ba ni skabs kyi don de las zlog pas te read de las bzlog pas zhes bya ba ni skabs kyi don de las zlog pas te* in accordance with the Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur*, vol. 98, 147.5, with the exception that final two syllables in the latter read *pa ste*.

“because production would be endless” (*skye ba thug pa med par 'gyur ba 'i phyir, atiprasaṅgadoṣāt*) is “because production has an end” (*skye ba thug pa yod pa yod par 'gyur ba 'i phyir, janmanirodhāt*). Hence, also because of being words affording an opportunity [for censure] it is also unreasonable. How [does Buddhapālita's explanation] come to be words affording an opportunity [for censure] through reversing the meaning put forward? Therefore, [Bhāvaviveka] utters:

དེ་ལས་བསྐྱོག་པས་ཞེས་བྱ་བས་ནི་སྐབས་ཀྱི་དོན་དེ་ལས་བསྐྱོག་
 པ་སྟེ། དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་བདག་གི་བདག་ཉིད་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་དེ་
 ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ལས་བསྐྱོག་པ། དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་གཞན་ལས་སྐྱེ་བར་
 འགྱུར་བ་དང་། དེ་དག་གི་སྐྱེ་བ་དོན་མེད་པ་ཉིད་ཏུ་འགྱུར་བའི་
 ཕྱིར་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ལས་བསྐྱོག་པ་སྐྱེ་བ་འབྲས་བུ་དང་བཅས་པ་ཉིད་
 ཏུ་འགྱུར་བ་དང་། སྐྱེ་བ་ལྷན་པ་མེད་པ་ཉིད་ཏུ་འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར་
 རོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ལས་བསྐྱོག་པ་སྐྱེ་བ་ལྷན་པ་ཡོད་པར་འགྱུར་བའི་
 ཕྱིར་ཞེས་བྱ་བས། སྐབས་ཡོད་པའི་ཚོག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཡང་
 རིགས་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཅོ། ། སྐབས་ཀྱི་དོན་ལས་བསྐྱོག་པས་ཇི་ལྟར་
 སྐབས་ཡོད་པའི་ཚོག་ཡིན་པར་འགྱུར་ཞེ་ན།

- and hence what becomes evident is the meaning of the opposite of the thesis and the property of that [that is, the reason] (*bsgrub par bya ba dang /de'i chos bzlog pa 'i don mngon pas, viparītarthasādhyataddharmavyakta*): [In that:]
 - the thesis (*bsgrub par bya ba, sādhya*): the thesis, “Things are not produced from self” (*dngos po rnam bdag gi bdag nyid las skye ba med de, na svata utpadyanti bhāvāḥ*).

དེའི་ཕྱིར་བསྐྱབ་པར་བྱ་བ་དང་། དེའི་ཚོས་བསྐྱོག་པའི་དོན་
 མངོན་པས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་སྐྱབ་ཏེ། བསྐྱབ་པར་བྱ་བ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་

དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་བདག་གི་བདག་ཉིད་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་དེ་ཞེས་
བརྒྱབ་པར་བྱའོ།

- **what becomes evident is the meaning of the opposite of that** (*de bzlog pa 'i don mngon pas, viparītartha...vyak-tau*): what becomes evident is the meaning of the opposite of “Things are not produced from self” (*dnegos po rnams bdag gi bdag nyid las skye ba med de, na svata utpadyanti bhāvāḥ*), that is, “Things are produced from other” (*dnegos po rnams gzhan las skye bar 'gyur ba, parasmāduppannā bhāvā*).

དེ་བརྗོད་པའི་དོན་མངོན་པས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་
བདག་གི་བདག་ཉིད་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་དེ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ལས་བརྗོད་
པའི་དོན་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་གཞན་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་མངོན་
པས་སོ།།

- **the property of that** (*de 'i chos, taddharma*): the property of that thesis, that is to say, [the reason which is] the property of the subject of that thesis,^a “Things are not produced from self” (*dnegos po rnams bdag gi bdag nyid las skye ba med de, na svata utpadyanti bhāvāḥ*), namely, “because their production would be just senseless and because production would be endless” (*de dag gi skye ba don med pa nyid du 'gyur ba 'i phyir dang skye ba thug pa med par 'gyur ba 'i phyir ro, tadutpadavaiyarthīyāt/atiprasaṅgadoṣācca*).

