


*Exposing Bhāvaviveka's
Assertion of Inherent Existence:
2nd Dalai Lama Gen-dün-gya-tsho,
Je-drung She-rab-wang-po,
Zha-mar Ge-dün-tan-dzin-gya-tsho,
Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho, and
Khay-drub Ge-leg-pal-sang:
Compatibly Appearing Subjects, 8*



Jeffrey Hopkins

UMA INSTITUTE
FOR TIBETAN STUDIES

Exposing Bhāvaviveka’s Assertion of Inherent Existence

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Jeffrey Hopkins

UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies

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1. Candrakīrti, sixth century. prasannapadā, tshig gsal. Second dalai lama gen-dün-gya-tsho, 1476-1542; Je-drung she-rab-wang-po, 1500-1586; Jam-yang-shay-pa, 1648-1722; Zha-mar ge-dün-tan-dzin-gya-tsho, 1852-1910; Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho, 1898-1946; Khay-drub ge-leg-pal-sang, 1385-1438. Tsong-kha-pa lo-zang-drag-pa, 1357-1419. *The Essence of Eloquence*. 2. Śūnyatā. 3. Dge-lugs-pa (Sect)--Doctrines. 4. Phar-phyin: drang nges; dbu ma: chos can mthun snang ba. 5. Wisdom--Religious aspects--Buddhism. I. Lo-sang-gyal-tshan, 1966-II. Title.

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Preface

This book is the last of eight volumes presenting Tibetan views on the controversy that arose in Buddhist India over how to refute production from self:

1. *Buddhapālita's Refutation of Production from Self, Bhāvaviveka's Criticism, and Avalokitavrata's Commentary: Jam-yang-shay-pa's Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Opposite of the Consequences*, 1.
2. *Chandrakīrti Defends Buddhapālita against Bhāvaviveka: Jam-yang-shay-pa's Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Opposite of the Consequences*, 2.
3. *Chandrakīrti Undermines Bhāvaviveka's Assertion of Autonomy: Jam-yang-shay-pa's Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Compatibly Appearing Subjects*, 3.
4. *Decisive Analyses concerning the Refutation of Production from Self: Jam-yang-shay-pa's Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six*, 4.^a
5. *What is a Consequentialist? Tsong-kha-pa's Great Exposition of Special Insight with the Four Interwoven Annotations: Compatibly Appearing Subjects*, 5.
6. *Finalizing the Meaning of Autonomist and Consequentialist: Tsong-kha-pa's Great Exposition of Special Insight with the Four Interwoven Annotations*, 6.
7. *Tsong-kha-pa's Revised Presentation of Compatibly Appearing Subjects in The Essence of Eloquence with Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho's Commentary*, 7.
8. *Exposing Bhāvaviveka's Assertion of Inherent Existence: 2nd Dalai Lama Gen-dün-gya-tsho, Je-drung She-rab-wang-po, Zha-mar Gedün-tan-dzin-gya-tsho, and Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho: Compatibly Appearing Subjects*, 8.

This eighth volume is inspired by a short suggestive comment by Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho that is translated in Part Three where he briefly mentions variant readings by three Tibetan scholars of a few words in a crucial passage in Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words*. Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho's laconic comment led to my putting variant readings in context.

In one way, this book is the most introductory of the eight volumes

^a This volume is scheduled last for translation since in it Jam-yang-shay-pa synthetically treats the materials in the other volumes, the first three and the last four, in the format of the debates of a Decisive Analysis.

because in the first two parts it presents the Second Dalai Lama Gen-dün-gya-tsho's lucid distillation of the core issue, showing how Chandrakīrti exposes Bhāvaviveka's assertion of inherent existence. Then, even though the next three parts examine how several Tibetan scholars read a few words in the same passage in Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words*, this minute attention, because of focusing within the main issue, provides further immersion in it.

EDITIONS CONSULTED

I. Three editions of the Second Dalai Lama Gen-dün-gya-tsho's^a *Ornament Vividly Clarifying the Thought of (Tsong-kha-pa's) "Explanation of (Chandrakīrti's) 'Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle"'"* (gsung 'bum thor bu las dbu ma 'jug pa'i rnam bshad dgongs pa'i don rab tu gsal ba'i rgyan), hereafter cited as *Ornament for the Thought (dgongs rgyan)*, are utilized:

1. Library of Tibetan Works (BDRC W1CZ2857-I1CZ2870:313-562); Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works, 2006; portion translated here, 62a.6-64a.6. (This is a very clear edition.)
2. *dkar mdzes par ma* (BDRC W861. 2); portion translated here, 56b.1-58a.5.
3. codex *ser smad dpe mdzod khang* (BDRC W1CZ2258); Bylakuppe, Mysore Distt., Karnataka, 1999; portion translated here, 224.17-228.12.

In Gen-dün-gya-tsho's Collected Works the *Ornament for the Thought* immediately follows his *Commentary on the Difficult Points of (Tsong-kha-pa's) "Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive": Lamp thoroughly Illuminating the Meaning of the Thought (drang nges rnam 'byed kyi dka' 'grel dgongs pa'i don rab tu gsal bar byed pa'i sgron me)*, hereafter cited as *Commentary on the Difficult Points*, his clear but incomplete commentary on Tsong-kha-pa's *The Essence of Eloquence*, where a similar lengthy explanation is found with variations, which are detailed in the notes to this translation since it appears that Gen-dün-gya-tsho modified his exposition from this former volume when he put it into the *Ornament for the Thought*. Two editions of the Second Dalai Lama Gen-dün-gya-tsho's *Commentary on the Difficult Points* are utilized:

1. *bkra shis chos sdings kyi par khang*, Reb gong, n.d. (BDRC W3MS878); portion referenced here, 106a.5-109b.1. (This is a very

^a *dge 'dun rgya mtsho*, 1476-1542.

clear edition.)

2. *dkar mdzes par ma* (BDRC W861.2:607-817); portion referenced here, 89a.5-92a.4.

II. Two editions of Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho's^a *Treatise Distinguishing All the Meanings of (Tsong-kha-pa's) "The Essence of Eloquence": Illuminating the Differentiation of the Interpretable and the Definitive: Port of Entry to "The Essence of Eloquence" (drang ba dang nges pa'i don rnam par phye ba gsal bar byed pa legs bshad snying po'i don mtha' dag rnam par 'byed pa'i bstan bcos legs bshad snying po'i 'jug ngogs)*, hereafter cited as *Port of Entry*, are utilized:

1. blockprints from *rong po dgon chen gyi par khang* in two vols, *na* and *pa* (12 and 13); Collected Works by Dzongkar Marnang Zhabdrung Jigme Damcho Gyatso (1898-1946); BDRC W00EGS1017401; portion translated here, vol. *pa* (vol. 13), 212a.6-212b.3.
2. BDRC W3621, in one vol (PDF of *pe cin: krung go'i bod kyi shes rig dpe skrun khang*, 1999); portion translated here, 576.26-577.5. This edition is in codex form with the text divided into paragraphs and with many subheadings filled in as if these were in the original whereas they actually are not and should have been put in smaller print.

III. Two editions of Je-drung She-rab-wang-po's^b *Delineation of the Difficult Points of (Tsong-kha-pa's) "Explanation of (Chandrakīrti's) 'Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle": Illumination of the Thought": Pellucid Clarification of (Tsong-kha-pa's) Thought (dbu ma la 'jug pa'i rnam bshad dgongs pa rab gsal gyi dka' gnad gtan la 'bebs pa dgongs pa yang gsal/ dbu ma'i spyi don dgongs pa yang gsal)*, published in 1531 in Lhasa, hereafter cited as *Pellucid Clarification of (Tsong-kha-pa's) Thought*, are utilized:

1. BDRC W1KG9039-I1KG9044, 1 vol, (gzhis ka rtse: bkra shis lhun po dgon, 1996), 197-571; portion translated here, 124a.3-124b.2.
2. in codex form BDRC W14081-I1KG15976, 1 vol, (lha sa: ser gtsug nang bstan dpe rnying 'tshol bsdu phyogs sgrig khang, 2010); portion translated here, 272.20-273.19.

See also Tshul-'khrim-bsKal-bzang, *An Introduction to rJe drung Shes rab dbang po's dGongs pa yang gsal: A Textbook (yig cha) for the Study of Madhyamaka of Byes pa College of Se ra Monastery*, Otani University

^a *jigs med dam chos rgya mtsho*, 1898-1946.

^b *rje drung shes rab dbang po*, 1500-1586.

Collection No. 13957 (Kyoto, Japan: Rinsen Book Co., 1992); and Tsultrim Kelsaṅ Khaṅkar and Katano Michio, tr. *A Study of Tsong khapa's Mādhyamika Philosophy II: Annotated Japanese translation of the Mādhyamika Section of Essence of the Good Explanations (Legs bśad sñiṅ po, ソンカパ中観哲学の研究II)*, assisted by Takada Yorihito (Kyoto, Japan: Bun-ei-do, 1998).

IV. One edition of Zha-mar Ge-dün-tan-dzin-gya-tsho's^a *Lamp Illuminating the Profound Thought, Set Forth to Purify Forgetfulness of the Difficult Points of (Tsong-kha-pa's) "Great Exposition of Special Insight" (lhag mthong chen mo 'i dka' gnad rnams brjed byang du bkod pa dgongs zab snang ba 'i sgron me)*, hereafter cited as *Lamp Illuminating the Profound Thought*, is utilized:

1. BDRC W2993; lha sa sman rtsis khang gi par khang, n.d., portion translated here, 88a.5-88b.4.

See also Delhi: Mongolian Lama Guru Deva, 1972.

V. Three editions of Khay-drub Ge-leg-pal-sang's^b *Treatise Vividly Clarifying the Suchness of the Profound Emptiness: Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate / Great Compilation on Emptiness (zab mo stong pa nyid rab tu gsal bar byed pa 'i bstan bcos skal bzang mig 'byed / stong thun chen mo)* are utilized:

1. BDRC W29195-5152-eBook; old Tashilhunpo blocks (bkra shis lhun po par rnying); portion translated here, 113a.7-116b.6.
2. in codex form BDRC W1KG15939-I1KG15952; portion translated here, 294.5-303.4.
3. BDRC W00EGS1016265-I00JW501183; Madhyamika Text Series, vol. 1; New Delhi, 1972; portion translated here, 161a.4-166a.2.

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^a *zhwa dmar dge bdun bstan 'dzin rgya mtsho*, 1852-1910.

^b *mkhas grub dge legs dpal bzang*, 1385-1438.

Technical Notes

It is important to recognize that:

- full bibliographical references are given in the footnotes at the first citation;
- translations and editions of texts are given in the Bibliography;
- the names of Indian Buddhist schools of thought are translated into English to try to increase accessibility for non-specialists;
- for the names of Indian scholars and systems used in the body of the text, *ch*, *sh*, and *ṣh* are used instead of the more usual *c*, *ś*, and *ṣ* for the sake of easy pronunciation by non-specialists; however, *cch* is used for *cch*, not *chchh*. In the notes the usual transliteration system for Sanskrit is used;
- transliteration of Tibetan is done in accordance with a system devised by Turrell Wylie; see “A Standard System of Tibetan Transcription,” *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 22 (1959): 261-267;
- the names of Tibetan authors and orders are given in “essay phonetics” for the sake of easy pronunciation; the system is based on Wylie transliteration with a view toward internet searchability;
- definitions are in **bold** type.

PART ONE:
Setting the Scene

Chandrakīrti takes issue with Bhāvaviveka’s own refutation of the Sāṃkhya assertion of production (or manifestation) of a phenomenon from causes (or unmanifest state) that is the same entity as that phenomenon. Bhāvaviveka’s refutation of the Sāṃkhya position is:^a

Ultimately the internal sense-spheres [eye sense, ear sense, and so forth] are not produced from self because of existing, like intelligence.^b

Tibetan: *don dam par nang gi skye mched rnam bdag las skye ba med par nges te yod pa’i phyir na shes pa yod pa nyid bzhin no//*
Sanskrit: *na paramārthata ādhyātmikānyāyatanāni svata utpannāni vidyamānatvāt caitanyavad//*

The subjects of the syllogism are “the internal sense-spheres”; the predicate is “are not produced from self”; the reason is “existing”; the example is “intelligence.” The reference of “intelligence” is the *puruṣa*—the person, or pure spirit, pure consciousness; to a Buddhist it could be taken as consciousness.

The subject, predicate, reason, and example of a syllogism must be certified by valid cognition, and Chandrakīrti surmises—from the way that Bhāvaviveka criticizes Buddhapālita for not stating syllogisms—that Bhāvaviveka holds that the subjects of a syllogism, in this case the eye sense-sphere and so forth, are certified similarly in the systems of both disputants, the Sāṃkhya and the Proponent of the Middle. Chandrakīrti criticizes Bhāvaviveka’s supposed assertion of such a compatibly appearing subject. Among those in India and Tibet who wrote about this controversy, it appears that only Tsong-kha-pa and his followers see Chandrakīrti’s criticism of Bhāvaviveka as revealing a difference between Bhāvaviveka’s and Chandrakīrti’s assertions about emptiness in the sense of there being a difference in the object of negation, that is, the status that

^a See Hopkins, *Chandrakīrti Undermines Bhāvaviveka’s Assertion of Autonomy: Jamyang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Compatibly Appearing Subjects*, 3 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, August 2018, uma-tibet.org), 25, 31, 119. The Sanskrit is from Louis de la Vallée Poussin, *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā commentaire de Chandrakīrti*, Bibliotheca Buddhica, 4 (Osnabrück, Germany: Biblio Verlag, 1970), 25.7-26.2; for the Tibetan, see 17.16-18.2 (Dharmasala: Tibetan Publishing House, 1968).

^b The Tibetan of the example *shes pa yod pa nyid* is a translation of the Sanskrit *caitanya* and is not an extension of the example to include the reason (“existing”) even though the full example is: “just as intelligence exists.”

emptiness negates.

Tsong-kha-pa himself reads the initial critical passage in two different ways. His longer treatment of “compatibly appearing subjects” is in the Great Exposition of Special Insight^a section in his *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path*,^b which he published in 1402, at the age of forty-five,^c but six years later he published a distinctly different reading in *The Essence of Eloquence*.^d

Although the actual subject of Bhāvaviveka's syllogism, as shown just above, is “the internal sense-spheres,” Tsong-kha-pa in the Great Exposition of Special Insight variously uses “eyes and so forth,” “forms and so forth,” and “eyes and so forth and forms and so forth” as Bhāvaviveka's subject; these are the respective first members in the lists of the six sense powers and six objects in the twelve sense-spheres. Ngag-wang-pal-dan's *Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-pa's) "Great Exposition of Tenets": Freeing the Knots of the Difficult Points, Precious Jewel of Clear Thought* describes the twelve sense-spheres:^e

Sense-spheres (*skye mched, āyatana*; literally, “producer-increasers”) are so called because:

- the six objects (forms, sounds, odors, tastes, tangible objects, and [other] phenomena) by way of acting as observed-object-conditions (*dmigs rkyen, ālambanapratyaya*)

^a *lhag mthong chen mo*.

^b In the Delhi edition of *Four Interwoven Annotations*, the section under consideration here is 265a.6-273a.4/ pdf 529.6-545.4. For translations see my fifth and sixth volumes listed in the Preface and those by others in the Bibliography. In particular, Tsong-kha-pa's entire text is translated in Tsong-kha-pa, *The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment*, vols. 1-3, trans. and ed. Joshua W. C. Cutler and Guy Newland (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 2004), the section under consideration here is vol. 3, 253-257; also, Alex Wayman translated the sections on calm abiding and special insight in *Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real* (New York: Columbia, 1978), the section under consideration here is 309-336.

^c The dates are drawn from Elizabeth Napper, *Dependent-Arising and Emptiness* (London: Wisdom, 1989), 6-7.

^d The section under consideration here is translated together with Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho's commentary in the previous volume in this series, Hopkins, *Tsong-kha-pa's Revised Presentation of Compatibly Appearing Subjects in The Essence of Eloquence with Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho's Commentary*, 7 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version April 2020: uma-tibet.org), 37-173; Tsong-kha-pa's text without the commentary, 175-202. Robert A. F. Thurman translated the entire text in *Tsong Khapa's Speech of Gold in the Essence of True Eloquence* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), the section under consideration here being 332-339.

^e *dngos, sha*, 42.5.

- and the six sense powers (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mental sense powers) by way of acting as proprietary [or empowering] conditions (*bdag po 'i rkyen, adhipatipratyaya*)

serve as doors causing their respective, previously nonexistent consciousnesses to be *produced* and to *increase*, that is, to maintain their continuum.

Let us consider these in a little detail. Etymologically, a form is so called because it is suitable to become an object of a sense consciousness upon the aggregation of other causes, such as the presence of an eye sense power.^a However, because there are forms perceived only by the mental consciousness, this explanation is merely an etymology and not a definition. Forms are divided into eleven types—the five physical sense powers, the five objects of the senses, and forms that are objects only of the mental consciousness.

The five sense powers are neither the coarse organs, which are the eyes, ears, nose, tongue, and body, nor are they consciousness. They are clear matter located in the coarse organs that cannot be seen with the eye but can be seen by certain clairvoyants. They give their respective consciousnesses dominance, or power, with respect to their respective objects and are thus called “powers” (*dbang po, indriya*). An eye sense power has dominance, or power, with respect to visible forms, that is, colors and shapes, but not with respect to sounds, odors, tastes, or tangible objects. An ear sense power has dominance, or power, with respect to sounds but not visible forms; and so forth. Sense powers give their respective consciousnesses the ability to apprehend and to be generated in the aspect, or representation, of their respective objects.

Eye (*mig, cakṣu*), eye sense power (*mig gi dbang po, cakṣurindriya*), eye-constituent (*mig gi kham, cakṣurdhātu*), and eye sense-spheres (*mig gi skye mched, cakṣurāyatana*; literally, “eye producer-increasers”) are equivalent. An eye sense power is called an eye-constituent because of being the *cause* giving rise to the continuation of its own similar type, that is, later moments of itself. It is also called an eye producer-increaser because of being a *door, cause, condition, or source* producing and increasing

^a The material on colors and shapes is drawn from Jeffrey Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness* (London: Wisdom Publications, 1983; rev. ed., Boston, Ma.: Wisdom Publications, 1996), 225, which is based on Cha-har Ge-she (1740-1810), *Identification of Elements, Elemental Evolutes, And So Forth*, The Collected Works of Cha-har dge-bshes blo-bzang-tshul-khrims, vol. 10 (New Delhi: Chatring Jansar Tenzin, 1973), 414ff.

an eye consciousness. The same terminology is also used for the ear, nose, tongue, and body sense powers.

The particles of each sense power are arranged in a specific shape: eye sense power, like that of a bud of a *zar ma* flower, perhaps *linum nutans maxim*; ear sense power, like the knot of a birch tree; nose sense power, like two fine hollow needles at the root of the nostrils; tongue sense power, like half moons having the area of only the point of a hair throughout the center of the tongue; body sense power, like skin or hide throughout the body. As types of the body sense power, the particles of the female organ are arranged like the inside of a drum, and those of the male organ are arranged like a thumb.

The sense power of the mental consciousness is not physical and thus has no shape; rather, a former moment of any of the six consciousnesses acts as the sense power of a mental consciousness. For instance, when one pays attention to a color, an eye consciousness acts like a sense power in that it gives the mental consciousness the ability to perceive a visible object. Thus, the six consciousnesses are also contained within this member, the sense power of the mental consciousness, of the twelve sense powers.

A sense power is an uncommon empowering condition (*thun mong ma yin pa'i bdag rkyen, asādhāraṇa-adhipatipratyaya*) of a consciousness because it gives it power with respect to its own special type of object. Also, a former moment of consciousness causes it to be an entity capable of *experiencing* objects. Thus, a mental consciousness has two consciousnesses as its causes: any of the six consciousnesses that is its empowering condition and a former moment of consciousness that is its immediately preceding condition (*de ma dag rkyen, samanantarapratyaya*).

A consciousness is also often caused, or affected, by an object in the sense that an object causes a consciousness to be generated in its image, much as objects cause a mirror to reflect their image. These objects are called observed-object-conditions (*dmigs rkyen, ālambana-pratyaya*). However, the object being seen is not just a mental image; the co-ordination of an image in consciousness with an object certifies that the object is being perceived properly, but the object seen is an external object, not an internal image. This Buddhist theory is not that everything being perceived exists inside either the eye or the brain.

Visible forms (*gzugs, rūpa*) are defined as **objects of apprehension by an eye consciousness** and are to be distinguished from the general term “form” that is the basis of the division into eleven types of forms. A visible form is called a form-constituent because of being a *cause* giving rise to the continuation of its own similar type, that is, later moments of visible form, and is called a form producer-increaser because of being a form that

is a *door, cause, condition, or source* of an eye consciousness. Visible forms are of two types: visible forms and shapes.

The subject of Bhāvaviveka's syllogism, *internal* sense-spheres, are conjoined with feeling, whereas *external* sense-spheres are not conjoined with feeling. Thus, one's own eyes are instances of internal sense-spheres, but one's own hair, excluding the roots, is an external sense-sphere and not an internal sense-sphere since it is not conjoined with feeling.

The twelve sense powers, internal and external, are a comprehensive categorization of all phenomena, impermanent and permanent, since the permanent are included in the last category of "forms and so forth," "(other) phenomena." Hence, that Bhāvaviveka has chosen "internal sense-spheres" as the subject of his syllogism should be seen only as choosing the first in the list.

When Tsong-kha-pa and others substitute "eyes and so forth" for Bhāvaviveka's "internal sense-spheres," this is shorthand for the five subtle material sense powers—eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body sense powers—and also the mental sense power, the last including the six consciousnesses—the eye consciousness, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mental consciousnesses. Although Bhāvaviveka uses "internal sense-spheres" as the subject of his syllogism, Tsong-kha-pa by sometimes stretching this to "eyes and so forth and forms and so forth" suggests that any phenomenon could be used as the subject.

THE REFUTATION

The heart of Chandrakīrti's refutation of Bhāvaviveka here in the *Clear Words* is that Chandrakīrti holds that Bhāvaviveka asserts that a subject, predicate, reason, and example of his syllogism "Ultimately the internal sense-spheres are not produced from self because of existing, like intelligence," are certified in a similar way in the systems of both the Middle Way School and the opponent.

- The subjects are the five subtle material sense powers—eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body sense powers—and also the mental sense power, the last including the six consciousnesses—the eye consciousness, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mental consciousnesses.
- The predicate is "are not produced from self," that is, are not produced from causes that are the same entity as those respective subjects.
- The reason is "because of existing."
- The example is "like intelligence."

The Tibetan of the example *shes pa yod pa nyid bzhin* is a translation of the Sanskrit *caitanya* and is not an extension of the example to include the reason (“existing”). For a Sāṃkhya, *caitanya* is the *puruṣa*—the person, pure consciousness. According to Avalokitavrata’s *Explanatory Commentary on (Bhāvaviveka’s) “Lamp for (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Wisdom’”*:^a

On this occasion with respect to “for example, the subject, intelligence,”^b “intelligence” (*shes pa yod pa nyid, caitanya*) is renowned to the opposing party [the Sāṃkhya] as just existent (*yod pa nyid, vidyamāna*), and conventionally “consciousness” (*rnam par shes pa nyid*) is renowned to the latter party^c [the Proponent of the Middle] as just existent (*yod pa nyid, vidyamāna*), and in this subject exist the two:

1. the predicate of the proposition (*bsgrub par bya ba chos*) “not produced from self” (*skye ba med pa, na...utpanna*), which is renowned to both disputants, and
2. the attribute that is the means of proving no production from self (*sgrub pa’i chos*), “existing” (*yod pa nyid, vidyamānava*), which is renowned to both disputants,

and hence it is called the subject.^d

སྐབས་འདིར་ནི་དབེར་ན་ཚོས་ཅན་ཤེས་པ་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ཅེས་
བྱ་བ་དེ་ཚོལ་བའི་སྤྱགས་ལ་ནི་ཤེས་པ་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ཅེས་བྱ་བ་
ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་བྲགས་ལ། ཕྱིར་ཚོལ་བའི་སྤྱགས་ལ་ནི་ཀུན་
རྗེས་དུ་རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ་ཉིད་ཅེས་བྱ་བར་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་
བྲགས་པ་དེ་ལ་བསྐྱབ་པར་བྱ་བ་ཚོས་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་

^a *shes rab sgron ma’i rgya cher ’grel pa, prajñāpradīpaṭīkā*; cited from Jeffrey Hopkins, *Buddhapālita’s Refutation of Production from Self, Bhāvaviveka’s Criticism, and Avalokitavrata’s Commentary: Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Opposite of the Consequences, I* (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version October, 2017: uma-tibet.org), 230-233. I take it that Avalokitavrata here is responding to Chandrakīrti, without mentioning him by name, by showing how these factors are renowned to both parties of the debate.

^b *dper na chos can shes pa yod pa nyid*.

^c *phyir rgol ba*.

^d *chos can, dharmin*; literally, the possessor of the attributes, which are the attribute (predicate) of the proposition and the attribute that is the means of proof (the reason).

བ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ཚོལ་བ་དང་། ཕྱིར་ཚོལ་བ་གཉི་ག་ལ་གྲགས་པ་
 དང་། བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་དེ་སྐྱེ་བ་པའི་ཚོས་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་
 ཅེས་བྱ་བ་ཚོལ་བ་དང་ཕྱིར་ཚོལ་བ་གཉི་ག་ལ་གྲགས་པ་དེ་
 གཉིས་ཡོད་པས་དེ་ནི་ཚོས་ཅན་ཞེས་བྱ་རྒྱུ།

Just as in the subject, intelligence, there is no production from self because of existing, so here also these “internal sense-spheres” are renowned to the opposing party [the Sāṃkhya] as just existent as “empowered and sustained by the self”^a and renowned to the latter party [namely, the Proponent of the Middle]^b as just existent as “conventionally able to apprehend an object,”^c like, for example, sound is renowned as just existent, that is, just arising immediately upon exertion, and in this^d subject exist the two:

1. the predicate of the proposition (*bsgrub par bya ba chos*) “not produced from self” (*skye ba med pa, na...utpanna*), which is renowned to both disputants, and
2. the attribute that is the means of proving no production from self (*sgrub pa'i chos*), “existing” (*yod pa nyid, vidyamānava*), which is renowned to both disputants,

and hence it is called the subject.

ཚོས་ཅན་ཤེས་པ་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་དེ་ལ་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་དེ་
 ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་དེ་བཞིན་དུ། འདིར་ཡང་ཚོས་
 ཅན་ནང་གི་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་རྣམས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་འདི་ཡང་ཚོལ་བའི་
 ཕྱོགས་ལ་ནི་བདག་གིས་བྱིན་གྱིས་བརྒྱབས་ཤིང་གནས་སུ་
 བྱས་པ་ཉིད་ཅེས་བྱ་བར་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་གྲགས་ལ། ཕྱིར་ཚོལ་

^a *bdag gis byin gyis brlabs shing gnas su byas pa nyid.*

^b Again, I take it that Avalokitavratā is responding to Chandrakīrti.

^c *kun rdzob tu yul 'dzin nus pa nyid.*

^d In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 213.2) and in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, 188.1.1) for *de las* read *de la* in accordance with the Karmapa *sde dge bstan 'gyur*, vol. 98, 135.7.

བའི་ཕྱོགས་ལ་ནི་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཏུ་ཡུལ་འཛིན་རྣམས་པ་ཉིད་ཅེས་
 བྱ་བར་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ཏུ་གྲགས་པ། དཔེར་ན་སྐྱེ་ལ་བརྩམ་མ་
 ཐག་ཏུ་འབྱུང་བ་ཉིད་ཏུ་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ཏུ་གྲགས་པ་དང་འབྲ་
 བ་དེ་ལ་བསྐྱབ་པར་བྱ་བ་ཚོས་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་ཞེས་
 བྱ་བ། རྒྱལ་བ་དང་སྤྱིར་རྒྱལ་བ་གཉི་ག་ལ་གྲགས་པ་དང་།
 བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་དེ་སྐྱབ་པའི་ཚོས་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ཅེས་
 བྱ་བ་རྒྱལ་བ་དང་སྤྱིར་རྒྱལ་བ་གཉི་ག་ལ་གྲགས་པ་དེ་གཉིས་
 ཡོད་པས་དེ་ཡང་ཚོས་ཅན་ཞེས་བྱ་རྟེ།

It is to be put together as “In the subject, the internal sense-spheres, also there is no production from self^a because of existing—like, for example, intelligence.” Therefore, [the syllogism is]:

Whatever exists is without production—like, for example, intelligence. Because the internal sense-spheres also are just existent, they also are without production.

ཚོས་ཅན་ནང་གི་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་རྣམས་ལ་ཡང་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་
 མེད་པར་ངེས་ཏེ་ཡོད་པའི་སྤྱིར། དཔེར་ན་ཤེས་པ་ཡོད་པ་
 ཉིད་བཞིན་ལོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བར་སྐྱུར་རོ། ། དེའི་སྤྱིར་གང་དང་གང་
 ཡོད་པ་དེ་ལ་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་དེ། དཔེར་ན་ཤེས་པ་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་
 བཞིན་ལོ། ། རང་གི་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་ཉིད་རྣམས་ཀྱང་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་
 ཡིན་པས་དེའི་སྤྱིར་དེ་དག་ལ་ཡང་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་དོ། །

In the Great Exposition of Special Insight Tsong-kha-pa cites and explains Chandrakīrti’s depiction of the evidence that Bhāvaviveka asserts that the subject, predicate, reason, and example of a syllogism are certified in a

^a In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 213.4) and in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, 188.1.2) for *bdag la* read *bdag las* in accordance with the Karmapa *sde dge bstan ’gyur*, vol. 98, 136.1.

similar way in the systems of both the Middle Way School and the opponent, this status often being called “compatibly appearing subjects.” From the way Bhāvaviveka asserts compatibly appearing subjects Tsong-kha-pa concludes that Bhāvaviveka asserts that all phenomena exist inherently, or under their own power, autonomously.

This sets the scene for the Second Dalai Lama Gen-dün-gya-tsho’s^a lucid depiction of Bhāvaviveka’s position and Chandrakīrti’s refutation of it.

^a *dge 'dun rgya mtsho*, 1476-1542; he came to be retroactively called the Second Dalai Lama when the third incarnation in his line, Sö-nam-gya-tsho, in 1578 received the name “Dalai” (*tā lai*, which translates the Tibetan *rgya mtsho* “ocean” in his name, *bsod nams rgya mtsho* “Ocean of Merit”) from his Mongolian patron and follower, Altan Khan.

PART TWO:
The Second Dalai Lama
Gen-dün-gya-tsho's
Ornament for the Thought

Ornament Vividly Clarifying the Thought of (Tsong-kha-pa's) "Explanation of (Chandrakīrti's) 'Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle'"

དབུ་མ་འཇུག་པའི་རྣམ་བཤད་དགོངས་པའི་དོན་རབ་ཏུ་གསལ་
བའི་རྒྱུ།

Key to the colorization: In the Tibetan, **turquoise highlight** indicates material added in place of ellipses, and **magenta highlight** sets off the ellipsis indicator when it has been filled in.

Here is a short biography of the Second Dalai Lama Gen-dün-gya-tsho by [Namdrol Miranda Adams](#) exactly as it appears online in The Treasury of Lives:^a

Gendun Gyatso (dge 'dun rgya mtsho) was born in 1476 in the Tanak area of Tsang. He was born to a family of yogic practitioners who had forged a connection to his predecessor the first Dalai Lama, and also had a strong historic connection with [Samye Monastery](#), where an ancestor was an abbot. His paternal grandfather, a Shangpa Kagyu lama named Lama Donyo Gyeltsen, was a disciple of the Sakya patriarch [Namkha Neljor](#) (nam mkha' rnal 'byor, 1388-1469/70) and founder of the Sakya monastery Tanak (rtanag). Donyo Gyeltsen's son, [Kunga Gyeltsen](#) (kun dga' rgyal mtshan, 1432-1481), a disciple of [Gendun Drub](#), was Gendun Gyatso's father. His mother was Kunga Pelmo (kun dga' dpal mo, d.u.), considered to be a reincarnation of the consort to the Kagyu master Gotsangpa (rgo tsang pa, d.u.). Gendun Gyatso was born when his father was forty-five years old. He wrote in his autobiography that at the moment of his birth he faced the direction of [Tashilhunpo](#) (bkra shis lhun po) and smiled. His birth name was Sangge Pel (sangs rgyas 'phel).

Gendun Gyatso was, by all accounts, an extraordinary child, speaking in song of his previous lives and expressing the wish to return to his monastery, Tashilhunpo to all those who would listen. He records that at three, upon being scolded by his mother, he responded with "Don't get annoyed at me or I won't stay, I'll go back to Tashilhunpo." Soon after a delegation from Tashilhunpo came to his home, and it is said that the child manifested extreme delight at their appearance, greeting each of them by name, and relating to them as if they were old friends.

At this time, in the early years of the Geluk lineage in Tibet, the tradition of recognizing reincarnated lamas was extremely unusual, and Gendun Gyatso remained at home for some time, before being enthroned as the reincarnation of Gendun Drub at Tashilhunpo in 1487. He did, however, receive novice vows at age ten or eleven, when he received the name Gendun Gyatso.

Gendun Gyatso trained at nearby monasteries of [Nenying](#) (gnas rnying), [Nartang](#) (snar thang), and his family's monas-

^a <https://treasuryoflives.org/biographies/view/Second-Dalai-Lama-Gendun-Gyatso/11114>.

tery of Tanak. It is likely that among the obstacles to his recognition was the reputation of his family, who openly embraced so many different religious traditions. Gendun Gyato's continued embrace of his family's eclectic traditions no doubt served him well as he sought to spread Tsongkhapa's Geluk teachings. This was important because during his youth the Kagyu leaders of Tsang and the Geluk heirarchs of Lhasa were at war, with the Tsangpa occupying Lhasa from 1498 to 1517.

Even before his studies were completed Gendun Gyatso began to teach and give initiations, and was greeted by the faithful in droves. Despite his fame, or, some say, perhaps because of it, Gendun Gyatso found the environment at Tashilhunpo increasingly uncomfortable, and in 1494 left for U, where he studied with [Jamyang Lekpai Chojor](#) ('jam dbyang legs pa'i chos 'byor, d.u.) at [Drepung Loseling Monastery](#) ('bras spungs blo gsal gling), taking full ordination and completing his studies.

For the next twenty years, Gendun Gyatso spent his life doing practice, pilgrimage, and giving teachings, and developed an enormous following in Tibet. During this time he met and took teachings and instruction from the solitary yogi Khedrub Norsang Gyatso (mkhas grub nor sang rgya mtsho, d.u.), and the two spent many months together practicing and meditating. Gendun Gyatso's biographies state that he attained enlightenment under the tutelage of this master.

Among the many accomplishments of his life, Gendun Gyatso is remembered for the construction of [Chokkhor Gyel Metok Tang](#) (chos 'khor rgyal me tog thang) in 1509. Chokkhor Gyel came to be known as the personal monastery of the Dalai Lamas. Gendun Gyatso also was crucial in the empowerment of [Lhamo Latso](#) (lha mo bla mtsho). This lake continued to play an important role in the recognition of later Dalai Lamas, and is still considered the most powerful source of divinations in Tibet. Gendun Gyatso served as abbot of Tashilhunpo in 1512, and of [Drepung](#) in 1517, following the return of Lhasa to Geluk control. In 1528 he became the abbot of [Sera](#). Gendun Gyatso also founded [Ngari Dratsang](#) (mnga' ris grwa tshang) in 1541, in response to the growing support for Geluk teachings of the kings of Guge (gu ge) in Ngari. His influence stretched from Ngari to Kham.

Around the year 1530 Gendun Gyatso built the Ganden Po-

drang (dga' ldan pho brang) at Drepung. It was built on land donated in 1518 by the Pakmodru leader of the time. This came to be the residence of the Dalai Lamas until the Potala was built in the seventeenth century, and gave its name to the government of the Dalai Lamas after the time of the Fifth Dalai Lama.

Local Lhasa knowledge also claims that Gendun Gyatso founded the [Banak Zhol Gyelkhang](#), an oracle shrine in the Banak Zhol neighborhood of Lhasa.

Gendun Gyatso passed away in 1542. He left behind many volumes of verse, composition, and practice instructions.

[Namdrol Miranda Adams](#) is the Dean of Education and a founder of Maitripa College. She holds an MA in Education from Portland State University, and a BA in English Literature from New York University. She is currently completing her doctoral work in Education at University of Portland.

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The *Ornament for the Thought* is the Second Dalai Lama Gen-dün-gya-tsho's *Ornament Vividly Clarifying the Thought of (Tsong-kha-pa's) "Explanation of (Chandrakīrti's) 'Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle'"*.^a In Gen-dün-gya-tsho's Collected Works this text immediately follows his *Commentary on the Difficult Points of (Tsong-kha-pa's) "Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive": Lamp thoroughly Illuminating the Meaning of the Thought*,^b his clear but incomplete commentary on Tsong-kha-pa's *The Essence of Eloquence*, where a similar lengthy explanation is found with variations. Gen-dün-gya-tsho modified his exposition from this former volume on Tsong-kha-pa's *The Essence of Eloquence* and put it into the *Ornament for the Thought* on Tsong-kha-pa's commentary on Chandrakīrti's *Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle,"* and adds a short presentation on the same section presented in accordance with the Great Exposition of Special Insight section of Tsong-kha-pa's earlier *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path* and Khay-drub Ge-leg-pal-sang's *Great Compilation on Emptiness*.^c

^a (gsung 'bum thor bu las) dbu ma 'jug pa'i rnam bshad dgongs pa'i don rab tu gsal ba'i rgyan.

^b drang nges rnam 'byed kyi dka' 'grel dgongs pa'i don rab tu gsal bar byed pa'i sgron me.

^c *Ornament for the Thought*, very clear edition in Library of Tibetan Works (BDRC)

W1CZ2857-11CZ2870:313-562), 61a.1-64a.6; *dkar mdzes par ma* (BDRC W861. 2), 55a.3-58a.5; codex *ser smad dpe mdzod khang* (BDRC W1CZ2258), 222.2-228.12. In Gen-dün-gya-tsho's *Commentary on the Difficult Points of (Tsong-kha-pa's) "Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive"* this passage is: *bkra shis chos sdings kyi par khang* (W3MS878), 106a.5-109b.1; and *dkar mdzes par ma* (BDRC W861. 2), 89a.5-92a.4.

