Tsang-kha-pa’s Revised Presentation of Compatibly Appearing Subjects in The Essence of Eloquence with Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s Commentary, 7

Jeffrey Hopkins

Dual language edition of Tsong-kha-pa’s text by Jongbok Yi

UMA INSTITUTE FOR TIBETAN STUDIES
Tsong-kha-pa’s Revised Presentation of Compatibly Appearing Subjects

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Translating texts from the heritage of Tibetan and Inner Asian Buddhist systems, the project focuses on Great Indian Books and Tibetan commentaries from the Go-mang College syllabus as well as a related theme on the fundamental innate mind of clear light in Tantric traditions. A feature of the Project is the usage of consistent vocabulary and format throughout the translations.

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Original printing: April, 2020
ISBN: 978-1-941381-49-6
Library of Congress Control Number:
I. Hopkins, Jeffrey, 1940-. II. Tsong-kha-pa’s revised presentation of compatibly appearing subjects in the essence of eloquence with jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary, 7. Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN: 978-1-941381-49-6
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(The elements in yellow highlight are added from Jig-me-dam-chö-gyagtsho’s commentary.)

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THE AUTHOR:
TSONG-KHA-PA LO-ZANG-DRAG-PA

The Ge-lug-pa order of Tibetan Buddhism was founded by the yogi-scholar Tsong-kha-pa Lo-zang-drag-pa (1357-1419), the fourth in a family of six sons in the Tsong-ka region of the northeastern province of Tibet called Am-do. He took layperson’s vows at the age of three from the Fourth Karma-pa Röl-pay-dor-je and novice monastic vows at seven. He studied and practiced in Am-do until age sixteen, when he left for central Tibet, never to return to Am-do. There, Chö-jé Don-drub-rin-chen advised him to study the Five Great Books of Indian Buddhism, which became the basic curriculum of sūtra study in the monasteries that Tsong-kha-pa and his followers established. From childhood, his study and practice were interlaced with tantra, and thus it is only a misimpression outside of Tibetan, Mongolian, and Chinese circles that he was not deeply involved with tantrism.

He studied a great deal with masters of the Ka-gyu and Sa-kyā orders. As Stephen Batchelor says in The Tibet Guide:

Tsongkhapa was born in 1357 in Amdo, the northeastern province of Tibet. During the time of the Third Dalai Lama his birthplace was marked by the erection of the Kumbum Jampa Ling Monastery near Xining. While still very young he was recognized as possessing unusual spiritual qualities and as a young man was sent to Central Tibet to further his understanding of Buddhism in the more cultured region of the country. The first monastery he visited

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a tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa.
b a mdo.
c karma pa rol pa’i rdo rje (1340-1383).
d chos rje rin chen don grub.
e bka’ brgyud.
f sa skya.
was that of Drigung, where he studied medicine and the doctrines of the Kagyu lineage. From here he proceeded to Netang, Samye, Zhalu, and Sakya monasteries. He met his main teacher Rendawa at Tsechen Monastery just outside Gyantse. For many years he studied the full range of Buddhist philosophy, including the more esoteric tantric systems. He then retreated to Olka, north of the Brahmaputra downstream from Tsetang, and spent the next four years in intense retreat. Upon returning to society he found himself much in demand as a teacher. One place where he taught was the hill in Lhasa on which the Potala was eventually built. Together with Rendawa he stayed for some time at Reting, where he composed his most famous work, *The Great Exposition of the Stages on the Path to Enlightenment*. After another meditation and writing retreat at Chöding Hermitage (above where Sera monastery now is), he founded, in 1409, the famous annual Mönlam (prayer) festival in Lhasa, which, after a twenty-five-year hiatus, was reinaugurated in 1986. (In the political unrest that followed the demonstrations of 1987 and 1988, it was canceled in 1989 and by 1994 had not been resumed.)

After the prayer festival Tsongkhapa decided to found his own monastery. He selected Mt. Drokri, a mountain upstream from Lhasa, and called the monastery “Ganden,” Tibetan for “Tushita,” the pure land where the future Buddha Maitreya resides. Within a year seventy buildings had been completed, but it was not until 1417 that the main hall of the monastery was consecrated.

Tsongkhapa died at Ganden two years later, in 1419, and shortly before his death passed the mantle of succession to Gyeltshab Je, one of his two chief disciples. Gyeltshab Je held the position of Ganden Tripa (Throne Holder of Ganden) until his own death twelve years later, when it passed to Tsongkhapa’s other chief disciple Khedrup Je. The post of Ganden Tripa was later given to the senior Dharma Master of one of the two main Ganden Colleges, Jangtse and Shartse. It was a five-year post for which to qualify one must first have obtained a geshe degree with highest honors (*lharampa*), proceeded to the abbotship of one of the two Lhasa tantric colleges, and from there been appointed Dharma Master of either Jangtse or Shartse college. The tradition has been continued in India. It is the Ganden Tripa, not the Dalai Lama, who heads the Gelukpa order.

During his lifetime Tsongkhapa was regarded as a remarkable spiritual figure whose genius and saintliness held him above the
sectarian differences of his times. Although greatly inspired by the example of Atisha, to the point of attributing authorship of his own major written work to him, and by the spirit of the Kadampa tradition, Tsongkhapa nonetheless studied widely with representatives of all the major orders in Tibet and assimilated their lineages. It is uncertain whether he intended to form his own order, though he must have realized it was liable to happen. He could not have foreseen, though, the dimensions this order (the Gelukpa) would eventually assume and the political power it would wield.

Over the following centuries Ganden Monastery grew to the size of a small township, delicately perched along the high sheltered slopes of the mountain. By 1959 this calm, secluded center of learning and contemplation housed more than five thousand monks, but with the Chinese occupation the monks were forced to scatter, and by the mid-sixties the monastery was nearly deserted. The final blow came with the cultural revolution. Coerced by the Chinese and caught up in the frenzy and terror of the times, the local Tibetans demolished the buildings. For many years only jagged ruins remained. The greater religious freedom permitted after the death of Mao allowed the laborious and gradual reconstruction of the monastery to begin. One by one the buildings emerged from out of the rubble and monks trickled back to their former home. Yet, perhaps because of its symbolic power as the stronghold of the previous spiritual rule as well as its distance from the capital, Ganden has been rebuilt largely through private funds and has received scant support from the government. Four hundred monks are officially allowed to live here now, although there are around six hundred actually in residence.

It strikes me that the construction of seventy buildings in one year and Tsong-kha-pa’s later instruction to two students to build other monastic universities in the Lhasa Valley—Dre-pung coming to have 2,000 monastic residents one year after commencement of construction—suggest that he did indeed intend to form a new order. In any case, the writings of his immediate followers, such as Gyal-tshab Dar-ma-rin-chen, Khay-drub

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a 'bras spungs.
c rgyal tshab dar ma rin chen, 1364-1432.
Ge-leg-pal-sang, and the latter’s brother Ba-so-chö-kyi-gyal-tshan, clearly indicate the raising of Tsong-kha-pa to the status of saint and founder of a new religious order.

His followers eventually came to have great influence throughout a vast region stretching from Kalmuck Mongolian areas, where the Volga empties into the Caspian Sea (in Europe), to Outer and Inner Mongolia, and the Buryat Republic of Siberia, as well as to most parts of Tibet and Ladakh. Tsong-kha-pa established a system of education centered in large monastic universities—eventually in three areas of Tibet which became some of the prime centers of religious education.

The form Buddhism took in Tibet was greatly influenced by the highly developed form of the religion present in India through the twelfth century and even later; the geographic proximity and perhaps relatively undeveloped culture of the region provided conditions for extensive, systematic transfer of highly developed scholastic commentaries and systems of practice. Unlike many of its East Asian counterparts, Tibetan Buddhism is centered not on Buddha’s word as found in sūtras and tantras but on Indian commentaries, many of which never made their way to East Asia. Scholasticism, therefore, often (but not always) occupies a more central place in aspects of Tibetan culture than it does farther east.

These Ge-lug-pa colleges came to share a curriculum that is based on Five Great Books of Buddhist India—a program of study that begins around age eighteen and lasts for about twenty-five years—but they use different textbooks that are commentaries on those Great Books. To prepare students for study of these texts, the curriculum starts with a class on introductory debate that serves to establish the procedure of outwardly combative but inwardly probing analysis used throughout the course of study. The debate format is at once individualistic, in the aim to win one-on-one debates, and group-stimulated, in the sense that information and

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a mkhas grub dge legs dpal bzang, 1385-1438, born in the western province of Tibet, gtsang, in ldog gzhung; see José Ignacio Cabezón, A Dose of Emptiness: An Annotated Translation of the stong thun chen mo of mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzang (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1992), 14.

b ba so chos kyi rgyal mtshan, born 1402.

c In his condensation of Tsong-kha-pa’s biography, Geshe Ngawang Dhargey (“A Short Biography,” 9, 11) speaks of the Five Great Books as if the category with this name predates Tsong-kha-pa; this is possible, although it necessary to pursue whether Geshe Ngawang Dhargey is overlaying a system of education that developed based on Tsong-kha-pa’s advice or a system that his successors founded. For a list of the seventeen texts that Tsong-kha-pa taught in a three-month teaching, see Geshe Ngawang Dhargey, “A Short Biography,” 13-14.
positions are acquired from fellow debaters in an ongoing network of communication and shared appreciation of insight. As further preliminaries, the classes study Awareness and Knowledge, a which is basic psychology, and Signs and Reasonings, b which is basic reasoning.

Then begins the first of the Five Great Books: the coming Buddha Maitreya’s Ornament for the Clear Realizations, c a rendering of the hidden teaching on the path structure in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras, which, according to the tradition, were spoken by the Buddha of this age, Shakymuni. In the standard Ge-lug-pa educational curriculum, six years are spent studying Maitreya’s Ornament for the Clear Realizations—a highly elaborate compendium on the paths that is not practiced in Tibet in its own form; rather, the long period of study is used to enrich understanding of a complex structure of spiritual development that provides an all-encompassing worldview daunting in its intricacy. Though the structure of the path, as it is presented in this text, does not provide the rubric of contemporary practice, much of its import is brought over to “stages of the path” literature, the practical implementation of which is certified by the great number of short texts in this genre aimed at daily meditation. The more complex system is dauntingly elaborate, such that it provides a perimeter within which the more practical teachings can be implemented.

Classes on Maitreya’s text (and the others) meet with a teacher for about two hours daily and then for two sessions of debates, each about two hours. Every year throughout the twenty-five-year program, time is taken out for pursuit of the second of the Great Books, Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on Valid Cognition d largely, though not only, epistemological and logical studies.

Having settled the path structure through the study of Maitreya’s Ornament for the Clear Realizations, the class passes on to the third Great

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c mgon rtogs rgyan, abhisamayālaṃkāra; Peking 5184, vol. 88. A notable exception is the curriculum at the monastery of the Pan-chen Lama, Tra-shi-lhun-po Monastic University (bkra shis lhun po), where Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika is the topic of this initial long period of study.

d tshad ma rnam ’grel, pramāṇavarttika; Peking 5709, vol. 130.
Book, Chandrakīrti’s *Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle, “* \(^a\) to explore for two years the emptiness of inherent existence. Emptiness is the primary content of path consciousnesses and is the explicit

\(^a\) *dbu ma la ’jug pa, madhyamakāvātāra*; Peking 5261, Peking 5262, vol. 98. Since Chandrakīrti often refers to Nāgārjuna’s *Treatise on the Middle* (*dbu ma’i bstan bcos, madhyamakaśāstra*) merely by the appellation *madhyamaka*, the madhyamaka of “*madhyamakāvātāra*” is held to refer to a text propounding the middle, specifically Nāgārjuna’s *Treatise on the Middle*. My translation of *avatāra* (*’jug pa*) as “supplement” is controversial; others use “introduction” or “entrance,” both of which are attested common translations in such a context. My translation is based on the explanation by Tsong-kha-pa that Chandrakīrti was filling in holes in Nāgārjuna’s *Treatise on the Middle*; see Tsong-kha-pa, Kensur Lekden, and Jeffrey Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism* (London: Rider, 1980; reprint, Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1980), 96-99. Among the many meanings of the Tibetan term for *avatāra*, *’jug pa* can mean “to affix” or “to add on.” To summarize the oral teachings of the late Ngag-wang-leg-dan:

*Avatāra* means “addition” in the sense that Chandrakīrti’s text is a supplement historically necessary so as to clarify the meaning of Nāgārjuna’s *Treatise on the Middle*. He wanted to make clear that the *Treatise* should not be interpreted according to the Mind-Only system or according to the Middle Way Autonomy School (*dbu ma rang rgyud pa, svatantrikādhyamika*), the founding of which is attributed to Bhāvaviveka. During Nāgārjuna’s lifetime, Bhāvaviveka had not written his commentary on the *Treatise*, nor had he founded his system; therefore, it was necessary later to supplement Nāgārjuna’s text to show why it should not be interpreted in such a way. Moreover, it is said that Chandrakīrti sought to show that a follower of Nāgārjuna should ascend the ten grounds by practicing the vast paths necessary to do so. This is because some interpret the Middle Way perspective as nihilistic. They see it as a means of refuting the general existence of phenomena rather than just their inherent existence and conclude that it is not necessary to engage in practices such as the cultivation of compassion. Therefore, in order to show that it is important to engage in three central practices—compassion, non-dual understanding, and the altruistic mind of enlightenment—and to ascend the ten Bodhisattva grounds, Chandrakīrti—in reliance on Nāgārjuna’s *Precious Garland*—wrote this supplementary text.


teaching of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras.

The next Great Book is Vasubandhu’s *Treasury of Manifest Knowledge,* a compendium of the types and natures of afflicted phenomena and their causes as well as the pure phenomena that act as antidotes to them and the states of cessation brought about by these antidotes; this takes two years. The last Great Book is Guṇaprabha’s *Aphorisms on Discipline,* again studied for two years. At the end, there are several years for review and preliminary rounds of debate in preparation for the yearly debate competition.

Tsong-kha-pa wrote commentaries on Maitreya’s *Ornament for the Clear Realizations* and Chandrakīrti’s *Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle,”* and his two main students, Gyal-tshab and Khay-drub, wrote commentaries on Dharmakīrti’s *Commentary on Valid Cognition.* Gyal-tshab also wrote a commentary on Maitreya’s text, which is said to reflect Tsong-kha-pa’s more mature thinking later in his life.

These commentaries by Tsong-kha-pa and his two chief disciples are used by the colleges, along with Tibetan commentaries by Chim Jam-pay-yang and the First Dalai Lama, Gen-dün-drub, on Vasubandhu’s *Treasury of Manifest Knowledge* and Tsho-na-wa’s and the First Dalai Lama’s commentaries on Guṇaprabha’s *Aphorisms on Discipline,* but Tsong-kha-pa’s works are not the chief textbooks in the monastic colleges. Given that the basic structure of the monastic university is to divide into camps that stimulate intellectual exchange, the main textbooks are sub-sub-commentaries written by prominent scholars, which present the aforementioned commentaries in a clearer format and attempt to resolve issues unclear (or confused) in those texts. These commentaries, called the college’s “textbook literature,” are the main focus, elevated even to a status of primary concern and adherence.

Despite my dubbing them “sub-sub-commentaries,” their significance in the community is focal. (Perhaps due to Protestant emphasis on early Christianity, we often unwarrantedly assume that the focus of religious systems is on their founder and early history, whereas the focus in this system is on the thought of the author of the textbook literature, perhaps as a door to the thought of the founder of their sect but more likely as the

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a chos mngon pa’i mdzod, abhidharmakośa; Peking 5590, vol. 115.
b ’dul ba’i mdo, vinayasūtra; Peking 5619, vol. 123.
c mchims ’jam pa’i dbyangs.
d dge ’dan grub; 1391-1475, retrospectively called the First Dalai Lama when Sö-nam-gya-tsho, the reincarnation of his reincarnation, received the title of Dalai.
e msho na wa rin chen bzung po.
f yig cha.
embodiment of his thought appropriate to one’s own time. I do not deny that the “door analogy” leads back eventually to Shākyamuni Buddha; rather, it seems that the focus is on the more current.)

In general, Ge-lug-pa doctrinal training can be divided into two types based on a division of texts into sūtra and tantra—both attributed to be Shākyamuni Buddha’s teachings that were committed to writing even many centuries later. The term “sūtra” can be used to refer to tantras, but here in the division of all of Buddha’s scriptures into the mutually exclusive categories of sūtra and tantra, it refers, roughly speaking, to those texts that are not based on the practice of deity yoga. a “Tantra,” on the other hand, refers to texts and systems whose main practitioners can employ deity yoga. In deity yoga, practitioners meditate on themselves as having the physical form not of an ordinary person but of a supramundane deity, an embodiment of the highest levels of wisdom and compassion.

Training in the systems that formed around sūtra-style teachings can be further divided into more practically oriented and more theoretically oriented modes of study. Both modes are concerned with both theory and practice, but the style of the former directly addresses particular meditation practices and behavior modification, whereas the style of the latter is primarily concerned with countering wrong ideas with scholastic arguments that, although they can be employed in meditation, are framed around critiques of issues often in the format of debate—refuting others’ mistakes, presenting one’s own view, and then dispelling objections to it. Both systems are based on focal Indian books and Tibetan texts, the latter being either explicit commentaries on the Indian texts or expositions of

a Here I am following Tsong-kha-pa’s presentation of the difference between sūtra and tantra in his Great Exposition of Secret Mantra (sngags rim chen mo) as found in H.H. the Dalai Lama, Tsong-kha-pa, and Jeffrey Hopkins, Tantra in Tibet (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1977; reprint, with minor corrections, Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1987). Tsong-kha-pa presents the difference between the Great Vehicle sūtra system (called the Perfection Vehicle) and the tantra system in terms of what the four classes of tantra (Action, Performance, Yoga, and Highest Yoga) present as the path for their main intended trainees. In this way, Tsong-kha-pa is able to posit deity yoga as the central distinctive feature of tantra, even though a majority of the tantras included in the class of Action Tantra do not involve deity yoga, since, as he puts it, those Action Tantras that do not involve deity are not intended for the main intended trainees of that class of tantra. One would expect that the majority of Action Tantras would be for the main intended trainees of Action Tantra, but in Tsong-kha-pa’s presentation the majority of Action Tantras are not intended for the main intended trainees of Action Tantra. Therefore, the mere presence and absence of the practice of deity yoga cannot serve as the feature distinguishing a particular text as tantra or sūtra, for the mere presence and absence of the practice of deity yoga serves only to distinguish tantra or sūtra in terms of the practices of their main intended trainees. This is why I have used the qualification “roughly speaking.”
their main themes or of issues that arise when juxtaposed with other material.

The more practical system of study is aimed at making coherent and accessible the plethora of practices that were inherited from India and are the topics of critical study in more theoretical texts. In the Ge-lug-pa sect, the more practical system of study centers on:

1. Tsong-kha-pa’s *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path*,\(^a\) which modestly calls itself a commentary on the *Lamp for the Path to Enlightenment*\(^b\) by the eleventh-century Indian scholar Atisha (who spent the last twelve years of his life in Tibet) but is much more, and

2. a commentary by one of Tsong-kha-pa’s two chief disciples, Gyal-tshab Dar-ma-rin-chen,\(^c\) on the Indian text *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* by the eighth-century scholar-yogi Shāntideva.\(^d\)

**TSONG-KHA-PA’S THE ESSENCE OF ELOQUENCE**

The present book is the seventh of eight volumes presenting Tibetan views on the controversy that arose in Buddhist India over how to refute production from self:

1. *Buddhapālita’s Refutation of Production from Self, Bhāvaviveka’s Criticism, and Avalokitavrata’s Commentary: Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Opposite of the Consequences*, 1

2. *Chandrakīrti Defends Buddhapālita against Bhāvaviveka: Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Opposite of the Consequences*, 2

3. *Chandrakīrti Undermines Bhāvaviveka’s Assertion of Autonomy: Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Compatibly Appearing Subjects*, 3

4. *Decisive Analyses concerning the Refutation of Production from Self: Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six*, 4

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\(^a\) *lam rim chen mo / skyes bu gsum gyi nyams su blang ba’i rim pa thams cad tshang bar ston pa’i byang chub lam gyi rim pa*; Peking 6001, vol. 152.

\(^b\) *byang chub lam gyi sgron ma, bodhipathapradipa*; Peking 5343, vol. 103.

\(^c\) *rgyal tshab dar ma rin chen*, 1364-1432.

\(^d\) *byang chub sems dpa’i spyod pa la ’jug pa, bodhicāryāvatāra*; Peking 5272, vol. 99. Gyal-tshab Dar-ma-rin-chen’s commentary is his *Explanatio of (Shāntideva’s) “Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds”: Entrance of Conqueror Children* (*byang chub sems dpa’i spyod pa la ’jug pa’i rnam bshad rgyal sras ’jug ngogs*).
5. *What is a Consequentialist?* Tsong-kha-pa’s *Great Exposition of Special Insight with the Four Interwoven Annotations: Compatibly Appearing Subjects*, 5.


The controversy revolves around the opening phrase of the first stanza of the first chapter of Nāgārjuna’s *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called “Wisdom”*:

Not from self, not from others,
Not from both, not causelessly
Are any things
Ever produced anywhere.

Uncharacteristically, Nāgārjuna says nothing more about the first leg of this reasoning—that things are not produced from self; rather, he immediately proceeds to the reasoning proving that things are not produced from other by examining the four types of conditions. His principal Indian commentators, however, explain the refutation of production from self in varying detail, the differences engendering the split between what came to be called the Autonomy School and the Consequence School.

Buddhapālita’s (c. 470-540?) commentary on the refutation of production from self provoked Bhāvaviveka (c. 500-570?) into extensive criticism and hence into a demonstration of his own preferred style of commentary. The first volume provides two Tibetan explanations of the controversy, shorter and longer, by the Tibetan scholar Jam-yang-shay-pa Ngag-wang-tsön-drü (1648-1721/1722). Included also in first volume are translations of Buddhapālita’s and Bhāvaviveka’s commentaries as well as the first translation into English of Avalokitaśravatā’s (flourished mid-seventh century) extensive commentary on Bhāvaviveka’s presentation, his minute examination allowing Bhāvaviveka’s terse text to be seen in high relief.

The second volume provides Jam-yang-shay-pa’s shorter and longer explanations of how Chandrakīrti defends Buddhapālita against Bhāvaviveka’s criticisms of Buddhapālita’s refutation of production from self. The third volume provides Jam-yang-shay-pa’s explanation of how...
Chandrakīrti tears apart Bhāvaviveka’s own refutation of production from self; the shorter version is just an abbreviated citation of Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words*, but the longer version provides Jam-yang-shay-pa’s extensive elaboration. It is concerned with compatibly appearing subjects, Ge-lug-pa scholars seeing this discussion as the prime, but not only, source showing that Bhāvaviveka accepts that phenomena are conventionally established by way of their own character. This complex topic is used in Tibetan monastic colleges to draw students into fascinating reflections about how phenomena appear in a false status and thereby to explore the nature of the reality behind appearances.

The first three volumes in this series are in the style of theoretically oriented modes of study in the form of general-meaning commentaries, whereas the fourth volume, still within the style of the theoretically oriented mode of study, moves beyond a general-meaning commentary and into a decisive-analysis commentary on those three volumes including all of their sources, taking on the sole format of debate in order to refute others’ mistakes. As Jam-yang-shay-pa’s fourth volume, it is scheduled for translation after the four volumes on Tsong-kha-pa’s works on these topics since it synthetically treats all of these materials, the first three and the last four volumes.

Tsong-kha-pa’s focus in the Great Exposition of Special Insight begins with the material in the final phase of the controversy between Buddhapālita, Bhāvaviveka, and Chandrakīrti on the topic of compatibly appearing subjects. Hence, his analysis of that phase appears in volumes five and six, for which Jam-yang-shay-pa’s three general-meaning volumes, 1-3, serve as introductions. This seventh volume on Tsong-kha-pa’s *The Essence of Eloquence* with Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary, which Tsong-kha-pa published six years after his intricate, long analysis of the same material in his *Stages of the Path to Enlightenment Thoroughly Teaching All the Stages of Practice of the Three Types of Beings* in a section called the Great Exposition of Special Insight, is a revised but much shorter presentation of the same material. About Tsong-kha-pa’s change of opinion, he says near the beginning of this section in *The Essence of Eloquence*:

> Although the two—[my] explanation elsewhere [in the Great Exposition of Special Insight] in terms of [Bhāvaviveka’s] having

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\[^a\] Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s *Port of Entry*, 569.12, and Ta-drin-rab-tan’s *Annotations*, 391.1. For this presentation, see Hopkins, *What is a Consequentialist? Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight with the Four Inverwoven Annotations: Compatibly*
asserted that a subject which is the basis [of the predicate, nonproduction from self,] degenerate from [or are not] established as [their own] suchness and this mode [of explanation just given here in The Essence of Eloquence]—do not agree, it is not that [my two explanations] disagree with respect to the tenet of refuting autonomy.

Although Tsong-kha-pa maintained in both readings that this section refuted autonomy, his readings of the details differed. Despite this, he did not rewrite the fulsome account of the Great Exposition of Special Insight as if he were revising a textbook; rather, the revisions for the most part are staccato overviews of the gist of Chandrakirti’s Clear Words which he almost never cites. Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho helpfully identifies the relevant passages in Chandrakirti’s Clear Words and rephrases Tsong-kha-pa’s meanings in sequences familiar to other genres of monastic textbooks and occasionally draws out issues. Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho cites these passages in abbreviated form with ellipses which I have restored in full in order to illustrate the material whose pith Tsong-kha-pa is presenting; I have put these passage in blue type to make them easily distinguishable from Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s own commentary.

Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho also expands on several points in a final section, which I intend to translate in the eighth volume along with comparing the treatments in The Essence of Eloquence and the Great Exposition of Special Insight. Tsong-kha-pa composed five expositions on the view of emptiness:

1. In 1402, at the age of forty-five, he published the Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path, which, as mentioned above, has a long and complicated section on special insight into emptiness called the Great Exposition of Special Insight.


a This brief rehearsal of his works on the view of emptiness is drawn from Elizabeth Napper, Dependent-Arising and Emptiness (London: Wisdom Publications, 1989), 6-7.


c lhag mthong, vipaśyanā.
2. Five years later, when he was fifty, he began writing a commentary on Nāgārjuna’s Treatise on the Middle, called Ocean of Reasoning, at Chō-ding Hermitage above what became Se-ra Monastic University on the northern outskirts of Lhasa, but in the midst of explicating the first chapter, he foresaw that there would be interruptions if he stayed there. Thus, he left Chō-ding Hermitage for another hermitage at Se-ra, Ra-ka Precipice, where he wrote the Treatise Differentiating Interpretable and Definitive Meanings: The Essence of Eloquence. (I imagine that he felt the need to compose his own independent work on the view of emptiness in the Great Vehicle schools as background for his commentary on Nāgārjuna’s treatise. If this is so, he wrote The Essence as an overarching structure in which that commentary could be understood.)

3. After completing The Essence in 1408, he returned to commenting on Nāgārjuna’s Treatise on the Middle, completing the Ocean of Reasoning.

4. At age fifty-eight in 1415, he wrote the Medium-Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path.

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a dbu ma rtsa ba’i tshig le’ur byas pa shes ras bya ba, praṇānāmaṁālamadhyamakārikā; P5224, vol. 95.
b dbu ma rtsa ba’i tshig le’ur byas pa shes ras bya ba’i rnam bshad rigs pa’i rgya mtsho; P6153, vol. 156. For a translation of the entire text, see Geshe Ngawang Samten and Jay L. Garfield, Ocean of Reasoning: A Great Commentary on Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakārikā (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
c chos sdings.
d rva kha brag: perhaps the meaning of the name is Goat-Face Crag.
f For the date, see Leonard W. J. van der Kuijp, “Apropos of a Recent Contribution to the History of Central Way Philosophy in Tibet: Tsong Khapa’s Speech of Gold” in Berliner Indologische Studien 1 (Reinbek, Germany: Verlag für Orientalistische Fachpublikationen, 1985), 68, n. 2.
5. At age sixty-one, one year before his death, he wrote a commentary on Chandrakīrti’s *Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle,”* a called *Illumination of the Thought.*

Of Tsong-kha-pa’s five expositions on the view of emptiness, his longest treatment of “compatibly appearing subjects” by far is in the “Great Exposition of Special Insight” in the *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path.* The treatment published six years later in *The Essence of Eloquence* differs in form and content, and at the end of his still later treatment of “opposite of the consequences” and “compatibly appearing subjects” in the *Ocean of Reasoning,* he refers readers to the discussion in “The Essence of Eloquence and so forth” for these topics. Mention of these topics is made only in passing in his later *Extensive Explanation of (Chandrakīrti’s) “Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle’”:* *Illumination of the Thought,* and no mention at all is made in the still later “Medium-Length Exposition of Special Insight.”

Tsong-kha-pa’s *The Essence of Eloquence* is considered to be so challenging that it is called his “iron bow and iron arrow.” As the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century commentator Wal-mang Kön-chog-gyal-tshan from the Am-do Province of Tibet says, just as it is hard to pull a iron bow to its full extent but if one can, the arrow will course over a great area, so even the words—not to consider the meaning—of this text are difficult to understand but when understood, yield great insight. The metaphor states a martial challenge to the reader, calling for heroic strength of intellectual will; the work is viewed as one of genius, difficult to control because of

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a  *dbu ma la ’jug pa, madhyamakāvatāra;* P5261, vol. 98 and P5262, vol. 98.
b  *dbu ma la ’jug pa ’i rgya cher bshad pa dgongs pa rab gsal;* P6143, vol. 154. Translations of the sections on the object of negation in the doctrine of emptiness and on the two truths are included in Hopkins, *Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom,* 181-213 and 215-262, respectively.
d  The wide attention by scholars that issues in the first chapter of Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words* have received has been brilliantly documented in Anne MacDonald’s magnificent *In Clear Words: The Prasannapadā, Chapter One* (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2015).
e  lcags mda’ lcags gehu.
f  *dbal mang dkon mchog rgyal mtshan, 1764-1853; Notes on (Kön-chog-jig-me-wang-po’s) Lectures,* 381.4-381.5.
g  Born in *bsang khog tshar tsha.* For dates and birthplaces of Am-do scholars, see Tenzin Palbar, *The Tragedy of My Homeland (nga’i pha yul gyi nga ba’i lo rgyus)* (Dharmsala, India: Narthang, 1994).
its often cryptic brevity but yielding profound insight if pursued with analytical fortitude. (The metaphor also may be a polite way of communicating that the book is so abstruse and sometimes apparently self-contradictory that it takes tremendous effort to attempt to construct a consistent account of Tsong-kha-pa’s thought.) Thus, among his five great works on the view of emptiness the iron bow and arrow is just *The Essence of Eloquence*.

**THE COMMENTATORS: THE PLACE OF JIG-ME-DAM-CHÖ-GYA-TSHO’S *PORT OF ENTRY***

This daunting challenge to take up the iron bow and arrow, repeated from generation to generation, has been accepted by so many brilliant Tibetan and Mongolian scholars, testing their strength on the iron bow and arrow, that we have a veritable treasure-trove of expositions. The emphasis on reasoning in the Ge-lug-pa sect—combined with the impetus gained from the culture’s parochialism such that small units came to be emphasized to the point of overwhelming the whole—spawned a dynamic tradition of commentarial exposition. Each educational unit sought to have its own distinctive literature on a topic in order both to promote analytical inquiry and to establish the claims of the greatness of the local leader. Disagreement even with Tsong-kha-pa Lo-zang-pa, the founder of the sect, is promoted within the bounds of not openly criticizing his works but doing so under various polite facades. Through such techniques, an atmosphere of considerable intellectual freedom is fostered, prompting the writing of many commentaries on a fundamental text like his *The Essence of Eloquence*.

