What Constitutes a Correct Reason?
Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s
Illuminating a Little the Presentation of Signs and Reasonings:
Beautiful Golden Garland of Eloquence, 2

Katherine M. Rogers
Edited by Jeffrey Hopkins
In consultation with Lo-sang-gyal-tshan

UMA INSTITUTE FOR TIBETAN STUDIES
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JAM-YANG-ZHAY-PA

Jam-yang-zhay-pa Ngag-wang-tsön-drü\(^a\) was born in the northeastern Am-do Province of Tibet in the Earth-Mouse year of 1648 east of the Blue Lake.\(^b\) At the age of five he was blessed by the Fifth Dalai Lama, from whom he later received monastic vows. Having studied the alphabet at age seven with his uncle, who was a monk, he mastered reading and writing and six years later became a novice monk, excelling among his fellow students by his ability quickly to understand texts and disputations. He went to Lhasa at age twenty-one to further his studies at the Gomang College of Dre-pung Monastic University. Arriving in Lhasa in 1668, he offered a presentation scarf to an image of Mañjushrī in the Jo-khang Temple, where the statue reportedly favored the young scholar with a smile, due to which he became known as Jam-yang-zhay-pa, “Smiled Upon by Mañjushrī.” Six years later he received full ordination and at twenty-nine entered Gyu-may Tantric College. From age thirty-three he spent two years in meditative retreat in a cave near Dre-pung.

At the age of thirty-eight in 1685 he published the first of his major works, Decisive Analysis of (Tsong-kha-pa’s) “Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive”: Storehouse of White Lapis-Lazuli of Scripture and Reasoning Free from Mistake, Fulfilling the Hopes of the Fortunate, commonly called Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive. In 1688 he published another of his great expositions, the Treatise on the Presentations of the Concentrative and Formless Absorptions: Adornment Beautifying the Subduer’s Teaching, Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning, Delighting the Fortunate, commonly called Great Exposition of the Concentrative and Formless Absorptions. He published the Root Text of Tenets: Lion’s Roar in 1689, and published the Great Exposition of Tenets—its prose auto-commentary—ten years later in 1699, and between those two, in 1695, he published the Decisive Analysis of (Chandrakīrti’s) “Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle’”: Treasury of

\(^a\) ‘jam dbyangs bzhad pa ngag dbang brtson grus, 1648-1722. For a longer biography of Jam-yang-zhay-pa see Derek F. Maher, “Knowledge and Authority in Tibetan Middle Way Schools of Buddhism: A Study of the Gelukha (dge lugs pa) Epistemology of Jamyang Shayba (‘jam dbyangs bzhad pa) In Its Historical Context” (Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, 2003), 169-196.

Scripture and Reasoning, Thoroughly Illuminating the Profound Meaning [of Emptiness], Entrance for the Fortunate, also called the Great Exposition of the Middle.

At age fifty-three in 1700 he became abbot of Go-mang College and in 1709 at sixty-two returned to Am-do Province, where he founded a highly influential monastery at Tra-shi-khyil\(^a\) in 1710. Seven years later he founded a tantric college at the same place. He wrote prolifically on the full range of topics of a typical Tibetan polymath and, having received honors from the central Tibetan government and from the Chinese Emperor, died at the age of seventy-three or -four in 1721/2.\(^b\)

Partly because of the close connection between Go-mang College and the Mongolian peoples stretching from the Caspian Sea through Siberia, who were predominantly Ge-lug-pa by this time, Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s influence on the Ge-lug-pa order has been considerable. His life manifests a pattern typical of many influential Tibetan religious figures—child prodigy, learned scholar, disseminator of the religion, politician, priest to political personages, monastery leader, yogi, magician, popular teacher, and prolific writer.

THE PRESENTATION OF SIGNS AND REASONINGS

The text translated here is the second section of Jam-yang-zhay-pa Ngag-wang-tson-drü’s\(^c\) Illuminating a Little the Presentation of Signs and Reasonings: Beautiful Golden Garland of Eloquence.\(^d\) Belonging to the debate-oriented decisive analysis (mtha’ dpyod) genre, it is an introductory textbook (yig cha) for the study of logic at the Go-mang Monastic College and at La-brang Tra-shi-khyil as well as their affiliated institutions throughout Inner Asia. In the curriculum this aspect of study is followed by Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s very lengthy decisive analysis of Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid Cognition” titled Decisive Analysis of the “Commentary on Valid Cognition” Fully Revealing the Path of Liberation: Hundreds of Blazing Lights of Valid Cognition.

Since their founding by Tsong-kha-pa in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, Ge-lug-pa monastic institutions, like those of other Tibetan orders, created their own systems of education. These often included

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\(^a\) bkra shis ‘khyil.
\(^b\) See Maher, “Knowledge and Authority in Tibetan Middle Way Schools of Buddhism,” 164.
\(^c\) ’jam dbyangs bzhad pa’i rdo rje ngag dbang brtson grus, 1648-1721/1722.
\(^d\) rtags rigs kyi rnam bzhag nyung gsal legs bshad gser gyi phreng mdzes.
a curriculum designed to enable the student to develop a “path of reasoning,” a consciousness trained in reasoned analysis until it can use analysis to realize initially the meaning of religious texts and eventually the true nature of reality. Reasoning is used to draw conclusions based on evidence, signs; and thus Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s book begins with a definition of a correct sign, and then lays out illustrations, divisions, how entailment operates, and so forth—all within the rubric of sometimes jaw-dropping challenges in the form of debates.

EDITIONS CONSULTED

Three basic editions of Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s Illuminating a Little the Presentation of Signs and Reasonings: Beautiful Golden Garland of Eloquence were consulted:

1. **chos thams cad rigs pas gtan la ’bebs pa’i gtan tshigs kyi rnam bzhag legs par bshad pa bzhugs so**. Published at Go-mang College, Lhasa, Tibet, date unknown. Interlinear reference in the Tibetan text “[G##a/b].” Abbreviated reference: “2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa,” so named because of being acquired in Lhasa, Tibet, at Go-mang College in 2015 by Jongbok Yi for the UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies. This version was likely originally printed at Go-mang College, Lhasa, Tibet, during Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s residence at Go-mang College. (To be made available at UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, uma-tibet.org.) Portion translated here: 9b.4-18a.2.

2. **rtags rigs kyi rnam bzhag nyung gs al legs bshad gser gvi phreng mdzes zhes bya ba bzhugs so**. TBRC W22186.14:176-304, which is a PDF of: bla brang bkra shis ’khyil: bla brang bkra shis ’khyil dgon, [n.d.]. Interlinear reference in the Tibetan text “[L##a/b].” Abbreviated reference: “2011 TBRC bla brang,” so named because of being acquired by E. Gene Smith for the Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center at the request of the UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies in 2010 and added to TBRC in 2011. This edition, which is a revision of the above edition, was originally printed in La-brang-tra-shi-khyil monastery founded by Jam-yang-zhay-pa after his return to Am-do. It is the preferred edition, in general, though not always. Portion translated here: 13a.4-26a.1.

3. **rtags rigs kyi rnam bzhag nyung gs al legs bshad gser phreng mdzes zhes bya ba bzhugs so**. Drepung Gomang Library Computer Section, North Karana, Karnataka, India, 2015. It appears to have been edited based on the “2011 TBRC bla brang” and the “2015 Old Go-mang

The digital Tibetan text of Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s *Presentation of Signs and Reasonings* provided in this book was supplied by the Drepung Gomang Library of Go-mang College in Mundgod, Karnataka State, India. I have edited it in consultation with all three of the above editions as well as other sources.

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Technical Notes

Please notice that:

• Full bibliographical references are given in the footnotes at first citation.
• For translations and editions of texts, see the Bibliography.
• The names of Indian Buddhist schools are translated into English in an effort to increase accessibility for non-specialists.
• For the names of Indian scholars and systems cited in the body of the text, \( ch \), \( sh \), and \( sh \) are used instead of the more usual \( c \), \( ś \), and \( s \) for the sake of easy pronunciation by non-specialists; however, \( cch \) is used for \( cch \), not \( chchh \). In parentheses the usual transliteration system for Sanskrit is used.
• Transliteration of Tibetan is done in accordance with a system devised by Turrell Wylie; see “A Standard System of Tibetan Transcription,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 22 (1959): 261-267.
• The names of Indian authors and orders are given in “essay phonetics” for the sake of easy pronunciation and internet accessibility.
• The names of Indian authors have been added to all citations.
• Ellipses are only used to depict authors’ own ellipses; thus, the usual practice of announcing citations that begin midstream with an ellipsis is not followed; the citation merely begins midstream, mirroring the Tibetan.
• In the Tibetan text when I have filled in an author’s ellipsis with the missing material, turquoise highlight indicates the material added in place of the author’s ellipsis and the added text is put in smaller type inside brackets in order to preserve access to the author’s intended text, and in the English translation only a footnote indicates that the material has been filled in, in order to avoid clutter in the translation.
• Tibetan passages cited in the notes often vary from Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s citations likely due to different editions and often also to his editing translations from Sanskrit.
Illuminating a Little the Presentation of Signs and Reasonings: Beautiful Golden Garland of Eloquence

Second in the series: Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s Illuminating a Little the Presentation of Signs and Reasonings: Beautiful Golden Garland of Eloquence


Key to the colorization: In situations of debate the Tibetan text and the translation are highlighted in three colors: black, blue and red. Blue colored statements represent what Jam-yang-zhay-pa considers to be right, while red colored statements represent what Jam-yang-zhay-pa considers to be wrong. Words in black are other information or function structurally. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight indicates material added in place of ellipses, and magenta highlight sets off the ellipsis indicators when the elided part has been filled in.
2. Explaining the definition of correct sign

That which is the three modes is the definition of correct sign because Dignāga’s Aphorisms on Valid Cognition [his Compilation of Valid Cognition] says:\textsuperscript{a}

[Inference] for oneself

Is to see an object [of inference] from a sign that is the three modes.

The three modes exist because the three—property of the subject, forward pervasion, and counter pervasion—are those.

With regard to the individual three modes, there are six [parts]: definitions, divisions, valid cognitions that are means of proof, valid cognitions ascertaining positive and negative concomitance, explaining the root meaning, and elimination of relevant qualms.

\textsuperscript{a} tshad ma kun las btus pa (pramāṇasamuccaya), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4203), BDRC W23703.174:189-304 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 4a.1.
a. Definitions of the individual three modes

That ascertained by valid cognition as just existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, in the flawless subject sought to be known in a specified proof is the definition of property of the subject in that proof.

That ascertained by valid cognition as just existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, in the flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent is the definition of property of the subject in the proof of sound as impermanent.

That ascertained by valid cognition as just existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, in the flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product, is the definition of property of the subject in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product.

Such a way of positing the definitions [of property of the subject] is logically feasible because of being proven by Dharmakīrti’s Ascertainment of
Valid Cognition which says:\(^a\)

Ascertained as existent in the object of inference [that is, the subject] as well as in what is similar to [the object inferred, that is, the predicate of the proposition], and

Ascertained as nonexistent in the nonexistent [that is, ascertained as nonexistent in what is without similarity to the object inferred, that is, the predicate of the proposition].

and the root text [Dharmakīrti’s *Drop of Reasoning*]\(^b\) and commentary, Dharmottara’s *Lesser Logicality* [his Commentary on (Dharmakīrti’s) ‘Drop of Reasoning’].\(^c\) which say:

Just existent in that which is to be inferred [that is, the subject].

That ascertained by valid cognition as just existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, in solely the similar class in a specified proof is the definition of forward pervasion in that proof.