INDICATING THAT [BHĀVAVIVEKA’S] POSITING HIS OWN SYSTEM IS NOT LOGICALLY FEASIBLE

རང་ལུགས་གཞག་པ་མི་འཐད་པར་བསྟན་པ་ནི།

Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words* having stated:^a

Furthermore,^b despite asserting the view of the Proponents of the Middle, this logician [Bhāvaviveka], while wishing merely to demonstrate that he has great skill in treatises of logic, expresses statements of autonomous syllogisms that are realized to be the locus of collections of a great many fallacies.

immediately thereafter identifies the master Bhāvaviveka’s own-system’s syllogistic statement (*sbyor ngag*) refuting production from self:

How? Respectively, here [Bhāvaviveka] states this syllogism:

Ultimately the internal sense-spheres are not produced from self because of existing, like intelligence.^c

ཚོག་གསལ་ལས། གཞན་ཡང་རྟོག་གི་པ་འདིས་བདག་ཉིད་རྟོག་གའི་བསྟན་བཅས་ལ་ཤིན་ཏུ་མཁས་པ་ཙམ་ཞིག་བསྟན་པར་འདོད་པས། དབུ་མ་པའི་ལྟ་བ་ལས་ལེན་བཞིན་ཏུ་ཡང་རང་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་སྐྱུར་བའི་ངག་བརྗོད་པ་གང་ཡིན་པ་དེ་ནི་ཚེས་ཤིན་ཏུ་ཉེས་པ་ཏུ་མའི་ཚོགས་ཀྱི་གནས་སུ་རྟོགས་ཏེ། ཞེས་གསུངས་ནས། སློབ་དཔོན་ལེགས་ལྷན་འབྲེད་རང་ལུགས་ཀྱི་བདག་འགོག་པའི་སྐྱུར་ངག་ངོས་འཛིན་པ་ནི་དེའི་དེ་མ་དག་ཏུ་ཇི་ལྟར་ཞེ་ན། དེ་ལ་རེ་

^a Tibetan of Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words*: Toh 3860, *sde dge, dbu ma*, vol. ‘a, 8b.4ff.; Sanskrit in La Vallée Poussin, *Prasannapadā*, 26.13ff.

^b Golden reprint, vol. 112, 12.1ff.

^c *don dam par nang gi skye mched rnam bdag las skye ba med par nges te yod pa’i phyir shes pa yod pa nyid bzhin no, na paramārthata ādhyātmikānyāyatanāni svata utpannāni vidyamānatvāt caitanyavad*. The Tibetan of the example *shes pa yod pa nyid* is a mere translation of the Sanskrit *caitanya* and is not an extension of it to include the reason (“existing”). The reference of “intelligence” is to the *puruṣa*—the person, or pure spirit, pure consciousness.

{KEY: In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight indicates material added in place of ellipses, and magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis sign has been filled in.}

ཞིག་གང་འདི་སྐད་དུ་འདིར་སྐྱོར་བའི་ཚིག་ཏུ་འགྱུར་བ་ནི། དོན་
 དམ་པར་ན་ནང་གི་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་རྣམས་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པར་
 དེས་ཏེ། ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་དཔེར་ན་ཤེས་པ་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་བཞིན་ལོ་
 ཞེས་སྐྱེས་པ་ཡིན་ལ་ཞེས།

Having identified Bhāvaviveka’s own system’s syllogistic statement “The subjects, the internal sense-spheres, eyes and so forth, ultimately are not produced from self because of existing, like intelligence,” [Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words*] sets forth a refutation of it at length, “Why is the specification “ultimately” (*don dam par, paramārthatas*) stated in this [syllogism]?” and so forth.^a

མིག་སོགས་ནང་གི་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་རྣམས་ཚོས་ཅན། དོན་དམ་པར་
 བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་དེ། ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར། དཔེར་ན་ཤེས་པ་ཡོད་
 པ་ཉིད་བཞིན་ཞེས་པའི་ལོགས་ལྡན་རང་ལུགས་ཀྱི་སྐྱོར་ངག་དོས་
 བཟུང་ནས། དེ་འགོག་པ་ནི། འདིར་དོན་དམ་པར་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་
 བྱུང་པར་ཅིའི་ཕྱིར་ཉེ་བར་བཞོད་པ་ཡིན་ཞེས་སོགས་སྐྱེ་ཆེར་
 གསུངས་ཏེ།

[Explaining Chandrakīrti’s Passage]

Since the way to refute autonomy and, moreover, mainly the way to refute compatibly appearing subjects depends on these stemming from them, let me explain them a little. Is this specification “ultimately” in “Eyes and so forth ultimately are not produced from self because of existing, like intelligence,” affixed to predicate of the proposition, or is it affixed as a specification of the subject?

འདི་དག་ལ་བཅུམས་ཏེ་རང་རྐྱུད་འགོག་པའི་ཚུལ་དང་། དེ་ཡང་
 གཙོ་བོར་ཚོས་ཅན་མཐུན་སྐྱེང་བ་འགོག་ཚུལ་ལ་རག་ལས་པས་

^a Gen-dün-gya-tsho says merely this and “and so forth at length”; since he cites the entire passage section by section just below, I have not filled in the full quote here.

{KEY: In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight indicates material added in place of ellipses, and magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis sign has been filled in.}

དེ་ཅུང་ཟད་བཤད་ན། མིག་སོགས་དོན་དམ་པར་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་
 བ་མེད་དེ་ཞེས་པའི་དོན་དམ་གྱི་བྱུང་པར་འདི་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཚོས་
 ལ་སྐྱུར་རམ། ཚོས་ཅན་གྱི་བྱུང་པར་ལ་སྐྱུར་རམ།

If, according to the first, “ultimately” is affixed as a specification to the predicate of the proposition, it is not reasonable to affix here such a specification of “ultimately” to refuting production from self because affixing it thusly is, on the one hand, purposeless relative to oneself, the protagonist,^a and also purposeless relative to usual worldly beings.

དང་པོ་ལྟར་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཚོས་ལ་སྐྱུར་ཞེ་ན། འདིར་བདག་སྐྱེ་
 འགོག་པ་ལ་འདི་འདྲའི་དོན་དམ་གྱི་བྱུང་པར་སྐྱུར་མི་རིགས་ཏེ།
 དེ་ལྟར་སྐྱུར་བ་ལ་སྐྱ་ཚོལ་རང་ལ་བསྐྱོས་ནས་ཀྱང་དགོས་པ་མེད།
 ཕྱི་ཚོལ་གངས་ཅན་ལ་བསྐྱོས་ནས་ཀྱང་དགོས་པ་མེད། འཇིག་
 ཉེན་རང་ག་བ་ལ་བསྐྱོས་ནས་ཀྱང་དགོས་པ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

The first [which is that affixing it thusly (as a specification to the predicate of the proposition) is, on the one hand, purposeless relative to oneself, the protagonist,] is established because Bhāvaviveka, oneself, does not assert production from self even in conventional terms.

དང་པོ་[དེ་ལྟར་སྐྱུར་བ་ལ་སྐྱ་ཚོལ་རང་ལ་བསྐྱོས་ནས་ཀྱང་དགོས་པ་མེད་
 པ་]གྱུབ་སྟེ། ལེགས་ལུན་རང་ཉིད་བདག་སྐྱེ་ཐ་སྐྱད་ཡང་ཁས་མི་
 ལེན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

The second [which is that affixing it thusly (as a specification to the predicate of the proposition) is also purposeless relative to the opponent, the Sāṃkhyas,] is established because it is good to refute the bad Forders’ system in terms of both truths.

^a *snga rgol*, prior disputant; the initial party in the debate.

{KEY: In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight indicates material added in place of ellipses, and magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis sign has been filled in.}

གཉིས་པ་[དེ་སྐྱར་སྐྱར་བ་ལ་སྤྱི་ཚོལ་གངས་ཅན་ལ་བསྐྱོས་ནས་ཀྱང་དགོས་པ་མེད་
 པ་]གྲུབ་སྟེ་མུ་སྟེགས་ངན་པའི་ལྷགས་བདེན་པ་གཉིས་ཀར་དུ་
 བཀག་ན་ལེགས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

The third [which is that affixing it thusly (as a specification to the predicate of the proposition) is also purposeless relative to usual worldly beings because worldly beings does only the presentation that effects arise from causes but does not analyze, “Are they produced from self or produced from other?”

གསུམ་པ་[དེ་སྐྱར་སྐྱར་བ་ལ་འཇིག་རྟེན་རང་ག་བ་ལ་བསྐྱོས་ནས་ཀྱང་དགོས་པ་
 མེད་པ་]གྲུབ་སྟེ། འཇིག་རྟེན་པ་རྣམས་རྒྱུ་ལས་འབྲས་བུ་འབྱུང་
 བའི་རྣམ་གཞག་ཅོམ་ཞིག་བྱེད་ཀྱི་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་འམ་གཞན་ལས་
 སྐྱེ་ཞེས་དབྱུང་པ་མི་བྱེད་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་པ་ནི།

Explaining this, Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* says:^a

Why is the specification “ultimately” (*don dam par*, *paramārthatas*) stated in this [syllogism]?

ཚོག་གསལ་ལས། འདིར་དོན་དམ་པར་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་བྱུང་པར་
 ཅིའི་ཕྱིར་ཉེ་བར་བཀོད་པ་ཡིན་གྱིས་པ་ནས་

[*Depicting Bhāvaviveka's response*: It is affixed to the predicate]^b because production that is asserted in accordance with worldly conventions is not to be refuted and because even if [production] were refuted [conventionally], it would follow that [the

^a Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words*, cited by Gen-dün-gya-tsho, is in blue type to make it easily distinguishable from Gen-dün-gya-tsho's own commentary. Tibetan of Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words*: Toh 3860, *sde dge, dbu ma*, vol. 'a, 8b.4ff.; Sanskrit in La Vallée Poussin, *Prasannapadā*, 26.13ff.

^b Jam-yang-shay-pa attributes this position to Bhāvaviveka whose syllogism in this phase is, “The internal sense-spheres are *not ultimately produced from self* because of existing, like intelligence.”

{KEY: In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight indicates material added in place of ellipses, and magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis sign has been filled in.}

refutation] would be damaged by [our own] assertion [of conventionally existent production].^a

གལ་ཏེ་འཇིག་རྟེན་གྱི་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཏུ་སྐྱེ་བར་ལས་སྤངས་པ་དགག་པར་བྱ་བ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་དང་། འགོག་ན་ཡང་ལས་སྤངས་པས་གཞོད་པར་ཐལ་བར་འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ་ཞེ་ན།

Answer: This is not reasonable because [Proponents of the Middle] do not assert production from self even conventionally. [The *Rice Seedling*] *Sūtra* says:^b

Also, when a shoot is produced, arising from its cause—a seed—it is not created by itself, not created by others, not created by both, not produced causelessly, not created by Īshvara, and not metamorphosed by time. It does not arise from particles, does not arise from the nature,^c and does not arise from its own entity.

འདི་ནི་རིགས་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་ནི་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཏུ་ཡང་ལས་མ་སྤངས་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། ། ཇི་སྐད་ཏུ་མངོ་ལས་ས་བོན་གྱི་རྒྱ་ལས་བྱུང་བའི་སྐྱ་གུ་དེ་ཡང་སྐྱེ་བ་ན། བདག་གིས་མ་བྱས། གཞན་གྱིས་མ་བྱས། གཉི་གས་མ་བྱས། དབང་བྱུག་གིས་མ་བྱས། ཏུས་ཀྱིས་མ་བསྐྱར། རྩལ་མ་རབ་ལས་མ་བྱུང་། རང་བཞིན་ལས་མ་བྱུང་། རོ་བོ་ཉིད་ལས་མ་བྱུང་། རྒྱ་མེད་པ་ལས་མ་སྐྱེས་ཞེས་གསུངས་པ་དང་།

^a Anne MacDonald in brief says:

Candrakīrti intends the technical meaning of *abhyupetaḥādā*, specifically, that the thesis of the inference would be sublated by what the *Mādhyamika*'s own system accepts: the unqualified proposition that the inner bases have not arisen from self is contradicted, is sublated—has, so to speak, the rug pulled out from under it—by the fact that the *Mādhyamika* does accept the arising of things on the surface level; without the qualification, (hypothetical) *Bhāviveka* argues, the opponent would attack the proposition as being spurious (*paḥsābhāsa*).

For this and more, see Anne MacDonald, *In Clear Words: The Prasannapadā, Chapter One* (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2015), 94 n. 202.

^b The Tibetan has “is not produced causelessly” at the end. La Vallée Poussin (*Prasannapadā*, 26, n. 3) draws our attention to Shāntideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds*, IX.142, and his *Compendium of Learnings*, 219.10. See also the notes in Yotsuya, *Critique*, 82-83.

^c *rang bzhin, prakṛti*; the source of material objects as in *Sāṃkhya*.

{KEY: In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight indicates material added in place of ellipses, and magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis sign has been filled in.}

and similarly [the *Extensive Sport Sūtra*] says:^a

If a seed exists, the shoot does also.

The shoot is not what the seed is.

It is not other than it nor just it.

Hence the noumenon^b is not permanent^c and not annihilatory.

and also this very [text, *Nāgārjuna's Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called "Wisdom,"*] says:^d

Whatever arises dependently is respectively

Not just those [that is, its causes] and also is not

Other than those. Hence [causes]

Are not annihilated nor permanent.

དེ་བཞིན་དུ། ས་བོན་ཡོད་ན་ལྷུ་གུ་ཇི་བཞིན་ཏེ། ས་བོན་གང་ཡིན་ལྷུ་གུ་དེ་ཉིད་
མིན། ། དེ་ལས་གཞན་མིན་དེ་ཡང་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། དེ་ལྟར་རྟག་མིན་ཆད་མིན་ཚོས་
ཉིད་དོ། ། ཞེས་གསུངས་པ་དང་། འདི་ཉིད་ལས་ཀྱང་། གང་ལ་བརྟེན་ཏེ་གང་
འབྱུང་བ། དེ་ནི་རེ་ཞིག་དེ་ཉིད་མིན། ། དེ་ལས་གཞན་པ་འང་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། དེ་ལྟར་
ཆད་མིན་རྟག་མ་ཡིན། ། ཞེས་འཆད་དོ། །

[Depiction of Bhāvaviveka's response:] The specification is made relative to the other's [that is, the Sāṃkhya's] system.

གཞན་གྱི་ལུགས་ལ་རྟེན་ཏེ་ལྷུང་བར་དུ་བྱས་སོ་ཞེན།

^a La Vallée Poussin identifies this as 210.3-210.5 and calls our attention to Shāntideva's *Compendium of Learnings*, 238.10, 239.4. Chandrakīrti cites the stanza again twice in commentary at the end of chapters two and twenty-one. As per Yotsuya (*Critique*, 83 n. 38, citing S. Lefmann, *Lalita vistara* [Halle a. S.: Verlag der Buchhandlung des Waisenhauses], p. 176, II.11-12), the Sanskrit is:

bhījasya sato yathānkuro
na ca yo b ī ja sa caiva ānkuro/
na ca anya tato na caiva tat
evam anuccheda aśāsvata dharmatā//

^b *chos nyid, dharmatā*. I use the term “noumenon” in its basic meaning as “final reality,” and not with a Kantian overlay or the like.

^c Since in Ge-lug-pa the nature of phenomena is indeed permanent, here “permanent” is read, as is often the case, as the extreme of inherent existence.

^d XVIII.10; brackets are from Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words*. The Sanskrit, as Chandrakīrti cites it (La Vallée Poussin, *Prasannapadā*, 26.11 and 375.11) is:

pratītya yadyadbhavati na hi tāvattadeva tat/
na cānyadapi tattasmānocchinnaṃ nāpi śāsvataṃ//

{KEY: In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight indicates material added in place of ellipses, and magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis sign has been filled in.}

Answer: That also is not reasonable because their presentations are not asserted [by Proponents of the Middle] even conventionally. It is to be realized that it is advantageous to the extent that the Forders (*mu stegs pa, tīrthika*) who have fallen from nonerroneous perception of the two truths are refuted in both ways [that is, conventionally and ultimately]. Thus, to express the specification relative to the other's system^a is also not reasonable.

དེ་ཡང་རིགས་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། དེ་དག་གི་རྣམ་པར་གཞག་པ་ནི་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཏུ་ཡང་
ལས་སྐྱེངས་པ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །བདེན་པ་གཞིས་ཕྱིན་ཅི་མ་ལོག་པར་མཐོང་བ་
ལས་ཉམས་པའི་སྤྲེལ་གས་པ་དག་ཇི་སྲིད་དུ་གཉེ་གའི་སྒོ་ནས་འགོག་པ་དེ་སྲིད་དུ་
ཡིན་ཏེ། ཉེད་ཡིན་པར་རྟོགས་སོ། །དེ་ལྟར་ན་གཞན་གྱི་གཞུང་ལ་ལྟོས་ཏེ་ཁྱེད་
པར་བརྗོད་པ་ཡང་རིགས་པ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །

Furthermore, the world—in relation to which the specification would be fruitful [that is, meaningful, if it did assert production from self]—does not construe production from self. Worldly beings—without employing analysis such as “from self” or “from other” and so forth—understand only this: “An effect arises from a cause.” The master [Nāgārjuna] presented it this way too. Therefore, the specification [“ultimately”] is ascertained as “meaningless” in all respects.

གང་ལས་དེ་ལ་སྒོས་ནས་ཀྱང་ཁྱེད་པར་འབྲས་བུ་དང་བཅས་པར་འགྱུར་བ་
འཇིག་རྟེན་ལས་ཀྱང་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བར་མི་རྟོགས་ཏེ། འཇིག་རྟེན་པས་ནི་བདག་
དང་གཞན་ལས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་དེ་ལྟ་བུ་ལ་སོགས་པའི་རྣམ་པར་སྲིད་པ་འཇུག་པ་མེད་
པར་བྱས་ནས། ལྷུ་ལས་འབྲས་བུ་འབྱུང་ངོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་འདི་ཙམ་ཞིག་རྟོགས་པ་ཡིན་
ནོ། །སློབ་དཔོན་ཡང་དེ་ལྟར་རྣམ་པར་གཞག་པ་མཐོང་བ་ཡིན་ཏེ། དེའི་ཕྱིར་རྣམ་
པ་ཐམས་ཅད་དུ་ཁྱེད་པར་དོན་མེད་པ་ཉིད་དོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བར་ངེས་སོ་

ཞེས་པའི་བར་གྱིས་བཤད་ནས།

Having explained this, Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* demonstrates a refutation of affixing [ultimately] as a specification of the predicate and the subject according to the second analysis with^b “Moreover, if wishing to refute

^a *gzhung, mata.*

^b Gen-dün-gya-tsho cites merely this and “below”; since he cites the entire passage section by section just below, I have not filled in the full quote here.

{KEY: In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight indicates material added in place of ellipses, and magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis sign has been filled in.}

the conventional production” and below.

བདག་པ་གཉིས་པ་སྣང་ཚེས་དང་ཚེས་ཅན་བྱང་པར་དུ་སྐྱེར་བ་
འགོག་པ་ནི་ཚིག་གསལ་ལས། གཞན་ཡང་གལ་ཏེ་ཀུན་རྫོབ་དུ་སྐྱེ་
བ་དགག་པར་འདོད་ནས། ཞེས་པ་མན་ཆད་ཀྱིས་སྟོན་ཏེ།

[Explaining Chandrakīrti’s Passage]

On this occasion of refuting production from self when eyes and so forth are held as the subjects, which from among holding ultimate eyes and so forth as the subjects, or holding conventional eyes and so forth held as the subjects, or holding eyes and so forth upon having discarded both those [ultimate and conventional]?

Bhāvaviveka says: It is according to the first [which is that on this occasion of refuting production from self, ultimately existent eyes and so forth are held as the subjects].

[Answer:] That is not reasonable because relative to the protagonist^a there would be the fallacy of a position [that is, thesis] or a sign in which the base, the subject, is nonestablished, because oneself has asserted ultimate sense-spheres, eyes and so forth, as nonexistent.

བདག་སྐྱེ་འགོག་པའི་སྐབས་འདིར་མིག་སོགས་ཚེས་ཅན་དུ་
འཛིན་ན་དོན་དམ་པའི་མིག་སོགས་ཚེས་ཅན་དུ་འཛིན་ནམ།
ཀུན་རྫོབ་པའི་མིག་སོགས་ཚེས་ཅན་དུ་འཛིན་ནམ། དེ་གཉིས་
ཀའི་བྱང་པར་དོར་བའི་མིག་སོགས་ཅམ་ཞེས་ཚེས་ཅན་དུ་འཛིན་
པ་ལས་གང་ཡིན། ལེགས་ལྡན་ན་རེ། དང་པོ་སྣང་ཡིན་ཅོ་ཞེ་ན་དེ་
ནི་མི་རིགས་ཏེ། དེ་སྟོན་པ་སྣང་གི་རང་ལ་བསྟོན་ཏེ་ཚེས་ཅན་གཞི་
མ་གྲུབ་པའི་སྐྱོགས་སམ། ཏྲགས་ཀྱི་སྐྱོན་དུ་འགྱུར་བའི་སྐྱིར་ཏེ།
རང་གི་དོན་དམ་པའི་མིག་སོགས་མེད་པར་ཁས་སྐྱོངས་པའི་སྐྱིར་
ཞེས་པ་ནི།

^a *snga rgol*, prior disputant; the initial party in the debate, who in this case is Bhāvaviveka.

{KEY: In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight indicates material added in place of ellipses, and magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis sign has been filled in.}

This is the meaning of Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words*:

Moreover, if this specification is made wishing to refute the conventional production [of subjects that are asserted to exist ultimately],^a then, for you there would be the fault of a position [that is, thesis] in which the base [that is, subject] is not established^b or the fallacy of a reason in which the base [that is, subject] is not established,^c because you do not assert sense-spheres, eyes and so forth, ultimately.^d

ཚོག་གསལ་ལས།

གཞན་ཡང་གལ་ཏེ་ཞེས་པ་ནས་ [གུན་རྫོབ་ཏུ་སྐྱེ་བ་དགག་པར་འདོད་
 ལྷན་བྱུང་པར་འདི་འགོད་པར་བྱུང་ན་ནི་དེའི་ཚེ་རང་ལ་གཞི་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་
 ལྷགས་ཀྱི་ཞེས་པའམ། གཞི་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་གཏུན་ཚོགས་ཀྱི་སྐྱོན་དུ་འགྱུར་ཏེ། རང་
 གིས་དོན་དམ་པར་མིག་ལ་སོགས་པའི་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་རྣམས་] །ལས་མ་སྐྱབས་
 པའི་སྐྱེར་རོ།

ཞེས་པའི་བར་གྱི་དོན་དང་།

If it is according to the second [which is that on this occasion of refuting production from self, conventionally existent eyes and so forth are held as the subjects], this also is not reasonable because relative to the opponent, a Sāmkhya, there would be the fallacy of a nonestablished base, the subject, and furthermore because you should have said, “The subject, conventional eyes and so forth, are not ultimately produced” but you did not say such.

^a Jam-yang-shay-pa takes this as depicting Bhāvaviveka’s opinion.
^b *gzhi ma grub pa, asiddhādhāra*.
^c *gzhi ma grub pa, āśrayāsiddha*.
^d Stcherbatsky (*The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana*, 113) translates this clause extremely freely, adding in considerable commentary as if Chandrakīrti says such in his text: “Indeed (Bhāvaviveka) himself being a Proponent of the Middle does not admit the transcendental reality of separate mental phenomena and at the same time he composes a syllogism about this very non-existing thing.” The last clause is total speculation stemming from Stcherbatsky’s assumption that Chandrakīrti does not accept the existence of anything.

{KEY: In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight indicates material added in place of ellipses, and magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis sign has been filled in.}

གཉེས་པ་སྟུང་ན་ཡང་མི་རིགས་ཏེ། གཞན་ཕྱི་རྒྱུ་གྲངས་ཅན་ལ་
 བསྟོན་ནས་ཚོས་ཅན་གཞི་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་སྟོན་དུ་འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར་
 དང་། གཞན་ཡང་མིག་སྟོན་གྲུབ་རྗེས་པ་རྣམས་ཚོས་ཅན། དོན་
 དམ་པར་སྟོབ་མེད་དེ། ཞེས་བརྗོད་རིགས་པ་ལས་དེ་སྟུང་ཡང་མ་
 བརྗོད་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་པ་ནི།

This is the meaning of Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words*:

ཚོག་གསལ་ལས།

[Depiction of Bhāvaviveka’s response:] Since eyes and so forth exist conventionally, there is no fault.

གལ་ཏེ་གྲུབ་རྗེས་དུ་ཞེས་པ་ནས་ [མིག་ལ་སྟོན་པ་ཡིད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེས་
 བ་མེད་དོ་ཞེ་ན།

Answer: Well then, what does “ultimately” qualify?

འོ་ན་དོན་དམ་པར་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་འདི་གང་གི་ཁྱད་བར་ཡིན།

[Depiction of Bhāvaviveka’s response:] Since the ultimate production of veilings [conventionalities] such as eyes is being refuted, “ultimately” qualifies the refutation of production.

གལ་ཏེ་མིག་ལ་སྟོན་པ་གྲུབ་རྗེས་པ་རྣམས་དོན་དམ་པར་སྟོབ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་
 དོན་དམ་པ་སྟོན་པ་ནི་སྟོབ་མེད་པའི་ཁྱད་བར་ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེ་ན།

Answer: In that case, you should have said, “Ultimately there is no production of veilings [conventionalities] such as eyes,”^a but such was not proposed. Even if you had [said such], the other party [a Sāṃkhya] asserts eyes and so forth just as substantially existent^b and does not assert them as imputedly existent,^c due to which the position [that is, thesis] would be fallacious in that the base [that is, subject] would not be established for the other [party, the

^a Or, to keep the subject-predicate order: “Conventionalities such as eyes do not have ultimately existent production.”
^b *rdzas su yod pa, dravyasat*; following De Jong’s correction (“Textcritical Notes,” 31, n. 28.1) of *vastusatām* to *dravyasatām*.
^c *btags par yod pa, prajñaptisat*.

{KEY: In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight indicates material added in place of ellipses, and magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis sign has been filled in.}

Sāṃkhya]. Hence, this is not reasonable.

དེ་ལྟར་ན་ནི་འོ་ན་མིག་ལ་སོགས་པ་ཀུན་རྫོབ་པ་ན་མས་དོན་དམ་པར་སྐྱེ་བ་ཡོད་པ་
 མ་ཡིན་ཏེ་ཞེས་དེ་སྐད་བརྗོད་པར་བྱ་བར་འགྱུར་ན། དེ་སྐད་དུ་ཡང་མ་སྐྱེས་སོ།
 སྐྱེ་ན་ཡང་པ་རོལ་པོ་དག་གིས་མིག་ལ་སོགས་པ་ན་མས་རྗེས་སུ་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་
 ལས་སྐངས་པའི་ཕྱིར་དང་། བརྟགས་པར་ཡོད་པར་ལས་མ་སྐངས་པའི་ཕྱིར་
 གཞན་ལ་གཞི་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་སྐྱོན་དུ་འགྱུར་བས།]འདི་ནི་མི་རིགས་
 ལོ་

ཞེས་པའི་བར་གྱི་དོན་ནོ། །

About that Bhāvaviveka says: If Buddhists in proving to a Vaisheshika that sound is impermanent held sound specified as an evolute of the elements as the subject, it is not established for the Vaisheshika, and if they held sound specified as a quality of space as the subject, it is not established for the Buddhist. Therefore, just as they hold mere sound— upon having discarded specifications of those two—as the subject, so here also mere eyes and so forth—upon having discarded the specifications of conventional and ultimate—are held as the subject, due to which the fault of the subject’s nonestablishment does not exist.

དེ་ལ་མིགས་ལྡན་ན་རེ། སངས་རྒྱས་པས་བྱེ་བྲག་པ་ལ་སྐྱ་མི་རྟག་
 པར་བསྐྱབ་པ་ལ་འབྱུང་འགྱུར་གྱི་བྱུང་པར་དུ་བྱས་པའི་སྐྱ་ཚོས་
 ཅན་དུ་བཟུང་ན་བྱེ་བྲག་པ་ལ་མ་གྲུབ་ཅིང་ན་མ་མཐའི་ཡོན་ཏན་
 གྱི་བྱུང་པར་དུ་བྱས་པའི་སྐྱ་ཚོས་ཅན་དུ་བཟུང་ན་སངས་རྒྱས་པ་
 ལ་མ་གྲུབ་པས། དེ་གཉིས་ཀྱི་བྱུང་པར་དོར་བའི་སྐྱ་ཚོས་ཚོས་ཅན་
 དུ་འཛིན་པ་བཞིན་དུ་འདྲིར་ཡང་། ཀུན་རྫོབ་དང་དོན་དམ་གྱི་
 བྱུང་པར་དོར་བའི་མིག་སོགས་ཚོས་ཞིག་ཚོས་ཅན་དུ་འཛིན་པས་
 ཚོས་ཅན་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་ཉེས་པ་མེད་དོ་ཞེ་ན། ཞེས་པ་ནི།

This is the meaning of Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words*:

ཚོག་གསལ་ལས།

{KEY: In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight indicates material added in place of ellipses, and magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis sign has been filled in.}

[*Depiction of Bhāvaviveka's response:*]^a It is like [on an occasion when to an opponent^b a Buddhist puts forward the thesis that] sound is impermanent, just generalities of the two, the subject and the predicate, are to be used, not specifics. If specifics were used, the conventions of inference and object of inference^c would be nonexistent. It is as follows: If “sound that is derived from the four great elements” were used, it would not be established for the other party. However, if “sound that is a quality of space”^d were used, it would not be established for oneself, the Buddhist.

^a Tsong-kha-pa's presentation of the controversy between Buddhapālita, Bhāvaviveka, and Chandrakīrti in his Great Exposition of Special Insight (see Volume 5 in this series) in the *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path* begins with this point, 37-41 and 123-126.

^b Tsong-kha-pa, as is evident below, identifies the opponent as a Vaiśeṣhika, but Kodo Yotsuya (*The Critique of Svatantra Reasoning by Chandrakīrti and Tsong-kha-pa*, 93 n. 73) points out that since Vaiśeṣhikas assert that sound is impermanent (as is explained in the next footnote), there is no need for a Buddhist to prove to a Vaiśeṣhika that sound is impermanent; therefore, he identifies the opponent as a Mīmāṃsaka. However, it may be that because Vaiśeṣhikas hold that a sound is a quality of space and space is permanent, the Buddhist here is holding that Vaiśeṣhikas are forced by reasoning to assert that a sound is permanent.

^c Gung-thang Lo-drö-gya-tsho's (*gung thang blo gros rgya mtsho*, 1851-1928/1930) *Day-making Illumination Clarifying the Meaning of the Thought of (Jam-yang-shay-pa's) "Decisive Analysis of the Middle: Treasury of Scripture and Reasoning"* (*dbu ma'i mtha' dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod kyi dgongs don gsal bar byed pa'i nyin byed snang ba zab lam la ba'i mig 'byed*) BDRC W140-1IKG15988, 152.14, glosses inference (*rje su dpag pa*) with “the sign that is the means of inference” (*dpag byed rtags, anumāna*) and object of inference (*rje su dpag par bya ba, anumeya*) with “predicate of the proposition that is the object inferred” (*dpag bya bsgrub bya'i chos*).

^d *nam mkha'*, *ākāśa*. As Ngag-wang-pal-dan's *Explanation of Obscurational and Ultimate Truths* (54.1; Hopkins, *Maps of the Profound*, 166) says about the Vaiśeṣhika assertion that sound is a quality of space:

“Whatever has production and disintegration necessarily depends upon some substance; for example, [the flame of] a butter lamp. Sound also has production and disintegration.” By such reasoning, sound is proved to depend upon a substance. Because sound is heard apart from the four elements, earth and so on, it does not depend on those four. Also, because it is observed externally by a sense consciousness, as shared between oneself and others, it is not a quality of the self. Since it is an object of apprehension by the ear, it is not a quality of the three—direction, time, and consciousness. Hence, it is asserted to be established as a quality only of space.

Kodo Yotsuya (*The Critique of Svatantra Reasoning by Chandrakīrti and Tsong-kha-pa*, 93 n. 73) points out that Mīmāṃsakas also assert that sound is a quality of space.

{KEY: In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight indicates material added in place of ellipses, and magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis sign has been filled in.}

ཅི་སྟེ་རི་སྒྲར་སྒྲུ་མི་རྟག་ཅེས་བྱ་བ་ལ་ཚོས་དང་ཚོས་ཅན་
 གཉིས་སྟེ་ཉིད་གཟུང་བ་ཡིན་གྱི། བྱང་པར་ནི་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། འིས་
 ས་ནས་། བྱང་པར་འཛིན་ན་ནི་རྗེས་སྤྱད་བཀའ་བ་དང་རྗེས་སྤྱད་བཀའ་བར་བྱ་
 བའི་ཐ་སྐད་མེད་པར་འགྱུར་རོ། །འདི་སྒྲར་གལ་ཏེ་འབྱུང་བ་ཚེན་པོ་བཞི་ལས་
 གྱུར་བའི་སྒྲ་འཛིན་ན་ནི་དེ་བ་རོལ་བོ་ལ་མ་གྲུབ་བོ། །འོན་ཏེ་ནམ་མཁའི་ཡིན་
 ཏན་འཛིན་ན་ནི་དེ་རང་ཉིད་སངས་རྒྱས་བ་ལ་མ་གྲུབ་བ་ཡིན་རོ། །

Similarly, even when a *Vaiśeṣhika*^a makes the thesis that sound is impermanent, if “sound that is a product” is used, it would not be established for the other party. However, if “manifested,” it would not be established for oneself.

Likewise, respectively, if “disintegration” is “caused,” it would not be established for oneself, a Buddhist. However, if “causeless,” it would not be established for the other party. Therefore, just as for these, mere generalities of subject and predicate are to be used, so here also a mere subject devoid of specifics is to be used.

དེ་བཞིན་དུ་བྱེ་བྲག་སྒྲུ་མི་རྟག་པར་དམ་འཆའ་བ་ན་ཡང་། བྱས་བའི་སྒྲ་འཛིན་
 ན་དེ་གཞན་ལ་མ་གྲུབ་བོ། །འོན་ཏེ་མངོན་པར་གསལ་བར་བྱས་བ་ཡིན་ན་ནི་དེ་
 རང་ལ་མ་གྲུབ་བ་ཡིན་རོ། །དེ་བཞིན་དུ་ཅི་རིགས་པར་འཛིག་པ་ཡང་གལ་ཏེ་རྒྱ་
 དང་བཅས་བ་ཡིན་ན་ནི། དེ་སངས་རྒྱས་བ་རང་ལ་མ་གྲུབ་བ་ཡིན་ལ། འོན་ཏེ་རྒྱ་
 མེད་བ་ཡིན་ན་ནི་དེ་བ་རོལ་བོ་ལ་མ་གྲུབ་བ་ཡིན་རོ། །དེའི་ཕྱིར་རི་སྒྲར་འདིར་

^a Here in this second example, a *Vaiśeṣhika* is proving to another party that sound is impermanent. Tsong-kha-pa, as is evident above, identifies the opponent as a *Dīpaka* (*gsal byed pa*), which *The Four Interwoven Annotations* (vol. 2, 526.4) explains is a type of *Sāṃkhya*, but Kodo Yotsuya (*The Critique of Svatantra Reasoning by Chandrakīrti and Tsong-kha-pa*, 93) here also takes the opponent to be a *Mīmāṃsaka*; in both cases his identifications are *Mīmāṃsaka*.

Jam-yang-shay-pa (see the previous volume) identifies the other party as a *Nirgrantha* (*gcer bu pa*), another name for *Jaina*; Stcherbatsky (*The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa*, 115) identifies the opponent as a *Mīmāṃsaka*, inserting the identification into the text as if *Chandrakīrti* so specified it, whereas he did not; Wayman (*Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real*, 310) goes along with Stcherbatsky; Gom-day Nam-kha-gyal-tshan (*Settling Difficult Points in the Opposite of the Consequences*, 633.2) identifies the other party as a *Dīpaka*. In any case, the assertion of the *Vaiśeṣhika*’s opponent is that sound is pre-existent in a nonmanifest state and is made manifest by conditions, something which the *Vaiśeṣhika* cannot accept.

{KEY: In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight indicates material added in place of ellipses, and magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis sign has been filled in.}

ཚོས་དང་ཚོས་ཅན་གྱི་ཅམ་ཞིག་འདོན་པ་དེ་བཞིན་དུ། འདིར་ཡང་། བྱུང་པར་
 དོར་བའི་ཚོས་ཅན་ཅམ་ཞིག་འདོན་པར་འགྱུར་རོ་ཞེ་ན།
 ཞེས་པའི་བར་གྱི་དོན་ནོ། །

[1. CHANDRAKĪRTI'S REFUTATION]

Refuting this, Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* indicates briefly:

དེ་འགོག་པ་ནི། ཚོག་གསལ་ལས།

[That (when Proponents of the Middle and Proponents of Truly Established Things debate, a compatibly established subject and so forth not qualified with either truth or falsity are asserted)^a is not so.]^b For, at that time when a negation of production is asserted here as the predicate of the proposition, this one himself [Bhāvaviveka] indeed has asserted that the entities of the subjects—the substrata of that [predicate] which gain their thingness by the mere erroneous—have degenerated from [establishment] in suchness. The erroneous and the nonerroneous are different.

འདི་ལྟར་གང་གི་ཚོ་འདིར་སྐྱེ་བ་
 བཀག་པ་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཚོས་སུ་འདོད་པ་དེའི་ཚོ་དེ་ལོ་ནར་
 འདི་རྟེན་ཚོས་ཅན་ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་ཅམ་གྱི་བདག་གི་དངོས་པོ་
 རྟེན་པ་ནི་ཉམས་པར་གྱུར་པ་འདིས་རང་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ཁས་
 སྲངས་པ་ཉིད་དོ། ། ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་དང་ཕྱིན་ཅི་མ་ལོག་པ་དག་
 བྱི་ཐ་དད་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །

ཞེས་མདོར་བསྟན་ནས།

and then Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* explains extensively:

^a Jam-yang-shay-pa's annotation from *The Four Interwoven Annotations on Tsongkha-pa's Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path*.

^b Inexplicably Gen-dün-gya-tsho omits this short beginning to his next citation from Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words*, so I have added it in brackets here.