1. The first is found in a work by Tsong-kha-pa’s student Khay-drub (1385-1438), called *Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate: Treatise Brilliantly Clarifying the Profound Emptiness*. Khay-drub views his work as bringing considerable clarity to Tsong-kha-pa’s explanation. The work has been translated in its entirety in José Ignacio Cabezón, *A Dose of Emptiness* (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1992).

Even though our Omniscient Foremost One [Tsong-kha-pa] has already extended the kindness of completely clarifying the systems of the great chariots [great leaders] in his *Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive: The Essence of Eloquence*, the
power of intelligence of present-day beings is very weak, and, therefore, all of these beings, subsumed in a state like intellectually undeveloped childhood, cannot open even a portion of [Tsong-kha-pa’s presentations that are] like words [used in] the Vajra [Vehicle whose meaning is hard to understand]. Having understood that they are just not penetrating [his words], I will show to listeners with very few words just those meanings—like a treasure beneath the ground—such that they are like olives\(^a\) resting in the palm of their hands. Stay with your ears inclined!

Khay-drub puts the blame for not understanding Tsong-kha-pa’s profound intent on the low intellectual level of “present-day beings,” but given that Khay-drub was Tsong-kha-pa’s own student and was writing his exposition approximately twenty years after the master’s work\(^b\) and thus not after centuries of possible decay of intelligence, his decrying the intellectual level of his compatriots hints at Tsong-kha-pa’s lack of clear exposition relative to his audience. Khay-drub obviously takes delight in providing such clarity on several major issues.

His exposition is synthetic, in that he draws from the entire scope of Tsong-kha-pa’s works on the view of emptiness, and thus this work is not strictly a commentary on The Essence of Eloquence. However, in the section on the Mind-Only view of emptiness, his exegesis is largely limited to The Essence of Eloquence. Still, since his presentation is oriented to several key issues and follows his own order, he does not provide either a section-by-section summation or exploration of a great number of issues in The Essence of Eloquence.

2. Such a summation subsequently was provided by Nyal-tön Pal-jor-lhün-drub\(^c\) (1427-1514) of the Jey College of Se-ra Monastic University,\(^d\)

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\(a\) skyu ru ra. The term also is used for a sour medicinal fruit, Emblica officinalis Linn., said to cure diseases of phlegm, bile, and blood; see Sarat Chandra Das, A Tibetan-English Dictionary (Calcutta: 1902; reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1969, 1970; compact reprint, Kyoto, Japan: Rinsen Book Company, 1981), 103. The usage here is to indicate something that is perfectly clear in front of the eyes.

\(b\) Tsong-kha-pa wrote The Essence in 1407-1408 (Thurman, Tsong Khapa’s Speech of Gold, 88), and Khay-drub wrote Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate sometime between 1424-1428 (Cabezón, Dose of Emptiness, 17).

\(c\) gnyal [also spelled gnyan] ston dpal ’byor lhun grub. A student of Lo-drö-rin-chenseng-ge (blo phros rin chen seng ge), he was taught The Essence of Eloquence by Nyan-po Sh sûkya Gyal-tshan (nyan po sûkya rgyal mthsan), who was taught the text by both of Tsong-kha-pa’s main students, Gyal-tshab and Khay-drub.

\(d\) se ra byes.
who wrote an exposition of Tsong-kha-pa’s text in a genre called a “difficult points commentary,” most likely around the end of the fifteenth century or the beginning of the sixteenth. His text, titled *Commentary on the Difficult Points of (Tsong-kha-pa’s) “The Essence of Eloquence”: Lamp for the Teaching*, cites all of Tsong-kha-pa’s text (with a few unintended omissions) and summarizes its meaning except when the original seemed adequately clear. Since Pal-jor-lhün-drub only occasionally expands on issues, the strength of his commentary is its restatement, usually in brief but clear form, of the entire text, making it a good introduction. He does not touch on scores of difficult issues, and thus its use is preliminary.

3. Later, Ge-dün-gya-tsho (1476-1542), retrospectively called the Second Dalai Lama when his reincarnation Sō-nam-gya-tsho received the title of Dalai from the Mongolian chieftain Altan Khan, wrote a section by section exposition on the entire text in the same genre as Pal-jor-lhün-drub, called *Commentary on the Difficult Points of “Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive” from the Collected Works of the Foremost Holy Omniscient (Tsong-kha-pa): Lamp Illuminating the Meaning of (Tsong-kha-pa’s) Thought*. Like Pal-jor-lhün-drub’s work, it assumed considerable importance since it covers Tsong-kha-pa’s complete text. When Ge-lug-pa scholars criticize it, the format is largely one of pretending to reframe his actual intent. The attention that it receives today is testimony to its stature in the tradition, since a text even from a Dalai Lama easily can be ignored.

Difficult issues are faced in print in a genre of literature used in monastic colleges called “general meaning,” which are often supplemented with “decisive analyses.” In their more advanced forms, these textbooks on seminal Indian texts actively stimulate the intellect through juxtaposing assertions that are, or appear to be, contradictory and through making often highly elaborate and esthetically attractive reformulations of assertions in order to create coherence. In this genre, the intellectual fervor behind the

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a  *dka’ 'grel.*
b  *legs bshad snying po’i dka’ 'grel bstan pa’i sgron me.*
c  *dge ’dun rgya mtsho.*
d  tā le; this is a translation of the last two syllables of his Tibetan name, “gya-tsho” (rgya mtsho).
e  *rje btsun thams cad mkhyen pa’i gsung ’bum las drang nges rnam ’byed kyi dka’ 'grel dgongs pa’i don rab tu gsal bar byed pa’i sgron me.*
f  *spyi don.*
g  *mtha’ dpyod.*
topics and the format of philosophical confrontation—which is not accompanied by concluding practical summations—suggest that the aim is not what usually would be considered practice, that is, meditation cultivating what has been studied, but endless intellectual reflection. This perspective has resulted in the flowering of intellectual pursuits in Tibet but calls into question the injunctions to practical implementation. It appears that internal practice has given way to external debate on major and minor issues, but the emphasis on intellectual development also stems from stark recognition that these matters are not easily penetrated, requiring much intellectual exploration, and that immersion in topics—even to the point of entering into a maze of conceptuality—can bear fruit over lifetimes. At least, this is the system’s self-justification for the pursuit of ever more refined conceptualization.

4&5. Also around the beginning of the fifteenth century, two scholars—who during the long and varied course of their education studied with the same teacher\(^a\)—wrote general-meaning commentaries on Tsong-kha-pa’s *The Essence of Eloquence*. Pan-ch’en Sö-nam-drag-pa\(^b\) (1478-1554) wrote his *Distinguishing through Objections and Answers (Tsong-kha-pa’s) “Differentiating the Interpretable and Definitive Meanings of All the Scriptures, The Essence of Eloquence”: Garland of Blue Lotuses,*\(^c\) and Je-tsün Chö-kyi-gyal-tshan (1469-1544/46) wrote his *General Meaning of (Tsong-kha-pa’s) “Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive”: Eradicating Bad Disputation: A Precious Garland,*\(^d\) in which he often refutes views held by Pan-ch’en Sö-nam-drag-pa.\(^e\) Both of these texts are mostly limited to commenting on the introductory and Mind-Only sections of Tsong-kha-pa’s work. Among the monastic colleges near Lhasa, the former came to be used by the Shar-tse College of Gan-dan Monastic University and the Lo-sal-ling College of Dre-pung Monastic University; the

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\(^a\) Jam-yang-dön-yö-pal-dan (’jam dbyangs don yod dpal ldan; 1445-1524).
\(^b\) pan chen bsod nams grags pa.
\(^c\) The late Khan-zur Ye-she-thub-tan reported that Pan-ch’en Sö-nam-drag-pa also wrote a “decisive analysis” titled *Eliminating Qualms about Difficult Topics in (Tsong-kha-pa’s) “The Essence of Eloquence”* (legs bshad snying po’i dka’ gnad dogs gcod) but that, despite an extensive search, it has not been found.
\(^d\) drang nges nram ’byed kyi spyi don rgol ngan tshar gcod rin po che’i phreng ba.
\(^e\) Je-tsün Chö-kyi-gyal-tshan refutes several of Pan-ch’en Sö-nam-drag-pa’s positions, and thus it seems likely that Pan-ch’en Sö-nam-drag-pa’s text was written first even though he was nine years younger than Je-tsün Chö-kyi-gyal-tshan. However, there are many ambiguities involved in trying to determine the historical order of texts written by contemporaries since positions finally put to print could have been part of an earlier, oral tradition.
\(^f\) blo gsal gling.
latter came to be used by the Jang-tse College of Gan-dan Monastic University and the Jey College of Se-ra Monastic University.

6. Gung-ru Chö-jung followers wrote down his much more extensive oral commentary, often highly critical of other commentaries and containing particularly good word-commentaries on Tsong-kha-pa’s text, called *Decisive Analysis of (Tsong-kha-pa’s) “Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive, The Essence of Eloquence”: Garland of White Lotuses*. This came to be used by the Go-mang Dre-pung Monastic University.

7. Two texts similar to those by Je-tsün Chö-kyi-gyal-tshan and Pan-chê Sö-nam-drâ-nga, but structured around the three wheels of doctrine, were written by Tan-pa-dar-gyaye (1493-1568); these came to be used by the May College of Se-ra Monastic University. Afterward, followers of these scholars wrote other commentaries (listed below), usually to support their colleges’ textbooks as issues of controversy and need for greater clarity came to the fore.

8. The last major development in college literature—in the sense of changing the most basic texts—came more than a century later, with the production of a revised set of monastic textbooks by Jam-yang-shay-pa (1648-1721). A long involved treatment of the introductory and Mind-Only sections of Tsong-kha-pa’s text, his text presents a sometimes lengthened but more often condensed and refined version of Gung-ru Chö-jung’s *Decisive Analysis*. Jam-yang-shay-pa often merely copies his predecessor

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a. *byang rtse.*

b. Whether he preceded or followed Pan-chê Sö-nam-drâ-nga and Je-tsün Chö-kyi-gyal-tshan is unclear; nevertheless, he refutes positions that they held. While studying at Go-mang College in Tibet in the fall of 1988, I obtained a copy of Gung-ru Chö-jung’s *Garland of White Lotuses* from the Inner Mongolian scholar Lo-sang-tan-dzin (*blo bzang bstan ’dzin*). He had received it from Kum-bum Monastic University in eastern Tibet just outside Si-ling, the capital of Am-do Province (Ch’ing-hai), where I later purchased copies.

c. *drang ba dang rgyas pa'i rnam par 'byed pa legs bshad snying po zhes bya ba'i mtha' dpayod padma dkar po'i phreng ba.*


e. *bstan pa dar rgyas.*

f. *se ra smad.*

g. *'jam dbyangs bzhad pa ngag dbang brtson grus.*
but sometimes corrects what he found to be errors; he also sharpens criticisms of Je-tsün Chö-kyi-gyal-tshan’s and Pan-chen Sö-nam-drag-pa’s texts (Tan-pa-dar-gyay seemingly being ignored). Jam-yang-shay-pa’s text, titled Decisive Analysis of (Tsong-kha-pa’s) “Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive”: Storehouse of White Lapis-Lazuli of Scripture and Reasoning Free from Error: Filling the Hopes of the Fortunate, replaced that by Gung-ru Chö-jung as the textbook on this topic for the Go-mang College of Dre-pung Monastic University near Lhasa, and he installed it as the textbook for this topic at the Tra-shi-khyil Monastic University in Am-do Province, which he founded.


10. The length and complexity of Gung-ru Chö-jung’s and Jam-yang-shay-pa’s works, as well as their intricate probing of Tsong-kha-pa’s sources (and thus reopening of issues), led to brilliant analyses by a gifted scholar of possibly Mongolian descent, Gung-thang Kön-chog-tan-pay-drön-me (1762-1823), who was born in Am-do Dzö-ge, south of Tra-shi-khyil; he became the chief student of Kön-chog-jig-me-wang-po. Gung-thang Kön-chog-tan-pay-drön-me began but did not finish two commentaries in the genres of “annotations” and “difficult points” on the Mind-Only section of Tsong-kha-pa’s text, usually from Jam-yang-shay-pa’s viewpoint but with considerable adjustment of the latter’s views.

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a. drang ba dang nges pa’i don rnam par ’byed pa’i mtha’ dpyod ’khrul bral lung rigs bai dOr dkar pa’i gan mdzod skal bzang re ba kun skong.
b. bkra shis ’khyil.
c. dkon mchog ’jigs med dbang po.
d. snang ra.
e. See the table of contents (most likely by Gene Smith) to the Ngawang Gelek edition.
f. Wal-mang Kön-chog-gyal-tshan also was a student of Gung-thang Kön-chog-tan-pay-drön-me.
g. bsang khog tshar tsha.
h. gung thang dkon mchog bstan pa’i sgron me. For a brief biography, see E. Gene Smith, University of Washington Tibetan Catalogue (Seattle, Washington: University of Washington Press, 1969), 1: 81-82.
i. mdzod dge.
largely within the facade of explaining Jam-yang-shay-pa’s text. Occasionally he prefers Gung-ru Chö-jung’s explanations to Jam-yang-shay-pa’s, and, conversely, at other times he explains away deficiencies in the latter’s presentations as due to merely cribbing Gung-ru Chö-jung’s.

11. To get a handle on the plethora of commentaries, one of Gung-thang’s students, Dön-drub-gyal-tshan\(^a\) (not from Am-do but in this tradition), wrote a text titled *Extensive Explanation of (Tsong-kha-pa’s) “Treatise Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive, The Essence of Eloquence,” Unique to Ge-lug-pa: Four Intertwined Commentaries.*\(^b\) It refers to four sets of works (and other minor texts) on Tsong-kha-pa’s *The Essence of Eloquence* found in the four major scholastic colleges around Lhasa, as well as to the Second Dalai Lama’s *Lamp Illuminating the Meaning*. The four sets are:

- **Lo-sal-ling College of Dre-pung Monastic University**
  - Pan-chen Sō-nam-drag-pa’s *Garland of Blue Lotuses* (also used as main textbook by Shar-tse College of Gan-dan Monastic University)
  - Tshül-khang Leg-pa-dön-drub’s\(^c\) *Commentary on the Difficult Points*

- **Go-mang College of Dre-pung Monastic University**
  - Gung-ru Chö-jung’s *Garland of White Lotuses*
  - Jam-yang-shay-pa’s *Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive*
  - Gung-thang Kön-chog-tan-pay-drön-me’s *Annotations*
  - Gung-thang Kön-chog-tan-pay-drön-me’s *Difficult Points*

- **Jey College of Se-ra Monastic University**
  - Pal-jor-lhün-drub’s *Lamp for the Teaching*
  - Je-tsün Chö-kyi-gyal-tshan’s *General-Meaning Commentary* (also used as main textbook by Jang-tse College of Gan-dan Monastic University)
  - She-rab-wang-po’s\(^d\) *Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive*
  - Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub’s\(^e\) *Ornament for the Thought*

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\(a\) *don grub rgyal mtshan.*

\(b\) *dge ldan thun mong ma yin pa drang ba dang nges pa ’i don rnam par phye ba ’i bstan bcov legs bsrad snying po ’i rgya cher bsrad pa dang nges bzhi ’drl.*

\(c\) *tshul khang legs pa don grub.*

\(d\) *shes rab dbang po.*

\(e\) *pra sti dge bshes rin chen don grub.* He flourished in the mid-seventeenth century and was born in Am-do *dpa’ ris pra sti.*
May College of Se-ra Monastic University
Tan-pa-dar-gyay’s General Meaning
Tan-pa-dar-gyay’s Decisive Analysis

(I have used all of these texts in my works in Tsong-kha-pa’s The Essence of Eloquence except for two that I could not locate, Tshül-khang Leg-pa-
đön-drub’s Commentary on the Difficult Points and She-rab-wang-po’s Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive.) Rather than a grand
synthesis of these many commentaries, Dön-drub-gyal-tshan’s text pro-
vides very short compilations of stances on many issues, and thus its use-
fulness is limited. It is likely that he was seeking to place Gung-thang Kôn-
chog-tan-pay-drön-me’s brilliant analyses in a wider framework of scho-
lastic interaction by identifying in brief terms the positions of other schol-
ars.

12. That Gung-thang Kôn-chog-tan-pay-drön-me did not finish his two
commentaries drew another of Jam-yang-shay-pa’s followers, Gung-thang
Lo-drö-gya-tsho, also called A-khu Lo-drö-gya-tsho, who was born in
Am-do Tsa-yū, southeast of Tra-shi-khyil, and flourished in the early
twentieth century (1851-1930), to write a difficult-points-commentary that
also includes very short sections on the Autonomy and Consequence
Schools. At times he abbreviates Gung-thang’s opinions and at others ex-
plains issues that Gung-thang only indicates require more thought.

13. Another early-twentieth-century follower but sometimes critic of Jam-
yang-shay-pa, is Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho (1898-1946), born in Am-do
A-wa, north of Tra-shi-khyil. Recognized as the reincarnation of Jig-me-

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a Dön-drub-gyal-tshan indicates that, in addition to these four sets, he consulted other
texts, such as the “separate disputation” zur rgol by Khyung-thrug-pa (khyung ’phrug pa),
a text from the Jang-tse College of Gan-dan Monastic University, which is used in addition
to Je-tsün Chö-kyi-gyal-tshan’s General-Meaning Commentary.
b a khu blo gros rgya mtsho.
c tsa yas.
d Mention also should be made of Jo-ne Paṇḍita Lo-sang-gya-tsho (co ne paṇḍita blo
bzang rgya mtsho), who was born in Am-do Chö-pal-zhing (chos dpal zhing) in Jo-ne (co
ne) and flourished in the early twentieth century. He gave lectures on Tsong-kha-pa’s The
Essence of Eloquence in 1927, from which notes were taken by Pha-bong-kha-pa Jam-pa-
tan-dzin-thrin-lay-gya-tsho (pha bong kha pa byams pa bs tan ’dzin ’phrin las rgya mtsho,
1878-1941), titled Presentation of the Interpretable and the Definitive, Brief Notes on the
Occasion of Receiving Profound [Instruction from Jo-ne Paṇḍita Lo-sang-gya-tsho] on
(Tsong-kha-pa’s) “The Essence of Eloquence.” The text is brief and somewhat haphazard,
since it was intended merely as Pha-bong-kha-pa’s personal notes.
e ’jigs med dam chos rgya mtsho; 1898-1946.
f a ba, or ’gar tse nyin, in reb gong gser mo ljongs.
sam-dan,\textsuperscript{a} his poetic name is Mi-pham-yang-ge-pay-dor-je.\textsuperscript{b} Author of sixteen volumes of works, he wrote a comprehensive commentary on Tsong-kha-pa’s entire text. Titled \textit{Treatise Distinguishing All the Meanings of (Tsong-kha-pa’s) “The Essence of Eloquence”: Illuminating the Differentiation of the Interpretable and the Definitive: Port of Entry to “The Essence of Eloquence”},\textsuperscript{c} it lists and examines the positions of many of the above authors. A synthetic, lengthy tome in two volumes on Tsong-kha-pa’s entire text, it provides extensive detail on the entire scope of commentaries. This work is dependent on teachings received from Gi-teng Lo-zang-pal-dan\textsuperscript{d} over more than eight months beginning in October/November of 1928 plus earlier teachings received from the same teacher over three years on the Naturelessness School. In the colophon he humbly says that he was setting down what this master taught.

The works by Gung-ru Chö-jung, Jam-yang-shay-pa, Gung-thang K ön-chog-tan-pay-drön-me, Gung-thang Lo-drö-gya-tsho, and Jig-m ed-dam-chö-gya-tsho are most effective when read in series. Since Gung-ru Chö-jung’s text was the basis for this tradition and since Jam-yang-shay-pa often condenses his predecessor’s more free-flowing presentation, Gung-ru Chö-jung’s work provides both a clear introduction and increased access to the twists and turns of the later texts. Many difficulties in Jam-yang-shay-pa’s textbook that can hinder continued reading are handled by Gung-thang K ön-chog-tan-pay-drön-me’s brilliant and incisive analyses, whose work, therefore, can be understood only within its context as a supplement to Jam-yang-shay-pa’s. Gung-thang Lo-drö-gya-tsho’s text is indispensable because it explains many points that Gung-thang K ön-chog-tan-pay-drön-me leaves hanging; still, it cannot stand alone since its flow is so bound to Jam-yang-shay-pa’s and Gung-thang K ön-chog-tan-pay-drön-me’s expositions. Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s text, on the other hand, is a massive synthesis.

In July 1996, when the Fourteenth Dalai Lama,\textsuperscript{e} born in Am-do Tag-tsher\textsuperscript{f} in 1935, came to Gethsemane in Kentucky for a Buddhist-Christian dialogue, I reported to him that I had twenty commentaries\textsuperscript{g} on Tsong-kha-pa’s text and was using eighteen. The next day when he asked me which

\textsuperscript{a} jigs med bsam gdan.
\textsuperscript{b} mi pham dbyangs can dges (or dgyes) pa ‘i rdo rje.
\textsuperscript{c} drang ba dang nges pa ‘i don rnam par phyé ba gsal bar byed pa legs bshad snying po ‘i don mtha’ dag rnam par ‘byed pa ‘i bstang bcos legs bshad snying po ‘i jug ngogs.
\textsuperscript{d} sgi steng blo bzang dpal ldan.
\textsuperscript{e} bstan ‘dzin rgya mtsho.
\textsuperscript{f} stag mtsher; southeast of sku ’ bum, where Tsong-kha-pa was born.
\textsuperscript{g} The total now is twenty-six.
commentary I thought was best, I answered, “Gung-thang Kön-chog-tan-pay-drön-me’s analyses are very good, but Jig-me-dam-chō-gya-tsho’s text is superb.” He quickly got up, went to his case, and took out the green Kalimpong edition of *The Essence* that he always has with him. He opened it to reveal that the margins were filled with notes in his own hand which he explained were mostly from Jig-me-dam-chō-gya-tsho’s commentary. He said he cut out blank pages for notes when the margins were not sufficient.

Jig-me-dam-chō-gya-tsho’s contributions are such that he could be called the “scholar of scholars” of Tsong-kha-pa’s *The Essence of Eloquence*:

a. Jig-me-dam-chō-gya-tsho covers all four sections of Tsong-kha-pa’s text in detail in two volumes—the Prologue and the Mind-Only School (356 folios), and the Autonomy School and Consequence School (299 folios). Unlike almost all of the other commentators from across the full breadth of the Tibetan cultural region, he does not desist from commenting on the sections on the Autonomy School and Consequence School, the omission by others usually being excused on the grounds that these schools are covered respectively in textbooks on Maitreya’s *Ornament for the Clear Realizations* and Chandrakīrti’s *Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s)”Treatise on the Middle.”* Although there are three texts from the Se-ra Jey College that treat the entire text, they are not nearly as expansive; that by Nyal-tön Pal-jor-lhün-drub does not even consider a great many issues; that by Ser-shül Lo-zang-phün-tshog⁴ gives an intriguingly unbiased treatment of difficult points in the Mind-Only section but offers only a “word-commentary”⁵ on the rest; that by Ta-drin-rab-brtan⁶ is simply a helpful word-commentary. (The latter two are discussed below.) It was reported⁷ that Gung-thang Kön-chog-tan-pay-drön-me’s seventh incarnation was supposed to finish his commentary, but it did not happen.

b. Jig-me-dam-chō-gya-tsho does not use the facade of defending the textbook literature he originally studied. All of the other post-sixteenth-century commentaries (except Ser-shül in places) play the

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⁴ *ser shul dge bshes blo bzang phun tshogs,* nineteenth century.
⁵ *tshig 'grel*.
⁷ By Go-mang Ge-she Thub-tan-gya-tsho.
game of pretending to re-explain the subtleties of their own textbook literature, but Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho does not shy away from frequently and openly criticizing Jam-yang-shay-pa and even Gung-thang Kön-chog-tan-pay-drön-me. It is reported\(^a\) that twenty ge-shes from Tra-shi-khyi sought to proceed to Reb-gong to debate with Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho after publication of his text in order to defend Jam-yang-shay-pa but the debate never took place.

c. Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho lists and analyzes the opinions of more Ge-lug authors. His biographer, Tshe-tan-zhab-drung Jig-me-rig-pay-lo-drö,\(^b\) says without exaggeration that he studied around forty such texts.

d. Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho pays close attention to the commentary by the seventh-century Korean scholar, Wonch’uk, on the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*:\(^c\) In the Mind-Only section, he cites Wonch’uk’s commentary at least twenty-two times. He uses it for explanation of terms, for revealing the sources of several of Tsong-kha-pa’s and Gung-thang Kön-chog-tan-pay-drön-me’s points, for including the opinions of Paramārtha, and as a means for developing topics.

e. He gives more definitions and etymologies than other authors do.

For these reasons Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s massive commentary is most helpful in organizing and penetrating the plethora of opinions on topics within Ge-lug circles. By giving his own opinions he keeps from falling into the numbness of a mere list of others’ positions.

His weakness is that he does not consider in detail the works of the scholar-yogi that Tsong-kha-pa marked out as his chief opponent, Döl-po-pa She-rab-gyal-tshan.\(^d\) Detailed analysis of She-rab-gyal-tshan’s *Ocean of Definitive Meaning, Fourth Council*, and so forth, would have fleshed out the context of *The Essence of Eloquence*. This failing is particularly intriguing since Gung-thang Kön-chog-tan-pay-drön-me does this to some extent. Also, Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho does not consider the opinions of non-Ge-lug scholars subsequent to Tsong-kha-pa, such as the intriguing Sa-kyā scholar, Shākya-chog-dan.\(^e\) Thus, his range is limited even if he is

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\(^a\) By Go-mang Ge-she Thub-tan-gya-tsho.

\(^b\) *tshe tan zhab drung ’jigs med rigs pa’i blo gros in mkhas dbang ’jigs med rigs pa’i blo gros kyi gsung rtson pod dang po* (mtsho sngon: mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1987), 228.13.

\(^c\) For discussion of Wonch’uk’s commentary, see p. *Error! Bookmark not defined.*

\(^d\) *dol po pa shes rab rgyal mtshan*, 1292-1361.

\(^e\) *gser mdo pa’i chen sākya mchog ldan*, 1428-1509.
indeed a scholar of scholars.

14. Two twentieth-century commentaries from the Jey College of Se-ra Monastic University also are particularly helpful. The first is a remarkably unbiased synthetic commentary by Ser-shül Lo-zang-phün-tshog, called Notes on (Tsong-kha-pa’s) “Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive”: Lamp Illuminating the Profound Meaning. In a genre called “separate annotations,” Ser-shül Ge-she makes reasoned choices among many of the above-mentioned commentaries on a plethora of key issues about the prologue and Mind-Only sections—allegiance to his college not dictating his preferences. The text’s lack of bias is a tribute to the author’s towering intellect and dedication to content. Still, being a series of disconnected annotations, it has to be read along with The Essence and, preferably, with the major commentaries since his annotations are historically rooted. For the sections on the Autonomy and Consequence Schools Ser-shül Lo-zang-phün-tshog gives a fleshed out “word-commentary” embedded within The Essence, thereby serving as a helpful entry to those parts of Tsong-kha-pa’s text.

15. Another twentieth-century work on Tsong-kha-pa’s entire text, a “difficult points” commentary by Ta-drin-rab-tan, does not evince Ser-shül Lo-zang-phün-tshog’s lack of bias, but I found it very helpful in reading the text and preparing a translation—much of the bracketed material in my translation being from this work. It provides helpful rephrasings, inserted into Tsong-kha-pa’s text, drawn from Pal-jor-lhün-drub’s and the Second Dalai Lama’s commentaries and also includes the extensive outline found in Lo-zang-ge-leg’s Mirror Illuminating the Meaning of the Thought of (Tsong-kha-pa’s) “Treatise Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive: The Essence of Eloquence.” Ser-shül Ge-she’s and Ta-drin-rab-tan’s works are synthetic representatives of genres aimed at providing easier access—the former to central issues and the latter to the organization, syntax, flow of ideas, and so forth.

16. Tshe-tan-lha-ram-pa. I have not located his actual texts or even his dates but have drawn his views from citations by Dön-drub-gyal-tshan,
Gung-thang Lo-drö-gya-tsho, Ser-shül Lo-zang-phün-tshog, and Jig-med-chö-gya-tsho. Ye-shé-thab-khay, in a list of fifty-eight commentaries on Tsong-kha-pa’s *The Essence of Eloquence*, reports that three of his works are listed under the title of *Questions and Answers: Throat Ornament for Those of Clear Intelligence*.

Much like the famed twenty-one Indian commentaries on Maitreya’s *Ornament for the Clear Realizations*, the number of commentaries on Tsong-kha-pa’s *The Essence of Eloquence* written over the last six centuries signifies both the seminal importance of Tsong-kha-pa’s text in the Tibetan cultural region and the vibrancy of the scholarly tradition. Indeed, the “iron bow and arrow” is of such depth and intriguing complexity that none of the commentaries, no matter how penetrating and provocative they are, it is hard to single one out and call it “the definitive commentary.”

**Editions Consulted**

For my earlier work on the section of Tsong-kha-pa’s *The Essence of Eloquence* on the Mind-Only School, I provided a critical edition of the Tibetan text utilizing ten editions, five of which were checked exhaustively with the assistance of advanced graduate students at the University of Virginia. During the editing process, Palden Drakpa and Damdul Namgyal published a critical edition of the entire text in 1991 and Ye-shé-thab-khay published a critical edition of the entire text in 1997. Not feeling a

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a. ye shes thabs mkhas.

b. In shar tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pas mdzad pa’i drang ba dang nges pa’i don rnam par phye ba’i btstan bcos legs bshad snying po, Tā la’i bla ma’i ’phags bod, vol. 22 (Varanasi, India: vāṇa dbus bod kyi ches mtho’i gtsug lag slob gnyer khang, 1997), 327-332, specifically 331.

c. In bod kyi btstan bcos khag ge g gi mtshan byang dri med shel dkar ’phreng ba (mtsho sngon dpe skrun khang, 1985), 614.

d. blo gsal dri lan blo gsal mgul rgyan. The three are:

- rgyal ba dge ‘dun rgya mtsha dang ’jam dbyang sga’ blo ‘jam dbyangs chos bshes sogs kyi drang nges gsung rgyun dri med lung rigs gter mdzod
- drang nges legs bshad snying po’i spyi don legs pa drang nges rnam ’byed kyi dga’ gnad cung zad bhus pa
- legs bshad snying po’i mtha’ dpod mkhas pa’i dbang po ’jam dbyangs chos dpal kyi gsung rgyun.

e. *The Essence of Eloquent Speech on the Definitive and Interpretable* (Mundgod, India: SOKU Publication, 1991), the relevant section being 84.16-103.6.

f. ye shes thabs mkhas, b. 1930.

g. shar tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pas mdzad pa’i drang ba dang nges pa’i don rnam
need now to produce a critical edition of the current section in this book, I have interspersed with the translation a digital version of the Tibetan of Tsong-kha-pa’s *The Essence of Eloquence* from ACIP, which was originally typed in Wylie from a printing the zhöl blocks in volume *pha* of the Collected Works in 114 folios;\(^a\) section translated here 86a-91a. Jongbok Yi had inserted the relevant portions on the Autonomy and Consequence Schools into my draft translations of Tsong-kha-pa’s *The Essence of Eloquence*, and I have utilized the portion on compatibly appearing subjects in the chapter on the Consequence School for this volume.

