Reasoning from Effects

Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s
Illuminating a Little the Presentation
of Signs and Reasonings:
Beautiful Golden Garland
of Eloquence, 3

Katherine M. Rogers
Edited by Jeffrey Hopkins
In consultation with Lo-zang-gyal-tshan

UMA INSTITUTE
FOR TIBETAN STUDIES
Reasoning from Effects

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UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies
uma-tibet.org
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Expanding Wisdom and Compassion
Through Study and Contemplation

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Translating texts from the heritage of Tibetan and Inner Asian Buddhist systems, the project focuses on Great Indian Books and Tibetan commentaries from the Go-mang College syllabus as well as a related theme on the fundamental innate mind of clear light in Tantric traditions. A feature of the Project is the usage of consistent vocabulary and format throughout the translations.

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UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies
7330 Harris Mountain Lane
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Preface

**JAM-YANG-ZHAY-PA**

Jam-yang-zhay-pa Ngag-wang-tsön-drü\(^a\) was born in the northeastern Am-do Province of Tibet in the Earth-Mouse year of 1648 east of the Blue Lake.\(^b\) At the age of five he was blessed by the Fifth Dalai Lama, from whom he later received monastic vows. Having studied the alphabet at age seven with his uncle, who was a monk, he mastered reading and writing and six years later became a novice monk, excelling among his fellow students by his ability quickly to understand texts and disputations. He went to Lhasa at age twenty-one to further his studies at the Gomang College of Dre-pung Monastic University. Arriving in Lhasa in 1668, he offered a presentation scarf to an image of Mañjushrī in the Jo-khang Temple, where the statue reportedly favored the young scholar with a smile, due to which he became known as Jam-yang-zhay-pa, “Smiled Upon by Mañjushrī.” Six years later he received full ordination and at twenty-nine entered Gyumay Tantric College. From age thirty-three he spent two years in meditative retreat in a cave near Dre-pung.

At the age of thirty-eight in 1685 he published the first of his major works, *Decisive Analysis of (Tsong-kha-pa’s) “Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive”: Storehouse of White Lapis-Lazuli of Scripture and Reasoning Free from Mistake, Fulfing the Hopes of the Fortunate*, commonly called *Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive*. In 1688 he published another of his great expositions, the *Treatise on the Presentations of the Concentrative and Formless Absorptions: Adornment Beautifying the Subduer’s Teaching, Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning, Delighting the Fortunate*, commonly called *Great Exposition of the Concentrative and Formless Absorptions*. He published the *Root Text of Tenets: Lion’s Roar* in 1689, and published the *Great Exposition of Tenets*—its prose auto-commentary—ten years later in 1699, and between those two, in 1695, he published the *Decisive Analysis of (Chandrakīrti’s) “Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle’”*: *Treasury of

\(^a\) Jam dbyangs bzhad pa ngag dbang brtson grus, 1648-1722. For a longer biography of Jam-yang-zhay-pa see Derek F. Maher, “Knowledge and Authority in Tibetan Middle Way Schools of Buddhism: A Study of the Gelukha (dge lugs pa) Epistemology of Jamyang Shayba (jam dbyangs bzhad pa) In Its Historical Context” (Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, 2003), 169-196.

Scripture and Reasoning, Thoroughly Illuminating the Profound Meaning [of Emptiness], Entrance for the Fortunate, also called the Great Exposition of the Middle.

At age fifty-three in 1700 he became abbot of Go-mang College and in 1709 at sixty-two returned to Am-do Province, where he founded a highly influential monastery at Tra-shi-khyil in 1710. Seven years later he founded a tantric college at the same place. He wrote prolifically on the full range of topics of a typical Tibetan polymath and, having received honors from the central Tibetan government and from the Chinese Emperor, died at the age of seventy-three or -four in 1721/2.b

Partly because of the close connection between Go-mang College and the Mongolian peoples stretching from the Caspian Sea through Siberia, who were predominantly Ge-lug-pa by this time, Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s influence on the Ge-lug-pa order has been considerable. His life manifests a pattern typical of many influential Tibetan religious figures—child prodigy, learned scholar, disseminator of the religion, politician, priest to political personages, monastery leader, yogi, magician, popular teacher, and prolific writer.

THE PRESENTATION OF SIGNS AND REASONINGS

The text translated here is the third section of Jam-yang-zhay-pa Ngag-wang-tson-drü’s Illuminating a Little the Presentation of Signs and Reasonings: Beautiful Golden Garland of Eloquence. Belonging to the debate-oriented decisive analysis (mtha’ dpyod) genre, it is an introductory textbook (yig cha) for the study of logic at the Go-mang Monastic College and at La-brang Tra-shi-khyil as well as their affiliated institutions throughout Inner Asia. In the curriculum this aspect of study is followed by Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s very lengthy decisive analysis of Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid Cognition” titled Decisive Analysis of the “Commentary on Valid Cognition” Fully Revealing the Path of Liberation: Hundreds of Blazing Lights of Valid Cognition.

Since their founding by Tsong-kha-pa in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, Ge-lug-pa monastic institutions, like those of other Tibetan orders, created their own systems of education. These often included

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a bkra shis ’khyil.
b See Maher, “Knowledge and Authority in Tibetan Middle Way Schools of Buddhism,” 164.
c jam dbyangs bzhad pa’i rdo rje ngag dbang brtson grus, 1648-1721/1722.
d rtags rigs kyi rnam bzhag nyung gsal legs bshad gser gyi phreng mdzes.
a curriculum designed to enable the student to develop a “path of reasoning,” a consciousness trained in reasoned analysis until it can use analysis to realize initially the meaning of religious texts and eventually the true nature of reality. Reasoning is used to draw conclusions based on evidence, signs; and thus Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s book begins with a definition of a correct sign, and then lays out illustrations, divisions, how entailment operates, and so forth—all within the rubric of sometimes jaw-dropping challenges in the form of debates.

EDITIONS CONSULTED

Three basic editions of Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s Illuminating a Little the Presentation of Signs and Reasonings: Beautiful Golden Garland of Eloquence were consulted:

1. chos thams cad rigs pas gtan la ’bebs pa’i gtan tshigs kyi rnam bzhag legs par bshad pa bzhugs so. Published at Go-mang College, Lhasa, Tibet, date unknown. Interlinear reference in the Tibetan text “[G##a/b].” Abbreviated reference: “2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa,” so named because of being acquired in Lhasa, Tibet, at Go-mang College in 2015 by Jongbok Yi for the UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies. This version was likely originally printed at Go-mang College, Lhasa, Tibet, during Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s residence at Go-mang College. (To be made available at UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, uma-tibet.org.) Portion translated here: 18a.2-26a.2.

2. rtags rigs kyi rnam bzhag nyung gsal legs bshad gser gyi phreng mdzes zhes bya ba bzhugs so. TBRC W22186.14:176-304, which is a PDF of: bla brang bkra shis ’khyil: bla brang bkra shis ’khyil dgon, [n.d.]. Interlinear reference in the Tibetan text “[L##a/b].” Abbreviated reference: “2011 TBRC bla brang,” so named because of being acquired by E. Gene Smith for the Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center at the request of the UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies in 2010 and added to TBRC in 2011. This edition, which is a revision of the above edition, was originally printed in La-brang-tra-shi-khyil monastery founded by Jam-yang-zhay-pa after his return to Am-do. It is the preferred edition, in general, though not always. Portion translated here: 26a.1-38a.3.

3. rtags rigs kyi rnam bzhag nyung gsal legs bshad gser gyi phreng mdzes zhes bya ba bzhugs so. Drepung Gomang Library Computer Section, North Kanara, Karnataka, India, 2015. It appears to have been edited based on the “2011 TBRC bla brang” and the “2015 Old Go-mang

The basic digital Tibetan text of Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s *Presentation of Signs and Reasonings* provided in this book was supplied by the Drepung Gomang Library of Go-mang College in Mundgod, Karnataka State, India. I have edited it in consultation with all three of the above editions as well as other sources.

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I wish to acknowledge the strategic input of Lo-zang-gyal-tshan, a Lharam-pa Ge-she of the Go-mang College of Drepung Monastic University, Mundgod, Karnataka State, India. He served as Abbot of Go-mang College of Drepung Monastic University in Mundgod, India, for six years from October 2015 and now is Abbot Emeritus. He also served a six-month term as Disciplinarian at the Tantric College of Lower Lhasa in Hunsur, India. He has worked with translators of the UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies since 2013.
Technical Notes

Please notice that:

- Full bibliographical references are given in the footnotes at first citation.
- For translations and editions of texts, see the Bibliography.
- The names of Indian Buddhist schools are translated into English in an effort to increase accessibility for non-specialists.
- For the names of Indian scholars and systems cited in the body of the text, ch, sh, and śh are used instead of the more usual c, ś, and ś for the sake of easy pronunciation by non-specialists; however, cch is used for cch, not chchh. In parentheses the usual transliteration system for Sanskrit is used.
- The names of Indian authors and orders are given in “essay phonetics” for the sake of easy pronunciation and internet accessibility.
- The names of Indian authors have been added to all citations.
- Ellipses are only used to depict authors’ own ellipses; thus, the usual practice of announcing citations that begin midstream with an ellipsis is not followed; the citation merely begins midstream, mirroring the Tibetan.
- In the Tibetan text when I have filled in an author’s ellipsis with the missing material, turquoise highlight indicates the material added in place of the author’s ellipsis and the added text is put in smaller type inside brackets in order to preserve access to the author’s intended text, and in the English translation only a footnote indicates that the material has been filled in, in order to avoid clutter in the translation.
- Tibetan passages cited in the notes often vary from Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s citations likely due to different editions and often also to his editing translations from Sanskrit.
**Illuminating a Little the Presentation of Signs and Reasonings:**

*Beautiful Golden Garland of Eloquence*

Third in the series: Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s *Illuminating a Little the Presentation of Signs and Reasonings: Beautiful Golden Garland of Eloquence*

1. *How Can a Conclusion be Drawn from a Sign? Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s Illuminating a Little the Presentation of Signs and Reasonings: Beautiful Golden Garland of Eloquence, 1.*


In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight indicates material added in place of ellipses, and magenta highlight shows that the ellipsis indicator has been filled in.

*Key to colorization in debates:* Even within an opponent’s mistaken challenge, parts with a subject and predicate are colored blue to represent what Jam-yang-zhay-pa considers to be right, while parts with a subject and predicate are colored red to represent what Jam-yang-zhay-pa considers to be wrong.
[I.] EXPLAINING CORRECT EFFECT SIGNS

[Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid Cognition” (I.4abc')] says:

[From among] the various natures, the causal [nature] such that
If it does not arise, [the effect] does not arise
Is a [correct] effect reason.

30. Someone says: Smoke is not a correct effect sign proving fire as existing on a smoky pass; however, the existence of smoke [or smoke exists, du ba yod pa] is a correct effect sign in the proof of [fire as existing on a smoky pass].

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that there does not exist a correct effect sign proving fire as existing on a smoky pass by the sign, smoke, because [according to you] smoke is not that [a correct effect sign proving fire as existing on a smoky pass by the sign, smoke]. If you [incorrectly] accept [that there does not exist a correct effect sign proving fire as existing on a smoky pass by the sign, smoke], it [absurdly] follows that the meaning of

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a tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi tshig le'ur byas pa (pramāṇavārttikakārikā), in bstan 'gyur (sde dge, 4210), BDRC W23703.174:189-304 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 94b.4.

b This is where Dharmakīrti’s quotation ends; Jam-yang-zhay-pa then adds yin te.

c 2011 BDRC bla brang, 26a.2; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 18a.2.
the passage from Dharmakīrti’s *Autocommentary on the “Commentary on (Dignāga’s) ‘Compilation of Valid Cognition’”*:a

An effect [sign] is, for instance, [smoke in] “Fire exists here [in this place] because smoke exists here.”

is not established because [according to you] smoke is not a correct effect sign proving fire as existing on a smoky pass.

Furthermore, it [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, smoke, there exist two pervasions—(1) whatever is the mode of statement in the proof of fire as existing on a smoky pass by the sign of it [smoke], is necessarily a copulative “is” statement (*yin ‘god*) and (2) whatever is the mode of proof [in the proof of fire as existing on a smoky pass by the sign, (smoke)] is necessarily a copulative “is” proof (*yin sgrub*)—because it [smoke] is a correct sign in the proof of [fire as existing on a smoky pass by the sign, (smoke)] and [according to you] the mode of statement in the proof of [fire as existing on a smoky pass] by the sign of it [smoke] is not an [ontological] “exists” (*yod ‘god*) statement and the mode of proof in the proof of [fire as existing on a smoky pass] by the sign of it [smoke] is not

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*a* tshad ma rnam ’grel gyi ’grel pa (pramāṇavārttikavṛtti), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4216), BDRC W23703.174:523-732 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 271a.4, which is a close match: ’bras bu yang de yod pa nyid na yod pa yin no/ de yang du ba la yod do/ de lta bas na ba ni ’bras bu yin no.

Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
an ontological (yod sgrub) “exists” proof.

The first [sign which is that (smoke) is a correct sign in the proof of fire as existing on a smoky pass by the sign, (smoke)] is established because it [smoke] is set as the sign in the proof of [fire as existing on a smoky pass by the sign, smoke], because of being selfless.

Above, if you [incorrectly] accept [that with respect to smoke, there exist two pervasions—whatever is the mode of statement in the proof of fire as existing on a smoky pass by the sign, smoke, is necessarily a copulative “is” statement and whatever is the mode of proof in the proof of fire as existing on a smoky pass by the sign, smoke, is necessarily a copulative “is” proof], it [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, smoke, on-a-smoky-pass is it [smoke] because (1) the mode of statement in the proof of fire as existing on a smoky pass by the sign of it [smoke] is a copulative “is” statement and the mode of proof [in the proof of fire as existing on a smoky pass by the sign, (smoke)] is a copulative “is” proof, and (2) it [smoke] is a correct sign in the proof of [fire as existing on a smoky pass by the sign, (smoke)].
If you accept [that on a smoky pass is (smoke)], it follows that the subject, on a smoky pass, is not smoke, because of being fire [according to you]. You have, by the meaning [of what you have expressed]a accepted the sign. The three spheres [of self-contradiction]!

Furthermore, it [absurdly] follows that the syllogism, “With respect to the subject, on a smoky pass, fire exists because smoke exists,” is not a correct syllogismb proving fire as existing on a smoky pass by the sign, smoke, because [according to you] smoke is not a correct effect sign in the proof of [fire as existing on a smoky pass by the sign, smoke]. It [absurdly]

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a Jam-yang-zhay-pa spells out that the opponent holds that the mode of statement in the proof of fire as existing on a smoky pass by the sign, smoke, is not an (ontological) “exists” statement and the mode of proof is not an (ontological) “exists” proof, based on the opponent asserting that “smoke” is not a correct effect sign in the proof of fire as existing on a smoky pass. Thus, the opponent’s position, as spelled out by Jam-yang-zhay-pa, implies that the mode of statement in the proof of fire as existing on a smoky pass is a (copulative) “is” statement and the mode of proof is a (copulative) “is” proof; that being the case, the opponent is put in the position of accepting that the subject, on a smoky pass, is fire (fire being the predicate of the proposition) and is smoke (smoke being the sign).

b Literally, “formulation of a sign” (rtags sbyor).

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follows [that smoke is not a correct effect sign in the proof of (fire as existing on a smoky pass by the sign, smoke)] because [according to you] it [smoke] is not in the least a correct sign in the proof of [fire as existing on a smoky pass by the sign, smoke].

If you [incorrectly] accept [that smoke is not a correct effect sign in the proof (of fire as existing on a smoky pass by the sign smoke)], it [absurdly] follows that the proof statement, “Wherever smoke exists, fire necessarily exists, as is the case with a kitchen; smoke also exists on this pass,” is not a correct proof statement in the proof of fire as existing on a smoky pass because you [incorrectly] accepted [that smoke is not a correct effect sign in the proof of fire as existing on a smoky pass by the sign, smoke]. If you [incorrectly] accept [that the proof statement, “Wherever smoke exists, fire necessarily exists, as is the case with a kitchen; smoke also exists on this pass,” is not a correct proof statement in the proof of fire as existing on a smoky pass], it [absurdly] follows that the meaning of the passage from Dharmakīrti’s *Drop of Reasoning*:

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*a* **rigs pa’i thigs pa zhes bya ba’i rab tu byed pa (nyāyabhīndupakarana), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4212), BDRC W23703.174:463-477 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa chöedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 233b.3: An effect reason-syllogism is: “Wherever smoke exists, fire necessarily exists, as is the case for example, with a kitchen and so forth; here also smoke exists.”**
An effect-syllogism is: “Wherever smoke exists, fire necessarily exists, as is the case with a kitchen; smoke also exists on this pass,”

is not established because you [incorrectly] accepted [that the proof statement, “Wherever smoke exists, fire necessarily exists, as is the case with a kitchen; smoke also exists on this pass,” is not a correct proof statement in the proof of fire as existing on a smoky pass].

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Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
31. **Someone says:** It is a correct sign in a specified proof and it is an effect of the explicit predicate of the proposition in that proof is the definition of correct effect sign in a specified proof; and **someone else says:** It is a correct sign in a specified proof and it is related as a dependent-arising with the predicate of the proposition in that proof is the definition of correct effect sign in a specified proof.

**Our response:** Well then, it [absurdly] follows that with regard to those two [opponents], the subject, smoke, is individually both of the two: (1) an effect of the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of fire as existing on a smoky pass and (2) related as a dependent-arising with it [the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of fire as existing on a smoky pass] because [smoke] is a correct effect sign in the proof of [fire as existing on a smoky pass].

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**Key to colorization:** Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
If you [incorrectly] accept [that smoke is individually both of the two: (1) an effect of the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of fire as existing on a smoky pass and (2) related as a dependent-arising with (the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of fire as existing on a smoky pass)], it [absurdly] follows that what is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of fire as existing on a smoky pass by the sign, smoke, is impermanent because smoke is the effect of [the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of fire as existing on a smoky pass by the sign, smoke].

If you [incorrectly] accept [that what is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of fire as existing on a smoky pass by the sign, smoke, is impermanent], it [absurdly] follows that fire which is held as the predicate of the proposition in the proof of fire as existing on a smoky pass by the sign, smoke, is impermanent because you [incorrectly] accepted that [what is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of fire as existing on a smoky pass by the sign, smoke, is impermanent].

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a That is, it follows that “fire which is held as the predicate of the proposition in the proof of fire as existing on a smoky pass by the sign, smoke” is impermanent. Here it is not just “fire” which held to be impermanent, but that which is conveyed by the whole phrase, “fire which is held as the predicate of the proposition in the proof of fire as existing on a smoky pass by the sign, smoke.”
If you [incorrectly] accept that [fire which is held as the predicate of the proposition in the proof of (fire as existing on a smoky pass by the sign, smoke), is impermanent], it [absurdly] follows that impermanent which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product, is impermanent because you [incorrectly] accepted [that fire which is held as the predicate of the proposition in the proof of fire as existing on a smoky pass, is impermanent].

If you [incorrectly] accept that [impermanent which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product, is impermanent], it [absurdly] follows that the factor of that [impermanent which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product] being that [impermanent] is ultimately established because you [incorrectly] accepted [that impermanent which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product, is impermanent].

*Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.*
If you [incorrectly] accept that [the factor of (impermanent which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product) being (impermanent) is ultimately established], it [absurdly] follows that the subject, the factor of [(impermanent which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product) being (impermanent)] is ultimately established as an entity that a valid cognition realizes directly because you [incorrectly] accepted [that the factor of (impermanent which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product) being (impermanent) is ultimately established]. You cannot accept [that the factor of (impermanent which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product) being (impermanent) is ultimately established] as an entity that a valid cognition realizes directly because of [its] being only imputed by conceptuality.\(^a\)

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\(^a\) That is, because the factor of impermanent—which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product—being impermanent is only imputed by conceptuality.
32. Someone says: a It is a correct sign in a specified proof and whatever is that which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition in that proof is necessarily the cause of it is the definition of correct effect sign in a specified proof.

Our response: Well then, it [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, smoke, whatever is that which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of fire as existing on a smoky pass by the sign of it [smoke] is necessarily the cause of it [smoke] because it [smoke] is a correct effect sign in the proof of [fire as existing on a smoky pass by the sign, (smoke)].

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a 2011 BDRC bla brang, 27b.1; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 19a.2.

Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
If you [incorrectly] accept [that whatever is that which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of fire as existing on a smoky pass by the sign, (smoke), is necessarily the cause of (smoke)], it [absurdly] follows that the subject, the existence of fire (me yod pa), is a cause of smoke because of being that which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of fire as existing on a smoky pass by the sign, smoke.

If you say that [the sign which is (the existence of fire) being that which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of fire as existing on a smoky pass by the sign, smoke] is not established, then [our own position is] it follows that with respect to the subject, the existence of fire, it [the existence of fire] is that which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of it [that is, the existence of fire] on a smoky pass by the sign, smoke, because it [the existence of fire] is selfless.

If you accept [that (the existence of fire) is the cause of smoke], it
[absurdly] follows [according to you] that the subject, the existence of fire, is impermanent because of being the cause of smoke. You have accepted the sign.

33. Also, someone says: It is a correct sign in a specified proof and there exists a common locus of (1) being that which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition in that proof by the sign of it and (2) being the cause of it is the definition of correct effect sign in a specified proof.

About this formulation, someone else says: Well then, it follows that the subject, smoke, is a correct effect sign proving fire empty of the two, permanent-and-thing, as existing on a smoky pass because there exists a common locus of being that which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of [fire empty of the two, permanent-and-thing, as existing on a smoky pass] by the sign [smoke] and being the cause of it [smoke], and it [smoke] is a correct sign in the proof of [fire empty of the two, permanent-and-thing, as existing on a smoky pass].

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a 2011 BDRC bla brang, 27b.5; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 19a.5.

Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
The first [sign which is that there exists a common locus of being that which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of (fire empty of the two, permanent-and-thing, as existing on a smoky pass) by the sign (smoke) and being the cause of (smoke)], is established because fire empty of the two, permanent-and-thing, is that [common locus]. It follows that [fire empty of the two, permanent-and-thing, is that common locus] because fire is that [common locus].

The second [sign which is that smoke is a correct sign in the proof of fire empty of the two, permanent-and-thing, as existing on a smoky pass] is established because smoke empty of the two, permanent-and-thing, is that [a correct sign in the proof of fire empty of the two, permanent-and-thing, as existing on a smoky pass]. It follows [that smoke empty of the two, permanent-and-thing, as existing on a smoky pass] because smoke is [a correct sign in the proof of fire empty of the two, permanent-and-thing, as existing on a smoky pass].
Explaining Correct Effect Signs

Above, if you accept [that smoke is a correct effect sign proving fire empty of the two, permanent-and-thing, as existing on a smoky pass], it follows that the subject, smoke, is a correct sign of a positive proving fire empty of the two, permanent-and-thing, as existing on a smoky pass because of being either of the two—correct effect or correct nature sign—in the proof of [fire empty of the two, permanent-and-thing, as existing on a smoky pass].

[Being either of the two—correct effect or correct nature sign—in the proof of fire empty of the two, permanent-and-thing, as existing on a smoky pass] entails being a correct sign of a positive proving fire empty of the two, permanent-and-thing, as existing on a smoky pass] because Dharmakīrti’s Auto-commentary says: a

Two are [reasons of] a positive thing; one is a reason of a negative.

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a tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi 'grel pa (pramāṇavārttikavṛtti), in bstan 'gyur (sde dge, 4216), BDRC W23703.174:523-732, 262a.6: de las gnyis ni dogos po sgrub pa yin la|| gcig ni dgag pa'i gtan tshigs yin te. This is cited later, 47 and 49. The complete sentence (262a.6-262a.7) reads: དེ་ལས་གཉིས་ནི་དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་ལ། གཅིག་ནི་དགག་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཡིན་ཏེ། རང་བཞིན་དང་འངོས་པ་ཡོད་པ་དོན་གྱིས་དོན་འངོས་པ་མེད་པ་དེ། དེ་ནི་དེའི་བདག་ཀྱིས་དེ་དེ་དང་ལེགས་པའི་ྟོར་བོ་གསུམ་ཀ་བར་འངོས་པ་མེད་པ་དེ། དེ་ནི་དེའི་བདག་ཀྱིས་དེ་དེ་དང་ལེགས་པའི་ྟོར་བོ་གསུམ་ཀ་བར་འངོས་པ་མེད་པ་དེ། དེ་ནི་དེའི་བདག་ཀྱིས་དེ་དེ་དང་ལེགས་པའི་ྟོར་བོ་གསུམ་ཀ་བར་འངོས་པ་མེད་པ་དེ། དེ་ནི་དེའི་བདག་ཀྱིས་དེ་དེ་དང་ལེགས་པའི་ྟོར་བོ་གསུམ་ཀ་བར་འངོས་པ་མེད་པ་དེ། དེ་ནི་དེའི་བདག་ཀྱིས་དེ་དེ་དང་ལེགས་པའི་ྟོར་བོ་གསུམ་ཀ་བར་འངོས་པ་མེད་པ་དེ། དེ་ནི་དེའི་བདག་ཀྱིས་དེ་དེ་དང་ལེགས་པའི་ྟོར་བོ་གསུམ་ཀ་བར་འངོς་པ་མེད་པ་དེ། དེ་ནི་དེའི་བདག་ཀྱིས་དེ་དེ་དང་ལེགས་པའི་ྟོར་བོ་གསུམ་ཀ་བར་འངོས་པ་མེད་པ་དེ། དེ་ནི་དེའི་བདག་ཀྱིས་དེ་དེ་དང་ལེགས་པའི་ྟོར་བོ་གསུམ་ཀ་བར་འངོས་པ་མེད་པ་དེ། དེ་ནི་དེའི་བདག་ཀྱིས་དེ་དེ་དང་ལེགས་པའི་ྟོར་བོ་གསུམ་ཀ་བར་འངོས་པ་མེད་པ་དེ། དེ་ནི་དེའི་བདག་ཀྱིས་དེ་དེ་དང་ལེགས་པའི་ྟོར་བོ་གསུམ་ཀ་བར་འངོས་པ་མེད་པ་དེ། དེ་ནི་དེའི་བདག་ཀྱིས་དེ་དེ་དང་ལེགས་པའི་ྟོར་བོ་གསུམ་ཀ་བར་འངོས་པ་མེད་པ་དེ། དེ་ནི་དེའི་བདག་ཀྱིས་དེ་དེ་དང་ལེགས་པའི་ྟོར་བོ་གསུམ་ཀ་བར་འངོས་པ་མེད་པ་དེ། དེ་ནི་དེའི་བདག་ཀྱིས་དེ་དེ་དང་ལེགས་པའི་ྟོར་བོ་གསུམ་ཀ་བར་འངོས་པ་མེད་པ་དེ། དེ་ནི་དེའི་བདག་ཀྱིས་དེ་དེ་དང་ལེགས་པའི་ྟོར་བོ་གསུམ་ཀ་བར་འངོས་པ་མེད་པ་དེ། དེ་ནི་diberna pa