^c *de kho nar*; for more on this reading, see remarks below.

Therefore, when,^a like the falling hairs and so forth [apprehended] by one with eye disease and so on, what is nonexistent is apprehended by an erroneous [consciousness] as just existing, how then could even a portion of an object existent [by way of its own character] be observed! When, like the falling hairs and so forth [not apprehended] by one without eye disease, the unreal is not superimposed by a nonerroneous [consciousness], how then could even the merest portion of nonexistent objects, veilings, be observed!

དེའི་སྐྱེར་གང་གི་ཚོ་ [རབ་རིབ་ཅན་གྱིས་སྐྱེར་གང་ལ་སོགས་པ་སྐྱེར་སྐྱེན་ཅི་ལོག་གིས་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ཏུ་འཛིན་པ་དེའི་ཚོ་མི་ཡོད་པར་གྱུར་པའི་དོན་ཚུ་ཅོམ་ཡང་དམིགས་པར་ག་ལ་འགྱུར། གང་གི་ཚོ་རབ་རིབ་ཅན་མ་ཡིན་པས་སྐྱེར་གང་ལ་སོགས་པ་སྐྱེར་སྐྱེན་ཅི་མ་ལོག་པས་ཡང་དག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་སྐྱོ་མི་འདོགས་པ་དེའི་ཚོ་ན་ཡང་གང་གིས་ན་དེའི་ཚོ་ན་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཏུ་འགྱུར་བ་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་གྱུར་པའི་དོན་ཚུ་ཅོམ་ཡང་དམིགས་པ་ག་ལ་ཡོད།

Hence, the holy master [Nāgārjuna] also says [in the *Refutation of Objections*]:^b

If direct perception and so forth did observe some [inherently established] objects,
 Then [it would be reasonable] to prove those or refute [those in others' systems],
 But since those do not exist,
 There is no [chance for you] to censure me.

Because in that way, the erroneous and the nonerroneous are different, the erroneous do not exist in a state [directly perceiving] the nonerroneous. Therefore, how could there be a veiling, an eye, that is a subject! Hence, there is no overturning the fallacy of a position whose base is not established^c and the fallacy of a reason

^a Gen-dün-gya-tsho cites merely “Therefore, when *and below*” (*de'i phyir gang gi tshes zhes pa man chad*) which I have filled in.
^b Stanza 30; P5228, vol. 95, 15.1.2. See also K. Bhattacharya, E. H. Johnston, and A. Kunst, *The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna* (New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978), 23.
^c *gzhi ma grub pa, asiddhādharma*.

{KEY: In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight indicates material added in place of ellipses, and magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis sign has been filled in.}

whose base is not established,^a and, therefore, this is just not a response.

དེ་ཉིད་གྱི་ཕྱིར་སློབ་དཔོན་གྱི་ལལ་ལྷན་གྲུང་། གལ་ཏེ་མངོན་སུམ་ལ་
སྐྱབས་པའི། །དོན་གྱིས་འགའ་ཞིག་དམིགས་ན་ནི། །སྐྱབས་པའམ་བསྐྱོག་པར་
བྱ་ན་དེ། །མེད་ཕྱིར་ང་ལ་སྐྱེན་ཀ་མེད། །ཅས་གསུངས་སོ། །གང་གི་ཕྱིར་དེ་
སྐྱར་ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་པ་དང་ཕྱིན་ཅི་མ་ལོག་པ་དག་ཐ་དད་པ་དེའི་ཕྱིར་ཕྱིན་
ཅི་མ་ལོག་པའི་གནས་སྐབས་ན་ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ན།
གང་ཞིག་ཚོས་ཅན་ཉིད་དུ་འགྱུར་བ་མིག་ཀུན་རྗེས་བཤུ་ག་ལ་ཡོད། དེའི་
ཕྱིར་གཞི་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱོགས་གྱི་སྐྱོན་དང་། གཞི་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་གཏན་
ཚིགས་གྱི་སྐྱོན་ཐོག་པ་མེད་པ་ཉིད་པས་འདི་ལན་མ་ཡིན་པ་ཉིད་དོ། །]

མན་ཚད་གྱིས་རྒྱས་པར་བཤད་པ་^bཡིན་པས་

^a gzhi ma grub pa, āśrayāsiddha.

^b In *Difficult Points* (*bkra shis chos sdings*, 106b.2, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 89b.1), Gen-dün-gya-tsho cites here Tsong-kha-pa’s commentary in *The Essence of Eloquence* on these two passages from Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words*:

In response, [Chandrakīrti] refutes [Bhāvaviveka] upon indicating that Bhāvaviveka himself has asserted that the entities of the subjects, eyes and so forth, are not found by the merely erroneous and the reasoning that the erroneous and non-erroneous are different—a direct dichotomy—and so forth.

དེའི་ལན་དུ་མིག་སྐྱབས་གྱི་ཚོས་ཅན་གྱི་རང་གི་ངོ་བོ་དེ་ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་ཅམ་གྱིས་རྗེད་པ་མེན་
པར་ལོགས་ལྡན་རང་ཉིད་གྱིས་ཁས་སྐྱངས་ལ། ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་མ་ལོག་ཐ་དད་པ་སྟེ་དངོས་
འགལ་ཡིན་པ་ལ་སྐྱབས་པའི་རིགས་པ་བསྐྱེན་ནས་བཀའག་གོ།

The meaning of those is: As the subjects in the proof that eyes and so forth are not produced from self, it is not suitable to posit mere eyes and so forth for which the specifics of the two truths have been discarded, because [according to Bhāvaviveka] (1) a valid cognition comprehending these subjects is a consciousness unmistakable with respect to the nature of eyes and so forth, but (2) states (*gnas skabs*) of—that is, objects found (*rnyed pa'i yul*) by—nonerroneous consciousnesses unmistakable with respect to the nature do not exist among false appearances, erroneous objects of knowledge appearing to exist by way of their own character whereas they do not.

དེ་དག་གི་དོན་ནི་མིག་སྐྱབས་བདག་ལས་མི་སྟེ་བར་སྐྱབས་པའི་ཚོས་ཅན་དུ་བདེན་གཉིས་གྱི་
བྱུང་བར་དོར་བའི་མིག་སྐྱབས་ཅམ་གཞན་གྱི་མི་རུང་སྟེ། ཚོས་ཅན་དེ་འཇལ་བའི་ཚད་མ་ནི་

{KEY: In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight indicates material added in place of ellipses, and magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis sign has been filled in.}

མིག་སོགས་ཀྱི་རང་བཞིན་ལ་མ་འཇུག་པའི་ཤེས་པ་ཡིན་ཅི་མ་ལོག་པ་^[87a]ལ་ཤེས་པ་བྱིན་ཅི་མ་ལོག་པ་
རང་བཞིན་ལ་མ་འཇུག་པའི་གནས་སྐབས་ཏེ། དེས་རྟེན་པའི་ཡུལ་ནི་ཤེས་བྱ་བྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་
རང་མཚན་གྱིས་མེད་བཞིན་དུ་དེར་སྣང་བའི་རླུང་སྣང་མེད་པའི་བྱིར་རོ། །

With respect to how [Bhāvaviveka] asserts the former reason [which is that (according to Bhāvaviveka) the valid cognitions comprehending those subjects are consciousnesses unmistaken with respect to the nature of eyes and so forth]:

- In a system asserting that whatever exists exists by way of its own entity, if [a consciousness] has come to be mistaken relative to the appearance of own-character [that is, the object's being established by way of its own character], it cannot be posited as finding [that is, realizing] its object of comprehension. Therefore, whether a conceptual or non-conceptual valid cognition, it must be unmistaken with respect to the own-character [that is, the establishment by way of its own character] of that with respect to which it is a valid cognition—the appearing object or the conceived object. In that case, [the consciousness] must go as a valid cognition with respect to the entity (*ngo bo*), or nature (*rang bzhin*), of the mode of subsistence of the object itself, this not just being nominally imputed in conventional terms, and [Bhāvaviveka] himself also asserts this.

རྟོགས་ཐུ་མ་དེ་ལས་སྣངས་པའི་ཚུལ་ནི། ཡོད་པ་གང་ཡིན་རང་གི་ངོ་བོས་ཡོད་པར་འདོད་
པའི་ལུགས་ལ་རང་མཚན་སྣང་བ་ལ་སྟོན་ཏེ་འཇུག་བར་སོང་ན་དེས་རང་གི་གཞུག་བྱ་རྟེན་
པར་འཇོག་མི་ལུས་པས། རྟོག་པ་དང་རྟོག་མེད་ཀྱི་ཚད་མ་གང་ཡིན་ཀྱང་ཚད་མར་སོང་ས་
སྣང་ཡུལ་དང་ཞེན་ཡུལ་རང་མཚན་ལ་མ་འཇུག་བ་ཅིག་དགོས་སོ། ། དེའི་ཚེ་ཐ་སྣང་དུ་མིང་
དུ་བཏགས་པ་ཙམ་མིན་པའི་དོན་རང་གི་གནས་ཚུལ་གྱི་ངོ་བོའམ་རང་བཞིན་ཅིག་ལ་ཚད་
མར་འགོ་དགོས་ཤིང་རང་གིས་ལས་ལེན་པ་ཡང་ཡིན་ལོ། །

- It is contradictory for whatever is an object found by such a valid cognition to be an erroneous object of knowledge, whereby the latter sign [which is that states of—that is, objects found by—nonerroneous consciousnesses unmistaken with respect to the nature do not exist among false appearances, erroneous objects of knowledge appearing to exist by way of their own character whereas they do not] is established. Likewise, it is also contradictory for whatever is an object found by a mistaken consciousness to be an erroneous object of knowledge.

Therefore, [Bhāvaviveka] cannot dispel the fallacy of a nonestablished subject.

དེ་འདྲ་བའི་ཚད་མས་རྟེན་པའི་དོན་ཡིན་ན་ཤེས་བྱ་བྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་ཡིན་པར་འགལ་བས་
རྟོགས་བྱི་མ་འགྲུབ་སོ། ། དེ་བཞིན་དུ་ཤེས་པ་འཇུག་བས་རྟེན་པའི་དོན་ཡིན་ན་ཡང་ཤེས་བྱ་
བྱིན་ཅི་མ་ལོག་པ་ཡིན་པ་འགལ་སོ། ། དེའི་བྱིར་ཚོས་ཅན་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་སྟོན་སྟོང་མི་ལུས་སོ། །

{KEY: In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight indicates material added in place of ellipses, and magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis sign has been filled in.}

[2. AUGMENTING CHANDRAKĪRTI'S BRIEF INDICATION]

Therefore, since these very words of commentary are hard to realize, let [me] explain them a little.^a It is not suitable to posit that mere eye sense (*mig dbang tsam de*) as an autonomous substratum subject, established for both, in the proof that an eye sense is not ultimately produced by the sign, existing, because as evidence, when on this occasion a negation of ultimate production is asserted as the predicate of the proposition, an eye sense—the entity of the substratum subject—is sought, it is not found, this Bhāvaviveka himself has asserted that its gaining thingness through a mere erroneous consciousness^b is not suitable. There is entailment^c because in that case that eye sense must be asserted as an object found by a nonerroneous consciousness^d unmistakable with respect to the inherent nature (*rang bzhin*) of the eye sense, and if this is asserted, that eye sense must not exist as an object of the erroneous consciousness comprehending eyes and so

See Hopkins, *Tsong-kha-pa's Revised Presentation of Compatibly Appearing Subjects in The Essence of Eloquence with Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho's Commentary*, 7 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version April 2020: uma-tibet.org), 65 and 181.

^a *Ornament*, Library of Tibetan Works, 62b.2, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 56b.2; *Difficult Points*, *bkra shis chos sdings*, 106b.2, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 89b.1.

^b *yul can*, literally, “object-possessor.”

^c “There is entailment” means:

[That when on this occasion a negation of production is asserted as the predicate of the proposition, an eye sense—the entity of the subject, the substratum—is sought, it is not found, this Bhāvaviveka himself has asserted that its gaining thingness through a mere erroneous object-possessor is not suitable] entails [that it is not suitable to posit that a mere eye sense as an autonomous substratum subject, established for both, in the proof that an eye sense is not ultimately produced by the sign, existing]

སྐབས་འདིར་དོན་དམ་སྐྱེ་བ་སྐྱེ་བ་བཀག་པ་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཚོས་སྲ་འདོད་པ་དེའི་ཚོ་ཁོ་ནར་
 ཉེན་ཚོས་ཅན་མིག་དབང་དེ་བཙལ་བའི་ཚོ་རྟོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཡུལ་ཅན་ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་ཅོམ་
 གྱིས་བདག་གི་དངོས་པོ་ཡོད་པར་རྟོད་པ་ནི་མི་ཅུང་བར་ལོགས་ལྷན་འདིས་རང་ཉིད་གྱིས་
 ལས་བླངས་ན་མིག་དབང་ཅོམ་པོ་དེ་ཡོད་པའི་དོན་གྱིས་དེ་རྟོགས་གྱིས་མིག་དབང་དོན་དམ་
 དུ་མི་སྐྱེ་བར་སྐྱབ་པའི་རང་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་ཚོས་ཅན་དུ་གཉིས་ཀ་ལ་གྲུབ་པར་གཞག་ཏུ་མི་ཅུང་བ་
 ཡིན་པས་]བྱབ་སྟེ།

^d *yul can*, literally, “object-possessor.”

{KEY: In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight indicates material added in place of ellipses, and magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis sign has been filled in.}

forth [asserted] by Sāṃkhyas, because the two objects existing in the appearance-perspective of two consciousnesses—erroneous and nonerroneous—are different, that is, contradictory.

This was an augmentation (*'bru bsnan pa*) to [Chandrakīrti's] words of commentary.^a

^a The same augmentation utilizing colored type: Blue type is Chandrakīrti's brief indication with crossed out material to show what Gen-dün-gya-tsho does not use; crossed out black type is material in Gen-dün-gya-tsho's *Difficult Points* that Gen-dün-gya-tsho deleted when he brought the passage over to *Ornament for the Thought*; orange type is material Gen-dün-gya-tsho added in *Ornament for the Thought*.

It is not suitable to posit that mere eye sense (*mig dbang tsam Ꞥ de*) as an autonomous **substratum** subject, established for both, in the proof that an eye sense is not ultimately produced by the fact of existing—that is, by the sign, existing. For, because as evidence, when at on this time occasion a negation of ultimate production is asserted as the predicate of the proposition, an eye sense—the entity of the subject, the substratum—is sought, it is not found, this Bhāvaviveka himself has just asserted that its gaining thingness through a mere erroneous consciousness is not suitable. —has degenerated from [establishment] in suchness. There is entailment because in that case that eye sense must be asserted as an object found by a nonerroneous consciousness unmistaken with respect to the inherent nature (*rang bzhin*) of the eye sense, and if this is asserted, that eye sense must not exist as an object of the erroneous consciousness comprehending eyes and so forth [asserted] by Sāṃkhyas, because the two objects existing in the appearance-perspective of two consciousnesses—erroneous and nonerroneous—are different, that is, contradictory.

This is an augmentation (*'bru bsnan pa*) of the passage in *Clear Words* to [Chandrakīrti's] words of commentary.

འགྲུབ་ཚེག་འདི་ཉིད་རྟོགས་དཀའ་བས་ཅུང་ཟད་བཤད་ན། དེ་ནི་དེ་ལྟར་ཡང་མ་
ཡིན་ཏེ། མིག་དབང་ཙམ་པོ་དེ་ཡོད་པའི་དོན་གྱིས་དེ་རྟོགས་ཀྱིས་མིག་དབང་དོན་
དམ་པར་དུ་མི་སྐྱེ་བར་བརྒྱབ་པའི་རང་རྒྱུ་གྱི་རྟོན་ཚོས་ཙན་དུ་གཉིས་ཀ་ལ་གྲུབ་
པར་གཞག་དུ་མི་རུང་སྟེ། རྒྱ་མཚན་འདི་ལྟར་གང་གི་ཚེ་སྐབས་འདིར་དོན་དམ་
པའི་སྐྱེ་བ་བཀག་པ་བརྒྱབ་པར་བྱ་བའི་ཚོས་སུ་འདོད་པ་དེའི་ཚེ་དེ་ལོ་མ་ར་དེའི་
རྟོན་ཚོས་ཙན་མིག་དབང་དེ་བཙལ་བའི་ཚེ་རྟོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཡུལ་ཙན་ཕྱིན་ཅི་
ལོག་ཙམ་གྱིས་བདག་གི་དངོས་པོ་ཡོད་པར་རྟོད་པ་ནི་ཉམས་པར་རྒྱུར་པ་འདིས་
མི་རུང་བར་ལེགས་ལྡན་འདིས་རང་ཉིད་གྱིས་ལས་སྤངས་པ་ཉིད་དོ། །འདི་སྟེ།
འབྲུབ་སྟེ། དེ་ལྟར་མིག་དབང་དེ་ཡུལ་ཙན་ཕྱིན་ཅི་མ་ལོག་པ་མིག་དབང་གི་རང་
བཞིན་ལ་མ་འབྲུལ་བའི་རྟོད་དོན་དུ་འདོད་དགོས་ཤིང་། དེ་འདོད་ན་མིག་དབང་

{KEY: In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight indicates material added in place of ellipses, and magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis sign has been filled in.}

འགྲོལ་ཚིག་འདི་ཉིད་རྟོགས་དཀའ་བས་ཅུང་ཟད་བཤད་ན། མིག་
 དབང་ཅམ་དེ་ཡོད་པའི་རྟོགས་ཀྱི་མིག་དབང་དོན་དམ་པར་མི་
 རྐྱེ་བར་རྒྱབ་པའི་རང་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་རྟེན་ཚོས་ཅན་གཉིས་ཀ་ལ་གྲུབ་
 པར་གཞག་ཏུ་མི་རུང་སྟེ། རྒྱ་མཚན་འདི་ལྟར་སྐབས་འདིར་དོན་
 དམ་པའི་རྐྱེ་བ་བཀག་པ་བརྒྱབ་བྱའི་ཚོས་སུ་འདོད་པ་དེའི་ཚེ་དེ་
 ཁོ་ནར་རྟེན་ཚོས་ཅན་མིག་དབང་དེ་བཙལ་བའི་ཚེ་རྟེན་པ་མ་
 ཡིན་པར་ཡུལ་ཅན་སྤྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་ཅམ་གྱི་བདག་གི་དངོས་པོ་ཡོད་
 པར་རྟེན་པ་ནི་མི་རུང་བར་ལེགས་ལྡན་འདི་རང་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ཁས་
 ལྗངས་པའི་སྤྱིར། ལྱབ་སྟེ། དེ་ལྟ་ན་མིག་དབང་དེ་ཡུལ་ཅན་སྤྱིན་
 ཅི་མ་ལོག་པ་མིག་དབང་གི་རང་བཞིན་ལ་མ་འཇུག་པའི་རྟེན་
 དོན་དུ་འདོད་དགོས་ཤིང་། དེ་འདོད་ན་མིག་དབང་དེ་གངས་

དེ་གངས་ཅན་གྱི་མིག་སོགས་འཇལ་བའི་ཤེས་པ་སྤྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་དེའི་ཡུལ་དུ་མེད་
 དགོས་པའི་སྤྱིར་ཏེ། སྤྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་དང་སྤྱིན་ཅི་མ་ལོག་པའི་ཤེས་པ་གཉིས་ཀྱི་སྤྱང་
 རོ་ན་ཡོད་པའི་ཡུལ་པ་དམ་ནི་གཉིས་པ་དད་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །སྤྱིར་ཏེ་འགལ་བའི་སྤྱིར་
 རྟོག་ཞེས་པ་ནི་འགྲོལ་ཚིག་ལ་ཚིག་གསལ་གྱི་ལུང་འབྲུ་བརྒྱན་པ་ཡིན་ལ།

^a In Gen-dün-gya-tsho’s *Difficult Points*, his commentary on Tsong-kha-pa’s *The Essence of Eloquence*, (*bkra shis chos sdings*, 106b.3; *dkar mdzes par ma*, 89b.2, and codex, 152.9) the dropping of *de* from *de kho nar* in his gloss of this passage of Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words* resulting in “at just when” rather than “in suchness” is significant because it accords with Tsong-kha-pa’s not mentioning “in suchness” in his distillation of this passage in his *The Essence of Eloquence*. Here Gen-dün-gya-tsho when transferring this passage from his *Difficult Points* to the *Ornament for the Thought* has restored *de* to *kho nar*. As I will indicate below, Gen-dün-gya-tsho explains Tsong-kha-pa’s “in suchness” (*de kho nar*) as “for the suchness that is the perspective of a rational consciousness analyzing the ultimate” (*don dam la dpyod pa’i rigs shes kyi ngo’am/ de kho nar*), thereby retaining the reading *de kho nar* as in the *Great Exposition of Special Insight* but not taking it to mean “established as [their own] suchness” (*de kho nar grub pa*).

^b Correcting *tsam pa’i* in *Ornament* (Library of Tibetan Works, 62b.3-4, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 56b.3) to *btsal ba’i* in accordance with *Difficult Points* (*dkar mdzes par ma*, 89b.2); *bkra shis chos sdings*, 106b.3, reads *btsal pa’i*.

{KEY: In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight indicates material added in place of ellipses, and magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis sign has been filled in.}

ཅན་གྱི་མིག་སྐྱོན་ལ་འཇམ་པའི་ཤེས་པ་ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་དེའི་ཡུལ་དུ་
 མེད་དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་དང་ཕྱིན་ཅི་མ་ལོག་པའི་
 ཤེས་པ་གཉིས་ཀྱི་སྣང་ངོ་ན་ཡོད་པའི་ཡུལ་གཉིས་ཐ་དད་པ་ཏེ་
 འགལ་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ་ཞེས་པ་ནི་འགྲེལ་ཚོགས་ལ་འབྲུ་བསྐྱེད་པ་ཡིན་
 ལ།

[3. EXPRESSING CHANDRAKĪRTI'S BRIEF INDICATION MORE ACCESSIBLY]

In the system of the Autonomists the valid cognition comprehending subjects such as eyes and so forth is asserted as a consciousness unmistakable with respect to the nature of eyes and so forth; thus with respect to the subjects, objects of knowledge, it follows that the appearance of eyes and so forth—as established by way of their own character to the valid cognition comprehending subjects such as eyes and so forth—is established in accordance with its appearance because (1) the valid cognition comprehending subjects such as eyes and so forth perceives eyes and so forth as established by way of their own character and (2) such a valid cognition is an unmistakable valid cognition with respect to the mode of being (*vin lugs*) of eyes and so forth.

རང་རྒྱུད་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་ལྷགས་ལ་ཚོས་ཅན་མིག་སྐྱོན་ལ་འཇམ་པའི་
 ཚད་མ་དེ་མིག་སྐྱོན་ཀྱི་རང་བཞིན་ལ་མ་འབྲུལ་བའི་ཤེས་པར་
 ཁས་ལེན་པ་དེ་ལྟར་ན།^a ཤེས་བྱ་ཚོས་ཅན། མིག་སྐྱོན་ལ་འཇམ་
 པའི་ཚད་མ་དེ་ལ་མིག་སྐྱོན་རང་མཚན་གྱིས་གྲུབ་བར་སྣང་བ་
 དེ་སྣང་བ་^b ལྟར་དུ་གྲུབ་པར་ཐལ། མིག་སྐྱོན་ལ་འཇམ་པའི་ཚད་

^a *Ornament* (Library of Tibetan Works, 63a.1, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 56b.6) *khas len pa de ltar na*; *Difficult Points* (*bkra shis chos sdings*, 107a.1, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 89b.6), *khas len pas/ de ltar na*.

^b *Ornament* (Library of Tibetan Works, 63a.1, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 57a.1) *snang ba de snang ba*; *Difficult Points* (*bkra shis chos sdings*, 107a.1, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 89b.5), *snang ba snang ba*.

མ་དེ་ལ་མིག་སོགས་རང་མཚན་གྱིས་སྐྱབ་བར་སྤང་བ་ནི་གང་
 ཞིག་དེ་འདྲའི་ཚད་མ་དེ་མིག་སོགས་ཀྱི་ཡིན་ལུགས་ལ་མ་འཇུག་
 བའི་ཚད་མ་ཡིན་པའི་སྤྱིར།^a

If it is accepted [that the appearance of eyes and so forth—as established by way of their own character to the valid cognition comprehending subjects such as eyes and so forth—is established in accordance with its appearance], it follows that the appearance of eyes and so forth as established by way of their own character is the mode of subsistence (*gnas lugs*), or nature, of eyes and so forth because it was accepted [that the appearance of eyes and so forth—as established by way of their own character to the valid cognition comprehending subjects such as eyes and so forth—is established in accordance with its appearance].

[མིག་སོགས་འཇུག་བའི་ཚད་མ་དེ་ལ་མིག་སོགས་རང་མཚན་གྱིས་སྐྱབ་བར་
 སྤང་བ་དེ་སྤང་བ་ལྟར་དུ་སྐྱབ་པར་]འདོད་ན། མིག་སོགས་རང་མཚན་
 གྱིས་སྐྱབ་པ་དེ་མིག་སོགས་ཀྱི་གནས་ལུགས་སམ་རང་བཞིན་དུ་
 གཞུ། [མིག་སོགས་འཇུག་བའི་ཚད་མ་དེ་ལ་མིག་སོགས་རང་མཚན་གྱིས་སྐྱབ་
 བར་སྤང་བ་དེ་སྤང་བ་ལྟར་དུ་སྐྱབ་པར་]འདོད་པའི་སྤྱིར།

If it is accepted [that the appearance of eyes and so forth as established by way of their own character is the mode of subsistence (*gnas lugs*), or nature, of eyes and so forth], it follows that this valid cognition comprehending eyes and so forth is a valid cognition comprehending the mode of subsistence of eyes and so forth because it was accepted [that the appearance of eyes and so forth as established by way of their own character is the mode of subsistence (*gnas lugs*), or nature, of eyes and so forth]. If it is accepted [that this valid cognition comprehending eyes and so forth is a valid cognition comprehending the mode of subsistence of eyes and so forth], it follows that the subjects, eyes and so forth, are not objects found by erroneous consciousnesses of Sāṃkhyas because of being objects

^a *Ornament* (Library of Tibetan Works, 63a.2, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 57a.1) *yin lugs la ma 'khrul ba'i tshad ma yin pa'i phyir*; *Difficult Points* (*bkra shis chos sdings*, 107a.2, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 90a.1), *sdod lugs la ma 'khrul ba'i phyir*.

{KEY: In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight indicates material added in place of ellipses, and magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis sign has been filled in.}

found by valid cognitions comprehending a nonerroneous mode of subsistence. [Whatever are objects found by valid cognitions comprehending a nonerroneous mode of subsistence] are necessarily [not objects found by erroneous consciousnesses of Sāṃkhyas] because objects found by the two—erroneous consciousnesses and nonerroneous consciousnesses—are different, that is, contradictory.

[མིག་སོགས་རང་མཚན་གྱིས་སྐྱབ་པ་དེ་མིག་སོགས་ཀྱི་གནས་ལྷགས་སམ་རང་
 བཞིན་དུ་]འདོད་ན་མིག་སོགས་འཇལ་བའི་ཚད་མ་དེ་མིག་སོགས་
 ཀྱི་གནས་ལྷགས་འཇལ་བའི་ཚད་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། [མིག་སོགས་
 རང་མཚན་གྱིས་སྐྱབ་པ་དེ་མིག་སོགས་ཀྱི་གནས་ལྷགས་སམ་རང་བཞིན་
 དུ་]འདོད་པའི་ཕྱིར། [མིག་སོགས་འཇལ་བའི་ཚད་མ་དེ་མིག་སོགས་ཀྱི་
 གནས་ལྷགས་འཇལ་བའི་ཚད་མ་ཡིན་པར་]འདོད་ན། མིག་སོགས་ཚོས་
 ཅན། གངས་ཅན་གྱི་ཤེས་པ་ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་གི་རྗེད་དོན་མ་ཡིན་
 པར་ཐལ། ཕྱིན་ཅི་མ་ལོག་པ་གནས་ལྷགས་འཇལ་བའི་ཚད་མའི་
 རྗེད་དོན་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། [ཕྱིན་ཅི་མ་ལོག་པ་གནས་ལྷགས་འཇལ་བའི་
 ཚད་མའི་རྗེད་དོན་ཡིན་ན་གངས་ཅན་གྱི་ཤེས་པ་ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་གི་རྗེད་དོན་མ་
 ཡིན་པས་]ཁྱབ་སྟེ། ཤེས་པ་ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་པ་དང་ཤེས་པ་ཕྱིན་ཅི་མ་
 ལོག་པ་གཉིས་ཀྱི་རྗེད་དོན་ཐ་དང་པ་སྟེ་འགལ་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Comment: This concludes Gen-dün-gya-tsho's augmentation and additional, more accessible explanation of the brief explanation in Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* according to Tsong-kha-pa's *The Essence of Eloquence*. Now Gen-dün-gya-tsho turns to Tsong-kha-pa's earlier explanation of the same topic in the Great Exposition of Special Insight section of the *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path* along with his student Khay-drub Ge-leg-pal-sang's explanation in his *Great Compilation: Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate*. Tsong-kha-pa in *The Essence of Eloquence* speaks to the difference between

these two explanations:^a

Although the two—[my] explanation [of Chandrakīrti’s passage] elsewhere [in the Great Exposition of Special Insight^b in the *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path*] in terms of [Bhāvaviveka’s] having asserted that the subjects which are the basis [of the predicate, nonproduction from self,] degenerate from [or are not] established as [their own] suchness (*de kho nar grub pa*) and this mode [of explanation just given here in *The Essence of Eloquence*]^c—do not agree, it is not that [my two explanations] disagree [that Chandrakīrti’s passage sets forth] the tenet of refuting autonomy.

རྟེན་ཚོས་ཅན་དེ་ལོ་ནར་གྲུབ་པ་ཉམས་པར་ཁས་
 ལྷངས་པའི་སྣང་ནས་ཀྱང་གཞན་དུ་བཤད་པ་དང་
 བཤད་ཚུལ་འདི་གཉིས་མི་མཐུན་ཀྱང་རང་རྒྱུད་འགོག་
 པའི་གྲུབ་མཐའ་མི་མཐུན་པ་མིན་ལོ། །

Tsong-kha-pa’s *Great Exposition of Special Insight* and Khay-drub Geleg-pal-sang’s *Great Compilation* explain it like this: When Proponents of the Middle prove for the perspective of Proponents of [Truly Established] Things that eyes and so forth are without tru[ly established] production, it is not reasonable that mere general eyes (*mig spyi tsam zhig*) not qualified with either truth or falsity are held as compatibly established subjects because this master Bhāvaviveka indeed has asserted the subjects—**eyes and so forth, the substrata of that** absence of tru[ly established] production (*de’i rten chos can*)—as having degenerated from establishment **in suchness**, that is, **as not established for the suchness that is the perspective of a rational consciousness analyzing the ultimate** (*don dam la dpyod pa’i rigs shes kyi ngo’am/ de kho nar ma grub pa*).^c

^a Hopkins, *Tsong-kha-pa’s Revised Presentation of Compatibly Appearing Subjects in The Essence of Eloquence with Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s Commentary*, 7 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version April 2020: uma-tibet.org), 103 and 191.

^b Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s *Port of Entry*, 569.12, and Ta-drin-rab-tan’s *Annotations*, 391.1.

^c This is like when *don dam bden pa* (*paramārthasatya*) is taken as “truth for the ultimate consciousness,” as when Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s *Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-pa’s) “Great Exposition of Tenets”*: *Freeing the Knots of the Difficult Points, Precious*

ལྷག་མཐོང་ཆེན་མོ་དང་སྣོང་ཐུན་དུ་འདི་ལྟར་བཤད་དེ། དབྱ་མ་
 པས་དངོས་སྣ་བའི་དོར་མིག་སོགས་བདེན་པའི་སྐྱེ་མེད་དུ་བསྐྱབ་
 །པའི་ཆེ་བདེན་རྒྱན་པ་གང་གིས་བྱུང་པར་དུ་མ་བྱས་པའི་མིག་སྐྱེ་
 ཅམ་ཞིག་གཉིས་ཀ་ལ་མཐུན་སྣང་དུ་སྐྱབ་པའི་ཚོས་ཅན་དུ་
 འཛིན་པར་རིགས་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། འདི་ལྟར་དེ་ཁོ་ནར་བདེན་
 པའི་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་དེའི་རྟེན་ཚོས་ཅན་མིག་ལ་སོགས་པ་ཉམས་
 པར་གྱུར་པ་སྐྱེ་དོན་དམ་ལ་དཔྱད་པའི་རིགས་ཤེས་ཀྱི་དོམས།^d དེ་
 ཁོ་ནར་མ་གྱུར་པར་ལེགས་ལྡན་འབྱེད་འདིས་ཁས་སྐྱབས་པ་ཉིད་

Jewel of Clear Thought on Jam-yang-shay-pa's root text says about the Autonomy School:

In ultimate-object-truth (*don dam bden pa, paramārthasatya*):

- Ultimate (*dam pa, parama*) is a Superior's uncontaminated awareness of meditative equipoise.
- Object (*don, artha*) is the object found by that uncontaminated awareness.
- It is a truth (*bden pa, satya*) because of being non-deceptive (*mi bslu ba*), since its mode of appearance and mode of subsistence agree.

Thereby it is the ultimate-object-truth [or ultimate truth].

དོན་དམ་པའི་བདེན་པ་ཞེས་པའི་ཚོག་ཟུར་གྱི་དམ་པ་ནི་འཕགས་པའི་མཉམ་
 གཞལ་ཟག་མེད་ཀྱི་སྣོང་དང་། དོན་ནི་ཟག་མེད་ཀྱི་སྣོང་དེས་རྟེན་པའི་དོན་ཡིན་ལ།
 དེ་ནི་སྣང་ཚུལ་དང་གནས་ཚུལ་མཐུན་པས་མི་བསྐྱབ་བའི་སྐྱེ་བདེན་པ་སྐྱེ། དེ་ནི་
 དོན་དམ་པའི་བདེན་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །

From Hopkins, *Maps of the Profound*, 754.

^a *Ornament* (Library of Tibetan Works, 63a.5, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 57a.4) *bsgrub*; *Difficult Points* (*bkra shis chos sdings*, 107a.5, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 90a.4), *sgrub*.

^b *Ornament* (Library of Tibetan Works, 63a.5, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 57a.4) *rdzun*; *Difficult Points* (*bkra shis chos sdings*, 107a.5, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 90a.4), *brdzun*.

^c *Ornament* (Library of Tibetan Works, 63a.5, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 57a.5) *rigs*; *Difficult Points* (*bkra shis chos sdings*, 107a.6, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 90a.4), 'thad.

^d *Ornament* (Library of Tibetan Works, 63a.6, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 57a.5) *nyams par gyur pa ste don dam la dpyod pa'i rigs shes kyi ngo'am/ de kho nar*; Gen-dün-gyatsho's *Difficult Points* (*bkra shis chos sdings*, 107a.6, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 90a.5), *nyams par gyur pa ste de kho nar*.

{KEY: In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight indicates material added in place of ellipses, and magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis sign has been filled in.}

ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

It follows [that this master Bhāvaviveka indeed has asserted the subjects—eyes and so forth, the substrata of that absence of tru(ly established) production—as having degenerated from establishment in suchness, that is, as not established for the suchness that is the perspective of a rational consciousness analyzing the ultimate] because when, that is, due to, having taken eyes and so forth as the subjects, a negation of tru[ly established] production is accepted as the predicate of the proposition, in that case Proponents of the Middle must assert that those very eyes and so forth gain their thingness by mere erroneous consciousnesses polluted by ignorance, whereas Proponents of [Truly Established] Things accept eyes and so forth as objects found by nonerroneous consciousnesses not polluted by causes of mistake, whereby a subject such as eyes and so forth is not established in compatible appearance, for, objects found by erroneous consciousnesses and objects found by nonerroneous consciousnesses are different by way of mutual exclusion.

[དེ་ལོ་ནར་བདེན་པའི་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་དེའི་རྟེན་ཚོས་ཅན་མིག་ལ་སོགས་པ་
 ཉམས་པར་གྱུར་པ་སྟེ་དོན་དམ་ལ་དཔྱད་པའི་རིགས་ཤེས་གྱི་ངོའམ། དེ་ལོ་
 རར་མ་གྲུབ་པར་ལེགས་ལྡན་འབྱེད་འདིས་ཁས་ལྷངས་པ་ཉིད་]དེར་ཐལ།
 གང་གི་ཚེ་མིག་སོགས་ཚོས་ཅན་དུ་བྱས་ནས་བདེན་པའི་སྐྱེ་བ་
 བཀག་པ་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཚོས་སུ་འདོད་པ་དེའི་ཚེ་སྟེ་དེའི་ཕྱིར། དེ་
 ལྟར་ན་དཔུ་མ་པས་མིག་སོགས་དེ་ཉིད་མ་རིག་པས་བསྐྱད་པའི་
 ཤེས་པ་ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་ཅོམ་གྱིས་བདག་གི་དངོས་པོ་རྟེན་པ་ཡིན་
 པར་ཁས་ལེན་དགོས་ལ། དངོས་སྐྱེ་བ་རྣམས་མིག་སོགས་འབྲུལ་
 རྒྱས་མ་བསྐྱད་པའི་ཕྱིན་ཅི་མ་ལོག་པའི་ཤེས་པའི་རྟེན་དོན་དུ་
 འདོད་པས་ཚོས་ཅན་མིག་སོགས་མཐུན་སྣང་དུ་གྲུབ་པ་མ་ཡིན་
 །^aདེ། ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་གི་ཤེས་པས་རྟེན་པའི་དོན་དང་། ཕྱིན་ཅི་མ་

^a Ornament (Library of Tibetan Works, 63b.2, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 57b.1) *ma yin*; *Difficult Points* (*bkra shis chos sdings*, 107b.3, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 90b.1), *min*.

{KEY: In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight indicates material added in place of ellipses, and magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis sign has been filled in.}

ལོག་པའི་ཤེས་པས་རྗེད་པའི་དོན་དག་ནི་ཕན་ཚུན་སྤང་བའི་^aསྐྱོ་
ནས་ནས་ཐ་དད་པ་ཡིན་ཞེས་པའོ།^b

Bhāvaviveka asserts that the diversity of subjects are not established for the perspective of a rational [consciousness] analyzing the ultimate because since Jñānagarbha's *Autocommentary on "The Two Truths"*^c explains "Therefore, sūtra says, 'Not seeing anything is suchness,'" the assertion of the two, father and son, is the same.