Two editions of Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary, *Treatise Distinguishing All the Meanings of (Tsong-kha-pa’ s) “The Essence of Eloquence”: Illuminating the Differentiation of the Interpretable and the Definitive: Port of Entry to “The Essence of Eloquence”* (drang ba dang nges pa’i don rnam par phye ba gsal bar byed pa legs bshad snying po ’i don mtha’ dag rnam par ’byed pa’i bstan bcos legs bshad snying po ’i ’jug ngogs), hereafter cited as *Port of Entry*, are utilized:

1. blockprints from rong po dgon chen gyi par khang in two vols, *na* and *pa* (12 and 13); Collected Works by Dzongkar Marnang Zhabdrung Jigme Damcho Gyatso (1898-1946); section translated here, vol. *na* (vol. 13), 199b.6-212a.6. Also, BDRC W00EGS1017401.
2. BDRC W3621, in one vol (PDF of Pe Cin: krung go’i bod kyi shes rig dpe skrun khang, 1999), 564.2-576.25; this edition is in codex form with the text divided into paragraphs and with many subheadings filled in.

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\(^{a}\) Many thanks to Craig Preston for providing the digital version and to Paul Hackett for confirming the edition.
Technical Notes

It is important to recognize that:

• full bibliographical references are given in the footnotes at the first citation;

• translations and editions of texts are given in the Bibliography;

• the names of Indian Buddhist schools of thought are translated into English in an effort to increase accessibility for non-specialists;

• for the names of Indian scholars and systems used in the body of the text, ch, sh, and šh are used instead of the more usual c, š, and s for the sake of easy pronunciation by non-specialists; however, cch is used for cch, not chchh. In the notes the usual transliteration system for Sanskrit is used;

• transliteration of Tibetan is done in accordance with a system devised by Turrell Wylie; see “A Standard System of Tibetan Transcription,” *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 22 (1959): 261-267;

• the names of Tibetan authors and orders are given in “essay phonetics” for the sake of easy pronunciation; the system is based Wylie transliteration with a view toward internet searchability;

• definitions are in bold type.
PART ONE:
Tsong-kha-pa Lo-zang-drag-pa’s
*The Essence of Eloquence:*
on Compatibly Appearing Subjects
with Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s
commentary *Port of Entry*

*Treatise Differentiating Interpretable and Definitive Meanings: The Essence of Eloquence* by Tsong-kha-pa Lo-zang-drag-pa

*Treatise Distinguishing All the Meanings of (Tsong-kha-pa’s) “The Essence of Eloquence”: Illuminating the Differentiation of the Interpretable and the Definitive: Port of Entry to “The Essence of Eloquence”* by Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho

Tsong-kha-pa’s text is at the margin; subheadings in yellow highlight are drawn from Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary *Port of Entry; otherwise, Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary is indented in a three-sided box to clearly distinguish it from Tsong-kha-pa’s text.
2' How autonomous signs are not asserted {2
parts}

This\(^a\) has two parts: a transition and the actual way autonomous signs are
not asserted.

\(^a\) The subheadings in yellow highlight are drawn from Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s *Port
of Entry*, vol. *na* (vol. 13), 199b.6-212a.6, and the codex edition, 564.2-576.25.

\(\text{Question: Indeed, since positions, signs, and examples that are established}
\) by way of their own character do not all occur, in that context not only
autonomous signs but also all actions, objects, and agents are not logically
feasible. However, what is the evidence why it is not suitable to assert the
agents and objects of autonomous signs and propositions in the system of
those who, refuting those, prove that all objects and agents such as proofs
and propositions and so forth are logically feasible?

\(^{\text{KEY: Tsong-kha-pa’s Essence is at the margin; headings in yellow highlight are from Jig-me-dam-
chö-gya-tsho’s *Port of Entry*, Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary is indented in a three-sided
box. Chandrakirti’s Clear Words, identified by Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho, is in blue type.}}\)
b' Actual way autonomous signs are not asserted
{3 parts}

This has three parts: the reasoning refuting autonomy, how even the opponent [Bhāvaviveka] by import has asserted this reasoning, and the evidence why those fallacies expressed are not the same for our own syllogisms.

Answer: Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words explains this in three [sections]: the reasoning refuting autonomy, how even the opponent by import has asserted this reasoning, and the evidence why those fallacies expressed are not the same for our own syllogisms.

I” REASONING REFUTING AUTONOMY {2 PARTS}

This has two parts: indicating the fallacy of the position in that the basal subject is not established and indicating due to this fallacy the nonestablishment also of the reason.
A" INDICATING THE FALLACY OF THE POSITION IN THAT
THE BASAL SUBJECT IS NOT ESTABLISHED [2 PARTS]

This has two parts: explaining that affixing the qualification “ultimately” is senseless and refuting [Bhāvaviveka’s] response that he holds a mere general subject.

Concerning those, Bhāvaviveka [in refuting production from self] states [the syllogism]:

Ultimately the internal sense-spheres are definite as not produced from self because of existing, like intelligence.

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a Bhāvaviveka’s Lamp for (Nāgārjuna’s) “Wisdom” (Toh 3853, sde dge, dbu ma, vol. tsha, 49a.2-49a.3); cited in Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words (Toh 3860, sde dge, dbu ma, vol. ‘a, 8b.3; La Vallée Poussin, Prasannapadā, 25.9-26.2).

b The Tibetan reads “are definite as not being produced from self” (bdag las skye ba med par nges te), but “definite” is not represented in Poussin’s Sanskrit. The reason could also be translated as “because of presently existing” since vidyamāṇa is the present middle particle; however, later Chandrakīrti (La Vallée Poussin, Prasannapadā, 33.4) cites the reason as sattvād, suggesting that the particular form makes little difference, this perhaps being why the reason was translated into Tibetan merely as yod pa’i phyir instead of da lta bar yod pa’i phyir.

The Tibetan of the example shes pa yod pa nyid bzhin is a mere translation of the Sanskrit caitanya and is not an extension of the example to include the reason, “existing.” The reference of “intelligence” is to the puruṣa—the person, or pure spirit, pure consciousness; to a Buddhist it could merely be taken as consciousness.

c don dam par nang gi skye mched rnams bdag las skye ba med par nges te yod pa’i phyir shes pa yod pa nyid bzhin no, na paramārthata ādhyātmikāṇāyatanāṇī svata utpāṇāni vidyāmānāvatāt caitanyaavad.

{KEY: Tsong-kha-pa’s Essence is at the margin; headings in yellow highlight are from Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s Port of Entry. Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary is indented in a three-sided box. Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words, identified by Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho, is in blue type.}
[If the qualification “ultimately” is affixed to the predicate (of the thesis), it is purposeless]

[If the qualification “ultimately” is affixed to the predicate (of the thesis), it is purposeless relative to Proponents of the Middle and relative to the Śāṃkhyas]

[This syllogism, which Bhāvaviveka states in order to refute production from self, is refuted by Chandrakīrti as follows.] If “ultimately” is affixed as a qualification of the thesis, then since ourselves do not assert production from self even conventionally, it does not need to be affixed relative to ourselves; if it is in relation to others, it is reasonable to refute the Forders—who have fallen from the two truths—from the approach of both truths, whereby it is good to refute [production from self] without affixing a qualification.

Also, it is not reasonable to affix the qualification relative to the conventions of the world since it is not reasonable to refute production from self [wrongly thinking] that it is asserted in the conventions of the world, because the world asserts just that effects arise from causes but does not analyze, “From what are they produced, self or other?”

{KEY: Tsong-kha-pa’s Essence is at the margin; headings in yellow highlight are from Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s Port of Entry, Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary is indented in a three-sided box. Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words, identified by Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho, is in blue type.}
Concerning those, to Bhāvaviveka’s statement in his Lamp for (Nāgārjuna’s) “Wisdom” of the syllogism “Ultimately the internal sense-spheres are definite as not produced from self because of existing, like intelligence,” the way Chandrakīrti expresses fallacies is that he indicates that if the qualification “ultimately” is affixed to the predicate [of the thesis], it is purposeless:

a Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary, Port of Entry, 200a.3/564.7.
b Golden reprint, vol. 107, 130.4.
c The Tibetan reads “are definite as not being produced from self” (bdag las skye ba med par rgyes te), but “definite” is not represented in the Sanskrit.

d Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words, cited by Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho, is in blue type to make it easily distinguishable from Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s own commentary. Tibetan of Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words: Toh 3860, sde dge, dbu ma, vol. ‘a, 8b.4-9a.2; The Sanskrit in P.L. Vaidya, Madhyamakaśāstra-vṛtti (La Vallée Poussin, Prasannapadā, 26.13-27.5): kimarthā punaratra paramārthata iti viśeṣaṇamupādiyate lokasāvṛtyābhupagatasya utpādasya apratīṣṭhitakṣaṇāntvā, pratisedhe ca abhyupetābhāpo prasāṅgāditi cet, naitadyuktam | saṃvṛtyāpi svata utpattyanabhupagamāt | yathoktam sātreat sa ca yāvin bhāhetu-kokukha utpadyamānāḥ na svayāṅkṛto na paraṅkṛto nabhayakṛto nāpya hetaṃ upektānno niśvarakaṅkṣaṇaṇaṇaḥ prabhaṃśadilhīvatvā iti | tathā-bhājya sato yathānūkuro na ca yo bhujā caiva anikuro | na ca anuy udo tato na caiva tadevamucchedaasāsāśvadadharmātā | ihaṃ vākyati - pratītya yadhābhaṅaḥ na hi tāvattadevata tāṣa cāntyādi tattasmānacchiniḥ naṃ nāpi śāsvatam | iti | paramārtha-pakṣam viśeṣaṇam ica cet | tad ayuktaṃ | saṃvṛtyāpi tadyayavasthānabhupagamāt | satyadvayāviṃśitarīḍarśanaparībhṛstā eva hi tūthikā
Why is the qualification “ultimately” (don dam par, paramārthata) stated in this [syllogism]? 

[ Hypothetical answer by Bhāvaviveka: It is affixed to the predicate] because production that is asserted in accordance with worldly conventions is not to be refuted and because even if [production] were refuted [conventionally], it would follow that [the refutation] would be damaged by [our own] assertion [of conventionally existent production].

yāvad ubhayathāpi niśidhyante tāvad gūna eva sambhāvyata iti | evaṃ paramatāpeksam api viśeṣanābhidhānaṃ na yuyate | na cāpi lokaḥ svata utpattim pratipanno yatas tadapekṣayāpi viśeṣanābhāvyam syāt/ loko hi svatah parata ity evamādaśm vinīcāram anavatārya kāraṇāt kāryam utpadyata ity etāvamātraṃ pratipannah.

See Jeffrey Hopkins, Chandrakīrti Undermines Bhāvaviveka’s Assertion of Autonomy: Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Compatibly Appearing Subjects, 3 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version August, 2018: uma-tibet.org) translation of Chandrakīrti, 119-123.; for Jam-yang-shay-pa’s intricate presentation of the meaning, see the same, 25-42.; also for an excellent translation of Chandrakīrti’s text together with a penetrating review of the academic literature see Anne MacDonald, In Clear Words: The Prasannapadā, Chapter One (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2015), 92-99.

a Jam-yang-shay-pa hypothetically attributes this position hypothetically to Bhāvaviveka. In this case, the argument would read, “The internal sense-spheres are not ultimately produced from self because of existing, like intelligence.”

b Anne MacDonald in brief says:

Candrakīrti intends the technical meaning of abhyupetabdhaḥ, specifically, that the thesis of the inference would be sublated by what the Mādhyamika’s own system accepts: the unqualified proposition that the inner bases have not arisen from self is contradicted, is sublated—has, so to speak, the rug pulled out from under it—by the fact that the Mādhyamika does accept the arising of things on

{KEY: Tsong-kha-pa’s Essence is at the margin; headings in yellow highlight are from Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s Port of Entry. Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary is indented in a three-sided box. Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words, identified by Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho, is in blue type.}
Response: This is not reasonable because [Proponents of the Middle] do not assert production from self even conventionally. The [Rice Seedling] Sūtra says:  

Also, when a shoot is produced, arising from its cause—a seed—it is not created by itself, not created by others, not created by both, not produced causelessly, not created by Īśvara, and not metamorphosed by time. It does not arise from particles, does not arise from the nature, and does not arise from its own entity.

For this and more, see Anne MacDonald, *In Clear Words: The Prasannapadā, Chapter One* (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2015), 94 n. 202.  

The Tibetan has “is not produced causelessly” at the end. La Vallée Poussin (*Prasannapadā*, 26, n. 3) draws our attention to Shāntideva’s *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds*, IX.142, and his *Compendium of Learnings*, 219.10. See also the notes in Yotsuya, *Critique*, 82-83.

*rang bzhin, prakṛti;* the source of material objects as in Sāṃkhya.

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and similarly [the Extensive Sport Sūtra] says:

If a seed exists, the shoot does also.
The shoot is not what the seed is.
It is not other than it nor just it.
Hence the noumenon\(^b\) is not permanent\(^c\) and not annihilatory.

and also this very [text, Nāgārjuna’s *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called “Wisdom, ”*] says:\(^d\)

Whatever arises dependently is respectively
Not just those [that is, its causes] and also is not
Other than those. Hence [causes]
Are not annihilated nor permanent.

\[\begin{align*}
&\text{La Vallée Poussin identifies this as 210.3-210.5 and calls our attention to Shāntideva’s} \\
&\text{Compendium of Learnings, 238.10, 239.4. Chandrakīrti cites the stanza again twice in} \\
&\text{commentary at the end of chapters two and twenty-one. As per Yotsuya (Critique, 83 n. 38,} \\
&\text{citing S. Lefmann, Lalita vistara [Halle a. S.: Verlag der Buchhandlung des Waisenhauses],} \\
&\text{p. 176, II.11-12), the Sanskrit is:} \\
&\text{bījasya satos yathāṅkuro} \\
&\text{na ca yo bṛja sa caiva āṅkuro/} \\
&\text{na ca anya tato na caiva tat} \\
&\text{evam anucchēda aśāśvata dharmatā/} \\
&\text{bchos nyid, dharmatā. I use the term “noumenon” in its basic meaning as “final reality,”} \\
&\text{and not with a Kantian overlay or the like.} \\
&\text{c Since in Ge-lug-pa the nature of phenomena is indeed permanent, here “permanent”} \\
&\text{is read, as is often the case, as the extreme of inherent existence.} \\
&\text{d XVIII.10; brackets are from Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words.* The Sanskrit, as Chandrakīrti} \\
&\text{cites it (La Vallée Poussin, Prasannapadā, 26.11 and 375.11) is:} \\
&\text{pratītya yadyadbhavati na hi tāvattadeva tat/} \\
&\text{na cānyadapi tattasminocchinnām nāpi śāśvataḥ/} \\
\end{align*}\]

\({\text{KEY: Tsong-kha-pa’s *Essence* is at the margin; headings in yellow highlight are from Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s *Port of Entry, Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary is indented in a three-sided box. Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words,* identified by Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho, is in blue type.}}\)
Hypothetical response by Bhāvaviveka:] The qualification is made relative to the other’s [that is, the Sāṃkhya’s] system.

Answer: That also is not reasonable because their presentations are not asserted [by Proponents of the Middle] even conventionally. It is to be realized that it is advantageous to the extent that the Forders (mu stegs pa, bīrthika) who have fallen from nonerroneous perception of the two truths are refuted in both ways [that is, conventionally and ultimately]. Thus, to express the qualification relative to the other’s system\(^a\) is also not reasonable.

Furthermore, the world—in relation to which the qualification would be fruitful [that is, meaningful, if it did assert production from self]—does not construe production from self. Worldly beings—without employing analysis such as “from self” or “from other” and so forth—understand only this: “An effect arises from a cause.” The master [Nāgārjuna] presented it this way too. Therefore, the qualification [“ultimately”] is ascertained as “meaningless” in all respects.

\(^a\) gzhung, mata.

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Concerning those, if the qualification “ultimately” is affixed to the predicate of the proposition, it is purposeless because of being purposeless relative to Proponents of the Middle ourselves, being purposeless relative also to others, the Sāṃkhyas, and being purposeless relative also to usual worldly beings. The first [part of the reason which is that if the qualification “ultimately” is affixed to the predicate (of the thesis), it is purposeless relative also to Proponents of the Middle ourselves] is established because the former party [the challengers], the Proponents of the Middle ourselves, do not assert production from self even conventionally.

The second [part of the reason which is that if the qualification “ultimately” is affixed to the predicate (of the thesis), it
is purposeless relative also to others, the Sāṃkhyas] is estab-
lished because it is good to refute [production from self] without affixing a qualification, because it is reasonable to refute the Forders—who have fallen from the two truths—
from the approach of both truths.

The third [part of the reason which is that if the qualification “ultimately” is affixed to the predicate (of the thesis), it is purposeless relative also to Proponents of the Middle] is es-
tablished because the world asserts just that effects arise from causes but does not analyze, “From what are they produced, self or other?”

Furthermore, if it is from wanting to refute even conventionally eyes and so forth that are asserted [to exist] ultimately by the opponent [the Sāṃkhyas], then there would be the fallacy of a position or of a sign in which the basal subject is not established because ourselves do not assert eyes and so forth ultimately.

[If the qualification “ultimately” is affixed to the subject, it also is purposeless]
Also, Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words says:

[Hypothetical response by Bhāvaviveka:] This qualification is made wishing to refute the conventional production [of subjects that are asserted to exist ultimately].

Answer: Then, for you there would be the fault of a position [that is, thesis] in which the base [that is, subject] is not established or the fallacy of a reason in which the base [that is, subject] is not established, because you do not assert sense-spheres, eyes and so forth, ultimately.

See Hopkins, Chandrakīrti Undermines Bhāvaviveka’s Assertion of Autonomy: Jamyang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Compatibly Appearing Subjects, 3 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version August, 2018: uma-tibet.org) translation of Chandrakīrti, 122-123; for Jam-yang-shay-pa’s presentation of the meaning, see the same, 43-44; also see Anne MacDonald, In Clear Words: The Prasannapadā, Chapter One, 100-102.
About this, if the qualification “ultimately” is affixed to the subject, it also is purposeless because if from wanting to refute even conventionally eyes and so forth that are asserted [to exist] ultimately by the opponent [the Sāṃkhyaś], then relative to the former party [the challenger, the Proponent of the Middle] there would be the fallacy of a position or of a sign in which the basal subject is not established, because oneself [the Proponent of the Middle] does not assert eyes and so forth ultimately.

[Objection:] Although ultimate[ly existent] eyes and so forth are not established, convention[ally existent] eyes and so forth exist, due to which that fallacy does not exist.

[Answer:] Well then, what does “ultimately” qualify?

[Rejoinder:] Since conventional eyes and so forth are refuted ultimately, it is a qualification of the refutation of production.

Rebuttal: This is not reasonable because you did not propound this and because even if you did propound it, there would be the fallacy that the

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subject would not be established for the other [party, a Sāṃkhya because Sāṃkhyas do not assert eyes and so forth as conventional in accordance with the assertion of the Proponents of the Middle].

Answer: Well then, what does “ultimately” qualify?

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a Although Sāṃkhyas assert that only the person and the general principal are ultimately existent and thus assert that eyes and so forth are conventionally existent, their sense of conventional existence fulfills the Middle Way sense of substantial existence (rdzas su yod pa, dravyasat) and thus ultimate existence and not as imputedly existent (btags par yod pa, prajñaptisat), due to which it would not be appropriate to refute mere conventionally existent eyes and so forth, as Chandrakīrti says.

b Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s Port of Entry, 200b.5/564.26.

c Toh 3860, sde dge, dbu ma, vol. ‘a, 9a.4-9a.7; La Vallée Poussin, Prasannapadā, 27.9-28.3 (with emendations from de Jong, “Text-Critical Notes,” 31): samvṛtvā caṣkūrāḍisaddhāvād adosā iti cet/ paramārthata ity etat tarhi kasya viśeṣanam// sāṃvṛtvām caṣkūrāḍinām paramārthata utpattiprayitśedhād utpattiprayitśedhaviśeṣanāṃ paramārthagrāhānam iti cet/ evam tarhy evam eva vaktvāṃ syāt/ sāṃvṛtvām caṣkūrāḍinām paramārthato nāstya utpattir iti/ na caivaṃ ucyate/ ucyamāne ‘pi parair dravyasatām eva caṣkūrāḍinām abhyupagamāt prajñaptisatām anabhyupagamāt parato ‘siddhādhiḥ śāraḥ pakṣadoṣaḥ syād iti na yutam atat/.

See Hopkins, Chandrakīrti Undermines Bhāvaviveka’s Assertion of Autonomy: Jamyang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Compatibly Appearing Subjects, 3 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version August, 2018: uma-tibet.org) translation of Chandrakīrti, 124-125; for Jam-yang-shay-pa’s presentation of the meaning, see the same, 44-48; also see Anne MacDonald, In Clear Words: The Prasannapadā, Chapter One, 102-103.

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[Hypothetical response by Bhāvaviveka:] Since the ultimate production of veiling [conventionalities] such as eyes is being refuted, “ultimately” qualifies the refutation of production.

\[\text{Answer:}\] In that case, you should have said, “Ultimately there is no production of veiling [conventionalities] such as eyes,”\(^a\) but such was not proposed. Even if you had [said such], the other party [a Sāṃkhya] asserts eyes and so forth just as substantially existent\(^b\) and does not assert them as imputedly existent,\(^c\) due to which the position [that is, thesis] would be fallacious in that the base [that is, subject] would not be established for the other [party, the Sāṃkhya]. Hence, this is not reasonable.

\(^a\) Or, to keep the subject-predicate order: “Conventionalities such as eyes do not have ultimately existent production.”

\(^b\) rdza su yod pa, dravyasat; following De Jong’s correction (“Textcritical Notes,” 31, n. 28.1) of vastusätām to dravyasatām.

\(^c\) btags par yod pa, prajñāpptisat.

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About this, someone says: That fallacy of the nonestablishment of the sign does not exist because although ultimately existent eyes and so forth do not exist, conventional existent eyes and so forth exist.

[Our] Question: Well then, what does “ultimately” qualify?

Rejoinder: “Ultimately” must be affixed as a qualification of the refutation of production because upon taking eyes and so forth as the subject this reasoning must refute ultimately existent production.

[Our] Rebuttal: This also is not reasonable because you did not propound this and because even if you did propound it,

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1 Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s Port of Entry, 200b.6/564.27; Jam-yang-shay-pa specifies “hence, there is no fallacy of nonestablished position or sign,” which is more fitting given the opponent’s response placing the qualification “ultimately” with the predicate of the position and given that Chandrakīrti says, “the position [that is, thesis] would be fallacious in that the base [that is, subject] would not be established for the other [party, the Sāṃkhya].”

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there would be the fallacy that the subject would not be established for the other [party, a Sāṃkhya because Sāṃkhyas do not assert eyes and so forth as conventional in accordance with the assertion of the Proponents of the Middle].

Comment by Hopkins: It seems to me that in this analysis of where the qualification “ultimately” is to be applied Chandrakīrti is adducing what he himself considers to be a minor fault in Bhāvaviveka’s argument. What he has said so far is not the heart of his argument; it is preliminary to what he getting at, which comes in the following section where he analyzes Bhāvaviveka’s insistence on the statement of a syllogism. Chandrakīrti point is that Bhāvaviveka’s insistence on the statement of a syllogism is based on the assumption that even in the refutation of ultimate existence the Proponents of the Middle and the opponent have a basic common ground in terms of how the elements of the syllogism—the subject, predicate, reason, and example—are certified in their systems.

For Chandrakīrti, Bhāvaviveka’s insistence on stating a syllogism that is approved in one’s own continuum (rang rgyud, svatantra) indicates that for Bhāvaviveka there are

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a Although Sāṃkhyas assert that only the person and the general principal are ultimately existent and thus assert that eyes and so forth are conventionally existent, their sense of conventional existence fulfills the Middle Way sense of substantial existence (rdzas su yod pa, dravyasat) and thus ultimate existence and not as imputedly existent (btags par yod pa, prajñaptisat), due to which it would not be appropriate to refute mere conventionally existent eyes and so forth, as Chandrakīrti says.

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compatibly appearing subjects, predicates, reasons, and examples to serve as the basis for the syllogistic argument. For Chandrakīrti, however, that which is being negated— inherent existence—appears right along with the subject even in direct perception, and thus when for the opponent the existence of the subject, and so forth is certified by valid cognition, the inherent existence of the subject and so forth is also certified, since for the opponent’s system the consciousness certifying the subject also certifies its inherent existence. According to Chandrakīrti’s explanation, due to this the subject as certified by the opponent’s system does not exist for the Proponent of the Middle, and, by the same token, the subject as certified in the system the Proponent of the Middle—this being as merely existent without the qualification of inherently existing or not inherently existent—does not exist for the opponent.

Because of this, there are no compatibly appearing subjects, predicates, reasons, and examples, the absence of which makes Bhāvaviveka’s insistence on the eventual statement of a syllogism ridiculous, even if one first uses a consequence to break down an opponent’s pointed adherence to a wrong conception. This very insistence runs against what should be the basic Middle Way assertion on what is being negated. Thus, the difference is not merely superficial or verbal but rests on the very important topic of the scope of the central negation, the meaning of emptiness.

Through this explanation of rang rgyud, svatantra, I hold that it is not necessary immediately to make the connection between rang rgyud and rang dbang: it is not necessary to insist from the start that rang rgyud (svatantra) means autonomous or self-powered even though Ge-lug-pa scholars take it this way, that is, as syllogisms in which the subject and so forth are held to be inherently established and not as meaning “inferences under one’s own power” in the sense of setting forth syllogisms from one’s own viewpoint, that is, in the sense of setting forth syllogisms that are in one’s own continuum. Rather, I think that one can say that Bhāvaviveka’s insistence on using a sign or syllogism that is established in one’s own continuum (rang rgyud, svatantra) indicates his assertion of autonomously established or self-powered phenomena, since it shows that he is not refuting this sense of
phenomena as covering their bases of designation, which undeniably appears even to sense consciousnesses and which is the very thingness of objects that Autonomists and below hold is certified with respect to objects when they hold that an object exists.

Here Chandrakīrti is seeking to dispose of the verbal fault in Bhāvaviveka’s argument and get down to what he thinks Bhāvaviveka is up to, namely, that Bhāvaviveka holds that there are generally established subjects, predicates, reasons, and examples not qualified by the assertions of the respective schools. Chandrakīrti has now finished the prologue of his argument, essential in the sense that it closes off the possibility of later claiming that the thesis is significantly qualified by the factors he has discussed up to this point.

It needs to be remembered that Bhāvaviveka himself only a few times used the term rang rgyud or rang dbang, one of these being in the introduction to the thirteenth chapter of his Lamp for (Nāgārjuna’s) “Wisdom”: Commentary on the “Treatise on the Middle” where he says:

Now the thirteenth chapter was composed for the sake of teaching naturelessness from the viewpoint of compositional phenomena, through the force of setting forth (1) answers to refutations and (2) own-powered inferences.a

Avalokitavrata’s commentary on that chapter also says:

Concerning that, here the meaning of the chapter is to teach the naturelessness of compositional phenomena through the force of setting forth answers to opponents’ refutations and demonstrating properb own-powered inferences.

I am suggesting that from the context it can be seen that the term “own-powered inferences” refers to putting forth not just a negative refutation but a positive presentation of one’s

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a rang dbang du rje su dpag pa; I suggest taking this as meaning “inferences under one’s own power” in the sense of setting forth syllogisms from one’s own viewpoint, or in the sense of setting forth syllogisms that are in one’s own continuum, but Ge-lug-pa scholars take this as meaning syllogisms in which the subject and so forth are held to be inherently established.

b kha na ma tho ba med pa; literally, “not unseemly.”

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own views.

2: Refuting [Bhāvaviveka’s] response that he holds a mere general subject {2 parts}

This has two parts: expressing [Bhāvaviveka’s] assertion [of holding a mere general subject] and refuting this.

A: Expressing [Bhāvaviveka’s] assertion [of holding a mere general subject]

To dispel those fallacies, [hypothetically Bhāvaviveka] says:

When Buddhists prove to a Vaiśeṣika that sound is impermanent, they hold [that is, use] the generality but do not hold [sound] specified [by the particular assertions of either school as the subject]; if they did hold such, the proposition and the proof would become nonexistent. For, if they held sound that is an evolute of the elements as the subject, it would not be established for the Vaiśeṣika, and if they held sound that is a quality of space [as the subject], it would not be established for the Buddhist. Therefore, just as they hold mere sound—the generality having discarded specifications—as the subject, so mere eyes and so forth—upon having discarded the specifications of ultimate or conventional—are held as the subject, because of which the fallacy of the subject’s not being established does not exist.

(KEY: Tsong-kha-pa’s Essence is at the margin; headings in yellow highlight are from Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s Port of Entry, Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary is indented in a three-sided box. Chandrakirti’s Clear Words, identified by Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho, is in blue type.)
Reasoning Refuting Autonomy

Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary: a Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words says:

[Response by Bhāvaviveka:] c It is like [on an occasion when to an opponent d a Buddhist puts forward the thesis

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a Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s Port of Entry, 201a.3/565.7.
b Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho cites merely a few words at the beginning and end of the citation with an ellipsis, which I have filled in. Toh 3860, sde dge, dbu ma, vol. 1, 9a.7-9b.3. The Sanskrit in La Vallée Poussin, Prasannapadā, 28.4-29.7 (which with emendations from de Jong, “Text-Critical Notes,” 31, is): atha syāt/ yathānityah śabda iti ṇairamānaḥ sāmānyam eva gṛhyate na viśeṣah/ viśeṣagrahaḥ hi saty anumānānumeyavAyavahārabhāvah svāt/ tathā hi/ yadi cāturmahābhaṭṭikaḥ śabdo gṛhyate sa parasyāsiddhāh/ aṭākāśgano gṛhyate sa bauddhasya svato ’siddhāh/ tathā vaiśeṣikasyāpi śabdānti-yatām pratijñānāsaya yadi kāryaḥ śabdo gṛhyate sa parato ’siddhāh/ atha vyāngyaḥ sa svato ’siddhāh/ evam yathāsambhāvam vināśo pī yadi sahetuḥkaḥ sa bauddhasya svato ’siddhāḥ/ atha nirhetuḥkaḥ sa parasyāsiddha iti// tasmād yathāra dharmānāṃstānāmātaraṃ/ evam ihāpi dharmānāmātaram uṣṭāvaviśeṣāṇaṃ grahīṣyata iti cet/.

See Hopkins, Chandrakīrti Undermines Bhāvaviveka’s Assertion of Autonomy: Jamyang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Compatibly Appearing Subjects, 3 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version August, 2018: uma-tibet.org) translation of Chandrakīrti, 125-127; for Jam-yang-shay-pa’s presentation of the meaning, see the same, 48-54. See also MacDonald, In Clear Words: The Prasannapadā, Chapter One, 104-109.


c Tsong-kha-pa’s presentation of the controversy between Buddhāpālita, Bhāvaviveka, and Chandrakīrti in his Great Exposition of Special Insight (see Volume 5 in this series) in the Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path begins with this point, 37-41 and 123-126.

d Tsong-kha-pa, as is evident below, identifies the opponent as a Vaisheshika, but Kodo

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that sound is impermanent, just generalities of the two, the subject and the predicate, are to be used, not specifics. If specifics were used, the conventions of inference and object of inference would be nonexistent. It is as follows: If “sound that is derived from the four great elements” were used, it would not be established for the other party. However, if “sound that is a quality of space” were used, it would not be established for oneself, the Buddhist.