དེའི་ཚོས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་བརྒྱབ་པར་བྱ་བ་དེའི་ཚོས་ཉེ་དངོས་པོ་
རྣམས་བདག་གི་བདག་ཉིད་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་དེ་ཞེས་བརྒྱབ་པར་
བྱ་བ་དེའི་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་ཚོས་དེ་དག་གི་སྐྱེ་བ་དོན་མེད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་
འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར་དང་། སྐྱེ་བ་ལྷན་པ་མེད་པར་འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ་
ཞེས་བྱ་བའོ།།

^a *bsgrub par bya ba de 'i phyogs kyi chos.*

- **what becomes evident is the meaning of the opposite of that** (*de bzlog pa 'i don mngon pas, viparītartha...vyak-tau*): what becomes evident is the meaning of the opposite of “because their production would be just senseless” (*de dag gi skye ba don med pa nyid du 'gyur ba 'i phyir, tadut-padavaivaryāṭ*), namely, “because production has effects” (*skye ba 'bras bu dang bcas pa nyid du 'gyur ba 'i phyir, janmasāphalyāṭ*)—and the opposite of “because production would be endless” (*skye ba thug pa med par 'gyur ba 'i phyir ro, atiprasaṅgadoṣācca*)—namely, “because production has an end” (*skye ba thug pa yod pa yin pa 'i phyir, janmanirodhāṭ*). How does [Buddhapālita's explanation] come to afford an opportunity [for censure] due to the manifesting of the opposite of those? Hence, [Bhāvaviveka] utters:

དེ་བརྗོད་པའི་དོན་མངོན་པས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་དེ་དག་གི་སྐྱེ་བ་དོན་
 མེད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་བརྗོད་པའི་དོན་སྐྱེ་བ་
 འབྲས་བུ་དང་བཅས་པ་ཉིད་དུ་འགྱུར་བ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་དང་། སྐྱེ་བ་
 རླུག་པ་མེད་པར་འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་བརྗོད་པའི་དོན་
 སྐྱེ་བ་རླུག་པ་ཡོད་པར་འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་མངོན་པས་
 ལྟོ།།

དེ་དག་བརྗོད་པའི་དོན་མངོན་པས་སྐྱགས་ཇི་ལྟ་བུ་ཡོད་པར་
 འགྱུར་ཞེ་ན།

- **things are produced from other and production has effects and production has an end, due to which^a** (*dnegos po rnamsgzhan las skye ba dang / skye ba 'bras bu dang bcas pa nyid du 'gyur ba dang / skye ba thug pa yod par 'gyur ba 'i phyir,*^b

^a Or, following the Sanskrit: “Things are produced from other because production has effects and because production has an end.” (*parasmādutpannā bhāvā janmasāphalyāṭ janmanirodhāceti*, which in Tibetan would be *dnegos po rnamsgzhan las skye ba yin te/ skye ba don yod pa nyid yin pa 'i phyir dang skye ba thug pa yod pa yin pa 'i phyir ro/*)

^b See the previous footnote.

parasmādutpannā bhāvā janmasāphalyāt janmanirodhāceti): because:

- (1) since the meaning of the opposite of the thesis "Things are not produced from self" (*dn̄gos po rnams bdag gi bdag nyid las skye ba med de, na svata utpadyanti bhāvāḥ*) becomes evident, [his explanation] affords an opportunity for the censure [that what he means is] "Things are produced from other" (*dn̄gos po rnams gzhan las skye bar 'gyur ba, parasmādutpannā bhāvā*),
- (2) and since the meaning of the opposite of the property of that [that is, the opposite of the reason] "because their production would be just senseless" (*de dag gi skye ba don med pa nyid du 'gyur ba 'i phyir, tadutpadavaiyarthiyāt*) becomes evident, [his explanation] affords an opportunity for the censure [that what he means is] "because production has effects" (*skye ba 'bras bu dang bcas pa nyid du 'gyur ba 'i phyir, janmasāphalyāt*),
- (3) and since the meaning of the opposite of the property of that [that is, the opposite of the reason] "because production would be endless" (*skye ba thug pa med par 'gyur ba 'i phyir ro, atiprasaṅgadoṣācca*) becomes evident, [his explanation] affords an opportunity for the censure [that what he means is] "because production has an end" (*skye ba thug pa yod pa yin pa 'i phyir, janmanirodhāt*). As a response to a hypothetical other party who asks,^a "What fallacy is there when it turns into such?" [Bhāvaviveka] utters:
 - **it would contradict tenets.** (*mdzad pa 'i mtha' dang 'gal bar 'gyur ro, kṛtāntavirodhaḥ syāt*): it would contradict the tenets in the master [Nāgārjuna's] scriptures that it is not asserted that things are produced from other, it is not asserted that production^b has effects, and it is not asserted that production has an end.^c Therefore, this explanation

^a In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 234.6) and in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, 191.1.8) for *'dri 'i phyogs* read *'dri ba 'i phyogs* in accordance with the Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur*, vol. 98, 148.5.

^b In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 234.6) and in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, 191.2.1) for *skye bas* read *skye ba* in accordance with the Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur*, vol. 98, 148.6.

^c Jam-yang-shay-pa (see above, ; *Great Exposition of the Middle*, 262a.6-262b.4) holds

by the Elder Buddhapālita is not reasonable^a since it contradicts reasoning and scripture.