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If you accept [that smoke is a correct sign of a positive proving fire empty of the two, permanent-and-thing, as existing on a smoky pass], it follows that with respect to the subject, smoke, it [smoke] is not a correct sign of a positive in the proof of [fire empty of the two, permanent-and-thing, as existing on a smoky pass] because it [smoke] is a correct sign of a negative in the proof of [fire empty of the two, permanent-and-thing, as existing on a smoky pass]. It follows [that smoke is a correct sign of a negative in the proof of fire empty of the two, permanent-and-thing, as existing on a smoky pass] because there exists a common locus of being that which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of [fire empty of the two, permanent-and-thing, as existing on a smoky pass] by the sign of it [smoke] and being a negative.
Our response: [The existence of a common locus of (1) being that which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of fire empty of the two, permanent-and-thing, as existing on a smoky pass by the sign, (smoke) and (2) being a negative] does not entail [that (smoke) is a correct sign of a negative in the proof of fire empty of the two, permanent-and-thing, as existing on a smoky pass].

The sign [which is that there exists a common locus of being that which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of fire empty of the two, permanent-and-thing, as existing on a smoky pass, smoke, and being a negative] is established because fire empty of the two, permanent-and-thing, is that [common locus].

Above, it follows that [there existing a common locus of being that which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of fire empty of the two, permanent-and-thing, as existing on a smoky pass, by the sign, (smoke), and being a negative] does not entail [that (smoke) is a correct sign of a negative in the proof of fire empty of the two, permanent-and-thing, as existing on a smoky pass] because in order for that [smoke] to be a correct sign of a negative in the proof of [fire empty of the two, permanent-and-thing, as existing on a smoky pass], a non-affirming
negative must definitely be held as the explicit predicate of the proposition, the presence of an affirming negative in that which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of [fire empty of the two, permanent-and-thing, as existing on a smoky pass] not being permissible, because Dharmakirti’s Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid Cognition” says:  

In Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s reading of this passage, which differs from the sde dge edition, the last line reads: ma yin gzhan pa gzhan yin no instead of Dharmakirti’s ma yin sgrub par byed phyir ro. The only text found citing the exact wording of Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s fourth line (ma yin gzhan pa gzhan yin no) is Avalokitavrata’s Explanatory Commentary on (Bhāvaviveka’s) “Lamp for (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Wisdom’” (shes rab sgron ma’i rgya cher ‘grel pa, prajñāpradīpatikā), (sde dge, 3859), BDRC W23703, vol. 99:4-575, 63b.6, which in context reads:

Concerning this the definitions of these two negations are described as:

Negations that indicate through import,
That establish through a phrase,
That possess those, and that do not indicate through their own words
Are affirming [negations]; others are other [that is, non-affirming negations].

Jeffrey Hopkins, Buddhāpālita’s Refutation of Production from Self; Bhāvaviveka’s Criticism, and Avalokitavrata’s Commentary: Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Opposite of the Consequences, 1 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version October, 2017: uma-tibet.org), 197-198; Hopkins notes that Jam-yang-zhay-pa identifies this passage in Avalokitavrata’s text as a work by the Sanskrit grammarian, Navedharma, Stanzas Demonstrating a Condensation of Exclusion (ldog pa bs dus pa bstan pa’i tshig le’ur byas pa, pnādanivartanairdeśaṅkārikā; P5782) and that there is a commentary by Navedharma, ldog pa bs dus pa bstan pa’i rnam ’grel, pnādanivartanairdeśavārttika; P5783; Toh. 4294. It appears that Jam-yang-zhay-pa may be interpolating ma yin gzhan pa gzhan yin no into the fourth line of this stanza in Dharmakirti’s Commentary on

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These, the explicit, without asserting
An actuality factor, [prove] a mere negative;
The former proofs [effect and nature reasons],
The others, the affirming [negatives], are other.
[That passage] entails [that in order for (smoke) to be a correct sign of a negative in the proof of (fire empty of the two, permanent-and-thing, as existing on a smoky pass), a non-affirming negative must definitely be held as the explicit predicate of the proposition, the presence of an affirming negative in that which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition in that proof not being permissible] because it says:

- “These” to explain: “Reasons that are nonobservations, illustrated by these reasons that are nonobservations of a cause and [these reasons that are nonobservations of] a pervader.”
- “the explicit, without asserting/ An actuality factor, [prove] a mere negative” to explain: “What is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition in a specified proof—that does not assert, or affirm, an actuality factor or positive, explicitly or implicitly—must be held to be a nonaffirming negative.”
- “The former proofs” to explain: “effect and nature reasons,”
- “The others, the affirming [negatives], are other” to explain: “Those two [effect and nature reasons] have positives [that is, there exists a positive in the predicate of the proposition being proved by those reasons] upon taking as [their] explicit predicate of the proposition either an affirming negative or a positive.”

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If it is not [that in order for (smoke) to be a correct sign of a negative in the proof of (fire empty of the two, permanent-and-thing, as existing on a smoky pass), a non-affirming negative must definitely be held as the explicit predicate of the proposition, the presence of an affirming negative in that which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of (fire empty of the two, permanent-and-thing, as existing on a smoky pass) not being permissible], then [for you] it [absurdly] follows that product is not a correct nature sign proving sound as impermanent because [product] is not a correct sign of a positive in the proof of [sound as impermanent]. It [absurdly] follows that [product is not a correct sign of a positive in the proof of sound as impermanent] because [according to you] it [product] is a correct sign of a negative in the proof of [sound as impermanent].

It [absurdly] follows [according to you] that [product is a correct sign of a negative in the proof of sound as impermanent] because there exists a common locus of being that which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of [sound as impermanent by the sign, product] and being a negative, and it [product] is a correct sign in the proof of [sound as impermanent by the sign, product].

It follows [that there exists a common locus of being that which is held
as the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of (sound as impermanent by the sign, product) and being a negative,] because impermanent is a common locus of (1) being that which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of [sound as impermanent by the sign, product] and (2) being a negative.

The first [which is that impermanent is that which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product] is easy. If you say that the second [which is that impermanent is a negative] is not established, then [our own position is] it follows that impermanent is a negative because [impermanent] (1) is explained as [being a negative] in Shākyabuddhi’s Commentarial Explanation of the first chapter of Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid Cognition”, and (2) is a negative also if treated in terms of the equivalents [of “impermanent”] in the original language [Sanskrit].

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a shākya blo, ca. 660-720.
b tshad ma rnam ’grel gyi ’grel bshad (pramāṇavārttikākā), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4220), BDRC W23703.176:3-657 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sunggrab partun khang, 1982-1985).

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Negatives from the viewpoint of effect are: sound not being an object of apprehension of an eye consciousness (sgra mig shes kyi bzung bya ma yi'n pa), ignorance (ma rig pa), unproduced (ma skyes pa), selfless (bdag med), and impermanent (mi rtag pa), Shākyabuddhi’s Commentarial Explanation says:

Negatives [from the viewpoint] of effect...impermanent is a neg-ative eliminating being permanent.

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a Jam-yang-zhay-pa may be paraphrasing Dharmakīrti’s Auto commentary, tshad ma nam 'grel gi 'grel pa (pramāṇavārttikavṛtti), in bstan 'gyur (sde dge, 4216), BDRC W23703.174, 299b.5-299b.6:

b Jam-yang-zhay-pa may be paraphrasing Shākyabuddhi’s Commentarial Explanation, tshad ma nam 'grel gi 'grel bshad (pramāṇavārttika kā), in bstan 'gyur (sde dge, 4220), BDRC W23703.176, 164a.4: When the term “impermanent” is posited through elimination of permanent, that is solely negation [from the viewpoint of] effect.

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Furthermore, it follows that the existence of a common locus of being that which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition in a specified proof by a specified sign and being a negative does not entail that it is a correct sign of a negative in that proof] because there exist many correct signs of a positive in specified proofs in which a negative is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition. It follows [that there exist many correct signs of a positive in specified proofs in which a negative is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition] because there exist many correct nature signs in specified proofs in which a negative is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition.
if treated in terms of the equivalents (of “impermanent”) in the original language (Sanskrit) is established because the word “impermanent” is a negative word if treated in terms of the Tibetan language and also is a negative word if treated in terms of any of the three equivalent [terms of negative prefixes] existing in the original Indian language [Sanskrit]. It follows [that there are three equivalent (terms of negative prefixes for the Tibetan mi) existing in the original Indian language (Sanskrit)] because a and ni and no, from the three equivalents [of mi] existing in the original language—a [meaning] sadad and a [meaning] tiryā (“set aside”) and ni [meaning] tiryā (“set aside”)—are negative words. It follows [that a and ni and no, from the three equivalents (of mi) existing in the original language—a (meaning) sadad and a (meaning) tiryā (“set aside”) and ni (meaning) tiryā (“set aside”)—are negative words] because Prajñākaragupta’s Ornament for (Dharmakīrti’s) “Commentary on (Dignāga’s) ‘Compilation of Valid Cognition’, “ in the context of refuting the negation [of the existence] of other worlds [that is, other lives] says:

“No” is a negative term; “a, ni, ma, and no” are negative terms.

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a Prajñākaragupta (shes rab ’byung gnas sbas pa) 750-810.
b ’tshad ma rnam ’grel gyi rgyan (pramāṇavārttikaśāra), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4221), BDRC W23703.178, 56a.3-56a.4. The full sentence reads: ཨ་བསྟན་འཛིན་འཇིག་རིང་དེ་དག་ལྟོག་གཅིག་ཐམས་ཅད་མེད་པའི་ཞིག་དེ་རོ། །

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Furthermore, it follows that the word *mi rtag pa* ("impermanent") is a negative word because *mi* which is a piece of that word [*mi rtag pa*] is a negative word indicating a meaning *other* than *rtag pa* ("permanent"). It follows [that *mi* which is a piece of that word (*mi rtag pa*) is a negative word indicating a meaning *other* than *rtag pa*] because [*mi* which is a piece of that word (*mi rtag pa*)] is, from among the seven negative terms, a negative term of other (*gzhan pa'i dgag sgra*). It follows [that *mi* which is a piece of that word (*mi rtag pa*) is, from among the seven negative terms, a negative term of other] because, concerning [the passage] from Dharmaṅkīrti’s *Auto-commentary*, “Suffering and selflessness and impermanence,” Shākyabuddhi’s *Commentarial Explanation* says:

The term *mi rtag pa* expresses impermanent through an expression of an imputation by awareness.

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*a* Correcting *chos can* in 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 20b.1, to *no* in accordance with 2011 DBRC *bla brang*, 29b.4.

*b* *tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi 'grel bshad* (*pramāṇavārttikā*), in *bstan 'gyur* (*sde dge*, 4220), BDRC W23703.176:3-657. This appears to be a paraphrase of Shākyabuddhi’s *Commentarial Explanation*, 164a.4: When the term “impermanent” is posited through elimination of permanent, that is solely negation [from the viewpoint of] effect.
Explaining Correct Effect Signs

It [absurdly] follows that (1) the three—non-attachment, non-hatred, and non-bewilderment—are not common loci of possessing an antidotal negative term and possessing a negative term indicating other meanings and (2) ignorance, unproduced, unceasing, and nonproduct do not possess negative terms indicating other meanings because [according to you] impermanent is not a negative.