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\(^a\) *tshad ma rnam par nges pa* (pramāṇaviniścaya), in *bstan ’gyur* (sde dge, 4211), BDRC W23703.174:305-462 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 168b.7.

\(^b\) *rigs pa’i thigs pa zhes bya ba’i rab tu byed pa* (nyāyabinduprakarana), in *bstan ’gyur* (sde dge, 4212), BDRC W23703.174:463-477 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 231b.7.

\(^c\) *rigs pa’i thigs pa’i rgya cher ’grel pa* (nyāyabinduṭīkā), in *bstan ’gyur* (sde dge, 4231), BDRC W23703.189:74-185 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 47b.4: *rjes su dpag par bya ba de la rtags yod pa nyid du nges pa ni tshul geig yin no* /

**Key to colorization:** Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipse. Magenta highlight = ellipse has been filled in.
That ascertained by valid cognition as just existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, in solely the similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent is the definition of forward pervasion in the proof of sound as impermanent.

Such is the way of positing the definitions [of forward pervasion] because Dharmakīrti’s Drop of Reasoning says:

Ascertained as just existent in just the similar class

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\(^a\) rigs pa ’thig pa zhes bya ba ’i rab tu byed pa (nyāyabinduprakāraṇa), in bsTan ‘gyur (sde dge, 4212), BDRC W23703.174:463-477. This appears to be an abbreviation of Dharmakīrti’s Drop of Reasoning, 232a.1: mthun pa ’i phyogs nyid la yod pa dang mi mthun pa ’i phyogs la med pa nyid du nges pa’o /

\(^b\) In the complete passage, in Dharmakīrti’s Drop of Reasoning, 232a.1 (see preceding note), this second nyid does not follow mthun pa ’i phyogs nyid la yod pa, but rather follows mi mthun pa ’i phyogs la med pa. Both texts, 2011 BDRC bla brang, 14a.2, and 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 10a.4, contain the same abbreviated version of this passage as used here by Jam-yang-zhay pa, with nyid following mthun pa ’i phyogs la yod pa.
and Dharmakīrti’s *Ascertainment of Valid Cognition* says:\(^a\)

Existent in what is similar to [the object of inference]

\(\text{ནམ་ངེས་ལས། དེ་མཐོང་ལ་ཡོད་དང་། ཞེས་དང་།}\

and Dignāga’s *Door to Valid Reasoning* says:\(^b\)

That ascertained as just existent in just the similar class is one mode;

\(\text{ཞེས་དང་།}\

and also Jetārī’s *Introducing Children to Logic* says:\(^c\)

He [Dignāga] says, “Ascertained also as existent in just the similar class.”

\(\text{ཞེས་དང་།}\

and Dharmottara’s [Greater] Logicality [his Commentarial Explanation of (Dharmakīrti’s) “Ascertainment of Valid Cognition”] says:\(^d\)

That ascertained as just existent in just the similar class is one mode;

\(\text{ཞེས་དང་།}\

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\(^a\) *tshad ma rnam par nges pa (pramāṇaviniścaya)*, in *bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4211)*, BDRC W23703.174:305-462, 168b.7: *rjes dpag bya dang de mthunugs pa / yod dang med la med par ni / nges pa /

\(^b\) *tshad ma rigs par ’jug pa’i sgo zhes bya ba’i rab tu byed pa (nyāyapraveśa-nāmāpramāṇaprakaranā)*, in *bstan ’gyur (snar thang, 4473)*, BDRC W22704.183:370-379 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 183b.6-183b.7.

\(^c\) *byis pa ’jug pa’i rtog ge (bāḷāvatārātarka)*, in *bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4263)*, BDRC W23703.190:652-674 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 329a.7.

\(^d\) *tshad ma rnam par nges pa ’i ’grel bshad / ’thad ldan (le’u gyum pa) (pramāṇaviniścayatīkā)*, in *bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4227)*, BDRC W23703.213 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985). This appears to be a paraphrase of Dharmottara’s Greater Logicality, 164a.2, *rjes su ’gro ba can gyi gtan tshigs de la yang gal te’ di mthun pa’i phyogs nyid la yod pa yin na /

*Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.*
and also Paṇḍita Mokṣḥākaragupta’s The Language of Logic says:\(^a\)

That ascertained as existent in solely the similar class is the second mode having the name “positive concomitance” [or forward pervasion].

That ascertained by valid cognition as just nonexistent in the dissimilar class, in accordance with the mode of statement, in a specified proof, by the power of the [sign’s] relation with the meaning-isolate of the explicit predicate of the proposition in that proof is the definition of counter pervasion in that proof.

When applied to a specific instance, that ascertained by valid cognition as just nonexistent in the dissimilar class, in accordance with the mode of statement, in the proof of [sound as impermanent], by the power of the [sign’s] relation with the meaning-isolate of the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent is the definition of counter pervasion in the proof of sound as impermanent because Dignāga’s Aphorisms on Valid Cognition [his Compilation of Valid Cognition] says:\(^b\)

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\(^a\) rtog ge’i skad (tarkabhāṣā), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4264), BDRC W23703.190:674-739 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa choedhey, gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 347a.3.

\(^b\) tshad ma kun las btus pa zhes bya ba’i rab tu byed pa (pramāṇasaṃuccaya), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4203), BDRC W23703.174:189-304. This appears to be an abbreviation of Dignāga’s poetry in Aphorisms on Valid Cognition, 4a.3: rjes dpag bya dang de mthun la / yod dang med nyid la med pa’o.

Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
[Exist]ent in the object of inference [and in what is similar to the object of inference], and nonexistent in just the nonexistent [that is, nonexistent in just what is without similarity to the object of inference]

and Dharmakīrti’s *Ascertainment of Valid Cognition* says:

Ascertained as existent in the object of inference [that is, the subject] as well as in what is similar to [the object of inference], and ascertained as nonexistent in the nonexistent [that is, ascertained as nonexistent in what is without similarity to the object of inference].

and Dharmakīrti’s *Drop of Reasoning* says:

Ascertained as just nonexistent in the dissimilar class.

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*a tsad ma rnam par ngoes pa (pramāṇaviniścaya), in bstan'gyur (sde dge, 4211), BDRC W23703.174:305-462. This appears to be an abbreviation of Dharmakīrti’s poetry in Ascertainment of Valid Cognition, 168b.7: rjes dpag bya dang de mshangs pa / yod dang med la med par ni / ngoes pa /  
b rigs pa'i thig pa zhes bya ba'i rab tu byed pa (nyāyabinduprakāraṇa), in bstan'gyur (sde dge, 4212), BDRC W23703.174:463-477, 232a.1.*
and also Jetārī’s [Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Door to Valid Reasoning”] says:\(^a\)

He [Dignāga] says, “The counter pervasion is ascertained as just nonexistent in the dissimilar class.”

and also Mokṣākaragupta’s The Language of Logic says:\(^c\)

That which is not the similar class is the dissimilar class; that which is ascertained as solely nonexistent in that [dissimilar class], is the third mode having the name “negative concomitance” [or counter pervasion].

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\(^a\) byis pa ’jug pa’i rtog ge (bālávatārataka), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4263), BDRC W23703.190:652-674, 329b.1.

\(^b\) Jetārī’s Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Door to Valid Reasoning, 329b.1, does not include ldog khyab ni here.

\(^c\) rtog ge’i skad (tarkabhāṣā), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4264), BDRC W23703.190:674-739, 347a.7.
1) **BRIEF DECISIVE ANALYSIS [OF PROPERTY OF THE SUBJECT]**

14. **Someone says:** That ascertained by valid cognition as just existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, in the subject in the proof of sound as impermanent is the definition of property of the subject in the proof of sound as impermanent. Furthermore, the meaning of this is that (1) sound is it [(that which goes as) the property of the subject in the proof of sound as impermanent], (2) it [(that which goes as) the property of the subject in the proof of sound as impermanent] is with the subject, sound [that is, impermanent is an attribute of sound], and (3) whatever is it [(that which goes as) the property of the subject in the proof of sound as impermanent] is necessarily impermanent.

**Our response:** Well then, it [absurdly] follows that the subject, impermanent, is the property of the subject in the proof of sound as impermanent because sound is it [impermanent], it [impermanent] is with the subject, sound [that is, impermanent is an attribute of sound], and whatever is it [impermanent] is necessarily impermanent.

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*a* 2011 BDRC *bla brang*, 14b.4; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 10b.3.

*b* The three su ’gro rgyu de were inserted by Lo-sang-gyal-tshan.
Both the first and second signs [which are that sound is (impermanent) and that (impermanent) is with the subject, sound] are established because sound is it [impermanent]. If you say that the third [sign which is that whatever is (impermanent) is necessarily impermanent] is not established, [our own position is] it follows that with respect to the subject, impermanent, whatever is it [impermanent] is necessarily it [impermanent] because it [impermanent] is selfless.

If you [incorrectly] accept [that impermanent is the property of the subject in the proof of sound as impermanent, our own position is] it follows that the subject, impermanent, is not the property of the subject in the proof of sound as impermanent because of being one of the nine nonestablished reasons in the proof of [sound as impermanent]. It follows [that impermanent is one of the nine nonestablished reasons in the proof of sound as impermanent] because of being a nonestablished reason due to the non-difference of the sign and the predicate of the proposition in the proof of [sound as impermanent].
If you [incorrectly] say [that the sign which is that impermanent is a nonestablished reason due to the nondifference of the sign and the predicate of the proposition in the proof of (sound as impermanent)] is not established, [our own position is] it follows that with respect to the subject, impermanent, it [impermanent] is a nonestablished reason due to the nondifference of the sign and the predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as it [impermanent] by the sign of it [impermanent] because it [impermanent] is a selflessness of persons.

Furthermore, it [absurdly] follows that the subject, sound, is the property of the subject in the proof of sound as impermanent because of being [according to you] ascertained by valid cognition as just existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, in the subject in the proof of sound as impermanent. It follows [that sound is ascertained by valid cognition as just existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, in the subject in the proof of sound as impermanent] because sound is it [sound], it [sound] is with the subject, sound, and whatever is it [sound] is necessarily impermanent. Each of these signs [that sound is sound, that sound is with the subject, sound, and that whatever is sound is necessarily impermanent] is established because of being one with sound [that is, because sound is one with sound].

If you [incorrectly] accept [that sound is the property of the subject in the proof of sound as impermanent, our own position is] it follows that the subject, sound, is not the property of the subject in the proof of sound as

Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
impermanent because [sound] is a nonestablished reason due to the nondifference of the basis [of debate] and the sign in the proof of [sound as impermanent].

If you [incorrectly] say [that the sign which is that sound is a nonestablished reason due to the nondifference of the basis of debate and the sign in the proof of sound as impermanent] is not established, [our own position is] it follows that with respect to the subject, sound, it [sound] is a nonestablished reason due to the nondifference of the basis [of debate] and the sign in the proof of it [sound] as impermanent by the sign of it [sound] because it [sound] is selfless.

Furthermore, it follows that with respect to the subject, sound, it [sound] is a nonestablished reason due to the nondifference of the basis [of debate] and the sign in the proof of it [sound] as impermanent by the sign of it [sound] because it [sound] is set as both the basis of debate and the sign in the proof of [sound as impermanent].

Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
15. **Someone says:** That ascertained by valid cognition as just existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, in the subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent, in the manner of the mutual difference of it and the subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent is the definition of property of the subject in the proof of [sound as impermanent].

**Our response:** It [absurdly] follows that the subject, impermanent, is the property of the subject in the proof of sound as impermanent because it [impermanent] is ascertained by valid cognition as just existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, in the subject sought to be known in the proof of [sound as impermanent], in the manner of the mutual difference of it [impermanent] and the subject sought to be known in the proof of [sound as impermanent].