Yotsuya (The Critique of Svatantra Reasoning by Chandrakīrti and Tsong-kha-pa, 93 n. 73) points out that since Vaisheshikas assert that sound is impermanent (as is explained in the next footnote), there is no need for a Buddhist to prove to a Vaisheshika that sound is impermanent; therefore, he identifies the opponent as a Mīmāṃsaka. However, it may be that because Vaisheshikas hold that a sound is a quality of space and space is permanent, the Buddhist here is holding that Vaisheshikas are forced by reasoning to assert that a sound is permanent.

Gung-thang Lo-drö-gya-tsho’s (gung thang blo gros rgya mtsho, 1851-1928/1930) Day-making Illumination Clarifying the Meaning of the Thought of (Jam-yang-shay-pa’s) “Decisive Analysis of the Middle: Treasury of Scripture and Reasoning” (dbu ma’i mtha’ dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod kyi dgongs don gsal bar byed pa’i nyin byed snang ba zab lam lta ba’i mig ‘byed) BDRC W140-11KG15988, 152.14, glosses inference (rje su dpag pa) with “the sign that is the means of inference” (dpag byed rtags, anumāṇa) and object of inference (rje su dpag par hya ba, anumeyā) with “predicate of the proposition that is the object inferred” (dpag bya bsgrub bya’i chos).

As Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Explanation of Obscurational and Ultimate Truths (54.1; Hopkins, Maps of the Profound, 166) says about the Vaisheshika assertion that sound is a quality of space:

“Whatever has production and disintegration necessarily depends upon some substance; for example, [the flame of ] a butter lamp. Sound also has production and disintegration.” By such reasoning, sound is proved to depend upon a substance. Because sound is heard apart from the four elements, earth and so on, it does not depend on those four. Also, because it is observed externally by a sense consciousness, as shared between oneself and others, it is not a quality of the self. Since it is an object of apprehension by the ear, it is not a quality of the three—direction, time, and consciousness. Hence, it is asserted to be established as a quality only of space.

Kodo Yotsuya (The Critique of Svatantra Reasoning by Chandrakīrti and Tsong-kha-pa, 93 n. 73) points out that Mīmāṃsakas also assert that sound is a quality of space.

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Similarly, even when a Vaisheshika makes the thesis that sound is impermanent, if “sound that is a product” is used, it would not be established for the other party. However, if “manifested,” it would not be established for oneself.

Likewise, respectively, if “disintegration” is “caused,” it would not be established for oneself, a Buddhist. However, if “causeless,” it would not be established for the other party. Therefore, just as for these mere generalities of subject and predicate are to be used, so here also a mere subject for which specifics have been discarded is to be used.

Here in this second example, a Vaisheshika is proving to another party that sound is impermanent. Tsong-kha-pa, as is evident above, identifies the opponent as a Dipaka (gsal byed pa), which The Four Interwoven Annotations (vol. 2, 526.4) explains is a type of Sāṃkhya, but Kodo Yotsuya (The Critique of Svanatra Reasoning by Chandrakirti and Tsong-kha-pa, 93) here also takes the opponent to be a Mīmāṃsaka; in both cases his identifications are Mīmāṃsaka.

Jam-yang-shay-pa (see the previous volume) identifies the other party as a Nirgrantha (gcer bu pa), another name for Jain; Stcherbatsky (The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa, 115) identifies the opponent as a Mīmāṃsaka, inserting the identification into the text as if Chandrakirti so specified it, whereas he did not; Wayman (Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real, 310) goes along with Stcherbatsky; Gom-de Nam-kha-gyal-tshan (Settling Difficult Points in the Opposite of the Consequences, 633.2) identifies the other party as a Dipaka. In any case, the assertion of the Vaisheshika’s opponent is that sound is pre-existent in a nonmanifest state and is made manifest by conditions, something which the Vaisheshika cannot accept.

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About that Bhāvaviveka says: When Buddhists prove to a Vaiśeṣika that sound is impermanent, they hold [as the subject] mere general sound that is not qualified even by any the qualities—“derived from the elements” or “quality of space” because if they did hold such, the proposition and the proof would become nonexistent, because if they held sound that is an evolute of the elements as the subject, it would not be established for the Vaiśeṣika, but if they held sound that is a quality of space as the subject, it would not be established for the Buddhist. Therefore, similarly when Proponents of Middle prove to Śāṃkhyas that eyes and so forth are not produced from self, they must hold mere eyes and so forth—the generality upon having discarded the specifications of true and false—established in compatible appearance as the subject because if truly established eyes and so forth are held as the subject, they would not established for ourselves and if falsely established eyes and so forth are held as the subject, they would not established for the Śāṃkhyas. Hence, by not affixing the specification “ultimate” to the subject the fallacy of nonestablishment relative to the disputants does not exist.
B: Refuting this [response by Bhāvaviveka that he holds a mere general subject] {2 parts}

This has two parts: the meaning of [Bhāvaviveka’s assertion that he holds a mere general subject] is not logically feasible and the difference [of the meaning of Bhāvaviveka’s assertion that he holds a mere general subject] from the example he cites.

1* THE MEANING OF [BHĀVAVIVEKA’S ASSERTION THAT HE HOLDS A MERE GENERAL SUBJECT] IS NOT LOGICALLY FEASIBLE {2 PARTS}
This has two parts: (1) explaining that [the meaning of Bhāvaviveka’s assertion] is not logically feasible from within [his] having asserted that the entities of subjects are not found by merely erroneous [consciousnesses] and (2) indicating that even [my earlier] explanation [in the Great Exposition of Special Insight] that [the meaning of Bhāvaviveka’s assertion is not logically feasible] from within [his] having asserted that the subjects are not established as [their own] suchness does not disagree that [Chandrakīrti’s passage] refutes the tenet of autonomy.

A* Explanining that [the meaning of Bhāvaviveka’s assertion] is not logically feasible] from within [his] having asserted that the entities of subjects are not found by merely erroneous [consciousnesses] {2 parts}

This has two parts: the actual [explanation that the meaning of Bhāvaviveka’s assertion is not logically feasible from within his having asserted that the entities of subjects are not found by merely erroneous consciousnesses] and dispelling objections.

I* The actual [explanation that the meaning of Bhāvaviveka’s assertion is not logically feasible from within his having asserted that the entities of subjects are not found

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by merely erroneous consciousnesses]

In response, [Chandrakīrti] refutes [Bhāvaviveka] upon demonstrating that Bhāvaviveka himself has asserted that the entities of the subjects, eyes and so forth, are not found by the merely erroneous and that the reasoning that the erroneous and non-erroneous are different—a direct dichotomy—and so forth.

The meaning of those is: As the subjects in the proof that eyes and so forth are not produced from self, it is not suitable to posit mere eyes and so forth for which the specifics of the two truths have been discarded, because [according to Bhāvaviveka] a valid cognition comprehending these subjects is a consciousness unmistaken with respect to the nature of eyes and so forth, but (2) states (gnas skabs) of—that is, objects found (rnyed pa’i yul) by—nonerroneous consciousnesses unmistaken with respect to the nature do not exist among false appearances, erroneous objects of knowledge appearing to exist by way of their own character whereas they do not.

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Ta-drin-rab-tan’s Annotations, 382.1.

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With respect to how [Bhāvaviveka] asserts the former reason [which is that (according to Bhāvaviveka) the valid cognitions comprehending those subjects are consciousnesses unmistaken with respect to the nature of eyes and so forth]:

- In a system asserting that whatever exists exists by way of its own entity, if [a consciousness] has come to be mistaken relative to the appearance of own-character [that is, the object’s being established by way of its own character], it cannot be posited as finding [that is, realizing] its object of comprehension. Therefore, whether a conceptual or non-conceptual valid cognition, it must be unmistaken with respect to the own-character [that is, the establishment by way of its own character] of that with respect to which it is a valid cognition—the appearing object or the conceived object. In that case, [the consciousness] must go as a valid cognition with respect to the entity (ngo bo), or nature (rang bzhin), of the mode of subsistence of the object itself, this not just being nominally imputed in conventional terms, and [Bhāvaviveka] himself also asserts this.
• It is contradictory for whatever is an object found by such a valid cognition to be an erroneous object of knowledge, whereby the latter sign [which is that states of—that is, objects found by—nonerroneous consciousnesses unmistaken with respect to the nature do not exist among false appearances, erroneous objects of knowledge appearing to exist by way of their own character whereas they do not] is established. Likewise, it is also contradictory for whatever is an object found by a mistaken consciousness to be an erroneous object of knowledge.

Therefore, [Bhāvaviveka] cannot dispel the fallacy of a nonestablished subject.a

Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary: b Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words says:c

a Ta-drin-rab-tan’s Annotations, 383.4, specifies “a compatibly appearing subject.”
b Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s Port of Entry, 201b.3/565.24.
c Toh 3860, sde dge, dbu ma, vol. ‘a, 9b.3ff. The Sanskrit in La Vallée Poussin, Prasannapada, 29.7-30.3, is:

na ca taivedya/ yasmād yadāvopāddhāpratisedho’tra sādyadharmo ‘bhipretah/ tadaiva dharmanastadādāhārasa viparītasamtrāśādādābhāvasya pracitūṁ svayamevānāṃgkṛtā/ bhinnau hi viparyāśāvipyārśa/ tadyādādāvāśāvipyārena asatsattvāna gṛhyate, tairāṃ kṣayena keśādi, tadā kutaḥ sadbhūtāpadārdhāleṣaṣāvipyāpalabdhiḥ/ yaddā ca aviparyāśāvipyārśa tadyādāvāśāvipyārena atiḥāśāvipyārena asatsattvāna gṛhyate, tairāṃ kṣayena keśādi, tadā kutaḥ sadbhūtāpadārdhāleṣaṣāvipyāpalabdhiḥ, yena tadānāṃ sāyāntīḥ syāt/ ata evokamācāryapādāḥ - yadi kihicdipalameyaṁ pravartayeṇaṁ nivartayeṇaṁ vā/ pratayakṣādibhirārthaistaddhāvāne’n- upālambhaḥ/ iti/ yataścāvām bhinnau viparyāśāvipyāρśa/ ato viduṣṣāma-viparītāvasthāyaṁ vipārītasyāśāvipyāpalabdhiḥ karakataḥ sāṃyṛtaḥ caṣṭuḥ yasya dharmit-vaṇ syāt/ iti na vyāvarṣate’śiddhāhāre paścāṣṭeṣaḥ, āśrayāśiddho va he- tudṣaḥ/ ityaparīḥāre evaṁ/.

For Jam-yang-shay-pa’s explication of this passage according to Tsong-kha-pa’s The Essence of Eloquence see Hopkins, Chandrakīrti Undermines Bhāvaviveka’s Assertion of

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That is not so. For, at just this time [of proving that eyes and so forth are without production]\(^a\) when a negation of production is asserted as the predicate of the proposition, this one [Bhāvaviveka] himself has just asserted that the entities of the subjects—the substrata of that [predicate, the absence of production from self,] which gain their thingness by mere erroneous [consciousness]—have degenerated from [establishment] in suchness.\(^b\) Erroneous

\(^a\) Brackets are Gom-de Nam-kha-gyal-tshan’s *Settling Difficult Points in the Opposite of the Consequences*, 634.4.l, and *Four Interwoven Annotations*, 530.1. The predicate of what Bhāvaviveka is proving is an absence, or negation, of production (ultimately) with respect to the subject, eyes and so forth, in this sense, Chandrakīrti says, “when it is the case that a negation of production (upādāpratīṣṭedha, skye ba bkag pa) is asserted (abhipreta, ‘dod pa) as the predicate of the proposition (sādhya-dharma, bsgrub bya’i chos su; the particle su means “as” and can in no way be construed as “and.” Thus, Chandrakīrti is providing the context for his following remarks—that of ultimate analysis, such as in this case when a negation of production is being asserted as, or taken as, the predicate of what one is proving.

Many Tibetan scholars take this as showing that Chandrakīrti is speaking only about occasions of debating about the final mode of subsistence of phenomena and that his remarks about no compatible subjects should not be extended to times when debating about conventional phenomena such as impermanence, since the question of whether the consciousness certifying the subject and so forth is valid with respect to the mode of subsistence is relevant only when one is debating about that mode of subsistence. There is more about this topic in the next volume.

\(^b\) Jam-yang-shay-pa, attempting to fuse Tsong-kha-pa’s two readings of this in his *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path* and *The Essence of Eloquence*, reformulates this material creatively:

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\(^a\) Wayman (*Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real*, 311-312) misconstrues the sentence to read, “At the very time that he denies in this phase (of proof) an arising (in the absolute sense) and believes in a feature to be proved (the sādhya-dharma).” The Sanskrit double nominative upādāpratīṣṭedho and sādhya-dharma is rendered into Tibetan in a very clear way as an objective nominative skye ba bkag pa and an adverbial accusative bsgrub bya’i chos su; the particle su means “as” and can in no way be construed as “and.” Thus, Chandrakīrti is providing the context for his following remarks—that of ultimate analysis, such as in this case when a negation of production is being asserted as, or taken as, the predicate of what one is proving.
and nonerroneous [objects] are different [mutually exclusive and a dichotomy].

Therefore, when, like the falling hairs and so forth [apprehended] by one with eye disease and so on, what is nonexistent is apprehended by an erroneous [consciousness] as just existing, how then could even a portion of an object existent [by way of its own character] be observed! When, like the falling hairs and so forth [not apprehended] by one without eye disease, the unreal is not superimposed by a nonerroneous [consciousness], how then could even the merest portion of nonexistent objects, veilings, be observed! Hence, the holy master [Nāgārjuna] also says [in the *Refutation of Objections*]:

> If direct perception and so forth did observe some [inherently established] objects,  
> Then [it would be reasonable] to prove those or refute [those in others’ systems],  
> But since those do not exist,  
> There is no [chance for you] to censure me.

For, at just this time [of proving that eyes and so forth are without production] when a negation of production is asserted as the predicate of the proposition, this one [Bhāvaviveka] himself just asserts that the entities of the subjects—the substrata of that [predicate, the absence of production from self,] which gain their thingness by mere erroneous [consciousness]—have degenerated from [being established] in suchness.

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a Stanza 30; P5228, vol. 95, 15.1.2. See also K. Bhattacharya, E. H. Johnston, and A. Kunst, *The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna* (New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978), 23. [KEY: Tsong-kha-pa’s *Essence* is at the margin; headings in yellow highlight are from Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s *Port of Entry*. Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary is indented in a three-sided box. Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words*, identified by Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho, is in blue type.]
Because in that way, the erroneous and the nonerroneous are different, the erroneous do not exist in a state [directly perceiving] the nonerroneous. Therefore, how could there be a veiling, an eye, that is a subject! Hence, there is no overturning the fallacy of a position whose base is not established and the fallacy of a reason whose base is not established, and, therefore, this is just not a response.

a  gzhi ma grub pa, asiddhādhāra.
b  gzhi ma grub pa, āśrayāsiddha.
c  Wayman (Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real, 312) translates the last line as, “You have no answer to this.” However, the Four Interwoven Annotations (533.4) make it clear that the reference is to the hypothetical Bhāvaviveka’s earlier answer, “The response that you have given is just not a response concordant with the fact (khyed kyis lan btab pa ’di ni don dang mthun pa i lan ma yin pa nyid do).” Bhāvaviveka’s earlier answer was that just generalities are to be used as subject, predicate, and so forth without being qualified by the particular assertions of the two schools. Chandrakīrti’s refutation of this is built

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Upon having demonstrated in brief that “the assertion by Bhāvaviveka that eyes and so forth are not found by the merely erroneous is refuted by the reasoning that the erroneous and non-erroneous are a direct dichotomy,” [Tsong-kha-pa’s] explanation of the meaning of this at length starts with “The meaning of those is:”.

Concerning this, as the subjects in the proof that eyes and so forth are not produced from self, it is not suitable to posit mere general eyes and so forth for which the specifics of the two truths have been discarded, because (1) [Bhāvaviveka]\(^a\) has asserted that a valid cognition comprehending subjects such as eyes and so forth must be a consciousness unmistaken with respect to the nature of eyes and so forth, and (2) false appearances—erroneous objects of knowledge appearing to exist by way of their own character whereas they do not—do not exist among objects found by nonerroneous consciousnesses, that is, unmistaken with respect to the nature of objects.

\(^a\) Ta-drin-rab-tan’s *Annotations*, 382.1.

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The first sign [which is that (Bhāvaviveka)a has asserted that a valid cognition comprehending subjects such as eyes and so forth must be a consciousness unmistaken with respect to the nature of eyes and so forth] is established because in a system asserting that whatever exists exists by way of its own entity, whatsoever valid cognition must go as a valid cognition with respect to something inherently established, not just imputed by terms and conceptuality in conventional terms, and is also asserted by the opponent [Bhāvaviveka] himself, because in that one’s system whether the valid cognition comprehending this subject is conceptual or non-conceptual, it must be unmistaken with respect to the own-character [that is, the establishment by way of its own character] of that with respect to which it is a valid cognition. It follows [that it must be unmistaken with respect to the own-character of that with respect to which it is a valid cognition] because in that system if it is a conceptual valid cognition, it must be unmistaken with respect to the own-character of the conceived object, and if it is a nonconceptual valid cognition, it must be unmistaken with respect to the own-character of the appearing object, because in that system if [a consciousness] has come to

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a Ta-drin-rab-tan’s Annotations, 382.1.

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be mistaken relative to the appearance of own-character [that is, the object’s being established by way of its own character], it cannot be posited as finding [that is, realizing] its object of comprehension.

The second sign [which is that false appearances—erroneous objects of knowledge appearing to exist by way of their own character whereas they do not—do not exist among objects found by nonerroneous consciousnesses, that is, unmistaken with respect to the nature of objects] is established because it is contradictory for whatever is an object found by a nonerroneous valid cognition to be an erroneous object of knowledge, because the two truths—falsities, erroneous ob-

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jects found by mistaken consciousnesses, and the nonerroneous objects found by unmistakable consciousnesses—are direct contradictory. Likewise, whatever is an object found by a mistaken consciousness necessarily is an erroneous object of knowledge; therefore, [Bhāvaviveka] cannot dispel the fallacy of a nonestablished subject.

2\textsuperscript{a} Dispelling objections \{2 parts\}

This has two parts: dispelling an objection about a compatibly appearing subject and dispelling an objection about an object found by such a valid cognition.

\textit{a}\textsuperscript{a} Dispelling an objection about a compatibly appearing
It might be thought:

- Just as although valid cognitions comprehending sound are limited to the two, permanent and impermanent, it is not necessary to prove—as the valid cognition that certifies sound—whether it is a valid cognition qualified by being either “an impermanent valid cognition” or “a permanent valid cognition,” so although consciousnesses are limited to the two, mistaken and unmistaken, it is not necessary when the valid cognition that certifies a subject is demonstrated, to prove it as qualified by either of those two.

- Likewise, just as it is not contradictory that although sound is limited to the two, permanent and impermanent, and a valid cognition comprehending sound does not find sound as either permanent sound or impermanent sound, still it comprehends sound, so although eyes and so forth are limited to the two, erroneous and nonerroneous objects of knowledge, and the valid cognition comprehending eyes and so forth does not find eyes and so forth as either erroneous or nonerroneous objects of knowledge, it is not contradictory that it comprehends eyes and so forth.

Hence those reasonings on the unsuitability of holding mere eyes and so forth as subjects are not logically feasible.

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Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary: About this, someone says: Those reasonings demonstrating that “holding mere generalities such as eyes and so forth as subjects is not suitable” are not logically feasible because:

- although consciousnesses are limited to the two, mistaken and unmistaken, it is not necessary to prove whether it qualified by either of those two when demonstrating the valid cognition certifying a subject, just as for example, although valid cognitions comprehending sound are limited to the two, permanent and impermanent, it is not necessary to prove—as the valid cognition that certifies sound—whether it is a valid cognition qualified by being either of those two [a permanent valid cognition or an impermanent valid cognition], and

- likewise, although eyes and so forth are limited to the two, erroneous and nonerroneous objects of knowledge, and the valid cognition comprehending eyes and so forth does not find eyes and so forth as either erroneous or nonerroneous objects of knowledge, it is not contradictory that it comprehends eyes and so forth, just as for example, it is not contradictory that although sound is limited
to the two, permanent and impermanent, and a valid cognition comprehending sound does not find sound as either permanent sound or impermanent sound, still it comprehends sound.

Reason why Chandrakīrti did not clear away this objection

Since it would be pointless for scholars such as Bhāvaviveka and so forth or Proponents of [Truly Established] Things to generate such a qualm, even Chandrakīrti did not construct a position to clear it away.
However, since generation [of this qualm] occurs in ignorant disputants such as those of the present day, let us explain it. [According to the assertions of the Autonomists,] when an object is analyzed as to whether it is established or not by valid cognition, that it is established by valid cognition must be understood by way of that object demonstrated either (1) as being established in accordance with the appearance to this consciousness if it is a non-conceptual valid cognition or (2) as established in accordance with the ascertainment or determination of the meaning by this consciousness if it is a conceptual valid cognition. This is the meaning of unmistaken because:

(1) through positing the object as established in accordance with how it appears to [this awareness] itself, this awareness is posited as unmistaken with respect to its appearing object, or
(2) through positing the object as established in accordance with how it is ascertained by [this awareness] itself, this awareness is posited as unmistaken with respect to ascertained or determined object.

Therefore, how could it be that [the subject] is only decided with respect to things and is not decided by the likes of what is established by awareness!

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In that way, an object found by a consciousness unmistaken relative to the appearance of [the object as established by way of its] own character is established as the means of positing [something as] a real object of knowledge, and therefore how could it be that real and unreal objects of knowledge are decided with respect to things and not decided in the perspective of the awareness!

These [points] are the system of establishment [that is, certification] through valid cognition by those disputants who assert that existents exist by way of their own entities; they are not [Chandrakīrti’s] own system. Therefore, according to the Autonomists, although subjects such as eyes and so forth are found by an unmistaken consciousness as such real objects of knowledge, these do not have to be established as qualified by either the [verbal] conventions or meanings of being established as [either of] the two truths, and [thus] taking them as the substrata, it is permissible to analyze whether they ultimately exist or not. Due to this, they think, “How could the fallacy involved in examining the specifics of the two truths apply to holding a generality as the subject!”

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Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary: There is a reason why even Chandrakīrti did not clear away such a qualm because such a qualm is not fit to be generated in the skilled. However, since generation of such a qualm occurs in latter-day Tibetans, let us explain it. According to the assertions of the Autonomists, the fallacy involved in examining the specifics of the two truths do not apply to holding a generality as the subject:

- because although subjects such as eyes and so forth are found by an unmistaken consciousness as real objects of knowledge—objects found by a consciousness unmistaken relative to the appearance of [the object as established by way of its] own character—these do not have to be established upon being qualified by either the [verbal] conventions or meanings of being established as [either of] the two truths, and [thus] taking them as the substrata, it is permissible to analyze whether they ultimately exist or not,
- because:
  1. it is not that although the established by valid cognition and the not established by valid cognition and the mistaken and the unmistaken are only decided with respect to things, they are not decided in the perspective of the awareness, and
  2. it is not that although real and unreal objects of knowledge are only decided with respect to things,
they are not decided in the perspective of the awareness.

The first sign [which is that it is not that although the established by valid cognition and the not established by valid cognition and the mistaken and the unmistaken are only decided with respect to things, they are not decided in the perspective of the awareness] is established because the meaning of “established by valid cognition” at the time of analyzing whether established or not established...
by valid cognition must be understood through that object in which mode of establishment by valid cognition is demonstrated (1) as established in accordance with the appearance to this consciousness if it is a non-conceptual valid cognition or (2) as established in accordance with the ascertainment or determination of the meaning by this consciousness if it is a conceptual valid cognition.

The second sign [which is that it is not that although real and unreal objects of knowledge are only decided with respect to things, they are not decided in the perspective of the awareness] is established because an object found by a consciousness unmistaken relative to the appearance of [the object as established by way of its] own character is established as the means of positing [something as] a real object of knowledge and through this an unreal object of knowledge also must be understood.

Those [positions], aside from being the system of Proponents of Inherent Existence, are not our own [Consequentialist] system.

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Chandrakīrti, thinking that such have come to be existent by way of their own entities and just that is the meaning of ultimately existing, whereby how could a mere subject in which that is held as the substratum occurs, refutes holding a generality devoid of specifics as the subject.

Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary: Therefore, this qualm of yours is not logically feasible because Autonomists think in accordance with what was just explained and the scope of such thinking is not reasonable, because through having asserted such, one comes to have asserted existence by way of [objects’] own entity and existence by way of [objects’] own entity itself is the meaning of existing ultimately. Hence, Chandrakīrti, thinking “How could mere subjects held as substrata of ultimately existing occur!” refutes the establishment of the Autonomists’ mode of thought that holds a generality devoid of specifics as a subject.
If you realize the essentials of these [points], you will understand:

- the Autonomists’ explanation [of the division of veilings, that is, conventional objects, into the real and unreal as in Jñānagarbha’s *Two Truths*].

  Though similar in appearing, there are those
  Able and not able to perform functions as they appear,
  Whereby a division of real and unreal
  Veilings is made.

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*b* Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s *Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-pa’s) “Great Exposition of Tenets”: Freeing the Knots of the Difficult Points, Precious Jewel of Clear Thought* (dbu ma pa, kha, 80.1) explains:

> Although similar in appearing to conventional consciousnesses that clearly perceive them, there are two types—those established and those not established in accordance with their mode of appearance—whereby a division is made into real and unreal veil truths. Although the explicit reading [of Jñānagarbha’s text] is seen to put this together as being able or not being able to *perform a function* in accordance with the mode of appearance, this is a mere illustration with regard to such phenomena as water and a mirage because otherwise it would have to be asserted that uncompounded space is an unreal conventionality [because, being permanent, it cannot perform a function].

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and also the Autonomists’ not dividing object-possessors [consciousnesses] into the two, real and unreal,

• and the evidence why the Consequentialists posit both real and unreal objects and object-possessors relative to just the world and do not posit such in their own system.

*Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary:* If you realize the essentials of these [points], you will decidedly understand reasons for the Autonomists’ explanation by Jñānagarbha’s Two Truths, “Though similar in appearing” and so forth, and moreover for their not dividing object-possessors (yul can, subjects) into the two, real and unreal, and for the Consequentialists’ positing the two, real and unreal, for both objects and object-possessors relative to just the world and not positing real and unreal in their own system. The meaning of the scripture from Jñānagarbha’s Two Truths is:

Though similar in having appearance to nonconceptual consciousnesses, from the viewpoint of those able and not able to perform functions in accordance with their appearance a division between real and unreal veilings is made with respect to the likes of water and mirage.
Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of Tenets: 

[The phrase “in their own system” or] “in the Middle Way’s own system” is to be taken as “in the perspective of the Middle Way rational consciousness of the unique Middle Way system.” In its perspective it is not suitable to divide veil truths into the real whose mode of appearance and mode of subsistence agree and the unreal whose mode of appearance and mode of subsistence do not agree because not only Superiors’ meditative equipoise but also their pristine wisdom subsequent to meditative equipoise perceive forms and so forth as like illusions and do not perceive their mode of appearance and mode of subsistence as in agreement…

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\[Taipei, 578.13; 2011 TBRC bla brang, pha, 185a.5. This comment is a condensed version with the omitted material indicated by ellipses as published in Jeffrey Hopkins, Maps of the Profound: Jam-yang-shay-ba’s Great Exposition of Buddhist and Non-Buddhist Views on the Nature of Reality (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 2003), 908-911, with the Tibetan added; the full version is contained in Jeffrey Hopkins, Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of Tenets on the Two Truths in the Consequence School with Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Annotations, Sections 1-5 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version April, 2017: uma-tibet.org), 134-183.\]

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Therefore, veil truths are divided into the two—real and unreal—in relation to the perspective of coarse, innate, worldly consciousnesses because:

- the six senses free from superficial damage and the six objects apprehended by them are posited as real\(^a\) in the perspective of innate coarse consciousnesses
- and the six senses having superficial damage and the six objects apprehended by them are posited as unreal\(^b\) in the perspective of worldly consciousnesses…

Proponents of the Middle\(^c\) themselves also assert such real and unreal [veilings relative to worldly valid cognition], but in conventional terms they do not assert the former type of real [veilings relative to a rational consciousness] in their own system…

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\(^a\) *yang dag*: this is better translated as “correct” for consciousnesses.

\(^b\) *log pa*: this is better translated as “incorrect” for consciousnesses.

\(^c\) Taipei, 580.3.
Therefore:

- The perspective of a worldly consciousness in “existing in conventional terms,”\(^a\) the perspective of a worldly consciousness in “existing in the world’s conventions,”\(^b\) the convention in “conventional truth,”\(^c\) and the noble [or superior] in “noble truth”\(^d\) are conventional valid cognitions.
- The perspective of a worldly consciousness in [Chandrakīrti’s Supplement, VI.25c,]\(^e\) “Are true [or real] just from the world,” is innate usual [consciousness].
- The veiling [consciousness] (kun rdzob, samvṛti) in the perspective of which forms and so forth are posited as true must be ignorance.

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\(^a\) tha snyad du yod.
\(^b\) 'jig rten gyi tha snyad du yod.
\(^c\) tha snyad bden pa.
\(^d\) 'phags pa'i bden pa.
\(^e\) Stanza VI.25 is:

Objects realized by the world that are apprehended
By [the consciousnesses of] the six sense powers undamaged [by superficial causes of mistake]
Are true [or real] just from the world [because of being phenomena that prior to realizing emptiness cannot be realized to be a combination of appearing to be inherently existent but being empty of such].
The rest [that is, those apprehended by sense consciousnesses damaged by superficial causes of mistake such as reflections, echoes, and so forth] are posited as unreal from just the world [that is, relative to the world].

La Vallée Poussin, Madhyamakāvatāra, 104.4-104.7; Illumination of the Thought, Sarnath 2009, 221.11-221.14; translation by Hopkins, Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom, 257.

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Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Annotations: a It is not that “real veilings do not exist in the Proponents of the Middle Way own system because real veilings do not exist for the perspective of a rational consciousness”; otherwise, because veil truths do not exist for the ascertaintment perspective of a rational consciousness, veil truths would not exist in the Proponents of the Middle Way own system. Hence, it is being said that there are real veilings relative to (la ltos te) worldly valid cognition, or conventional valid cognition, but real veilings relative to a rational consciousness do not exist because real veilings relative to the mode of analysis by a rational consciousness do not exist, because that which is established as real relative to this does not exist, for, according to the mode of analysis by a rational consciousness, all phenomena must be established as false and the truly established does not exist. …

\[ \text{dbu ma pa, ka, 190.8.} \]

a [Tsong-kha-pa’s Essence is at the margin; headings in \textbf{yellow highlight} are from Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s Port of Entry. Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary is indented in a three-sided box. Chandrakirti’s Clear Words, identified by Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho, is in blue type.]
In this system:

• Since veiling phenomena are not established in accordance with how they appear and conventional consciousnesses are mistaken consciousnesses [in that objects falsely appear to inherently exist], a division of veiling objects and subjects into the real and unreal is not asserted.

• Among the six non-conceptual consciousnesses in the continuum of a common being there are none that are unmistaken.

However, it is not contradictory that those consciousnesses are valid cognitions able to posit phenomena—forms and so forth—as existing because although an unmistaken subject [that is, consciousness] is needed to posit a true object, a mistaken subject itself serves to assist in positing a false object.

a  _dbu ma pa, ga_, 191.7.

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It is explained that:

- the division of veilings into real and unreal by other [that is, non-Consequentialist] Proponents of the Middle derives from their assertion of establishment by way of the object’s own character, while

- here [in the Consequence School] their not dividing veilings into real and unreal even in conventional terms derives from their not asserting establishment by way of the object’s own character.