If you accept [that (1) the three—non-attachment, non-hatred, and non-bewilderment—are not common loci of possessing an antidotal negative term and possessing a negative term indicating other meanings and

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(2) ignorance, unproduced, unceasing, and nonproduct do not possess negative terms indicating other meanings, then because Vasubandhu’s Commentary on the Sūtra on Dependent-Arising says: “This also is seen in seven meanings; negating existents is nonapprehension,” it also [absurdly] follows that the meaning of the passage from this very text:

Negating existents, other, similar, inferior, small, separate from, and antidote—these exist is not established because [according to you] whatever is any of the seven negatives explicitly indicated in that [text] is not necessarily a negative. It follows [that whatever is any of the seven negatives explicitly indicated in that (text) is not necessarily a negative] because [according to you] impermanent is not a negative.

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a Vasubandhu (dbzyig gnyen), fl.360.
b rten 'brel mdo 'grel/ rten cing 'brel pa 'byung ba dang po dang nam par dbye ba bshad pa (pratītyasamutpadādīvāhāgranirdeśa), in bstan 'gyur (sde dge, 3995), BDRC W23703.115:4-123, (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 7a.4. The complete sentence, 7a.4-7a.5, reads:

\[ \text{དོན་པ་ཚིགས་ཞིག་བན་པ་ནི། དག་ནི་འགོག་པ་དང༌། གཞན་པ་ཉིད་དང་འོ་བ་དང༌། ལད་དང་ངོ་མོ་ཐོན་དང༌། དགེན་པོ་དག་ལ་འདི་ཡོད་དོ། །} \]

\[ \text{ཞེས་བ་ཡིན་ནོ།} \]

c rten 'brel mdo 'grel/ rten cing 'brel pa 'byung ba dang po dang nam par dbye ba bshad pa (pratītyasamutpadādīvāhāgranirdeśa), in bstan 'gyur (sde dge, 3995), BDRC W23703.115:4-123, 7b.1, which in full reads:

\[ \text{ལྷོ་འཇིག་གློས་དང་། འཇིག་གློས་དང་། འཇིག་གློས་དང་། འཇིག་གློས་དང་། འཇིག་གློས་དང་། འཇིག་གློས་དང་།} \]

\[ \text{ཞེས་བ་ཡིན་ནོ།} \]

d The seven negatives (dgag pa bdun po): negative negating an existent, negative of other, negative of similarity, negative of inferiority, negative of smallness, negative of separation, and antitodal negative.

*Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.*
Furthermore, it follows that whatever is a correct sign in a specified proof in which an affirming negative is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition does not have to be a correct sign of a negative in that proof because there exists a correct sign of a positive in a specified proof in which an affirming negative is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition. It follows [that there exists a correct sign of a positive in a specified proof in which an affirming negative is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition] because there exist many correct nature signs [in specified proofs] in which an affirming negative is held [as the explicit predicate of the proposition]. It follows [that there exist many correct nature signs (in specified proofs) in which an affirming negative is held (as the explicit predicate of the proposition)] because having the very nature of disintegration is a correct nature sign in the proof that the five aggregates—form and so forth—do not abide for a second moment after their establishment. It follows [that having the very nature of disintegration is a correct nature sign in the proof that the five aggregates—form and so forth—do not abide for a second moment after their establishment] because Jetārī’s\(^c\) Introducing Children to Logic says:\(^c\)

\(^a\) Correcting yod pa dang in 2011 BDRC bla brang, 30a.3, to yod pa dag in accordance with 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 20b.5.

\(^b\) Jetārī (dgra las rgyal ba), c. 10th century.

\(^c\) byis pa ’jug pa’i rtog ge (bālāvatāratarka), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4263), BDRC W23703.190:652-674 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun)
The syllogism:

What has the very nature of disintegration does not abide for a second moment after its establishment, like, for example, lightning and so forth; those aggregates, form and so forth, also at the time of their establishment have the very nature of disintegration.

is a nature reason.

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[That passage] entails [that having the very nature of disintegration is a correct nature sign in the proof that the five aggregates, form and so forth, do not abide for a second moment after their establishment] because by "nature reason" a correct nature sign is indicated [and] not abiding for a second moment after its time is an affirming negative.

Furthermore, it follows that being a correct sign of a positive in a specified proof does not entail that what is held as the predicate of the proposition in that proof is a positive because there exist many correct signs of a positive in specified proofs in which an affirming negative is held as the predicate of the proposition. It follows [that there exist many correct signs of a positive in specified proofs in which an affirming negative is held as the predicate of the proposition] because there exist many correct nature signs in specified proofs in which an affirming negative is held as the predicate of the proposition.

Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
It follows [that there exist many correct nature signs in specified proofs in which an affirming negative is held as the predicate of the proposition] because being that which has the attribute of decreasing when near its antidote is a correct nature sign proving a collection of faults as having the attribute of disintegration, not increase, when near the antidote that overcomes it.

It follows [that being that which has the attribute of decreasing when near its antidote is a correct nature sign proving a collection of faults as having the attribute of disintegration, not increase, when near the antidote that overcomes it] because Shākyabuddhi’s Commentarial Explanation says:b

The syllogism also:

a 2011 BDRC bla brang, 30b.6, grub; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 21a.5, sgrub.
b tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi 'grel bshad (pramāṇavārttikā), in bstan 'gyur (sde dge, 4220), BDRC W23703.176:3-657, 250a.5-250a.6:

Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
When such and such have been achieved, those collections of faults, which have the attribute of decreasing, have the attribute of disintegration, not any increase at all, when near any [of their antidotes], like, for example, fire being without increase due to being overwhelmed by water and so forth; a collection of faults also has the attribute of decreasing when near [any of its antidotes].

is a nature reason.

[That passage] entails [that being that which has the attribute of decreasing when near its antidote is a correct nature sign proving a collection of faults as having the attribute of disintegration, not increase, when near the antidote that overcomes it] because “nature reason” indicates a nature sign and because there exists a meaning of the passage [above], “[those collections of faults] have the attribute of disintegration, not any increase at all, when near any of their antidotes.”

Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipses. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
Furthermore, it follows that being a correct sign in a specified proof and there existing a common locus of (1) being that which is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition in that proof by the sign of it [that correct sign] and (2) being a negative does not entail being a correct sign of a negative in that proof because there exist many correct signs of a positive in specified proofs in which a negative is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition. It follows [that there exist many correct signs of a positive in specified proofs in which a negative is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition] because that of which its apprehension is devoid of knowing-gnosis’s understanding (rig pa ye shes kyi rto ba) is a correct nature sign proving ignorance as erred from its own apprehension, because the master Devendrabuddhi’s commentary on the second chapter [of Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid Cognition”] says:  

The syllogism:  

That of which whatsoever apprehension is devoid of understanding has erred from [how] its own apprehension [should be], like, for example, that which is devoid of understanding suffering due to discriminating suffering as pleasure; ignorance also has apprehension devoid of understanding.

is a nature reason.

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a Devendrabuddhi (lha dbang blo), 630-690.  
b tshad ma rnam ‘grel dka’ grel (pramāṇavārttika-pañjikā), in bstan ‘gyur (sde dge, 4217), BDRC W23703.175:3-654 (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyal-wae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 91b.6-91b.7:

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Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
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Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis; magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.

[That passage] entails that of which its apprehension is devoid of knowing-gnosis’s understanding is a correct nature sign proving ignorance as erred from its own apprehension because there exists a meaning of the passage “is a nature reason” and because that which has erred from its own

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a 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 21b.2, rigs pa; 2011 BDRC bla brang, 31a.6, rig pa.
b 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 21b.2, rtogs pa; 2011 BDRC bla brang, 31a.6, rtog pa.
c Old Go-mang Lhasa, 21b.3, rtogs pa; 2011 BDRC bla brang, 31b.1, rtog pa.
apprehension is a negative of inferiority from among the fifteen negatives.

Furthermore, it [absurdly] follows that it is reasonable to explain:

Being a correct nature or effect sign in a specified proof entails that solely a positive is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition in that proof.

as the meaning of the passage in Dharmakīrti’s Auto-commentary:

With respect to those, two are [reasons of] a positive thing; one is a reason of a negative.

because [according to you] your thesis is logically feasible.

You cannot accept [that it is reasonable to explain the meaning of the passage in Dharmakīrti’s Auto-commentary that way] because it is not reasonable to posit such since affirming negatives and so forth exist in the explicit predicate of the proposition of each [of the two]—correct effect sign and correct nature sign—in a specified proof.

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a tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi 'grel pa (pramāṇavārttikavṛtti), in bstan 'gyur (sde dge, 4216), BDRC W23703.174:523-732, 262a.6: de las gnyis ni dngos po sgrub pa yin la| gcig ni dgag pa'i gtan tshigs yin te. This is cited earlier and later, 28 and 48.

Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
It follows [that it is not reasonable to posit such since affirming negatives and so forth exist in the explicit predicate of the proposition of each (of the two)—correct effect sign and correct nature sign—in a specified proof] because Shākyabuddhi’s Commentarial Explanation, in the translation by Ma [Lo-tsa Ge-way-lo-drö], a says. b

From among the three reasons [effect, nature, and nonobservation reasons], nature and effect reasons [prove] positive things (bhāva); positive things [means] positive existents. “Soely two” is a delimitation, but it is not saying “solely a positive thing [is held as the predicate of the proposition]” because those two [correct effect and correct nature signs] also prove negatives.

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Furthermore, it [absurdly] follows that whatever is a correct sign in a specified proof, in which a negative is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition, is necessarily a correct sign of a negative in that proof because [according to you] there does not occur a negative in the explicit predicate of the proposition of a correct effect or nature sign.

If you accept [that whatever is a correct sign in a specified proof, in which a negative is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition, is necessarily a correct sign of a negative in that proof], it [absurdly] follows that it is reasonable to explain:

Whatever is a correct sign in a specified proof in which a negative is held as the predicate of the proposition is necessarily a correct nonobservation sign in that proof.

as the meaning of the passage from Dharmakīrti’s Autocommentary:

Lhasa, 21b.7, bya bar; 2011 BDRC bla brang, 32a.1, bya ba.

Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
One is a reason of a negative.

because you have accepted [that whatever is a correct sign in a specified proof, in which a negative is held as the explicit predicate of the proposition, is necessarily a correct sign of a negative in that proof].

You cannot accept [that it is reasonable to explain “Whatever is a correct sign in a specified proof in which a negative is held as the predicate of the proposition is necessarily a correct nonobservation sign in that proof” as the meaning of the passage from Dharmakīrti’s Autocommentary: “One is a reason of a negative,”] because Shākyabuddhi’s Commentarial Explanation says:

Nonobservation having the character described in “One is a reason of a negative” is solely a reason of a negative. [This statement] is not a delimitation as “solely one” because even the earlier two

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*a tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi 'grel bshad (pramāṇavārttikakā), in bstan 'gyur (sde dge, 4220), BDRC W23703.176:3-657, 10a.6-10a.7;* 

Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
[correct effect and correct nature reasons] are realized in the manner of elimination.

Furthermore, it follows that although whatever is a correct sign in a specified proof in which a positive is held as the predicate of the proposition is necessarily a correct sign of a positive in that proof, whatever is a correct sign in a specified proof in which a negative is held as the predicate of the proposition is not necessarily a correct sign of a negative in that proof because with respect to the meaning of correct sign of a positive in a specified proof: a correct sign mainly proving a positive is posited as “a correct sign proving a positive in a specified proof even though there exists holding a negative in the predicate of the proposition in that proof.”
It follows [that with respect to the meaning of correct sign of a positive in a specified proof: a correct sign mainly proving a positive is posited as “a correct sign proving a positive in a specified proof even though there exists holding a negative in the predicate of the proposition in that proof”] because on account of this there exists a correct sign of a positive in a specified proof in which an affirming negative is held as the predicate of the proposition.

It follows [that on account of this there exists a correct sign of a positive in a specified proof in which an affirming negative is held as the predicate of the proposition] because (1) in the case of an affirming negative [that is, in the case of a correct sign of a positive in which an affirming negative is held as the predicate of the proposition in that proof], a positive is predominant [that is, an affirming negative is predominantly a positive] and (2) on account of this there exists holding an affirming negative in the predicate of the proposition of an effect or nature sign in a specified proof.

That is, on account of the meaning of correct sign of a positive being: a correct sign mainly proving a positive is posited as “a correct sign proving a positive in a specified proof even though there exists holding a negative in the predicate of the proposition in that proof.”

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The first [sign which is that in the case of an affirming negative, a positive is predominant] is established because Bhāvaviveka’s Lamp for (Nāgārjuna’s) “Wisdom” says:

An affirming negative is not taken as proven in that case because it [that is, an affirming negative] is predominantly a positive thing.