དེའི་སྐྱིར་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་གཞན་ལས་སྐྱེ་བར་འགྱུར་བ་དང་། སྐྱེ་
 བ་འབྲས་བུ་དང་བཅས་པ་ཉིད་དུ་འགྱུར་བ་དང་། སྐྱེ་བ་སྐྱུག་པ་
 ཡོད་པར་འགྱུར་བའི་སྐྱིར་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་སྐྱུས་ཏེ། བསྐྱབ་པར་བྱ་བ་
 དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་བདག་གི་བདག་ཉིད་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་དེ་ཞེས་བྱ་
 བ་བརྗོད་པའི་དོན་མངོན་པས་ནི་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་གཞན་ལས་སྐྱེ་
 བ་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་སྐྱགས་ཡོད་པར་འགྱུར་བ་དང་། དེའི་ཚོས་དེ་དག་
 གིས་སྐྱེ་བ་དོན་མེད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་འགྱུར་པའི་སྐྱིར་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་བརྗོད་
 པའི་དོན་མངོན་པས་ནི་སྐྱེ་བ་འབྲས་བུ་དང་བཅས་པ་ཉིད་ཅེས་
 བྱ་བའི་སྐྱགས་ཡོད་པར་འགྱུར་བ་དང་། དེའི་ཚོས་སྐྱེ་བ་སྐྱུག་པ་
 མེད་པར་འགྱུར་བའི་སྐྱིར་རོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་བརྗོད་པའི་དོན་མངོན་
 པས་ནི་སྐྱེ་བ་སྐྱུག་པ་ཡོད་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་སྐྱགས་ཡོད་པར་འགྱུར་
 བའི་སྐྱིར་རོ། ། དེ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་ན་ཉེས་པ་ཅི་ཡོད་ཅེས་འདྲི་བའི་
 རྩོགས་སྐྱ་མ་ཁོང་ནས་དབྱུང་བ་དེའི་ལན་དུ་མཛད་པའི་མཐའ་
 དང་འགལ་བར་འགྱུར་རོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་སྐྱུས་ཏེ། འདི་རྣམས་སྟོབ་
 དཔོན་གྱི་ལུང་ལས། དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་གཞན་ལས་སྐྱེ་བར་མི་
 བཞེད་པ་དང་། སྐྱེ་བ་འབྲས་བུ་དང་བཅས་པར་མི་བཞེད་པ་
 དང་། སྐྱེ་བ་སྐྱུག་པ་ཡོད་པར་མི་བཞེད་པའི་གྲུབ་པའི་མཐའ་
 དང་འགལ་བར་འགྱུར་རོ། ། དེ་རྣམས་ན་གནས་བརྟན་བྱུང་བ་

that the three points themselves are not the tenet that is contradicted; rather, the three points show that, according to Bhāvaviveka, Buddhapālita has contradicted the tenet of the Middle Way School that the refutation of production from self is a nonaffirming negative.

^a In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 235.2) and in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, 191.2.2) for *rig pa* read *rigs pa* in accordance with the Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur*, vol. 98, 148.7.

ལི་ཏས་རྣམས་པར་བཤད་པ་དེ་ནི་རྒྱལ་པ་དང་ལྷུང་དང་འགལ་
བས་རིགས་པ་མ་ཡིན་ལོ། །

Abbreviations

“co ne” = *co ne bstan 'gyur*. TBRC W1GS66030. *co ne dgon chen: co ne*, 1926.

“Dharma” = the *sde dge* edition of the Tibetan canon published by Dharma Press: the *Nying-ma Edition of the sDe-dge bKa'-'gyur and bsTan-'gyur*. Oakland, Calif.: Dharma Press, 1980.

“Golden Reprint” = *gser bris bstan 'gyur* (Sichuan, China: krung go'i mtho rim nang bstan slob gling gi bod brgyud nang bstan zhib 'jug khang, 1989).

“Grag pa & rnam rgyal” = Palden Drakpa and Damdul Namgyal. *drang nges legs bshad snying po: The Essence of Eloquent Speech on the Definitive and Interpretable*, 84.16-103.5. Mundgod, India: SOKU, 1991.

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“Peking” = *Tibetan Tripitaka: Peking Edition kept in the Library of the Otani University, Kyoto*. Edited by Daisetz Teitarō Suzuki. Tokyo, Kyoto, Japan: Tibetan Tripitaka Research Foundation, 1955-1961.

“*sde dge*” = *sDe dge Tibetan Tripitaka—bsTan hgyur* preserved at the Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo. Edited by Z. Yamaguchi, et al. Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1977-1984. The catalogue numbers are from Complete Catalogue of the Tibetan Buddhist Canons. Edited by Hukuji Ui. Sendai, Japan: Tohoku University, 1934. And A Catalogue of the Tohoku University Collection of Tibetan Works on Buddhism. Edited by Yensho Kanakura. Sendai, Japan: Tohoku University, 1953. TBRC W23703 (PDF of Delhi, India: Karmapae Chodhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1977).