ལོགས་ལྡན་གྱིས་དོན་དམ་དཔྱད་བྱེད་གྱི་རིགས་དོར་ཚོས་ཅན་ཇི་
སྟེད་པ་མ་གྲུབ་པར་ཞལ་གྱིས་བཞེས་ཏེ། ཡེ་ཤེས་སྟོང་པའི་བདེན་
གཉིས་རང་འགྲུལ་ལས། དེ་ཉིད་གྱི་ཕྱིར་མདོ་སྡེ་ལས་འགའ་ཡང་
མཐོང་བ་མེད་པ་ནི་དེ་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་ཅེས་གསུངས་སོ། ། ཞེས་བཤད་
པས་ཡབ་སྐུ་གཉིས་བཞེད་པ་གཅིག་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Hence, compatibly appearing subjects do not exist (1) for Consequentialists and (2) for Autonomists and below because in the systems of Autonomists and below, if [a consciousness] has become a valid cognition with respect to a phenomenon, they assert that it definitely must be non-mistaken with respect to that phenomenon, whereas in the system of the Consequentialists they assert that mistaken with respect to that phenomenon (*chos de la 'khrul ba*) and having come to be a valid cognition with respect to that phenomenon (*chos de la tshad ma song ba*) are not contradictory, because if it were not so, consciousnesses of common being could not posit any objects, because whatever is a consciousness of a common

^a *Ornament* (Library of Tibetan Works, 63b.3, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 57b.2) *spang ba'i*; *Difficult Points* (*bkra shis chos sdings*, 107b.3, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 90b.2), *spangs pa'i*.

^b *Ornament* (Library of Tibetan Works, 63b.3, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 57b.2) omits *Difficult Points* (*bkra shis chos sdings*, 107b.4-109a.2, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 90b.2-91b.5) *des na gal te sgra... 'gog par mdzad do//*, and replaces it with the long sentence *legs ldan kyis...gcig pa'i phyir* which is not in *Difficult Points*.

^c *Autocommentary on the Differentiation of the Two Truths* (*bden gnyis rnam 'byed pa'i 'grel pa*), Tibetan digital reprint edition: In *bstan 'gyur (sde dge)*, BDRC W23703.107: 8-32 (PDF of: Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985).

being is necessarily affected by pollution by the apprehension of true [existence] as well as its predispositions.

དེས་ན་^aཐལ་འགྱུར་བ་དང་། རང་རྒྱུད་པ་མན་ཚད་ལ་^bཚོས་ཅན་
 མཐུན་སྣང་བ་མེད་དེ། རང་རྒྱུད་པ་མན་ཚད་ཀྱི་ལྷགས་ལ་ཚོས་
 དེ་ལ་ཚད་མར་སོང་ན་ཚོས་དེ་ལ་མ་འཇུག་བ་ཞིག་ངེས་པར་
 དགོས་པར་བཞེད་ལ། ཐལ་འགྱུར་བའི་ལྷགས་ལ་ཚོས་དེ་ལ་
 འཇུག་བ་དང་ཚོས་དེ་ལ་ཚད་མ་སོང་བ་མི་འགལ་བར་བཞེད་
 པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ།^d དེ་ལྟར་མ་ཡིན་ཅེ་ན་སོ་སོ་སྐྱེ་བའི་ཤེས་པས་ལྷུལ་
 གང་ཡང་འཛོག་མི་ལུས་པར་འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། སོ་སོ་སྐྱེ་བའི་
 ཤེས་པ་ཡིན་ན་འཇུག་བས་བྱུང་བའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། དེ་ཡིན་ཅེ་ན་བདེན་
 འཛོལ་བག་ཆགས་དང་བཅས་པའི་སྤང་བ་ལྷགས་པས་བྱུང་བའི་
 ཕྱིར།

Therefore, in the Consequentialists' system since although to a direct

^a Ornament (Library of Tibetan Works, 63b.5, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 57b.3) *des na; Difficult Points (bkra shis chos sdings*, 109a.2, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 91b.5), *de'i phyir*.

^b Ornament (Library of Tibetan Works, 63b.4, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 57b.3) *man chad la; Difficult Points (bkra shis chos sdings*, 109a.2, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 91b.5), *man chad la ni*.

^c Ornament (Library of Tibetan Works, 63b. 4, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 57b.3) *chos can mthun snang ba; Difficult Points (bkra shis chos sdings*, 109a.2, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 91b.5), *chos can tshad mas grub tshul mthun snang ba*.

^d Ornament (Library of Tibetan Works, 63b.6, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 57b.4) *bzhed pa'i phyir te/; Difficult Points (bkra shis chos sdings*, 109a.3, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 91b.6), *bzhed pa'i phyir ro/*.

^e Ornament (Library of Tibetan Works, 63b.6, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 57b.4) *de ltar ma yin; Difficult Points (bkra shis chos sdings*, 109a.3, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 91b.6), *de ltar min*.

^f Ornament (Library of Tibetan Works, 63b.6, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 57b.4) *mi nus par 'gyur ba'i phyir te/; Difficult Points (bkra shis chos sdings*, 109a.4, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 91b.6), *mi nus par 'gyur te/*.

^g Ornament (Library of Tibetan Works, 63b.6) *'khrul bas* and (*dkar mdzes par ma*, 57b.5) *'khrul pas; Difficult Points (bkra shis chos sdings*, 109a.4, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 92a.1), *'khrul shes yin pas*.

perception apprehending a pot—in the continuum of common being—a pot appears as established by way of its own character, it is mistaken with respect to that, they assert that the direct perception apprehending the pot can posit the pot, but the Autonomists and below assert that if a direct perception apprehending a pot is mistaken with respect to the pot, it cannot posit the pot.

དེས་ན་ཐལ་འགྱུར་བའི་ལུགས་ལ་སོ་སོ་སྐྱེ་བའི་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་བུམ་
 འཛིན་མངོན་སུམ་ལ་བུམ་པ་^aརང་མཚན་གྱིས་གྲུབ་པར་སྣང་
 བས། དེ་དེ་ལ་འབྲུལ་ཡང་བུམ་འཛིན་མངོན་སུམ་གྱིས་བུམ་པ་
 འཛིན་ལྷུས་པར་བཞིན་ལ། རང་རྒྱུད་པ་མན་ཆད་^bབུམ་འཛིན་
 མངོན་སུམ་བུམ་པ་ལ་འབྲུལ་ན་བུམ་པ་འཛིན་མི་ལྷུས་པར་
 བཞིན་དོ།

About such an exposition, someone says: In that case compatibly appearing subjects would exist for the two, Consequentialists and Proponents of Cognition,^c because even both those two assert that a direct perception apprehending a pot—in the continuum of common being—is mistaken with respect to the pot.

[*Our response:*] That fault does not exist because although Proponents of Cognition assert that the direct perception apprehending a pot is mistaken with respect to the likes of a pot's appearance as an external object, they assert that it is not mistaken with respect to a pot's establishment by way of its own character, because they accept that a pot is established by way of its own character.

^a *Ornament* (Library of Tibetan Works, 64a.1, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 57b.6) *bum pa rang mtshan gyis grub par snang bas/ de de la 'khrul yang bum 'dzin mngon sum gyis bum pa*; *Difficult Points* (*bkra shis chos sdings*, 109a.5, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 92a.2), *bum pa la 'khrul kyang des bum pa*.

^b *Ornament* (Library of Tibetan Works, 64a.2, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 57b.6) *man chad bum 'dzin mngon sum bum pa la 'khrul na bum pa 'jog*; *Difficult Points* (*bkra shis chos sdings*, 109a.5, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 92a.2), *man chad de de la 'khrul na de 'jog*.

^c *rnam rig pa, vijñaptika*; another name for Proponent of Mind-Only.

{KEY: In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight indicates material added in place of ellipses, and magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis sign has been filled in.}

དེ་ལྟར་བཤད་པ་ལ་ཁོ་ན་རེ། དེ་ལྟར་ན་ཐལ་འགྱུར་བ་དང་རྣམ་
 རིག་པ་གཉིས་ལ་ཚོས་ཅན་མཐུན་སྣང་བ་ཡོད་པར་འགྱུར་ཏེ། དེ་
 གཉིས་ཀའང་^bསོ་སྐྱའི་བུམ་འཇོན་མངོན་སུམ་བུམ་པ་ལ་འཇུལ་
 པར་བཞིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེ་ན། དེའི་སྐྱོན་མེད་དེ། རྣམ་རིག་པ་
 རྣམས་བུམ་འཇོན་མངོན་སུམ་བུམ་པ་སྐྱེ་རོལ་དོན་དུ་སྣང་བ་ལྟ་
 བུ་ལ་འཇུལ་བར་བཞིན་ཀྱང་བུམ་པ་རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་
 གྲུབ་པ་^dལ་མ་འཇུལ་བར་བཞིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། བུམ་པ་རང་གི་
 མཚན་ཉིས་ཀྱིས་གྲུབ་པར་འདོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།^e

Thus, refutation of autonomous signs meets back to this mode of refuting compatibly appearing subjects; and that also meets back to whether establishment by way of its own character is asserted or is not asserted because Autonomists and below accept that if [a consciousness] has become a valid cognition with respect to a stalk, for instance, it necessarily has become a valid cognition with respect to its establishment by way of its own character, and Consequentialists assert that [its] becoming a valid cognition with respect to [the object's] establishment by way of its own character does not occur.

Elaborations on the way to refute compatibly appearing subjects have

^a *Ornament* (Library of Tibetan Works, 64a.2, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 57b.6) *de ltar bshad pa la kho na re/*; *Difficult Points* (*bkra shis chos sdings*, 109a.5, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 92a.2), *kho na re/*.

^b Correcting *de gnyis la 'ang* in *Ornament* (Library of Tibetan Works, 64a.2) to *de gnyis ka 'ang* in accordance with *Ornament* (*dkar mdzes par ma*, 58a.1); *Difficult Points* (*bkra shis chos sdings*, 109a.6, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 92a.3), *gnyis ka*.

^c *Ornament* (Library of Tibetan Works, 64a.3, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 58a.1) *bzhes pa'i phyir zhe na/*; two slightly different versions in *Difficult Points* (*bkra shis chos sdings*, 109a.6) *bzhes pa'i phyir ro/ zhe na/* and *Difficult Points* (*dkar mdzes par ma*, 92a.2), *bzhes pa'i phyir ro/ zhe na/*.

^d *Ornament* (Library of Tibetan Works, 64a.3, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 58a.2) *bzhes kyang bum pa rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa/*; *Difficult Points* (*bkra shis chos sdings*, 109b.1, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 92a.3), *bzhes kyang / de rang mtshan kyis grub pa*.

^e *Ornament* (Library of Tibetan Works, 64a.4, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 58a.3) *'dod pa'i phyir/*; *Difficult Points* (*bkra shis chos sdings*, 109b.1, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 92a.4), *'dod pa'i phyir ro*. The remainder of my citation from the *Ornament* is not in the *Difficult Points*.

been explained in [my] *Difficult Points of (Tsong-kha-pa's) "Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive."*^a

དེ་ལྟར་ན་རང་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་རྟགས་འགོག་པ་ནི་ཚོས་ཅན་མཐུན་སྣང་
 བ་འགོག་ཚུལ་འདི་ལ་ཐུག་ལ། དེ་ཡང་ཐ་སྟོད་དུ་རང་མཚན་
 གྱིས་གྲུབ་པ་ཁས་ལེན་མི་ལེན་ལ་ཐུག་སྟེ། རང་རྒྱུད་པ་མན་ཚད་
 ཚོས་ཅན་ལྷུ་གུ་ལྟ་བུ་ལ་ཚད་མར་སོང་ན་དེ་རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་
 གྱིས་གྲུབ་པ་ལ་ཚད་མར་སོང་བས་ཁྱབ་པར་འདོད་ཅིང་། ཐལ་
 འགྱུར་བ་རྣམས་ལྷུ་གུ་རང་མཚན་གྱིས་གྲུབ་པ་ལ་ཚད་མར་སོང་
 བ་མི་སྲིད་པར་བཞེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་འདིའི་ཚོས་ཅན་མཐུན་སྣང་བ་
 འགོག་ཚུལ་གྱི་འཕྲོས་རྣམས་ནི་དྲང་ངེས་རྣམ་འབྱེད་ཀྱི་དཀའ་
 འབྲེལ་དུ་བཤད་ཟིན་ཏོ།།

Comment: In the *Ornament for the Thought* Gen-dün-gyatsho explains Tsong-kha-pa's "in suchness" (*de kho nar*) as "for the suchness that is the perspective of a rational consciousness analyzing the ultimate" (*don dam la dpyod pa'i rigs shes kyi ngo'am/de kho nar*). This is like when "ultimate truth" (*don dam bden pa, paramārthasatya*) is taken as "truth for the ultimate consciousness." For instance, Ngag-wang-pal-dan's *Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-pa's) "Great Exposition of Tenets"*: *Freeing the Knots of the Difficult Points, Precious Jewel of Clear Thought* on Jam-yang-shay-pa's root text says about the Autonomy School:^b

In ultimate-object-truth (*don dam bden pa, paramārthasatya*):

- Ultimate (*dam pa, parama*) is a Superior's uncontaminated awareness of meditative equipoise.

^a This sentence likely refers to an intention to return to writing a detailed commentary on the remainder of Tsong-kha-pa's *The Essence of Eloquence* in his *Difficult Points*, an intention that was not fulfilled.

^b Hopkins, *Maps of the Profound*, 754.

- Object (*don, artha*) is the object found by that uncontaminated awareness.
- It is a truth (*bden pa, satya*) because of being non-deceptive (*mi bslu ba*), since its mode of appearance and mode of subsistence accord.

Thereby it is the ultimate-object-truth [or truth that is the object of the ultimate awareness.

དོན་དམ་པའི་བདེན་པ་ཞེས་པའི་ཚོག་ཟུར་གྱི་དམ་པ་
 རི་འཕགས་པའི་མཉམ་གཞག་ཟག་མེད་གྱི་སློང་དང་།
 དོན་མི་ཟག་མེད་གྱི་སློང་དེས་རྟེན་པའི་དོན་ཡིན་ལ། དེ་
 རི་སྣང་ཚུལ་དང་གནས་ཚུལ་མཐུན་པས་མི་བསྐྱེད་པའི་
 རྩེད་བདེན་པ་སྟེ། དེ་རི་དོན་དམ་པའི་བདེན་པ་ཡིན་
 རོ། །

Forms and so forth are “not established in suchness (*de kho nar ma grub*),” that is, are not ultimately existent, because of not being objects found by a rational consciousness analyzing the ultimate.

Now we turn to Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s focus on three renowned Tibetan scholars’ treatments of the occurrence, or not, of “in suchness” (*de kho nar*) in Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words* at this point.

PART THREE:
Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho's
Focus on Two Phrases in
Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words*

Treatise Distinguishing All the Meanings of (Tsong-kha-pa's) "The Essence of Eloquence": Illuminating the Differentiation of the Interpretable and the Definitive: Port of Entry to "The Essence of Eloquence"

by Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho

དྲུང་བ་དང་ངེས་པའི་དོན་རྣམ་པར་སྐྱེ་བ་གསལ་བར་བྱེད་པ་
ལེགས་བཤད་སྒྲིང་པོའི་དོན་མཐའ་དག་རྣམ་པར་འབྱེད་པའི་
བསྟན་བཅོས་ལེགས་བཤད་སྒྲིང་པོའི་འཇུག་དོགས། །

Continuing from Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho's commentary in the previous, seventh volume in this series:

Tsong-kha-pa's Revised Presentation of Compatibly Appearing Subjects in "The Essence of Eloquence" with Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho's Commentary, 7.

Here is a short biography of Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho by [Sonam Dorje](#) and [Nicole Willock](#) exactly as it appears online in The Treasury of Lives:^a

Jigme Damcho Gyatso ('jigs med dam chos rgya mtsho) was born in 1898, on the day of twenty-fifth day of the twelfth lunar month of the lunar calendar, to a nomadic family in Abar (a bir), Rebkong (reb kong) in eastern Amdo (a mdo). He was the youngest son of his father, [Gendun Sonam](#) (dge 'dun bsod nams, d.u.) and mother, [Dolma Kyi](#) (sgrol ma skyid). His parents, who belonged to the Nyingma tradition, named him Guru Wangchen Kyap (gu ru dbang chen skyab).

When he turned five his parents brought him to the [Sixth Rongwo Drubchen Lobzang Tenpai Gyeltsen](#) (rong bo grub chen 06 blo bzang bstan pa'i rgyal mtshan, 1859-1915) at the Geluk Rongwo Monastery in Rebkong. The lama was impressed with the boy, and recognized him as a reincarnation of [Dzongkar Jigme Samten](#) (rdzong dkar grub dbang 'jigs med bsam gtan, 1814-1881/1897), which was confirmed by the [Fourth Amdo Zhamar Gendun Tendzin Gyatso](#) (a mdo zhwa dmar 04 dge 'dun bstan 'dzin rgya mtsho, 1852-1912), a teacher of the [Thirteenth Dalai Lama](#) (tA la'i bla ma 13 thub bstan rgya mtsho, 1876-1933). In 1904 the Fourth Amdo Zhamar gave him the name Jigme Damcho Gyatso ('jigs med dam chos rgya mtsho).

Then he moved to Karing (ka ring) Monastery to take up residence at his previous incarnation's monastic seat at Tashi Choling (bkra shis chos gling), located in present day Xunhua County of Qinghai Province. In the wood snake year (1905) he went to Draklung Monastery (brag lung dgon) in Chentsa (gcan tsha). He requested important teachings, particularly empowerments to the thirteen forms of Vajrabhairava.

Following his enthronement at Rongwo Gonchen Tosam Namgyel Ling (rong bo dgon chen thos bsam rnam rgyal gling) he began studying reading and writing under the [Chennga Konchok Puntso](#) (spyan nga dkon mchog phun tshogs, d.u.), at the command of the Fourth Amdo Zhamar.

At the age seven, he was transferred to Ditsa Tashi Choding Ling (lde tsha bkra shis chos sding gling) for training in Buddhism, and there he received novice monastic vows from the Fourth Amdo Zhamar, who gave him his name Jigme Damcho

^a <https://treasuryoflives.org/biographies/view/Jigme-Damcho-Gyatso/3889>.

Gyatso. After he received the teachings of Bhairava from the Fourth Amdo Zhamar he was given the secret name Rinchen Dorje Tsel (rin chen rdo rje rtsal).

In 1907 he went to Kumbum to receive blessings from the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, who was on his return trip to Tibet from in Mongolia. In the ninth month of that year, he sojourned at Beyul Karpo Shong (sbas yul dkar po gshong) in upper Rebkong, where he listened to teachings given by [Changlung Trigen Jamyang Tubten Gyatso](#) (lchang lung khri rgan 'jam dbyangs thub bstan rgya mtsho, 1866-1928), from whom he received many tantric initiations and empowerments. Jamyang Tubten Gyatso later gave him full ordination, when Jigme Damcho Gyatso was nineteen.

When he turned eleven, he went again on pilgrimage in eastern Amdo, visiting Tu Gon (mthu dgon), Denma ('dan ma), Dantik (dan tig), Gyazhur (rgya zhur), and other Buddhist places. On this trip he met Tsaton Tendzin Chopel (gtsa stod bstan 'dzin chos 'phel, d.u.) at Shel Gon (shel dgon) and with him studied the Kadam Lekbam (bka' gdams glegs bam), the writings of the Third Tukwan [Lobzang Chokyi Nyima](#) (thu'u bkwan 03 blo bzang chos kyi nyi ma, 1737-1802), [Arol Lungrik Gyatso](#) (a rol lung rig rgya mtsho, 1805-1886) and other relevant subjects.

When he was thirteen years old, he arrived back to Ditsa to study Buddhist philosophy and other courses under instructions from [Dzoge Tsultrim Gyatso](#) (mdzod dge tshul khri ms rgya mtsho, d.u.) and [Yongdzin Pandita Lobzang Pelden](#) (yongs 'dzin paNDi ta blo bzang dpal ldan, 1880-1944), also known as Giteng Rinpoche (sgis steng rin po che).

When he was fifteen years old, in 1912, his most important teacher, the Fourth Amdo Zhamar passed away. He overcame this obstacle and continued studying. At the age sixteen he went to Gelek Chodzung (dge legs chos rdzung) and studied Abhidharma, via the Abhidharma-Samucchaya and the Abhidharmakoṣa, with [Changlung Trigen Jamyang Tubten Gyatso](#) (lchang lung khri rgan 'jam dbyangs thub bstan rgya mtsho, 1866-1928). When he turned nineteen, he accepted further monk's vows from Changlung Trigen and Yongdzin Paṇḍita.

Due to the revolt in Rebkong in 1917, Jigme Damcho Gyatso went to Shel Monastery and studied tantra with Yongdzin Paṇḍita, and Sanskrit grammar, writing, divination and astrology with Rongwo Jigme (rong wo 'jigs med, d.u.) and Taklung Tulku (stag lung sprul sku, d.u.). Yongdzin Paṇḍita also taught him poetics,

and, starting at the age of twenty-eight, Madhyamaka. Yongdzin Paṇḍita gave him the pen name Yangchen Gyepai Dorje (dbyangs can dgyes pa'i rdo tje).

At the age thirty he returned to Rongwo and took the throne at the Dechen Khorling (bde chen chos 'khor gling) section. There he gave teachings to monks, including the [Seventh Rongwo Drubchen, Kelzang Trinle Lungtok Gyatso](#) (rong bo grub chen 07 blo bzang 'phrin las lung rtogs rgya mtsho, 1916-1978) The next year, he went to Ngawa (rnga ba) and gave teachings at Kirti Monastery, Namgyel Dechen Ling (ki+rti nmam rgyal bde chen gling).

In 1937, and Kumbum, Jigme Damcho Gyatso met the [Ninth Panchen Lama, Lobzang Tubten Chokyi Nyima](#) (paN chen bla ma 09 blo zang thub bstan chos kyi nyi ma, 1883-1937), who was travelling to China and Mongolia due to his conflicts with the Tibetan Central Government in Lhasa.

Jigme Damcho Gyatso had been a great debating partner in Dobi [Geshe Sherab Gyatso](#) (rdo sbis dge bshes shes rab rgya mtsho, 1884-1968) and out of their discussions on philosophical views both produced significant compositions.

In addition to the Fifth Amdo Zhamar, he trained the Sixth Tseten Zhabdrung, [Jigme Rigpai Lodro](#) (tshe tan zhabs drung 06 'jigs med rigs pa'i blo gros, 1910-1985), one of the most influential Geluk lamas of the twentieth century. He wrote biographies of [Jigme Samdrub Gyatso](#) ('jigs med bsam grub rgya mtsho, 1833-1847), the fifty-third throne holder of Labrang, and of his teacher Changlung Trigen.

Jigme Damcho Gyatso passed away in 1946 due to illness at Ewam hermitage above Karing Monastery. On his deathbed, he expressed his last will and testament to Tsetan Zhabdrung and the two Dzongkar Kuzhab (rdzong dkar sku zhabs): the Alak Sertri (a lags gser khri) and the Alak Dzongkar Gonpai Gondak Lama (a lags rdzong dkar dgon pa'i dgon bdag bla ma). These wishes included writing *dhāraṇī* on his corpse and for the construction of eight stupas at Karing Monastery.

According to Dungkar's biography there are twenty volumes to his *Collected Works*, however the current woodblock print from Rong bo Monastery only contains fifteen volumes. Volume *ba* contains a praise poem written by the Fourteenth Dalai Lama.

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Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho's *Port of Entry*

To expand:

ཇིག་ལྟར་^a

Examining the explanations in Tsong-kha-pa's Great Exposition of Special Insight of "in suchness - the subjects, the substrata of that" (*de kho nar de'i rten chos can, tadaiva dharminastadādhārasya*)^b in Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words*, where Tsong-kha-pa's Great Exposition of Special Insight says:^c

eyes or forms and so forth—the subjects which are substrata of that (*de'i rten chos can*) predicate of the proposition—have degenerated from in suchness (*de kho nar*),

and.^d

When—that is, because—this negation ultimately of production depends as a predicate of the proposition upon subjects (*de'i rten chos can*), then if [those] are established in suchness (*de kho nar*), it is contradictory for that to depend on them (*de'i rten*).

ཚིག་གསལ་ལས། དེ་ལོ་ནར་དེའི་རྟེན་ཚོས་ཅན། ཞེས་པའི་དེ་ལོ་
ན་ཞེས་པ་འཆད་བྱེད་ལྷག་མཐོང་ལས། བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཚོས་ཀྱི་རྟེན་
ཚོས་ཅན་མིག་གམ་^[212b]གཟུགས་ལ་སོགས་པ་ནི་དེ་ལོ་ནར་
ཉམས་པར་གྱུར་པ་སྟེ། ཞེས་པ་དང་། ཚོས་ཅན་དེ་དག་ལ་བསྐྱབ་
བྱའི་ཚོས་སུ་བརྟེན་པ་དེའི་ཚེ་སྟེ་དེའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། དེ་ལོ་ནར་གྱུ་བ་ན་
དེ་བརྟེན་པ་འགལ་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། ། ཞེས་པ་གང་ཡིན་བརྟག་ཅིང་།

^a Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho's *Port of Entry*, 212a.6/576.27.

^b Sanskrit from La Vallée Poussin, *Prasannapadā*, 30.1.

^c From Hopkins, *What is a Consequentialist?* Tsong-kha-pa's *Great Exposition of Special Insight with the Four Interwoven Annotations: Compatibly Appearing Subjects*, 5 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version August 2018, uma-tibet.org), 63 and 135.

^d From Hopkins, *What is a Consequentialist?* Tsong-kha-pa's *Great Exposition of Special Insight with the Four Interwoven Annotations: Compatibly Appearing Subjects*, 5 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version August 2018, uma-tibet.org), 136.

Comment: Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words*, in accordance with the citation in the previous volume (68-69), with the two phrases being discussed in **bold print**, is:^a

That is not so. For, at just that time when a negation of production is accepted as the predicate of the proposition, this one [Bhāvaviveka] himself indeed has asserted that the entities of **the subjects—the substrata of that** [predicate, the absence of production from self,] which gain their thingness by mere erroneous [consciousness]—have degenerated from [establishment] **in suchness**.

དེ་ནི་དེ་ལྟར་ཡང་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། འདི་ལྟར་གང་གི་ཚེ་འདིར་
སྐྱེ་བ་བཀག་པ་བསྐྱབ་པར་བྱ་བའི་ཚོས་སུ་འདོད་པའི་དེའི་
ཚེ་དེ་ལོ་ནར་དེའི་རྟེན་ཚོས་ཅན་ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་ཅམ་གྱིས་
བདག་གི་དངོས་པོ་རྟེན་པ་ནི་ཉམས་པར་འགྱུར་བར་
འདིས་རང་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ཁས་སྐྱབས་པ་ཉིད་དོ།

The first phrase quoted as it appears in the sentence from Tsong-kha-pa's *Great Exposition of Special Insight* is:^b

Bhāvaviveka himself has asserted that eyes or forms and so forth—**the subjects which are the substrata** of the predicate of the proposition—have degenerated from in suchness, that is to say, are not established **in suchness**.

བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཚོས་ཀྱི་རྟེན་ཚོས་ཅན་མིག་གམ་གཟུགས་ལ་
སོགས་པ་ནི་དེ་ལོ་ནར་ཉམས་པར་གྱུར་པ་སྟེ་མ་གྱུབ་པར་
ལོགས་ལྡན་འབྱེད་འདིས་རང་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ཁས་སྐྱབས་པ་
ཡིན་ལོ།

With Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub's annotations in aqua

^a From Hopkins, *What is a Consequentialist?* Tsong-kha-pa's *Great Exposition of Special Insight with the Four Interwoven Annotations: Compatibly Appearing Subjects*, 5 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version August 2018, uma-tibet.org), 63 and 135.

^b From Hopkins, *What is a Consequentialist?* Tsong-kha-pa's *Great Exposition of Special Insight with the Four Interwoven Annotations: Compatibly Appearing Subjects*, 5 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version August 2018, uma-tibet.org), 63 and 135.

highlight the sentence reads:^a

On this occasion of proving that eyes and so forth are without truly established production when a negation of production is accepted here as the predicate of the proposition, this one, the master Bhāvaviveka, himself indeed has asserted that the entities of the subjects—eyes and so forth, the substrata of that predicate, the absence of truly established production, which gain their thingness by way of being taken as objects by mere erroneous consciousnesses polluted by ignorance—have degenerated from in suchness, that is to say, are not established in suchness, that is, such subjects are not ultimately established.

The second phrase quoted as it appears in Tsong-kha-pa's Great Exposition of Special Insight is:^b

Concerning [Bhāvaviveka's] mode of assertion: When—that is, because—this negation ultimately of production **depends** as a predicate of the proposition **upon subjects**, then if [those] are established **in suchness**, it is contradictory for that to **depend on them**.

ཁས་སྐྱངས་ལྷགས་ནི་དོན་དམ་པར་སྐྱེ་བ་བཀག་པ་དེ་ཚོས་
 ཅན་དེ་དག་ལ་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཚོས་སུ་བརྟེན་པ་དེའི་ཚོ་སྟེ།
 དེའི་ཕྱིར་ཉེ་དེ་ལོ་ནར་སྐྱབ་ན་དེ་བརྟེན་པ་འགལ་བའི་
 ཕྱིར་རོ།།

With Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub's annotations in **turquoise** highlight the sentence reads:^c

^a From Hopkins, *What is a Consequentialist?* Tsong-kha-pa's *Great Exposition of Special Insight with the Four Interwoven Annotations: Compatibly Appearing Subjects*, 5 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version August 2018, uma-tibet.org), 63.

^b From Hopkins, *What is a Consequentialist?* Tsong-kha-pa's *Great Exposition of Special Insight with the Four Interwoven Annotations: Compatibly Appearing Subjects*, 5 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version August 2018, uma-tibet.org), 136.

^c From Hopkins, *What is a Consequentialist?* Tsong-kha-pa's *Great Exposition of Special Insight with the Four Interwoven Annotations: Compatibly Appearing Subjects*, 5 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version August 2018, uma-tibet.org), 64-65 and without the annotations, 136.

Concerning [Bhāvaviveka’s] mode of assertion: When—that is, because—this **very** negation ultimately of production **depends** as a predicate of the proposition **upon subjects**, substrata, such as forms and so forth that are objects found by a mistaken consciousness, then those subjects have come to be asserted as not established in suchness because if those subjects, forms and so forth, are established in **suchness**, or ultimately, it is **very** contradictory for that predicate of the proposition—“not produced ultimately”—to depend on **subjects that are ultimately established**.

[Returning to Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s *Port of Entry*, **bold** words are being augmented; **orange** words are augmentations.]

1. [The Second Dalai Lama Gen-dün-gya-tsho’s^a] *Commentary on the Difficult Points*^b and *Ornament for the Thought*^c harmoniously make the augmentation (‘*bru bsnan*): “**the subjects—eyes and so forth, the substrata of that** [predicate of the proposition] **not established for suchness**^d (*de kho nar ma grub pa de’i rten chos can mig sogs*).”

དགའ་འགྲེལ་དང་དགོངས་རྒྱན་མཐུན་པར། དེ་ཁོ་ནར་མ་གྲུབ་
པ་དེའི་རྟེན་ཚན་ཅན་མིག་སོགས་ཞེས་འབྲུ་བསྐྱབ་ལ།

2. In Je-drung’s^e textbook on the Middle^f [*tshe de kho nar* is taken as] “at

^a 1476-1542.

^b *dka’ ’grel*.

^c *dgongs rgyan*. Here, *Ornament for the Thought* (*dgongs rgyan*) is not either of two books by Dra-ti (or, Pra-ti) Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub (*bra sti [or, par sti] dge bshes rin chen don grub*, 17-18th century), since both are concerned only with mind-only and not relevant here. The longer of the two is: *Treatise Commenting Completely on the Profound Difficult Points of the Great Treatise Differentiating Interpretable and Definitive Meanings: Ornament for the Thought of (Tsong-kha-pa’s) “The Essence of Eloquence”* (*drang ba dang nges pa’i don rnam par ’byed pa’i bstan bcos chen po legs par bshad pa’i snying po’i dka’ gnas zab mo cha tshang bar ’grel pa’i bstan bcos legs par bshad pa’i snying po’i dgongs rgyan*), BDRC W1CZ1982 (PDF of Sku ’bum byams pa gling edition, n.d.). The shorter of the two is sometimes attributed to the Lesser Dra-ti.

^d In the *Ornament for the Thought* Gen-dün-gya-tsho glosses “for the suchness” (*de kho nar*) as “for the perspective of a rational consciousness” (*don dam la dpyod pa’i rigs shes kyi ngo’am/ de kho nar*), discussed below in the translation of the *Ornament*, 57.

^e Je-drung She-rab-wang-po (*rje drung shes rab dbang po*), 1500-1586.

^f Je-drung She-rab-wang-po’s *Delineation of the Difficult Points of (Tsong-kha-pa’s)*

the time of **just that**" (*de kho na'i tshe*); *de kho nar* is moved earlier, [resulting in] "the time of just that [assertion]"^a (*de nyid kyi tshe*).

རྗེ་དབྱང་དབྱུ་མར་དེ་ལོ་ནའི་ཚེ་ཞེས་དེ་ལོ་ནར་ཞེས་པ་གོང་དུ་
སྐྲངས་ནས་བཤད་དེ་དེ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ཚེ་ཞེས་པ་འོ། །

3. [Zha-mar Ge-dün-tan-dzin-gya-tsho's]^b *Lamp Illuminating the Profound Thought*^c asserts: (1) a mode of commentary without disturbing [the word order] in accordance with Tsong-kha-pa's Great Exposition of Special Insight,

དགོངས་ཟབ་སྒྲུང་བའི་སྐོན་མེར་སྟག་མཐོང་ལྟར་ན་མ་དགུགས་པར་
འགྲེལ་ཚུལ་དང་།

(2) and in accordance with this [*The Essence of Eloquence*] comments within affixing "in suchness" (*de kho nar*) earlier: "when [asserting] here in suchness [that is, ultimately] a negation of production as the predicate of the proposition".

འདི་ལྟར་ན། གང་གི་ཚེ་འདིར་དེ་ལོ་ནར་སྐྱེ་བ་བཀག་པ། ཞེས་དེ་ལོ་
ནར་ཞེས་པ་གོང་དུ་སྐྱུར་ནས་བཀྲལ་བར་བཞེད་དོ། །

"Explanation of (Chandrakīrti's) 'Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle': Illumination of the Thought': Pellucid Clarification of (Tsong-kha-pa's) Thought (dbu ma la 'jug pa'i rnam bshad dgongs pa rab gsal gyi dka' gnad gtan la 'bebs pa dgongs pa yang gsal/ dbu ma'i spyi don dgongs pa yang gsal), published in 1531 in Lhasa; in BDRC W1KG9039, 1 vol, ([gzhis ka rtse/]: bkra shis lhun po dgon, 1996), 197-571; and in codex form BDRC W14081, 1 vol, (lha sa: ser gtsug nang bstan dpe rnying 'tshol bsdu phyogs sgrig khang, 2010). See Tshul-'khrim-bsKal-bzang, *An Introduction to rJe drung She's rab dbang po's dGongs pa yang gsal: A Textbook (yig cha) for the Study of Madhyamaka of Byes pa College of Se ra Monastery*, Otani University Collection No. 13957 (Kyoto, Japan: Rinsen Book Co., 1992). See also Tsultrim Kelsaṅ Khaṅkar and Katano Michio, tr. *A Study of Tsong khapa's Mādhyamika Philosophy II: Annotated Japanese translation of the Mādhyamika Section of Essence of the Good Explanations (Legs bśad sñin po, ツォンカパ中観哲学の研究 II)*, assisted by Takada Yorihito (Kyoto, Japan: Bun-ei-do, 1998).

^a I would translate *de nyid kyi tshe* alone as "at just that time," but in the context of Je-drung She-rab-wang-po's explanation '*dod pa de nyid kyi tshe* I translate it as "at the time of just that assertion."

^b zhwa dmar dge bdun bstan 'dzin rgya mtsho, 1852-1910.

^c *Lamp Illuminating the Profound Thought, Set Forth to Purify Forgetfulness of the Difficult Points of (Tsong-kha-pa's) "Great Exposition of Special Insight" (lhag mthong chen mo'i dka' gnad rnam brjed byang du bkod pa dgongs zab snang ba'i sgron me; BDRC W2993).*

PART FOUR:
Explanations of the Critical Passage
by 2nd Dalai Lama Gen-dün-gya-tsho,
Je-drung She-rab-wang-po, and
Zha-mar Ge-dün-tan-dzin-gya-tsho

The three commentators cited by Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho—the Second Dalai Lama Gen-dün-gya-tsho (1476-1542), Je-drung She-rab-wang-po (1500-1586), and Zha-mar Ge-dün-tan-dzin-gya-tsho (1852-1910)—augment Tsong-kha-pa’s two commentaries on Chandrakīrti’s focal passage in different ways. Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho says no more than what is translated in Part Three just above; so let us probe in detail each of his brief citations of these commentators.

1. SECOND DALAI LAMA GEN-DÜN-GYA-TSHO’S PROVOCATIVE REVISING THE MEANING OF THE CRUCIAL PHRASE

The *Ornament for the Thought*^a is the Second Dalai Lama Gen-dün-gya-tsho’s^b *Ornament Vividly Clarifying the Thought of (Tsong-kha-pa’s) “Explanation of (Chandrakīrti’s) ‘Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle’”*.^c Previous to this citation Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho twice calls this text by the shorter title *Ornament for the Thought of the Explanation of (Chandrakīrti’s) “Supplement”* (*’jug pa’i rnam bshad dgongs rgyan*).

In Gen-dün-gya-tsho’s earlier *Difficult Points*^d he drops the syllable *de* in *de kho nar* in his gloss of this passage from Chandrakīrti’s *Clear*

^a Here, *Ornament for the Thought (dgongs rgyan)* is not either of two books by Dra-ti (or, Pra-ti) Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub (*bra sti [or, par sti] dge bshes rin chen don grub*, 17-18th century), since both are concerned only with mind-only and not relevant here. The longer of the two is: *Treatise Commenting Completely on the Profound Difficult Points of the Great Treatise Differentiating Interpretable and Definitive Meanings: Ornament for the Thought of (Tsong-kha-pa’s) “The Essence of Eloquence”* (*drang ba dang nges pa’i don rnam par ’byed pa’i bstan bcos chen po legs par bshad pa’i snying po’i dka’ gnas zab mo cha tshang bar ’grel pa’i bstan bcos legs par bshad pa’i snying po’i dgongs rgyan*), BDRC W1CZ1982 (PDF of Sku ’bum byams pa gling edition, n.d.). The shorter of the two is sometimes attributed to the Lesser Dra-ti.