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15. Someone says: That ascertained by valid cognition as just existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, in the subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent, in the manner of the mutual difference of it and the subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent is the definition of property of the subject in the proof of [sound as impermanent].

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, impermanent, is the property of the subject in the proof of sound as impermanent because it [impermanent] is ascertained by valid cognition as just existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, in the subject sought to be known in the proof of [sound as impermanent], in the manner of the mutual difference of it [impermanent] and the subject sought to be known in the proof of [sound as impermanent].

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15. Someone says: That ascertained by valid cognition as just existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, in the subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent, in the manner of the mutual difference of it and the subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent is the definition of property of the subject in the proof of [sound as impermanent].

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, impermanent, is the property of the subject in the proof of sound as impermanent because it [impermanent] is ascertained by valid cognition as just existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, in the subject sought to be known in the proof of [sound as impermanent], in the manner of the mutual difference of it [impermanent] and the subject sought to be known in the proof of [sound as impermanent].
It follows that [(impermanent) is ascertained by valid cognition as just existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, in the subject sought to be known in the proof of (sound as impermanent), in the manner of the mutual difference of (impermanent) and the subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent] because it [impermanent] is mutually different from sound, sound is it [impermanent], it [impermanent] is with the subject, sound, and whatever is it [impermanent] is necessarily impermanent.

You have come to assert the latter signs [which are that sound is (impermanent), (impermanent) is with the subject, sound, and whatever is (impermanent) is necessarily impermanent].

The first [sign, which is that (impermanent) is mutually different from sound] is established because it [impermanent] is different from sound and sound is different from it [impermanent].
If you [incorrectly] accept [that impermanent is the property of the subject in the proof of sound as impermanent], then it [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, impermanent, there exists a flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign of it [impermanent] because it [impermanent] is the property of the subject in the proof of [sound as impermanent].

If you [incorrectly] accept [that there exists a flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, (impermanent)], then it [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, [impermanent], there exists a person who, having ascertained by valid cognition sound as it [impermanent], is doubting whether or not sound is impermanent because there exists a flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign of it [impermanent].

You cannot accept [that there exists a person who, having ascertained by valid cognition sound as (impermanent), is doubting whether or not sound...
is impermanent] because if sound is ascertained by valid cognition as impermanent, then there cannot be doubt concerning whether or not sound is impermanent, because [sound] is selfless.

16. Someone says:\footnote{2011 BDRC bla brang, 16a.3; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 11b.3.} That which is such that there exists a flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of [sound as impermanent] by the sign of “it” [that is, a specified sign] and “it” [that specified sign] is ascertained by valid cognition as just existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, in the subject sought to be known in the proof of [sound as impermanent] in the manner of the mutual difference of “it” and sound is the definition of property of the subject in the proof of sound as impermanent. Furthermore, with respect to the meaning of existing, in accordance with the mode of statement [in the subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent], merely:

sound is “it”; “it” is with the subject, sound; and whatever is “it” is necessarily impermanent

is the meaning of [existing, in accordance with the mode of statement (in the subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent)].
Our response: It [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, impermanent, it [impermanent] is that which exists, in accordance with the mode of statement, in the subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent because sound is it [impermanent], it [impermanent] is with the subject sound, and whatever is it [impermanent] is necessarily impermanent.

If you [incorrectly] accept [that (impermanent) is that which exists, in accordance with the mode of statement, in the subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent], it [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, impermanent, the meaning of existent (yod pa), in accordance with the mode of statement, in the subject sought to be known in the proof of [sound as impermanent], is complete in it [impermanent] because it [impermanent] is the “existent” (yod pa) that is a piece of that phrase, [“existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, in the subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent” (de sgrub kyi shes ’dod chos can la ’god tshul dang mthun par yod pa)].

Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
If you [incorrectly] accept [that the meaning of existent (yod pa), in accordance with the mode of statement, in the subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent, is complete in (impermanent)], it [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, [impermanent], it [impermanent] is not any of the three nonestablished reasons in relation to the fact in the proof of [sound as impermanent] because the meaning of “existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, in the subject sought to be known in the proof of [sound as impermanent],” is complete in it [impermanent] [according to you]. The three spheres [of self-contradiction]!

[That the meaning of “existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, in the subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent” is complete in impermanent] entails [that impermanent is not any of the three non-established reasons in relation to the fact in the proof of sound as impermanent] because the term “existent” in “existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, in the subject sought to be known in the proof of [sound as impermanent],” eliminates [impermanent] as being those non-established [reasons] in relation to the fact [in the proof of sound]
as impermanent], because Dharmottara’s Lesser Logicality\(^a\) [his Commentary on (Dharmakirti’s “Drop of Reasoning”) \(^b\) says:\(^b\)

The word stating “existent” excludes [the sign being] a nonestablished [reason] in the case of [for example], “because of being the object of apprehension of an eye consciousness,” and so forth;

and Mokşākaragupta’s The Language of Logic says:\(^c\)

The word stating “existent” excludes nonestablished [reasons], such as [in the case of], “Sound is impermanent because of being an object of apprehension of an eye consciousness.”

and Jetāri’s Introducing Children to Logic says:\(^d\)

The word stating “existent” excludes nonestablished [reasons].

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\(^a\) Correcting Dharmottara’s Greater Logicality to Dharmottara’s Lesser Logicality due to the absence of this quote in the former and presence in the latter; see the next footnote, and Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s citation below.

\(^b\) rigs pa’i thigs pa’i rgya cher ’grel pa (nyāyabinduśākā), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4231), BDRC W23703.189:74-185, 47b.7-48a.1, which reads:

\(^c\) rtog ge’i skad (tarkabhāṣā), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4264), BDRC W23703.190:674-739. This appears to be a paraphrase of Mokşākaragupta’s The Language of Logic, 346b.6-346b.7, which reads: ‘dir yod pa smos pas ma grub pa bsal te / dper na sgrya mi rtag stey mig gi gzung bar bya ba nyid kyi phyir ro zhes pa bsin no /

\(^d\) byis pa ’jug pa’i rtog ge (bāḷāvatārātaka), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4263), BDRC W23703.190:652-674, 329a.6, which reads:

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Furthermore, it [absurdly] follows that “existent” that is a piece of the phrase in Dharmakīrti’s *Drop of Reasoning*,3 “Just existent in that which is to be inferred [that is, the subject],” does not exclude [the sign being] a nonestablished [reason] in relation to the fact because [according to you] “existent” that is a piece of the phrase, “existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, in the subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product” does not exclude [the sign being] a nonestablished [reason] in relation to the fact [in the proof of sound as impermanent].

Above, if you [incorrectly] accept [that “existent” that is a piece of the phrase in Dharmakīrti’s *Drop of Reasoning*, “Just existent in that which is to be inferred (that is, the subject),” does not exclude (the sign being) a nonestablished (reason) in relation to the fact], it [absurdly] follows that

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3 rigs pa’i thugs pa zhes bya ba’i rab tu byed pa (nyāyabhūsāprakāraṇa), in bstan ‘gyur (sde dge, 4212), BDRC W23703.174:463-477, 231b.7.

Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
the meaning of the passage from Dharmottara’s *Lesser Logicality* [his *Commentary on (Dharmakīrti’s) “Drop of Reasoning”*]:

The word “existent” excludes [the sign being] a nonestablished [reason] in the case of [for example], “because of being the object of apprehension of an eye consciousness,” and so forth, is not established because [according to you, your] thesis [which is that “existent” that is a piece of the phrase, “Just existent in that which is to be inferred (that is, the subject),” does not exclude the sign being a nonestablished (reason) in relation to the fact] is logically feasible.

Furthermore, it follows [that your thesis—which is that “existent” that is a piece of the phrase in Dharmakīrti’s *Drop of Reasoning*, “Just existent in that which is to be inferred (that is, the subject),” does not exclude the sign being a nonestablished (reason) in relation to the fact] is not logically feasible because Jetāri and so on explain that (1) stating “existent” excludes [the sign being] a nonestablished [reason] in relation to the fact, and (2) the term expressing “just” excludes [the sign being] a nonestablished [reason] in relation to one portion of the subject, b and (3) stating “ascertained” excludes [the sign being] a nonestablished [reason] in relation to an awareness.

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a *rigs pa’i thigs pa’i rgya cher ’grel pa (nyāyabinduṭikā)*, in *bstan ’gyur* (*sde dge*, 4231), BDRC W23703.189:74-185, 47b.7-48a.1, de la yod pa’i tshig gis ni mig gis gzung bar bya ba yin pa’i phyir zhes bya ba la sogs pa ma grub pa bsal ba yin no /

b A reason that is “just existent in that which is to be inferred (that is, the subject)” must exist in all instances of the subject; it cannot be nonexistent in any instances of the subject. Thus the term “just” eliminates the possibility of the reason being “a nonestablished reason in relation to one portion of the subject” (*chos can gvi phyogs gcig la llos te ma grub pa’i gtan tshig*).
It follows that [Jētārī and so on explain that (1) stating “existent” excludes (the sign being) a nonestablished (reason) in relation to the fact, and (2) stating “just” excludes (the sign being) a nonestablished (reason) in relation to one portion of the subject, and (3) stating “ascertained” excludes (the sign being) a nonestablished (reason) in relation to an awareness] because (1) “existent”—that is a piece of the phrase, “ascertained by valid cognition as just existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, in the subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product”—excludes [the sign being] a nonestablished [reason] in relation to the fact; (2) and “just” [that is a piece of the phrase, “ascertained by valid cognition as just existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, in the subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product”] excludes [the sign being] a nonestablished [reason] in relation to one portion of the subject; (3) and stating “ascertained” [that is a piece of that same phrase] excludes [the sign being] a nonestablished (reason) in relation to an awareness.

Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
The first piece of the sign [which is that “existent”—that is a piece of the phrase, “ascertained by valid cognition as just existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, in the subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product”—excludes the sign being a nonestablished (reason) in relation to the fact] is established because Jetāri’s *Introducing Children to Logic* says:\(^{a}\)

Stating ‘existent’ excludes nonestablished [reasons].

The second piece of the sign [which is that “just” (that is a piece of the phrase, “ascertained by valid cognition as just existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, in the subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product”) excludes the sign being a nonestablished (reason) in relation to one portion of the subject] is established because Vinītadeva’s *Great Commentary on (Dharmakīrti’s) “Drop of Reasoning”: Assisting Students* says:\(^{b}\)

The term “solely” (ko na) excludes nonestablished [reasons] in relation to one portion of the subject,

and Dharmottara’s *Lesser Logicality* [his Commentary on (Dharmakīrti’s) “Drop of Reasoning”] says:\(^{c}\)

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\(^{a}\) byis pa ’jug pa’i rtog ge (bālāvatāratarka), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4263), BDRC W23703.190:652-674, 329a.6, བཙན་འགོ་ (སད་དག, 4283)

\(^{b}\) rigs pa’i thigs pa’i rgya cher ’grel pa (nyāyabinduṭīkā), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4230), BDRC W23703.189:4-74 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab par- tunkhang, 1982-1985). This passage was not found.

\(^{c}\) rigs pa’i thigs pa’i rgya cher ’grel pa (nyāyabinduṭīkā), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4231), BDRC W23703.189:74-185, 48a.1, བཙན་འགོ་ (སད་དག, 4283)

Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
Stating “just” (nyid) excludes nonestablished [reasons] in relation to a portion of the subject.