“*stog Palace*” refers to the *Tog Palace Manuscript of the Tibetan Kanjur* (Leh, Ladakh: Smarntsis Shesrig Dpemdzod, 1979).

“TBRC” = Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center (<http://www.tbrc.org>).

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 pramāṇavārttikakārikā
 tshad ma nam 'grel gyi tshig le'ur byas pa
 Tibetan digital reprint edition: In *bstan 'gyur (sde dge, 4210)*. TBRC W23703.174:189-304 (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985).
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Compilation of Prime Cognition
 pramāṇasamuccaya
 tshad ma kun las btus pa
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Settling Difficult Points in the Opposite of the Consequences: Key to (Chandrakīrti's) "Clear

- Words,*” *Written by Jam-pay-yang Gom-day Nam-kha-gyal-tshan*
 thal bzlog gi dka’ ba’i gnas gtan la ’bebs pa ’jam pa’i dbyang sgom sde nam mkha’ rgyal mtshan
 gyis mdzad pa’i tshig gsal gyi lde mig
 in *The Obligatory Texts (Yig-cha)* for the Study of Madhyamika of Byes Grwa-tshan of Se-ra
 Monastery, Madhyamika Text Series, vol. 4
 New Delhi: Lha-mkhar yoñs-dzin bstan-pa-rgyal-mtshan, 1973.
- Gyal-tshab-dar-ma-rin-chen (*rgyal tshab dar ma rin chen*, 1364-1432)
Explanation of (Dharmakīrti’s) Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Prime Cognition”:
Unerring Illumination of the Path to Liberation / Illumination of the Path to Liberation
 tshad ma rnam ’grel gyi tshig le’ur byas pa’i rnam bshad thar lam phyin ci ma log par gsal bar
 byed pa / rnam ’grel thar lam gsal byed
 Tibetan editions: In *gsung ’bum (rgyal tshab rje, bla brang par ma)* TBRC W4CZ2710.5:229-
 410 (PDF of *bla brang: bla brang bkra shis ’khyil*, 1999).
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 Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1980-1981).
 Tibetan digital reprint edition: In *tshad ma rnam ’grel gyi rnam bshad*. TBRC W665:11-548
 (PDF of zhang kang: zhang kang then ma dpe skrun kung zi, 2000).
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 Demo, 1981. Also: Varanasi, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1974.
- Jam-yang-shay-pa Ngag-wang-tson-drü (*’jam dbyangs bzhad pa’i rdo rje ngag dbang brtson grus*,
 1648-1721/1722)
Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive / Decisive Analysis of (Tsong-kha-pa’s)
“Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive”: *Storehouse of White Beryl of Scripture*
and Reasoning Free from Mistake, Fulfilling the Hopes of the Fortunate
 drang ba dang nges pa’i don rnam par ’byed pa’i mtha’ dpyod ’khrul bral lung rigs bai dūr dkar
 pa’i ngan mdzod skal bzang re ba kun skong
 Tibetan digital reprint edition: TBRC W22186.10:1-288 (PDF of *bla brang bkra shis ’khyil*, bla
 brang bkra shis ’khyil dgon, publishing date unknown).
 Tibetan digital reprint edition: TBRC W1KG21952.1 (PDF of sbag sa: nang bstan shes rig ’dzin
 skyong slob gnyer khang, [1968]).
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 Taiwan, 2008) of the 1999 codex (Mundgod, India: Go-mang Library, 1999) based on the
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in His Teachings. UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, uma-tibet.org.
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in the Sūtras. UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, uma-tibet.org.
- Great Exposition of the Middle / Decisive Analysis of (Chandrakīrti’s) “Supplement to (Nāgār-
 juna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle’”:* *Treasury of Scripture and Reasoning, Thoroughly Illuminat-
 ing the Profound Meaning [of Emptiness], Entrance for the Fortunate*
 dbu ma chen mo / dbu ma ’jug pa’i mtha’ dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zab don kun gsal skal
 bzang ’jug ngogs
 Tibetan digital reprint edition: In *gsung ’bum (’jam dbyangs bzhad pa’i rdo rje)*. TBRC
 W21503.9:11-894 (PDF of South India?: Gomang College?, 1997?).
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 shis ’khyil: bla brang bkra shis ’khyil dgon, publishing date unknown. Also available at: TBRC

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Great Exposition of Tenets / Explanation of Tenets: Sun of the Land of Samantabhadra Brilliantly Illuminating All of Our Own and Others' Tenets and the Meaning of the Profound [Emptiness], Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning Fulfilling All Hopes of All Beings

grub mtha' chen mo / grub mtha'i rnam bshad rang gzhan grub mtha' kun dang zab don mchog tu gsal ba kun bzang zhing gi nyi ma lung rigs rgya mtsho skye dgu'i re ba kun skong

In the *Collected Works of 'Jam-dbyaṅs-bzad-pa'i-rdo-rje*: Reproduced from prints from Labrang-tra-shi-khyil blocks, 15 vols, Gedan Sungrab Minyam Gyunphel Series. New Delhi, India: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1973.