The second [sign which is that on account of this (that is, on account of the meaning of correct sign of a positive being: a correct sign mainly proving a positive is posited as “a correct sign proving a positive in a specified proof even though there exists holding a negative in the predicate of the proposition in that proof”) there exists holding an affirming negative in the predicate of the proposition of an effect or nature sign in a specified proof] is established because meanings exist of “the affirming [negatives]” and “other” which are pieces of the passage from the fourth chapter [of Dharma-kirti’s Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid Cognition”]: “The others, the affirming [negatives], are other.”

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a Bhāvaviveka (legs ldan ’byed), c. 500-570?
b shes rab sgron ma (prajñaprādipa), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 3856), BDRC W23703, 97:92-520, (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985). In this edition of Bhāvaviveka’s Lamp, dngos sgrub shas che never appears, but rdul shas che appears five times; sgrub par mi bya never appears, but nges par gzung bar mi bya appears twelve times; dngos po sgrub appears once (97a.1); the full sentence, 96b.7-97a.1, reads:

c tshad ma rnam ’grel gyi tshig le’ur byas pas (pramāṇavārttikākārikā), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4210), BDRC W23703.174:189-304, 149b.6-149.7, has a different reading:

These, even the explicit, without asserting
Explaining Correct Effect Signs

An actuality factor, [prove] a mere negative;
The former proofs [effect and nature reasons]
Prove an affirming [negative].

Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s last line reads: ma yin gzhan pa gzhan yin no instead of Dharmakīrti’s ma yin sgrub par byed phyir ro. The only text found citing the exact wording of Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s fourth line (ma yin gzhan pa gzhan yin no) is Avalokitaratna’s Explanatory Commentary on (Bhāvaviveka’s) “Lamp for (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Wisdom’” (shes rab sgron ma’i rgya cher 'grel pa, prajñāpradīpikā), (sde dge, 3859), BDRC W23703, vol. 99:4-575, 63b.6, which in context reads:

Concerning this the definitions of these two negations are described as:
Negations that indicate through import,
That establish through a phrase,
That possess those, and that do not indicate through their own words
Are affirming [negations]; others are other [that is, non-affirming negations].

Jeffrey Hopkins, Buddhapaśita’s Refutation of Production from Self; Bhāvaviveka’s Criticism, and Avalokitaratna’s Commentary: Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Opposite of the Consequences, 1 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version October, 2017: uma-tibet.org), 197-198; Hopkins notes that Jam-yang-zhay-pa identifies this passage in Avalokitaratna’s text as a work by the Sanskrit grammarian, Vacanavibhāga, Stanzas Demonstrating a Condensation of Exclusion (lde’u sgrub pa’i rnam ‘grel, pindanivartananirdeśavārttika; P5782) and that there is a commentary by Navidharma, lde’u sgrub pa’i rnam ‘grel, pindanivartananirdeśavārttika; P5783; Toh. 4294. It appears that Jam-yang-zhay-pa may be interpolating ma yin gzhan pa gzhan yin no into the fourth line of this stanza in Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid Cognition”: ma yin sgrub par byed phyir ro.

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Furthermore, it follows that the various existents in the nature of fire, such as heat, radiance, blazing red, and so forth, are predicates to be understood, having established the relationship of cause and effect [between fire and smoke] by the sign, smoke, because smoke is a correct effect sign that makes understood those [heat, radiance, blazing red, and so forth] by the power of the relationship of the nature of fire with those [heat, radiance, blazing red, and so forth]. It follows [that smoke is a correct effect sign that makes understood those (heat, radiance, blazing red, and so forth) by the power of the relationship of the nature of fire with those (heat, radiance, blazing red, and so forth)] because Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid Cognition” (I.4abc’) says:

An effect [for instance, smoke] that is such that if the cause [fire] does not have [Fire’s] various natures, [smoke] does not arise, Is a [correct] effect reason.c

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a 2011 BDRC bla brang, 32b.5; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 22b.1. Because this is the second major development in the discussion of these lines quoted from Dharmakīrti’s text before the first debate of this book, #30, 15, and in order to avoid its being mistaken as merely a continuation of a lesser unit, Jam-yang-zhay-pa did not treat this as a new debate. For the sake of clarity and to maintain the continuity of debate numbers I have inserted a debate number in brackets.

b tshad ma rnam ’grel gyi tshig le’ur byas pas (pramāṇavārttikakārikā), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4210), BDRC W23703.174:189-304, 94b.4.

c The translation reflects how the opponent reads Dharmakīrti, whereas in accordance with Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s response, the following is how he reads Dharmakīrti:

[From among] the various natures, the causal [nature] such that If it does not arise, [the effect] does not arise Is a [correct] effect reason.
Our response: [That passage from Dharmakīrti’s *Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid Cognition”* does not entail [that smoke is a correct effect sign that makes understood those (heat, radiance, blazing red, and so forth) by the power of the relationship of the nature of fire with those (heat, radiance, blazing red, and so forth)] because the meaning of that passage indicates:

From among the various existent natures of fire, the causal nature [which is fire itself] is posited as the predicate to be understood by the sign, smoke, upon the relationship of cause and effect [between fire and smoke] having been established in that if this [causal] nature [fire] exists, smoke arises, and if it [fire] does not exist, smoke does not arise, but those [natures of fire] other than [the causal nature (which is fire itself)—these others being heat, radiance, blazing red, and so forth] are not posited [as the predicate to be understood by the sign smoke because the above relationship of cause and effect is not established between smoke and those individually].

\[\text{\textsuperscript{a}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{a}}\] The causal nature (*rgyud i rang bzhin*) of fire is fire itself; “causal” means that if fire does not arise, the effect—smoke—does not arise. This is a relationship of cause and effect between fire and smoke, and therefore, fire is a predicate to be understood by the sign, smoke. However, other natures of fire, such as heat, radiance, and blazing red, do not have a relationship of cause and effect with smoke; and therefore, those natures of fire—heat, radiance, and blazing red—cannot be predicates to be understood by the sign, smoke.
If the root [consequence] that the various existents in the nature of fire, such as heat, radiance, blazing red, and so forth, are predicates to be understood, having established the relationship of cause and effect (between fire and smoke) by the sign, smoke] is accepted, it [absurdly] follows that if smoke exists in that place [that is, is a specified place], the natures of fire—radiance, blazing red, and heat—necessarily exist in that place because [according to you] those natures of fire are predicates to be understood, having established the relationship of cause and effect [between fire and smoke] by the sign, smoke.

If you accept [that if smoke exists in a specified place, the natures of fire—radiance, blazing red, and heat—necessarily exist in that place], it [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, in a place possessing smoke where smoke has arisen from rubbing kindling sticks together but before blazing red fire has arisen, there exist the three natures of fire—radiance, blazing red, and heat—because smoke exists. The three spheres [of self-contradiction]!

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You cannot accept that in a place possessing smoke where smoke has arisen from rubbing kindling sticks together but before blazing red fire has arisen, there exist the three natures of fire—radiance, blazing red, and heat.] because the master [Dharmakīrti] responded that “Radiant fire and blazing red fire do not exist in that place, but since heat exists, the fallacy—that fire does not exist—does not exist” [that is, fire does exist because heat exists] because Dharmakīrti’s Autocommentary which serves as the root text of his Ascertainment of Valid Cognition says:

*Question:* If smoke is unmistakably from fire, why does smoke arise from kindling sticks?

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*a* tshad ma rnam par nges pa (pramāṇaviniścaya), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4211), BDRC W23703.174:305-462 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985). Craig Preston suggests that Jam-yang-zhay-pa appears to be condensing this passage (181a.6-181b.2):

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**Answer:** The feature of transforming kindling and just heat are fire; hence, the fallacy [of fire not existing] does not exist.

**[That passage] entails [that the master responded that “Radiant fire and blazing red fire do not exist in that place, but since heat exists, the fallacy that fire does not exist does not exist”] because the meaning of that passage is:**

“With the feature of transforming kindling” indicates the function of fire which is to burn kindling a little; “heat” indicates fire’s own entity, and the effect is smoke; since these three are complete, the fallacy of fire not existing does not exist.

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\[G23a\] གཞི་ལེན་གྱི་ȕང་ཟད་བེ་གྲེག་པའི་མེའི་ཐེད་ལས་བེན།

\[G23b\] ལེན་པའི་སྨན་པར་དང་ཞེས་པས།

\[L33b\] ལོ་ཞེས་པའི་vê་བ་གྲམ་ཚང་བོ་མེ་མེད་པའི་Dzོན་མེད་ཅེས་ʃོབ་དཔོན་གྱིས་ལན་བཏབ་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ Cô་

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\[a\] Correcting ćing in 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 22b.6, to kyang in accordance with 2011 DBRC bla brang, 33a.6, and New Go-mang, 200.8.

\[b\] 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 23a.1-2, reads: me rang gi ngo bo bstan pa’i phyir/ der thal/ des na me'i hyed las ngo bo 'bras bu.

**Key to colorization:** Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
35. About this, someone says: a It follows that the three natures of fire—heat, radiance, blazing red—are causes of the object to be inferred by the sign, smoke, because fire is the cause of the object to be inferred by the sign, smoke, and those three [natures of fire—heat, radiance, blazing red] are distinguishing features of fire.

Our response: [That fire is the cause of the object to be inferred by the sign, smoke, and that those three (natures of fire—heat, radiance, blazing red) are distinguishing features of fire] does not entail [that the three natures of fire—heat, radiance, blazing red—are causes of the object to be inferred by the sign, smoke.] You cannot accept [that the three natures of fire—heat, radiance, blazing red—are causes of the object to be inferred by the sign, smoke] because the arising of smoke exists without those three [natures of fire—heat, radiance, blazing red].

\[\text{Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipses. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.}\]
That the arising of smoke exists without those three [natures of fire—heat, radiance, blazing red] entails [that you cannot accept that those three natures of fire are causes of the object to be inferred by the sign, smoke] because whatever is a cause of the object to be inferred by the sign, smoke, must be a cause of smoke such that itself [the object to be inferred by the sign, smoke] is established in a relationship-of-indispensable-source (med na mi 'byung ba'i 'brel ba) with smoke.

It follows [that whatever is a cause of the object to be inferred by the sign, smoke, must be a cause of smoke such that itself is established in a relationship-of-indispensable-source with smoke] because Dharmakīrti’s Autocommentary says:

It is not so because its arising exists even without the existence of those, whereby [the Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid Cognition” (1.4abc)'] says:

[From among] the various natures, the causal [nature] such that
If it does not arise, [the effect] does not arise
Is a [correct] effect reason.

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a tshad ma rnam 'grel gvi 'grel pa (pramāṇavārttikavṛtti), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4216), BDRC W23703.174:523-732, 262b.5: ma yin de/ de med par 'byung ba ni de las skye bnges pa med pa’i phyir ro/ de lta bas na/ rgyu la rang bzhit ji snyed cig/ med na mi 'byung 'bras bu nii/ de dag gi gtan tshigs yin te.

b tshad ma rnam ’grel gvi tshig le’ur byas pas (pramāṇavārttikārikā), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4210), BDRC W23703.174:189-304, 94b.4-94b.5.
36. Someone says: It follows that the subject, whitish-grayish substance, is a correct effect sign in the proof of fire as existing on a smoky pass because of being an effect of fire that exists in the collection of smoke established in a relationship-of-indispensable-source with fire. It follows [that (whitish-grayish substance) is an effect of fire that exists in the collection of smoke established in a relationship-of-indispensable-source with fire] because smoke is [an effect of fire established in a relationship-of-indispensable-source with fire] and whitish-grayish substance is an attribute of smoke.

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\[\text{As noted earlier, this is where Dharmakirti’s quotation ends; Jam-yang-zhay-pa then adds}\]

\[\text{yin te.}\]

\[\text{2011 BDRC bla brang, 33b.6; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 23a.4.}\]

\[\text{In other words, the collection of smoke is established in a relationship with fire such that fire’s existence is indispensable to the arising of everything in the collection.}\]
Our response: That smoke is [(an effect of fire established in a relationship-of-indispensable-source with fire) and whitish-grayish substance is an attribute of smoke] does not entail [that whitish-grayish substance is an effect of fire that exists in the collection of smoke established in a relationship-of-indispensable-source with fire].

The first [sign which is that smoke is (an effect of fire established in a relationship-of-indispensable-source with fire)] is easy [to prove]. If you say that the second [sign which is that whitish-grayish substance is an attribute of smoke] is not established, [our own position is] it follows that the subject, whitish-grayish substance, is an attribute, or distinguishing feature, of smoke because of being the predicate of the proposition in the proof of smoke as whitish-grayish substance.