The third piece of the sign [which is that stating “ascertained” [that is a piece of the phrase, “ascertained by valid cognition as just existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, in the subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product”] excludes (the sign being) a nonestablished (reason) in relation to an awareness] is established because the word stating “ascertained—that is a piece of the phrase, (“ascertained by valid cognition as just existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, in the subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product”)—excludes nonestablished (reasons) in relation to an awareness having doubt and so forth. It follows [that the word stating “ascertained”—that is a piece of the phrase, (“ascertained by valid cognition as just existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, in the subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product”)—excludes nonestablished (reasons) in relation to an awareness having doubt and so forth] because Mokṣhākaragupta’s

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a Cited earlier as ‘thad ldan chung ba.
b Dharmottara’s Lesser Logicality, 48a.1, phyogs gcig la; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 12b.1, phyogs gcig la; 2011 BDRC bla brang, 17b.1, phyogs la.
c Nonestablished reasons in relation to an awareness are of four types: Nonestablished reason in relation to an awareness having doubt (1) with regard to the entity of the sign, (2) with regard to the entity of the subject, (3) with regard to the relationship of the basis of debate and the sign, and (4) nonestablished reason due to the nonexistence of the subject sought to be known.

Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
The Language of Logic says:\(^{a}\)

Stating “ascertained” excludes [reasons] that are nonestablished upon having doubt;

and Jetārī’s [Introducing Children to Logic] also says:\(^{b}\)

Stating “ascertained” excludes [reasons] that are nonestablished upon having doubt.

To state the proof of the property of the subject: It follows that the subject, product, is the property of the subject in the proof of sound as impermanent because there exists a flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign of it [product], and it

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\(^{a}\) rtog ge’i skad (tarkabhāṣā), in bstan 'gyur (sde dge, 4264), BDRC W23703.190:674-739, 347a.5: "nges pa smos pas ni the tshom za ba gcod do /

\(^{b}\) byis pa ’jug pa’i rtog ge (bālavāratarka), in bstan 'gyur (sde dge, 4263), BDRC W23703.190:652-674, 329a.7-329b.1: "nges pa smos pas ni the tshom za ba gcod do /.

Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
[product] is ascertained by valid cognition as just existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, in the subject sought to be known in the proof of [sound as impermanent].

The first [sign which is that there exists a flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, (product)] is established because sound is [the flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, (product)].

If you say that [the sign which is that sound is the flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, (product)] is not established, [our own position is] it follows that, with respect to the subject, sound, it [sound] is the flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product, because it [sound] is that which is held as the subject in the proof of [sound as impermanent by the sign, product], and there exists a person who, having ascertained it [sound] by valid cognition as a product, is engaged in wanting to know whether it [sound] is impermanent.
If you say that the first [sign which is that sound is that which is held as the subject in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product] is not established, [our own position is] it follows that, with respect to the subject, sound, it [sound] is that which is held as the subject in the proof of it [sound] as impermanent [by the sign, product] because it [sound] is held as the subject in the syllogism, “The subject, it [sound], is impermanent because of being a product.” It follows [that sound is held as the subject in the syllogism, “The subject, (sound), is impermanent because of being a product”] because it [sound] is selfless.

The second [sign which is that there exists a person who, having ascertained by valid cognition that sound is a product, is engaged in wanting to know whether sound is impermanent] is established because the full-fledged opponent in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product, is that [person who, having ascertained by valid cognition that sound is a product, is engaged in wanting to know whether sound is impermanent].
If you [incorrectly] say that the earlier second sign\(^a\) [which is that product is ascertained by valid cognition as just existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, in the subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent] is not established, [our own position is] it follows that with respect to the subject, product, it is ascertained by valid cognition as just existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, in the subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent because (1) it [product] accords with the mode of statement in the subject sought to be known in the proof of [sound as impermanent], (2) the meaning of “existent” (yod pa)—that is a piece of the phrase [“ascertained by valid cognition as just existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, in the subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent”]—is complete in it [product], (3) the meaning of “just” (nyid) being affixed to “existent” (yod pa nyid) is complete in it [product], and (4) the meaning of “ascertained by valid cognition” (tshad mas nges pa) is complete in it [product].

\(^a\) Correcting phyir rgyol in 2011 TBRC bla brang (18a.2) to phyi rgyol in accordance with 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (12b.6).

\(^b\) The earlier second sign is on p. 39.
The first [sign which is that product accords with the mode of statement in the subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent] is established because the mode of statement in the proof of [sound as impermanent] by the sign of it [product] is a copulative “is” statement (yin 'god), the mode of proof is a copulative “is” proof (yin sgrub), sound is it [product], and it [product] is with the subject, sound.\(^a\)

[That the mode of statement in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product, is a copulative “is” statement (yin 'god), the mode of proof is a copulative “is” proof (yin sgrub), sound is product, and product is with the subject, sound] entails [that product accords with the mode of statement in the subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent] because the meaning of according with the mode of statement is taken as:

1. in the case of a copulative “is” statement, what goes as the subject in the proof of [sound as impermanent] is the sign [in the sense that, for example, sound is a product], and the sign is with it [the subject, in the sense that, for example, product is with sound]; and
2. in the case of an [ontological] “exists” statement, the sign exists with what goes as the subject [in the sense that, for example, fire exists with a smoky pass], and the sign exists in [or on] the subject [in the sense that, for example, fire exists in (or on) a smoky pass].

It follows that [the meaning of according with the mode of statement is taken as: (1) in the case of a copulative “is” statement, what goes as the subject in the proof of (sound as impermanent) is the sign and the sign is with it; and (2) in the case of an (ontological) “exists” statement, the sign

\(^a\) There are two modes of statement, that is to say, two ways of stating a syllogism: the copulative and the ontological. (1) The copulative mode is an “is” statement using the linking form of the verb “to be” and (2) the ontological mode can be either an “exists” statement using the verb “to exist” or an “is” statement using the ontological form of the verb “to be” as in “there is a cat in the backyard.” The syllogism, “The subject, sound, is impermanent because of being a product” is in the copulative mode: sound must be ascertained as being impermanent and being a product. The syllogism, “With respect to the subject, on a smoky pass, fire exists, because smoke exists” is in the ontological mode: smoke must be ascertained as existing on the smoky pass, and fire must be ascertained as existing on the smoky pass.
exists with what goes as the subject and the sign exists in the subject] be-
cause the meaning of [according with the mode of statement] exists.

If you say that the second [sign\(^a\) which is that the meaning of “existent”—that is a piece of the phrase, “ascertained by valid cognition as just existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, in the subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent”—is complete in product] is not established, [our own position is] it follows that with respect to

\(^a\) The second sign is on p. 42.
the subject, product, the meaning of “existent”—that is a piece of the phrase, [“ascertained by valid cognition as just existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, in the subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent”]—is complete in it [product] because it [product] is not any of the nonestablished reasons in relation to the fact in the proof of [sound as impermanent].

It follows [that product is not any of the nonestablished reasons in relation to the fact in the proof of sound as impermanent] because product (1) is not a nonestablished reason due to the nondifference of the basis [of debate] and the sign in the proof of [sound as impermanent], (2) is not a nonestablished reason due to the nondifference of the sign and the predicate of the proposition in the proof of [sound as impermanent], (3) is not a nonestablished reason due to the nonexistence of the entity of the sign in the proof of [sound as impermanent], and (4) is not a nonestablished reason due to the nonexistence of the entity of the subject in the proof of [sound as impermanent].

\[\text{It follows [that product is not any of the nonestablished reasons in relation to the fact in the proof of sound as impermanent] because product (1) is not a nonestablished reason due to the nondifference of the basis [of debate] and the sign in the proof of [sound as impermanent], (2) is not a nonestablished reason due to the nondifference of the sign and the predicate of the proposition in the proof of [sound as impermanent], (3) is not a nonestablished reason due to the nonexistence of the entity of the sign in the proof of [sound as impermanent], and (4) is not a nonestablished reason due to the nonexistence of the entity of the subject in the proof of [sound as impermanent].}\]

\[\text{Jam-yang-zhay-pa mentions six types of nonestablished reasons in relation to the fact in this text: four are listed here. The other two are: nonestablished reason in relation to one portion of the subject (chos can gyi phyogs gcig la los te ma grub pa'i gtan tshigs) and nonestablished reason due to the nondifference of the basis of debate and the predicate of the proposition (rtags chos tha dad med nas ma grub ba'i gtan tshigs). A seventh, mentioned by Pur-bu-jog in his introductory logic manual, The Topic of Signs and Reasonings from the “Great Path of Reasoning” in the Magic Key to the Path of Reasoning, Explanation of the /collected Topics Revealing the Meaning of the Texts on Valid Cognition, is: nonestablished reason due to the nonexistence of the sign, in accordance with the mode of statement, with the subject sought to be known (rtags shes 'dod chos can gyi steng du 'god tshul dang mthun par med nas ma grub pa'i gtan tshigs) in thad ma'i gzhung don 'byed}\]
What Constitutes a Correct Reason?

If you [incorrectly] say that the first [sign which is that product is not a nonestablished reason due to the nondifference of the basis of debate and the sign in the proof of sound as impermanent] is not established, it [absurdly] follows that the subject, product, is one with sound because of being a nonestablished reason due to the nondifference of the basis of debate and the sign in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product [according to you].

[Being a nonestablished reason due to the nondifference of the basis of debate and the sign in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product] entails [being one with sound] because the meaning—of a nonestablished reason due to the nondifference of the basis of debate and the sign in a specified proof—is taken as one phenomenon set as the two, the subject and the sign, because a meaning of it [that is, of a nonestablished reason due to the nondifference of the basis of debate and the sign in a specified proof] exists. It follows [that its meaning exists] because of being selfless.

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pa’i bsdus grya’i rnam par bshad pa rigs lam ‘phrul gyi lde’u mig las rigs lam che bar tags rigs kyi slor, Buxa, 1965, 21b.3.

Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
The second [sign which is that product is not a nonestablished reason due to the nondifference of the sign and the predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent] is established because it [product] exists and it [product] is not one with what goes as the predicate of the proposition in the proof of [sound as impermanent].

[That product exists and is not one with what goes as the predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent] entails [that product is not a nonestablished reason due to the nondifference of the sign and the predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent] because its significance [that is, the significance of a nonestablished reason due to the nondifference of the sign and the predicate of the proposition] requires that a single meaning be set as the two, the sign and the predicate of the proposition.
The third [sign which is that product is not a nonestablished reason due to the nonexistence of the entity of the sign in the proof of sound as impermanent] is established because it [product] is the sign in the proof of [sound as impermanent] and it [product] is not nonexistent. [That (product) is the sign in the proof of (sound as impermanent) and is not nonexistent] entails [that product is not a nonestablished reason due to the nonexistence of the entity of the sign in the proof of sound as impermanent] because in order to be nonestablished due to the nonexistence of the entity of the sign in the proof of [sound as impermanent], a nonexistent must be set as the sign.

\[ \text{The fourth [sign which is that product is not a nonestablished reason due to the nonexistence of the entity of the subject in the proof of sound as impermanent] is established because whatever goes as the subject in the proof of [sound as impermanent] must be an existent.} \]

*Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, [blue text] = material in place of ellipsis. [magenta text] = ellipsis has been filled in.
goes as the subject in the proof of sound as impermanent must be an existent] entails [that product is not a nonestablished reason due to the nonexistence of the entity of the subject in the proof of sound as impermanent] because in this case [—that is, in the case of a nonestablished reason due to the nonexistence of the entity of the subject—the subject] must be a nonexistent. [ཉིད་པ་ཞི་མི་ལག་པར་ཐབས་ཀྱི་ཆོས་ཅན་གྱི་ངོ་བོ་མེད་ནས་མ་ཐེབ་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཡང་མ་ཡིན་པས་ཁྱབ་པའི་ཉིད་པ་ཞི་མི་ལག་པར་ཐབས་ཀྱི་]

If you say that the earlier third root sign⁸ [which is that the meaning of “just” (nyid) being affixed to “existent” (yod pa nyid) is complete in (product)] is not established, [our own position is] it follows that with respect to the subject, product, the meaning of stating “just” that is a piece of the phrase, [“ascertained by valid cognition as just existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, in the subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent”], is complete in it [product] because it [product] is not any of the nonestablished reasons in relation to the fact, [such as] a nonestablished reason in relation to one portion [of the subject], and so forth in the proof of [sound as impermanent]. That [product is not

⁸ The third root sign in on p. 42.
any of the nonestablished reasons in relation to the fact, such as a nonestablished reason in relation to one portion (of the subject), and so forth in the proof of (sound as impermanent) entails [that the meaning of stating “just” that is a piece of the phrase, “ascertained by valid cognition as just existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, in the subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent,”] is complete in (product) because the meaning of stating “solely” (kho na) or “just” (nyid) is for the sake of excluding nonestablished reasons in relation to the fact, because Vinitadeva’s Great Commentary on (Dharmakīrti’s) “Drop of Reasoning”: Assisting Students says:

“Soledly” excludes a nonestablished [reason] in relation to one portion [of the subject].