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Tibetan digital reprint edition: TBRC W22186.13:35-614 (PDF of *bla brang bkra shis 'khyil: bla brang bkra shis 'khyil dgon*, [n.d.]). Abbreviated reference: "2001 TBRC *bla brang*."

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- Translation into complex-character Chinese: Su-an Lin. *Jeffrey Hopkins' Easy Access to Jamyang-shay-pa's Maps of the Profound: Consequence School*.
- Root Text of Tenets: Lion's Roar / Presentation of Tenets: Roar of the Five-Faced [Lion] Eradicating Error, Precious Lamp Illuminating the Good Path to Omniscience*
 grub mtha' rtsa ba gdong lnga'i sgra dbyangs / grub pa'i mtha'i rnam par bzhag pa 'khrul spong
 gdong lnga'i sgra dbyangs kun mkhyen lam bzang gsal ba'i sgron me
- Collected Works of 'Jam-dbyaṅs-bzhad-pa'i-rdo-rdo-rje, vol. 14 (entire). New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1973 [this is the Tra-shi-khyil blockprint with some "corrections"].
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- Jang-kya Röl-pay-dor-je (*lcang skya rol pa'i rdo rje*, 1717-1786)
Clear Exposition of the Presentations of Tenets: Beautiful Ornament for the Meru of the Subduer's Teaching / Presentations of Tenets
 grub mtha'i rnam bzhag / grub pa'i mtha'i rnam par bzhag pa gsal bar bshad pa thub bstan lhun po'i mdzes rgyan
- Tibetan digital reprint edition: In *gsung 'bum* (*rol pa'i rdo rje*). TBRC W28833.7:7-220 (PDF of Pe Cin: krung go bod brgyud mtho rim nang bstan slob gling nang bstan zhib 'jug khang, 1995).
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- English translation of part of Consequence School chapter: Jeffrey Hopkins. *Emptiness Yoga: The Tibetan Middle Way*, 355-428. Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 1983.
- Jñānagarbha (*ye shes snying po*, eighth century)
Autocommentary of Differentiation of the Two Truths
 bden gnyis rnam 'byed pa'i 'grel pa
- Tibetan digital reprint edition: In *bstan 'gyur* (*sde dge*). TBRC W23703.107: 8-32 (PDF of: Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985).
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- Differentiation of the Two Truths*
 satyadvayavibhaṅgākārika
- bden pa gnyis rnam par 'byed pa'i tshig le'u byas pa
- Tibetan digital reprint edition: In *bstan 'gyur* (*sde dge*). TBRC W23703.107: 4-8 (PDF of: Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985).
- Kamalaśīla (*pad ma'i ngang tshul*; ca. 740-795)

Illumination of the Middle

madhyamakāloka

dbu ma snang ba

Tibetan digital reprint edition: In *bstan 'gyur* (*sde dge*, 3887). TBRC W23703.107:268-489 (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985).

Peking 5287

Khay-drub-ge-leg-pal-sang (*mkhas grub dge legs dpal bzang*, 1385-1438)

Compilation on Emptiness / Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate: Treatise Brilliantly Clarifying the Profound Emptiness

stong thun chen mo / zab mo stong pa nyid rab tu gsal bar byed pa'i bstan bcos skal bzang mig 'byed

Tibetan digital reprint edition: In *dbu ma stong thun chen mo*. TBRC W00EGS1016265:9-481 (PDF of Madhyamika Text Series, Vol. 1, New Delhi: ed. *lha mkhar yongs 'dzin bstan pa rgyal mtshan*, 1972).

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Kön-chog-jig-may-wang-po (*dkon mchog 'jigs med dbang po*, 1728-1791)

Precious Garland of Tenets / Presentation of Tenets: A Precious Garland

grub pa'i mtha'i rnam par bzhag pa rin po che'i phreng ba

Tibetan digital reprint edition: In *gsung 'bum* (*dkon mchog 'jigs med dbang po*). TBRC W1KG9560.6:496-546. New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1971. (PDF of New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1971).

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Maitreya (*byams pa*)

4. Ornament for the Clear Realizations

abhisamayālamkāra/ abhisamayālamkāra-nāma-prajñāpāramitopadeśaśāstrakārikā
mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan/ shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par
rtogs pa'i rgyan shes bya ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa

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———. *Golden Garland of Eloquence: legs bshad gser phreng*, 4 vols. Fremont, CA: Jain Publishing Company, 2008-2010.