^b *dge ’dun rgya mtsho*, 1476-1542; he came to be retroactively called the Second Dalai Lama when the third incarnation in his line, Sö-nam-gya-tsho, in 1578 received the name “Dalai” (*tā lai*, which translates the Tibetan *rgya mtsho* “ocean” in his name, *bsod nams rgya mtsho* “Ocean of Merit”) from his Mongolian patron and follower, Altan Khan.

^c (*gsung ’bum thor bu las*) *dbu ma ’jug pa’i rnam bshad dgongs pa’i don rab tu gsal ba’i rgyan*; in *gsung ’bum (dge ’dun rgya mtsho)*, BDRC W861. 2: 819-1044 (PDF of *dkar mdzes par ma*; also, in *gsung ’bum (dge ’dun rgya mtsho)*, TBRC W1CZ2857. 4: 313-562 (PDF of Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works, 2006); also, BDRC W1CZ2258 (PDF of *ser smad dpe mdzod khang*, Bylakuppe, Mysore Dist., Karnataka, 1999).

^d *bkra shis chos sdings*, 106b.3; *dkar mdzes par ma*, 89b.2, and codex, 152.9.

Words resulting in “at just when.” Tsong-kha-pa’s *The Essence of Eloquence* at the point of explaining Chandrakīrti’s brief indication, as per his method in this section of not citing Chandrakīrti’s text but summarizing its pith, does not use “as suchness” (*de kho nar*) nor even “at only” or “for only” (*kho nar*). However, since Gen-dün-gya-tsho’s gloss of this passage both at the corresponding point in his earlier *Difficult Points* and here in the *Ornament for the Thought* has to be in accord with Tsong-kha-pa’s explanation in the Great Exposition of Special Insight, Gen-dün-gya-tsho in the *Ornament for the Thought* emends it to *de kho nar* to fit with Tsong-kha-pa’s own explanation which openly speaks about “in suchness” and “suchness”; Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight says:^a

Those forms and so forth, which are not established in suchness (*de kho nar ma grub*) and also are not meanings [that are] suchness (*de kho na nyid kyi don ma yin pa*), are not suitable as objects found by nonmistaken consciousness. Hence, they are found by object-possessors that are conventional consciousnesses apprehending falsities, whereby those also are mistaken, polluted by ignorance.

དེ་ཁོ་ནར་མ་གྲུབ་ཅིང་དེ་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་ཀྱི་དོན་ཡང་མ་ཡིན་
 པའི་གཟུགས་ལ་སོགས་པ་དེ་དག་ནི་མ་འབྲུལ་བའི་ཤེས་པས་
 རྐྱེད་པའི་དོན་དུ་མི་རུང་བས་ཡུལ་ཅན་བརྒྱན་པ་འཇིན་པའི་
 ཐ་སྐད་པའི་ཤེས་པས་རྐྱེད་པ་ཡིན་པས་དེ་དག་ཀྱང་མ་རིག་
 པས་བསྐྱད་པའི་འབྲུལ་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །

Therefore, the object found by nonmistaken [consciousness] does not appear to mistaken consciousness, and the false objects appearing to mistaken consciousness are not found by nonmistaken consciousness because the two—conventional erroneous mistaken consciousness and nonerroneous nonmistaken consciousness—are different in terms of engaging objects from the viewpoint that their respective objects are mutually exclusive. This is the meaning of [Chandrakīrti’s] saying, “The erroneous

^a From Hopkins, *What is a Consequentialist?* Tsong-kha-pa’s *Great Exposition of Special Insight with the Four Interwoven Annotations: Compatibly Appearing Subjects*, 5 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version August 2018, uma-tibet.org), 136.

and the nonerroneous are different.”^a

དེས་ན་མ་འཇུག་བས་རྗེད་པའི་དོན་འཇུག་ཤེས་ལ་མི་སྣང་
 ལ། འཇུག་ཤེས་ལ་སྣང་བའི་དོན་མ་འཇུག་བའི་ཤེས་པས་
 རྗེད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་འཇུག་ཤེས་དང་ཕྱིན་ཅི་མ་
 ལོག་པ་མ་འཇུག་བའི་ཤེས་པ་གཉིས་རང་རང་གི་ཡུལ་པན་
 ཚུན་སྣངས་པའི་སྐོ་ནས་ཡུལ་ལ་འཇུག་པའི་ཐ་དད་པ་ཡིན་
 པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། ། ཞེས་པ་ནི་ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་དང་ཕྱིན་ཅི་མ་ལོག་པ་
 དག་ནི་ཐ་དད་པ་ཉིད་དོ་ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་དོན་རོ། །

Tsong-kha-pa's explanation of “in suchness” as that forms and so forth are “not established in suchness (*de kho nar ma grub*),” that is, not ultimately existent, “and also are not meanings [that are] suchness (*de kho na nyid kyi don ma yin pa*),” that is, that forms and so forth also not themselves ultimates is the reason and foundation for his reading Chandrakīrti's statement that “The erroneous and the nonerroneous are different,” as being two types of consciousness—conventional mistaken consciousness and nonmistaken consciousness.

In the *Ornament for the Thought* Gen-dün-gya-tsho renders Tsong-kha-pa's just given explanation this way (with his augments in orange type):^b

[Tsong-kha-pa's] Great Exposition of Special Insight and [Khay-drub's] *Great Compilation* explain it like this: When Proponents of the Middle prove for the perspective of Proponents of [Truly Established] Things that eyes and so forth are without tru[ly established] production, it is not reasonable that mere general eyes (*mig spyi tsam zhig*) not qualified with either truth or falsity are held as compatibly established subjects because this master Bhāvaviveka indeed has asserted the subjects—**eyes and so forth, the substrata of that** absence of tru[ly established] production (*de'i rten chos can*)—as having degenerated from establishment **in suchness**, that is, **as not established for the suchness that is the**

^a *phyin ci log dang phyin ci ma log pa dag ni tha dad pa yin no, bhinnau hi viparyāsāvīparyāsau.*

^b Quoted from Part Two, 44ff.

perspective of a rational consciousness analyzing the ultimate (*don dam la dpyod pa 'i rigs shes kyi ngo'am/ de kho nar ma grub pa*).^a

ལྷག་མཐོང་ཆེན་མོ་དང་སྣོང་ཐུན་དུ་འདི་ལྟར་བཤད་དེ།
དུ་མ་པས་དངོས་སྣེ་བའི་དོར་མིག་སོགས་བདེན་པའི་སྣེ་
མེད་དུ་བསྐྱབ་^bཔའི་ཆོ་བདེན་རྒྱན་གང་གིས་བྱད་པར་དུ་མ་
བྱས་པའི་མིག་སྣེ་ཅམ་ཞིག་གཉིས་ཀ་ལ་མཐུན་སྣང་དུ་གྲུབ་
པའི་ཆོས་ཅན་དུ་འཛིན་པར་རིགས་^cཔ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། འདི་ལྟར་
དེ་ཁོ་ནར་བདེན་པའི་སྣེ་བ་མེད་པ་དེའི་རྟེན་ཆོས་ཅན་མིག་
ལ་སོགས་པ་ཉམས་པར་གྱུར་པ་སྟེ་དོན་དམ་ལ་དཔྱད་པའི་

^a This is like when *don dam bden pa* (*paramārthasatya*) is taken as “truth for the ultimate consciousness,” as when Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s *Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-pa’s) “Great Exposition of Tenets”: Freeing the Knots of the Difficult Points, Precious Jewel of Clear Thought* on Jam-yang-shay-pa’s root text says about the Autonomy School:

In ultimate-object-truth (*don dam bden pa, paramārthasatya*):

- Ultimate (*dam pa, parama*) is a Superior’s uncontaminated awareness of meditative equipoise.
- Object (*don, artha*) is the object found by that uncontaminated awareness.
- It is a truth (*bden pa, satya*) because of being non-deceptive (*mi bslu ba*), since its mode of appearance and mode of subsistence agree.

Thereby it is the ultimate-object-truth [or ultimate truth].

དོན་དམ་པའི་བདེན་པ་ཞེས་པའི་ཚིག་ཟུར་གྱི་དམ་པ་ནི་འཕགས་པའི་མཉམ་
གཞལ་ཟག་མེད་གྱི་སྣོང་དང་། དོན་ནི་ཟག་མེད་གྱི་སྣོང་དེས་རྟོག་པའི་དོན་ཡིན་ལ།
དེ་ནི་སྣང་ཚུལ་དང་གནས་ཚུལ་མཐུན་པས་མི་བསྐྱབ་བའི་ཕྱིར་བདེན་པ་སྟེ། དེ་ནི་
དོན་དམ་པའི་བདེན་པ་ཡིན་ལོ། །

From Hopkins, *Maps of the Profound*, 754.

^b *Ornament* (Library of Tibetan Works, 63a.5, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 57a.4) *bsgrub*; *Difficult Points* (*bkra shis chos sdings*, 107a.5, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 90a.4), *sgrub*.

^c *Ornament* (Library of Tibetan Works, 63a.5, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 57a.4) *rdzun*; *Difficult Points* (*bkra shis chos sdings*, 107a.5, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 90a.4), *brdzun*.

^d *Ornament* (Library of Tibetan Works, 63a.5, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 57a.5) *rigs*; *Difficult Points* (*bkra shis chos sdings*, 107a.6, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 90a.4), *'thad*.

རིགས་ཤེས་ཀྱི་ངོའམ།^a དེ་ཁོ་ནར་མ་གྲུབ་པར་ལེགས་ལྡན་
འབྱེད་འདིས་ཁས་སྒངས་པ་ཉིད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

It follows [that this master Bhāvaviveka indeed has asserted the subjects—eyes and so forth, the substrata of that absence of tru(ly established) production—as having degenerated from establishment in suchness, that is, as not established for the suchness that is the perspective of a rational consciousness analyzing the ultimate] because when, that is, due to, having taken eyes and so forth as the subjects, a negation of tru[ly established] production is accepted as the predicate of the proposition, in that case Proponents of the Middle must assert that those very eyes and so forth gain their thingness by mere erroneous consciousnesses polluted by ignorance, whereas Proponents of [Truly Established] Things accept those eyes and so forth as objects found by nonerroneous consciousnesses not polluted by causes of mistake, whereby a subject such as eyes and so forth is not established in compatible appearance, for, objects found by erroneous consciousnesses and objects found by nonerroneous consciousnesses are different by way of mutual exclusion.

[དེ་ཁོ་ནར་བདེན་པའི་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་དེའི་རྟེན་ཚོས་ཅན་མིག་ལ་སོགས་པ་
ཉམས་པར་གྱུར་པ་སྟེ་དོན་དམ་ལ་དཔྱད་པའི་རིགས་ཤེས་ཀྱི་ངོའམ། དེ་
ཁོ་ནར་མ་གྲུབ་པར་ལེགས་ལྡན་འབྱེད་འདིས་ཁས་སྒངས་པ་ཉིད་]དེར་
ཐལ། གང་གི་ཚེ་མིག་སོགས་ཚོས་ཅན་དུ་བྱས་ནས་བདེན་
པའི་སྐྱེ་བ་བཀག་པ་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཚོས་སུ་འདོད་པ་དེའི་ཚེ་སྟེ་
དེའི་ཕྱིར། དེ་ལྟར་ན་དབྱུ་མ་པས་མིག་སོགས་དེ་ཉིད་མ་རིག་
པས་བསྐྱད་པའི་ཤེས་པ་ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་ཅོམ་གྱིས་བདག་གི་
དངོས་པོ་རྟེན་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཁས་ལེན་དགོས་ལ། དངོས་སྐྱེ་བ་

^a *Ornament* (Library of Tibetan Works, 63a.6, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 57a.5) *nyams par gyur pa ste don dam la dpyod pa'i rigs shes kyi ngo'am/ de kho nar*; Gen-dün-gya-tsho's *Difficult Points* (*bkra shis chos sdings*, 107a.6, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 90a.5), *nyams par gyur pa ste de kho nar*.

རྣམས་མིག་སོགས་འཇུག་རྒྱས་མ་བསྐྱད་པའི་ཕྱིན་ཅི་མ་ལོག་
 པའི་ཤེས་པའི་རྗེད་དོན་དུ་འདོད་པས་ཚོས་ཅན་མིག་སོགས་
 མཐུན་སྣང་དུ་གྲུབ་པ་མ་ཡིན་^a ། ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་གི་ཤེས་པས་
 རྗེད་པའི་དོན་དང་། ཕྱིན་ཅི་མ་ལོག་པའི་ཤེས་པས་རྗེད་པའི་
 དོན་དག་ནི་ཕན་ཚུན་སྣང་བའི་^b རྣམས་ནས་ཐ་དད་པ་ཡིན་
 ཞེས་པའོ། །^c

Gen-dün-gya-tsho did not finish his intended commentary on Tsong-kha-pa's *The Essence of Eloquence* other than a short outline in the *Difficult Points*; therefore, we do not know how he would have augmented this critical passage in Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* according to *The Essence of Eloquence*. We may have a clue, however, in his dropping "in suchness" here in the *Difficult Points* for his explanation of Tsong-kha-pa's Great Exposition of Special Insight, which I find appropriate to Tsong-kha-pa's explanation of this critical passage in *The Essence of Eloquence*.

^a *Ornament* (Library of Tibetan Works, 63b.2, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 57b.1) *ma yin*; *Difficult Points* (*bkra shis chos sdings*, 107b.3, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 90b.1), *min*.

^b *Ornament* (Library of Tibetan Works, 63b.3, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 57b.2) *spang ba'i*; *Difficult Points* (*bkra shis chos sdings*, 107b.3, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 90b.2), *spangs pa'i*.

^c *Ornament* (Library of Tibetan Works, 63b.3, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 57b.2) omits *Difficult Points* (*bkra shis chos sdings*, 107b.4-109a.2, and *dkar mdzes par ma*, 90b.2-91b.5) *des na gal te sgra... 'gog par mdzad do//*, and replaces it with the long sentence *legs ldan kyis...gcig pa'i phyir* which is not in *Difficult Points*.

2. JE-DRUNG SHE-RAB-WANG-PO'S MEANINGFUL ADHERENCE TO THE VOCABULARY OF *THE ESSENCE*

Here is a short biography of Je-drung She-rab-wang-po by [Samten Chhosphel](#) exactly as it appears online in The Treasury of Lives:^a

Jedrung Sherab Wangpo (rje drung shes rab dbang po) was born in Kham with some auspicious signs in the fire-monkey year of the eighth sexagenary cycle, the year 1500, in Khyungpo Jangshod Kyi Datang (khyun po ljang shod kyis zla thang). His father was Lhachen Agur (Iha chen A 'gur, d.u.) and his mother was Triza Tso (khri bza' mtso, d.u.). As a child he was said to have had intrinsic and strong faith in dharma, compassion to sentient beings, and enthusiasm and intelligence to learn things fast. Moreover, it was said that the Indian Mahasiddha Mitrayogin personally appeared and blessed him with the name “Prajna Indra” and predicted his benefit for sake of sentient beings, and that, when he was merely a child of five, the dharmapala of Chamdo requested him to be throne holder of [Jampa Ling](#).

He was given lay vows and the name Sherab Wangpo by Choje Trisum Peltsek (chos rje khri gsum dpal brtsegs, d.u.) at the age of seven. Thereafter he was admitted to Dilgo Monastery (dil mgo dgon) where he did basic study including memorizing the root verses of some fundamental sutra and tantra texts. He was ordained to novice monk by abbot Sanggye Gyeltsen (sangs rgyal mtshan) who also granted him empowerments of Guhyasamāja and Yamāntaka.

At the age of seventeen Sherab Wangpo studied under a lama named Tenpai Nyima (bstan pa'i nyi ma), and thereafter at twenty-three, he left for U, and, after several supernatural signs pointed him there, he entered the Khe-nyen monastic house of [Sera Je College](#) (se ra byes khe nyen grwa tshang). There he studied traditional subjects under the great master [Chokyi Gyeltsen](#) (chos kyi rgyal mtshan, 1469-1544), the author of Sera Je text books. He also received teachings from [Gendun Gyatso](#) (ta la'i bla ma 02 dge 'dun rgya mtsho, 1476-1542), posthumously identified as the Second Dalai Lama, on various important texts including the *Gonpa*

^a <https://treasuryoflives.org/biographies/view/Jedrung-Sherab-Wangpo/8103>.

Rabsal (*dgongs pa rab gsal*), a comprehensive commentary on Madhyamaka by Tsongkhapa, and the Naro Chodruk (na ro chos drug). After completing his studies he performed a traditional recitation of commentary of the Pramāṇavārttika in [Sera Monastery](#) (se ra dgon), and participated actively in a scholarly seminar in [Drepung Monastery](#) ('bras spungs) that witnessed his profound knowledge of Buddhist philosophy.

At Ganden Monastery (dga' ldan) Sherab Wangpo received teachings from [Panchen Sonam Drakpa](#) (paN chen bsod nams grags pa, 1478-1554), the Fifteenth Ganden Tripa, the head of Geluk tradition. The Sixteenth Tripa, [Chokyong Gyatso](#) (chos skyong rgya mtsho, 1473-1539) gave him teachings on fundamental texts of tantra. He also trained in the corresponding ritual techniques of chanting and maṇḍala drawings and so forth. In 1529, at the age of thirty he was fully ordained by Gendun Gyatso, assisted by Chokyi Gyeltsen and other senior monks in Sera Monastery.

Soon after, Sherab Wangpo requested Chokyi Gyeltsen to visit Kham, but the proposal was reversed; both Chokyi Gyeltsen and the Gendun Gyatso both recommended that he return to Kham. At their request, after making offerings to the Buddha in Lhasa and praying for success in his dharma activities, he went to Kham, where he initially served as the head of Dilgo (dil mgo) and Gyak (gyag) monasteries, and gave teachings on both sutra and tantra. He also administered the vows of novice and full ordinations to a great extent.

In 1533, at the age of thirty-four, Sherab Wangpo served as the abbot of [Zhertsa Chode](#) (zher rtsa chos sde) and gave comprehensive teachings on Lamrim and the five traditional texts of the Geluk monastic curriculum. In 1536 he established the seat of [Potima](#) (po ti ma'i gdan sa), installing in its temples statues of Śākyamuni, Maitrya, Mahākāla, and so forth. In addition to the construction and developmental program, he gave regular teachings. In the meanwhile he also received initiations from the yogi Lodro Rinchen (bya bral blo gros rin chen) and teachings from the Second Pakpa Lha, [Sanggye Pel](#) (phags pa lha 02 sangs rgyas, 1507-1566), and empowerments from Jedrung Ngakrampa [Gendun Tashi](#) (rje drung sngags ram pa dge 'dun bkra shis, 1486-1557), the eighth abbot of Chamdo Jampa Ling (chab mdo byams pa gling).

In 1559, with Potima as model, Sherab Wangpo established Ngushod Dargye Monastery (rngu shod dar rgyas dgon). The identification of this monastery remains unclear; the Tibetan Buddhist

Resource Center has it that Sherab Wangpo established the famous [Dargye](#) monastery in Ganzi in 1543 and again a Dargye monastery in Chamdo in 1548, but neither of these are attested in the biography of Sherab Wangpo in the history of Chamdo Jampa Ling.

Soon after Sherab Wangpo was invited, and accepted, to assume the abbacy of Chamdo Jampa Ling. Thereafter in 1560 he went to the monastery where he was traditionally welcomed by the ninth abbot, [Jedrung Miyowa Zhonnu Lodro](#) (rje drung mi g.yo ba gzhon nu blo gros, 1497-1564), and thousands of monks. He was said to have vision of Mahākāla upon his arrival. On the same day he was enthroned to the seat of abbot and gave a teaching on *The Praise of Dependent Arising* (*rten 'bral bstod pa*) to make the occasion auspicious. Sherab Wangpo accepted teachings from the previous abbot, on Lamrim, Vinaya, Abhidharmakosha, Madhyamaka, and Prajnaparmita for the winter session.

Sherab Wangpo briefly went to Darge Monastery (dar rgyas dgon) in Kham and assisted in the plans of future projects there such as the installation of statues. He returned to Chamdo and settled in the Khujug Residence (*khu byug gzim khang*). He reviewed the monastic discipline and made amendments in the code. He also continued teachings on various topics, according to the needs of the audience. His teachings were mainly based on the texts by Tsongkhapa, his two chief disciples and various Kadampa lamas; stories of the past lives of the Buddha; and certain commentaries on the major Geluk tantras. His major construction project was a large gold statue of the Buddha in the Central Hall of the monastery.

After serving as abbot for six years, in the fire-tiger year of the 10th sexagenary cycle, the year 1566, he passed the throne to [Jedrung Jamyang Shenyin](#) (rje drung 'jam dbyangs bshes gnyen, 1502-1569). He left Chamdo with a promise to return soon, keeping busy in dharma-related work in the southern Kham for about three years.

Unfortunately, Jedrung Jamyang Shenyin passed away after three years, and Sherab Wangpo was requested to again take up the abbacy. He returned to the throne in the iron-horse year of the tenth sexagenary cycle, the year 1570, serving for ten years.

During his second tenure of abbotship, Sherab Wangpo continued to give teachings on sutra and tantra, transmissions, initiations, and empowerments. He also gave vows of different levels of ordination. He commissioned an edition of the Kangyur (bka'

'gyur) in one hundred ten volumes, printed in gold and silver. He had many paintings made, and was said to have commissioned over one thousand statues of [Tsongkhapa](#) in addition to many others, particularly for the Mahākāla temple. He also composed a text on Madhyamaka that was widely studied by his followers.

Sherab Wangpo was widely said to be effective in invoking Yamataka for aid in subduing obstacles to religious activity. It is said that when he endeavored to build a statue of Yamāntaka, most of it arose naturally. His supernatural abilities were compared to [Ra Lotsāwa](#) (rsa lo tsA ba, 1016-c.1198), the famous translator who employed a wide variety of unorthodox methods, including the murder of thirteen lamas.

In 1577 Sherab Wangpo mediated a dispute between the Third Pakpa Lha, [Tongwa Donden](#) ('pags pa lha 03 mthong ba don ldan, 1567-1604) and the local leaders of Tsawa, inviting them all to Chamdo to air their grievances. He also settled disputes between Rijang (ri sbyang) and Gomngom (sgom ngom).

In 1579, his age becoming an increasing burden, Sherab Wangpo traveled to southern Kham. The following year, the iron-dragon year, 1580, he appointed [Jedrung Lhawang Choekyi Gyeltsen](#) (rje drung lha dbang chos kyi rgyal mtsan, 1537-1604) to the seat of abbot of Chamdo Jampa Ling and retired. Thus, he served a total of about sixteen years as abbot of Chamdo Jampa Ling.

Following his retirement Sherab Wangpo spent most of his time in meditation on preparation for death, sleeping little. In 1587, at the age of eighty-seven, in the fire-dog year of the tenth sexagenary cycle, he passed away in Poti Chode (po ti chos sde). His body was put in a gold plated copper stupa in the Poti monastery. His followers identified his incarnation in Zeto Danak (rdzi tho brag nag, d.u.), henceforth known as the Zetho Danak Tulku (rdzi tho brag nag sprul sku).

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In Je-drung She-rab-wang-po's *Pellucid Clarification of (Tsong-kha-pa's) Thought* any meaning of "suchness" is dropped, leaving: "at the time of just that assertion" (*'dod pa de kho na'i tshe*). Is it happenstance that his reading accords with the Sanskrit of Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words*^a and three Tibetan recensions of the Tibetan Translations of Treatises (*bstan 'gyur*), the Peking (*pe cin*, 9b.1), Nar-thang (*sar thang*, 11a.1), and Golden Manuscript (*gser bris ma*, 13a.6) which read "only/just" (*kho nar*)?^b Could She-rab-wang-po be reflecting a version like these, along with noticing that Tsong-kha-pa in his *The Essence of Eloquence* simply does not use "suchness" when explaining this passage in Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words*?

Also, as observed above, when Gen-dün-gya-tsho in his *Difficult Points of (Tsong-kha-pa's) "Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive"* quotes this passage in Tsong-kha-pa's Great Exposition of Special Insight, he eliminates "suchness" (*de kho nar*), leaving "only/just" (*kho*

^a La Vallée Poussin, *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās avec la Prasannapadā*, 30.1. As J.W. De Jong says in his "Textcritical Notes on the Prasannapadā" (*Indo-Iranian Journal* 20:1978, 25) about La Vallée Poussin's excellent edition:

La Vallée Poussin's edition of the Prasannapadā (*Bibliotheca Buddhica IV*, St.-Petersbourg, 1903-1913) is based upon three manuscripts: Cambr. (C. Bendall, *Catalogue of the Buddhist Sanskrit Manuscripts in the University Library, Cambridge*, Cambridge, 1883, pp. 114-117, Add. 1483), Paris, (J. Filliozat, 'Catalogue des manuscrits sanskrits et tibétains de la Société Asiatique', *JA*, 1941-1942, pp. 12-13, No. 8) and Calc. (R. Mitra, *The Sanskrit Buddhist Literature of Nepal*, Calcutta, 1882, pp. 169-172, B 2). In his preface La Vallée Poussin remarked that all three manuscripts were mediocre copies of an original which itself was not faultless. In order to establish a correct text La Vallée Poussin relied heavily on the Tibetan translation which he considered more reliable than the manuscripts at his disposal.

De Jong speaks of three other Sanskrit manuscripts, and so forth, and of his wish that someone will consult all of these in making a new edition. De Jong's own "Textcritical Notes" are a marvelous addition to La Vallée Poussin's masterpiece. Our concern appears not to require further consultation with other Sanskrit editions.

^b Three recensions—*sde dge* (9b.3), *co ne* (9b.1), and *dpe bsdur ma* (21.17)—read *de kho nar* ("suchness"). All six recensions present just one translation by the same two translators and the same two revisors, the latter being a different Indian scholar but the Tibetan translator also serving as the Tibetan revisor:

Translators: Mahāsumati (called Sumatikīrti in *dpe bsdur ma*) and Pa tshab nyi ma grags
 Revisors: Kanakavarma (Kanakavarma in *co ne* and *dpe bsdur ma*) and Pa tshab nyi ma grags.

Thanks to Jongbok Yi of Stockton University and UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies for compiling and comparing the passage and translator colophons of the six recensions.

nar) and thus perhaps was doing the same but changed his opinion when bringing over his commentary to the *Ornament for the Thought* where he inserts “in suchness” (*de kho nar*) with a creative augmentation (above, 54 and 79):

this master Bhāvaviveka indeed has asserted the subjects—**eyes and so forth, the substrata of that** absence of tru[ly established] production (*de'i rten chos can*)—as having degenerated from establishment **in suchness**, that is, **as not established for the suchness that is the perspective of a rational consciousness** (*don dam la dpyod pa'i rigs shes kyi ngo'am/ de kho nar ma grub pa*).

However, if Gen-dün-gya-tsho in his earlier reading in the *Difficult Points* and especially Je-drung She-rab-wang-po have the support of a different version of Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words*, why do they not cite it? In any case, Tsong-kha-pa's second, new explanation in *The Essence of Eloquence* in which “in suchness” plays no role is a strong prompt to allow “in suchness” to disappear when augmenting Gen-dün-gya-tsho's explanation here.

Je-drung She-rab-wang-po's augmentation of this passage according to Tsong-kha-pa's *The Essence of Eloquence* does exactly this, “in suchness” disappears:^a (She-rab-wang-po's augmentations are in orange type.)

That **assertion [by Bhāvaviveka] that the mode of establishment by valid cognition of mere general eyes—having discarded the specifications of the two truths as the subjects in the proof of eyes and so forth as not produced from self—are in compatible appearance** is not **logically feasibly** so: For, at the time of **just** that acceptance (*'dod pa de kho na'i tsho*)—as what is being proven—that the negation that **eyes and so forth** are produced **from self**, **Bhāvaviveka** himself indeed has asserted that those eyes and so forth, the subjects, the substrata of that **absence of production**, have degenerated from gaining **their own thingness** (*dngos po*), **that is, entities** (*ngo bo*), by way of the mere erroneous **because**:

1. a valid cognition comprehending the subjects is, in Bhāvaviveka's own system, a consciousness unmistaken with respect to the nature of eyes and so forth, and
2. the two, the erroneous objects found by mistaken consciousnesses—appearing to exist inherently whereas they do not—

^a Je-drung She-rab-wang-po's *Pellucid Clarification of (Tsong-kha-pa's) Thought*, BDRC W1KG9039-I1KG9044 (hereafter “1996bkra shis lhun po”), 124a.3, and BDRC W14081-I1KG15976 (hereafter “2010LhasaCodex”), 272.20.

and the nonerroneous objects found by consciousnesses un- mistaken with respect to inherent existence are different, that is, contradictory.

མིག་སོགས་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་ཚོས་ཅན་དུ་
བདེན་གཉིས་ཀྱི་ཁྱད་བར་དོར་བའི་མིག་སྐྱེ་ཚམ་ཚོས་ཅན་
ཚད་མས་སྐྱབ་ཚུལ་མཐུན་པར་སྤང་བར་འདོད་པ་དེ་ནི། དེ་
ལྟར་འཐད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། གང་གི་ཚེ་མིག་སོགས་བདག་ལས་
སྐྱེ་བ་བཀག་པ་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཚོས་སུ་འདོད་པ་དེ་ལོ་ནའི་ཚེ་སྐྱེ་
མེད་དེའི་རྟེན་ཚོས་ཅན་མིག་སོགས་དེའི་བདག་གི་དངོས་པོ་
སྐྱེ་དོ་བོ་ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་ཚམ་གྱིས་རྟེན་པ་ཉམས་པ་སྐྱེ་ལེགས་
ལྡན་རང་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ཁས་སྤངས་པ་ཉིད་ཡིན་ཏེ། ཚོས་ཅན་
འཇལ་བའི་ཚད་མ་ནི། མིག་སོགས་ཀྱི་རང་བཞིན་ལ་ལེགས་
ལྡན་རང་ལུགས་ལ་མ་འཇུལ་བའི་ཚད་མ་ཡིན་པ་གང་ཞིག །
ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་རང་བཞིན་གྱིས་མེད་བཞིན་དུ་དར་སྤང་བའི་
འཇུལ་ཤེས་ཀྱི་རྟེན་དོན་དང་ཕྱིན་ཅི་མ་ལོག་པ་རང་བཞིན་
ལ་མ་འཇུལ་བའི་ཤེས་པའི་རྟེན་དོན་གཉིས་ཐ་དད་པ་སྐྱེ་
འགལ་པའི་ཕྱིར།^a

^a Word order changed from:
ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་ཚམ་གྱིས་བདག་གི་དངོས་པོ་

to:
བདག་གི་དངོས་པོ་ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་ཚམ་གྱིས་

^b The same passage in Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* also showing the words that Je- drung She-rab-wang-po has dropped or moved is:

གང་གི་ཚེ་མིག་སོགས་བདག་ལས་འདོད་སྐྱེ་བ་བཀག་པ་བསྐྱབ་པར་བྱའི་ཚོས་
སུ་འདོད་པ་དེ་ལོ་ནའི་ཚེ་དེ་ལོ་ནར་སྐྱེ་མེད་དེའི་རྟེན་ཚོས་ཅན་མིག་སོགས་དེའི་

With respect to how [Bhāvaviveka] has asserted the former reason [which is that a valid cognition comprehending the subjects is, in Bhāvaviveka’s own system, a consciousness unmistaken with respect to the nature of eyes and so forth]: In a system that accepts existing (*yod pa*) and inherently existing (*rang bzhin yod pa*) as without distinction, whatever is a valid cognition comprehending the subject is asserted as necessarily having come to be a valid cognition with respect to a subject established by way of its own character; Tsong-kha-pa’s *Differentiating Interpretable and Definitive Meanings: The Essence of Eloquence* says:^a

In a system accepting that whatever exists exists by way of its own entity, if [a consciousness] has come to be mistaken relative to the appearance of own-character [that is, the object’s being established by way of its own character], it cannot be posited as finding [that is, realizing] its object of comprehension. Therefore, whether a conceptual or non-conceptual valid cognition, it must be unmistaken with respect to the own-character [that is, the establishment by way of its own character] of that with respect to which it is a valid cognition—the appearing object or the conceived object.

and:^b

[According to the assertions of the Autonomists,] when an object is analyzed as to whether it is established or not by valid cognition, that it is established by valid cognition must be understood by way of that object demonstrated either (1) as being established in accordance with the appearance to this consciousness if it is a non-conceptual valid cognition or (2) as established in accordance with the ascertainment or determination of the meaning by this consciousness if it is a conceptual valid cognition. This is

བདག་གི་དངོས་པོ་སྟེ་ངོ་བོ་ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་ཅམ་གྱིས་རྗེད་པ་ནི་ཉམས་པར་གྱུར་པར་
 སྟེ་ལོགས་ལྡན་འདིས་རང་ཉིད་གྱིས་ཁས་ལྷངས་པ་ཉིད་ཡིན་ཏེ། དོ། ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་
 དང་ཕྱིན་ཅི་མ་ལོག་པ་དག་ནི་ཐ་དང་པ་ཡིན་ཅོ།

^a Hopkins, *Tsong-kha-pa’s Revised Presentation of Compatibly Appearing Subjects in The Essence of Eloquence with Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s Commentary*, 7 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version April 2020: uma-tibet.org), 66 and 182.

^b *IBID*, 78 and 185.

the meaning of unmistakable because:

- (1) through positing the object as established in accordance with how it appears to [this awareness] itself, this awareness is posited as unmistakable with respect to its appearing object, or
- (2) through positing the object as established in accordance with how it is ascertained by [this awareness] itself, this awareness is posited as unmistakable with respect to ascertained or determined object.

ཏྲགས་ལྷ་མ་ལེགས་ལྷན་གྱི་ཁས་སྐྱབས་ཚུལ་ནི། ཡོད་པ་དང་
 རང་བཞིན་ཡོད་པ་ཁྱད་མེད་དུ་འདོད་པའི་ལྷགས་ལ་ཚོས་
 ཅན་དེ་འཇལ་བྱེད་གྱི་ཚད་མ་ཡིན་ན། རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་
 གྱིས་གྲུབ་པའི་ཚོས་ཅན་ལ་ཚད་མར་སོང་བས་ཁྱབ་པར་ཁས་
 ལེན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། དང་ངེས་ནམ་འབྱེད་ལས། ཡོད་པ་གང་
 ཡིན་རང་གི་ངོ་བོས་ཡོད་པར་འདོད་པའི་ལྷགས་ལ་རང་
 མཚན་སྐྱབ་པ་ལ་ལྷོས་ཏེ་འབྲུལ་བར་སོང་ན། དེས་རང་གི་
 གཞུལ་བྱ་རྗེད་པར་འཇོག་མི་ལུས་པས་རྟོག་པ་དང་རྟོག་མེད་
 གྱི་ཚད་མ་གང་ཡིན་ཡང་། ཚད་མར་སོང་ས་སྐྱབ་ལུལ་དང་
 ཞེན་ལུལ་རང་མཚན་ལ་མ་འབྲུལ་པ་གཅིག་དགོས་སོ། ། ཞེས་
 དང་། དོན་དེ་ཚད་མས་གྲུབ་མ་གྲུབ་དཔྱོད་པའི་དུས་སུ་ཚད་
 མས་གྲུབ་ཅེས་པ་ནི་རྟོག་མེད་གྱི་ཚད་མ་ཡིན་ན་དོན་དེ་རང་
 ལ་སྐྱབ་པ་ལྟར་གྲུབ་པ་དང་། རྟོག་པའི་ཚད་མ་ཡིན་ན། དོན་

^a *dus su* is not in either version of She-rab-wang-po's *Pellucid Clarification*: 1996bkra shis lhun po, 124a.7, and 2010LhasaCodex, 273.14.

དེ་རང་གིས་^aངེས་པའམ་ཞེན་པ་^bལྟར་གྲུབ་པ་ཅིག་ཏུ་གང་
 །ལ་སྟོན་པའི་ཡུལ་ངེས་གོ་^dདགོས་སོ། ། དེ་ནི་མ་འཇུག་པའི་
 དོན་ཡིན་ཏེ་ཡུལ་དེ་རང་ལ་སྤྲང་བ་ལྟར་^eདང་རང་གིས་ངེས་
 པ་བཞིན་ཏུ་གྲུབ་པའི་རྣམ་འཛོག་གིས་སྟོ་དེ་སྤྲང་ཡུལ་དང་
 ཞེན་ཡུལ་ལམ་ངེས་ཡུལ་ལ་མ་འཇུག་བར་འཛོག་པའི་ཕྱིར་
 རོ། །

Je-drung She-rab-wang-po augments Tsong-kha-pa's commentary on Chandrakīrti's brief indication according to Tsong-kha-pa's *The Essence of Eloquence* without ever mentioning "suchness," most likely because it simply is not needed to explicate the logic of Tsong-kha-pa's presentation. For the last part of Tsong-kha-pa's presentation, Je-drung She-rab-wang-po merely quotes it without giving his own additional explanation.

^a She-rab-wang-po's *Pellucid Clarification* 1996bkra shis lhun po, 124a.7, and 2010LhasaCodex, 273.16, rang *gi nges pa*, and similarly again below and also *rnam 'jog gi blo*.

^b Correcting *nges pa'i zhen pa* in She-rab-wang-po's *Pellucid Clarification* 1996bkra shis lhun po, 124a.7, to *nges pa'am zhen pa* in accordance with 2010LhasaCodex, 273.16.

^c She-rab-wang-po's *Pellucid Clarification* 1996bkra shis lhun po, 124b.1, and 2010LhasaCodex, 273.16, *gcig gang*.

^d She-rab-wang-po's *Pellucid Clarification* 1996bkra shis lhun po, 124b.1, *ston pa'i yul nges go*, and 2010LhasaCodex, 273.16, *ston pa'i dus des go*.

^e She-rab-wang-po's *Pellucid Clarification* 1996bkra shis lhun po, 124b.1, and 2010LhasaCodex, 273.16, *ltar grub pa*.