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a rigs pa’i thigs pa’i rgya cher ’grel pa (nyâyabinduṭīkā), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4230), BDRC W23703.189:74-185 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa chodhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985). This passage was not found.
Furthermore, it follows that the subject, product, is just \textit{(nyid)} existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, in the subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent because [product] is solely \textit{(kho na)} existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, in the subject sought to be known in the proof of [sound as impermanent].

It follows [that product is solely existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, in the subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent] because it [product] is simply \textit{(rkyang pa)} existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, in the subject sought to be known in the proof of [sound as impermanent]. [Product is simply existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, in the subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent] because of not being any of the non-established reasons, in relation to one portion [of the subject] in the proof of [sound as impermanent].
It follows [that product is not any of the nonestablished reasons, in relation to one portion (of the subject) in the proof of (sound as impermanent)] because sound is it [product], it [product] is with the subject, sound, and whatever is sound is necessarily it [product].

If you say that the earlier fourth root sign[^1] [which is that the meaning of “ascertained by valid cognition” is complete in product] is not established, [our own position is] it follows that with respect to the subject, product, the meaning of “ascertained by valid cognition”—that is a piece of the phrase, “ascertained by valid cognition as just existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, in the subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent”—is complete in it [product] because there occurs a full-fledged opponent for whom it [product] is the property of the subject in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign of it [product] who, having ascertained by valid cognition it [product] as just existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, [in the subject sought to be known] in the proof of sound as impermanent, is engaged in wanting to know whether sound is impermanent.

[^1]: The fourth root sign is on p. 42.
It follows [that there occurs a full-fledged opponent—for whom (product) is the property of the subject in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign (product)—who, having ascertained by valid cognition (product) as just existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, (in the subject sought to be known) in the proof of sound as impermanent, is engaged in wanting to know whether sound is impermanent] because there occurs a person who, having ascertained by valid cognition sound as it [product], is engaged in wanting to know whether sound is impermanent. [That there occurs a person who, having ascertained by valid cognition sound as a product, is engaged in wanting to know whether sound is impermanent] entails [that there occurs a full-fledged opponent—for whom product is the property of the subject in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product—who, having ascertained by valid cognition that sound is just existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, (in the subject sought to be known) in the proof of sound as impermanent, is engaged in wanting to know whether sound is impermanent] because the meaning of “ascertained by valid cognition” that is a piece of the phrase, ["ascertained by valid cognition as just existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, in the subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent"] is taken as ascertained or not ascertained by a full-fledged opponent in the proof of [sound as impermanent] and is not taken as ascertained by the generality-isolate of valid cognition or by the generality-isolate of person.
It follows [that the meaning of “ascertained by valid cognition” that is a piece of the phrase, (“ascertained by valid cognition as just existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, in the subject sought to be known in the proof of sound as impermanent”) is taken as ascertained or not ascertained by a full-fledged opponent in the proof of (sound as impermanent) and is not taken as ascertained by the generality-isolate of valid cognition or by the generality-isolate of person] because the logical feasibility thus of the meaning of the four features of the property of the subject is the thought of the Foremost Father [Tsong-kha-pa] and his spiritual son, because Gyal-tshab Dar-ma-rin-chen’s Great Explanation of (Dharmakīrti’s) “Ascertainment of Valid Cognition” says:¹

The capacity of the phrase, “ascertained as solely existent in that which is to be inferred,” excludes (1) faulty meanings—which are that [the sign] is utterly nonexistent in that which is to be inferred and, [that the sign,] although existent in that which is to be inferred, is nonexistent as the pervader—and (2) faulty awarenesses which have such qualms. [These two (faulty meanings and faulty

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¹ Old Go-mang Lhasa, 14a.1, gi; New Go-mang, 183.2, gis; 2011 BDRC bla brang, 19b.5, gis.

Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
awarenesses) are excluded\(^a\) by the four [features of the property of the subject], respectively [that is, the two forms of the first, faulty meanings, are excluded by the first two features, and the two forms of the second, faulty awarenesses, are excluded by the last two features]:

1. existent in that which is to be inferred
2. solely existent in that which is to be inferred
3. ascertained as existent in that which is to be inferred
4. ascertained as solely existent in that which is to be inferred.

17. In the context of stating the term “solely” (kho na) or “just” (nyid) before “exists” (yod pa), someone says:\(^b\) Either (1) that ascertained by valid cognition as existent (yod pa), in accordance with the mode of statement, in solely the subject sought to be known in a specified proof, or (2) that ascertained by valid cognition as solely existent, in

\(^a\) The material in the brackets in this sentence comes from context.

\(^b\) 2011 BDRC \textit{bla brang}, 20a.2; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 14a.3.
accordance with the mode of statement, in the subject sought to be known in a specified proof is posited as the definition of property of the subject in that proof.

Our response: Well then, it [absurdly] follows that whatever is the property of the subject in the proof of sound as impermanent must be an uncommon indefinite reason in the proof of sound as impermanent because [according to you] stating the term “solely” or “just” before “exists” is reasonable. If stating the term “solely” or “just” before “exists” is reasonable, then whatever is the property of the subject in the proof of sound as impermanent must be an uncommon indefinite reason in the proof of sound as impermanent because if [the term “solely” or “just] is stated before “exists,” whatever is the property of the subject in a specified proof must become an uncommon reason in that proof.
18. Furthermore, in the context of not stating the term “solely” (kho na), someone says: That ascertained by valid cognition as existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, in the subject sought to be known in a specified proof is the definition of [property of the subject in that proof].

Our response: Well then, it [absurdly] follows that the subject, sleeping at night with folded leaves, is the property of the subject in the proof of a tree as having consciousness because of being ascertained by valid cognition as existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, [in the subject sought to be known] in the proof of a tree as having consciousness. It follows [that sleeping at night with folded leaves is ascertained by valid cognition as existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, (in the subject sought to be known) in the proof of a tree as having consciousness] because of existing, in accordance with the mode of statement, [in the subject sought to be known] in the proof of a tree as having consciousness.

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a 2011 TBRC bla brang, 20a.6; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 14a.6.

b The syllogism here is: “The subject, a tree, has consciousness because of sleeping at night with folded leaves.” The term ljon shing could be translated as either “tree,” “a tree,” or “trees.” I have chosen “a tree” for ease of understanding.
What Constitutes a Correct Reason?

Above, if you accept [that sleeping at night with folded leaves is the property of the subject in the proof of a tree as having consciousness], [our own position is] it follows that the subject, [sleeping at night with folded leaves,] is not the property of the subject in the proof of [a tree as having consciousness] because of being one of the nine nonestablished reasons in the proof of [a tree as having consciousness]. It follows [that sleeping at night with folded leaves is one of the nine nonestablished reasons in the proof of a tree as having consciousness] because of being a nonestablished reason in relation to one portion of the subject, in that proof,\(^a\) because Dharmottara’s Lesser Logicality [his Commentary on (Dharmakīrti’s) ‘Drop of Reasoning’] says:\(^b\)

Stating “just” excludes nonestablished [reasons] in relation to one portion of the subject because, for example, such is the case with the proof of a tree as having consciousness due to sleeping at night with folded leaves.

\(^a\) Some trees, but not all, fold their leaves at night, thereby giving the appearance of “sleeping at night with folded leaves.” Oak trees do not fold their leaves at night; hence, whatever is a tree does not necessarily sleep at night with folded leaves and therefore “sleeping at night with folded leaves” is a reason that is nonestablished in relation to one portion of the subject in the proof of a tree as having consciousness.

\(^b\) rigs pa’i thigs pa’i rgya cher ’grel pa (nyāyabinduṭīkā), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4231), BDRC W23703.189:74-185. This appears to be a paraphrase of Dharmottara’s Lesser Logicality, 48a.1-48a.2: nyid kyi tshig gis ni phyogs gcig la ma grub pa bsal ba yin te / ji ltar sngon shing ni srog dang bcas pa yin te / nyal ba’i phyir ro zhes ljon shing phyogs su byas la lo ma ’khum pa’i mishan nyid kyi nyal ba ni phyogs gcig la ma grub pa yin te /
19. Someone says. It follows that its being [that is, a specified sign’s being] any of the seven nonestablished reasons in a specified proof necessitates [its] being a sign—in one cycle of the syllogism—which is not established in that proof by the sign of it because there exists evidence that its being one among the seven nonestablished reasons in one cycle of the syllogism in a specified proof necessitates that the property of the subject, in that proof by the sign of it, is not established.

Our response: [That there exists evidence that its being (that is, a specified sign’s being) one among the seven nonestablished reasons in one cycle of the syllogism in a specified proof necessitates that the property of the subject, in that proof by the sign of it, is not established] does not entail [that its being one among the seven nonestablished reasons in a specified proof]

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a 2011 BDRC bla brang, 20b.4; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 14b.3.
b Lo-sang-gyal-tshan explains that the phrase, “one cycle of the syllogism” (shyor ba skor gcig), refers to any specified syllogism; that is, it refers to the collection of subject, predicate of the proposition, and sign of any given syllogism. For example: “The subject, sound, is impermanent because of being a product” is “one cycle of the syllogism (shyor ba skor gcig)” containing a subject (sound), a predicate of the proposition (impermanent), and a sign (product).
necessitates (its) being a sign—in one cycle of the syllogism—which is not established in that proof by the sign of it.

Well then, it [absurdly] follows that, with respect to the subject, cause of product, it [cause of product] is a sign—in one cycle of the syllogism—which is not established in the proof of a blue patch—that is a cause of product—as impermanent by the sign of it [cause of product] because of being one among the seven nonestablished reasons in one cycle of the syllogism in the proof [of a blue patch—that is a cause of product—as impermanent by the sign, cause of product].