Since if forms and so forth were posited as real, this would be damaged by a rational consciousness realizing their emptiness, [the Consequentialists] do not divide veilings into real and unreal; however, relative to only the perspective of conventional consciousnesses (tha snyad pa'i shes pa'i ngo tsam la ltos te)—and not relative to a rational consciousness (rigs shes la ltos te)—it is suitable to make a division into real and unreal because although dividing an illusory horse and a fully qualified horse into false and true relative to a rational consciousness is not logically feasible, these are suitable to receive the conventions “false” and “true” relative to conventional consciousnesses…

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Thus, you should know that:

- Although [veilings] are divided into the real and unreal relative to (la ltos te) conventional valid cognition, they are not divided into real and unreal in the perspective of (ngor) conventional valid cognition.\(^a\)
- Although veiling phenomena are posited as unreal relative to a rational consciousness, they are not also posited as unreal in the perspective of a rational consciousness.\(^b\) …

The conventional consciousness\(^c\) for the perspective of an awareness in which an eye consciousness apprehending a form is posited as mistaken, and the conventional consciousness for the perspective of an awareness in which an eye consciousness apprehending a form is posited as an unmistaken object-possessor on this occasion are separate…

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\(^a\) tha snyad pa ’i tshad ma la ltos te yang log gnyis su ’byed kyang tha snyad pa ’i tshad ma ’i ngor yang log gnyis su mi ’byed; 192.6.

\(^b\) kun rdzob pa ’i chos rnams rigs shes la ltos te log par ’jog kyang rigs shes kyi ngor log par ’jog pa min; 192.7.

\(^c\) dbu ma pa, ga, 199.4.

\{KEY: Tsong-kha-pa’s Essence is at the margin; headings in yellow highlight are from Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s Port of Entry. Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary is indented in a three-sided box. Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words, identified by Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho, is in blue type.\}
A conventional valid cognition realizing that an eye consciousness apprehending a form is mistaken [with regard to its appearing-object since the object appears to inherently exist] and a conventional valid cognition realizing that an eye consciousness apprehending a form is a real [that is, correct] object-possessor [in that it apprehends the form correctly] are not equivalent, and the factor proven by the one is also not refuted by the other.a

If it is posited that the subject is established by a mistaken consciousness—conceptual or non-conceptual—to which own-characterb does not exist as it appears, then since the meaning of what is being proved, the absence of inherent existence, would already have established, how could this one be suitable as an opponent for whom this needs to be proved! Therefore, the fallacy of the nonestablishment of the subject remains as before.

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a For a thorough discussion of this topic see Guy Newland, The Two Truths (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 1992), 136-157.
b That is, establishment by way of its own character.
Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary: If you posit that the subject is established by a mistaken consciousness to which own-character\(^a\) does not exist as it appears, then since the meaning of what you are to prove, the absence of inherent existence, would already have been established, this one is not suitable as an opponent for whom you need to prove this, whereby the fallacy of the nonestablishment of the subject remains as before.

Comment by Hopkins: If the two disputants are able to posit a subject certified by a consciousness that does not also certify the object’s being established by way of its own character, then those two disputants have both been able to make the difference between existence and existence in the sense of being established by way of the object’s own character, in which case there is no need to prove emptiness to the other party.

Thus, by extension Consequentialists among themselves on occasions when they are debating about conventionalities can have an agreed upon subject, called a mere subject (chos can tsam po ba). Although it is a commonly appearing subject in the sense that the certification of the subject is asserted similarly by both parties as not establishing the object as either inherently existent or not inherently existent, such a subject is not called a commonly appearing subject since the

\(^a\) That is, establishment by way of its own character.

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term is confined to the context of those systems that insist upon the statement in all situations of a syllogism in which the subject, predicate, reason, and example are similarly established in the systems of both parties as existing by way of their own character.

Hence, although Consequentialists hold that both parties in the debate have consciousnesses that certify the existence of the subject, they hold that when the other party is a non-Consequentialist, this disputant does not properly understand the certifying consciousness that he or she already has and mistakenly propounds that in their system the consciousness certifying the subject also certifies that the subject is established by way of its own character.

There comes to be a question as to whether there are commonly appealing subjects under any circumstances. One can quickly answer that there are no commonly appearing subjects when a Consequentialist debates with a non-Consequentialist about the ultimate and that there are commonly appearing subjects posited by mistaken systems; it would further seem that according to the explanation given above, from Consequentialists’ perspective, even when the other schools are debating amongst themselves about topics other than the ultimate or when the Consequentialists debate with them on topics other than the ultimate there are no commonly appearing subjects given the rather strict explanation here as revolving around the point that the consciousness certifying the subject certifies the subject’s being established by way of its own character. For there is no such establishment.

b⁶ Dispelling an objection about an object found by such a valid cognition

Objection: If [based on Chandrakīrti’s text⁶ you are holding that] the two, a  The reference is to Chandrakīrti’s statement cited earlier:

That is not so. For, at just this time [of proving that eyes and so forth are without production] (de’i tshe kho nar, tadaiva) when it is the case that a negation of

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object found by a mistaken consciousness and nonerroneous object of knowledge, are contradictory, then the two, object found by an inferential rational consciousness [this being an emptiness] and an ultimate truth, also would be contradictory. Also since [ultimate truths] are not asserted as found by mere erroneous consciousness, they must be found by consciousnesses that are nonmistaken with respect to the nature, in which case all veilings also would become those [that is, ultimate truths] because those are comprehended by a Victor’s pristine wisdom knowing the diversity and because the term “mere” eliminates that [those veilings] are found by a nonmistaken [consciousness].

Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s Commentary:

(1) Someone says: If the two, object found by a mistaken
consciousness and nonerroneous object of knowledge, are contradictory, it follows that the subject, ultimate truth, is not a nonerroneous object of knowledge because of being an object found by a mistaken consciousness, because of being an object found by an inferential rational consciousness, and

(2) Someone else says: If whatever is not found by a mere erroneous consciousness (phyn ci log tsam) is necessarily an object found by a nonmistaken consciousness, it follows that the subject, a veil truth, is not an object found by a nonmistaken consciousness because of not being found by a mere erroneous consciousness, because of being comprehended even by pristine wisdom knowing the diversity. [Being comprehended even by pristine wisdom knowing the diversity] entails [not being found by a mere erroneous consciousness] because the term “mere” eliminates “found by the nonmistaken.”

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a  This is because an inferential rational consciousness is mistaken with respect to it appearing object (snang yul) even though it not mistaken with respect to its conceived object (zhen yul).

b  See three notes above.

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Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary.\(^b\)

[Response:] Concerning those, to the first [objection, our response is that being an object found by an inferential rational consciousness] does not entail [not being a nonerroneous object of knowledge] because although an inferential rational consciousness is a mistaken consciousness that is mistaken with respect to its appearing object, it is not contradictory that what is found by it is not found by a mistaken consciousness, like for example, although an ear consciousness finds the sound of a conch that is on the one hand a sound and also false is found,\(^a\) it is not contradictory that a false sound of a conch is not found.

\(^a\) That is, perceived incontrovertibly.

\(^b\) Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s Port of Entry, 568.14.

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When one considers where the delimitation “mere” [in the referenced citation from Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words] is applied, such a qualm could be produced, but the speaker [Chandrakīrti’s] intention is that he said “mere” wishing to refute that [conventionalities] are found by an analytical [consciousness] analyzing what the mode of existence is, but not [intending] to refute that [conventionalities] are found by a nonmistaken consciousness because [Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words] says:\textsuperscript{a}

I also propound, “What is the use of applying fine analysis to the conventions of the world!” For, veiling gain their existent entity only through a veiled erroneous [consciousness].

\textit{Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary:} \textsuperscript{b} To the second [objection, our response is that that the term “mere” eliminates “found by the nonmistaken”] is not established, because when one considers where the delimitation “mere” in

\textsuperscript{a} Toh 3860, sde dge, dbu ma, vol. ‘a’, 23a.7-23b.1; La Vallée Poussin, Prasannapadā, 68.7-68.8: vayamapyevasv brūmah/ kimaya sūkṣmēsūkṣayā laukikavyavahāre’vatāri-kayā/ tiṣṭha tāvadeṣā viparyāsamārātādī ṭābhāvasattākā sāmyātīt.

\textsuperscript{b} Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s Port of Entry, 568.17.
the statement Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words*, “gain their thing-
ness by mere erroneous [consciousness],” (phyin ci log tsam
gyis dag gi ngo bo yod par rnyed pa) is connected, a qualm
wondering whether [any objects] found by nonmistaken con-
sciousnesses are eliminated might be produced, but the hon-
orable Chandrakīrti’s intention in saying this is that he said
“mere” wishing to refute that [conventionalities] are found
by an analytical [consciousness] that analyzes what the mode
of existence is, but not that he is refuting that [conventional-
ities] are found by a nonmistaken consciousness, because
Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words* says:ًا

I also propound, “What is the use of applying fine analysis
to the conventions of the world!” For, veiling find their
existent entity only through a veiled erroneous [con-
ssciousness].

The meaning of this is:

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ًا Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho cites only a few words, but I have given the entire quote as
 cited by Tsong-kha-pa just above. See also MacDonald, *In Clear Words: The Prasanna-
padā*, Chapter One, 260.8.

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chö-gya-tsho’s *Port of Entry*, Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary is indented in a three-sided
box. Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words*, identified by Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho, is in blue type.}
I Chandrakīrti also propound, “What is the use of applying fine analysis seeking the imputed meaning in the conventions of the world!” For, veilings are posited not to something found in accordance with the mode of analysis by a rational consciousness analyzing the ultimate, but to an object that finds its entity through mere concordance with the mode of analysis by a conventional consciousness, an awareness erroneous relative to the appearance of establishment by way of its own character.

Therefore, in accordance with the statements about the meaning of compatibly appearing subjects in Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight:a

Moreover, the meaning of the subject and so forth being established in compatible appearance is establishment for the proponent by the sort of valid cognition by which these are established also for the opponent.

and:b

Thus, this master [Chandrakīrti] refutes autonomy, thinking that such valid cognitions as those of the opponents through which subjects are established are not suitable for

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b Ibid., 55 and 134.

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the other party [the Middle Way Consequentialists], because not any phenomenon even in conventional terms has an entity established by way of its own character, and hence there is no valid cognition confirming such.

Any phenomenon that is also established for the other party, a Proponent of the Middle, by such a valid cognition that is asserted by the opponent, a Proponent of [Truly Established] Things, as established by valid cognition observing it as established by way of its own character—that is, the opponent’s assertion that [the certifying consciousness] has come to be a valid cognition with respect to an object established by way of its own character is also asserted by the other party [a Proponent of the Middle]—is the measure of the hypothetical establishment of a compatibly appearing subject.
Although the two—[my] explanation elsewhere [in the Great Exposition of Special Insight]a in terms of [Bhāvaviveka’s] having asserted that a subject which is the basis [of the predicate, nonproduction from self,] degenerate from [or are not] established as [their own] suchness and this mode [of explanation just given here in The Essence of Eloquence]—do not agree, it is not that [my two explanations] disagree with respect to the tenet of refuting autonomy.

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a Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s Port of Entry, 569.12, and Ta-drin-rab-tan’s Annotations, 391.1. For this presentation, see Hopkins, What is a Consequentialist? Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight with the Four Inverwoven Annotations: Compatibly Appearing Subjects, 5 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version July, 2019: uma-tibet.org), 32-80 and 122-144.
**Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary:**\(^a\) With respect to the meaning of Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words:*\(^b\)

For, at this time when here a negation of production is asserted as the predicate of the proposition, this one [Bhāvaviveka] himself has just asserted that the entities of the subjects—the substrata of that [predicate, the absence of production from self] which gain their thingness by mere erroneous [consciousness] by mere erroneous [consciousness]—have degenerated from [establishment] in suchness. Erroneous and nonerroneous are different.

although [Tsong-kha-pa’s] two ways of [explaining Chandrakīrti’s] criticizing Bhāvaviveka:

1. the explanation in Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight in terms of [Bhāvaviveka’s] having asserted (*khas blangs pa*) that subjects such as forms and so forth which are the basis [of the predicate, nonproduction from self,] have degenerated from establishment in suchness (*de kho nar grub par nyams pa*), that is to say, do not ultimately exist (*don dam par med pa*), and

2. the explanation from this text [*The Essence of Eloquence*] in terms of [Bhāvaviveka’s] having come to assert (*khas blangs par song ba*) that subjects such as forms and so forth, which are the basis [of the predicate, nonproduction from self,] ultimately [exist]

do not agree, it is not that [the two explanations] disagree with respect to the tenet of refuting autonomy, because aside from those two only differing in (1) explaining that Bhāvaviveka “asserted that eyes and so forth do not ultimately exist” and (2) [explaining] that forced by reasoning (*rigs pas ’phul ba*) “Bhāvaviveka has come to assert that those ultimately [exist],” both refute autonomy.

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\(^a\) Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s *Port of Entry*, 569.8.

\(^b\) Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho cites only a few words at the beginning and “and so forth”; I have filled in the ellipsis.

{KEY: Tsong-kha-pa’s *Essence* is at the margin; headings in yellow highlight are from Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s *Port of Entry*. Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary is indented in a three-sided box. Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words*, identified by Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho, is in blue type.}
With respect to how those two modes of explanation disagree:

1. According to the statement in Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight:\textsuperscript{b}
Let us explain this within associating it with the text [of Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words*].

and so forth, compatibly appearing subjects do not exist because Bhāvaviveka himself has asserted that the subjects, forms and so forth, are not ultimately established.

[That Bhāvaviveka himself has asserted that the subjects, forms and so forth, are not ultimately established] entails [that compatibly appearing subjects do not exist] because in that case the subjects, forms and so forth, would not be objects found by nonmistaken consciousnesses. [That the subjects, forms and so forth, are not objects found nonmistaken consciousnesses,] entails [that Bhāvaviveka himself having asserted the subjects, forms and so forth, are not ultimately established necessitates that compatibly appearing subjects do not exist] because opponents who are Proponents of [Truly Established] Things assert that the valid cognitions comprehending eyes and so forth are objects found by nonmistaken consciousnesses, [whereas] the other party, the Proponents of the Middle, assert that the valid cognitions comprehending eyes and so forth are mistaken with respect to eyes and so forth establishment by way of their own character.

{KEY: Tsong-kha-pa’s *Essence* is at the margin; headings in yellow highlight are from Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s *Port of Entry*. Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary is indented in a three-sided box. Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words*, identified by Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho, is in blue type.}
At the juncture of the earlier [statement of] no entailment, the sign [which is that Bhāvaviveka himself has asserted that forms and so forth are not ultimately established] is established because Bhāvaviveka states those eyes and so forth as subjects in the proof of them as not ultimately produced.

At the juncture of the later [statement of] no entailment, the sign [which is that opponents who are Proponents of (Truly Established) Things assert that the valid cognitions comprehending eyes and so forth are objects found by non-mistaken consciousnesses, (whereas) the other party, the Proponents of the Middle, assert that the valid cognitions comprehending eyes and so forth are mistaken with respect to eyes and so forth establishment by way of their own character] is established because whatever phenomenon is not established as [its own] suchness [that is, is not ultimately established] and also is not an object that is suchness necessarily is an object found by a conventional consciousness that is a falsity such as a form and so forth and because the two—object found by a mistaken consciousness and object found by a nonmistaken consciousness—are directly contradictory.

{KEY: Tsong-kha-pa’s Essence is at the margin; headings in yellow highlight are from Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s Port of Entry, Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary is indented in a three-sided box. Chandrakirti’s Clear Words, identified by Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho, is in blue type.}
Therefore, also to add syllables to [that is, flesh out] the statement in Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words*: (Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s additions are in orange type)

At this time—that is, because—here on this occasion of proving that production from self does not exist, a negation of production ultimately—the nonexistence of production—is asserted as the predicate of the proposition, this Bhāvaviveka himself just explicitly asserts the degeneration in suchness, that is, the nonestablishment ultimately, of the entities of the subjects eyes and so forth—subjects that are the substrata of that syllogism refuting production from self—which gain their entities of eyes and so forth through mere erroneous consciousnesses in the sense of being polluted by ignorance.

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a  Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho (*Port of Entry*, 570.3) substitutes *ngo bo* for *dngos po.*

b  Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho (*Port of Entry*, 570.3) moves *de kho nar* from *'dod pa de'i tshe de kho nar* to *rnyed pa ni de kho nar* to clarify its place in syntactical order of the sentence. In 1989 I published an article, “A Tibetan Delineation of Different Views of Emptiness in the Indian Middle Way School: Dzong-ka-ba’s Two Interpretations of the *Locus Classicus* in Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words* Showing Bhāvaviveka’s Assertion of Commonly Appearing Subjects and Inherent Existence,” *Tibet Journal* 14, no. 1 (1989): 10-43, in which I demonstrate that *de kho nar* is a misreading for *kho nar,* based on a corrupt edition that is absent in the surviving Sanskrit; unfortunately I had no chance to read over the proofs, riddled with printing errors, before publication. This issue is addressed below.

{KEY: Tsong-kha-pa’s *Essence* is at the margin; headings in yellow highlight are from Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s *Port of Entry*. Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary is indented in a three-sided box. Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words*, identified by Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho, is in blue type.}
In brief, the meaning is “When [Bhāvaviveka] refutes production from self, he asserts that eyes and so forth do not ultimately exist.”

2. According to the statement in Tsong-kha-pa’s text [The Essence of Eloquence].

Bhāvaviveka himself asserts that the entities of the subjects—eyes and so forth—are not found by the merely erroneous

and so forth, compatibly appearing subjects do not exist because it is not suitable to hold as the subject mere eyes and so forth devoid of the specifics of the two truths in the system of the two disputants, because according to you Bhāvaviveka, a valid cognition taking mere eyes and so forth as [its] object...
It follows [that according to you Bhāvaviveka, a valid cognition taking mere eyes and so forth as (its) object that has discarded the specification “ultimate” does not exist] because Bhāvaviveka himself has asserted that eyes and so forth are not objects found by valid cognition mistaken with respect to inherent existence. [That Bhāvaviveka himself has asserted that eyes and so forth are not objects found by valid cognition mistaken with respect to inherent existence] entails [that according to you Bhāvaviveka, a valid cognition taking mere eyes and so forth as (its) object devoid of the specification “ultimate” does not exist] because in that case (1) the two, object found by a consciousness mistaken with respect to the inherent existence of the object and object found by a consciousness nonmistaken with respect to the inherent existence of the object, are directly contradictory, whereby eyes and so forth become objects by consciousnesses nonmistaken with respect to the own-character of the object and (2) valid cognitions nonmistaken relative to the appearance of the own-character of eyes and so forth must comprehend eyes and so forth as ultimately existing, but it is not suitable for them to comprehend mere eyes and so forth devoid of the specification “ultimate.” The former sign [which is that the two, object found by a consciousness mistaken with respect to the inherent existence of the object and object found by a
consciousness nonmistaken with respect to the inherent existence of the object, are directly contradictory, whereby eyes and so forth become objects by consciousnesses nonmistaken with respect to the own-character of the object] is established by the assertions of Bhāvaviveka himself.

Therefore, also to add syllables to [that is, flesh out] the statement in Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words*: (Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s new additions are in green type; additions already made in Great Exposition of Special Insight and retained in *The Essence of Eloquence* are in orange type)

At this time when here on this occasion of proving that
production from self does not exist, a negation of production in suchness, that is, ultimately, is asserted as the predicate of the proposition, this Bhāvaviveka himself just explicitly asserts that the entities of the subjects eyes and so forth—the substrata subjects which merely gain their entities [as] eyes and so forth through erroneous consciousness have degenerated, that is, are not feasible.

At this time—that is, because—when here on this occasion of proving that production from self does not exist, a negation of production in suchness, that is, ultimately—the nonexistence of production—is asserted as the predicate of the proposition, this Bhāvaviveka himself just explicitly asserts that the entities of the subjects eyes and so forth—subjects that are its substrata that syllogism refuting production from self—which merely gain their entities [as] eyes and so forth through erroneous consciousness consciousnesses in the sense of being polluted by ignorance have degenerated, that is, are not feasible.

{KEY: Tsong-kha-pa’s Essence is at the margin; headings in yellow highlight are from Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s Port of Entry. Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary is indented in a three-sided box. Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words, identified by Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho, is in blue type.}
At this time—that is, because—when here on this occasion of proving that production from self does not exist, a negation of production in suchness, that is, ultimately—the nonexistence of production—is asserted as the predicate of the proposition, this Bhāvaviveka himself just explicitly asserts that the entities of the subjects eyes and so forth—subjects that are its substrata that syllogism refuting production from self—which merely gain their entities [as] eyes and so forth through erroneous consciousness consciousnesses in the sense of being polluted by ignorance have degenerated, that is, are not feasible. in suchness, that is, nonestablishment ultimately

In brief, the meaning is “When Bhāvaviveka refutes production from self, he asserts the nonexistence of production ultimately as the predicate of the proposition, and when this is the case, he has asserted eyes and so forth as objects of real [that is, right] object-possessors (yul can yang dag gi yul).

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1. sounds, or terms (sgra, śabda)
2. awarenesses (blo, mati)
Here, from between erroneous and nonerroneous with respect to consciousness and object of consciousness, a consciousness mistaken about inherent existence (*rang bzhin la 'khrul ba'i shes pa*) is an erroneous consciousness, and a consciousness nonmistaken about inherent existence (*rang bzhin la ma 'khrul ba'i shes pa*) is a nonerroneous consciousness. An object found by a consciousness mistaken with respect to inherent nature (*rang bzhin la 'khrul ba'i shes pa*) is the definition of an erroneous object of consciousness (*shes bya phyin ci log*); erroneous object of consciousness, veil truth (*kun rdzob bden pa, saṃvratisatya*), and phenomenon whose mode of appearance and mode of subsistence are discordant (*snang tshul gnas tshul mi mthun pa'i chos*) are equivalent.

3. persons (gang zag, pudgala).

Terms refer to objects and thus have, or possess, objects; awarenesses apprehend objects and thus have, or possess, objects; and persons have, or possess, objects. Of these three, the one relevant here is awareness, consciousness.

A complication in English is that within subject-object this is subject, consciousness, but within the subject-predicate of a syllogism, an object-possessor in general is not this type of subject (*chos can, dharmin*) as in our central topic “compatibly appearing subject” (*chos can mthun snang*).

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(don gcig). An object found by a consciousness nonmis-taken with respect to inherent nature (rang bzhin la ma 'khrul ba'i shes pa) is the definition of a nonerroneous object of consciousness (shes bya phyin ci ma log pa); nonerroneous object of consciousness, ultimate truth (don dam bden pa, paramārthasatya), and phenomenon whose mode of appearance and mode of subsistence are concordant (snang tshul gnas tshul mthun pa'i chos) are equivalent (don gcig).

Having refuted through those the meaning [of a compatibly appearing subject], let us now refute the example. When a Buddhist proves to a Vaishēṣhika that sound is impermanent, then although the valid cognition comprehending the subject does not establish a derivative of elements or a quality of space [asserted] by the two systems, there is an object that is mere sound with respect to which [this consciousness] has become a valid
cognition demonstrable for “It is this.” However, a proponent of emptiness of inherent existence who is proving that eyes and so forth are not produced from self and a proponent of non-emptiness of inherent existence cannot demonstrate to each other such-and-such an entity of a subject which, despite its not being comprehended as either existing by way of its own entity or not existing by way of its own entity, is—for both of them—nevertheless being comprehended. Hence, [the example, the proof of sound as impermanent, and the exemplified, the proof of eyes as not produced from self] are not similar.

The suggestion seems to be that when a Buddhist proves to a Vaisheshika that sound is impermanent there indeed is a commonly appearing subject. If the Buddhist here is a non-Consequentialist, one could say that the commonly appearing subject is something only posited by their systems. On the other hand, if “Buddhists” includes Consequentialists as I would think it would, then there would be commonly appearing subjects at times when one was not establishing the ultimate mode of existence of things. Whether a commonly appearing subject exists or not would then depend upon what was being proved. However, since the meaning of a commonly appearing subject is tied down to a certification of the subject’s inherent existence by the consciousness certifying the subject itself, one has to say that from the Consequentialist viewpoint there are no commonly appearing subjects at all, no matter what is being proven, since the hypothesization of the subject cannot be ignored.
The example also lacks similarity [with the intended meaning]. Even if there [in the example] a generality of sound and a generality of impermanence that are not wished to be expressed as qualified [with particular tenets] do exist for both [parties], nevertheless proponents of emptiness and proponents of non-emptiness do not assert in that fashion a generality of eyes conventionally and also not ultimately; hence, the example lacks similarity [with the exemplified meaning].

Furthermore, the stated example, [the proof of sound as impermanent.] is not similar with the meaning, [the exemplified, the proof of eyes as not produced from self.] because:

dཔེ་ལ་ཡང་འȮ་བ་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །

See Hopkins, Chandrakīrtī Undermines Bhāvaviveka’s Assertion of Autonomy: Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Compatibly Appearing Subjects, 3 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version August, 2018: uma-tibet.org) translation of Chandrakīrtī, 130; for Jam-yang-shay-pa’s presentation of the meaning, see the same, 68-78. See also MacDonald, In Clear Words: The Prasannapadā, Chapter One, 113.

c The example is not similar to what it is intended to exemplify.
• when an Inner [Buddhist] proves to a Vaiśeṣika that sound is impermanent, then although the valid cognition comprehending the subject does not establish a derivative of elements of the Buddhist system or a quality of space of the Vaiśeṣika system, there is an object that is the mere sound with respect to which [this consciousness] has become a valid cognition demonstrable for “The object of hearing is this,”

• but when eyes and so forth are proved as not produced from self, for both a Consequentialist who propounds eyes and so forth as not inherently established and an Autonomist who propounds those as not empty of inherent existence, such an entity of a subject—despite not being comprehended as either of the two, existing from its own side or not existing from its own side—cannot be mutually demonstrated as nevertheless being comprehended by both of them. It is like, for example, when sound is comprehended, it is permissible that it is comprehended even though sound has been treated as without impermanence (sgra mi rtag par med du zin kyang), but when sound is comprehended, it is not permissible that it is comprehended even though comprehension is asserted upon having discarded [its] nature observed by valid cognition.

The example seems to suggest that when a Buddhist proves to a Vaiśeṣika that sound is impermanent there is a commonly appearing subject; however, if the Buddhist here is a non-Consequentialist, one could say that the commonly appearing subject is something only posited by their systems. If the term “Buddhists” includes Consequentialists, as one would think it would, then there would be commonly appearing subjects at times when one was not establishing the ultimate mode of existence of things. Whether a commonly appearing subject exists or not would then depend upon what was being proved. However, since the meaning of a commonly appearing subject is tied down to a certification of the subject’s inherent existence by the consciousness that certifies the subject itself, one has to say that from the Consequentialist viewpoint there are no commonly appearing subjects at all, no matter what is being proven, since the hypothesization of the subject cannot be ignored.

{KEY: Tsong-kha-pa’s Essence is at the margin; headings in yellow highlight are from Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s Port of Entry. Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary is indented in a three-sided box. Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words, identified by Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho, is in blue type.}
Concerning this, the Autonomists, Bhāvaviveka and so forth, cannot prove that although a generality—devoid of such specifics that could be shown to each other [the two parties in the debate]—does not exist, a generality not qualified with either existing or not existing ultimately, or truly, is apprehendable as the subject, because if [something] exists by way of its own entity, this is the meaning of truly existing [or ultimately existing and Bhāvaviveka and so forth themselves accept that the subject is qualified by existing by way of its own entity].

{KEY: Tsong-kha-pa’s Essence is at the margin; headings in yellow highlight are from Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s Port of Entry. Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary is indented in a three-sided box. Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words, identified by Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho, is in blue type.}
Concerning that, certain Autonomists say: Although mere general eyes and so forth—devoid of the specifics of existing from their own side and not existing from their own side—that both could show to both do not exist, a generality not qualified with either existing or not existing ultimately is apprehendable as the subject.

Through this they cannot prove an avoidance of fallacy because if [something] exists by way of its own entity, this is the meaning of truly existing.

Therefore, such arose due to the essential of their disagreeing with respect to the measure of the object of negation [Bhāvaviveka holding that only ultimate existence is refuted and Buddhapālita and Chandrakīrti holding that existence by way of the object’s own entity is the very meaning of ultimate existence], whereby even with respect to proving that sound is impermanent, although [the subject] is not confirmed as qualified by the two specifics of those systems, it is demonstrated that “A ground of confirmation of sound exists.” However, a valid cognition in accordance with how those two propound the valid cognition comprehending sound as having become a valid cognition with respect to such a meaning of sound does not exist.

\[ Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s Port of Entry, 571.13. \]

{KEY: Tsong-kha-pa’s Essence is at the margin; headings in yellow highlight are from Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s Port of Entry, Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary is indented in a three-sided box. Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words, identified by Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho, is in blue type.}
That is done in terms of the former party’s asserting existence by way of [the object’s] own entity; still, even though a Consequentialist acted as the former party, the Consequentialist could not demonstrate to that latter party a mode of the subject’s being established by a valid cognition comprehending it without qualification by either existing by way of its own entity or not existing by way of its own entity.

**Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary:** Therefore, such a difference of the permissibility and nonpermissibility of holding the mere general subject of eyes and so forth arose due to the essential of the Consequentialists and Autonomists disagreeing with respect to the measure of the object of negation [Bhāvaviveka holding that only ultimate existence is refuted and Buddhapālita and Chandrakīrti holding that existence by way of the object’s own entity is the very meaning of ultimate existence], whereby even with respect to proving that sound is impermanent, although [the subject] is not confirmed as qualified by the two specifics of those two systems—a derivative of the elements by the Inner [Buddhist] system and a quality of space by the Vaisheshika system—it
is demonstrated for a ground of confirmation of sound, “A mere generality that is an object of hearing by an ear consciousness exists.” However, a valid cognition in accordance with how those two, the Inner [Buddhist] and the Vaisheshika, propound the valid cognition comprehending sound as having become a valid cognition with respect to such a meaning of sound—a phenomenon that is a derivative of the elements and a phenomenon that is a quality of space—does not exist, because the valid cognition as propounded by the Vaisheshika “as having become a valid cognition with respect to such a meaning of sound—a phenomenon that is a quality of space—” does not exist, because a sound that is a quality of space does not exist.
That is done in terms of the former party’s asserting existence by way of [the object’s] own entity, an Autonomist, and the latter party’s not asserting such, a Consequentialist; still, even though a Consequentialist acted as the former party and an Autonomist acted as the latter party, [the former party] could not demonstrate to the latter party a mode of the confirming by valid cognition comprehending the subject without qualification by either existing by way of its own entity or not existing by way of its own entity.

That is done in terms of the former party’s asserting existence by way of [the object’s] own entity, an Autonomist, and the latter party’s not asserting such, a Consequentialist; still, even though a Consequentialist acted as the former party and an Autonomist acted as the latter party, [the former party] could not demonstrate to the latter party a mode of the confirming by valid cognition comprehending the subject without qualification by either existing by way of its own entity or not existing by way of its own entity.

B“ INDICATING DUE TO THIS FALLACY [OF THE POSITION IN THAT THE BASAL SUBJECT IS NOT ESTABLISHED] THE NONESTABLISHMENT ALSO OF THE REASON

Through those reasonings, you also should understand how the reason [“existing”] is not established [in Bhāvaviveka’s syllogism refuting the Sāṃkhya’s, “The subjects, eyes and so forth, are not produced from self because of existing, like intelligence.”]

\[89b\]}

Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary: a Chandrakīrti’s

a Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s Port of Entry, 572.2.

{KEY: Tsong-kha-pa’s Essence is at the margin; headings in yellow highlight are from Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s Port of Entry. Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary is indented in a three-sided box. Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words, identified by Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho, is in blue type.}
Clear Words says:

Just this mode of expressing the fallacy of the position [that is, thesis,] which is that the substratum [the subject] is not established is to be applied also in expressing the fallacy of nonestablishment with respect to this [Bhāvaviveka’s] reason—“because of existing.”