If you accept [that whitish-grayish substance is an attribute or distinguishing feature of smoke], it [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, whitish-grayish substance, it does not arise without fire because of being whitish-grayish substance established in a relationship-of-indispensable-source with fire [according to you].
If you accept [that whitish-grayish substance does not arise without fire], it [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, on a fireless lake at night, whitish-grayish substance does not exist because fire does not exist.

You cannot accept [that on a fireless lake at night, whitish-grayish substance does not exist] because on a fireless lake at night vapor exists.

Those signs [which are that on a fireless lake at night fire does not exist and that on a fireless lake at night vapor exists] are established because Shākyabuddhi’s Commentarial Explanation says:¹

¹ tshad ma rnam ’grel gyi ’grel bshad (pramāṇavārttikaśā), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4220), BDRC W23703.176:3-657. Jam-yang-zhay-pa cites only the first sentence of Shākyabuddhi’s Commentarial Explanation (11b.4-11b.5) in a more accessible paraphrase (rgyu’i chos rnams go bar bya ba dang ’bras bu’i chos rnams go bar bya ba min te ci’i phyir zhe na) followed by an ellipsis, which I have filled in from Shākyabuddhi’s Commentarial Explanation (11b.5-11b.7), with the exception that Jam-yang-zhay-pa provides the first line of the quote from Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid Cognition.” The entire passage in Shākyabuddhi’s Commentarial Explanation (11b,2-11b,7) reads:

Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
Causal attributes [for example, fire] are to be understood, and effect attributes [for example, (whitish-grayish) substance] are not to be understood; why? Without that, that is, without fire, just mist and so forth arise. It is this way: Since just [whitish-grayish] substance and so forth exist even in other non-smoke [situations], it is not suitable to infer fire from those, that is, from just [whitish-grayish] substance and so forth lacking the features [of fire].

Likewise, without those, that is, without those features—radiance and so forth—that exist in fire, the arising of mere smoke does not possess the certainty of being generated from those, because there is no certainty of the generation [of smoke]—from those features [radiance and so forth] that exist in fire. Therefore, the features of fire are not to be known from mere smoke. Since that is so, [Dharmakirti’s Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid Cognition” at the beginning of Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s section on correct effect signs] says:\(^a\)

\[\text{[From among] the various natures, the causal [nature] such that If it does not arise, [the effect] does not arise Is a [correct] effect reason.}\]

\(^a\) Shākyabuddhi cites only the first line; I have filled in the rest; this is the passage (above, 14) from Dharmakirti’s Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid Cognition” at the beginning of Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s section on correct effect signs.
37. About this, someone says: It follows that the two—the measure of what is stated as the predicate of the proposition and the measure of what comes to be the predicate of the proposition—do not exist in the predicate of the proposition in the proof of fire as existing on a smoky pass by the sign, smoke, because Gyal-tshab’s Explanation of (Dharmakirti’s) Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid Cognition” says:

What comes to be the sign you did not state; what you stated is not what comes to be the sign.

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a 2011 BDRC bla brang, 34a.5; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 23b.2.
b Gyal-tshab Dar-ma-rin-chen (rgyal tshab dar ma rin chen), 1364-1432.
c tshad ma rnam ’grel gyi tshig le’ur byas pa’i rnam bshad thar lam phyin ci ma log par gsal bar byed pa’i rnam ’grel thar lam gsal byed, in gsung ’bum (rgyal tshab rje, bla brang par ma), BDRC W4CZ2710.5:229-410 (bla brang: bla brang bkra shis ’khyil, 1999), 11a.2. The full passage, 11a.2-11a.3, reads:

Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
Our response: [Gyal-tshab’s passage] does not entail [that the two—the measure of what is stated as the predicate of the proposition and the measure of what comes to be be the predicate of the proposition—do not exist in the predicate of the proposition in the proof of fire as existing on a smoky pass by the sign, smoke], because that [passage] was set out in order to refute what was said by an earlier Tibetan:

Fire exists (me yod pa) is the measure of what is stated as the predicate of the proposition, and smoke exists (du ba yod pa) the measure of what is stated as the sign in the proof of [fire as existing on a smoky pass by the sign, smoke], but fire exists is not the predicate of the proposition in the proof of [fire as existing on a smoky pass by the sign, smoke], and smoke exists is not the sign in the proof of [fire as existing on a smoky pass by the sign, smoke]; however, although the two, fire (me) and smoke (du ba), are not [respectively] the measure of what is stated as the predicate of the proposition and the measure of what is stated as the sign in the proof of [fire as existing on a smoky pass by the sign, smoke], [the two, fire and smoke,] are the predicate of the proposition and the sign in the proof of [fire as existing on a smoky pass by the sign, smoke].

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a 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 23b.3, kyang; 2011 BDRC bla brang, 34b.1, cing; New Go-mang, 201.16, cing.

Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
If you accept [that the two—the measure of what is stated as the predicate of the proposition and the measure of what comes to be the predicate of the proposition—do not exist in the predicate of the proposition in the proof of fire as existing on a smoky pass by the sign, smoke], it [absurdly] follows that the two—the measure of what is stated as the predicate of the proposition and the measure of what comes to be the predicate of the proposition—do not exist in the predicate of the proposition in the proof of fire devoid of the touch of cold as existing on a smoky pass by the sign, smoke, because [according to you] those two [the measure of what is stated as the predicate of the proposition and the measure of what comes to be the predicate of the proposition] do not exist in the predicate of the proposition in the proof of fire as existing on a smoky pass by the sign, smoke.

Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
If you accept [that the two—the measure of what is stated as the predicate of the proposition and the measure of what comes to be the predicate of the proposition—do not exist in the predicate of the proposition in the proof of fire devoid of the touch of cold as existing on a smoky pass by the sign, smoke], it [absurdly] follows that:

(1) the two—the measure of what comes to be [the predicate of the proposition] and the measure of what is stated as [the predicate of the proposition]—do not exist in the predicate of the proposition in the syllogism, “With respect to the subject, on a smoky pass, fire devoid of the touch of cold (grang reg gis dben pa ’i me) exists because smoke exists,” stated for an opponent who is engaged in wanting to know about the mere existence of fire devoid of the touch of cold on a smoky pass, and

(2) the two—the measure of what comes to be [the predicate of the proposition] and the measure of what is stated as [the predicate of the proposition]—do not exist in the predicate of the proposition of that [same] syllogism, stated for an opponent who is engaged in wanting to infer the mere absence of the touch of cold (grang reg gis dben pa tsam) on a smoky pass, because [according to you] the two—the measure of what is stated as the predicate of the proposition and the measure of what comes to be the predicate of the proposition—do not exist in the predicate of the proposition in the proof of [fire devoid of the touch of cold as existing on a smoky pass] by the sign, smoke.

Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
Explaining Correct Effect Signs

If you accept that (1) the two—the measure of what comes to be (the predicate of the proposition) and the measure of what is stated as (the predicate of the proposition)—do not exist in the predicate of the proposition in the syllogism, “With respect to the subject, on a smoky pass, fire devoid of the touch of cold exists because smoke exists,” stated for an opponent who is engaged in wanting to know about the mere existence of fire devoid of the touch of cold on a smoky pass, and

(2) the two—the measure of what comes to be (the predicate of the proposition) and the measure of what is stated as (the predicate of the proposition)—do not exist in the predicate of the proposition of that [same] syllogism, stated for an opponent who is engaged in wanting to infer the mere absence of the touch of cold on a smoky pass], that is not logically feasible because concerning the predicate of the proposition of the syllogism under consideration, b (1) the two—[the measure] of what comes to be [the predicate of the proposition] and the measure of what is stated as [the predicate of the proposition]—do not exist in the predicate of the proposition (bkod tshod kyi bsgrub bya’i chos dang song tshod kyi bsgrub bya’i chos), and in refuting this view, 69, Jam-yang-zhay-pa refers to the same mistaken position in this abbreviated form: song bkod gnyis med, in place of bkod tshod kyi bsgrub bya’i chos dang song tshod kyi bsgrub bya’i chos gnyis med pa. Therefore, in translating the abbreviated form I am using the fuller form for the sake of clarity.

a Jam-yang-zhay-pa makes it clear later in the text that the term song bkod is, in the context of the debate under consideration, an abbreviation of a longer phrase meaning “the measure of what comes to be the predicate of the proposition and the measure of what is stated as the predicate of the proposition (bkod tshod kyi bsgrub bya’i chos dang song tshod kyi bsgrub bya’i chos).” Similarly, he states an opponent’s mistaken view, 59, as “the two—the measure of what is stated as the predicate of the proposition and the measure of what comes to be the predicate of the proposition—do not exist...(bkod tshod kyi bsgrub bya’i chos dang song tshod kyi bsgrub bya’i chos gnyis med pa),” and in refuting this view, 69, Jam-yang-zhay-pa refers to the same mistaken position in this abbreviated form: song bkod gnyis med, in place of bkod tshod kyi bsgrub bya’i chos dang song tshod kyi bsgrub bya’i chos gnyis med pa. Therefore, in translating the abbreviated form I am using the fuller form for the sake of clarity.

b That is, the syllogism: “With respect to the subject, on a smoky pass, fire devoid of the touch of cold exists because smoke exists.”

Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
icate of the proposition] and [the measure] of what is stated as [the predicate of the proposition]—exist in the predicate of the proposition that is stated for an opponent who is mainly engaged in wanting to know how a smoky pass is empty of the touch of cold, and (2) the two—[(the measure) of what comes to be (the predicate of the proposition) and (the measure) of what is stated as (the predicate of the proposition)]—exist [in the predicate of the proposition that is stated] for an opponent who is mainly engaged in wanting to know about fire empty of the touch of cold on a smoky pass.

The first [sign which is that concerning the predicate of the proposition of the syllogism under consideration, (1) the two—(the measure) of what comes to be (the predicate of the proposition) and (the measure) of what is stated as (the predicate of the proposition)—exist in the predicate of the proposition that is stated for an opponent who is mainly engaged in wanting to know how a smoky pass is empty of the touch of cold] follows because fire empty of the touch of cold is, for such an opponent, the measure of what comes to be the predicate of the proposition and the main predicate of the proposition in the proof of [fire devoid of the touch of cold as existing on a smoky pass] and thus [the sign in that proof] is posited as a sign
It follows [that fire empty of the touch of cold is, for such an opponent, the measure of what comes to be the predicate of the proposition and the main predicate of the proposition in the proof of (fire devoid of the touch of cold as existing on a smoky pass) and thus (the sign in that proof) is posited as a sign of a negative in that proof] because such is said by the Foremost Father [Tsong-kha-pa] and his spiritual son. It follows [that such is said by the Foremost Father (Tsong-kha-pa) and his spiritual son] because Gyal-tshab Dar-ma-rin-chen’s Commentary on (Dharmakīrti’s) “Drop of Reasoning” says:

Someone says: “If you accept [that fire empty of the touch of cold is, for such an opponent, the measure of what comes to be the predicate of the proposition and the main predicate of the proposition], then [the sign in that proof] would not be a correct effect sign,”

[My response is:] Relative to the thought of the defender (phyi rgol)—who is mainly engaged in wanting to know how [a smoky

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*a tshad ma rigs thigs kyi 'grel pa legs bshad snying po'i gter, in gsung 'bum, rgyal tshab rje (bkra shis lhun po par rnying), BDRC MW29194_212CF3:525-650 (Dharamsala: Sherig Parkhang, 1997). This appears to be a paraphrase of Gyal-tshab’s Commentary on (Dharmakīrti’s) “Drop of Reasoning,” 26a.5-26a.6:

'dod na 'bras rtags ma yin par 'gyur ro / zhe na / phyir rgol gyi shes 'dod dang / rgol ba'i dpag 'dod grang reg gis stong ba la gtsos bo rtags na me yod shyor tshul tams yin gyi / don dgag rtags su 'gyur has so /

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pass] is empty of the touch of cold—and of the challenger (rgol ba), the existence of fire (me yod pa) is a mere mode of statement, but since at that time a negation is predominant [that is, what is predominantly being proved is a negative], [the sign in that proof] becomes a sign of a negative.

38. Someone says. It follows that fire is not realized as existent by an inference generated in dependence on a correct sign in the proof of fire empty of the touch of cold as existing on a smoky pass by the sign, smoke because smoke is a correct sign of a negative in the proof of [fire empty of the touch of cold as existing on a smoky pass by the sign, smoke] for an opponent who is mainly engaged in wanting to know how a smoky pass is empty of the touch of cold.

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The defender or “latter opponent” (phyi rgol) is the person responding to a debate challenge and the “former opponent” (snga rgol) is the person presenting the debate challenge. Here Jam-yang-zhay-pa refers to the challenger as rgol ba.

b 2011 BDRC bla brang, 35a.5; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 24a.4.