It follows [that (cause of product) is one among the seven nonestablished reasons in one cycle of the syllogism in the proof of a blue patch—that is a cause of product—as impermanent by the sign, (cause of product)] because of being a nonestablished reason due to nonrelation between the sign and the predicate of the proposition in the proof of [a blue patch—that is a cause of product—as impermanent]. It follows [that cause of product is a nonestablished reason due to nonrelation between the sign and the predicate of the proposition in the proof of (a blue patch—that is a cause of product)] because it [cause of product] is not related with impermanent. It follows [that (cause of product) is not related with

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The syllogism here is, “The subject, a blue patch—that is a cause of product—is impermanent because of being a cause of product.”
impermanent] because of not being related as one entity with [impermanent] and, furthermore, not being related [with impermanent] through arising from it. It follows [that cause of product is not related as one entity with impermanent and, furthermore, is not related with impermanent through arising from it] because of being a cause of impermanent.
2) **Brief Decisive Analysis of Forward Pervasion**

20. **Someone says:**

That ascertained by valid cognition as existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, in the similar class in a specified proof is the definition of forward pervasion in that proof. Furthermore, the meaning of existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, in the similar class in a specified proof is merely: it is what goes as that which is held as the predicate of the proposition in a specified proof and whatever is it is necessarily [what goes as that which is held as the predicate of the proposition in that proof].

*Our response:* Well then, it [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, impermanent, it is the forward pervasion in the proof of sound as impermanent because it [impermanent] is ascertained by valid cognition as existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, in the similar class in the proof of [sound as impermanent]. It follows [that (impermanent) is ascertained by valid cognition as existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, in the similar class in the proof of (sound as impermanent)] because it [impermanent] is impermanent and whatever is it [impermanent] is necessarily impermanent.

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*a 2011 BDRC bla brang, 21a.3; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 14b.6.*
If you [incorrectly] accept [the root consequence that (impermanent) is the forward pervasion in the proof of sound as impermanent], it [absurdly] follows that the subject, [impermanent], is related with what goes as the predicate of the proposition in the proof of [sound as impermanent] because of being the forward pervasion in the proof of [sound as impermanent].

[Being the forward pervasion in the proof of sound as impermanent] entails [being related with what goes as the predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent] because whatever is not related with [what goes as the predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent] must not be either the forward pervasion or the counter pervasion in the proof of [sound as impermanent], because Dignāga’s Auto-commentary on “Compilation of Valid Cognition” says:

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a William Magee notes that he has not found this quote in Dignāga, tshad ma kun las btes pa’i ’grel pa (pramāṇasamuccayavṛtta), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4204), BDRC W23703.174:30-172 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985) but that perhaps Jam-yang-zhay-pa (perhaps also) is referring to Dharmakīrti, tshad ma rnam ’grel gyi ’grel pa (pramāṇavārttikavṛtta), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4216), BDRC W23703.174:523-732 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 266b.7, which reads:

Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
That which is unrelated [with the predicate of the proposition] cannot be the positive and negative concomitances [that is, the forward and counter pervasions].

Above, if you [incorrectly] accept [that impermanent is related with what goes as the predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent], it [absurdly] follows that the subject, impermanent, is different from impermanent because of being related with [impermanent].

Furthermore, it [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, particularity of product, it [particularity of product] is impermanent and whatever is [particularity of product] is necessarily impermanent because it [particularity of product] is the forward pervasion in the proof of [sound as impermanent]. It follows [that particularity of product is the forward pervasion in the proof of sound as impermanent] because it [particularity of product] is the three modes in the proof of [sound as impermanent]. It follows [that particularity of product is the three modes in the proof of sound as impermanent] because [particularity of product] is a correct sign in the proof of [sound as impermanent].

If you [incorrectly] accept [the root consequence that (particularity of product) is impermanent and whatever is (particularity of product) is necessarily impermanent], it [absurdly] follows that the subject, [particularity of product], is impermanent because you accepted [that particularity of product] is impermanent.
product is impermanent and whatever is particularity of product is necessarily impermanent]. You cannot accept [that particularity of product is impermanent] because [particularity of product] is permanent.

21. About this formulation, someone says: It follows that the subject, particularity of product, is not ascertained by valid cognition as just existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, in the similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent because of being permanent.

*a 2011 BDRC bla brang, 21b.4; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 15a.5.

Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
Our response: Here [being permanent] does not entail [that particularity of product is not ascertained by valid cognition as just existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, in the similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent].

22. Someone says: a That ascertained by valid cognition as existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, in the similar class in a specified proof—without stating “solely” (kho na) before or after “existent” (yod pa)—is the definition of forward pervasion in that proof.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, existence (yod pa), is the forward pervasion in the proof of sound as impermanent because of being ascertained by valid cognition as existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, in the similar class in the proof of [sound as impermanent]. It follows [that existence is ascertained by valid cognition as existent, in accordance with the mode of statement, in the similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent] because of existing in the similar class in the proof of [sound as impermanent]. It follows [that existence exists in the similar class in the proof of sound as impermanent] because of existing in both the similar class and the dissimilar class in that proof.

\[L22a\]
What Constitutes a Correct Reason?

Above, if you [incorrectly] accept [the root consequence that existence is the forward pervasion in the proof of sound as impermanent], it [absurdly] follows that the subject, existence, is impermanent because of being existent.

Furthermore, it follows that there is a purpose for stating “just” (nyid) [in the definition of forward pervasion] because stating “just” excludes common indefinite [reasons] [and] because Dharmottara’s Lesser Logicality [his Commentary on (Dharmakirti’s) “Drop of Reasoning”] says a:

By stating “just,” just common indefinite [reasons] are excluded.

23. Someone says b: The forward pervasion in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product, is: whatever is a product is pervaded by impermanent [that is, whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent].

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a rigs pa’i thugs pa’i rgya cher ’grel pa (nyāyabinduṭī), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4231), BDRC W23703.189:74-185, 48a.4.

b 2011 BDRC bla brang, 22a.4; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 15b.2.

Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
Our response: It [absurdly] follows that if the forward pervasion of one cycle of the syllogism in a specified proof is established, then the explicit pervasion in that proof is necessarily established because [according to you] those two [forward pervasion of one cycle of the syllogism in a specified proof and explicit pervasion in that proof] are equivalent.

If you [incorrectly] accept [that if the forward pervasion of one cycle of the syllogism in a specified proof is established, then the explicit pervasion in that proof is necessarily established], it [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, product is a product, the explicit pervasion—one cycle of the syllogism in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign of it [product is a product]—is established because [according to you] the forward pervasion in the proof of [sound as impermanent] by the sign of it [product is a product], is established. It [absurdly] follows [that the forward pervasion—in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product is a product—is established] because it [product is a product] is the forward pervasion in the proof of [sound as impermanent by the sign, product is a product]. It [absurdly] follows [that product is a product is the forward pervasion in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product is a product] because [product is a product] is the three modes in the proof of [sound as impermanent by the sign, product is a product]. It [absurdly] follows [that (product is a product) is the three modes in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product is a product] because [product is a product] is a correct sign in the proof of [sound as impermanent by the sign, product is a product, (according to you)].
Above, if you [incorrectly] accept [that the explicit pervasion—of one cycle of the syllogism in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product is a product—is established], it [absurdly] follows that the subject, horn of a rabbit, is impermanent because product is a product.  

Furthermore, it [absurdly] follows that the forward pervasion—in the proof of sound that is a cause of product as impermanent by the sign, a cause of product—is established because the explicit pervasion of the syllogism in the proof of [sound—that is a cause of product—as impermanent by the sign, a cause of product,] is established.a

You have [incorrectly] accepted the entailment [that if the explicit pervasion of the syllogism in the proof of sound—that is a cause of product—as impermanent by the sign, a cause of product, is established, the forward

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a The syllogism here is, “The subject, sound that is a cause of product, is impermanent because of being a cause of product.”
pervasion in the proof of sound—that is a cause of product—as impermanent by the sign, a cause of product, is necessarily established.] That the sign [which is that the explicit pervasion of the syllogism in the proof of sound—that is a cause of product—as impermanent by the sign, a cause of product, is established] follows because (1) the explicit pervasion in the proof [of sound—that is a cause of a product—as impermanent by the sign, a cause of a product.] is: whatever is a cause of product is pervaded by impermanent [that is, whatever is a cause of product is necessarily impermanent], and (2) that [pervasion: whatever is a cause of product is necessarily impermanent] is established.

The first [sign—which is that the explicit pervasion in the proof (of sound that is a cause of a product as impermanent by the sign, a cause of a product) is: whatever is a cause of product is pervaded by impermanent (that is, whatever is a cause of product is necessarily impermanent)]—is established because that [explicit pervasion: whatever is a cause of product is necessarily impermanent] is the normal pervasion (rnal khyab) in the proof [of sound, that is a cause of a product, as impermanent].

Above, if you [incorrectly] accept [the consequence that the forward pervasion—in the proof of sound that is a cause of product as impermanent by the sign, a cause of product—is established], it [absurdly] follows that
with respect to the subject, a cause of product, it [a cause of product] is related with what goes as the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound—that is a cause of product—as impermanent because [according to you] it [a cause of product] is the forward pervasion in the proof of [sound—that is a cause of product—as impermanent].

[Being the forward pervasion in the proof of sound—that is a cause of product—as impermanent] entails [being related with what goes as the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound—that is a cause of product—as impermanent] because whatever is not related with what goes as the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of [sound—that is a cause of product—as impermanent] must not be either the forward pervasion or the counter pervasion in the proof of [sound—that is a cause of product—as impermanent], because Dharmakīrti’s *Autocommentary on the “Commentary on (Dignāga’s) ‘Compilation of Valid Cognition’”* says:

Without relationship [between the sign and the predicate of the

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*a* William Magee relates that he cannot find this in Dharmakīrti’s text and thinks rang ’grel here might refer to Dharmottara’s *Greater Logicality*, [his *Commentarial Explanation of (Dharmakīrti’s) “Ascertainment of Valid Cognition,”* tṣhad ma rnam par nges pa ’i ’grel bshad / ’thad ldan (le’u dang po dang gnyis pa) (pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4229), BDRC W23703.188:4-579 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae chödhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 270a.5.

Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipse. magenta highlight = ellipse has been filled in.
proposition], there cannot be ascertainment of the positive and negative concomitances [that is, the forward and counter pervasions].

and [Khay-drub Ge-leg-pal-sang’s] Ornament for the Seven Treatises says:

The two—the forward pervasion of one cycle of the syllogism and the explicit pervasion—are not equivalent;...In a specified proof, there is no certainty that the forward pervasion being established entails the counter pervasion being established, and if the explicit pervasion is established, there is no certainty that the counter pervasion is established; although the forward and counter pervasions are established, there is no certainty that the three modes are established.

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a This may be a paraphrase of Khay-drub Ge-leg-pal-zang’s Ornament for the Set of Seven Valid Cognition Treatises Dispelling Mental Darkness, tshad ma sde bdun gyi rgyan yid kyi mun sel, in gsung 'bum (mkhas grub rje), BDRC W29195.8:395-778 (Dharamsala: Shering Parkhang, 1997), 126b.3-126b.5.

Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
What Constitutes a Correct Reason?

[72x139]Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
b. Explaining the meaning of the text

Let us explain—from the approach of a brief indication—that which is the three modes as the definition of correct sign. [Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid Cognition’] says:

A [valid] reason is a property of the subject.
It is pervaded by a factor [that is, the predicate] of that [position (phyogs, pakṣa)].

The basis from which this is derived exists, for it is the passage in Dignāga’s Root Aphorisms [his Compilation of Valid Cognition].

[Inference] for oneself
Is to see an object [of inference] from a sign that is the three modes.

Regarding the explanation on this occasion which is that that which is the three modes is the definition of correct sign, [the context is the concern:] “What are the three modes and what are correct signs?” To explain these, the just cited text [from Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid Cognition,’] occurs. Then to explain:

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*a* tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi tshig le'ur byas pa (pramāṇavārttaśārikā), in bstan 'gyur (sde dge, 4210), BDRC W23703.174:189-304 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 94b.3-94b.4. The Sanskrit is found in Miyasaka (114.5): paksadharmas tadāṃśena vyāptō hetus.