Moreover, a compatibly appearing sign also is not established because a valid cognition that is a means proving [Bhāvaviveka’s] reason—“because of existing”—established in compatible appearance for the systems of those two also does not exist, because the position (phyogs), or proposition (bsgrub bya), which is a combination of the two—the subject, eyes and so forth, of the autonomous sign (rang rgyud kyi rtags) and the predicate, nonexistence of production from self—does not exist. It follows [that the position (phyogs), or proposition (bsgrub bya), which is a combination of the two—the subject, eyes and so forth, of the autonomous sign (rang rgyud kyi rtags) and the predicate, nonexistence of production from self—does not exist] because of the earlier reasoning explaining that a valid cognition that is means proving a reason established in compatible appearance of a subject for the systems of the two disputants about

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a  Toh 3860, sde dge, dbu ma, vol. ‘a, 9b.. The Sanskrit in La Vallée Poussin, Prasannapadā, 30.15-16:

yasācāyamasiddhādharapakṣadosdhāvane vidhiḥ, eṣa eva sattvādityasya hetorasaiddhārthad神通h dhāvane'pi yojya ||.

See Hopkins, Chandrakīrti Undermines Bhāvaviveka’s Assertion of Autonomy: Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Compatibly Appearing Subjects, 3 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version August, 2018: uma-tibet.org) translation of Chandrakīrti, 130; for Jam-yang-shay-pa’s presentation of the meaning, see the same, 79. See also MacDonald, In Clear Words: The Prasannapadā, Chapter One, 113.

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whether empty or not empty of nature in the sense of establishment by [the object’s] own entity does not exist.

"དེ་ཡང་མེན་པ་ཡང་མ་ཐེག་པའི་ཞེས་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཀྱང་དེ་གཉིས་ཀྱི་རིགས་ལ་མེན་པའི་ཐབས་པའི་ཚད་མ་མེད་པར་བཤད་པའི་རིགས་པ་

[208a]དེར་ཐལ།

[KEY: Tsong-kha-pa’s Essence is at the margin; headings in yellow highlight are from Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s Port of Entry. Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary is indented in a three-sided box. Chandrakirti’s Clear Words, identified by Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho, is in blue type.]
Even Bhāvaviveka himself examines the meaning of the sign [“the Victor said such”] in terms of the two truths in the statement [by Buddhist Proponents of Truly Existent Things] “The internal sense-spheres have causes and conditions that are [their] producers because the Victor said such,”\(^a\) and expressed fault with it: “If that is conventionally, it is not established for you; if it is ultimately, it is not established for me.” Therefore, it is reasonable to express fault [with respect to Bhāvaviveka’s own inference] upon examining specifics: “Is the subject found by a mistaken or nonmistaken consciousness?” The evidence for this is by way of the essential that Chandrakīrti’s *Supplement* says that the two—objects found by consciousnesses perceiving real objects of knowledge and by consciousnesses perceiving false, that is, distorted (*log pa*), objects of knowledge—are the meaning of the two truths: \(^b\)

[Buddha] said that all things hold two natures,
Those found by perceptions of reality and of falsities—
Objects of perceptions of reality are suchness,
And objects of perceptions of falsities are veil truths.

[Also] just as [Bhāvaviveka] did no more than a twofold analysis of the two truths with respect to the sign [stated above by the Proponents of Truly Existent Things], it must be asked what the meaning of the sign is; it needs to be asked “What is stated as the sign on an occasion of doing three analyses including that of mere [existence] not qualified by either of the two?”

\(^a\) Bhāvaviveka faults this inference in his *Lamp for (Nāgārjuna’s) “Wisdom,”* commenting on stanza I.7; Toh 3853, sde dge, dbu ma, vol. tsha, 58b.3-58b.7.

\(^b\) Stanza VI.23; Toh 3861, sde dge, dbu ma, vol. ‘a, 205a.5-205a.6; La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra* , 102.8-102.11.
ཁྱེད་རང་དང་དོན་དམ་ȭ་ཡིན་ན་ངེད་ལ་མ་ǿབ་བོ་ཞེས་བདེན་
གཉིས་ལ་བȦགས་ནས་Dzོན་བȚོད་པའི་ɉིར།

ཆོས་ཅན་འǺལ་མ་
འǺལ་གྱི་ཤེས་པ་གང་གིས་ȟེད་ཅེས་Ɏེད་ɐག་ལ་བȦགས་ནས་
Dzོན་བȚོད་པར་རིགས་སོ།

འདིའི་ȅ་མཚན་ནི་འșག་པ་ལས།
དངོས་ཀུན་ཡང་དག་བɳན་པ་མཐོང་བ་ཡིས།
དངོས་ȟེད་ངོ་
བོ་གཉིས་ནི་འཛིན་པར་འǽར།
ཡང་དག་མཐོང་ɺལ་གང་
ཡིན་དེ་ཉིད་དེ།
མཐོང་བ་བɳན་པ་ཀུན་ɲོབ་བདེན་པར་
གཉིས་ཀྱི་དོན་ȭ་གེངས་པའི་གནད་ཀྱིས་སོ།
Ȧགས་ལ་བདེན་
གཉིས་ཀྱི་བȦག་པ་གཉིས་ལས་མ་མཛད་པ་Ȩར་ན་Ȧགས་ཀྱི་
དོན་གང་ཡིན་ཞེས་Ȯི་དགོས་ལ།

dེ་གཉིས་གང་གིས་ཀྱང་ཁྱད་
པར་ȭ་མ་ȭས་པའི་ཙམ་པོ་དང་བཅས་པའི་བȦག་པ་གཉིས་ལས་མ་མཛད་པ་Ȩར་ན་Ȧགས་ཀྱི་
དོན་གང་ཡིན་ཞེས་Ȯི་དགོས་སོ།

Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary: a Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words says:b

a Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s Port of Entry. 572.11.
b Toh 3860, sde dge. dbu ma, vol. ‘a. ཆོས།. The Sanskrit in P.L.Vaidya, Madhyamakaśāstra-vṛtti (La Vallée Poussin, Prasannapadā, 31.1) is:

itthaṁ ca ittadvam, yatkavantamānānāνāṇā yathokta’rtho’bhyupagatastārki-
keṣa | santyvedhāyātmikā yatanotpādakā hetvādayaḥ , tathā tathāgatena nird-
ēṣāt | yadāḥ yathā tathāgatenāsti nirdiṣṭaṁ tattathā, tadyathā śāntaṁ nir-
vānānītī ||
asya paropakṣiptasya sādhanaṁ svapunābhihitamanena - ko hi bhava-
tāmabhāpṛeto’tra hetvārthaḥ? saṁvyāt tathā tathāgatena nirdesāt, uta para-
māṭhata iti ? saṁvyāt cet, svato hetorasiṣṭhaḥḥṛthataḥ | paramāṭhataścet,

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chö-gya-tsho’s Port of Entry. Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary is indented in a three-sided box. Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words, identified by Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho, is in blue type.}
For, this logician [Bhāvaviveka] himself [comes to] assert the points as explained earlier. How? Another stated this proof:

Causes and so forth producing the internal sense-spheres just exist because the One-Gone-Thus said so. Whatever the One-Gone-Thus said is that way, as, for example, is the case with his saying that nirvāṇa is peace.

To this, [Bhāvaviveka] propounded this fallacy with:

What are you asserting as the meaning of the reason?

\[
\text{na sannāsanna sadasaddharmo nirvartate yadā | sadasadbhayāmaka-kāryapratayayatvanirākaraṇāt, taddā -kathām nirvartako heturevaṁ sati ki yujyate} ||
\text{naivāsau nirvartako heturiti vākyārthah | tataśca paramārthato nirvartyanirvar-
takatvāsiddheḥ asiddārthātā viruddhārthātā vā hetoriti} ||
\text{yataścaivaṁ svayamevām nyāyena hetorasiiddhāṅgikṛtānena,}
\text{tasmatśarvesvevānumāṇeṣu vastu dharmopanyasthetukṣeṣu svata evam}
\text{hetvādināmasiddhatvāt sarvāyeyā sadhanāni vyāhanyante | tadyathā - na}
\text{paramārthataḥ parebhyaṣṭatprayayebhyāḥ ādhyātmikāyatanajanma, paravāt,}
\text{tadyathā patasya | athavā - na pare paramārthena vivakṣitāḥ}
\text{caṅsurādyāṅgikāyatananirvarṭakāḥ pratayāḥ iti prátiyante, paravāt,}
\text{tadyathā tattvādaya iti | paravādākamatra svata evāṁiddham ||.}
\]

See Hopkins, Chandrakīrti Undermines Bhāvaviveka’s Assertion of Autonomy: Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Compatibly Appearing Subjects, 3 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version August, 2018: uma-tibet.org) translation of Chandrakīrti, 130-133; for Jam-yang-shay-pa’s presentation of the meaning, see the same, 79-95. See also MacDonald, In Clear Words: The Prasannapadā, Chapter One, 113-119.

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[Are you saying] “because the One-Gone-Thus said [such in terms of] conventional [existence]”\(^a\) or “because the One-Gone-Thus said [such in terms of] ultimate [existence]”? If conventionally, the meaning of the reason is not established for yourself, but if ultimately, [then as Nāgārjuna’s *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called “Wisdom”* says:]\(^b\)

> When [one analyzes whether] the phenomena [of effects] exist, 
> Do not exist, or [both] exist and do not exist [at the time of their causes], they are [understood as] not established [by causes].

At that time, conditions [producing] effects that have a nature of existence, nonexistence, or both [at the time of their causes] are refuted. Therefore:\(^c\)

> How could [an ultimately established definition, such as] “that which establishes”\(^d\) be [the definition of] causal [condition]?!
> In that case, it is not feasible [to say that because the definition of causal condition ultimately exists, causal conditions ultimately exist].

The meaning of [Nāgārjuna’s] statement is that those [ultimately existent things] are just not causes producing [effects]. Therefore, because [we Proponents of the Middle assert that]\(^f\) what is established [that is, effects,] and establishers [that is, causes,] do not ultimately exist, this reason is just nonestablished [for a Proponent of the Middle if the referent is to ultimate existence], and it is just contradictory [because this ultimately existent reason is very contradictory with a

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\(^a\) The bracketed material in this sentence is from the *Four Interwoven Annotations*, 561.4ff.
\(^b\) 1.7ab; the bracketed material in the stanza is from Tsong-kha-pa’s *Ocean of Reasoning*, 77.3ff. (Varanasi 1973 edition).
\(^c\) 1.7cd.
\(^d\) sgrub byed, nirvartaka; or “that which produces.”
\(^e\) rgyu’i rkyen, hetupratyaya.
\(^f\) The bracketed material in this sentence and the next is from the *Four Interwoven Annotations*, 562.4, except for “effects” and “causes” which come from the context above.

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Because this one [Bhāvaviveka] himself [comes] in this way to assert the nonestablishment of reasons, in all inferences in which he states phenomena that are actualities \( (\text{dngos po'i chos, vastudharma}) \) as reasons, the reason and so forth are not established for him, whereby all [his] proofs are destroyed. For, in:

> Ultimately the internal sense-spheres are not produced from their conditions which are other [than them] because of being other, as, for example, is the
The producers of the internal sense-spheres such as eyes, which others want to say [exist] ultimately, are not ascertained as conditions [producing the internal sense-spheres] because of being other, as, for example, is the case with threads and so forth.

“other” and so forth are not established for oneself [that is, for Bhāvaviveka].

Furthermore, even Bhāvaviveka by import (don gyis) has asserted those reasonings refuting autonomy from the approach of explaining that a subject, sign, and so forth—established in compatible appearance for both disputants—do not exist; he did this upon examining the distinction whether “a subject, sign, and so forth are found by a mistaken consciousness or by a nonmistaken consciousness” because Bhāvaviveka’s Lamp for (Nāgārjuna’s) “Wisdom,” Commentary on the “Treatise on the Middle” says:

Or, even our own schools are rejected...this reason is just nonestablished [for a Proponent of the Middle if the referent is to ultimate existence], and it is just contradictory

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a Reading ghatasya in accordance with De Jong (“Textcritical Notes,” 31, n. 31.14).
b Following the Tibetan gzhan gyis; the Sanskrit is pare which Stcherbatsky (Conception of Buddhist Nirvana, 119, n.7) prefers as paraih but De Jong (“Textcritical Notes,” 31, n. 31.14) decides should be left as it is.
c Bhāvaviveka faults this inference in his Lamp for (Nāgārjuna’s) “Wisdom,” commenting on stanza I.7; Toh 3853, sde dge, dbu ma, vol. tsha, 58b.3-58b.7; the brackets are from Four Interwoven Annotations, 562.4.

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How even Bhāvaviveka by Import has Asserted this Reasoning

[because this ultimately existent reason is very contradictory with a predicate of the proposition that is a conventionality].

Concerning this, Proponents of Truly Existent Things stated:

The internal sense-spheres have causes and conditions that are [their] producers because the Victor said causes and conditions that are [their] producers exist, because sūtra says, “Causes are the accomplishing. Objects of observation (dmigs rkyen, ālambanapratyaya),\(^a\) are the objects of observation of minds and mental factors. The immediately preceding (de ma thag rkyen, samanantarapratyaya) are the immediately ceased minds and mental factors except for the last. The proprietary (bdag rkyen, adhipatipratyaya) are what arise if certain ones exist.”

To this, Bhāvaviveka examines the meaning of the sign “because the One-Gone-Thus said” [asking] which of the two truths is it? If conventionally existent, the conventionally existent meaning of the sign is not established for you; if ultimately existent, the ultimately existent meaning of the sign is not established for me, and thereupon expressed fault with

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\(^a\) This is sometimes phrased “object of observation condition”—its condition of being an object of observation.

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That is the same essential as expressing fault upon examining specifics: “Is the subject found by a mistaken or non-mistaken consciousness?” because “Which of the two truths is it?” is the same essential as “Is the subject found by a mistaken or non-mistaken consciousness?” It follows [that “Which of the two truths is it?” is the same essential as “Is the subject found by a mistaken or non-mistaken consciousness?”] because that which is found by a mistaken consciousness is conventional and that which is found by a non-mistaken consciousness is ultimate. It follows [that which is found by a mistaken consciousness is conventional and that which is found by a non-mistaken consciousness is ultimate]
because the two—objects of knowledge found by consciousnesses perceiving real objects of knowledge and by consciousnesses perceiving distorted (log pa) objects of knowledge are the meaning of the two truths. It follows [that the two—objects of knowledge found by consciousnesses perceiving real objects of knowledge and by consciousnesses perceiving distorted (log pa) objects of knowledge are the meaning of the two truths] because Chandrakīrti’s *Supplement* [to (Nāgārjuna’s)”Treatise on the Middle”] says:*

[Buddha] said that all things hold two natures,
Those found by perceptions of reality and of falsities—
Objects of perceptions of reality are suchness,
And objects of perceptions of falsities are veil truths.

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*a* Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho cites only the first line and “and so forth,” which I have filled in; stanza VI.23; Toh 3861, sde dge, dbu ma, vol. *a*, 205a.5-205a.6; La Vallée Pous-sin, *Madhyamakāvatāra*, 102.8-102.11.

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The meaning of this: The Teacher [Buddha] said that all external and internal phenomena each hold two natures: from between the two:

- that which finds the own entity of the object by the pristine wisdom of the mode [of being or how phenomena are] by those who directly perceive the meaning of reality
- that which finds the existence of its own entity through the power of perceptions of falsities by beings under the influence of ignorance,

an object found by a rational consciousness comprehending the meaning of reality is an ultimate truth and that found by conventional valid cognition perceiving a false object of knowledge is a veil truth.

About this sign “because the One-Gone-Thus said so,” Bhāvaviveka’s Lamp for (Nāgārjuna’s) “Wisdom” [says in paraphrase:] it should be objected and examined: Here if it done with no more than the twofold examination of the two truths, what are you asserting as the meaning of the reason? [Are you saying] “because the One-Gone-Thus said [such in
How even Bhāvaviveka by Import has Asserted this Reasoning

terms of] conventional [existence]\(^a\) or “because the One-
Gone-Thus said [such in terms of] ultimate [existence]?”\(^b\); then, the meaning of the sign must be examined as before, “If it is conventionally existent, it is not established for you,” and so forth, because that very text [Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words*]
says:\(^b\)

If conventionally, the meaning of the reason is not estab-
lished for yourself, but if ultimately, [then as Nāgārjuna’s
*Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called “Wisdom”*]
says:\(^c\)

> When [one analyzes whether] the phenomena [of ef-

> ffects] exist,

> Do not exist, or [both] exist and do not exist [at the
time of their causes], they are [understood as]
not established [by causes].

> At that time, conditions [producing] effects having a na-
ture of existence, nonexistence, or both [at the time of
their causes] are refuted. Therefore:\(^d\)

> How could [an ultimately established definition,
such as] “that which establishes”\(^e\) be [the defini-
tion of] causal [condition]?!!

> In that case, it is not feasible [to say that because the
definition of causal condition ultimately exists,
causal conditions ultimately exist].

> [The meaning of (Nāgārjuna’s) statement is that] those
[ultimately existent things] are just not causes producing

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\(^a\) The bracketed material in this sentence is from the *Four Interwoven Annotations*, 561.4ff.

\(^b\) See Hopkins, *Chandrakīrti Undermines Bhāvaviveka’s Assertion of Autonomy: Jamyang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Compatibly Appearing Subjects*, 3 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version August, 2018: uma-tibet.org) translation of Chandrakīrti, 131; for Jamyang-shay-pa’s presentation of the meaning, see the same, 80-81. See also MacDonald, *In Clear Words: The Prasannapadā, Chapter One*, 114-117.

\(^c\) S.I.7ab; the bracketed material in the stanza is from Tsong-kha-pa’s *Ocean of Reasoning*, 77.3ff. (Varanasi 1973 edition).

\(^d\) S.I.7cd.

\(^e\) sgrub byed, nirvartaka; or “that which produces.”

\(^f\) rgyu’i rkyen, hetupratyaya.

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It must be asked “What is stated as the sign on the occasion of doing three analyses? “Because the One-Gone-Thus said [such in terms of existing] conventionally” a is stated as the sign or “because he said [such in terms of existing] ultimately?” or “because the One-Gone-Thus said [such] without qualification by either of the two truths” is stated as the sign? It must be examined that if it is in accordance with the first, it would not be established for you, and if it is in accordance with the second, it would not be established for me, whereas if it is in accordance with the third, the entailment would incur the fallacy of indefiniteness. b

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a The bracketed material in this sentence is from the *Four Interwoven Annotations*, 561.4ff.

b The point might be restated this way:

When Bhāvaviveka refuted the Proponents of True Existence among our own schools, he should have done a triple examination, asking whether “The Victor’s saying that causes and conditions exist conventionally” is stated as the sign, or

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whether “The Victor’s saying that causes and conditions exist ultimately” is stated as the sign, or whether merely the Victor’s saying that causes and conditions exist is stated as the sign. The two examinations of conventional and ultimate are not sufficient; otherwise, when Bhāvaviveka himself proves through the sign of existence that eyes are not produced from self, the fallacy that if eyes ultimately existing is stated as the sign, it is not established for Bhāvaviveka himself and if eyes existing conventionally is stated as the sign, it is not established for the other party, the Sāṃkhya. And it also should be asked, “What is stated as the sign on the occasion of doing three examinations?” this being together with merely being said by the Victor that eyes and so forth have causes and conditions without being qualified by either of those two, in which case the entailment would incur the fallacy of indefiniteness.

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3" EVIDENCE WHY THOSE FALLACIES EXPRESSED ARE NOT THE SAME FOR OUR OWN SYLLOGISMS {5 PARTS}

This has five parts: (1) to refute an opponent’s wrong conceptions, establishment for both disputants is not necessary; (2) having explained the meaning of an autonomous sign, indicating that this is not asserted; (3) when, having identified an other-renowned sign, upon its being known the view is found, at which point wrong conceptions discarding the class of behavior are blocked; (4) indicating that for a correct sign of other renown establishment by valid cognition by the opponent is necessary; and (5) dispelling a qualm about Autonomists not being Proponents of the Middle.

A" TO REFUTE AN OPPONENT’S WRONG CONCEPTIONS, ESTABLISHMENT FOR BOTH DISPUTANTS IS NOT NECESSARY

As evidence why such expressions of fault do not similarly [apply] to our syllogisms, [Chandrakīrti] states that he does not assert autonomy and thereupon says that it is sufficient that syllogisms proving objects of proof of our own system are established for the other party because of being for the sake of only the overcoming of wrong conceptions by that very [other party]. To a question about whether being established for either party [that

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is, the other party] might not be sufficient, [Chandrakīrti explains] that it is sufficient, citing the example of worldly dispute [in which one is defeated either by one’s own word in the sense of oneself coming to accept that one is defeated or by the word of a judge accepted by both parties but not just by the word of the person with whom one is in dispute]. Also, he explains that even Dignāga, who asserts that in both proofs and refutations [the subject and so forth] must be established by both [parties], should assert the earlier position [that acceptance by the opponent is sufficient] because [Dignāga himself asserts that] in damage [or contradiction] by scripture and inference for oneself establishment for oneself is sufficient.a

Even Dignāga accepts that in debate one can use citations of the scriptures of the other party, even if one oneself does not accept them, to refute the person. Also he accepts that out of the context of debating others, when one is engaged in internal reflection alone (this being called inference for oneself) since there is no other party, of course the subject and so forth cannot be established similarly for both parties. Chandrakīrti’s point is that once Dignāga is willing to accept the validity of these he should extend it to all cases of inference. Chandrakīrti’s view accords with the usual procedure of debate; it is merely that the logicians have mistakenly formulated the necessary grounds for debate.

b  Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s Port of Entry, 209b.2/573.27.
Clear Words says:*

[Hypothetical objection by Bhāvaviveka:] Is it not that just those faults that you ascribe to another’s [that is, my own] syllogisms follow for your inferences, due to which they would just have the fallacies of nonestablishment of the subject, reason, and so forth? Therefore, do not object to one [of us] with the faults that are incurred by both. Therefore, all these faults are not reasonable.

svaprasiddhaiva-vānumāṇena virudhyata iti etāvamātrasmadāmāmānairudbhāvyata iti kuto’ṃmatpakṣe yathokta-dosāvatāraḥ, yataḥ samānaścataḥ syāt? kīṁ punaḥ - anyataraprasiddhaṇānumāṇenānyānumānābādhaḥ | asti, sā ca svaprasiddhaṇaiva hetunā, na paraprasiddhaṇa, lokata eva dṛṣṭatvāt | kadāciddhi loke arthipratyarthibhyāḥ pramāṇīktetasāya sākṣiṇo vacanena jayo bhavati parājaya vā, kadācit svavacanena | paravacanena tu na jayo nāpi parājayaḥ | yathā ca loke, tathā nyāye pi | laukīkasaiva vyavahārasya nyāyasāstre prastutatvāt | ata eva kaiśiciduktam - na parataḥ prasiddhi-balādānumānābādhaḥ, paraprasiddheravā nirācākārasatvādīt | yauṣṭu manyate - ya eva ubhayaniścita-vādī, sa pramāṇam dīsaṇaṁ vā, nānyataraprasiddhasanidigdha-vaśīt iti, tenāpi laukīkīṃ vyavasthāmanurudhyāmānaḥ anumāṇe yathokta eva nyāyaḥbhavayaḥ ||

tathā hi nobhayaprasiddhena vā āgamena bādhā, kīṁ tarhi svaprasiddhenāpi || svārthānumāṇe tu sarvatva svaprasiddhīre va garīyasya, nobhayaprasiddhiḥ | ata eva tarkalakṣaṇābhīdhānaḥ nisprayojanaḥ, yathāsvaprasiddhāya upapattyā buddhaistadanaabhihiśvaveyjanānumānuṣrayaḥ | ityālaḥ prasāragena ||

See Hopkins, Chandrakīrti Undermines Bhāvaviveka’s Assertion of Autonomy: Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Compatibly Appearing Subjects, 3 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version August, 2018: uma-tibet.org) translation of Chandrakīrti, 138-143; for Jam-yang-shay-pa’s presentation of the meaning, see the same, 97-115. See also MacDonald, In Clear Words: The Prasannapadā, Chapter One, 129-139. {KEY: Tsong-kha-pa’s Essence is at the margin; headings in yellow highlight are from Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s Port of Entry. Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary is indented in a three-sided box. Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words, identified by Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho, is in blue type.}

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*a* Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s Port of Entry, 509b.2/573.27, cites only the beginning and ending of the citation; I have filled in the entire citation. The Sanskrit in P.L.Vaidya, Madhyamakāśāstraḥ: svapraśiddhaṇaiva-vānumāṇena virudhyata iti etāvamātrasmadāmānairudbhāvyata iti kuto’ṃmatpakṣe yathokta-dosāvatāraḥ, yataḥ samānaścataḥ syāt? kīṁ punaḥ - anyataraprasiddhaṇānumāṇenānyānumānābādhaḥ | asti, sā ca svaprasiddhaṇaiva hetunā, na paraprasiddhaṇa, lokata eva dṛṣṭatvāt | kadāciddhi loke arthipratyarthibhyāḥ pramāṇīktetasāya sākṣiṇo vacanena jayo bhavati parājaya vā, kadācit svavacanena | paravacanena tu na jayo nāpi parājayaḥ | yathā ca loke, tathā nyāye pi | laukīkasaiva vyavahārasya nyāyasāstre prastutatvāt | ata eva kaiśiciduktam - na parataḥ prasiddhi-balādānumānābādhaḥ, paraprasiddheravā nirācākārasatvādīt | yauṣṭu manyate - ya eva ubhayaniścita-vādī, sa pramāṇam dīsaṇaṁ vā, nānyataraprasiddhasanidigdha-vaśīt iti, tenāpi laukīkīṃ vyavasthāmanurudhyāmānaḥ anumāṇe yathokta eva nyāyaḥbhavayaḥ ||

tathā hi nobhayaprasiddhena vā āgamena bādhā, kīṁ tarhi svaprasiddhenāpi || svārthānumāṇe tu sarvatva svaprasiddhīre va garīyasya, nobhayaprasiddhiḥ | ata eva tarkalakṣaṇābhīdhānaḥ nisprayojanaḥ, yathāsvaprasiddhāya upapattyā buddhaistadanaabhihiśvaveyjanānumānuṣrayaḥ | ityālaḥ prasāragena ||

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Answer: Proponents of autonomous inferences (rang rgyud kyi rjes su dpag pa, svaṭantra-anumāṇa) come to have these faults, but we do not use autonomous inferences because our inferences have the fruit of only refuting others’ theses. It is as follows. Others who think that the eye sees are refuted by an inference established for them:

You assert on the one hand (kyang) that an eye has the attribute of not seeing its own entity and also assert that if it does not have the attribute of seeing other [forms such as blue, then seeing] just does not occur. Therefore:

Whatever [substratum] does not possess [the attribute] of not seeing its own entity just does not see [other forms].

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\[a\] “Our” is missing in the Tibetan. The Sanskrit (La Vallée Poussin, Prasannapadā, 34.5) has asmadanumāṇānām. The Four Interwoven Annotations (572.4) glosses this as referring to the inferences appearing in Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words and so forth, thereby reading the statement as referring not to all syllogistic reasoning in general but to those refuting production from self such as those drawn from Buddhapālita’s text. This reading preserves other-renowned inferences, or syllogisms, as a means also for positively communicating one’s own tenets, though the interpolation seems forced. Later in the Four Interwoven Annotations (573.4), the same passage is glossed this way: “but we [Consequentialists] do not use autonomous inferences because inferences [used by us Consequentialists] have the fruit [or purpose] of only refuting the [wrong] theses of other [parties].” In this version, the added commentary is not aimed at preserving the positive use of syllogisms, but I would add that Ge-lug-pa scholars could still hold that “inferences” here means not all but some inferences stated by Consequentialists. In any case, the Ge-lug-pa position is clear: other-renowned inferences are used for both positive and negative purposes.

\[b\] La Vallée Poussin (Prasannapadā, 34.6 and n. 5) changes paraś caksuḥ to param caṇḍuḥ recognizing that the Tibetan (dzhan) does not confirm the change and preferring that it read dzhan la; however, Dr. Vaidya leaves the manuscript as is, and the Four Interwoven Annotations (573.5) follows the same reading, identifying the term as referring to other parties who assert that the eye sees. I consider La Vallée Poussin’s emendation to be unnecessary.

\[c\] The bracketed material in this and the next section is from the Four Interwoven Annotations, 573.6-574.2.

{KEY: Tsong-kha-pa’s Essence is at the margin; headings in yellow highlight are from Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s Port of Entry. Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary is indented in a three-sided box. Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words, identified by Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho, is in blue type.}
tribute of] seeing its own entity also does not possess [the attribute of] seeing others [such as blue and so forth], as, for example, like a pot [which because of not seeing its own entity does not see others]. Also, an eye possesses [the attribute of] not seeing its own entity; therefore, this also does not possess [the attribute of] seeing others [such as forms]. Because of that, seeing others—blue and so forth—which is contradictory with not seeing its own entity is cleared away by inference established for them.

Since only such is expressed by our\textsuperscript{b} inferences, how could our position be subject to those faults as mentioned and due to which\textsuperscript{c} fallacy would be equally incurred?

\begin{quote}

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\texttt{བོད་པར་ེ་ཞེས་ེ་བར་ེ་བར་ེ་བར་}

\texttt{འུ་ཞེས་ེ་བར་ེ་བར་ེ་བར་ེ་བར་}

\texttt{ཁོ་བོ་ཅག་ནི་རང་གི་ེད་ཀྱི་ེས་ར་དཔག་པ་}

\texttt{མི་རོར་ཏེ། ཆོས་ར་དཔག་པ་དག་ནི་གཞན་}

\texttt{གི་དམ་བཅའ་བ་འགོག་པ་ཙམ་གྱི་}

\texttt{འཛིན་ཅན་ཡིན་པའི་ིར་རོ། །}

\texttt{འདི་ེར་གཞན་མིག་ཞེས་བར་བར་བ་}

\texttt{དེ་ནི་མིག་ལ་རང་གི་བདག་ཉིད་མི་ཐེ་བའི་}

\texttt{ཆོས་ཀྱང་འདོད་ལ།}

\texttt{གཞན་ལ་西藏་བའི་ཆོས་མེད་ན་མི་འཛིན་}

\texttt{ཡིད་ཐང་བ་ཉིད་ཞེང་ཁས་ཐངས་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ།}

\texttt{དེའི་ིར་གང་དང་གང་ལ་རང་གི་བདག་}

\texttt{ཉིད་ཐང་བ་མེད་པ་དེ་དང་དེ་ལ་ནི་གཞན་}

\texttt{ལ་西藏་བ་ཡང་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ།}

\texttt{དཔེར་ན་ཐམ་པ་བཞིན་ནོ། །}

\texttt{མིག་}

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\textsuperscript{a} \textit{Four Interwoven Annotations}, 574.4.

\textsuperscript{b} Missing in the Tibetan; the Sanskrit (La Vallée Poussin, \textit{Mūlamadhyamakakārikās avec la Prasannapadā}, 34.11) has \textit{asmad anumānāś}. 

\textsuperscript{c} Both editions of Jam-yang-shay-pa’s text (2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 169b.3, and 2011 TBRC \textit{bla brang}, 230b.3) read \textit{gang la}; Peking, vol.98 7.2.2, reads \textit{gang las}, which is preferable.