3. ZHA-MAR GE-DÜN-TAN-DZIN-GYA-TSHO'S PROVOCATIVE REVISION TO HIS OWN COMMENTARY

Here is a short biography of The Fourth Amdo Zha-mar, Ge-dün-tan-dzin-gya-tsho, by [Tsering Namgyal](#) exactly as it appears online in The Treasury of Lives:^a

The Fourth Amdo Zhamar Gendun Tendzin Gyatso (a mdo zhwa dmar 04 dge 'dun bstan 'dzin rgya mtsho) was born in Zhamar (zhwa dmar) village in Dabzhi (mda' bzhi) in the Tsongon (mtsho sngon) region of Amdo, in 1852, the water-mouse year of the fourteenth sexagenary cycle. His father was named Benyen (ban yan) and his mother was called [Machik](#) (ma gcig). He was the youngest of his brothers and sisters. Dabzhi was a place with strong connections with Lamo Dechen Monastery.

At a very early age he was identified as the reincarnation of the Third Amdo Zhamar, [Ngawang Tendzin Gyatso](#) (a mdo zhwa dmar 03 ngag dbang bstan 'dzin rgya mtsho, 1807-1848), which was confirmed by the Seventh Panchen Lama, [Lobzang Pelden Tenpai Nyima](#) (paN chen 07 blo bzang dpal ldan bstan pa'i nyi ma, 1782-1853) and Lobzang Tenpai Gyeltsen (blo bzang bstan pa'i rgyal mtshan, d.u).

When he turned four, he was enthroned to the throne of his predecessor at Lamo Dechen (la mo bde chen) Monastery where he studied reading and writing under Geshe Rongpo Alag (dge bshes rong po a lags, d.u) and Kunpangpa Tendzin Gyeltsen (kun spangs pa bstan 'dzin rgyal mtshan, d.u)

At the age of eight he received the novice vows from [Tarshul Gendun Chokiyong Gyatso](#) (thar shul dge 'dun chos skyong rgya mtsho, d.u.) who gave him the name Gendun Tendzin Gyatso. After three years he began to study logic and other subjects under the tutorship of Takri Rabjampa Lobzang Nyima (stag ri rab 'byams pa blo bzang nyi ma, d.u). He then joined the general monastic education and studied the five standard subjects of logic, Madhyamaka, Prajñāpāramitā, Abhidharma and Vinaya under the instruction of Drungchen [Sherab Gyatso](#) (drung chen shes rab rgya

^a <https://treasuryoflives.org/biographies/view/Fourth-Amdo-Zhamar-Gendun-Tendzin-Gyatso/3296>.

mtsho, 1803-1875).

When he turned sixteen he became secretary of the monastery, a post he seemed not have enjoyed, as three years later he fled to Rongpo (rong po) Monastery in Rebkong (reb gong) in order to enter into meditation retreat. There he had an audience with the Second Arol, [Lobzang Lungrik Gyatso](#) (a rol 02 blo bzang lung rigs rgya mtsho, 1805-1886).

Soon after, at the command of the Second Arol, he matriculated in Labrang Tashikyil (bla brang bkra shis khyil). There he studied with numerous masters, including Khewang Gendun Zangpo (mkhas dbang dge 'dun bzang po, d.u); [Zhangton Tenpa Gyatso](#) (zhang ston bstan pa rgya mtsho, 1825-1897); and Drungchen Sherab Gyatso, with whom he had studied at Lamo Dechen, and who gave him novice ordination at the age of twenty. When he was either twenty-three or twenty-seven he received full ordination from Khuluk Geshe Nyima Richen (khu lugs dge bshes nyi ma rin chen, d.u).

He returned briefly to Rongpo to receive teachings from the Second Arol, and then went back to Labrang to continue his studies with Drungchen Sherab Gyatso. He also studied astrology with Nyalung Ngarampa Gendun Tendzin (nya lung sngags rabs pa dge 'dun bstan 'dzin, d.u.), medicine with Chukya Tsoje (chu kya 'tso byed, d.u), and grammar with Tsadampa Jamyang Tsultrim Gyatso (tsha 'dam pa 'jam dbyangs tshul khriims rgya mtsho, d.u). He gave his first empowerment, on Dudul Namgyal (bdud las rnam rgyal) at Gomar Ganden Puntsok Ling (sgo dmar dga' ldan phun tshogs gling). At the age of thirty four, in 1885, at Ragya Monastery (ra rgya), he completed his education and received his Geshe (*dge bshes*) degree.

The Amdo Zhamar spent much of the next fifteen years in retreat. Beginning at the age of thirty-six, at the command of the Second Arol and of [Shingza Pandita Lobzang Dargye Gyatso](#) (shing bza' paN+Di ta blo bzang dar rgyas rgya mtsho, 1752-1824), he entered retreat at Samten Choding (bsam gtan chos sdings) Hermitage. A large number of practitioners gathered around him and as a group they began to wander the region. Eventually they settled at a place that was given the name Ditsa (Ide tsha, or dhi tsha), and Horchen Yeshe Gyatso (hor chen ye shes rgya mtsho, d.u.) was invited to teach.

In 1903 the site was formally established as a monastery, Pel Mingyur Deden Tashi Choding (dpal mi 'gyur bde ldan bkra shis

chos sdings), commonly known as Ditsa. A local patron named Tashi Tsering (bkra shis tshe ring) gave financial support.

The monastery grew dramatically from the outset, its reputation bolstered by its strict regimen of teaching that attracted around three thousand students before the Fourth Zhwa dmar died.

In 1896, when he was forty-five, he spent the winter months at Madram Dorje Drak (rma 'gram rdo rje brag) hermitage. There, under the guidance of Dharmakīrti Pelzang (d+harma kirti dpal bzang, d.u.) he edited works on Madhyamaka with Geshe Sherab Gyatso and the Seventh Zhabdrung Karpo, [Gendun Tendzin Norbu](#) (zhabs drung dkar po 07 dge 'dun bstan 'dzin nor bu, 1873-1927). In 1902 he supervised the carving of the collected works of Tarshul Gendun Chokiyong Gyatso and composed the table of contents.

During this period he also traveled occasionally to give teachings at monasteries in the region, including Kumbum (sku 'bum), Jakhyung (bya khyung), [Serkhok](#) (gser khog), Gonlung (dgon lung), Bido (bis mdo), Arik Gonchen Ganden Chopel Ling (a rig dgon chen dga' ldan chos 'phel gling), Kangtsa (rkang tsha), and Ngagar Jangchub Ling (rnga sgar byang chub gling).

Some time between 1905 and 1907, the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, [Tubten Gyatso](#) (tA la'i bla ma 13 thub bstan rgya mtsho, 1876-1933), who had fled Lhasa in advance of the British Young-husband invasion of Tibet in 1904, was residing at Kumbum Monastery. The Amdo Zhamar met him there and gave him extensive empowerments and instructions, and so impressed the Dalai Lama that the latter gave him the title of paṇḍita together with a seal and a large number of gifts. Thereafter he was known as Zhamar Paṇḍita.

Among the many important Geluk lamas of twentieth century Amdo that he trained were the Eleventh Tongkhor, [Lobzang Jigme Tsultrim Gyatso](#) (stong 'khor 11 blo bzang 'jigs med tshul khriims rgya mtsho, 1891-1909); Sertok Nominhan [Lobzang Tsultrim Gyatso](#) (gser tog no mo han blo bzang tshul khriims rgya mtsho, 1845-1915); the Third Chesho, Lobzang [Jangchub Tenpai Dronme](#) (che shos 03 blo bzang byang chub bstan pa'i sgron me, 1861-1935); the seventieth abbot of Rongpo, [Lobzang Lungtok Chokyi Gyatso](#) (blo bzang lung rtogs chos kyi rgyal mtshan, 1880-1959); Jamyang Tubten Gyatso ([jam dbyangs thub bstan rgya mtsho](#), 1866-1928); the Third Arol, [Lobzang Lungtok Tenpai Gyeltsen](#) (a rol 03 blo bzang lung rtogs bstan pa'i rgyal mtshan, 1888-1959);

the Fourth Minyak, [Ngawang Lekshe Gyatso](#) (mi nyag 04 ngag dbang legs bshad rgya mtsho, 1902-1958); [Deyang Lobzang Tendzin Norbu](#) (bde yangs blo bzang bstan 'dzin nor bu, 1839-1911); Abhya [Jigme Damcho Gyatso](#) (a bhya 'jigs med dam chos rgya mtsho, 1898-1946); Giteng [Lobzang Pelden](#) (sgis /sge'u steng blo bzang dpal ldan, 1880-1944); and [Pelri Lobzang Rabsel](#) (dpal ris blo bzang rab gsal, 1840-1910). The famous iconoclast [Gendun Chopel](#) (dge 'dun chos 'phel, 1903-1951) is also said to have studied under the Fourth Zhamar for several years in his youth, likely from the age of six or seven until around eight or nine, although it is possible he arrived at Ditsa only after the master had passed away.

His compositions, on over fifty-eight different topics, were collected into nine volumes.

He passed away at the age of sixty one, in 1912, the water-male mouse year of the fifteenth sexagenary cycle.

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Zha-mar Ge-dün-tan-dzin-gya-tsho keeps the format of Tsong-kha-pa’s statements in the Great Exposition of Special Insight:^a (the phrases from Tsong-kha-pa’s text that Zha-mar reflects in his commentary are in orange type)

this Bhāvaviveka himself has asserted that eyes or forms and so forth—which are the subjects that are the substrata of the predicate of the proposition—have **degenerated from in suchness, that is to say, are not established in suchness.**

བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཚོས་ཀྱི་རྟེན་ཚོས་ཅན་མིག་གམ་གཟུགས་ལ་
སོགས་པ་ནི་དེ་ལོ་ནར་ཉམས་པར་གྱུར་པ་སྟེ་མ་གྲུབ་པར་
ལེགས་ལྡན་འབྱེད་འདིས་རང་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ཁས་སྐྱོངས་པ་ཡིན་
ནོ། །

and:

Those forms, which are **not established in suchness and also are not suchness** meanings [that are] suchness (*de kho na nyid kyi don ma yin pa*), are not suitable as objects found by nonmistaken consciousness. Hence, they are found by object-possessors that are conventional consciousnesses apprehending falsities, whereby those also are mistaken, polluted by ignorance.

དེ་ལོ་ནར་མ་གྲུབ་ཅིང་དེ་ལོ་ན་ཉིད་ཀྱི་དོན་ཡང་མ་ཡིན་
པའི་གཟུགས་ལ་སོགས་པ་དེ་དག་ནི་མ་འཇུག་པའི་ཤེས་པས་
རྟོག་པའི་དོན་དུ་མི་རུང་བས་ལྷུལ་ཅན་བརྟུན་པ་འཛིན་པའི་
ཐ་སྟོན་པའི་ཤེས་པས་རྟོག་པ་ཡིན་པས་དེ་དག་གྲུང་མ་རིག་
པས་བསྐྱོད་པའི་འཇུག་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །

by saying in his commentary:

On the occasion when stating a syllogism proving things as not produced from self, **“not ultimately produced”** is accepted [by

^a From Hopkins, *What is a Consequentialist?* Tsong-kha-pa’s *Great Exposition of Special Insight with the Four Interwoven Annotations: Compatibly Appearing Subjects*, 5 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version August 2018, uma-tibet.org), 63 and 135.

{KEY: In the Tibetan, **turquoise highlight** indicates material added in place of ellipses, and **magenta highlight** indicates the ellipsis sign has been filled in.}

Bhāvaviveka] as the predicate of the proposition; therefore, this Bhāvaviveka indeed has asserted subjects such as forms and so forth as **not ultimately established**. Since forms and so forth that are **not ultimately established and also are not the meaning of suchness** [that is, are not suchness] must be objects found by conventional consciousnesses apprehending falsities, it follows that the subjects, forms and so forth, are not objects found by nonmistaken consciousnesses because of being objects found by mistaken consciousnesses.

གང་གི་ཚོད་ངོས་པོ་རྣམས་བདག་ལས་མི་སྐྱེ་བར་བསྐྱབ་པའི་
 སྐྱེ་བ་འགོད་པའི་སྐབས་སུ་དོན་དམ་པར་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་
 བསྐྱབ་བྱ་ཚོས་སུ་འདོད་པས་ན། ཚོས་ཅན་གཞུགས་སོགས་
 དོན་དམ་པར་མ་གྲུབ་པར་ལེགས་ལྡན་འདིས་ཁས་ལྷངས་པ་
 ཉིད་དོ། ། དོན་དམ་པར་མ་གྲུབ་ཅིང་དེ་ལོན་ཉིད་ཀྱི་དོན་
 ཡང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་གཞུགས་ལ་སོགས་པ་རྣམས་རྩུན་པ་འཇིན་
 པའི་ཐ་སྐྱད་པའི་ཤེས་པས་རྗེད་དོན་ཡིན་དགོས་པས་ན།
 གཞུགས་སོགས་ཚོས་ཅན། མ་འབྲུལ་བའི་ཤེས་པའི་རྗེད་དོན་
 མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། འབྲུལ་བའི་ཤེས་པའི་རྗེད་དོན་མ་ཡིན་
 པའི་ཕྱིར།

However, Zha-mar does not perform such a reflection of format when he comments on the corresponding passage in Tsong-kha-pa's *The Essence of Eloquence*; rather, since Tsong-kha-pa neither cites Chandrakīrti's passage nor augments the passage, Zha-mar must use Tsong-kha-pa's summary of the passage where "suchness" is not even used. Still, although Zha-mar, despite recognizing that "in suchness" has no place in the procedure of Tsong-kha-pa's logic, he, unlike Je-drung She-rab-wang-po who dropped "in suchness" entirely, feels pressed to include it somewhere likely because "in suchness" is found in the edition of Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* he was using. So, the only other place to put it is earlier in the passage at the beginning:

When—or at the time of—accepting here a negation **in suchness**

{KEY: In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight indicates material added in place of ellipses, and magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis sign has been filled in.}

(*de kho nar*) [that is, ultimately] of production as the predicate of the proposition, **compatibly appearing subjects are asserted as existing; therefore,**

དེ་ལོ་ནར་ཞེས་པ་གོང་དུ་སྐྱུར་ནས་གང་གི་ཚེ་འདིར་དེ་ལོ་
 རར་སྐྱེ་བ་བཀག་པ་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཚམས་སུ་འདོད་པ་དེའི་ཚེ་འམ་
 དུས་སུ་ཚམས་ཅན་མཐུན་སྤང་བ་ལས་ལེན་པས་

These are the two ways that Zha-mar Ge-dün-tan-dzin-gya-tsho presents Tsong-kha-pa's treatment of "in suchness" first in the Great Exposition of Special Insight and then in *The Essence of Eloquence*, the former through actual citations and later through imaginative creation.

To shed more light on these two approaches, let us first look again at what Tsong-kha-pa himself says in his Great Exposition of Special Insight where he comments on the brief indication in Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* within connecting it to Chandrakīrti's text: (the phrases that Zha-mar will mirror in his own commentary are in orange type)

The meaning of the passage [in Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words*]:

[That is not so. For,] at that time when a negation of production is accepted here as the predicate of the proposition, this one himself has just asserted that the entities of the subjects—the substrata of that [predicate,] which gain their thingness by the mere erroneous—have degenerated from [establishment] in suchness.

is that Bhāvaviveka himself has asserted that eyes or forms and so forth—which are the subjects that are the substrata of the predicate of the proposition—have degenerated from [establishment] in suchness, that is to say, are not established in suchness.

གང་གི་ཚེ་ཞེས་པ་ནས་[འདིར་སྐྱེ་བ་བཀག་པ་བསྐྱབ་པར་བྱ་བའི་
 ཚམས་སུ་འདོད་པ་དེའི་ཚེ་དེ་ལོ་ནར་དེའི་ཉེན་ཚམས་ཅན་ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་ཅམ་
 གྱིས་བདག་གི་དངོས་པོ་རྟེན་པ་ནི་ཉམས་པར་གྱུར་པར་འདིས་རང་ཉིད་
 གྱིས་]ལས་སྤངས་པ་ཉིད་དོ་ཞེས་པའི་དོན་ནི་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཚམས་
 གྱི་ཉེན་ཚམས་ཅན་མེག་གམ་གཟུགས་ལ་སོགས་པ་ནི་དེ་ལོ་

ནར་ཉམས་པར་གྱུར་པ་སྟེ་མ་གྲུབ་པར་ལེགས་ལྡན་འབྱེད་
འདིས་རང་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ཁས་སྐྱབས་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །

What sort of subjects are these? They are those that gain their own thingness by mere erroneous consciousnesses polluted by ignorance—objects established by mere conventional consciousnesses such as eye consciousnesses and so forth.

ཚོས་ཅན་ཇི་འདྲ་བ་སྟོམ་ན་མ་རིག་པས་བསྐྱད་པའི་སྤྱིན་ཅི་
ལོག་ཅོམ་གྱིས་བདག་གི་དངོས་པོ་རྟེན་པ་སྟེ། མིག་གི་ཤེས་པ་
ལ་སོགས་པའི་ཐ་སྟོད་པའི་ཤེས་པ་ཅོམ་གྱིས་གྲུབ་པའི་དོན་
ནོ། །

Concerning [Bhāvaviveka’s] mode of assertion: When—that is, because—this negation ultimately of production depends as a predicate of the proposition upon subjects, then if [those] are established in suchness, it is contradictory for that to depend on them.

ཁས་སྐྱབས་ལུགས་ནི་དོན་དམ་པར་སྐྱེ་བ་བཀག་པ་དེ་ཚོས་
ཅན་དེ་དག་ལ་བསྐྱབས་བྱའི་ཚོས་སུ་བརྟེན་པ་དེའི་ཚེ་སྟེ། དེའི་
སྤྱིར་ཉེ་དེ་ལོ་ནར་གྲུབ་ན་དེ་བརྟེན་པ་འགལ་བའི་སྤྱིར་རོ། །

[Bhāvaviveka] might query: Though [I] do indeed assert thus, what would that incur?

Response: Those forms, which are **not established in suchness and also are not suchness**, are not fit to be objects found by non-mistaken consciousness. Hence, they are found by object-possessors that are conventional consciousnesses apprehending falsities, whereby those also are mistaken, polluted by ignorance.

འོ་ན་དེ་ལྟར་ཁས་ལེན་མོད་དེས་ཅིར་འགྱུར་སྟོམ་ན། དེ་ལོ་
ནར་མ་གྲུབ་ཅིང་དེ་ལོ་ན་ཉིད་ཀྱི་དོན་ཡང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་
གཞུགས་ལ་སོགས་པ་དེ་དག་ནི་མ་འཇུག་པའི་ཤེས་པས་རྟེན་

{KEY: In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight indicates material added in place of ellipses, and magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis sign has been filled in.}

པའི་དོན་དུ་མི་རུང་བས་ཡུལ་ཅན་བརྒྱན་པ་འཇོན་པའི་ཐ་
སྐྱད་པའི་ཤེས་པས་རྗེད་པ་ཡིན་པས་དེ་དག་ཀྱང་མ་རིག་
པས་བསྐྱད་པའི་འཇུག་པ་ཡིན་ལོ། །

Therefore, the object found by nonmistaken [consciousness] does not appear to mistaken consciousness, and the false objects appearing to mistaken consciousness are not found by nonmistaken consciousness because the two—conventional erroneous mistaken consciousness and nonerroneous nonmistaken consciousness—are different in terms of engaging objects from the viewpoint that their respective objects are mutually exclusive. This is the meaning of [Chandrakīrti's] saying, “The erroneous and the nonerroneous are different.”

དེས་ན་མ་འཇུག་བས་རྗེད་པའི་དོན་འཇུག་ཤེས་ལ་མི་སྐྱང་
ལ། འཇུག་ཤེས་ལ་སྐྱང་བའི་དོན་མ་འཇུག་བའི་ཤེས་པས་
རྗེད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་འཇུག་ཤེས་དང་ཕྱིན་ཅི་མ་
ལོག་པ་མ་འཇུག་བའི་ཤེས་པ་གཉིས་རང་རང་གི་ཡུལ་ཕན་
ཚུན་སྤངས་པའི་སྐོ་ནས་ཡུལ་ལ་འཇུག་པའི་ཐ་དད་པ་ཡིན་
པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། ། ཞེས་པ་ནི་ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་དང་ཕྱིན་ཅི་མ་ལོག་པ་
དག་ནི་ཐ་དད་པ་ཉིད་དོ་ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་དོན་ལོ། །

...For the two—a Proponent of Naturelessness for whom a nature established by way of its own entity does not exist and a Proponent of [Truly Established] Things—when a form sense-field is posited as a subject, a direct perception and so forth that is nonmistaken is not established in compatible appearance, whereby a valid cognition that is a means of establishing a compatibly appearing subject in the systems of both does not exist, and hence a flawless position that is to be proven for the other party by means of an autonomous reason is not positable. That is the meaning.

རང་གི་ངོ་བོས་གྲུབ་པའི་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པར་སྐྱབ་དང་
དངོས་པོར་སྐྱབ་པ་གཉིས་ལ་གཟུགས་ཀྱི་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་ཚོས་ཅན་དུ་

བཞག་པའི་ཚེ་མ་འབྲུལ་པའི་མངོན་སུམ་མཐུན་སྣང་དུ་མ་
 གྲུབ་པས། གཉིས་ཀའི་ལྷགས་ལ་མཐུན་སྣང་དུ་གྲུབ་པའི་ཚོས་
 ཅན་སྐྱབ་བྱེད་ཀྱི་ཚད་མ་མེད་པས་རང་རྒྱུད་ཏུགས་ཀྱིས་བྱི་
 སྐོལ་ལ་བསྐྱབ་པར་བྱ་བའི་ཕྱོགས་སྐྱོན་མེད་བཞག་དུ་མེད་
 ཅེས་པའི་དོན་ནོ། །

In his exposition, Zha-mar Ge-dün-tan-dzin-gya-tsho says in his *Lamp Illuminating the Profound Thought*:^a (the phrases from Tsong-kha-pa’s text that Zha-mar reflects in his commentary are in orange type)

According to what is literally said in this text [Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight, I] think it is easily understandable if explained [this way]: On the occasion when stating a syllogism proving things as not produced from self, “not ultimately produced” is accepted [by Bhāvaviveka] as the predicate of the proposition; therefore, this Bhāvaviveka indeed has asserted subjects such as forms and so forth as not ultimately established. Since forms and so forth that are not ultimately established and also are not the meaning of suchness [that is, are not suchness] must be objects found by conventional consciousnesses apprehending falsities, it follows that the subjects, forms and so forth, are not objects found by nonmistaken consciousnesses because of being objects found by mistaken consciousnesses. [Whatever are objects found by mistaken consciousnesses] necessarily are not [objects found by nonmistaken consciousnesses] because the two, objects found by mistaken consciousnesses and objects found by nonmistaken consciousnesses, are directly contradictory.

གཞུང་འདིའི་གསུང་ཟིན་ལྟར་ན་གང་གི་ཚེ་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་
 བདག་ལས་མི་སྐྱེ་བར་བསྐྱབ་པའི་སྐྱོར་བ་འགོད་པའི་སྐབས་
 ལུ་དོན་དམ་པར་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་བསྐྱབ་བྱ་ཚོས་སུ་འདོད་པས་
 ར། ཚོས་ ཅན་གཟུགས་སོགས་དོན་དམ་པར་མ་གྲུབ་པར་

^a Zha-mar Ge-dün-tan-dzin-gya-tsho’s *Lamp Illuminating the Profound Thought*, 88a.5-88b.4.

{KEY: In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight indicates material added in place of ellipses, and magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis sign has been filled in.}

ལེགས་ལྷན་འདིས་ལས་སྒངས་པ་ཉིད་དོ། ། འོན་པར་མ་
 གྲུབ་ཅིང་དེ་ལོ་ན་ཉིད་ཀྱི་དོན་ཡང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་གཟུགས་ལ་
 སོགས་པ་རྣམས་རྒྱན་པ་འཛིན་པའི་ཐ་སྙད་པའི་ཤེས་པས་
 རྟོག་དོན་ཡིན་དགོས་པས་ན། གཟུགས་སོགས་ཚོས་ཅན། མ་
 འཇུག་པའི་ཤེས་པའི་རྟོག་དོན་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། འཇུག་པའི་
 ཤེས་པའི་རྟོག་དོན་མ་ཡིན་པའི་སྤྱིར། [འཇུག་པའི་ཤེས་པའི་རྟོག་
 དོན་མ་ཡིན་ན་མ་འཇུག་པའི་ཤེས་པའི་རྟོག་དོན་མ་ཡིན་པས་]ལྷུབ་ཏུ།
 འཇུག་པའི་ཤེས་པའི་རྟོག་དང་། མ་འཇུག་པའི་ཤེས་
 པའི་རྟོག་དོན་གཉིས་དངོས་འགལ་བ་ཡིན་པའི་སྤྱིར།

If the root [consequence that forms and so forth are not objects found by nonmistaken consciousness] is accepted, compatibly appearing subjects would not be established because in the system of the opponent, a Proponent of [Truly Established] Things, if subjects such as forms and so forth are not established as objects found by valid cognitions nonmistaken relative to the appearance of own-character,^a there is no way to posit them as existing, but in the system of the challenger, the Proponent of the Middle, forms and so forth are accepted as objects found by valid cognitions mistaken with respect to own-character [that is, the appearance of establishment by way of the object's own character].

[གཟུགས་སོགས་མ་འཇུག་པའི་ཤེས་པའི་རྟོག་དོན་མ་ཡིན་པ་]ཙུ་བར་
 འདོད་ན། ཚོས་ཅན་མཐུན་སྒྲུབ་བ་མ་གྲུབ་པར་འགྱུར་ཏེ། སྤྱི་
 སྤོལ་དངོས་སྤྱོད་པའི་ལུགས་ལ་ཚོས་ཅན་གཟུགས་སོགས་རང་
 མཚན་སྒྲུབ་བ་ལ་ལྟོས་ཏེ་མ་འཇུག་པའི་ཚད་མའི་རྟོག་དོན་
 དུ་མ་གྲུབ་ན་ཡོད་པར་འཛོག་ཚུལ་མེད་ལ། སྤྱི་སྤོལ་དབུ་མ་
 པའི་ལུགས་ལ་གཟུགས་སོགས་རང་མཚན་ལ་འཇུག་པའི་ཚད་

^a That is, establishment of phenomena by way of their own character.

མའི་རྗེད་དོན་དུ་འདོད་པའི་སྤྱིར་ཞེས་བཤད་ན་གོ་བདེའམ་
སྟམ།

Zha-mar Ge-dün-tan-dzin-gya-tsho replaces “in suchness” in Tsong-kha-pa’s statement in the Great Exposition of Special Insight with “ultimately” and replaces “degenerated from [being] in suchness, that is to say, are not established in suchness,” with “not ultimately established” and replaces “Those forms, which are not established in suchness and also are not suchness” with “not ultimately established and also are not the meaning of suchness.” He thereby clarifies Tsong-kha-pa’s meaning of “in suchness”; Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho adds that Zha-mar, by keeping “in suchness” or its equivalent “ultimately” does not change the word order.

However, for Tsong-kha-pa’s *The Essence of Eloquence*, Zha-mar (undoubtedly because “in suchness” is in the version of the Tibetan translation of Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words* that he was using) includes “in suchness” even though Tsong-kha-pa does not mention it in *The Essence of Eloquence* on this passage, and decides that “in suchness” must be moved earlier. However, he first presents his readers with his commentary on this section without “in suchness” :^a

According to Tsong-kha-pa’s *The Essence of Eloquence*, the meaning of that passage in Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words* is: Bhāvaviveka and so forth describe compatibly appearing subjects as existing; therefore, they themselves have asserted those subjects as not being found by mere erroneous [consciousnesses], whereby it follows that it is not suitable to posit eyes and so forth, for which the specifics of truth and falsity have been discarded, as subjects because (1) eyes and so forth are objects found (*rnyed don*) by valid cognitions unmistaken with respect to the nature (*rang bzhin*) and (2) objects found by mistaken valid cognitions must not be among objects found by unmistaken valid cognitions. [Bhāvaviveka and so forth] have asserted the first sign.

ལེགས་བཤད་སྟེང་པོ་སྟར་ན་ཚོག་གསལ་གྱི་ལུང་དེའི་དོན་ནི།
ལེགས་ལྟན་སོགས་ཀྱིས་ཚོས་ཅན་མཐུན་སྣང་བ་ཡོད་པར་
བཤད་པས། ཚོས་ཅན་དེ་སྤྱིར་ཅི་ལོག་ཅམ་གྱིས་རྗེད་པ་མེན་

^a Zha-mar Ge-dün-tan-dzin-gya-tsho’s *Lamp Illuminating the Profound Thought*, 88b.5-99a.3.

{KEY: In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight indicates material added in place of ellipses, and magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis sign has been filled in.}

བར་རང་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ཁས་སྒྲུབ་པ་དེས་ན། བདེན་རྒྱུན་གྱི་ལྷན་
 བར་དོར་བའི་མིག་སོགས་ཚོས་ཅན་དུ་བཞག་མི་རུང་བར་
 ཐལ། མིག་སོགས་རང་བཞིན་ལ་མ་འཇུག་བའི་ཚད་མའི་རྗེད་
 དོན་གང་ཞིག ། མ་འཇུག་བའི་ཚད་མའི་རྗེད་དོན་ལ་འཇུག་
 བའི་ཚད་མའི་རྗེད་དོན་མ་ཡིན་དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར། རྟགས་དང་
 བོ་ཁས་

With respect to how the second [sign] is proven, it is in accordance with the statement in this very text [Tsong-kha-pa's *The Essence of Eloquence*]:

[(Chandrakīrti) refutes (Bhāvaviveka) upon demonstrating that Bhāvaviveka himself has asserted that] the entities of the subjects, eyes and so forth, are not found by the merely erroneous^a and that the reasoning that the erroneous and non-erroneous are different—a direct dichotomy—and so forth. The meaning of those is: As the subjects in the proof that eyes and so forth are not produced from self, it is not suitable to posit mere eyes and so forth for which the specifics of the two truths have been discarded, because [according to Bhāvaviveka] (1) a valid cognition comprehending these subjects is a consciousness unmistaken with respect to the nature of eyes and so forth, but (2) states (*gnas skabs*) of—that is, objects found (*rnyed pa'i yul*) by—nonerroneous consciousnesses unmistaken with respect to the nature do not exist among false appearances, erroneous objects of knowledge appearing to exist by way of their own character whereas they do not.

^a Zha-mar cites the remainder of the quote with “and so forth” which I have filled in because it is crucial to his point. From Hopkins, *Tsong-kha-pa's Revised Presentation of Compatibly Appearing Subjects in The Essence of Eloquence with Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho's Commentary*, 7 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version April 2020: uma-ti-bet.org), 65-67.

གཉིས་པ་སྐྱེན་ཅི་ལོག་མ་ལོག་དངོས་འགལ་གྱིས་འགྲུབ་ཅེས་
 རྒྱུ་པ་པའི་ཚུལ། དེ་ཉིད་ལས། མིག་སོགས་ཀྱི་ཚོས་ཅན་གྱི་རང་
 ལོ་ངོ་བོ་དེ་སྐྱེན་ཅི་ལོག་ཅམ་གྱིས་རྗེད་པ་མིན་པར་[ལེགས་
 རྒྱན་རང་ཉིད་གྱིས་ཁས་ལྗངས་ལ། སྐྱེན་ཅི་ལོག་མ་ལོག་ཐ་དང་པ་སྐྱེ་
 དངོས་འགལ་ཡིན་པ་ལ་སོགས་པའི་རིགས་པ་བརྟམ་ནས་བཀག་གོ། དེ་
 དག་གི་དོན་ནི་མིག་སོགས་བདག་ལས་མི་སྐྱེ་བར་རྒྱབ་པའི་ཚོས་ཅན་དུ་
 བདེན་གཉིས་ཀྱི་ཁྱད་པར་དོར་བའི་མིག་སོགས་ཅམ་གཞག་ཏུ་མི་རུང་སྟེ།
 ཚོས་ཅན་དེ་འཇལ་བའི་ཚད་མ་ནི་མིག་སོགས་ཀྱི་རང་བཞིན་ལ་མ་འཇུག་
 བའི་ཤེས་པ་ཡིན་^[87a]ལ་ཤེས་པ་སྐྱེན་ཅི་མ་ལོག་པ་རང་བཞིན་ལ་མ་
 འཇུག་བའི་གནས་སྐབས་ཏེ། དེས་རྗེད་པའི་ཡུལ་ནི་ཤེས་བྱ་སྐྱེན་ཅི་ལོག་
 རང་མཚན་གྱིས་མེད་བཞིན་དུ་དེར་སྣང་བའི་རྩྱུན་སྣང་མེད་པའི་སྐྱིར་
 རོ།

With respect to how [Bhāvaviveka] has asserted the former reason [which is that (according to Bhāvaviveka) the valid cognitions comprehending those subjects are consciousnesses unmitaken with respect to the nature of eyes and so forth]:

- In a system accepting that whatever exists exists by way of its own entity, if [a consciousness] has come to be mistaken relative to the appearance of own-character [that is, the object’s being established by way of its own character], it cannot be posited as finding [that is, realizing] its object of comprehension. Therefore, whether a conceptual or non-conceptual valid cognition, it must be unmitaken with respect to the own-character [that is, the establishment by way of its own character] of that with respect to which it is a valid cognition—the appearing object or the conceived object. In that case, [the consciousness] must go as a valid cognition with respect to the entity (*ngo bo*), or nature (*rang bzhin*), of the mode of subsistence of the object itself, this not just being nominally imputed in

{KEY: In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight indicates material added in place of ellipses, and magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis sign has been filled in.}

conventional terms, and [Bhāvaviveka] himself also asserts this.

རྟགས་ལྟ་མ་དེ་ཁས་སྒྲངས་པའི་ཚུལ་ནི། ཡོད་པ་གང་ཡིན་རང་གི་ངོ་བོས་
ཡོད་པར་འདོད་པའི་ལྷགས་ལ་རང་མཚན་སྣང་བ་ལ་ལྟོས་ཏེ་འབྲུལ་བར་
སོང་ན་དེས་རང་གི་གཞལ་བྱ་རྗེད་པར་འཇོག་མི་རུས་པས། རྟོག་པ་དང་
རྟོག་མེད་གྱི་ཚད་མ་གང་ཡིན་ཀྱང་ཚད་མར་སོང་ས་སྣང་ཡུལ་དང་ཞེན་
ཡུལ་རང་མཚན་ལ་མ་འབྲུལ་བ་ཅིག་དགོས་སོ། ། དེའི་ཚེ་ཐ་སྐྱད་དུ་མིང་
དུ་བརྟགས་པ་ཅམ་མིན་པའི་དོན་རང་གི་གནས་ཚུལ་གྱི་ངོ་བོ་འཇམ་རང་
བཞིན་ཅིག་ལ་ཚད་མར་འགོ་དགོས་ཤིང་རང་གིས་ཁས་ལེན་པ་ཡང་ཡིན་
ནོ། །

- It is contradictory for whatever is an object found by such a valid cognition to be an erroneous object of knowledge, whereby the latter sign [which is that states of—that is, objects found by—nonerroneous consciousnesses unmitaken with respect to the nature do not exist among false appearances, erroneous objects of knowledge appearing to exist by way of their own character whereas they do not] is established. Likewise, it is also contradictory for whatever is an object found by a mistaken consciousness to be an erroneous object of knowledge.

དེ་འདྲ་བའི་ཚད་མས་རྗེད་པའི་དོན་ཡིན་ན་ཤེས་བྱ་ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་ཡིན་
པར་འགལ་བས་རྟགས་ཕྱི་མ་འབྲུབ་བོ། ། དེ་བཞིན་དུ་ཤེས་པ་འབྲུལ་བས་
རྗེད་པའི་དོན་ཡིན་ན་ཡང་ཤེས་བྱ་ཕྱིན་ཅི་མ་ལོག་པ་ཡིན་པ་འགལ་
ལོ། །] ཞེས་སོགས་གསུངས་སྟུང་རོ།

Accordingly, except for connecting earlier [the term] “in suchness” [occurring] in Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words*:

When—or at the time of—accepting here a negation in **suchness** (*de kho nar*) [that is, ultimately] of production as the predicate of the proposition, **compatibly appearing subjects are asserted as existing; therefore,**

[Tsong-kha-pa in *The Essence of Eloquence*] does not state “ac-

cepting a negation of production” as the predicate of the proposition as evidence for [Bhāvaviveka and so forth] having asserted thus [that they have asserted eyes and so forth as not found by mere erroneous consciousnesses].

འདི་ལྟར་ན་ཚིག་གསལ་ལས་དེ་ལོ་ནར་ཞེས་པ་གོང་དུ་སྐྱར་
ནས་གང་གི་ཚེ་འདྲིར་དེ་ལོ་ནར་སྐྱེ་བ་བཀག་པ་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་
ཚོས་སུ་འདོད་པ་དེའི་ཚེ་འམ་དུས་སུ་ཚོས་ཅན་མཐུན་སྣང་བ་
ཁས་ལེན་པས་ཞེས་གོང་ལྟར་སྐྱོར་བ་མ་གཏོགས། སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་
པ་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཚོས་སུ་འདོད་པ་དེ་དེ་ལྟར་ཁས་སྐྱངས་པའི་རྒྱ་
མཚན་དུ་བཀོད་པ་མིན།

Zha-mar Ge-dün-tan-dzin-gya-tsho first documents how Tsong-kha-pa uses “in suchness” (*de kho nar*) three times in the Great Exposition of Special Insight, and then in *The Essence of Eloquence* in accordance with Tsong-kha-pa’s neither using the term “in suchness” (*de kho nar*) nor anything like it in his reworking of Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words* at this point, Zha-mar decides that “in suchness” (*de kho nar*) requires the insertion of a clause—“compatibly appearing subjects are asserted as existing”—so as not to connect his own insertion of “in suchness” with what follows. Thus, Zha-mar begins his own commentary:

Bhāvaviveka and so forth describe compatibly appearing subjects as existing; therefore,

ལེགས་ལྡན་སོགས་ཀྱིས་ཚོས་ཅན་མཐུན་སྣང་བ་ཡོད་པར་
བཤད་པས།

and leaves out:

When accepting here **in suchness** (*de kho nar*) a negation of production as the predicate of the proposition,

གང་གི་ཚེ་འདྲིར་དེ་ལོ་ནར་སྐྱེ་བ་བཀག་པ་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཚོས་
སུ་འདོད་པ་དེའི་ཚེ

Now, here he inserts the following at the beginning of his commentary:

{KEY: In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight indicates material added in place of ellipses, and magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis sign has been filled in.}

Accordingly, except for connecting earlier [the term] “in suchness” [occurring] in Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words*:

When—or at the time of—accepting here **in suchness** (*de kho nar*) a negation of production as the predicate of the proposition, **compatibly appearing subjects are asserted as existing; therefore,**

[Tsong-kha-pa in *The Essence of Eloquence*] does not state “accepting a negation of production” as the predicate of the proposition as evidence for [Bhāvaviveka and so forth] having asserted thus [that they have asserted eyes and so forth as not found by mere erroneous consciousnesses].