*b* tshad ma kun las btsus pa zhes bya ba'i rab tu byed pa (pramāṇaśāsaṃuccayā), in bstan 'gyur (sde dge, 4203), BDRC W23703.174:189-304, 4a.1. The Sanskrit is found in H. Kitagawa, Indo koten ronrigaku no kenkyū, Jinna no taikei (Tokyo: Suzuki Gakujutsu Zaidan, 1973), 74, n. 7: trirūpāl līṅgato 'rtha'drīk/.

Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis; magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
With respect to the subject, correct signs, their definite enumeration is three because of being definite as the three: correct signs of effect, nature, and nonobservation.

The statement, “Those are just threefold,” occurs [in Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid Cognition”].

24. About this formulation, someone says: It follows that the phrase, “Whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent” explicitly expresses the forward pervasion in the proof of sound as impermanent because the pervasion—whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent—is the forward pervasion in the proof of [sound as impermanent]. It follows [that the pervasion—whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent—is the forward pervasion in the proof of sound as impermanent] because a forward pervasion in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product, exists.

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*a* tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi tshig le’ur byas pa (pramāṇavārttikakārikā), in bstan ‘gyur (sde dge, 4210), BDRC W23703.174:189-304, 94b.4.

*b* 2011 BDRC bla brang, 23a.4; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 16a.5.

Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
Our response: [That a forward pervasion in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product, exists] does not entail [that the pervasion—whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent—is the forward pervasion in the proof of sound as impermanent].

If you [incorrectly] accept the root [consequence that the phrase, “Whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent” explicitly expresses the forward pervasion in the proof of sound as impermanent], then it [absurdly] follows that the phrase, “Whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent” does not merely explicitly indicate one portion of the relationship [between the sign and the predicate of the proposition] in the proof of [sound as impermanent] because of explicitly indicating a single valid cognition—of the forward pervasion—in the proof of [sound as impermanent].

\[\text{Jam-yang-zhay-pa's opinion is that the phrase, “Whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent” does merely explicitly indicate one portion of the relationship (’brel ba’i phyogs gcig) between the sign (product) and the predicate of the proposition (impermanent), in the proof of sound as impermanent. Later, p. 81, Jam-yang-zhay-pa explains that the portion of the relationship that is explicitly indicated is: “when impermanent is eliminated, product is also necessarily eliminated (mi rtag pa log na byas pa yang log pas khyab pa).}\]
What Constitutes a Correct Reason?

[That (the phrase, “Whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent,”) explicitly indicates a single valid cognition—of the forward pervasion—in the proof of sound as impermanent] entails [that the phrase, “Whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent,” does not merely explicitly indicate one portion of the relationship (between the sign and the predicate of the proposition) in the proof of (sound as impermanent)] because ascertainment by valid cognition of the forward pervasion in a specified proof must be preceded by ascertainment of the relationship [between the sign and the predicate of the proposition] in that proof.

Above, you cannot accept [that the phrase, “Whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent” does not merely explicitly indicate one portion of the relationship in the proof of sound as impermanent] because the phrase “Whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent,” explicitly indicates one portion of the meaning-isolate of the relationship [between sign (product) and predicate of the proposition (impermanent)] in the proof of sound as impermanent.

It follows [that the phrase, “Whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent” explicitly indicates one portion of the meaning-isolate of the relationship (between product and impermanent) in the proof of sound as impermanent] because [that phrase, “Whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent,”] indicates only singularly the latter portion of the meaning-isolate of the relationship [between product and impermanent] which has three parts: 1) product is impermanent, 2) product is of one nature with impermanent, and 3) when impermanent is eliminated, product is also necessarily eliminated.
25. **Someone says:**\(^a\) It follows that product is the three modes in the proof of sound as impermanent because it [product] is a correct sign in the proof of [sound as impermanent]. If you accept [that product is the three modes in the proof of sound as impermanent], it follows that the term “product” expresses the forward pervasion in the proof of [sound as impermanent] because product is the forward pervasion in the proof of [sound as impermanent].

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\(^a\) 2011 BDRC *bla brang*, 23b.3; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 16b.2.
as impermanent] does not entail [that the term “product” expresses the forward pervasion in the proof of sound as impermanent] because although [product] is the forward pervasion in the proof of [sound as impermanent], the term that expresses [“product”] does not have to express the three modes in the proof of [sound as impermanent]. It follows [that although (product) is the forward pervasion in the proof of sound as impermanent, the term that expresses (“product”) does not have to express the three modes in the proof of (sound as impermanent)] because, from among the three modes [property of the subject, forward pervasion and counter pervasion] in the proof of [sound as impermanent], the term “product” expresses only the property of the subject in the proof of [sound as impermanent], because Dignāga’s Aphorisms on Valid Cognition [his Compilation of Valid Cognition] says:

Concerning the expression “sign” [which is] the three modes, [it, the sign] abides well established as the property of the subject.

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a *tshad ma kun las btus pa zhes bya ba'i rab tu byed pa (pramāṇasamuccaya)*, in bstan 'gyur (sde dge, 4203), BDRC W23703.174:189-304, 8b.4-8b.5, *tshul gsum rtags shes brjod pa las* / phyogs kyi chos su legs gnas pa'i /
b 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 16b.3, does not contain one step in the reasoning found in what must be an emendation in the later bla brang edition, the words following *de sgrub kyi tshul gsum* (in bold): *brjod mi dgos pa'i phyir / der thal/ de zhes brjod pa'i sgras de sgrub kyi tshul gsum* gyi nang nas de sgrub kyi phyogs chos tsam brjod pa'i phyir.

Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
[That passage] entails [that from among the three modes—property of the subject, forward pervasion and counter pervasion—in the proof of sound as impermanent, the term “product” expresses only the property of the subject in the proof of (sound as impermanent)] because “the three modes” indicates that product is the three modes in the proof of [sound as impermanent] and “Concerning the expression ‘sign,’ [it, the sign] abides well established as the property of the subject” indicates that the term that expresses that [sign, that is, “product”] expresses only the property of the subject in that proof.

If [according to you] it is not the case [that product being the forward pervasion in the proof of sound as impermanent does not entail that the term “product” expresses the forward pervasion in the proof of sound as impermanent], then for you it [absurdly] follows that the term expressing “pot” expresses the selflessness of phenomena because pot is without a self of phenomena.

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a Dignāga’s Aphorisms on Valid Cognition, 8b.5, lax; 2011 BDRC bla brang, 23b.6, la, 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 16b.3, lax; New Go-mang, 188.6, la.

b This means that the opponent rejects the arguments set forth above in “Our response” and continues to hold the position set forth by the opponent in the beginning of debate 25, p. 77: “It follows that the term “product” expresses the forward pervasion in the proof of [sound as impermanent] because product is the forward pervasion in the proof of [sound as impermanent].”

Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
26. About this formulation, someone says: \(^a\) That pot is without a self of phenomena does not entail [that the term expressing “pot” expresses the selflessness of phenomena] because in order to express that pot is without a self of phenomena, it is necessary to express the way in which [pot] is not established as a self of phenomena.

Our response: Well then, the same situation occurs in regard to the forward pervasion in the proof of sound as impermanent because product is posited as expressing the forward pervasion in the proof of [sound as impermanent] through product being expressed as existing, in accordance with the mode of statement, in solely the similar class in the proof of [sound as impermanent].

27. About this formulation, someone says: \(^b\) It follows that the meaning of the line from Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid Cognition”: \(^c\)

Although that does not exist in what is prerequisite to the pervasion,

is not established because the phrase “Whatever is a product is necessarily

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\(^a\) 2011 BDRC bla brang, 24a.2; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 16b.5.
\(^b\) 2011 BDRC bla brang, 24a.4; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 16b.6.
\(^c\) tshad ma rnam ’grel gyi tshig le’ur byas pa (pramāṇavārttikakārikā), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4210), BDRC W23703.174:189-304, 140a.4.
impermanent” does not explicitly indicate the pervasion in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product.

Our response: [That the phrase “Whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent” does not explicitly indicate the pervasion in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product] does not entail [that the meaning of the line from Darmakirti’s Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid Cognition,” “Although that does not exist in what is prerequisite to the pervasion,” is not established.]

Furthermore, if it is said:

It follows that the meaning of that line is not established because the proof statement, “Whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent, like, for example, pot; sound also is a product,” is not a proof statement that is prerequisite to the pervasion in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product. It follows [that the proof statement, “Whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent, like, for example, pot; sound also is a product,” is not a proof statement that is prerequisite to the pervasion in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product] because such a proof statement [“Whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent, like, for example, pot; sound also is a product”] is not a proof statement that expresses the forward pervasion in the proof of [sound as impermanent by the sign, product] before [expressing] the property of the subject in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product.

Key to colorization: Blue print – right. Red print – wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
What Constitutes a Correct Reason?

[Our own position is:] That [such a proof statement ("Whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent, like, for example, pot; sound also is a product")] is not a proof statement that expresses the forward pervasion in the proof (of sound as impermanent by the sign, product) before (expressing) the property of the subject in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product] does not entail [that the proof statement, “Whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent, like, for example, pot; sound also is a product,” is not a proof statement that is prerequisite to the pervasion in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product] because in order to express the forward pervasion in the proof of [sound as impermanent], there must also be the words “sound also is a product.”

It follows [that in order to express the forward pervasion in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product], there must also be the words “sound also is a product” because by the mere words, “whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent,” it is not possible to completely express the forward pervasion in the proof of [sound as impermanent by the sign, product]. It follows [that by the mere words, “whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent,” it is not possible to completely express the forward pervasion in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product] because realization of the pervasion—whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent—does not function toward realization of the forward pervasion in the proof of [sound as impermanent by the sign, product].

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28. **Someone says:** It follows that the pervasion that is a piece of the phrase, “Although that does not exist in what is prerequisite to the pervasion,” does not exist because the pervasion that is a piece of the phrase, “Although that does not exist in what is prerequisite to the pervasion,” is not taken as the forward pervasion in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product.

**Our response:** [That (the pervasion that is a piece of the phrase, “Although that does not exist in what is prerequisite to the pervasion,”) is not taken not taken...]

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*a 2011 BDRC *bla brang*, 24b.3; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 17a.3.

**Key to colorization:** Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
as the forward pervasion in the proof of (sound as impermanent by the sign, product) does not entail [that the pervasion that is a piece of the phrase, “Although that does not exist in what is prerequisite to the pervasion,” does not exist] because that [pervasion that is a piece of the phrase, “Although that does not exist in what is prerequisite to the pervasion,”] indicates one portion of the forward pervasion in the proof of [sound as impermanent by the sign, product], upon having been designated by the name of that (“pervasion”).