**Key to colorization:** Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
Our response: [That smoke is a correct sign of a negative in the proof of (fire empty of the touch of cold as existing on a smoky pass by the sign, smoke) for an opponent who is mainly engaged in wanting to know how a smoky pass is empty of the touch of cold does not entail [that fire is not realized as existent by an inference which is generated in dependence on a correct sign in the proof of fire empty of the touch of cold as existing on a smoky pass by the sign, smoke], because Gyal-tshab Dar-ma-rin-chen’s Commentary on (Dharmakīrti’s) “Drop of Reasoning” says:]

If you say, “Fire is not realized,” there is no entailment and so forth.

The second root sign [which is that concerning the predicate of the...]

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a tshad ma rigs thigs kyi 'grel pa legs bshad snying po'i gter, in gsung 'bum, rgyal tshab rje (bkra shis po par rnying), BDRC MW29194_212CF3:525-650, 26a.6.

b In debate 37, p. 71.
proposition of the syllogism under consideration,\(^a\) the two—(the measure) of what comes to be (the predicate of the proposition) and (the measure) of what is stated as (the predicate of the proposition)—exist (in the predicate of the proposition that is stated) for an opponent who is mainly engaged in wanting to know about fire empty of the touch of cold on a smoky pass] is established because:

- at a time when the defender—who is mainly engaged in wanting to know about fire empty of the touch of cold on a smoky pass—is mainly engaged in wanting to know about fire on a smoky pass (\textit{du ldan kyi la'i me}),
- fire is the main predicate of the proposition and the measure of what comes to be the predicate of the proposition in the proof of fire empty of the touch of cold as existing on a smoky pass,
- and ancillary, a negative is proven, whereby smoke is a correct sign of a positive in the proof of fire empty of the touch of cold as existing on a smoky pass.

\(^a\) That is, the syllogism, “With respect to the subject, on a smoky pass, fire devoid of the touch of cold exists because smoke exists.”

\(^b\) 2011 DBRC bla brang, 35b.2, and New Go-mang, 203.4, \textit{kyi}; Old Go-mang Lhasa, 24a.7, \textit{gyi}; the first two are taking into account the extra suffix \textit{da}.

\textbf{Key to colorization:} Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
It follows [that] at the time when the latter opponent—who is mainly engaged in wanting to know about fire empty of the touch of cold on a smoky pass—is mainly engaged in wanting to know about fire on a smoky pass, fire is the main predicate of the proposition and the measure of what comes to be the predicate of the proposition in the proof of fire empty of the touch of cold as existing on a smoky pass, and, ancillarily, a negative is proven, whereby smoke is a correct sign of a positive in the proof of fire empty of the touch of cold as existing on a smoky pass] because sounds that are means of expression (rjod byed kyi sgra rnams) indicate the meaning that the speaker is engaged in wanting to express.

It follows [that sounds that are means of expression indicate the meaning that the speaker is engaged in wanting to express] because the fourth chapter of Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid Cognition” says:

Because terms follow the intention of speech and:

Even if not expressed, intention prevails.

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Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
For, it is as is said in Gyal-tshab Dar-ma-rin-chen’s *Commentary on (Dharmakīrti’s) “Drop of Reasoning”*.\(^a\)

However, if one is mainly engaged in wanting to know about fire, the fallacy—that its emptiness is a mere mode of statement and it becomes a sign of a negative—does not exist.

[Those passages] entail [that sounds that are means of expression indicate the meaning which the speaker is engaged in wanting to express] because the meaning of “mode of statement” is established. This refutes [the position] that the two, [the measure] of what comes to be [the predicate of the proposition] and [the measure] of what is stated as [the predicate of the proposition], do not exist.\(^b\)

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\(^a\) *tshad ma rigs thugs kyi 'grel pa legs bshad snying po'i gter*, in *gsung 'bum rgyal tshab rje (bkra shis po par rnying)*, BDRC MW29194_212CF3:525-650. This is similar to *Commentary on (Dharmakīrti’s) “Drop of Reasoning,”* 26a.6-26b.1: me la gtso bor shes 'dod zhugs na 'bras rtags yin gyi / grang reg gis stong ba sbyor tshul tsam du zad do (using *bkod tshul* instead of *sbyor tshul* and ending with *dgag rtags su 'sgyur ba'i skyon med de* instead of *zad do*).

\(^b\) This position, in its full expression, was stated by the opponent in the beginning of debate #37, 59, “the two—the measure of what is stated as the predicate of the proposition and the measure of what comes to be the predicate of the proposition—do not exist in the predicate of the proposition in the proof of fire as existing on a smoky pass by the sign, smoke.”
39. Someone says: It follows that smoke is not a correct sign of a positive in the proof [of fire empty of the touch of cold as existing on a smoky pass] for an opponent who is mainly engaged in wanting to know about fire empty of the touch of cold on a smoky pass because [smoke] is a correct sign of a negative in the proof of [fire empty of the touch of cold as existing on a smoky pass]. It follows [that smoke is a correct sign of a negative in the proof of fire empty of the touch of cold as existing on a smoky pass] because there exists holding a negative as the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of [fire empty of the touch of cold as existing on a smoky pass], and the inference generated in dependence on a correct sign in the proof of [fire empty of the touch of cold as existing on a smoky pass] is a conceptual consciousness having the aspect of a negative.

Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis; magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.

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a 2011 BDRC bla brang, 35b.5; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 24b.3.
b 2011 DBRC bla brang, 35b.6, rgol pa; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 24b.3, rgol ba; New Go-mang, 203.14, rgol pa.
c Correcting kyang in 2011 DBRC bla brang, 36a.1, and New Go-mang, 203.16, to cing in accordance with 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 24b.4, because cing is preferable for the opponent’s reading, kyang being impossible.
Our response: [That there exists holding a negative as the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of (fire empty of the touch of cold as existing on a smoky pass), and that the inference generated in dependence on a correct sign in the proof of (fire empty of the touch of cold as existing on a smoky pass) is a conceptual consciousness having the aspect of a negative] does not entail [that smoke is a correct sign of a negative in the proof of fire empty of the touch of cold as existing on a smoky pass].

It follows [that there exists holding a negative as the explicit predicate of the proposition in the proof of (fire empty of the touch of cold as existing on a smoky pass), and that the inference generated in dependence on a correct sign in the proof of (fire empty of the touch of cold as existing on a smoky pass) is a conceptual consciousness having the aspect of a negative] because (1) there exists holding a negative as the explicit predicate of the proposition in a specified proof, and (2) the correct sign in a specified proof in which a negative is held as the predicate of the proposition does not have to be a correct sign of a negative just because the inference—generated in dependence on a correct sign in that proof—is a conceptual consciousness having the aspect of a negative, and (3) the inference having the aspect of a negative which is generated in dependence on a correct sign in a specified proof—in which a negative is held as the predicate of the proposition—does not have to be a conceptual consciousness of a negative.
Explaining Correct Effect Signs

It follows [that (1) there exists holding a negative as the explicit predicate of the proposition in a specified proof, and (2) the correct sign in a specified proof in which a negative is held as the predicate of the proposition does not have to be a correct sign of a negative just because the inference—generated in dependence on a correct sign in that proof—is a conceptual consciousness having the aspect of a negative, and (3) the inference having the aspect of a negative which is generated in dependence on a correct sign in a specified proof—in which a negative is held as the predicate of the proposition—does not have to be a conceptual consciousness of a negative] because Gyal-tshab Dar-ma-rin-chen’s Commentary on (Dharmakīrti’s) “Drop of Reasoning” says:

In accordance with what has been said, although even the two signs of a positive [that is, effect signs and nature signs] prove a negative, [the terms] “sign of a negative” and “conceptual consciousness of a negative” due to the aspect (rnam pa) of a negative being involved in the objects of inference dependent on those [that is, dependent on those effect and nature signs] are not used because of considering the actual object (dngos yul).

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Therefore, (1) that whatever is a correct sign in a specified proof—in which a negative is held as the predicate of the proposition—is necessarily a correct sign of a negative in that proof, and (2) that whatever is a conceptual consciousness having the aspect of a negative is necessarily a conceptual consciousness of a negative, are repudiated because it is indicated that in order to become a correct sign of a negative in a specified proof (1) a negative must be the main object being proved in the predicate of the proposition, it not being sufficient merely that a negative is held as the predicate of the proposition, and (2) whatever is a conceptual consciousness of a negative must be a conceptual consciousness mainly comprehending an actual negation (dngos su bkag pa) of its object of negation, it not being sufficient merely that its object appears in a negative aspect (dgag pa’i rnam pa).
40. Someone says: Occasional occurrence is a correct effect sign in the proof of the appropriated aggregates as being preceded by their own causes.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, occasional occurrence, whatever is it [an occasional occurrence] must be preceded by its own cause because it is a correct effect sign in the proof of [the appropriated aggregates as being preceded by their own causes].

If you accept [that whatever is an occasional occurrence must be preceded by its own cause], it [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, [occasional occurrence], whatever is it [an occasional occurrence] must be impermanent because whatever is it [an occasional occurrence]

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*a* 2011 BDRC *bla brang*, 36b.2; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 25a.3.

Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
must be preceded by its own cause. If you accept [that whatever is (an occasional occurrence) must be impermanent] it [absurdly] follows that the subject, isolate of pot, is [impermanent] because [isolate of pot] is an occasionally occurring existent. It follows [that isolate of pot is an occasionally occurring existent] because of being an occasionally occurring permanent phenomenon.

If you say [that the sign which is that isolate of pot is an occasionally occurring permanent phenomenon] is not established, [our own position is] it follows that with respect to the subject, pot, its isolate is an occasionally occurring permanent phenomenon because it [pot] is an occasionally occurring effective thing.a

41. Someone says:b It follows that an occasionally occurring permanent

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a In certain circumstances, the term *dngos po* is used to refer to both permanent and impermanent phenomena; however, here *dngos po* has been translated as “effective thing” in order make it clear that it is being used only for impermanent phenomena. In *Meditation on Emptiness*, 220, Jeffrey Hopkins writes, “The term ‘thing’ (*bhāva, dngos po*), when used strictly...applies only to products; however, when it is used loosely as it often is in the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras, it refers to both products and non-products as when Buddha says that all things do not ultimately exist.”

b 2011 BDRC *bla brang*, 36b.6; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 25a.5.
phenomenon does not exist because whatever is occasionally occurring must be an effective thing. It follows [that whatever is occasionally occurring must be an effective thing] because occasional occurrence is a correct effect sign proving the appropriated aggregates as being preceded by their own causes. It follows [that occasional occurrence is a correct effect sign proving the appropriated aggregates as being preceded by their own causes] because Dignāga’s Root Aphorisms on Valid Cognition [his Compilation of Valid Cognition] says:

Due to being just occasionally occurring, suffering is established as just having causes.

Our response: [That passage from Dignāga’s Root Aphorisms on Valid Cognition] does not entail [that occasional occurrence is a correct effect sign proving the appropriated aggregates as being preceded by their own causes] because the meaning of that passage is: “Occasionally occurring effective thing is a correct effect sign proving the appropriated aggregates as having their own causes.”

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\[L37a\] This passage is not found in Dignāga’s Root Aphorisms on Valid Cognition [his Compilation of Valid Cognition] but is found in Dharmaśīri’s Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid Cognition,” tshad ma rnam ’grel gi tshig le’ur byas pas (pramāṇavārttikakārikā), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4210), BDRC W23703.174:189-304, 114b.1.
A. OUR OWN SYSTEM

1. Definitions of correct effect sign

That which is the three effect modes is the definition of correct effect sign. [Correct effect sign] and thing are equivalent. That which is the three effect modes in a specified proof is the definition of correct effect sign in that proof.

If treated in terms of understanding: It is a correct sign in a specified proof and there occurs a common locus of (1) being what is the main object held as the explicit predicate of the proposition in that proof by the sign of it, and also (2) being the cause of it is the definition of correct effect sign in a specified proof. Whatever is a correct effect sign in a specified proof is necessarily a correct sign of a positive in that proof.
2. Divisions of correct effect sign

From the approaches of the thought of the defender and of the mode of statement of the challenger, there exist five [correct effect signs]: correct effect sign proving an actual cause, correct effect sign proving a general cause, correct effect sign proving a preceding cause, correct effect sign proving a particular cause, and correct effect sign that is a means of inferring causal attributes. When divided in detail, there exist a great number more.

[a. Correct effect sign proving an actual cause]

Smoke is a correct effect sign proving an actual cause in the proof of fire as existing on a smoky pass.

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a 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 25b.1, gce bor appears to have broken ligatures on the wood-block for gtso bor as in 2011 DBRC bla brang, 37a.4.
[b. Correct effect sign proving a general cause]

Occasionally produced thing is a correct effect sign proving a general cause in the proof of the appropriated aggregates as having their own causes.

[c. Correct effect sign proving a preceding cause]

Contaminated consciousness is a correct effect sign proving a preceding cause in the proof of Devadatta’s desirous consciousness as preceded by its cause.