འདི་ལྟར་ན་ཚིག་གསལ་ལས་དེ་ལོ་ནར་ཞེས་པ་གོང་དུ་སྐྱར་
 རས་གང་གི་ཚེ་འདྲིར་དེ་ལོ་ནར་སྐྱེ་བ་བཀག་པ་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་
 ཚོས་སུ་འདོད་པ་དེའི་ཚེ་འམ་དུས་སུ་ཚོས་ཅན་མཐུན་སྣང་བ་
 ཁས་ལེན་པས་ཞེས་གོང་ལྟར་སྐྱོར་བ་མ་གཏོགས། སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་
 པ་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཚོས་སུ་འདོད་པ་དེ་དེ་ལྟར་ཁས་ལྷངས་པའི་རྒྱ་
 མཚན་དུ་བཀོད་པ་མིན།

The result is that the beginning lines of Zha-mar’s commentary on Tsong-kha-pa’s *The Essence of Eloquence* which Zha-mar himself wrote as:

According to Tsong-kha-pa’s *The Essence of Eloquence*, the meaning of that passage in Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words* is: Bhāvaviveka and so forth describe compatibly appearing subjects as existing; therefore, they themselves have asserted those subjects as not being found by mere erroneous [consciousnesses], whereby it follows that it is not suitable to posit eyes and so forth, for which the specifics of truth and falsity have been discarded, as subjects because (1) eyes and so forth are objects found (*rnyed don*) by valid cognitions unmistaken with respect to the nature (*rang bzhin*) and (2) objects found by mistaken valid cognitions must not be among objects found by unmistaken valid cognitions.

ལེགས་བཤད་སྟིང་པོ་ལྟར་ན་ཚིག་གསལ་གྱི་ལྷང་དེའི་དོན་ནི།
 ལེགས་ལྟན་སོགས་ཀྱིས་ཚོས་ཅན་མཐུན་སྣང་བ་ཡོད་པར་

བཤད་པས། ཚེས་ཅན་དེ་ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་ཅམ་གྱིས་རྗེད་པ་མིན་
 པར་རང་ཉིད་གྱིས་ཁས་སྒྲངས་པ་དེས་ན། བདེན་རྒྱུན་གྱི་ཁྱད་
 པར་དོར་བའི་མིག་སོགས་ཚེས་ཅན་དུ་བཞག་མི་རུང་བར་
 ཐལ། མིག་སོགས་རང་བཞིན་ལ་མ་འཇུག་པའི་ཚད་མའི་རྗེད་
 དོན་གང་ཞིག ། མ་འཇུག་པའི་ཚད་མའི་རྗེད་དོན་ལ་འཇུག་
 བའི་ཚད་མའི་རྗེད་དོན་མ་ཡིན་དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

he now shows how to add “in suchness” to that passage (almost as if he would just as soon not do so, which indeed he himself did not do perhaps because it becomes so difficult to read):

According to Tsong-kha-pa’s *The Essence of Eloquence*, the meaning of that passage in Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words* is: **When—or at the time of—accepting here a negation in suchness (*de kho nar*) [that is, ultimately] of production as the predicate of the proposition, compatibly appearing subjects are asserted as existing; therefore, [Bhāvaviveka and so forth] themselves have asserted those subjects as not being found by mere erroneous [consciousnesses], whereby it follows that it is not suitable to posit eyes and so forth, for which the specifics of truth and falsity have been discarded, as subjects because (1) eyes and so forth are objects found (*rnyed don*) by valid cognitions unmistaken with respect to the nature (*rang bzhin*) and (2) objects found by mistaken valid cognitions must not be among objects found by unmistaken valid cognitions.**

ལེགས་བཤད་སྒྲིང་པོ་ལྟར་ན་ཚོག་གསལ་གྱི་ལྷང་དེའི་དོན་ནི།
 གང་གི་ཚེ་འདྲིར་དེ་ཁོ་ནར་སྐྱེ་བ་བཀག་པ་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཚེས་
 ལུ་འདོད་པ་དེའི་ཚེ་འམ་དུས་སུ་ཚེས་ཅན་མཐུན་སྒྲུང་བ་ཁས་
 ལེན་པས་[ལེགས་ལྡན་སོགས་]རང་ཉིད་གྱིས་ཚེས་ཅན་མཐུན་
 སྒྲུང་བ་ཡོད་པར་བཤད་པས། ཚེས་ཅན་དེ་ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་ཅམ་
 གྱིས་རྗེད་པ་མིན་པར་རང་ཉིད་གྱིས་ཁས་སྒྲངས་པ་དེས་ན།

{KEY: In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight indicates material added in place of ellipses, and magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis sign has been filled in.}

བདེན་རྒྱུན་གྱི་བྱུང་བར་དོར་བའི་མིག་སོགས་ཚོས་ཅན་དུ་
 བཞག་མི་བྱུང་བར་ཐལ། མིག་སོགས་རང་བཞིན་ལ་མ་འཇུག་པ་
 བའི་ཚད་མའི་རྗེད་དོན་གང་ཞིག ། མ་འཇུག་པ་བའི་ཚད་མའི་
 རྗེད་དོན་ལ་འཇུག་པ་བའི་ཚད་མའི་རྗེད་དོན་མ་ཡིན་དགོས་
 བའི་ཕྱིར།

Zha-mar immediately points out that the “when clause” modifies the second clause (“compatibly appearing subjects are asserted as existing”), and not the third clause (“therefore” and so forth):

[Tsong-kha-pa in *The Essence of Eloquence*] does not state “accepting a negation of production” as the predicate of the proposition as evidence for [Bhāvaviveka and so forth] having asserted thus [that they have asserted eyes and so forth as not found by mere erroneous consciousnesses].

This is why Zha-mar has inserted this clause (“compatibly appearing subjects are asserted as existing”) between the other two.

Jam-yang-shay-pa in his commentary on this passage in Tsong-kha-pa’s *The Essence of Eloquence* similarly inserts “in suchness” at the beginning together with Bhāvaviveka’s assertion of compatibly appearing subjects and so forth, with “suchness” identified as “the ultimate (*don dam*) that is the perspective of a rational consciousness (*rigs shes kyi ngo*)”:^a

It follows that the assertion by you Bhāvaviveka that on the occasion of proving—for the ultimate (*don dam*) that is the perspective of a rational consciousness (*rigs shes kyi ngo*)—that eyes, forms, and so forth are not produced from self there are mere generalities, or compatible appearances, devoid of qualification by the two truths is not logically feasible[.]

^a From Hopkins, *Chandrakīrti Undermines Bhāvaviveka’s Assertion of Autonomy: Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Compatibly Appearing Subjects*, 3 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version August, 2018: uma-tibet.org), 55. The gloss of “suchness” as “the ultimate (*don dam*) that is the perspective of a rational consciousness is similar to Gen-dün-gya-tsho’s gloss of “suchness” in this context for Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight.

It is likely that Zha-mar's reading is based on Jam-yang-shay-pa's exposition.

PART FIVE:
Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho's
Explanations of the
Critical Passage
in the *Clear Words* according to
Tsong-kha-pa's Two Readings

JIG-ME-DAM-CHÖ-GYA-TSHO’S RENDITION ACCORDING TO TSONG-KHA-PA’S GREAT EXPOSITION OF SPECIAL INSIGHT IN THE *GREAT EXPOSITION OF THE STAGES OF THE PATH*

Let us consider in detail how Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho^a fleshes out Tsong-kha-pa’s citation—in the Great Exposition of Special Insight—of Chandrakīrti’s brief criticism in his *Clear Words* of Bhāvaviveka’s syllogism stated above:^b (Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s augmentations are in orange type)

At this time—that is, because—here on this occasion of proving that production from self does not exist, the negation of production ultimately—the nonexistence of production—is accepted as the predicate of the proposition, this Bhāvaviveka himself has indeed explicitly asserted the degeneration in suchness, that is, the nonestablishment ultimately, of the entities of the subjects eyes and so forth—subjects that are the substrata of that syllogism refuting production from self—which gain their entities, entities of eyes and so forth through the mere erroneous, that is, consciousness polluted by ignorance.

གང་གི་ཚེ་བདག་སྐྱེ་མེད་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་སྐབས་འདིར་དོན་
དམ་པར་སྐྱེ་བ་བཀག་པ་སྟེ་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་བསྐྱབ་པར་བྱ་བའི་
ཚེས་སུ་འདོད་པའི་དེའི་ཚེ་སྟེ་དེའི་ཕྱིར་ན་བདག་སྐྱེ་འགོག་
པའི་སྐྱོར་བ་དེའི་རྟེན་ཚེས་ཅན་མིག་སོགས་ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་སྟེ་
མ་རིག་པས་བསྐྱད་པའི་ཤེས་པ་ཅམ་གྱིས་བདག་གི་ངོ་བོ་སྟེ་

^a Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s *Port of Entry*, 570.2.
^b Hopkins, *Tsong-kha-pa’s Revised Presentation of Compatibly Appearing Subjects in The Essence of Eloquence with Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s Commentary*, 7 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version April 2020: uma-tibet.org), 108-109.
^c Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho (*Port of Entry*, 570.3) substitutes *ngo bo* for *dngos po*.

མིག་སྐྱོད་འོ་བོ་རྒྱུ་པ་ནི་དེ་ལོ་ནར་^aཉི་དོན་དམ་པར་
 ཉམས་པར་ཉི་མ་གྲུབ་པར་འགྱུར་བར་ལེགས་ལྷན་འདིས་
 རང་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་དངོས་སུ་ཁས་སྐྱབས་པ་ཉིད་དོ།།

Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho concludes:

In brief, the meaning is: “When [Bhāvaviveka] refutes production from self, he accepts the nonexistence of production ultimately as the predicate of the proposition, whereby he has asserted eyes and so forth as not ultimately existent.”

མདོར་ན་བདག་སྐྱེ་འགོག་པ་ན་དོན་དམ་པར་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་བསྐྱབས་
 བྱི་ཚོས་སུ་འདོད་པས་ན་མིག་སྐྱོད་འོ་བོ་^[206a]དམ་པར་མེད་
 པར་ལེགས་ལྷན་ཀྱིས་ཁས་སྐྱབས་ཞེས་པའི་དོན།

Below is a list of Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho's augmentations in chart form in the order of the English translation:

^a Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho (*Port of Entry*, 570.3) moves *de kho nar* from *'dod pa de'i tshe de kho nar* to *rnyed pa ni de kho nar* to clarify its syntactical place in the sentence. Although I published an article, “A Tibetan Delineation of Different Views of Emptiness in the Indian Middle Way School: Dzong-ka-ba's Two Interpretations of the *Locus Classicus* in Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* Showing Bhāvaviveka's Assertion of Commonly Appearing Subjects and Inherent Existence,” *Tibet Journal* 14, no. 1 (1989): 10-43, in which I demonstrate that *de kho nar* is a misreading for *kho nar*, based on a corrupt edition that is absent in the surviving Sanskrit, I had no chance to read over the proofs, riddled with printing errors, before publication. This issue is addressed in further detail below.

Chandrakīrti's Clear Words	Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho's Augmentation
At this time (<i>de'i tshe</i>)	At this time—that is, because— (<i>de'i tshe ste de'i phyir na</i>)
here (<i>'dir</i>)	on this occasion of proving that production from self does not exist (<i>bdag skye med par sgrub pa'i skabs 'dir</i>)
the negation of production (<i>skye ba bkag pa</i>)	the negation of production ultimately—the nonexistence of production— (<i>don dam par skye ba bkag pa ste skye ba med pa</i>)
this one himself (<i>'dis rang nyid kyis</i>)	this Bhāvaviveka himself (<i>legs ldan 'dis rang nyid kyis</i>)
has indeed asserted (<i>khas blangs pa nyid</i>)	has indeed explicitly asserted (<i>ngos su khas blangs pa nyid</i>)
the degeneration in suchness (<i>de kho nar nyam par 'gyur pa</i>)	the degeneration in suchness, that is, the non-establishment ultimately, (<i>de kho nar te don dam par nyam par te ma grub par 'gyur pa</i>)
the subjects (<i>chos can</i>)	the subjects eyes and so forth (<i>chos can mig sogs</i>)
the substrata of that (<i>de'i rten chos can</i>)	the substrata of that syllogism refuting production from self (<i>bdag skye 'gog pa'i sbyor ba de'i bsgrub bya'i chos kyi rten chos can</i>)
gain their entities (<i>bdag gi ngos po rnyed pa</i>)	gain their entities, entities of eyes and so forth, (<i>bdag gi ngo bo mig sogs de'i ngo bo rnyed pa</i>)
the erroneous (<i>phyin ci log</i>)	the erroneous, that is, consciousness polluted by ignorance (<i>phyin ci log ste ma rig pas bslad pa'i shes pa</i>)

Sources for Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho's augmentations of Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* are mostly found in Tsong-kha-pa's own explanation in the Great Exposition of Special Insight:

Chandrakīrti's Clear Words	Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho's Augmentation
At this time (<i>de'i tshe</i>)	because (<i>de'i tshe ste de'i phyir na</i>)

and

a negation of production (<i>skye ba bkag pa</i>)	the negation of production ultimately—the nonexistence of production— (<i>don dam par skye ba bkag pa ste skye ba med pa</i>)
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Tsong-kha-pa's Great Exposition of Special Insight:^a

^a What is a Consequentialist? Tsong-kha-pa's Great Exposition of Special Insight with

Concerning [his] mode of assertion: When—that is, **because**—this **negation ultimately of production** depends as a predicate of the proposition upon subjects, then if [those] are established in suchness, it is contradictory for that to depend on them.

ཁས་སྒྲངས་ལུགས་ནི་དོན་དམ་པར་སྐྱེ་བ་བཀག་པ་དེ་ཚོས་
ཅན་དེ་དག་ལ་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཚོས་སུ་བརྟེན་པ་དེའི་ཚེ་སྟེ། དེའི་
སྤྱིར་ཏེ་དེ་ལོ་ནར་གྱུ་བ་ན་དེ་བརྟེན་པ་འགལ་བའི་སྤྱིར་རོ། །

this one himself (<i>'dis rang nyid kyis</i>)	this Bhāvaviveka himself (<i>legs ldan 'dis rang nyid kyis</i>)
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and

the subjects (<i>chos can</i>)	the subjects eyes and so forth (<i>chos can mig sogs</i>)
----------------------------------	--

and

gain their entities (<i>bdag gi dngos po rnyed pa</i>)	gain their entities, entities of eyes and so forth , (<i>bdag gi ngo bo mig sogs de'i ngo bo rnyed pa</i>)
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Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight:^a

The meaning...is that **Bhāvaviveka** himself has asserted that **eyes** or forms **and so forth**—which are the subjects that are the substrata of the predicate of the proposition—have degenerated from [establishment] in suchness, that is to say, are not established in suchness.

དོན་ནི་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཚོས་ཀྱི་རྟེན་ཚོས་ཅན་མིག་གམ་གཟུགས་
ལ་སོགས་པ་ནི་དེ་ལོ་ནར་ཉམས་པར་གྱུར་པ་སྟེ་མ་གྱུ་བ་པར་
ལེགས་ལྡན་འབྱེད་འདིས་རང་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ཁས་སྒྲངས་པ་ཡིན་
ལོ། །

the Four Interwoven Annotations: Compatibly Appearing Subjects, 5 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version August 2018, uma-tibet.org), 64 and 136.

^a Ibid., 63 and 135.

the erroneous (<i>phyin ci log</i>)	the erroneous, that is, consciousness polluted by ignorance (<i>phyin ci log ste ma rig pas bsblad pa'i shes pa</i>)
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Tsong-kha-pa's Great Exposition of Special Insight:^a

What sort of subjects are these? They are those that gain their own thingness by mere erroneous consciousnesses **polluted by ignorance**—objects established by mere conventional consciousnesses such as eye consciousnesses and so forth.

ཚོས་ཅན་ཇི་འདྲ་བ་སྣམ་ན་མ་རིག་པས་བསྐྱད་པའི་ཕྱིན་ཅི་
ལོག་ཅོམ་གྱིས་བདག་གི་དངོས་པོ་རྟེན་པ་སྟེ། མིག་གི་ཤེས་པ་
ལ་སོགས་པའི་ཐ་སྐྱད་པའི་ཤེས་པ་ཅོམ་གྱིས་གྲུབ་པའི་དོན་
ནོ། །

Exact sources for Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho's "has indeed **explicitly** asserted" (*angos su khas blangs pa nyid*) and "the substrata of that **syllogism refuting production from self**" (*bdag skye 'gog pa'i sbyor ba de'i rten chos can*) are not found in Tsong-kha-pa's own explanation in the Great Exposition of Special Insight, but Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho's "has indeed **explicitly** asserted" is perhaps a verbal extension of Chandrakīrti's "has **indeed** asserted" (*khas blangs pa nyid*), although Jam-yang-shay-pa (below, 125) in the context of explaining Tsong-kha-pa's *The Essence of Eloquence* does not hold that Bhāvaviveka explicitly asserts such. The phrase "the substrata of that **syllogism refuting production from self**" merely provides Tsong-kha-pa's own context.

JIG-ME-DAM-CHÖ-GYA-TSHO'S RENDITION ACCORDING TO TSONG-KHA-PA'S *THE ESSENCE OF ELOQUENCE*

Contrary to the rendition in Tsong-kha-pa's Great Exposition of Special Insight of this passage in Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words*, where Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho describes Bhāvaviveka as having asserted the subject of his syllogism *as not ultimately existing*, in describing the rendition of this pas-

^a Ibid., 63 and 135.

sage in Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* in Tsong-kha-pa's *The Essence of Eloquence* Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho says that Bhāvaviveka is forced by reasoning into asserting that the subject of his syllogism *ultimately exists*.

Even though Tsong-kha-pa here in *The Essence of Eloquence* does not cite Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words*, it is obvious that he is explaining this same passage; thus, as above, let us consider in detail how Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho^a fleshes out Tsong-kha-pa's different explanation—in *The Essence of Eloquence*—of Chandrakīrti's brief criticism in his *Clear Words* of Bhāvaviveka's syllogism:^b (Chandrakīrti's text is in black type; Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho's new augmentations are in green type; Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho's augmentations already made in the Great Exposition of Special Insight that he also adds to *The Essence of Eloquence* are in orange type)

At this time when here on this occasion of proving that production from self does not exist, the negation of production in suchness, that is, ultimately, is accepted as the predicate of the proposition, this Bhāvaviveka himself has indeed explicitly asserted that the entities of the subjects eyes and so forth—the substrata subjects which merely gain their entities, entities of eyes and so forth, through erroneous consciousness have degenerated, that is, are not logically feasible.

གང་གི་ཚེ་བདག་སྐྱེ་མེད་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་སྐབས་འདིར་དེ་ལོ་
 བར་ཉི་དོན་དམ་པར་སྐྱེ་བ་བཀག་པ་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཚམས་སུ་
 འདོད་པའི་དེའི་ཚེ་སྐྱེ་དུས་སུ་དེའི་ཉིན་ཚམས་ཅན་མིག་སོགས་
 ཤེས་པ་བྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་གིས་བདག་གི་ངོ་བོ་སྐྱེ་མིག་སོགས་དེའི་
 ངོ་བོ་རྐྱེད་པ་ཅམ་ཡིན་པ་ནི་ཉམས་པར་གྱུར་པ་སྐྱེ་མི་འཐད་
 པར་ལོགས་ལྡན་འདིས་རང་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་དངོས་སུ་ཁས་སྐྱབས་
 པ་ཉིད་དོ།།

Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho concludes:

^a Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho's *Port of Entry*, 570.7.

^b Hopkins, *Tsong-kha-pa's Revised Presentation of Compatibly Appearing Subjects in The Essence of Eloquence with Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho's Commentary*, 7 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version April 2020: uma-tibet.org), 111-114.

In brief, the meaning is: “When Bhāvaviveka refutes production from self, he asserts the nonexistence of production ultimately as the predicate of the proposition, and when this is the case, he has asserted eyes and so forth as objects of real [that is, right] object-possessors^a (*yul can yang dag gi yul*).

མདོར་ན་བདག་སྐྱེ་འཕོག་པ་ན་དོན་དམ་པར་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་བསྐྱབ་
བྱའི་ཚོས་སྐྱེ་འདོད་ལ་དེའི་ཚོ་མིག་སོགས་ཡུལ་ཅན་ཡང་དག་གི་
ཡུལ་དུ་ལེགས་ལྷན་གྱིས་ཁས་སྐྱབས་པའི་དོན་ནོ། །

Below is a list of Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho's augmentations in chart form in the order of the English translation:

Chandrakīrti's Clear Words	Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho's Augmentation
At this time (<i>de'i tshe</i>)	At this time when (<i>de'i tshe ste dus su</i>)
here (<i>'dir</i>)	on this occasion of proving that production from self does not exist (<i>bdag skye med par sgrub pa'i skabs 'dir</i>)
the negation of production (<i>skye ba bkag pa</i>)	the negation of production in suchness, that is, ultimately, (<i>de kho nar te don dam par skye ba bkag pa</i>)
this one himself (<i>'dis rang nyid kyis</i>)	this Bhāvaviveka himself (<i>legs ldan 'dis rang nyid kyis</i>)
has indeed asserted (<i>khas blangs pa nyid</i>)	has indeed explicitly asserted (<i>ngos su khas blangs pa nyid</i>)
the subjects (<i>chos can</i>)	the subjects eyes and so forth (<i>chos can mig sogs</i>)

^a Tibetan books on psychology and philosophy speak of three types of object-possessors (*yul can, viṣayin*):

1. sounds, or terms (*sgra, śabda*)
2. awarenesses (*blo, mati*)
3. persons (*gang zag, pudgala*).

Terms refer to objects and thus have, or possess, objects; awarenesses apprehend objects and thus have, or possess, objects; and persons have, or possess, objects. Of these three, the one relevant here is awareness, consciousness.

A complication in English is that within subject-object this is subject, consciousness, but within the subject-predicate of a syllogism, an object-possessor in general is not this type of subject (*chos can, dharmin*) as in our central topic “compatibly appearing subject” (*chos can mthun snang*).

the substrata subjects which gain their entities by the mere erroneous (<i>de'i rten chos can phyin ci log tsam gis bdag gi ngo bo rnyed pa</i>)	the substrata subjects which merely gain their entities [as] eyes and so forth by erroneous consciousness (<i>de'i rten chos can mig sogs shes pa phyin ci log gis bdag gi ngo bo ste mig sogs de'i ngo bo rnyed pa tsam yin pa</i>)
have degenerated. (<i>nyams par gyur</i>)	have degenerated, that is, are not logically feasible. (<i>nyams par gyur pa ste mi 'thad par</i>)

Since in *The Essence of Eloquence* Tsong-kha-pa explains but does not cite this crucial passage from Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* and does not seek to explain its meaning within direct association with Chandrakīrti's text, only approximate sources for Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho's additions to Chandrakīrti's passage are mostly found in Tsong-kha-pa's *The Essence of Eloquence*:

Chandrakīrti's Clear Words	Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho's expansion
At this time (<i>de'i tshe</i>)	At this time when (<i>de'i tshe ste dus su</i>)

I surmise that Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho's addition of "when" (*dus*) is an augmentation to Chandrakīrti's *gang gi tshe...de'i tshe (yadā...tadā)* to indicate that he has found no evidence in *The Essence of Eloquence* for reading this as "because" (*de'i phyr na*) as Tsong-kha-pa did in the Great Exposition of Special Insight.

here (<i>'dir</i>)	on this occasion of proving that production from self does not exist (<i>bdag skye med par sgrub pa'i skabs 'dir</i>)
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Tsong-kha-pa's *The Essence of Eloquence*.^a

As the subjects in **the proof that eyes and so forth are not produced from self,**

མིག་སྟོན་པ་བྱེད་པའི་མཉམ་པའི་རྒྱུ་བར་སྐྱབ་པའི་ཚུལ་ཅན་དུ་

a negation of production (<i>skye ba bkag pa</i>)	the negation of production in suchness, that is, ultimately, (<i>de kho nar te don dam par skye ba bkag pa</i>)
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^a From Hopkins, Hopkins, *Tsong-kha-pa's Revised Presentation of Compatibly Appearing Subjects in The Essence of Eloquence with Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho's Commentary*, 7 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version April 2020: uma-tibet.org), 65, 71, and 181.

Tsong-kha-pa's *The Essence of Eloquence*.^a

Thinking that such have come to be existent by way of their own entities and just that is the meaning of **ultimately existing**, whereby how could a mere subject in which that is held as the substratum occurs, Chandrakīrti refutes holding a generality devoid of specifics as the subject.

ཟླ་བས་དེ་འདྲ་བ་དེ་རང་གི་ངོ་བོས་ཡོད་པར་སོང་ལ་དེ་ཉིད་
 དོན་དམ་པར་ཡོད་པའི་དོན་ཡིན་པས་དེ་བྱུང་གཞིར་བཟུང་
 བའི་ཚེས་ཅན་ཅམ་པོ་ག་ལ་སྲིད་སྟམ་དུ་དགོངས་ནས་བྱུང་
 པར་དོར་བའི་སྲི་ཚེས་ཅན་དུ་འཛིན་པ་འགོག་གོ།

Tsong-kha-pa's *The Essence of Eloquence* does not use “in suchness” (*de kho nar*) anywhere in this section.

this one himself ('dis rang nyid kyis)	this Bhāvaviveka himself (<i>legs ldan 'dis rang nyid kyis</i>)
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Tsong-kha-pa's *The Essence of Eloquence*.^b

In response [Chandrakīrti]^c refutes [Bhāvaviveka] upon demonstrating the reasoning (1) that **Bhāvaviveka** himself has asserted

^a From Hopkins, *Tsong-kha-pa's Revised Presentation of Compatibly Appearing Subjects in The Essence of Eloquence with Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho's Commentary*, 7 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version April 2020: uma-tibet.org), 83 and 187.

^b From Hopkins, *Tsong-kha-pa's Revised Presentation of Compatibly Appearing Subjects in The Essence of Eloquence with Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho's Commentary*, 7 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version April 2020: uma-tibet.org), 65 and 181.

^c Tsong-kha-pa paraphrases Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words*:

That is not so. For, at just that time [of proving that eyes and so forth are without production] (*de'i tshe kho nar, tadaiva*) when it is the case that a negation of production is asserted here as the predicate of the proposition, this one [Bhāvaviveka] himself just asserts the degeneration [or nonestablishment] of the entities of the subjects [eyes and so forth]—the substrata of that [predicate, the absence of production from self]—which gain their thingness by way of mere erroneous [consciousnesses]. Erroneous and nonerroneous [objects] are different [mutually exclusive and a dichotomy].

དེ་ནི་དེ་ལྟར་ཡང་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། འདི་ལྟར་གང་གི་ཚེ་འདིར་སྐྱེ་བ་བཀག་པ་བསྐྱབ་པར་བྱ་
 བའི་ཚེས་སུ་འདོད་པའི་དེའི་ཚེ་ཁོ་ནར་དེའི་ཉེན་ཚེས་ཅན་ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་ཅམ་གྱིས་

བདག་གི་དངོས་པོ་རྗེས་པ་ཞི་ཉམས་པར་འགྱུར་བར་འདིས་རང་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ལས་སྒྲངས་
པ་ཉིད་དོ། ། ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་དང་ཕྱིན་ཅི་མ་ལོག་པ་དག་ནི་ཐ་དད་པ་ཡིན་ལོ། །

Therefore, when, like the falling hairs and so forth [apprehended] by one with eye disease and so on, what is nonexistent is apprehended by an erroneous [consciousness] as just existing, how then could even a portion of an object existent [by way of its own character] be observed! When, like the falling hairs and so forth [not apprehended] by one without eye disease, the unreal is not superimposed by a nonerroneous [consciousness], how then could even the merest portion of nonexistent objects, veils, be observed! Hence, the holy master [Nāgārjuna] also says [in the *Refutation of Objections*, Stanza 30; P5228, vol. 95, 15.1.2]:

If direct perception and so forth did observe some [inherently established] objects,
Then [it would be reasonable] to prove those or refute [those in others’ systems],
But since those do not exist,
There is no [chance for you] to censure me.

དེའི་ཕྱིར། གང་གི་ཚེ་རབ་རིབ་ཅན་གྱིས་སྐྱེ་ཤད་ལ་སོགས་པ་ལྟར་ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་གིས་
ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ཏུ་འཛིན་པ་དེའི་ཚེ་ནི་ཡོད་པར་གྱུར་པའི་དོན་ཚུལ་
ཡང་དམིགས་པར་ག་ལ་འགྱུར། གང་གི་ཚེ་རབ་རིབ་ཅན་མ་ཡིན་པས་སྐྱེ་ཤད་ལ་སོགས་
པ་ལྟར་ཕྱིན་ཅི་མ་ལོག་པས་ཡང་དག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་སྐྱོ་མི་འདོགས་པ་དེའི་ཚེ་ན་ཡང་
གང་གིས་ན་དེའི་ཚེ་ན་ཀྱང་རྫོགས་ཏུ་འགྱུར་བ་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་གྱུར་པའི་དོན་ཚུལ་
ཅུལ་ཡང་དམིགས་པ་ག་ལ་ཡོད། དེ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ཕྱིར་སྐྱོབ་དཔོན་གྱི་ཞལ་ལྷན་ནས་ཀྱང་། གལ་
ཏེ་མདོན་སུམ་ལ་སོགས་པའི། ། དོན་གྱིས་འགའ་ཞིག་དམིགས་ན་ནི། ། རླུབ་པའམ་
བསྐྱོག་པར་བྱ་ན་དེ། ། མེད་ཕྱིར་ང་ལ་ལྷན་ཀ་མེད། ། ཅེས་གསུངས་སོ། །

Because in that way, the erroneous and the nonerroneous are different, the erroneous do not exist in a state [directly perceiving] the nonerroneous. Therefore, how could there be a veiling, an eye, that is a subject! Hence, there is no overturning the fallacy of a position whose base is not established and the fallacy of a reason whose base is not established,⁶ and, therefore, this is just not a response.

གང་གི་ཕྱིར་དེ་ལྟར་ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་པ་དང་ཕྱིན་ཅི་མ་ལོག་པ་དག་ཐ་དད་པ་དེའི་ཕྱིར་
ཕྱིན་ཅི་མ་ལོག་པའི་གནས་སྐབས་ན་ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ན། གང་
ཞིག་ཚས་ཅན་ཉིད་ཏུ་འགྱུར་བ་མིག་ཀྱང་རྫོགས་པ་ལྟ་ག་ལ་ཡོད། དེའི་ཕྱིར་གཞི་མ་གྲུབ་
པའི་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་སྐྱོན་དང་། གཞི་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཀྱི་སྐྱོན་ཕྱོགས་མེད་པ་ཉིད་
པས་འདི་ལན་མ་ཡིན་པ་ཉིད་དོ། །

that the entities of the subjects—eyes and so forth—are not found by the merely erroneous [that is, a consciousness mistaken with respect to the object's being established by way of its own character]

དེའི་ལན་དུ་མིག་སྐྱོད་ཀྱི་ཚམས་ཅན་གྱི་རང་གི་ངོ་བོ་དེ་ཕྱིན་ཅི་
མིག་ཅམ་གྱིས་རྗེད་པ་མིན་པར་ལེགས་ལྡན་རང་ཉིད་གྱིས་ཁས་
ལྡངས་ལ།

has indeed asserted (*khas blangs pa nyid*)

has indeed **explicitly** asserted (*ngos su khas blangs pa nyid*)

It can be seen in the quote from *The Essence of Eloquence* just above that Tsong-kha-pa's text merely reads "has asserted" (*khas blangs*), not "has indeed explicitly asserted" (*ngos su khas blangs pa nyid*). Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho assumes that Bhāvaviveka actually asserts this; however, Jam-yang-shay-pa does not hold that Bhāvaviveka explicitly asserts such,

Toh 3860, *sde dge, dbu ma*, vol. 'a, 9b.3ff. The Sanskrit in La Vallée Poussin, *Prasannapadā*, 29.7-30.3, is:

na caitadevaṃ/ yasmād yadai votpādapratiṣedho'tra sādhyadharmo'bhipretah/ ta-
daiva dharṇastadādādhārasya viparyāsamātrāsādītātmabhāvasya pracyutiḥ
svayamevānenāṅgīkṛtā/ bhinnau hi viparyāsāvīparyāsau/ tadyadā viparyāsena
asatsattvena grhyate, taimirikeṇeva keśādi, tadā kutah sadbhūtapā-
dārthaleśasyāpyupalabdhiḥ/ yadā ca viparyāsādabhūtaṃ nādhyāropitaṃ
vitaimirikeṇeva keśādi, tadā kuto'sadbhūtapadārthaleśasyāpyupalabdhiḥ, yena
tadānīm saṃvṛtiḥ syāt/ ata evoktamācāryapādaiḥ - yadi kīrcidupalameyaṃ
pravartayeyaṃ nivartayeyaṃ vā/ pratyakṣādibhirthaistadabhāvanme'n-
upālabhaḥ/ /iti/ yataścaivaṃ bhinnau viparyāsāvīparyāsau, ato viduśāma-
viparītāvasthāyām viparītasya sambhavātkutah saṃvṛtaṃ cakṣuḥ yasya dharmit-
vaṃ syāt/ iti na vyāvartate'siddhādhāre pakṣadoṣaḥ, āśrayāsiddho vā hetuḍoṣaḥ/
ityaparihāra evāyam/.

For Jam-yang-shay-pa's explication of this passage according to Tsong-kha-pa's *The Essence of Eloquence* see Hopkins, *Chandrakīrti Undermines Bhāvaviveka's Assertion of Autonomy: Jam-yang-shay-pa's Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Compatibly Appearing Subjects*, 3 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version August, 2018: uma-tibet.org), 56-61. For Jam-yang-shay-pa's outline and occasional comments and Dra-ti Geshe Rin-chen-dön-drub's copious annotations to Tsong-kha-pa's Great Exposition of Special Insight in his *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path* see Hopkins, *What is a Consequentialist? Tsong-kha-pa's Great Exposition of Special Insight with the Four Interwoven Annotations: Compatibly Appearing Subjects*, 5 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version July, 2019: uma-tibet.org), 45ff., and without the annotations, 129ff. See also MacDonald, *In Clear Words: The Prasannapadā, Chapter One*, 104-109.

for he says:^a

Hence, although Bhāvaviveka himself has not explicitly asserted these fallacies of nonestablishment upon having examined the position and the sign, it follows that he *has come to have asserted them* and must assert them because:

1. in his *Lamp for (Nāgārjuna's) "Wisdom"* [in response to] another school's stating, "The subjects, the internal sense-spheres, are just caused (*rgyu yod kho na*) because the One-Gone-Thus said so," Bhāvaviveka explains [in paraphrase]:

Since a third category that is not either ultimate establishment or only conventional establishment is not possible, as which of these do you assert the meaning of the measure of what comes to be the sign [that is, do you assert that the One-Gone-Thus said that the internal sense-spheres are ultimately caused or only conventionally caused]? If they are ultimately established, they are not established for a Proponent of the Middle, but if you say only conventionally, they are not established for the Proponent of [Truly Established] Things. Hence, the fallacy comes that this reason is not established for both parties.

2. and in that case the fallacies of the nonestablishment of the sign and the subject also come to the autonomous [syllogism] refuting production from self of Bhāvaviveka himself.

དེས་ན་སྤྱོད་པ་དང་རྟོགས་ལ་བརྟེན་ན་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་སྦྱོར་
འདི་ལེགས་ལྡན་རང་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་དངོས་སུ་ཁས་མ་ལྡངས་ཀྱང་
ཁས་ལྡངས་པར་སོང་ཞིང་ཁས་ལེན་དགོས་པར་ཐལ། ཤེས་
རབ་སྦྱོར་མེ་ལས། རང་གི་སྦྱེ་མཆོད་རྣམས་ཚོས་ཅན། ལྷུ་ཡོད་
པ་ཁོ་ན་ཡིན་ཏེ། དེ་ལྟར་དེ་བཞིན་གཤེགས་པས་གསུངས་
པའི་སྤྱིར། ཞེས་ཟླེ་པ་གཞན་གྱིས་བཀོད་པ་ལ་ལེགས་ལྡན་གྱིས་

^a From Hopkins, *What is a Consequentialist? Tsong-kha-pa's Great Exposition of Special Insight with the Four Interwoven Annotations: Compatibly Appearing Subjects*, 5 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version July, 2019: uma-tibet.org), 80-81.

དེའི་རྟགས་སུ་སོང་ཚོད་ཀྱི་དོན་དེ་དོན་དམ་པར་གྲུབ་པ་
 དང་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཅམ་དུ་གྲུབ་པ་གང་ཡང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱང་
 གསུམ་མི་མིད་པས་དེ་གཉིས་གང་དུ་འདོད། དོན་དམ་པར་
 གྲུབ་ན་དབུ་མ་པ་ལ་མ་གྲུབ། ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཅམ་དུ་ཟེར་ན་དངོས་
 གྲུབ་པས་གཏན་ཚིགས་དེ་སྐོལ་བ་གཉིས་ཀ་ལ་མ་
 གྲུབ་པའི་སློན་ཡོད་ཅེས་བཤད་པ་གང་ཞིག་དེ་ལྟར་ན་ལེགས་
 ལུགས་རང་ཉིད་བདག་སྐྱེ་འགོག་པའི་རང་རྒྱུད་ལ་ཡང་རྟགས་
 དང་^[G167b]ཚོས་ཅན་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་སློན་འོང་བའི་བྱིར།

the subjects (<i>chos can</i>)	the subjects eyes and so forth (<i>chos can mig sogs</i>)
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Tsong-kha-pa's *The Essence of Eloquence*.^a

Bhāvaviveka himself has asserted that the entities of the subjects **eyes and so forth** are not found by the merely erroneous

མིག་སོགས་ཀྱི་ཚོས་ཅན་གྱི་རང་གི་ངོ་བོ་དེ་ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་ཅམ་
 གྱིས་རྗེད་པ་མིན་པར་ལེགས་ལུགས་རང་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ཁས་སྐྱེངས་ལ།

the substrata subjects which gain their entities by the mere erroneous (<i>de'i rten chos can</i>)	the substrata subjects which merely gain their entities [as] eyes and so forth by mere erroneous consciousness (<i>de'i rten chos can mig sogs shes pa phyin ci log gis bdag gi ngo bo ste mig sogs de'i ngo bo rnyed pa tsam</i>)
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The words that Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho adds do not appear in these places in Tsong-kha-pa's rendering in *The Essence of Eloquence*^b but are justifiable clarifications since Tsong-kha-pa uses these terms in other similar places.