If [according to you] it is not the case that [the pervasion that is a piece of the phrase, “Although that does not exist in what is prerequisite to the pervasion,”] indicates one portion of the forward pervasion in the proof of (sound as impermanent by the sign, product), upon having been designated by the name of that (“pervasion”), it [absurdly] follows that the two, (1) phyogs (pakṣa) that is a piece of the phrase; and (2) phyogs (pakṣa) that is a piece of the phrase:

[A (valid) reason] is a property of the subject (phyogs chos). It is pervaded by a factor [that is, the predicate] of that [position].

and (2) phyogs (pakṣa) that is a piece of the phrase:

[A (valid) reason] that is the property of the subject either exists

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a Correcting de de in 2011 TBRC bla brang (24b.4) to des de in accordance with 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa (17a.4).
b Since the opponent is saying this is not the case, the opponent’s position is that: the pervasion that is a piece of the phrase, “Although that does not exist in what is prerequisite to the pervasion,” does not indicate one portion of the forward pervasion in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product, upon having been designated by the name of that (“pervasion.”

c tshad ma rnam ’grel gyi tshig le’ur bya pa (pramāṇavārttikakārikā), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4210), BDRC W23703.174:189-304, 94b.3-94b.4. The Sanskrit is found in Miyasaka (114.5): pakṣadharman tadamśena vyāptō hetus.
or does not exist in the similar class (phyogs, pakṣa),

are the position (phyogs, pakṣa) in the proof of [sound as impermanent by the sign, product] because you [incorrectly] accepted [that the pervasion that is a piece of the phrase, “Although that does not exist in what is prerequisite to the pervasion,” does not indicate one portion of the forward pervasion in the proof of (sound as impermanent by the sign, product), upon having been designated by the name of that (“pervasion”).

You cannot accept [that the two, (1) phyogs (pakṣa) that is a piece of the phrase, “[A (valid) reason] is a property of the subject (phyogs chos). It is pervaded by a factor [that is, the predicate] of that [position]” and (2) phyogs (pakṣa) that is a piece of the phrase, “[A (valid) reason that is] the property of the subject either exists or does not exist in the similar class (phyogs, pakṣa),” are the position in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product], because [those two, that is, phyogs in those two phrases] indicate [individually] one portion of the position in the proof of [sound as impermanent by the sign, product], through being designated by the name “position.”
29. **Also, someone says:** It follows that “Whatever is a product is pervaded by impermanent” [that is, “Whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent”] is the pervasion that is a piece of the phrase, \[A\] [valid reason] is a property of the position (phyogs chos, paksadharma). It is pervaded by a factor [that is, the predicate] of that [position (phyogs)].” because while that [pervasion, namely, “Whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent”] is the [pervasion that is a piece of that phrase], product is not the [pervasion that is a piece of that phrase], because product is not the pervasion in the proof of sound as impermanent. It follows [that product is not the pervasion in the proof of sound as impermanent] because product is one.

*Our response:* [That product is one] does not entail [that product is not the pervasion in the proof of sound as impermanent]. It follows that it is not logically feasible that if product is one, [product] does not have to be the pervasion in the proof of sound as impermanent, because although product is one, due to [product] being what is pervaded in the proof of [sound as impermanent], [product] is the pervasion, because due to [product] being what is pervaded by the predicate of the proposition in the proof of [sound as impermanent], [product] is both the pervasion and the reason in the

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\[a\] 2011 BDRC bla brang, 24b.6; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 17a.6.

\[b\] *tshad ma rnam ’grel gyi tshig le’ur byas pa* (pramāṇavārttikakarikā), in *bstan ’gyur* (sde dge, 4210), BDRC W23703.174:189-304, 94b.3-94b.4.

**Key to colorization:** Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
proof of [sound as impermanent]. It follows [that due to (product) being what is pervaded by the predicate of the proposition in the proof (of sound as impermanent), (product) is both the pervasion and the reason in the proof (of sound as impermanent)] because concerning the words [from Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid Cognition”], “[It] is pervaded by,” Dharmakīrti’s Autocommentary on the “Commentary on (Dignāga’s) ‘Compilation of Valid Cognition’” says:a

With regard to what is called “pervasion,” because there exists a pervader and there exists what is pervaded, [it is called] pervasion.

Furthermore, it follows that product is the pervasion in the proof of [sound as impermanent] because [product] is explained as being the pervasion due to being what is pervaded, the object of pervasion of the predicate of the proposition in the proof of [sound as impermanent], because the Great

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a tsad ma rnam 'grel gyi 'grel pa (pramāṇavārttikavṛtti), in bstan 'gyur (sde dge, 4216), BDRC W23703.174:523-732, 262a.3, which reads:

Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
Brahmin [Shaṃkarānanda’s] Explanatory Commentary says:\footnote{Shaṃkarānanda (bram ze bde byed dga’ ba).}

The pervasion is the object of pervasion, what is pervaded.

Furthermore, it follows that the pervasion does not have to be a collection of the two, the predicate of the proposition and the subject, because product is both the pervasion and the reason in the proof of sound as impermanent. It follows [that product is both the pervasion and the reason in the proof of sound as impermanent] because Shākyabuddhi’s Commentarial Explanation of Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid Cognition”\footnote{tshad ma rnam ’grel gyi ’grel bshad (pramāṇavārttīkā), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4220), BDRC W23703.176.3-657 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 6b.2} says:\footnote{tshad ma rnam ’grel gyi ’grel bshad (pramāṇavārttīkā), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4223), BDRC W23703.182: 4-587. This may be a paraphrase of of Shaṃkarānanda’s Explanatory Commentary, 11a.3-11a.4, khyab par byed pas khyab par bya ba khyab pa yin ba ’i phyur khyab pa yin no /}

The pervasion—the object of pervasion, what is pervaded—is the reason.

and the Great Brahmin [Shaṃkarānanda’s] Explanatory Commentary says:\footnote{tshad ma rnam ’grel gyi ’grel bshad (pramāṇavārttīkā), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4223), BDRC W23703.182: 4-587, (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985). This may be a paraphrase of Shaṃkarānanda’s Explanatory Commentary, 11a.3-11a.4, which reads, khyab par byed pas khyab par bya ba khyab pa yin ba ’i phyur khyab pa yin no /}

The pervasion—the object of the pervasion, that which is pervaded.

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\footnote{Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.}
[Those two passages] entail [that product is both the pervasion and the reason in the proof of sound as impermanent] because “The pervasion” [in both those passages] explains the two pervasions [forward pervasion and counter pervasion] that are pieces of the phrase [in Dharmakīrti’s *Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid Cognition”*], “[A (valid) reason is the property of the subject; it] is pervaded by a factor [that is, the predicate of that position],” [and] the remainder [(of both passages), “the object of pervasion, what is pervaded—is the reason” and “the object of pervasion, that which is pervaded”] explains that because product is that which is pervaded—the object of pervasion of the predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent—[product] is both the pervasion and the reason in the proof of [sound as impermanent].

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a Two pervasions are not explicitly mentioned in this passage from Dharmakīrti’s *Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid Cognition,”* but the term khyab pa in the passage refers to both the forward pervasion and the counter pervasion.

b *tshad ma rnam ‘grel gyi tshig le’ir byas pa* (pramāṇavārttikakārikā), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4210), BDRC W23703.174:189-304, 94b.3-94b.4. I.1ab. The Sanskrit is found in Miyasaka (114.5): pakṣadharmas tadaṃśena vyāptō hetu.

*Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis; magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.*
It follows [that “The pervasion” (in both those passages) explains the two pervasions (forward pervasion and counter pervasion) that are pieces of the phrase, (“A reason is the property of the subject; it) is pervaded by a factor (that is, the predicate of that position”), (and) the remainder (of both passages) explains that because product is that which is pervaded—the object of pervasion of the predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent—(product) is both the pervasion and the reason in the proof (of sound as impermanent)] because there exists a mode of explanation through combining the meaning of those two [passages]. It follows [that there exists a mode of explanation through combining the meaning of those two (passages)] because the meaning of those two [passages] exists.

Furthermore, it follows that the pervasion of product by impermanent [that is, “Whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent”] is not the pervasion that is a piece of the phrase,¹ “[A (valid) reason is a property of the position. It] is pervaded by a factor [that is, the predicate of that position],” because product is the two pervasions [forward pervasion and counter pervasion] that are pieces of that phrase. It follows [that product is the two pervasions (forward pervasion and counter pervasion) that are pieces of that phrase] because it is also the thought of the Foremost Father [Tsong-

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¹ tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi tshig le'ur byas pa (pramāṇavārttikakārikā), in bstn 'gyur (sde dge, 4210), BDRC W23703.174:189-304, 94b.3-94b.4. The Sanskrit is found in Miyasaka (114.5): paksadharmanas tadamsena vyāpto hetus.
kha-pa] and his spiritual son that it [product] is the three modes in the proof of [sound as impermanent]. It follows [that it is also the thought of the Foremost Father (Tsong-kha-pa) and his spiritual son that product is the three modes in the proof of sound as impermanent] because the Great Brahmin [Shaṃkaraṇānanda’s] Explanatory Commentary says:

The object pervaded by the perceiver is also the forward and counter pervasions.

[That passage] entails [that it is also the thought of the Foremost Father (Tsong-kha-pa) and his spiritual son that product is the three modes in the proof of sound as impermanent] because “the perceiver” (khyab par byed pa) indicates the perceiver, the predicate of the proposition, impermanent; “the object pervaded” (yul khyab par bya ba) indicates that which is pervaded, the reason, product; [and] the remainder [“also the forward and counter pervasions”] indicates that [product] is the two pervasions [forward pervasion and counter pervasion] in the proof of [sound as impermanent].

\[ \text{G18a.1} \] This passage was not found.
Abbreviations

“2015 Old Lhasa Go-mang” = chos thams cad rigs pas gtan la ’bebs pa’i gtan tshigs kyi rnam bzhag legs par bshad pa bzhugs so (Elegant Explanation of the Presentation of Reasons Delineating All Phenomena by Reasoning). Named “2015” because of being acquired in Lhasa, Tibet, at Go-mang College in 2015 by Jongbok Yi for the UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies; originally published at Go-mang College, date unknown. (Complete edition, to be made available at UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, uma-tibet.org.)

“2011 TBRC bla brang” = rtags rigs kyi rnam bzhag nyung gsal legs bshad gser gyi phreng mdzes zhes bya ba bzhugs so. Named because of being acquired by E. Gene Smith for the Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center in 2010 and added to TBRC in 2011; originally published in Labrang-tra-shi-khyil monastery, date unknown.

“co ne” = co ne bstan ’gyur. TBRC W1GS66030. co ne dgon chen: co ne, 1926.


“TBRC” = Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center (http://www.tbrc.org).
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Seven Treatises on Valid Cognition
Three resembling a body

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3. Drop of Reasoning
   nyāyabinduprakarana
Four resembling limbs

4. **Drop of Reasons**
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   - rtsod pa’i rigs pa
   - (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985).
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nyāyapraśesa-nāma-pramānaprakaraṇa
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Wheel of Reasonings
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2. OTHER WORKS

Katherine Rogers holds a B.A. in Religious Studies as well as an M.A. and a Ph.D. in Tibetan Buddhist Studies from the University of Virginia. She taught at Washington and Lee University as an Assistant Professor for two years.

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This book is a translation of the second section of Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s *Illuminating a Little the Presentation of Signs and Reasonings: Beautiful Golden Garland of Eloquence*, a textbook studied by beginners at the Gomang College of Drepung Monastery and at La-brang Tra-shi-khyil and their affiliated institutions throughout Inner Asia.

In their system, the student needs to develop a strong “path of reasoning”—a mind trained in valid knowledge—in order to pursue not only the academic path but also the path of meditation and self-transformation. The study of Signs and Reasonings plays an important role in the development of this path of reasoning, being an introduction to the fundamentals of logic, including syllogisms and their components, correct reasons (or “signs”) and how they come to be correct—able to induce in the debater and meditator new knowledge about something not formerly understood.

In this section of his work, Jam-yang-zhay-pa introduces the student to definitions for the basic concepts of correct reasoning, with a focus on laying the foundation for understanding the necessary relationship between the subject, predicate, and sign in the context of the generation of valid inferential knowledge, leading to direct perception of reality.