[d. Correct effect sign proving a particular cause]

Thing not produced without its own observed object condition is a correct effect sign proving a particular cause in the proof that a sense consciousness perceiving blue has a cause other than its own immediately preceding condition.

Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
[e. Correct effect sign that is a means of inferring causal attributes]

The present taste of molasses is a correct effect sign that is a means of inferring causal attributes in the proof that, in relation to a lump of molasses in the mouth, there exists the capacity of the former taste of molasses to generate the later form of molasses.

3. Identification of the three—sign, predicate of the proposition, and basis of debate\(^b\)

Smoke is all three—a correct sign in the proof of [fire as existing on a smoky pass]; the measure of what is stated as the sign in the proof of [fire as existing on a smoky pass]; and the measure of what comes to be the sign in the proof of [fire as existing on a smoky pass]—and a correct sign in the proof of [fire as existing on a smoky pass] by the sign, smoke.

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\(^a\) 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 25b.5, snga ma ’i; 2011 DBRC bla brang, 37b.3, snga mas.

\(^b\) The term chos, which sometimes is the subject (chos can), here is the predicate of the proposition (sgrub bya ’i chos). The term don, usually translated as “object” or “meaning,” is “basis of debate” in this context.

\(^c\) 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 25b.6, du ldan la de; 2011 DBRC bla brang, 37b.4, du ldan gyi la de; New Go-mang, 206.1, du ldan gyi la de.
Although smoke exists is both a correct sign and the measure of what is stated as the sign in the proof of [fire as existing on a smoky pass], smoke exists is not either the measure of what comes to be the sign in the proof of [fire as existing on a smoky pass] or a correct sign in the proof of [fire as existing on a smoky pass] by the sign, smoke. 

Fire is all three—the main predicate of the proposition in the proof of [fire as existing on a smoky pass] by the sign, smoke; the measure of what is stated as the predicate of the proposition in the proof of [fire as existing on a smoky pass] by the sign, smoke; and the measure of what comes to be [the predicate of the proposition] in the proof of [fire as existing on a smoky pass] by the sign, smoke—and the predicate of the proposition in the proof of [fire as existing on a smoky pass].

Although fire exists is all three—the ordinary predicate of the proposition

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in the proof of [fire as existing on a smoky pass]; the measure of what is stated as the predicate of the proposition in the proof of [fire as existing on a smoky pass]; and the predicate of the proposition in the proof of [fire as existing on a smoky pass] by the sign, smoke—fire exists is not the measure of what comes to be the predicate of the proposition in the proof of [fire as existing on a smoky pass].

Although fire observed by valid cognition is the predicate of the proposition in the proof of [fire as existing on a smoky pass] by the sign, smoke, fire observed by valid cognition is not the predicate of the proposition in the proof of [fire as existing on a smoky pass] because of being a correct sign proving just the convention in the proof of [fire as existing on a smoky pass].

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\[\text{2015 Old Go-mang, 26a.1, phal pa; New Go-mang, 206.8, phal ba; 2011 BDRC blang, 38a.1, phal ba.}\]

Key to colorization: Blue print = right. Red print = wrong. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight = material in place of ellipsis. Magenta highlight = ellipsis has been filled in.
Abbreviations

“2015 Old Lhasa Go-mang” = chos thams cad rigs pas gtan la 'bebs pa'i gtan tshigs kyi rnam bzhag legs par bshad pa bzhugs so (Elegant Explanation of the Presentation of Reasons Delineating All Phenomena by Reasoning). Named “2015” because of being acquired in Lha-sa, Tibet, at Go-mang College in 2015 by Jongbok Yi for the UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies; originally published at Go-mang College, date unknown. (Complete edition, to be made available at UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, uma-tibet.org.)

“2011 TBRC bla brang” = rtags rigs kyi rnam bzhag nyung gsal legs bshad gser gyi phreng mdzes zhes bya ba bzhugs so. Named because of being acquired by E. Gene Smith for the Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center in 2010 and added to TBRC in 2011; originally published in La-brang-tra-shi-khyil monastery, date unknown.

“co ne” = co ne bstan 'gyur. TBRC W1GS66030. co ne dgon chen: co ne, 1926.


“TBRC” = Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center (http://www.tbrc.org).
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Commentary on the Difficult Points in (Dharmakīrti’s) “Commentary on (Dignāga’s) ‘Compilation of Valid Cognition’”
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2. Ascertainment of Valid Cognition
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3. Drop of Reasoning
nyāyabinduprakaraṇa
rigs pa'i thigs pa zhes bya ba'i rab tu byed pa


Four resembling limbs

4. Drop of Reasons
hetubinduprakaraṇa
gtan tshigs kyi thigs pa zhes bya ba rab tu byed pa

5. Analysis of Relations
sambandhaparśkā
'brel pa brtag pa

6. Proof of Other Continuums
saṁtāntarasiddhināmaprakaraṇa
rgyud gzhan grub pa zhes bya ba'i rab tu byed pa

7. Reasoning for Debate
vādanyāya
rtsod pa'i rigs pa

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**Commentary on (Dharmakīrti’s) “Drop of Reasoning” / Lesser Logicality**

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[Auto-]Commentary on the Completion of Valid Cognition

pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti
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**Compilation of Valid Cognition**

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tshad ma kun las btus pa


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nyāyapraveśa-nāma-pramāṇapraṇakaraṇa
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hetucakretaṇamaraṇa
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**Commentary on (Dharmakīrti’s) Drop of Reasoning: Treasure having an Essence of Eloquence**

tshad ma rigs thigs kyi ’grel pa legs bshad snying po’i gter

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bstan bcos mgon par rtsogs pa'i rgyan gyi mtha' dpyod shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i don kun gsal ba'i rin chen sgron me


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dbu ma chen mo / dbyer ma ‘jug pa’i mtha’ dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zab don kun gsal skal bzang ‘jug ngogs

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Translation of the first section: Jules Levinson, *What Does Chandrakīrti Add to Nāgārjuna’s...*


**Great Exposition of Tenets / Explanation of Tenets:** *Sun of the Land of Samantabhadra Brilliantly Illuminating All of Our Own and Others’ Tenets and the Meaning of the Profound [Eminence], Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning Fulfilling All Hopes of All Beings*

grub mtha’ chen mo / grub mtha’i mam bshad rang gzhon grub mtha’ kun dang zab don mchog tu gsal ba kun bzung zhing gi nйi ma lung rigs rgya mtsho skye dgu’i re ba kun skong


English translation (entire root text and edited portions of the auto commentary and Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s *Annotations*): Jeffrey Hopkins. *Maps of the Profound: Jam-yang-zhayba’s Great*


Illuminating a Little the Presentation of Awareness and Knowledge: Beautiful Golden Garland of Elocution
blo rig gi rnams kbza’ gsal legs bshad gser gyi ’phreng mdzes

Illuminating a Little the Presentation of Signs and Reasonings: Beautiful Golden Garland of Elocution
rtags rigs kyi rnams kbza’ gsal legs bshad gser gyi phreng mdzes

Jetāri / Jitāri (dgra las rgyal ba, c. 10th century)
Explanation of the Suchness of the Reasons
hetutattvopadesā
gtan tshigs kyi de kha na nyid bstan pa

Introducing Children to Logic
byis pa ’jug pa’i rtog ge
bāḷāvattarātāraka

Jhānashīrbhadra
pramāṇaviniścayatīkā
The order of the Six Collections is drawn from Gareth Sparham, *Sources, Homage, Purpose, and Openers of the Chariot-Ways: Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s Decisive Analysis: Introduction 1*, (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, April, 2015: uma-tibet.org), 37, and endnotes 4 and 5, 179-180:

The way Nāgārjuna comments on the thought of those Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras in the Six Collections of Reasoning that refute a truly established actuality, the proposition [taken up by our own and others’ Proponents of Truly Established Things] is established because there are the six:

1. *Treatise on the Middle*, refuting [in general the proposition of] truly established actualities [by our own and others’ Proponents of Truly Established Things] (Brackets from Gung-thang Lo-drö-gya-tsho’s *Clarification of Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s “Decisive Analysis”* and Gung-thang Kön-chog-tan-pay-drön-me’s “Annotations,” TBRC W1KG21227, 6a.5: rang gzhän gyi sde pa dngos smra ba rnams kyi bsgrub byar byas pa’i bden dngos)  
2. *Refutation of Objections*, an extension of the meaning of the first chapter of that [*Treatise on the Middle*]  
3. *Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness*, an extension of the meaning of chapter seven  
4&5. both the *Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning* and the *Precious Garland*, refuting the truly established actualities [propounded] by our own [Buddhist] parties in particular  

Gung-thang Lo-drö-gya-tsho (*Clarification of Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s “Decisive Analysis”* and Gung-thang Kön-chog-tan-pay-drön-me’s
1. Treatise on the Middle / Fundamental Treatise on the Middle, Called “Wisdom”
madhyaṃakaśāstra / prajñānamālamadhyamakārikā
dbu ma’i bstan bcos / dbu ma rtsa ba’i tshig le’ur byas pa shes rab ces bya ba
P5224, vol. 95; D3824, vol. tsa
(PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985).
2. Refutation of Objections
vigrāhavārttakārikā
rtsod pa bzlog pa’i tshig le’ur byas pa
P5228, vol. 95; D3828, vol. tsa
3. Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness
śūnyatāsaptatikārikā
stong pa nyid bdun cu pa’i tshig le’ur byas pa
P5227, vol. 95; D3827, vol. tsa

“As Annotations,” TBRC W1KG21227, 6a.5) explains (1) that the Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning proves that from accustoming to the pristine wisdom realizing the absence of true existence nirvāṇa is attained and (2) that the Precious Garland proves that from it omniscience is attained, due to which these two texts are said to refute the truly established actualities propounded by our own Buddhist sects in particular.

6. Treatise Called the Finely Woven [or Fine Pulverization Treatise], refuting the logicians’ sixteen categories of proofs of tru[ly established] actualities.
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yuktiśatākārīkā

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P5225, vol. 95; D3825, vol. tsa


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rājaparikāthāratnāvalla

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Navidharma

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pramāṇavārttikātkā
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Explanation of (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle": Ocean of Reasoning / Great Commentary on (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle"
dbu ma rtsa ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa shes rab ces bya ba'i rnam bshad rigs pa'i rgya mtsho / rtsa shes tık chen
Tibetan digital reprint edition: In gsung 'bum (tsong kha pa, bla brang par ma). BDRC W22273.15:5-622 (PDF of bla brang: bla brang bkra shis 'khyil, [1997]).
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pratyayasamutpadādīvahanganārdeśa
ten 'brel mdo 'grel / ten cing 'brel par 'byung ba dang po dang rnam par dbye ba bshad pa
2. OTHER WORKS


Katherine Rogers holds a B.A. in Religious Studies as well as an M.A. and a Ph.D. in Tibetan Buddhist Studies from the University of Virginia. She taught at Washington and Lee University as an Assistant Professor for two years. She spent one year as a volunteer with the Tibet Information Network, working with Tibetan refugees in Northern India.

She has a published work, *Tibetan Logic*, and is the translator and editor of *The Garland of Mahamudra Practices* by Khenpo Konchog Gyaltsen. Working with the UMA Institute of Tibetan Studies, she has translated the first two sections of Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s logic manual; these have been published in two works: *How can a Conclusion be Drawn from a Sign?* and *What Constitutes a Correct Reason?*

She served for four years on the Board of Trustees of Nurse Healers-Professional Associates, Incorporated. Currently, as well as working as a translator with the UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, she co-owns a small business, Valley of Gems.
This book is an annotated translation of the third section of Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s *Illuminating a Little the Presentation of Signs and Reasonings: Beautiful Golden Garland of Eloquence*, a textbook studied by beginners at the Gomang College of Drepung Monastery and at Labrang Tra-shi-khyil and their affiliated institutions throughout Inner Asia.

In their system, the student needs to develop a strong “path of reasoning”—a mind trained in valid knowledge—in order to pursue not only the academic path but also the path of meditation and self-transformation. The study of Signs and Reasonings plays an important role in the development of this path of reasoning, being an introduction to the fundamentals of logic, including syllogisms and their components, correct reasons (or “signs”) and how they come to be correct—able to induce in the debater or meditator new knowledge about something not formerly understood.

Correct signs are of three types, correct effect, nature, and nonobservation signs, which aid, respectively, in understanding the important topics of cause and effect, impermanence, and emptiness. In this section of his work, Jam-yang-zhay-pa’s focus is on correct effect signs, introducing the student to a number of debate topics that bring to light various aspects of the topic, such as the relationship between the predicate and the sign, and whether the predicate is a positive or a negative phenomenon.

In this way, Jam-yang-zhay-pa continues his work of introducing the student to the basic concepts of correct reasoning, with a focus on laying the foundation for understanding the necessary relationship between the subject, predicate, and sign in the context of generating valid inferential knowledge, leading to direct perception of reality and purification of the mind-stream.