Nāgārjuna (*klu sgrub*, first to second century, C.E.)

Treatise on the Middle / Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called "Wisdom"

madhyamakāśāstra / prajñānāmamūlamadhyamakakārikā

dbu ma'i bstan bcos / dbu ma rtsa ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa shes rab ces bya ba

Tibetan digital reprint edition: In *bstan 'gyur (sde dge, 3824)*. TBRC W23703.96:3-39, vol. tsa (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985). Peking 5224, vol. 95.

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Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness

śūnyatāsaptatikārikā

stong pa nyid bdun cu pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa

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Peking 5227, vol. 95.

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Precious Garland of Advice for the King

rājaparīkathāratnāvalī

rgyal po la gdam bya ba rin po che'i phreng ba

Tibetan digital reprint edition: In *bstan 'gyur* (*sde dge*, 4158). TBRC W23703.172:215-253 (PDF of Delhi, India: Del-hi Karmapae choedhey, gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985).

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Navidharma

Stanzas Demonstrating a Condensation of Exclusions

piṇḍanivartananirdeśakārikā

ldog pa bsdu pa bstan pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa

Tibetan digital reprint edition: In *bstan 'gyur* (*sde dge*, 4293, *sgra mdo*, *she* 250b.7-254a.3. TBRC W23703.196:502-509 (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985).

Peking 5782, *sgra rig pa*, *le* 245b.6-249a.6 (vol.140, p.100-101).

[N] *le* 230b.1-234a.4. [Kinsha] 3782, *le* 316b.1 (p.159-3-1).

Commentary on "Stanzas Demonstrating a Condensation of Exclusions"

piṇḍanivartananirdeśāvarttika

ldog pa bsdu pa bstan pa'i mnam 'grel

Tibetan digital reprint edition: In *bstan 'gyur* (*sde dge*, 4294, *sgra mdo*, *she* 254a.4-277a.7. [N] *le* 234a.4-260b.2). TBRC W23703.196:509-555 (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae

- choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985).
 Peking 5783, *sgra rig pa*, le 249a.6-273b.7 (vol.140, p.101-111).
 [N] le 234a.4-260b.2. [Kinsha] 3783, le 322b.1 (p.163-1-1).
 Ngag-wang-pal-dan (*ngag dbang dpal ldan*, b. 1797), also known as Pal-dan-chö-jay (*dpal ldan chos rje*)
Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-pa's) "Great Exposition of Tenets": Freeing the Knots of the Difficult Points, Precious Jewel of Clear Thought
 grub mtha' chen mo'i mchan 'grel dka' gnad mdud grol blo gsal gces nor
 Sarnath, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1964. Tibetan digital reprint edition: In TBRC W5842.1 (PDF of Sarnath, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1964.).
 Collected Works of Chos-rje ñag-dbañ Dpal-ldan of Urga, vols. 4 (entire)-5, 1-401. Delhi: Guru Deva, 1983. Tibetan digital reprint edition: In *gsung 'bum (nga dbang dpal ldan)*. TBRC W5926.177. 3-356 (PDF of Delhi, India: Mongolian Lama Gurudeva, 1983).
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Explanation of Veil Truths and the Ultimate in the Four Systems of Tenets
 grub mtha' bzhi'i lugs kyi kun rdzob dang don dam pa'i don rnam par bshad pa legs bshad dpyid kyi dpal mo'i glu dbyangs
 Tibetan digital reprint edition: In *gsung 'bum (ngag dbang dpal ldan)*. TBRC W5926.1:9-280 (PDF of Delhi, India: Mongolian Lama Gurudeva, 1983).
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Stating the Modes of Explanation in the Textbooks on the Middle Way and the Perfection of Wisdom in the Lo-sel-ling and Go-mang Colleges: Festival for Those of Clear Intelligence
 blo gsal gling dang bkra shis sgo mang grwa tshang gi dbu phar gyi yig cha'i bshad tshul bkod pa blo gsal dga' ston
 Tibetan digital reprint edition: In *gsung 'bum (ngag dbang dpal ldan)*. TBRC W5926.3:417-598. (PDF of Delhi, India: Mongolian Lama Gurudeva, 1983).
Word Commentary on the Root Verses of (Jam-yang-shay-pa's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets'
 tshig 'grel / grub mtha' chen mo'i mchan 'grel gyi skabs skabs su mdzad pa'i rtsa ba'i tshig 'grel zur du bkod pa
 In *Collected Works of Chos-rje ñag-dbañ Dpal-ldan of Urga*, vols. 4 (entire)-5, 1-401. Delhi: Guru Deva, 1983.
 Tibetan digital reprint edition: In *gsung 'bum (nga dbang dpal ldan)*. TBRC W5926.177. 3-356 (PDF of Delhi, India: Mongolian Lama Gurudeva, 1983).
grub mtha' chen mo'i mchan 'grel dka' gnad mdud grol blo gsal gces nor, Taipei Edition (see above), includes Ngag-wang-pal-dan's *Word Commentary on the Root Verses*.
 Prajñāmokṣha (*shes rab thar pa*)
Commentary on (Atisha's) "Quintessential Instructions on the Middle Way"
 dbu ma'i man ngag ces bya ba'i 'grel ba
 Tibetan digital reprint edition: In *bstan 'gyur (dpe bsdur ma)*. TBRC W1PD95844.64:381-399 (PDF of Pe cin: krung go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang, 1994-2008).
 Ren-da-wa Shön-nu-lo-drö (*red mda' ba gzhon nu blo gros*, 1349-1412)
Commentary on (Chandrakīrti's) "Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) 'Fundamental Treatise on the Middle'" : Illuminating the Tenable
 dbu ma rtsa ba'i 'grel pa 'thad pa'i snang ba
 Tibetan digital reprint edition: In *gsung 'bum (gzhon nu blo gros)* TBRC W23629.2:155-478 (PDF of Kathmandu: Sa skya rgyal yongs gsung rab slob gnyer khang, 1999).
 Shāntideva (*zhi ba lha*, eighth century C.E.)
Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds

bodhi[sattva]caryāvātāra

byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa

Tibetan digital reprint edition: In *bstan 'gyur (sde dge, 3871)*. TBRC W23703.105: 84-578, dbu ma, vol. la (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985).

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Ta-drin-rab-tan (*rta mgrin rab brtan, tre hor dge bshes, 1920-1986*)

Annotations / Annotations for the Difficult Points of (Tsong-kha-pa's) "The Essence of Eloquence": Festival for the Unbiased Endowed with Clear Intelligence

drang nges nmam 'byed legs bshad snying po dka' gnad nams mchan bur bkod pa gzur gnas blo gsal dga' ston

Tibetan digital reprint edition: TBRC W1KG10421, 1 vol. (No publication data).

Delhi: Lhun-grub-chos-grags, 1978.

Tag-tshang Shay-rab-rin-chen (*stag tshang lo tsā ba shes rab rin chen, b.1405*)

Explanation of "Freedom from Extremes through Knowing All Tenets": Ocean of Eloquence

grub mtha' kun shes nas mtha' bral grub pa zhes bya ba'i bstan bcos mam par bshad pa legs bshad kyī rgya mtsho

Tibetan digital edition: In *grub mtha' kun shes nas mtha' bral sgrub pa zhes bya ba'i bstan bcos*: TBRC W29895: 55-271 (PDF of Pe Cin: Mi Rigs dpe skrun khang, 2004).

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Freedom from Extremes through Knowing All Tenets

grub mtha' kun shes nas mtha' bral grub pa zhes bya ba'i bstan bcos

Tibetan digital edition: In *grub mtha' kun shes nas mtha' bral sgrub pa zhes bya ba'i bstan bcos*: TBRC W29895: 29-54 (PDF of Pe Cin: Mi Rigs dpe skrun khang, 2004).

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Tsong-kha-pa Lo-sang-drag-pa (*tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa, 1357-1419*)

Explanation of (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle": Ocean of Reasoning / Great Commentary on (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle"

dbu ma rtsa ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa shes rab ces bya ba'i nram bshad rigs pa'i rgya mtsho / rtsa

shes tik chen

Tibetan digital reprint edition: In *gsung 'bum (tsong kha pa, bla brang par ma)*. TBRC W22273.15:5-622 (PDF of bla brang: bla brang bkra shis 'khyil, [199?]).

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dbu ma la 'jug pa'i rgya cher bshad pa dgongs pa rab gsal

Tibetan digital reprint edition: In *gsung 'bum (tsong kha pa, bla brang par ma)*. TBRC W22273.16:5-582 (PDF of bla brang: bla brang bkra shis 'khyil, [199?]).

Peking 6143, vol. 154.

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lam rim mchan bzhi sbrags ma/ mnyam med rje btsun tsong kha pa chen pos mdzad pa'i byang chub lam rim chen mo'i dka' ba'i gnad mams mchan bu bzhi'i sgo nas legs par bshad pa theg chen lam gyi gsal sgron

Tibetan digital reprint edition: In *lam rim mchan bzhi sbrags ma (bla brang bkra shis 'khyil par ma)*. TBRC W29037.1:3- 978 (PDF of bla brang bkra shis 'khyil edition printed from the 1807 bla brang bkra shis 'khyil blocks in 1999?).

Also: New Delhi: Chos-'phel-legs-ldan, 1972.