{KEY: Tsong-kha-pa’s \textit{Essence} is at the margin; headings in yellow highlight are from Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s \textit{Port of Entry}. Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary is indented in a three-sided box. Chandrakīrti’s \textit{Clear Words}, identified by Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho, is in blue type.}
[Hypothetical rejoinder by Bhāvaviveka:] Is there damage by inference even from an inference established for either [of the parties]?

[Answer:] There is. It moreover is just by a reason established to that [opponent] oneself, but not by what is established for the other [disputant], because such is seen in the world. In the world, sometimes [one party] prevails and [the other] is defeated by the word of a judge that both take to be valid, and sometimes comes about only by their own words, but victory or defeat does not come about by the other’s words. Just as it is in the world, so it is also in reasoning because only the conventions of the world are appropriate in treatises of reasoning.

{KEY: Tsong-kha-pa’s Essence is at the margin; headings in yellow highlight are from Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s Port of Entry, Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary is indented in a three-sided box. Chandrakirti’s Clear Words, identified by Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho, is in blue type.}
Therefore, some say, “There is no damage by inference that is through the force of being approved by the other [party] because [we] wish to refute what is merely renowned to others.” Also, there is someone who thinks, “That [sign] which expresses ascertainment [established] for both is [capable of] proof and refutation; that which is either established for just one or about which there is doubt [by either party as to whether it is established] is not [capable of such].” In dependence upon the world’s presentation of conventions they also should assert just this mode, as described above, with respect to inference. For, damage through scripture is not from the approach of only scripture established for both [parties]. Then how? It is also from the approach of [scripture] established for [the opponent] oneself. [Furthermore] in inference for oneself, always just what is established for oneself is weightier, not what is established for both.

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a The bracketed material is from the *Four Interwoven Annotations*, 591.1ff. 
{KEY: Tsong-kha-pa’s *Essence* is at the margin; headings in yellow highlight are from Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s *Port of Entry*. Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary is indented in a three-sided box. Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words*, identified by Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho, is in blue type.}
Therefore, expression of the definitions of logic [as they are renowned in the systems of the Autonomists and below] is not needed because the Buddhas help beings—who are trainees not knowing suchness—with the tenable in accordance with what is renowned to them. Enough extensive elaboration.

\[\text{a \hspace{1cm} Four Interwoven Annotations, 592.2.}\]

\[\text{b \hspace{1cm} With respect to “who do not know suchness” the Sanskrit (La Vallée Poussin, Prasannapadā, 36.1) is merely tadanabhijña “who do not know that [or those, which could refer to ‘definitions’]” whereas the Tibetan reads de kho na mi shes pa’i “who do not know suchness.” I have followed the Tibetan as it presumably reflects the translators’ reading of tad as meaning tattva (see La Vallée Poussin, Prasannapadā, 36, n.3). The Four Interwoven Annotations (592.3) takes it even further: chos kyi de kho na nyid ma shes pa’i “who do not know the suchness of phenomena.”}\]

\{KEY: Tsong-kha-pa’s Essence is at the margin; headings in yellow highlight are from Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s Port of Entry. Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary is indented in a three-sided box. Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words, identified by Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho, is in blue type.\}
In that [long passage cited just above, the first part] in the *Clear Words*:

*Hypothetical objection by Bhāvaviveka:* Is it not that just those faults that you ascribe to another’s [that is, my own] syllogisms follow for your inferences, due to which they would just have the fallacies of nonestablishment of the subject, reason, and so forth? Therefore, do not object to one [of us] with the faults that are incurred by both. Therefore, all these faults are not reasonable.

*Answer:* Proponents of autonomous inferences (rang rgyud kyi rjes su dpag pa, svatantra-anumāna) come to
have these faults, but we do not use autonomous inferences because our\(^a\) inferences have the fruit of only refuting others’ theses. It is as follows. Others\(^b\) who think that the eye sees are refuted by an inference established for them:

You assert on the one hand (\textit{kyang}) that an eye has the attribute of not seeing its own entity and also\(^c\) assert that if it does not have the attribute of seeing other [forms such as blue, then seeing] just does not occur. Therefore:

Whatever [substratum] does not possess [the attribute of] seeing its own entity also does not possess [the attribute of] seeing others [such as blue and so forth], as, for example, like a pot [which because of not seeing its own entity does not see others]. Also, an eye possesses [the attribute of] not seeing its own entity; therefore, this also does not possess [the attribute of] seeing others [such as forms]. Because of that, seeing others—blue

\(^a\) “Our” is missing in the Tibetan. The Sanskrit (La Vallée Poussin, \textit{Prasannapadā}, 34.5) has \textit{asmad-anumānānām}. The \textit{Four Interwoven Annotations} (572.4) glosses this as referring to the inferences appearing in Chandrakīrti’s \textit{Clear Words} and so forth, thereby reading the statement as referring not to all syllogistic reasoning in general but to those refuting production from self such as those drawn from Buddhapālita’s text. This reading preserves other-renowned inferences, or syllogisms, as a means also for positively communicating one’s own tenets, though the interpolation seems forced. Later in the \textit{Four Interwoven Annotations} (573.4), the same passage is glossed this way: “but we [Consequentialists] do not use autonomous inferences because inferences [used by us Consequentialists] have the fruit [or purpose] of only refuting the [wrong] theses of other [parties].” In this version, the added commentary is not aimed at preserving the positive use of syllogisms, but I would add that Ge-lug-pa scholars could still hold that “inferences” here means not all but some inferences stated by Consequentialists. In any case, the Ge-lug-pa position is clear: other-renowned inferences are used for both positive and negative purposes.

\(^b\) La Vallée Poussin (\textit{Prasannapadā}, 34.6 and n. 5) changes \textit{paraś caṅkṣuh} to \textit{param caṅkṣuh} recognizing that the Tibetan (\textit{gzhon}) does not confirm the change and preferring that it read \textit{gzhon la}; however, Dr. Vaidya leaves the manuscript as is, and the \textit{Four Interwoven Annotations} (573.5) follows the same reading, identifying the term as referring to other parties who assert that the eye sees. I consider La Vallée Poussin’s emendation to be unnecessary.

\(^c\) The bracketed material in this and the next section is from the \textit{Four Interwoven Annotations}, 573.6-574.2.

\(^d\) \textit{Four Interwoven Annotations}, 574.4.

{KEY: Tsong-kha-pa’s \textit{Essence} is at the margin; headings in \textbf{yellow highlight} are from Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s \textit{Port of Entry}. Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary is indented in a three-sided box. Chandrakīrti’s \textit{Clear Words}, identified by Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho, is in blue type.}
and so forth—which is contradictory with not seeing its own entity is cleared away by inference established for them.

Since only such is expressed by our\(^a\) inferences, how could our position be subject to those faults as mentioned and due to which\(^b\) fallacy would be equally incurred?

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\(^a\) Missing in the Tibetan; the Sanskrit (La Vallée Poussin, *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās avec la Prasannapada*, 34.11) has *asmanumānāir*.

\(^b\) Both editions of Jam-yang-shay-pa’s text (2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 169b.3, and 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 230b.3) read *gang la*; Peking, vol.98 7.2.2, reads *gang las*, which is preferable.

{KEY: Tsong-kha-pa’s* Essence* is at the margin; headings in yellow highlight are from Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s* Port of Entry*. Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary is indented in a three-sided box. Chandrakīrti’s* Clear Words*, identified by Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho, is in blue type.}
says that as evidence why such expressions of fault examining the two truths do not similarly [apply] to our own syllogisms, [Chandrakīrti] states that he does not assert autonomy and thereupon says that it is sufficient that the three—the sign, predicate [of the proposition], and subject (rtags chos don gsum)—of syllogisms proving objects of proofs of our own system are established for the other party because of being for the sake of only the overcoming of wrong conceptions by that very [other party].

With respect to the meaning of the term “only,” it is like the statement in Tsong-kha-pa’s Explanation [his Extensive Explanation of (Chandrakīrti’s) “Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle’”: Illumination of the Thought when it glosses the same statement in Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words]: syllogisms are exhausted as only refutations by the other party of theses of inherent existence; the meaning is that [these syllogisms] do not prove other than this, but it is not that it prevents proving a mere negation (bkag pa tsam)

{KEY: Tsong-kha-pa’s Essence is at the margin; headings in yellow highlight are from Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s Port of Entry. Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary is indented in a three-sided box. Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words, identified by Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho, is in blue type.}
Tsong-kha-pa’s *Great Commentary on (Nāgārjuna’s) “Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called ‘Wisdom’”* also accords with that.

[In that long passage, the next part] in the *Clear Words*:³

[Hypothetical rejoinder by Bhāvaviveka:] Is there damage by inference even from an inference established for either [of the parties]?

[Answer:] There is. It moreover is just by a reason established to that [opponent] oneself, but not by what is established for the other [disputant], because such is seen in the world. In the world, sometimes [one party] prevails and [the other] is defeated by the word of a judge that both take to be valid, and sometimes comes about only by their own words, but victory or defeat does not come about by the other’s words. Just as it is in the world, so it is also in reasoning because only the conventions of the world are

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³ Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho cites merely the beginning and end of this passage with an ellipsis in the middle; I have filled in the ellipsis. See Hopkins, *Chandrakīrti Undermines Bhāvaviveka’s Assertion of Autonomy: Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Compatibly Appearing Subjects*, 3 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version August, 2018: uma-tibet.org) translation of Chandrakīrti, 138-143; for Jamyang-shay-pa’s presentation of the meaning, see the same, 97-109. See also MacDonald, *In Clear Words: The Prasannapadā, Chapter One*, 129-134.

{KEY: Tsong-kha-pa’s *Essence* is at the margin; headings in *yellow highlight* are from Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s *Port of Entry*. Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary is indented in a three-sided box. *Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words*, identified by Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho, is in blue type.}
appropriate in treatises of reasoning.

Therefore, some say, “There is no damage by inference that is through the force of being approved by the other [party] because [we] wish to refute what is merely renowned to others.”

says that [in response] to wondering whether establishment of the three—the sign, predicate [of the proposition], and subject (rtags chos don gsum)—of a syllogism for either of the two disputants is not sufficient, using worldly debate as an example sometimes [one party] wins and [the other] is defeated by the word of a judge, and sometimes victory and defeat comes about only by one’s own word, whereby this [establishment for one of the two disputants] is sufficient.
And [in that long passage, the next part] in the Clear Words:⁴

Also, there is someone who thinks, “That [sign]⁵ which expresses ascertainment [established] for both is [capable of] proof and refutation; that which is either established for just one or about which there is doubt [by either party as to whether it is established] is not [capable of such].” In dependence upon the world’s presentation of conventions they also should assert just this mode, as described above, with respect to inference. For, damage through scripture is not from the approach of only scripture established for both [parties]. Then how? It is also from the approach of [scripture] established for [the opponent] oneself. [Furthermore] in inference for oneself, always just what is established for oneself is weightier, not what is established for both.

⁴ Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho cites merely the beginning and “and so forth” (sogs); I have filled in the remainder. See Hopkins, Chandrakīrti Undermines Bhāvaviveka’s Assertion of Autonomy: Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Compatibly Appearing Subjects, 3 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version August, 2018: uma-tibet.org) translation of Chandrakīrti, 141-143; for Jam-yang-shay-pa’s presentation of the meaning, see the same, 109-115. See also MacDonald, In Clear Words: The Prasannapadā, Chapter One, 134-139.

⁵ The bracketed material is from the Four Interwoven Annotations, 591.1ff.
says that the assertion by Dignāga who accepts that for both
“proof” (sgrub pa), that is, syllogisms (sbyor ba), and “refutation” (sun 'byin pa), that is, consequences (thal 'gyur), establishment of the three—the sign, predicate [of the proposition], and subject—by both [disputants] is necessary in accordance with the statement in his Autocommentary:\(^a\)

Only statements ascertained for both are proofs and refutations but statements established for either [disputant] and doubtful statements are not because of relying on further proof.

Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words explains that even those and so forth should assert the earlier system [described by him], the system in which what is only established for the opponent themselves is sufficient because on some occasions scriptures accepted by the opponent alone are damaging [to the opponent’s own position] and in inference for oneself the three modes established for oneself is sufficient.

\(^a\) Commenting on his Compilation of Valid Cognition (tshad ma kun gtus, pramāṇasamuccaya) III.12ab:

Therefore, just establishment for both
Is [required for] proof or refutation.
Having explained the meaning of an autonomous sign, indicating that this is not asserted

Therefore, since when in Bhāvaviveka’s Lamp for (Nāgārjuna’s) “Wisdom” on an occasion of expressing another’s fallacies, he says, “[These] are expressed in terms of own-power [that is, one’s own position] or in terms of refutation,” the two, this translation as “own-power” (rang dbang) and autonomy (rang rgyud, svatantra) are equivalent; therefore, that which generates an inference realizing the proposition upon having ascertained with valid cognition the two subjects and the modes of the sign, without involvement in the opponent’s assertions but in the manner of [their being] self-powered from an objective mode of abiding, is the meaning of autonomous.
Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho's commentary: a [In Tsong-kha-pa’s text] “is the meaning” and above is an identification of the hypothetical meaning of autonomous (rang rgyud); what is below [which appears in the next block of text] indicates not asserting this.

Moreover, that which generates an inference realizing the proposition from the approach of having ascertained with valid cognition how the two—the subject wanted to be known and the subject of the example—and the modes of the sign are established, without involvement in the opponent’s assertions but self-powered (rang dbang) from an objective mode of abiding is the significance of autonomous [syllogism] because the translation of Bhāvaviveka’s Lamp for (Nāgārjuna’s) “Wisdom” by Jog-ro [Lui-gyal-tshan] (cog ro) b “expressed in the context of own-power [that is, one’s own position] or in the context of repudiation,” the two, this translation as own-power (rang dbang) and autonomy (rang rgyud, svatantra), are synonyms (rnam grangs).

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a  Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s Port of Entry, 210a.5/574.19.
b  cog ro klu’i rgyal mtshan.

{KEY: Tsong-kha-pa’s Essence is at the margin; headings in yellow highlight are from Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s Port of Entry. Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary is indented in a three-sided box. Chandrakirti’s Clear Words, identified by Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho, is in blue type.}
Concerning this, prior to having established what is to be proven [the emptiness of inherent existence] to another party who asserts that existents exist by way of their own entities, [a Consequentialist] cannot cause [that party] to ascertain this mode of establishment of objects of comprehension by a valid cognition without any qualification of existing or not by way of [the object’s] own entity [through saying], “It is such and such.” Therefore, although [Consequentialists] assert signs and propositions, they do not assert autonomous signs and propositions.

**Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary:** Thus, although [Consequentialists] assert signs and propositions, they do not assert autonomous signs and propositions because until the proposition [of the emptiness of inherent existence] has been established for a Proponent of [Inherent] Nature, [that party] cannot ascertain “The mode of establishment of objects of

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a Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s Port of Entry, 210b.2/574.26.
comprehension by a valid cognition that is not qualified by either existing or not existing from its own side is such-and-such.”

With respect to stating an other-renowned inference proving that a stalk is without a nature in the sense of being established by way of its own entity in dependence on the reason of dependent-arising and on the example of a reflection, it is not that this is called “not established for both” and “other-renowned” by reason of one’s own not asserting that a stalk is a dependent-arising and that whatever is a dependent-arising is necessarily without inherent existence. Rather, since, like earlier, a ground for proving by valid cognition [the elements of a syllogism] under their own power does not occur, it means that [the elements of a syllogism] are not established for both oneself and the other by valid cognition in that way.
Although establishment of a stalk and establishment of it as a dependant-arising, and so forth, by conventional innate valid cognitions does indeed exist in the continuums of both disputants [the Consequentialist and the non-Consequentialist], the two—this and a valid cognition comprehending existence by way of [the object’s] own entity—are mixed in the perspective of the other disputant due to which these are not differentiated until the view is generated. Because of this, although the former disputant [the Consequentialist] has differentiated these, [the former disputant] cannot demonstrate such for that period. Although the mode of establishment by valid cognition is demonstrable mutually among Consequentialists without involvement in [an opponent’s] assertions, those are valid cognitions posited through the force of nominal conventions and not posited through the force of the thing’s own entity; therefore, autonomous [syllogisms] are not suitable.
Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary: a With respect to stating the other-renowned syllogism, “The subject, a stalk, is without the nature of being established from its own side because of being a dependent-arising, like a reflection,” it is not that this is called “a reason not established for both disputants” and “an other-renowned syllogism” due to the Consequentialist oneself not asserting (1) a stalk as a dependent-arising and (2) that whatever is a dependent-arising is necessarily without inherent existence. Rather, since, as explained earlier, a ground for proving the three modes [of a sign] as established by valid cognition under their own power does not occur, “other-renowned syllogism” means that the three modes are established by valid cognition for both oneself and the other without involvement in the opponent’s assertions.

Although establishment of a stalk and establishment of it as a dependent-arising, and so forth, by conventional innate

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a  Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s *Port of Entry*, 210b.3/575.4.
b  As in, “The subject, a stalk, is without a nature of establishment by way of its own entity because of being a dependent-arising, like a reflection.”

{KEY: Tsong-kha-pa’s *Essence* is at the margin; headings in yellow highlight are from Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s *Port of Entry*. Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary is indented in a three-sided box. *Chandrakirti’s Clear Words*, identified by Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho, is in blue type.}
valid cognitions exists in the continuums of both disputants [the Consequentialist and the non-Consequentialist], nevertheless until the view of the Middle is found, the two—this conventional innate valid cognition and a valid cognition comprehending existence from [the object’s] own side—having been mixed in the perspective of the other disputant are not differentiated, and hence although the former disputant [the Consequentialist] has differentiated these, [the Consequentialist] cannot demonstrate this [to a non-Consequentialist] within differentiating them for that period [that is to say, until the non-Consequentialist has differentiated them]. Even mutually among Consequentialists autonomous [syllogisms] are not suitable because although even among Consequentialists the mode of establishment by valid cognition is demonstrable without involvement in [an opponent’s] assertions, aside from conventional valid cognitions those are not valid cognitions posited through the force of things.

With respect to the likes of a stalk, there are three apprehensions: apprehension of it as existing by way of its own entity, apprehension of it as not existing by way of its own entity, and apprehension of it without qualification by either of those two. If the distinction that although all three
exist in the continuum of those who have generated the view [of emptiness], in the continuum of those who have not found the view there are no more than two, the first and the last, are known well, [you will realize that] everything apprehended by conceptual thinking, “This [is such-and-such],” is not refuted by reasoning, and you will prevent well wrong views devaluing the entire class of [altruistic] deeds after fancying that you have generated the view in your continuum upon thinking that all [practices] such as training in the mind directed toward enlightenment and so forth prior to generating the view [of emptiness] in your continuum are apprehensions of true existence or apprehensions of signs [that is, misconceptions of the nature of phenomena] and thereupon the devaluing of the entire class of [altruistic] deeds after fancying that you have generated the view [of emptiness] in your continuum.

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Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s Commentary:

- Although in the continuum of those who have generated...
the view [of emptiness], all three—apprehension [of objects] as existing from their own side and so forth [that is, apprehension as not existing from their own side, and apprehension without qualification by either of those two] exist with respect to the likes of a stalk,

- in the continuum of those who have not found the view apprehension [of objects] as not existing from their own side does not exist

are known, you will not act like Tibetans for whom everything apprehended by conceptuality is refuted by reasoning and will prevent well bad views discarding the entire class of [altruistic] deeds when they fancy that the view [of emptiness] has been generated.

Therefore, to prove a proposition through an other-renowned sign it is not sufficient that [the elements of the syllogism] only be asserted by the other party; rather, it must be that when the two subjects, the sign, and so forth are comprehended from their own side, they are established also by valid cognition, and he/she [the opponent] definitely should assert them or assert

D" INDICATING THAT FOR A CORRECT OTHER-RENOWNED SIGN ESTABLISHMENT BY VALID COGNITION BY THE OPPONENT IS NECESSARY

Therefore, to prove a proposition through an other-renowned sign it is not sufficient that [the elements of the syllogism] only be asserted by the other party; rather, it must be that when the two subjects, the sign, and so forth are comprehended from their own side, they are established also by valid cognition, and he/she [the opponent] definitely should assert them or assert
them, because, without this, if [a consciousness] is mistaken with respect to its conceived object, it cannot generate the view realizing suchness. Just this point that conventional valid cognition is an indispensable cause for comprehending the ultimate is the meaning of the statement [in Nāgārjuna’s Treatise on the Middle].

Without depending on conventionalities
The ultimate will not be realized.

Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary: Therefore, to prove a proposition through an other-renowned sign it is not sufficient that [the elements of the syllogism] only be asserted by the other party; rather, it must be that when the subject wanted to be known and the subject of the example, the sign, the predicate [of the proposition], and so forth are com-
prehended by this [other party] from within taking as a foundation establishment from their own side, these are established by valid cognition; if this is forced by reasoning, he/she must definitely assert it or it must be that it is asserted without relying on being forced by reasoning, because, without establishment by valid cognition, if [a consciousness] is mistaken with respect to its conceived object, it cannot generate the view realizing suchness, because Nāgārjuna’s *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called “Wisdom”* says that without depending on conventional valid cognition the ultimate cannot be realized.

Here, concerning the presentation of the other-renowned syllogism indicated in Chapter Three (stanzas 2c-3b) of Nāgārjuna’s *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called “Wisdom”*: a

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*a* The translation is from Hopkins, *Finalizing the Meaning of Autonomist and Consequentialist: Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight with the Four Interwoven Annotations: Compatibly Appearing Subjects*, 6, (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version: September, 2019, uma-tibet.org), 49 and 104; the bracketed material is from Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub’s annotations in the same, 49.

{KEY: Tsong-kha-pa’s *Essence* is at the margin; headings in yellow highlight are from Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s *Port of Entry*, Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary is indented in a three-sided box. Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words*, identified by Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho, is in blue type.}
About this seeing [by the eye], it does not see
The entity of [the eye] itself [because itself acting on it-
self is contradictory].
[If] it [the eye] does not see [its own] self,
How [would] it [the eye—from its own side perform] the
seeing of others[, a form]?

and so forth,

1. a syllogism proving a proposition through the three
   modes renowned to the other, latter disputant without be-
   ing established by valid cognition unmistaken with re-
   spect to own-character for both disputants is the definition
   of an other-renowned syllogism

2. the two, self-renowned syllogism and other-renowned syl-
   logism, are equivalent

3. etymologies:
   (a) [a syllogism] is not called “other-renowned” because the
   three—its sign, predicate [of the proposition], and subject
   (rtags chos don gsum)—and the example are not asserted by
   the former disputant [the Consequentialist]; rather, it is called
   “a syllogism renowned to Proponents of Actualities them-
   selves” (dngos smra ba la rang grags kyi sbyor ba) because

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chö-gya-tsho’s Port of Entry. Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary is indented in a three-sided
box. Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words, identified by Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho, is in blue type.}
the subject, sign, example, and so forth are asserted as objects found by valid cognitions unmistaken relative to the appearance of own-character in the systems of Proponents of Actualities themselves,

(b) and it is called “an other-renowned syllogism” because of being renowned that way in the systems of Proponents of Actualities, who are other than Proponents of the Middle;

(c) although the subject, sign, example, and so forth are asserted by the former disputant [the Consequentialist], that these are found by valid cognitions unmistaken with respect to own-character is not established in compatible appearance for both disputants—aside from only the latter disputant [the Proponent of Actualities]—whereby this must also be known as the meaning of “not established for both.”

4. an illustration of other-renowned syllogism, for instance: the subject, an eye, does not by way of its own entity see a form because of not seeing itself, like for example, a pot;
E" DISPELLING A QUALM ABOUT AUTONOMISTS NOT BEING PROPONENTS OF THE MIDDLE

Question: According to these proponents, since the Autonomists such as Bhāvaviveka and so forth assert the meaning of ultimate or true establishment, they should not be posited as Proponents of the Middle, should they?

Answer: Just as:

• although those who have ascertained a bulbous thing [with a flat bottom and able to hold fluid] but have not ascertained this base as a pot still need establishment [of it as a pot] by valid cognition, and therefore it cannot be propounded that they assert this base as a pot, and
• although concerning a pot a Vaiśeṣikas has established through valid cognition the meaning of the nonexistence of a whole b that is a substantial entity other than its own parts, c it cannot be said that a

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a See Hopkins, *Finalizing the Meaning of Autonomist and Consequentialist: Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight with the Four Intervened Annotations: Compatibly Appearing Subjects*, 6, (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version: September, 2019, uma-tibet.org), 49-77 and 104-120.

b yan lag can; literally, “branch-possessor.”

c yan lag; literally, “branches.” In ordinary cognition Vaiśeṣikas validly know that a pot cannot be found separate from its constituent parts, but in their tenets they assert that the whole is a separate substantial entity.

{KEY: Tsong-kha-pa’s Essence is at the margin; headings in yellow highlight are from Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s Port of Entry. Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary is indented in a three-sided box. Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words, identified by Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho, is in blue type.}
Vaiśeṣika is not a proponent of the tenet asserting that the whole is another substantial entity [from its parts],
so, similarly since those scholars [the Autonomists such as Bhāvaviveka and so forth] refute through many approaches of reasoning the tenet that phenomena truly exist and assert well that phenomena do not truly exist, they are Proponents of the Middle. This does not contradict [Chandrakīrti’s] statement that it is unsuitable for whoever is a Proponent of the Middle to use autonomous [syllogisms]; it is like the fact that although it is not suitable for a monastic who has taken the formulated code to contradict the code, merely contradicting it does not necessitate not being a monastic.

\[\begin{align*}
\text{Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary:}^a \\
\text{Question: About that, according to the Consequentialists,}
\end{align*}\]

\[\begin{align*}
\text{since although the Autonomists do not accept true establishment and so forth, they assert the meaning of those, that is,}
\end{align*}\]

\[\begin{align*}
\text{\[KEY: Tsong-kha-pa’s Essence is at the margin; headings in yellow highlight are from Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s Port of Entry, Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary is indented in a three-sided box. Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words, identified by Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho, is in blue type.\]}
\end{align*}\]
establishment by way of its own character, they should not be posited as Proponents of the Middle, should they?

Answer: Just as for example:

- although those who have ascertained a bulbous thing [with a flat bottom and able to hold fluid] but have not ascertained this base as a pot cannot be propounded as asserting this base as a pot, and
- although it cannot be propounded that a Vaisheshika is not a proponent of the tenet asserting that [the whole\textsuperscript{a}] is another substantial entity [from its parts\textsuperscript{b}],

so, since Autonomists also refute true establishment and assert well the absence of true existence, they are Proponents of the Middle. This does not contradict the statement in Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words* that it is unreasonable for whoever is a Proponent of the Middle to use autonomous [syllogisms]\textsuperscript{c}.

Also, it is not suitable for one who is a Proponent of the Middle to make autonomous inferences because of not asserting other positions [among the four extremes].

because of being like the fact that merely contradicting the code\textsuperscript{d} does not necessitate not being a monastic. Likewise, it should also be known that although Bhāvaviveka and so forth

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\textsuperscript{a} yan lag; literally, “branch-possessor.”

\textsuperscript{b} yan lag; literally, “branches.” In ordinary cognition Vaisheshikas validly know that a pot cannot be found separate from its constituent parts, but in their tenets they assert that the whole is a separate substantial entity.

\textsuperscript{c} Jeffrey Hopkins, *Chandrakīrti Defends Buddhapālita against Bhāvaviveka: Jamyang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Opposite of the Consequences*, 2 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, October 2017, uma-tibet.org), 28 and 157.

\textsuperscript{d} Transgressing formulated codes such as sleeping on a high bed as opposed to root infractions and transgressions of natural codes against naturally immoral acts, such as murder.

{KEY: Tsong-kha-pa’s *Essence* is at the margin; headings in *yellow highlight* are from Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s *Port of Entry*. Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary is indented in a three-sided box. Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words*, identified by Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho, is in blue type.}
are Proponents of the Middle who assert the meaning of the extreme of permanence, they are not Proponents of the Middle who assert the extreme of permanence, and so forth.

{KEY: Tsong-kha-pa’s Essence is at the margin; headings in yellow highlight are from Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s Port of Entry. Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s commentary is indented in a three-sided box. Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words, identified by Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho, is in blue type.}
PART TWO:
Tsong-kha-pa’s
The Essence of Eloquence:
on Compatibly Appearing Subjects

Treatise Differentiating Interpretable and Definitive Meanings: The Essence of Eloquence by Tsong-kha-pa Lo-zang-drag-pa

༅།།ཐོང་བ་དང་ངེས་པའི་དོན་ȷམ་པར་འེད་པའི་བྱན་བཅོས་ལེགས་བཤད་ȡིང་པོ།
2' How autonomous signs are not asserted

Question: Indeed, since positions, signs, and examples that are established by way of their own character do not at all occur, in that context not only autonomous signs but also all actions, objects, and agents are not logically feasible. However, what is the evidence why it is not suitable to assert the agents and objects of autonomous signs and propositions in the system of those who, refuting those, prove that all objects and agents such as proofs and propositions and so forth are logically feasible?

Answer: Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words explains this in three [sections]: the reasoning refuting autonomy, how even the opponent by import has asserted this reasoning, and the evidence why those fallacies expressed are not the same for our own syllogisms.

Concerning those, Bhāvaviveka [in refuting production from self] states [the syllogism]:

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a Bhāvaviveka’s Lamp for (Nāgārjuna’s) “Wisdom” (Toh 3853, sde dge, dbu ma, vol. tsha, 49a.2-49a.3); cited in Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words (Toh 3860, sde dge, dbu ma, vol. ‘a, 8b.3; La Vallée Poussin, Prasannapadā, 25.9-26.2).
Ultimately the internal sense-spheres are definite as not produced from self\(^a\) because of existing, like intelligence.\(^b\)

[This syllogism, which Bhāvaviveka states in order to refute production from self,] is refuted [by Chandrakīrti as follows.] If “ultimately” is affixed as a qualification of the thesis, then since ourselves do not assert production from self even conventionally, it does not need to be affixed relative to ourselves; if it is in relation to others, it is reasonable to refute the Forders—who have fallen from the two truths—from the approach of both truths, whereby it is good to refute [production from self] without affixing a qualification.

\(^a\) The Tibetan reads “are definite as not being produced from self” (*bdag las skye ba med par nges te*), but “definite” is not represented in Poussin’s Sanskrit.

The reason could also be translated as “because of presently existing” since *vidyamāna* is the present middle particle; however, later Chandrakīrti (La Vallée Poussin, *Prasannapadā*, 33.4) cites the reason as *sattvād*, suggesting that the particular form makes little difference, this perhaps being why the reason was translated into Tibetan merely as *yod pa'i phyir* instead of *da lta bar yod pa'i phyir*.

The Tibetan of the example *shes pa yod pa nyid bzhin* is a mere translation of the Sanskrit *caitanya* and is not an extension of the example to include the reason, “existing.” The reference of “intelligence” is to the *purusa*—the person, or pure spirit, pure consciousness; to a Buddhist it could merely be taken as consciousness.

\(^b\) *don dam par r när gi skye mched rnam* *bdag las skye ba med par nges te yod pa'i phyir shes pa yod pa nyid bzhin no, na paramārthāḥ ādhyātmikānyāyatanaḥ svata utpānī ni vidyamānātvāt caitanyavād.*
Also, it is not reasonable to affix the qualification relative to the conventions of the world since it is not reasonable to refute production from self [wrongly thinking] that it is asserted in the conventions of the world, because the world asserts just that effects arise from causes but does not analyze, “From what are they produced, self or other?”

Furthermore, if it is from wanting to refute even conventionally eyes and so forth that are asserted [to exist] ultimately by the opponent [the Sāṃkhyas], then there would be the fallacy of a position or of a sign in which the basal subject is not established because ourselves do not assert eyes and so forth ultimately.

[Objection:] Although ultimately existent eyes and so forth are not established, conventionally existent eyes and so forth exist, due to which that fallacy does not exist.