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Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path / Stages of the Path to Enlightenment Thoroughly Teaching All the Stages of Practice of the Three Types of Beings

lam rim chen mo / skyes bu gsum gyi nyams su blang ba'i rim pa thams cad tshang bar ston pa'i byang chub lam gyi rim pa

Tibetan digital reprint edition: In *gsung 'bum (tsong kha pa, bla brang par ma)*. TBRC W22273.13:51026 (PDF of bla brang: bla brang bkra shis 'khyil, [199?]).

Peking 6001, vol. 152.

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sde bdun la 'jug pa'i sgo don gnyer yid kyi mun sel

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sde dge, 5416.

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Medium-Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment to be Practiced by Beings of the Three Capacities / Medium-Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment to be Practiced by Beings of the Three Capacities together with an Outline / Short Exposition of the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment

skyes bu gsum gyis nyams su blang ba'i byang chub lam gyi rim pa / skyes bu gsum gyi nyams su blang ba'i byang chub lam gyi rim pa bring po sa bead kha skong dang beas pa / lam rim 'bring / lam rim chung ngu

Tibetan digital reprint edition: In *gsung 'bum (tsong kha pa, bla brang par ma)*. TBRC W22273.14:5-474 (PDF of bla brang: bla brang bkra shis 'khyil, 199?);

Peking 6002, vol. 152-153.

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Treatise Differentiating Interpretable and Definitive Meanings: The Essence of Eloquence

drang ba dang nges pa'i don rnam par phye ba'i bstan bcos legs bshad snying po

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Tibetan digital reprint edition: In *gsung 'bum (tsong kha pa)*. TBRC W22274.19 (PDF of sde dge lhun grub steng: sde dge par khang, n.p.).

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Ye-shay-day (ye shes sde, fl. 8th century)

Distinctions in the Views

lta ba'i khyad par

Tibetan digital reprint edition: In *bstan 'gyur (sde dge)*, 4360. TBRC W23703.206:428-457 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985).

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Jeffrey Hopkins is Professor Emeritus of Tibetan Buddhist Studies at the University of Virginia where he taught Tibetan Buddhist Studies and Tibetan language for thirty-two years from 1973. He received a B.A. *magna cum laude* from Harvard University in 1963, trained for five years at the Lamaist Buddhist Monastery of America in Freewood Acres, New Jersey, USA (now the Tibetan Buddhist Learning Center in Washington, New Jersey), and received a Ph.D. in Buddhist Studies from the University of Wisconsin in 1973.

He served as His Holiness the Dalai Lama's chief interpreter into English on lecture tours for ten years, 1979-1989. At the University of Virginia he founded programs in Buddhist Studies and Tibetan Studies and served as Director of the Center for South Asian Studies for twelve years. He has published fifty-one books, some of which have been translated into a total of twenty-two languages. He published the first translation of the foundational text of the Jo-nang school of Tibetan Buddhism in *Mountain Doctrine: Tibet's Fundamental Treatise on Other-Emptiness and the Buddha-Matrix*, and two on the Nying-ma view, *Fundamental Mind: The Nyingma View of the Great Completeness* and *Mi-pam-gya-tsho's Primordial Enlightenment: The Nying-ma View of Luminosity and Emptiness, Analysis of Fundamental Mind, with oral commentary by Khetsun Sangpo*.

He has translated and edited sixteen books from oral teachings by His Holiness the Dalai Lama, the last four being *How to See Yourself as You Really Are*; *Becoming Enlightened*; *How to Be Compassionate*; and *The Heart of Meditation: Discovering Innermost Awareness*. He is the Founder and President of the UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies.

The first stanza of the first chapter of Nāgārjuna’s *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called “Wisdom”* is:

Not from self, not from others,
Not from both, not causelessly
Do any things
Ever arise anywhere.

Uncharacteristically, Nāgārjuna says nothing more about the first leg of this reasoning—that things are not produced from self. He immediately proceeds to the reasoning proving that things are not produced from other by examining the four types of conditions. His principal Indian commentators, however, explain the refutation of production from self in varying detail, the differences engendering the split between what came to be called the Autonomy School and the Consequence School.

Buddhapālita’s commentary on the refutation of production from self provoked Bhāvaviveka into extensive criticism and hence into a demonstration of his own preferred style of commentary. The present book provides two Tibetan explanations of the controversy, shorter and longer, by the Tibetan scholar Jam-yang-shay-pa Ngag-wang-tson-drü. Included also are translations of Buddhapālita’s and Bhāvaviveka’s commentaries as well as the first translation into English of Avalokitavrata’s extensive Bhāvaviveka’s presentation, his minute examination allowing Bhāvaviveka’s terse text to be seen in high relief. Bhāvaviveka’s argument is seen as it could not be otherwise.

This complex topic is used in Tibetan monastic colleges to draw students into fascinating reflections about how phenomena appear and thereby to explore the nature of the reality behind appearances.

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