[Answer:] Well then, what does “ultimately” qualify?

[Rejoinder:] Since conventional eyes and so forth are refuted ultimately, it is a qualification of the refutation of production.
Rebuttal: This is not reasonable because you did not propound this and because even if you did propound it, there would be the fallacy that the subject would not be established for the other [party, a Sāṃkhya because Sāṃkhyas do not assert eyes and so forth as conventional in accordance with the assertion of the Proponents of the Middle].

To dispel those fallacies, [hypothetically Bhāvaviveka] says:

When Buddhists prove to a Vaiśeṣika that sound is impermanent, they hold [that is, use] the generality but do not hold [sound] specified [by the particular assertions of either school as the subject]; if they did hold such, the proposition and the proof would become nonexistent. For, if they held sound that is an evolute of the elements as the subject, it would not be established for the Vaiśeṣika, and if they held sound that is a quality of space [as the subject], it would not be established for the Buddhist. Therefore, just as they hold mere sound—the generality having discarded specifications—as the subject, so mere eyes and so forth—upon having discarded the specifications of ultimate or conventional—are held as the subject, because of which the fallacy of the subject’s not being established does not exist.

a Although Sāṃkhya assert that only the person and the general principal are ultimately existent and thus assert that eyes and so forth are conventionally existent, their sense of conventional existence fulfills the Middle Way sense of substantial existence (rdzas su yod pa, dravyasat) and thus ultimate existence and not as imputedly existent (btags par yod pa, prajñaptisat), due to which it would not be appropriate to refute mere conventionally existent eyes and so forth, as Chandrakīrti says.
In response, [Chandrakīrti] refutes [Bhāvaviveka] upon demonstrating that Bhāvaviveka himself has asserted that the entities of the subjects, eyes and so forth, are not found by the merely erroneous and that the reasoning that the erroneous and non-erroneous are different—a direct dichotomy—and so forth.

The meaning of those is: As the subjects in the proof that eyes and so forth are not produced from self, it is not suitable to posit mere eyes and so forth for which the specifics of the two truths have been discarded, because [according to Bhāvaviveka]a (1) a valid cognition comprehending these subjects is a consciousness unmistaken with respect to the nature of eyes and so forth, but (2) states (gnas skabs) of—that is, objects found (rnyed pa’i yul) by—nonerroneous consciousnesses unmistaken with respect to the nature do not exist among false appearances, erroneous objects of knowledge appearing to exist by way of their own character whereas they do not.

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a Ta-drin-rab-tan’s Annotations, 382.1.
With respect to how [Bhāvaviveka] asserts the former reason [which is that (according to Bhāvaviveka) the valid cognitions comprehending those subjects are consciousnesses unmistakable with respect to the nature of eyes and so forth]:

• In a system asserting that whatever exists exists by way of its own entity, if [a consciousness] has come to be mistaken relative to the appearance of own-character [that is, the object’s being established by way of its own character], it cannot be posited as finding [that is, realizing] its object of comprehension. Therefore, whether a conceptual or non-conceptual valid cognition, it must be unmistakable with respect to the own-character [that is, the establishment by way of its own character] of that with respect to which it is a valid cognition—the appearing object or the conceived object. In that case, [the consciousness] must go as a valid cognition with respect to the entity (ngo bo), or nature (rang bzhin), of the mode of subsistence of the object itself, this not just being nominally imputed in conventional terms, and [Bhāvaviveka] himself also asserts this.

[72x670]དེ་དག་གི་དོན་ནི་མིག་སོགས་བདག་ལས་མི་Dzེ་བར་ȍབ་པའི་
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གཞག་ȣ་མི་ɻང་Ȫེ།

[72x646]ཆོས་ཅན་དེ་འཇལ་བའི་ཚད་མ་ནི་མིག
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[87a]ལ་ཤེས་
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ཏེ།

dེས་ȟེད་པའི་ɺལ་ནི་ཤེས་Ɏ་ɉིན་ཅི་ལོག་རང་མཚན་གྱིས་
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• In a system asserting that whatever exists exists by way of its own entity, if [a consciousness] has come to be mistaken relative to the appearance of own-character [that is, the object’s being established by way of its own character], it cannot be posited as finding [that is, realizing] its object of comprehension. Therefore, whether a conceptual or non-conceptual valid cognition, it must be unmistakable with respect to the own-character [that is, the establishment by way of its own character] of that with respect to which it is a valid cognition—the appearing object or the conceived object. In that case, [the consciousness] must go as a valid cognition with respect to the entity (ngo bo), or nature (rang bzhin), of the mode of subsistence of the object itself, this not just being nominally imputed in conventional terms, and [Bhāvaviveka] himself also asserts this.

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Evidence why those Fallacies are not the Same for our own Syllogisms

It is contradictory for whatever is an object found by such a valid cognition to be an erroneous object of knowledge, whereby the latter sign [which is that states of—that is, objects found by—nonerroneous consciousnesses unmistaken with respect to the nature do not exist among false appearances, erroneous objects of knowledge appearing to exist by way of their own character whereas they do not] is established. Likewise, it is also contradictory for whatever is an object found by a mistaken consciousness to be an erroneous object of knowledge.

Therefore, [Bhāvaviveka] cannot dispel the fallacy of a nonestablished subject.a

It might be thought:

• Just as although valid cognitions comprehending sound are limited to the two, permanent and impermanent, it is not necessary to prove—as the valid cognition that certifies sound—whether it is a valid cognition qualified by being either “an impermanent valid cognition” or “a permanent valid cognition,” so although consciousnesses are limited to the two, mistaken and unmistaken, it is not necessary when the valid cognition that certifies a subject is demonstrated, to prove it as qualified by either of those two.

• Likewise, just as it is not contradictory that although sound is limited

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a Ta-drin-rab-tan’s Annotations, 383.4, specifies “a compatibly appearing subject.”
to the two, permanent and impermanent, and a valid cognition comprehending sound does not find sound as either permanent sound or impermanent sound, still it comprehends sound, so although eyes and so forth are limited to the two, erroneous and nonerroneous objects of knowledge, and the valid cognition comprehending eyes and so forth does not find eyes and so forth as either erroneous or nonerroneous objects of knowledge, it is not contradictory that it comprehends eyes and so forth.

Hence those reasonings on the unsuitability of holding mere eyes and so forth as subjects are not logically feasible.

Since it would be pointless for scholars such as Bhāvaviveka and so forth or Proponents of [Truly Established] Things to generate such a qualm, even Chandrakīrti did not construct a position to clear it away.
However, since generation [of this qualm] occurs in ignorant disputants such as those of the present day, let us explain it. [According to the assertions of the Autonomists,] when an object is analyzed as to whether it is established or not by valid cognition, that it is established by valid cognition must be understood by way of that object demonstrated either (1) as being established in accordance with the appearance to this consciousness if it is a non-conceptual valid cognition or (2) as established in accordance with the ascertainment or determination of the meaning by this consciousness if it is a conceptual valid cognition. This is the meaning of unmistaken because:

(1) through positing the object as established in accordance with how it appears to [this awareness] itself, this awareness is posited as unmistaken with respect to its appearing object, or
(2) through positing the object as established in accordance with how it is ascertained by [this awareness] itself, this awareness is posited as unmistaken with respect to ascertained or determined object.

Therefore, how could it be that [the subject] is only decided with respect to things and is not decided by the likes of what is established by awareness!
In that way, an object found by a consciousness unmistaken relative to the appearance of [the object as established by way of its] own character is established as the means of positing [something as] a real object of knowledge, and therefore how could it be that real and unreal objects of knowledge are decided with respect to things and not decided in the perspective of the awareness!

These [points] are the system of establishment [that is, certification] through valid cognition by those disputants who assert that existents exist by way of their own entities; they are not [Chandrakirti’s] own system. Therefore, according to the Autonomists, although subjects such as eyes and so forth are found by an unmistaken consciousness as such real objects of knowledge, these do not have to be established as qualified by either the [verbal] conventions or meanings of being established as [either of] the two truths, and [thus] taking them as the substrata, it is permissible to analyze whether they ultimately exist or not. Due to this, they think, “How could the fallacy involved in examining the specifics of the two truths apply to holding a generality as the subject!”
Evidence why those Fallacies are not the Same for our own Syllogisms

Chandrakīrti, thinking that such have come to be existent by way of their own entities and just that is the meaning of ultimately existing, whereby how could a mere subject in which that is held as the substratum occurs, refutes holding a generality devoid of specifics as the subject.

If you realize the essentials of these [points], you will understand:

• the Autonomists’ explanation [of the division of veilings, that is, conventional objects, into the real and unreal as in Jñānagarbha’s Two Truths].

  Though similar in appearing, there are those
  Able and not able to perform functions as they appear,
  Whereby a division of real and unreal
  Veilings is made.


b  Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-pa’s) “Great Exposition of Tenets”: Freeing the Knots of the Difficult Points, Precious Jewel of Clear Thought (dbu ma pa, kha, 80.1) explains:

Although similar in appearing to conventional consciousnesses that clearly perceive them, there are two types—those established and those not established in accordance with their mode of appearance—whereby a division is made into real and unreal veil truths. Although the explicit reading [of Jñānagarbha’s text] is seen to put this together as being able or not being able to perform a function in accordance with the mode of appearance, this is a mere illustration with regard to such phenomena as water and a mirage because otherwise it would have to be
and also the Autonomists’ not dividing object-possessors [consciousnesses] into the two, real and unreal,

and the evidence why the Consequentialists posit both real and unreal objects and object-possessors relative to just the world and do not posit such in their own system.

If it is posited that the subject is established by a mistaken consciousness—conceptual or non-conceptual—to which own-character a does not exist as it appears, then since the meaning of what is being proved, the absence of inherent existence, would already have established, how could this one be suitable as an opponent for whom this needs to be proved! Therefore, the fallacy of the nonestablishment of the subject remains as before.

asserted that uncompounded space is an unreal conventionality [because, being permanent, it cannot perform a function].

That is, establishment by way of its own character.
Objection: If [based on Chandrakīrti’s text] you are holding that the two, object found by a mistaken consciousness and nonerroneous object of knowledge, are contradictory, then the two, object found by an inferential rational consciousness [this being an emptiness] and an ultimate truth, also would be contradictory. Also since [ultimate truths] are not asserted as found by mere erroneous consciousness, they must be found by consciousnesses that are nonmistaken with respect to the nature, in which case all veilings also would become those [that is, ultimate truths] because those are comprehended by a Victor’s pristine wisdom knowing the diversity and because the term “mere” eliminates that [those veilings] are found by a nonmistaken [consciousness].

The reference is to Chandrakīrti’s statement cited earlier:

That is not so. For, at just this time [of proving that eyes and so forth are without production] (de’i tse kho nar, tadaiva) when it is the case that a negation of production is asserted here as the predicate of the proposition, this one [Bhāvakīrti] himself just asserts the degeneration [or nonestablishment] of the entities of the subjects [eyes and so forth]—the substrata of that [predicate, the absence of production from self]—which gain their thingness by way of mere erroneous [consciousnesses]. Erroneous and nonerroneous [objects] are different [mutually exclusive and a dichotomy].
[Response:] The first fallacy does not exist because although an inferential rational consciousness is a mistaken consciousness mistaken with respect to its appearing object, it is not contradictory that what is found by it is not found by a mistaken consciousness, just as although the sound of a conch that is on the one hand a sound and also false is found, it is not contradictory that a false sound of a conch is not found.

When one considers where the delimitation “mere” [in the referenced citation from Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words] is applied, such a qualm could be produced, but the speaker [Chandrakīrti’s] intention is that he said “mere” wishing to refute that [conventionalities] are found by an analytical [consciousness] analyzing what the mode of existence is, but not [intending] to refute that [conventionalities] are found by a nonmistaken consciousness because [Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words] says:

I also propound, “What is the use of applying fine analysis to the conventions of the world!” For, veilings gain their existent entity only through a veiled erroneous [consciousness].

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a  That is, perceived incontrovertibly.
b  Toh 3860, sde dge, dbu ma, vol. ‘a, 23a.7-23b.1; La Vallée Poussin, Prasannapada, 68.7-68.8: vayamapyevaḥ brūmah/ kimanayā sūkṣmeṣṭikāyā laukikavayavahāre ’vatāri- kayā/ tiṣṭhatu tāvadeṣaḥ viparyāsaṁtāśātiḥāvahāvasattākā samvṛtīr.
Although the two—[my] explanation elsewhere [in the Great Exposition of Special Insight] in terms of [Bhāvaviveka’s] having asserted that a subject which is the basis [of the predicate, nonproduction from self,] degenerate from [or are not] established as [their own] suchness and this mode [of explanation just given here in The Essence of Eloquence]—do not agree, it is not that [my two explanations] disagree with respect to the tenet of refuting autonomy.

Having refuted through those the meaning [of a compatibly appearing subject], let us now refute the example. When a Buddhist proves to a Vaisheshika that sound is impermanent, then although the valid cognition comprehending the subject does not establish a derivative of elements or a quality of space [asserted] by the two systems, there is an object that is mere sound with respect to which [this consciousness] has become a valid cognition demonstrable for “It is this.” However, a proponent of emptiness of inherent existence who is proving that eyes and so forth are not

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a Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s Port of Entry, 569.12, and Ta-drin-rab-tan’s Annotations, 391.1. For this presentation, see Hopkins, What is a Consequentialist? Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight with the Four Inverwoven Annotations: Compatibly Appearing Subjects, 5 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version July, 2019: uma-tibet.org), 32-80 and 122-144.

b The suggestion seems to be that when a Buddhist proves to a Vaisheshika that sound is impermanent there indeed is a commonly appearing subject. If the Buddhist here is a non-Consequentialist, one could say that the commonly appearing subject is something only posited by their systems. On the other hand, if “Buddhists” includes Consequentialists as I would think it would, then there would be commonly appearing subjects at times when one was not establishing the ultimate mode of existence of things. Whether a commonly appearing subject exists or not would then depend upon what was being proved. However,
produced from self and a proponent of non-emptiness of inherent existence cannot demonstrate to each other such-and-such an entity of a subject which, despite its not being comprehended as either existing by way of its own entity or not existing by way of its own entity, is—for both of them—nevertheless being comprehended. Hence, [the example, the proof of sound as impermanent, and the exemplified, the proof of eyes as not produced from self] are not similar.

Concerning this, the Autonomists, Bhāvaviveka and so forth, cannot prove that although a generality—devoid of such specifics that could be shown to each other [the two parties in the debate]—does not exist, a generality not qualified with either existing or not existing ultimately, or truly, is apprehendable as the subject, because if [something] exists by way of its own entity, this is the meaning of truly existing [or ultimately existing and Bhāvaviveka and so forth themselves accept that the subject is qualified by existing by way of its own entity].

since the meaning of a commonly appearing subject is tied down to a certification of the subject’s inherent existence by the consciousness certifying the subject itself, one has to say that from the Consequentialist viewpoint there are no commonly appearing subjects at all, no matter what is being proven, since the hypothesization of the subject cannot be ignored.
Therefore, such arose due to the essential of their disagreeing with respect to the measure of the object of negation [Bhāvaviveka holding that only ultimate existence is refuted and Buddhapālita and Chandrakirti holding that existence by way of the object’s own entity is the very meaning of ultimate existence], whereby even with respect to proving that sound is impermanent, although [the subject] is not confirmed as qualified by the two specifics of those systems, it is demonstrated that “A ground of confirmation of sound exists.” However, a valid cognition in accordance with how those two propound the valid cognition comprehending sound as having become a valid cognition with respect to such a meaning of sound does not exist.

That is done in terms of the former party’s asserting existence by way of [the object’s] own entity; still, even though a Consequentialist acted as the former party, the Consequentialist could not demonstrate to that latter party a mode of the subject’s being established by a valid cognition comprehending it without qualification by either existing by way of its own entity or not existing by way of its own entity.
Through those reasonings, you also should understand how the reason ['existing'] is not established [in Bhāvaviveka’s syllogism refuting the Sāṃkhyas, “The subjects, eyes and so forth, are not produced from self because of existing, like intelligence.”]

Even Bhāvaviveka himself examines the meaning of the sign [“the Victor said such”] in terms of the two truths in the statement [by Buddhist Proponents of Truly Existent Things] “The internal sense-spheres have causes and conditions that are [their] producers because the Victor said such,” and expressed fault with it: “If that is conventionally, it is not established for you; if it is ultimately, it is not established for me.” Therefore, it is reasonable to express fault [with respect to Bhāvaviveka’s own inference] upon examining specifics: “Is the subject found by a mistaken or nonmistaken consciousness?” The evidence for this is by way of the essential that Chandrakīrti’s Supplement says that the two—objects found by consciousnesses perceiving real objects of knowledge and by consciousnesses perceiving false, that is, distorted (log pa), objects of knowledge—are the meaning of the two truths:

[Buddha] said that all things hold two natures,
 Those found by perceptions of reality and of falsities—
 Object of perceptions of reality are suchness,
 And objects of perceptions of falsities are veil truths.

[Also] just as [Bhāvaviveka] did no more than a twofold analysis of the two truths with respect to the sign [stated above by the Proponents of Truly

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a Bhāvaviveka faults this inference in his Lamp for (Nāgārjuna’s) “Wisdom,” commenting on stanza I.7; Toh 3853, sde dge, dbu ma, vol. tsha, 58b.3-58b.7.

b Stanza VI.23; Toh 3861, sde dge, dbu ma, vol. a, 205a.5-205a.6; La Vallée Poussin, Madhyamakāvatāra, 102.8-102.11.
As evidence why such expressions of fault do not similarly [apply] to our syllogisms, [Chandrakirti] states that he does not assert autonomy and thereupon says that it is sufficient that syllogisms proving objects of proof of our own system are established for the other party because of being for the sake of only the overcoming of wrong conceptions by that very [other party]. To a question about whether being established for either party [that
is, the other party] might not be sufficient, [Chandrakīrti explains] that it is sufficient, citing the example of worldly dispute [in which one is defeated either by one’s own word in the sense of oneself coming to accept that one is defeated or by the word of a judge accepted by both parties but not just by the word of the person with whom one is in dispute]. Also, he explains that even Dignāga, who asserts that in both proofs and refutations [the subject and so forth] must be established by both [parties], should assert the earlier position [that acceptance by the opponent is sufficient] because [Dignāga himself asserts that] in damage [or contradiction] by scripture and inference for oneself establishment for oneself is sufficient.a

Therefore, since when in Bhāvaviveka’s Lamp for (Nāgārjuna’s) “Wisdom” on an occasion of expressing another’s fallacies, he says, “[These] are expressed in terms of own-power [that is, one’s own position] or in terms of refutation,” the two, this translation as “own-power” (rang

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a Even Dignāga accepts that in debate one can use citations of the scriptures of the other party, even if one oneself does not accept them, to refute the person. Also he accepts that out of the context of debating others, when one is engaged in internal reflection alone (this being called inference for oneself) since there is no other party, of course the subject and so forth cannot be established similarly for both parties. Chandrakīrti’s point is that once Dignāga is willing to accept the validity of these he should extend it to all cases of inference. Chandrakīrti’s view accords with the usual procedure of debate; it is merely that the logicians have mistakenly formulated the necessary grounds for debate.
dbang) and autonomy (rang rgyud, svatantra) are equivalent; therefore, that which generates an inference realizing the proposition upon having ascertained with valid cognition the two subjects and the modes of the sign, without involvement in the opponent’s assertions but in the manner of [their being] self-powered from an objective mode of abiding, is the meaning of autonomous.

Concerning this, prior to having established what is to be proven [the emptiness of inherent existence] to another party who asserts that existents exist by way of their own entities, [a Consequentialist] cannot cause [that party] to ascertain this mode of establishment of objects of comprehension by a valid cognition without any qualification of existing or not by way of [the object’s] own entity [through saying], “It is such and such.” Therefore, although [Consequentialists] assert signs and propositions, they do not assert autonomous signs and propositions.

With respect to stating an other-renowned inference proving that a stalk is without a nature in the sense of being established by way of its own
entity in dependence on the reason of dependent-arising and on the example of a reflection, it is not that this is called “not established for both” and “other-renowned” by reason of one’s own not asserting that a stalk is a dependent-arising and that whatever is a dependent-arising is necessarily without inherent existence. Rather, since, like earlier, a ground for proving by valid cognition [the elements of a syllogism] under their own power does not occur, it means that [the elements of a syllogism] are not established for both oneself and the other by valid cognition in that way.

Although establishment of a stalk and establishment of it as a dependent-arising, and so forth, by conventional innate valid cognitions does indeed exist in the continuums of both disputants [the Consequentialist and the non-Consequentialist], the two—this and a valid cognition comprehending existence by way of [the object’s] own entity—are mixed in the perspective of the other disputant due to which these are not differentiated until the view is generated. Because of this, although the former disputant [the Consequentialist] has differentiated these, [the former disputant] cannot demonstrate such for that period. Although the mode of establishment by valid cognition is demonstrable mutually among Consequentialists without involvement in [an opponent’s] assertions, those are valid cognitions posited through the force of nominal conventions and not posited through the force of the thing’s own entity; therefore, autonomous [syllogisms] are not suitable.
With respect to the likes of a stalk, there are three apprehensions: apprehension of it as existing by way of its own entity, apprehension of it as not existing by way of its own entity, and apprehension of it without qualification by either of those two. If the distinction that although all three exist in the continuum of those who have generated the view [of emptiness], in the continuum of those who have not found the view there are no more than two, the first and the last, are known well, [you will realize that] everything apprehended by conceptuality thinking, “This [is such-and-such],” is not refuted by reasoning, and you will prevent well wrong views devaluing the entire class of [altruistic] deeds after fancying that you have generated the view in your continuum upon thinking that all [practices] such as training in the mind directed toward enlightenment and so forth prior to generating the view [of emptiness] in your continuum are apprehensions of true existence or apprehensions of signs [that is, misconceptions of the nature of phenomena] and thereupon the devaluing of the entire class of [altruistic] deeds after fancying that you have generated the view [of emptiness] in your continuum.
Therefore, to prove a proposition through an other-renowned sign it is not sufficient that [the elements of the syllogism] only be asserted by the other party; rather, it must be that when the two subjects, the sign, and so forth are comprehended from their own side, they are established also by valid cognition, and he/she [the opponent] definitely should assert them or assert them, because, without this, if [a consciousness] is mistaken with respect to its conceived object, it cannot generate the view realizing suchness. Just this point that conventional valid cognition is an indispensable cause for comprehending the ultimate is the meaning of the statement [in Nāgārjuna’s Treatise on the Middle].

Without depending on conventionalities
The ultimate will not be realized.

a  XXIV.10ab; translation as in Hopkins, Maps of the Profound, 758. Tsong-kha-pa cites Nāgārjuna’s Treatise on the Middle with an interesting variation of the wording of the second line, reading dam pa ’i don ni rtogs mi ’gyur rather than dam pa ’i don ni bstan mi nus. The entire stanza in Toh 3824, sde dge, dbu ma, vol. tsu, 15a.2, reads: tha snyad la ni ma brten par/ dam pa ’i don ni bstan mi nus/ dam pa ’i don ni ma rtogs par/ mya ngan ’das pa thob mi ’gyur/; the Sanskrit in de Jong, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, 35 is: vyavahāram anāsīrtvam paramārtho na deśyate/ paramārthham anāgamyā nirvāṇam nādhigamyate/. Jigme-dam-chö-gya-tsho uses Tsong-kha-pa’s reading in his commentary.
Evidence why those Fallacies are not the Same for our own Syllogisms

Question: According to these proponents, since the Autonomists such as Bhāvaviveka and so forth assert the meaning of ultimate or true establishment, they should not be posited as Proponents of the Middle, should they?

Answer: Just as:

- although those who have ascertained a bulbous thing [with a flat bottom and able to hold fluid] but have not ascertained this base as a pot still need establishment [of it as a pot] by valid cognition, and therefore it cannot be propounded that they assert this base as a pot, and
- although concerning a pot a Vaisheshika has established through valid cognition the meaning of the nonexistence of a whole\(^a\) that is a substantial entity other than its own parts,\(^b\) it cannot be said that a Vaisheshika is not a proponent of the tenet asserting that the whole is another substantial entity [from its parts],

so, similarly since those scholars [the Autonomists such as Bhāvaviveka and so forth] refute through many approaches of reasoning the tenet that phenomena truly exist and assert well that phenomena do not truly exist, they are Proponents of the Middle. This does not contradict [Chandrakirti’s] statement that it is unsuitable for whoever is a Proponent of the Middle to use autonomous [syllogisms]; it is like the fact that although it

\(\text{\textit{yan lag}}\) can; literally, “branch-possessor.”

\(\text{\textit{yan lag}}\); literally, “branches.” In ordinary cognition Vaisheshikas validly know that a pot cannot be found separate from its constituent parts, but in their tenets they assert that the whole is a separate substantial entity.
is not suitable for a monastic who has taken the formulated code to contradict the code, merely contradicting it does not necessitate not being a monastic.

Tsong-kha-pa’s *The Essence of Eloquence*
Abbreviations

“co ne” = *co ne bstan ’gyur*. TBRC W1GS66030. *co ne dgon chen: co ne*, 1926.


“Golden Reprint” = *gser bris bstan ’gyur* (Sichuan, China: krung go’i mtho rim nang bstan slob gling gi bod brgyud nang bstan zhib ’jug khang, 1989).


“stog Palace” refers to the *Tog Palace Manuscript of the Tibetan Kanjur* (Leh, Ladakh: Smanrtsis Shesrig Dpemdzod, 1979).

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madhayamakāvatārabhāṣya
dbu ma la ‘jug pa’i bshad pa / dbu ma la ‘jug pa’i rang ‘grel


Clear Words, Commentary on (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle”
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dbu ma rtṣa ba’i ‘grel pa tshig gsal ba


Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle”

madhyamakāvatāra

dbu ma la ’jug pa


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See also references under Chandrakīrti’s [Auto]commentary on the “Supplement.”

Dharmakīrti (chos kyi grags pa, seventh century)

Seven Treatises on Valid Cognition

Three resembling a body

1. Commentary on Valid Cognition / Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid Cognition”

pramāṇavārttikakārikā

tshad ma rnam ’grel gyi tshig le’ur byas pa


Peking 5709, vol. 130.


2. Ascertainment of Valid Cognition

pramāṇavinicayā
tshad ma mam par nges pa
Peking 5710, vol. 130.

3. Drop of Reasoning

nyāyabinduprakaraṇa
rigs pa ’i thigs pa zhes bya ba ’i rab tu byed pa
Peking 5711, vol. 130.


Four resembling limbs

4. Drop of Reasons

hetubindunāmaprakaraṇa
gtan thigs kyi thigs pa zhes bya ba rab tu byed pa
Peking 5712, vol. 130.

5. Analysis of Relations

sambandhaparīkṣā
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6. Proof of Other Continuums

samtāntarasidhināmaprakaraṇa
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<td>Medium-Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment to be Practiced by Beings of the Three Capacities / Medium-Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment to be Practiced by Beings of the Three Capacities together with an Outline / Short Exposition of the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>skyes bu gsum gyis nyams su blang ba'i byang chub lam gyi rim pa / skyes bu gsum gyi nyams su blang ba'i byang chub lam gyi rim pa bring po sa bcad kha skong dang beas pa / lam rim 'bring / lam rim chung ngu</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English translation of the section on special insight:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Editions: see the preface to Hopkins’ critical edition of the Introduction and section on the Mind-Only School, Emptiness in Mind-Only, 355. Also:


Vasubandhu (dbyig gnyen, fl. 360)

Eight Prakāraṇa Treatises

1. Commentary on (Maitreya’s) “Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes” madhyāntavibhāga śāstra

dbus dang mtha’i ram par ’byed pa’i ’grel pa / dbus mtha’i ’grel pa


Peking 5528, vol. 108

Sanskrit: Gadjin M. Nagao. Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya. Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation,


2. Explanation of (Maitreya’s) “Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras”

Bibliography 219


3. Principles of Explanation

vyākyayuktī


4. The Thirty / Treatise on Cognition-Only in Thirty Stanzas

triṃśikākārikā / sarvavijñānamatrādakāraṃśikākārikā


5. Treasury of Manifest Knowledge

abhidharmakośa


6. **The Twenty**

viṃśatikā / viṃśikākārikā

nyi shu pa’i tshig le’ur byas pa


Peking 5557, vol. 113


7. **Work on Achieving Actions**

karmasiddhiprakaraṇa

las grub pa’i rab tu byed pa


P5563, vol. 113


8. **Work on the Five Aggregates**

pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa

phung po lha’i rab tu byed pa


P5560, vol. 113
2. OTHER WORKS


MacDonald, Anne. *In Clear Words: The Prasannapadā, Chapter One.* Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2015.


Jeffrey Hopkins is Professor Emeritus of Tibetan Buddhist Studies at the University of Virginia where he taught Tibetan Buddhist Studies and Tibetan language for thirty-two years from 1973 to 2005. He received a B.A. magna cum laude from Harvard University in 1963, trained for five years at the Lamaist Buddhist Monastery of America in Freewood Acres, New Jersey, USA (now the Tibetan Buddhist Learning Center in Washington, New Jersey), and received a Ph.D. in Buddhist Studies from the University of Wisconsin in 1973. He served as His Holiness the Dalai Lama’s chief interpreter into English on lecture tours for ten years, 1979-1989. At the University of Virginia he founded programs in Buddhist Studies and Tibetan Studies and served as Director of the Center for South Asian Studies for twelve years. He has published fifty-seven books, some of which have been translated into a total of twenty-two languages. He published the first translation of the foundational text of the Jo-nang school of Tibetan Buddhism in *Mountain Doctrine: Tibet’s Fundamental Treatise on Other-Emptiness and the Buddha-Matrix*. He has translated and edited sixteen books from oral teachings by His Holiness the Dalai Lama, the last four being *How to See Yourself as You Really Are; Becoming Enlightened; How to Be Compassionate; and The Heart of Meditation: Discovering Innermost Awareness*. He is the Founder and President of the UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies where he has edited seventeen books by other translators.
This is the seventh of eight volumes presenting Tibetan views on the controversy that arose in Buddhist India over how to refute production from self. The controversy revolves around the opening phrase of the first stanza of the first chapter of Nāgārjuna’s *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called “Wisdom”*:

Not from self, not from others,  
Not from both, not causelessly  
Do any things  
Ever arise anywhere.

Nāgārjuna’s principal Indian commentators, however, explain the refutation of production from self in varying detail, the differences engendering the split between what came to be called the Autonomy School and the Consequence School.

Tsong-kha-pa’s focus in his *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path* is on the material in the final phase of the controversy between Buddhālita, Bhāvaviveka, and Chandrakīrti on the topic of compatibly appearing subjects. His intricate long analysis of that phase appears in volumes 5 and 6, for which Jam-yang-shay-pa’s three volumes, 1-3, serve as introductions. The current volume 7 on Tsong-kha-pa’s *The Essence of Eloquence*, which Tsong-kha-pa published six years contains a revised but much shorter presentation of the same material. Although Tsong-kha-pa maintained in both readings this section in Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words* refutes autonomy, his explanation of the details differs. Yet, he did not rewrite the fulsome account of the Great Exposition of Special Insight as if he were revising a textbook; rather, the new presentation for the most part are staccato overviews of the gist of Chandrakīrti’s text, which he cites only once.

The early twentieth-century commentator Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho helpfully identifies the relevant passages in Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words* and rephrases Tsong-kha-pa’s meanings in sequences familiar to monastic textbooks and occasionally draws out issues. These are included here in volume 7. Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho also expands on several points in a final section, which I intend to translate in volume 8 along with minutely comparing the treatments in *The Essence of Eloquence* and the Great Exposition of Special Insight.

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