^a Tsong-kha-pa's Revised Presentation of Compatibly Appearing Subjects, 65 and 181.
^b Tsong-kha-pa's Revised Presentation of Compatibly Appearing Subjects, 65 and 181.

have degenerated. (<i>nyams par gyur</i>)	have degenerated, that is, are not logically feasible. (<i>nyams par gyur pa ste mi 'thad par</i>)
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In *The Essence of Eloquence* Tsong-kha-pa does not use the term “have degenerated” (*nyams par gyur/gyur*) in this context except to point out that his treatment of Chandrakīrti’s passage in the Great Exposition of Special Insights differs from what he has given here in *The Essence of Eloquence*.^a

Although the two—[my] explanation [of Chandrakīrti’s passage] elsewhere [in the Great Exposition of Special Insight^b in the *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path*] in terms of [Bhāvaviveka’s] having asserted that the subjects which are the basis [of the predicate, nonproduction from self,] degenerate from [or are not] established as [their own] suchness (*de kho nar grub pa*) and this mode [of explanation just given here in *The Essence of Eloquence*—do not agree, it is not that [my two explanations] disagree [that Chandrakīrti’s passage sets forth] the tenet of refuting autonomy.

རྟེན་ཚཱ་ཅན་དེ་ལོ་ནར་གྲུབ་པ་ཉམས་པར་ཁས་སྐྱབས་པའི་
 ལྷེང་ནས་ཀྱང་གཞན་དུ་བཤད་པ་དང་བཤད་ཚུལ་འདི་གཉིས་མི་
 མཐུན་ཀྱང་རང་རྒྱུད་འགོག་པའི་གྲུབ་མཐའ་མི་མཐུན་པ་མིན་
 འོ། །

Tsong-kha-pa’s preference for, or at least emphasis on, the explanation given in his *The Essence of Eloquence* may also be evident in a later treatment in two folios of “Opposite of the Consequences” in his *Explanation of (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle: Ocean of Reasoning”* after which he refers readers to the discussion in his “*The Essence of Eloquence* and so forth” for the topics of compatibly appearing subjects:^c

^a Tsong-kha-pa’s *Revised Presentation of Compatibly Appearing Subjects*, 103 and 191.

^b Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s *Port of Entry*, 569.12, and Ta-drin-rab-tan’s *Annotations*, 391.1.

^c *dbu ma rtsa ba’i tshig le’ur byas pa shes rab ces bya ba’i rnam bshad rigs pa’i rgya mtsho* (TBRC W22272. vol. 15, PDF of sku 'bum: sku 'bum byams pa gling), 34a.5. The topics are mentioned only in passing in Tsong-kha-pa’s later *Extensive Explanation of*

These should be known from [my] having already explained them in *The Essence of Eloquence* and so forth upon seeing that they are very difficult to realize.^a

འདི་དག་གི་ཉམ་ཏུ་རྟོགས་དཀའ་བར་མཐོང་ནས་ལེགས་བཤད་
སྒྲིང་པོ་ལ་སོགས་པར་རྒྱས་པར་བཤད་ཟིན་པ་ལས་ཤེས་པར་
བྱའོ།

Even though the explanation in the “Great Exposition of Special Insight” is included in “and so forth,” he openly mentions only *The Essence of Eloquence*, thereby drawing attention to its differences from the Great Exposition of Special Insight.

Tsong-kha-pa does not explain how his new explanation developed, but I came to suspect a possible reason when noticing the way Jam-yang-shay-pa treats the critical passage in Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words*. The contrast between (1) Tsong-kha-pa explanation of Chandrakīrti’s passage in *The Essence of Eloquence* without involving “in suchness” and (2) Jam-yang-shay-pa’s nevertheless weaving “in suchness” into his explanation of Tsong-kha-pa’s meaning even in *The Essence of Eloquence*, suggested to me that Tsong-kha-pa, between composition of the *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path* and *The Essence of Eloquence*, may have discovered another reading of Chandrakīrti’s passage that did not support “in suchness.”

Specifically, in his explanation of Tsong-kha-pa’s *The Essence of Eloquence*, even though Tsong-kha-pa does not mention “in suchness” (*de kho nar*), Jam-yang-shay-pa introduces “in suchness” (*de kho nar*) from that version of Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words*, and takes it as “for the suchness that is the perspective of a rational consciousness” (*rigs shes kyi ngo’i de kho nar*) and puts it the previous clause.^b

(Chandrakīrti’s) “Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle’”: *Illumination of the Thought* (*dbu ma la ’jug pa’i rgya cher bshad pa dgongs pa rab gsal*) (Dharmasala: Tibetan Cultural Printing Press, no date), 80.16–81.1, and are not mentioned at all in his still later “Middle-length Exposition of Special Insight” (*lhag mthong ’bring*).

^a As per the list of the chronology of Tsong-kha-pa’s five works on the view of emptiness given earlier (18), it may be that his two-folio composition in the *Ocean of Reasoning* on Buddhapālita’s position and Bhāvaviveka’s rebuttal, followed by a two-folio composition on Chandrakīrti’s defense of Buddhapālita through the opposite of the consequences, contributed to his decision to divert to composing *The Essence of Eloquence* because of the complexity of the issues involved in compatibly appearing subjects.

^b From Hopkins, *Chandrakīrti Undermines Bhāvaviveka’s Assertion of Autonomy*:

It follows [that (according to you Bhāvaviveka) direct valid cognitions comprehending the two, eyes and forms, are nonmistaken with respect to those two being established by way of their own character] because (1) in a system in which whatever is an established base [that is, whatever exists] must be established by way of its own character, those objects are not found and posited [that is, certified,] by a mere awareness mistaken with respect to [the object’s being established by way of its own character] and (2) you, Bhāvaviveka, also have asserted such, because that very text [Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words*] says:^a

That is not so. For, at that time when for the suchness [that is a rational consciousness] a negation of production is accepted here as the predicate of the proposition, this one [Bhāvaviveka] himself has just asserted that the subjects—the substrata of that [predicate]—which gain their thingness through the mere erroneous have degenerated.

[མིག་གཟུགས་གཉིས་འངལ་བའི་མངོན་སུམ་ཚད་མ་ནི་དེ་གཉིས་རང་གི་མཚན་
 ཉིད་ཀྱིས་གྲུབ་པ་ལ་མ་འབྲུལ་བ་ཡིན་པ་]དེར་ཐལ། གཞི་གྲུབ་ན་རང་
 མཚན་གྱིས་གྲུབ་དགོས་པའི་ལྷགས་ལ་དེ་ལ་འབྲུལ་བའི་སྣོ་
 ཅམ་གྱིས་ལུལ་དེ་རྗེད་པ་དང་འཇོག་པ་མིན་ལ་ལེགས་ལྡན་
 ལྷོད་ཀྱིས་ཀྱང་དེ་ལྟར་ཁས་སྤངས་པའི་སྤྱིར། དེ་ཉིད་ལས།
 གང་གི་ཚེ་འདྲིར་སྐྱེ་བ་བཀག་པ་བརྒྱབ་བྱའི་ཚོས་སུ་འདོད་པ་
 དེའི་ཚེ་དེ་ཁོ་ནར་དེའི་རྗེན་ཚོས་ཅན་སྤྱན་ཅི་ལོག་ཅམ་གྱིས་
 བདག་གི་ངོ་བོ་རྗེད་པ་ནི་ཉམས་པར་གྱུར་པ་འདྲིས་རང་ཉིད་
 ཀྱིས་ཁས་སྤངས་པ་ཉིད་དོ། ། ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་སྤྱིར།

[That Chandrakīrti says this] entails [that (1) in a system in which whatever is an established base must be established by way of its own character, those objects are not found and posited by a mere

Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Compatibly Appearing Subjects, 3 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version August, 2018: uma-tibet.org), 56-58.

^a Translated in accordance with Jam-yang-shay-pa’s explanation below.

awareness mistaken with respect to (the object's being established by way of its own character) and (2) you, Bhāvaviveka, also have asserted such] because:

1. [Chandrakīrti's statement] "At that time when a negation of production is accepted as the predicate of the proposition" (*gang gi tshe 'dir skye ba bkag pa bsgrub bya'i chos su 'dod pa de'i tshe de kho nar*) is explaining, "At that time when a refutation of production is the predicate of the proposition for the suchness that is the perspective of a rational consciousness"^a (*rigs shes kyi ngo'i de kho nar*).

[དེ་ཉིད་ལས། གང་གི་ཚེ་འདིར་སྐྱེ་བ་བཀག་པ་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཚོས་སུ་འདོད་པ་དེའི་
 ཚེ་དེ་ལོ་ནར་དེའི་རྟེན་ཚོས་ཅན་ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་ཅམ་གྱིས་བདག་གི་ངོ་བོ་རྟེན་པ་ནི་
 ཉམས་པར་གྱུར་པ་འདིས་རང་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ཁས་སྐྱབས་པ་ཉིད་དོ། ། ཞེས་གསུངས་ན་
 གཞི་གྲུབ་ན་རང་མཚན་གྱིས་གྲུབ་དགོས་པའི་ལུགས་ལ་དེ་ལ་འཇུག་པའི་སློ་ཅམ་
 གྱིས་ལུལ་དེ་རྟེན་པ་དང་འཇོག་པ་མིན་ལ་ལེགས་ལྡན་ཁྱེད་ཀྱིས་ཀྱང་དེ་ལྟར་ཁས་
 སྐྱབས་པས་] བྱུང་སྟེ། [གང་གི་ཚེ་འདིར་སྐྱེ་བ་བཀག་པ་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཚོས་སུ་
 འདོད་པ་དེའི་ཚེ་] དེ་ལོ་ནར་ཞེས་པ་ཡན་ཚད་ཀྱིས་རིགས་ཤེས་ཀྱི་
 ངོའི་^b དེ་ལོ་ནར་སྐྱེ་བ་བཀག་པ་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཚོས་ཡིན་པའི་ཚེ་
 ཞེས་བཤད།

Prior to this, when Jam-yang-shay-pa explains what Chandrakīrti's statement "That is not so," means, Jam-yang-shay-pa substitutes "ultimate" (*don dam*) for "suchness" (*de kho nar*):^c

It follows that the assertion by you Bhāvaviveka that on the occasion of proving—for the ultimate (*don dam*) that is the perspective of a rational consciousness (*rigs shes kyi ngo*)—that eyes, forms,

^a 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 224b.5, *rigs shes kyi ngo'i de kho nar*; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 165a.3, *rigs shes kyi ngo bo'i de kho nar*. Following the Old Go-mang Lhasa reading, I would translate the clause as "At just that time when a refutation of production is the predicate of the proposition for the suchness that is the **entity** of a rational consciousness."

^b 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 224b.5, *rigs shes kyi ngo'i de kho nar*; 2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 165a.3, *rigs shes kyi ngo bo'i de kho nar*.

^c From Hopkins, *Chandrakīrti Undermines Bhāvaviveka's Assertion of Autonomy: Jam-yang-shay-pa's Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Compatibly Appearing Subjects*, 3 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version August, 2018: uma-tibet.org), 55.

and so forth are not produced from self there are mere generalities, or compatible appearances, devoid of qualification by the two truths is not logically feasible

ལེགས་ལྷན་བྱེད་ཀྱིས་མིག་དང་གཟུགས་སོགས་རིགས་ཤེས་ཀྱི་
ངོའི་དོན་དམ་པར་བདག་ལས་མི་སྐྱེ་བར་སྐྱབ་པའི་སྐབས་སུ་
བདེན་གཉིས་ཀྱི་བྱུང་པར་དོར་བའི་སྐྱེ་ཚམ་མམ་མཐུན་སྣང་
བ་ཞིག་འདོད་པ་མི་འབྲད་པར་བཤམ།

Jam-yang-shay-pa renders “the **suchness** that is the perspective of a rational consciousness (*rigs shes kyi ngo'i de kho nar*)” as “the **ultimate** (*don dam*) that is the perspective of a rational consciousness (*rigs shes kyi ngo'i don dam par*).” This is like when “ultimate truth” (*don dam bden pa, paramārthasatya*) is taken as “truth for the ultimate consciousness,” when Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s *Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-pa’s) “Great Exposition of Tenets”: Freeing the Knots of the Difficult Points, Precious Jewel of Clear Thought* on Jam-yang-shay-pa’s root text says about the Autonomy School:^a

In ultimate-object-truth (*don dam bden pa, paramārthasatya*):

- Ultimate (*dam pa, parama*) is a Superior’s uncontaminated awareness of meditative equipoise.
- Object (*don, artha*) is the object found by that uncontaminated awareness.
- It is a truth (*bden pa, satya*) because of being non-deceptive (*mi bslu ba*), since its mode of appearance and mode of subsistence accord.

Thereby it is the ultimate-object-truth [or truth that is the object of the ultimate awareness.

དོན་དམ་པའི་བདེན་པ་ཞེས་པའི་ཚིག་ཟུར་གྱི་དམ་པ་ནི་
འཕགས་པའི་མཉམ་གཞག་ཟུག་མེད་ཀྱི་སློང་དང་། དོན་ནི་
ཟུག་མེད་ཀྱི་སློང་དེས་རྗེད་པའི་དོན་ཡིན་ལ། དེ་ནི་སྣང་ཚུལ་

^a Hopkins, *Maps of the Profound*, 754.

དང་གནས་ཚུལ་མཐུན་པས་མི་བསྐྱེ་བའི་ཕྱིར་བདེན་པ་སྟེ།
 དེ་ནི་དོན་དམ་པའི་བདེན་པ་ཡིན་ལོ། །

This is similar to how the Second Dalai Lama Gen-dün-gya-tsho (above in *Ornament for the Thought*, 54) augments “in suchness” (*de kho nar*) for this passage in Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words* as “for the suchness that is the perspective of a rational consciousness analyzing the ultimate (*don dam la dpyod pa’i rigs shes kyi ngo’am/ de kho nar*).” However, Gen-dün-gya-tsho does this for Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight in the *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path* and Khay-drub Ge-leg-pal-sang’s *Great Compilation*. Also, Gen-dün-gya-tsho does not provide any commentary at all, aside from a general outline, for a further explanation of Tsong-kha-pa’s *The Essence of Eloquence* in his *Difficult Points of (Tsong-kha-pa’s) “Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive.”*

La Vallée Poussin’s Sanskrit^a has the temporal correlatives *ya-daiva...tadaiva (tadā eva)*, rendered in three Tibetan recensions as *gang gi tshe...de’i tshe kho nar*, not as *gang gi tshe...de’i tshe de kho nar* as in three other recensions of the Tibetan Translations of Treatises (*bstan ’gyur*).^b With the latter reading, the passage from Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words*, as cited in Tsong-kha-pa’s *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path*, yields together with Jam-yang-shay-pa’s (yellow highlight) and Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub’s (turquoise highlight) annotations:

That when Proponents of the Middle and Proponents of [Truly Established] Things debate, a compatibly established subject and so forth not qualified with either truth or falsity are asserted is not logically feasibly so. For, on this occasion of proving that eyes and so forth are without truly established production when a negation of production is asserted here as the predicate of the proposition, this one, the master Bhāvaviveka, himself indeed has asserted that the entities of the subjects—eyes and so forth, the substrata of that predicate, the absence of truly established production, which gain their thingness by way of being taken as objects by mere erroneous consciousnesses polluted by ignorance—have degenerated from being established in suchness, that is, such subjects are not ultimately established. Hence, a subject established in compatible

^a La Vallée Poussin, *Mūlamadhyamakārikās avec la Prasannapadā*, 30.1.

^b The reading *gang gi tshe...de’i tshe kho nar* is in Peking (*pe cin*, 9b.1), Nar-thang (*snar thang*, 11a.1), and Golden Manuscript (*gser bris ma*, 13a.5-6); the reading *gang gi tshe...de’i tshe de kho nar* is in *sde dge* (9b.3), *co ne* (9b.1), and *dpe bsdur ma* (21.17).

appearance for both Proponents of the Middle and Proponents of [Truly Established] Things does not occur, because the entities of erroneous mistaken consciousnesses polluted by ignorance and nonerroneous consciousnesses not polluted by ignorance that are unmistakable perceptions of suchness in the meditative equipoise of Superiors are different in the sense that their modes of engaging objects are contradictory by way of being mutually exclusive.

According to this reading, once Bhāvaviveka asserts that eyes and so forth are not ultimately established and are not ultimates, it is established that they are falsities. It would be very contradictory for a consciousness of reality—emptiness—being devoid of dualistic appearance to take such falsities as its objects in the perspective of its perceiving suchness; therefore, these must be objects found by erroneous, or mistaken, consciousness and must be objects in relation to which a consciousness comes to be considered a mistaken consciousness.

However, the Proponent of the Middle is debating with a Proponent of Truly Established Things, such as a Sāṃkhya, who (at least according to Tsong-kha-pa) asserts that valid sense consciousnesses are nonmistaken with respect to the inherent existence of visible forms and so forth. Therefore, it would be very contradictory for this one object to be that in relation to which a sense consciousness becomes mistaken, as in the Middle Way School, and that in relation to which it becomes nonmistaken,^a as in the system of a Proponent of Truly Established Things. Due to this, there is no subject compatibly established for both the Proponent of the Middle and the Proponent of Truly Established Things. For, an erroneous, mistaken consciousness polluted by ignorance and a nonerroneous, nonmistaken consciousness of a Superior's^b meditative equipoise perceiving suchness are different, that is, mutually exclusive in terms of how they engage their objects, the one dualistically and the other nondualistically.^c

In this explanation, the last sentence—"Erroneous and nonerroneous [consciousnesses] are different"—is an all-inclusive set of consciousnesses neither of which can validly certify the existence of objects that are established by way of their own character. That which is erroneous—a consciousness to which an object that does not inherently exist appears to

^a In the *Four Interwoven Annotations* Delhi edition vol. 2 (531.2), read *tshad ma ma 'khrul ba'i yul* for *tshad ma 'khrul pa'i yul*.

^b *'phags pa, āryan*.

^c The source for the last part of the sentence is commentary from the late Ye-she-thub-tan, abbot emeritus of and ge-she in the Lo-sal-ling College of Dre-pung Monastic University in Mundgod, Karnataka State, India.

inherently existent—cannot certify an inherently existent object, because this is the very status with respect to which it is mistaken. The nonerroneous—a consciousness of meditative equipoise that does not involve such mistaken appearance—also cannot certify the existence of veilings such as an eye sense power and so forth (here the subjects of the syllogism about no ultimately established production), because veilings do not appear to it, even in the case of a Buddha, in terms of a Buddha's mode of perceiving emptiness nondualistically, since veilings, or conventionalities, can only be perceived in a dualistic mode.

Also, in this explanation “degeneration” is taken by Jam-yang-shay-pa as Bhāvaviveka's logically being forced to assert that eyes and so forth are not established ultimately, or as not established by way of their own character, because of being found or certified as existing by mistaken consciousnesses, since even he holds that they are not found by a consciousness of meditative equipoise.

The second explanation. Tsong-kha-pa's *The Essence of Eloquence*, published six years later than the *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path*, offers a different reading of this passage. At the point of explaining Chandrakīrti's response to the hypothetical Bhāvaviveka's proposal that the subject and so forth are established because only generalities are used, Tsong-kha-pa's *The Essence of Eloquence* says:^a

In response [Chandrakīrti]^b refutes [Bhāvaviveka] upon demonstrating the reasoning (1) that Bhāvaviveka himself has asserted

^a From Hopkins, *Tsong-kha-pa's Revised Presentation of Compatibly Appearing Subjects*, 65 and 181; see also the translation in Thurman, *Tsong Khapa's Speech of Gold*, 334-335.

^b Tsong-kha-pa paraphrases Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words*:

That is not so. For, at just that time [of proving that eyes and so forth are without production] (*de'i tshes kho nar, tadaiva*) when a negation of production is asserted here as the predicate of the proposition, this one [Bhāvaviveka] himself just asserts the degeneration [or nonestablishment] of the entities of the subjects [eyes and so forth]—the substrata of that [predicate, the absence of production from self]—which gain their thingness by way of mere erroneous [consciousnesses]. Erroneous and nonerroneous [objects] are different [mutually exclusive and a dichotomy].

དེ་ནི་དེ་ལྟར་ཡང་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། འདི་ལྟར་གང་གི་ཚེ་འདིར་སྐྱེ་བ་བཀག་པ་བསྐྱབ་
པར་བྱ་བའི་ཚས་སུ་འདོད་པའི་དེའི་ཚེ་ཁོ་ནར་དེའི་རྟེན་ཚས་ཅན་ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་
ཅས་གྱིས་བདག་གི་དངོས་པོ་རྟེན་པ་ནི་ཉམས་པར་འགྱུར་བར་འདིས་རང་ཉིད་

གྲིས་ལས་སྒངས་པ་ཉིད་དོ། ། ལྷན་ཅི་ལོག་དང་ལྷན་ཅི་མ་ལོག་པ་དག་ནི་ཐ་དང་
པ་ཡིན་ལོ། །

Therefore, when, like the falling hairs and so forth [apprehended] by one with eye disease and so on, what is nonexistent is apprehended by an erroneous [consciousness] as just existing, how then could even a portion of an object existent [by way of its own character] be observed! When, like the falling hairs and so forth [not apprehended] by one without eye disease, the unreal is not superimposed by a nonerroneous [consciousness], how then could even the merest portion of nonexistent objects, veilings, be observed! Hence, the holy master [Nāgārjuna] also says [in the *Refutation of Objections*, Stanza 30; P5228, vol. 95, 15.1.2]:

If direct perception and so forth did observe some [inherently established] objects,
Then [it would be reasonable] to prove those or refute [those in others’ systems],
But since those do not exist,
There is no [chance for you] to censure me.

དེའི་ལྷན་གང་གི་ཚེ་རབ་རིབ་ཅན་གྲིས་སྐྱེ་ཤད་ལ་སོགས་པ་སྟར་ལྷན་ཅི་ལོག་གིས་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་འཇོན་པ་དེའི་ཚེ་ནི་ཡོད་པར་གྱུར་པའི་དོན་ཆ་ཅམ་ཡང་དམིགས་པར་ག་ལ་འགྱུར། གང་གི་ཚེ་རབ་རིབ་ཅན་མ་ཡིན་པས་སྐྱེ་ཤད་ལ་སོགས་པ་སྟར་ལྷན་ཅི་མ་ལོག་པས་ཡང་དག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་སྐྱོ་མི་འདོགས་པ་དེའི་ཚེ་ནི་ཡང་གང་གིས་ན་དེའི་ཚེ་ནི་གུན་རྫོབ་ཏུ་འགྱུར་བ་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་གྱུར་པའི་དོན་ཆ་ཅམ་ཡང་དམིགས་པ་ག་ལ་ཡོད། དེ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ལྷན་སྐྱོབ་དཔོན་གྱི་ཞལ་སྡེ་ནས་ཀྱང་། གལ་ཏེ་མངོན་སུམ་ལ་སོགས་པའི། ། དོན་གྲིས་འགའ་ཞིག་དམིགས་ན་ནི། ལྷུབ་པའམ་བསྐྱོག་པར་བྱ་ན་དེ། ། མེད་ལྷན་ང་ལ་ལྷན་གཞེད། ། ཅེས་གསུངས་སོ། །

Because in that way, the erroneous and the nonerroneous are different, the erroneous do not exist in a state [directly perceiving] the nonerroneous. Therefore, how could there be a veiling, an eye, that is a subject! Hence, there is no overturning the fallacy of a position whose base is not established and the fallacy of a reason whose base is not established, and, therefore, this is just not a response. གང་གི་ལྷན་དེ་སྟར་ལྷན་ཅི་ལོག་པ་དང་ལྷན་ཅི་མ་ལོག་པ་དག་ཐ་དང་པ་དེའི་ལྷན་ཅི་མ་ལོག་པའི་གནས་སྐབས་ན་ལྷན་ཅི་ལོག་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ལྷན་ན། གང་ཞིག་ཚེས་ཅན་ཉིད་དུ་འགྱུར་བ་མིག་གུན་རྫོབ་པ་ལྷ་ག་ལ་ཡོད། དེའི་ལྷན་

that the entities of the subjects—eyes and so forth—are not found by the merely erroneous [that is, a consciousness mistaken with respect to the object's being established by way of its own character] and (2) reasonings that the erroneous and non-erroneous are different—a direct dichotomy—and so forth.

དེའི་ལན་དུ་མིག་སོགས་ཀྱི་ཚེས་ཅན་གྱི་རང་གི་ངོ་བོ་དེ་ཕྱིན་
 ཅི་ལོག་ཅོམ་གྱིས་རྗེད་པ་མིན་པར་ལེགས་ལྡན་རང་ཉིད་གྱིས་
 བས་སྒྲངས་ལ། ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་མ་ལོག་ཐ་དད་པ་སྟེ་དངོས་
 འགལ་ཡིན་པ་ལ་སོགས་པའི་རིགས་པ་བསྟན་ནས་བཀག་གོ།

The meaning of those is: As the subjects in the proof that eyes and so forth are not produced from self, it is not suitable to posit

གཞི་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་སྐྱོན་དང་། གཞི་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཀྱི་སྐྱོན་ཕྱོགས་
 པ་མེད་པ་ཉིད་བས་འདི་ལན་མ་ཡིན་པ་ཉིད་དོ།

Toh 3860, *sde dge, dbu ma*, vol. 'a, 9b.3ff. The Sanskrit in La Vallée Poussin, *Prasanna-padā*, 29.7-30.3, is:

na caitadevaṃ/ yasmād yadai votpādapratiṣedho'tra sādhyadharmo'bhipretah/ ta-
 daiva dharṃastadādadhārasya viparyāsamātrāsādītātmabhāvasya pracyutiḥ
 svayamevānenāṅgīkṛtā/ bhinnau hi viparyāsāvīparyāsau/ tadyadā viparyāseṇa
 asatsattvena grhyate, taimirikeṇeva keśādi, tadā kutaḥ sadbhūtapadārtha-
 leśasyāpyupalabdhiḥ/ yadā ca aviparyāsādabhūtaṃ nādhyāropitaṃ vitaimiri-
 keṇeva keśādi, tadā kuto'sadbhūtapadārthaleśasyāpyupalabdhiḥ, yena tadānīṃ
 saṃvṛtiḥ syāt/ ata evoktamācāryapādaiḥ - yadi kiṃcidupalameyaṃ pravartaye-
 yaṃ nīvartayeyaṃ vā/ pratyakṣādibhirarthaistadabhāvānme'nupālabhah/ /iti/
 yataścaivaṃ bhinnau viparyāsāvīparyāsau, ato viduśāmviparītāvasthāyāṃ
 viparītasyāsaṃbhavātkutaḥ sāmṃvṛtaṃ cakṣuḥ yasya dharmīvaṃ syāt/ iti na
 vyāvartate'siddhādhāre pakṣadoṣaḥ, āśrayāsiddho vā hetudoṣaḥ/ ityaparīhāra
 evāyam/

For Jam-yang-shay-pa's explication of this passage according to Tsong-kha-pa's *The Essence of Eloquence* see Hopkins, *Chandrakīrti Undermines Bhāvaviveka's Assertion of Autonomy: Jam-yang-shay-pa's Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Compatibly Appearing Subjects*, 3 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version August, 2018: uma-tibet.org), 56-61. For Jam-yang-shay-pa's outline and occasional comments and Dra-ti Geshe Rin-chen-dön-drub's copious annotations to Tsong-kha-pa's Great Exposition of Special Insight in his *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path* see Hopkins, *What is a Consequentialist? Tsong-kha-pa's Great Exposition of Special Insight with the Four Interwoven Annotations: Compatibly Appearing Subjects*, 5 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version July, 2019: uma-tibet.org), 45ff., and without the annotations, 129ff. See also MacDonald, *In Clear Words: The Prasannapadā, Chapter One*, 104-109.

mere eyes and so forth for which the specifics of the two truths have been discarded, because [according to Bhāvaviveka]^a (1) a valid cognition comprehending these subjects is a consciousness unmistaken with respect to the nature of eyes and so forth, but (2) states (*gnas skabs*) of—that is, objects found (*rnyed pa’i yul*) by—nonerroneous consciousnesses unmistaken with respect to the nature do not exist among false appearances, erroneous objects of knowledge appearing to exist by way of their own character whereas they do not.

དེ་དག་གི་དོན་ནི་མིག་སྟོན་སྟེ་བར་སྐྱབ་པའི་
 ཚམས་ལྟར་དུ་བདེན་གཞིས་ཀྱི་ཁྱད་པར་དོར་བའི་མིག་སྟོན་སྟེ་
 ཚམས་གཞན་དུ་མི་རྒྱུ་ལྟར། ཚམས་ལྟར་དེ་འཇལ་བའི་ཚད་མ་ནི་
 མིག་སྟོན་སྟེ་རང་བཞིན་ལ་མ་འཇུག་པའི་ཤེས་པ་ཡིན་
 [87a]ལ་ཤེས་པ་སྐྱེན་ཅི་མ་ལོག་པ་རང་བཞིན་ལ་མ་འཇུག་པའི་
 གནས་སྐབས་ཏེ། དེས་རྗེད་པའི་ཡུལ་ནི་ཤེས་བྱ་སྐྱེན་ཅི་ལོག་
 རང་མཚན་གྱིས་མེད་བཞིན་དུ་དེར་སྣང་བའི་རྩོན་སྣང་མེད་
 པའི་སྐྱེར་རོ། །

With respect to how [Bhāvaviveka] asserts the former reason [which is that (according to Bhāvaviveka) the valid cognitions comprehending those subjects are consciousnesses unmistaken with respect to the nature of eyes and so forth]:

- In a system asserting that whatever exists exists by way of its own entity, if [a consciousness] has come to be mistaken relative to the appearance of own-character [that is, the object’s being established by way of its own character], it cannot be posited as finding [that is, realizing] its object of comprehension. Therefore, whether a conceptual or non-conceptual valid cognition, it must be unmistaken with respect to the own-character [that is, the establishment by way of its own character] of that with respect to which it is a valid cognition—the ap-

^a Ta-drin-rab-tan’s *Annotations*, 382.1.

pearing object or the conceived object. In that case, [the consciousness] must go as a valid cognition with respect to the entity (*ngo bo*), or nature (*rang bzhin*), of the mode of subsistence of the object itself, this not just being nominally imputed in conventional terms, and [Bhāvaviveka] himself also asserts this.

རྟོགས་སྣ་མ་དེ་ཁས་སྒྲངས་པའི་ཚུལ་ནི། ཡོད་པ་གང་ཡིན་
 རང་གི་ངོ་བོས་ཡོད་པར་འདོད་པའི་ལྷགས་ལ་རང་མཚན་
 ལྡང་བ་ལ་ལྟོས་ཏེ་འབྱུང་བར་སོང་ན་དེས་རང་གི་གཞལ་བྱ་
 རྟེན་པར་འཇོག་མི་རུས་པས། རྟོག་པ་དང་རྟོག་མེད་ཀྱི་ཚད་
 མ་གང་ཡིན་ཀྱང་ཚད་མར་སོང་ས་སྡང་ལྷུལ་དང་ཞེན་ལྷུལ་
 རང་མཚན་ལ་མ་འབྱུང་བ་ཅིག་དགོས་སོ། ། དེའི་ཚེ་ཐ་སྟོན་
 དུ་མིང་དུ་བརྟགས་པ་ཅོམ་མིན་པའི་དོན་རང་གི་གནས་ཚུལ་
 ཀྱི་ངོ་བོ་འམ་རང་བཞིན་ཅིག་ལ་ཚད་མར་འགོ་དགོས་ཤིང་
 རང་གིས་ཁས་ལེན་པ་ཡང་ཡིན་ནོ། །

- It is contradictory for whatever is an object found by such a valid cognition to be an erroneous object of knowledge, whereby the latter sign [which is that states of—that is, objects found by—nonerroneous consciousnesses unmistaken with respect to the nature do not exist among false appearances, erroneous objects of knowledge appearing to exist by way of their own character whereas they do not] is established. Likewise, it is also contradictory for whatever is an object found by a mistaken consciousness to be an erroneous object of knowledge.

Therefore, [Bhāvaviveka] cannot dispel the fallacy of a nonestablished subject.^a

དེ་འདྲ་བའི་ཚད་མས་རྟེན་པའི་དོན་ཡིན་ན་ཤེས་བྱ་ཕྱིན་ཅི་
 ལོག་ཡིན་པར་འགལ་བས་རྟོགས་ཕྱི་མ་འབྱུང་བོ། ། དེ་བཞིན་

^a Ta-drin-rab-tan's *Annotations*, 383.4, specifies "a compatibly appearing subject."

དུ་ཤེས་པ་འབྲུལ་བས་རྗེད་པའི་དོན་ཡིན་ན་ཡང་ཤེས་བྱ་
 ཕྱིན་ཅི་མ་ལོག་པ་ཡིན་པ་འགལ་ལོ། ། དེའི་ཕྱིར་ཚོས་ཅན་མ་
 གྲུབ་པའི་སྐྱོན་སྤོང་མི་རུས་སོ། །

In Tsong-kha-pa’s earlier explanation in the *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path*, what Bhāvaviveka is said to have asserted is that eye sense powers and so forth are not established **in suchness**, that is, that eyes are so forth are not established by way of their own character because of being found—realized, confirmed—by mistaken consciousnesses. This is a position logically forced on him, since Bhāvaviveka actually asserts that eyes and so forth are established by way of their own character. In the later explanation in *The Essence of Eloquence* however, the position that Bhāvaviveka is said to assert is that eyes and so forth are not found by mistaken consciousnesses because they are certified by consciousnesses that are not mistaken with respect to those objects being established by way of their own character, and Bhāvaviveka actually does assert this.

To repeat: In the first explanation in Tsong-kha-pa’s *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path*, this passage in Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words* reads:

That is not so. For, at this time when a negation of production is accepted here as the predicate of the proposition, this one [Bhāvaviveka] himself indeed has asserted the degeneration [or nonestablishment] of the entities of the subjects—the substrata of that [predicate, the absence of production from self]—which gain their thingness by way of mere erroneous [consciousnesses]—have degenerated from in suchness [that is, from being ultimately established]. Erroneous and nonerroneous [consciousnesses] are different [mutually exclusive].

གང་གི་ཚོའདྲིར་སྐྱེ་བ་བཀག་པ་བརྒྱབ་པར་བྱ་བའི་ཚོས་སྐྱེ་
 འདོད་པ་དེའི་ཚོ་དེ་ལོ་ནར་དེའི་རྟེན་ཚོས་ཅན་ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་
 ཅམ་གྱིས་བདག་གི་དངོས་པོ་རྗེད་པ་ནི་ཉམས་པར་གྱུར་པར་
 འདིས་རང་ཉིད་གྱིས་ཁས་སྐྱབས་པ་ཉིད་དོ། ། ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་
 དང་ཕྱིན་ཅི་མ་ལོག་པ་དག་ནི་ཐ་དད་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །

Later in *The Essence of Eloquence* Tsong-kha-pa does not cite the passage but based on his explanation of it I speculate that he is using the reading

lacking “in suchness,” due to which the translation becomes:

That is not so. For, at just this time when (*de'i tsho kho nar, ta-daiva*) a negation of production is accepted here as the predicate of the proposition, this one [Bhāvaviveka] himself indeed has asserted the degeneration [or nonestablishment] of the entities of the subjects [eyes and so forth]—the substrata of that [predicate, the absence of production from self]—which gain their thingness by way of mere erroneous [consciousnesses]. Erroneous and nonerroneous [objects] are different [mutually exclusive and a dichotomy].

གང་གི་ཚེ་འདིར་སྐྱེ་བ་བཀག་པ་བརྒྱབ་པར་བྱ་བའི་ཚེས་སྲུ་
 འདོད་པ་དེའི་ཚེ་ཁོ་ནར་དེའི་རྟེན་ཚེས་ཅན་ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་
 ཅམ་གྱིས་བདག་གི་དངོས་པོ་རྟོད་པ་ནི་ཉམས་པར་གྱུར་པར་
 འདིས་རང་ཉིད་གྱིས་ཁས་སྐྱངས་པ་ཉིད་དོ། ། ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་
 དང་ཕྱིན་ཅི་མ་ལོག་པ་དག་ནི་ཐ་དད་པ་ཡིན་འོ། །

In the first explanation Bhāvaviveka is being logically forced to assert that eyes and so forth are not established by way of their own character because of being found by mistaken consciousnesses, whereas in the second explanation Bhāvaviveka is indicated as actually asserting that eyes and so forth are not found by mistaken consciousnesses.

Still, even in Tsong-kha-pa's second explanation, an implication of Bhāvaviveka's being a Proponent of the Middle, which holds that all conventional objects are falsities, is that he should assert that eyes and so forth are not established by way of their own character because of being found by mistaken consciousnesses.

Also, in the second explanation the last sentence—“Erroneous and nonerroneous are different”—is not about *consciousnesses*, as in the first explanation, but about *objects*. In the first explanation, the statement that “Erroneous and nonerroneous are different” is taken to mean that an erroneous, mistaken *consciousness* polluted by ignorance and a nonerroneous, nonmistaken *consciousness* of a Superior's meditative equipoise perceiving suchness are different, that is, are mutually exclusive in terms of how they engage their objects, the one dualistically and the other nondualistically, and neither can validly certify a subject compatibly established in the systems of both the Proponent of the Middle and the Proponent of [Truly Established] Things. In the second explanation, “Erroneous and

nonerroneous are different” is taken to mean that the two, false erroneous *objects* found by a mistaken consciousness and true nonerroneous *objects* found by a nonmistaken consciousness, are different, that is, mutually exclusive and a dichotomy, and thus a falsity cannot be among objects found by a nonmistaken consciousness. The conclusion in both cases is that there can no compatibly established subjects.

My speculation is that since in *The Essence of Eloquence* Tsong-kha-pa does not use “in suchness” (in the reading *de'i tshe de kho nar*) in any way at all, he came to understand “in suchness” (*de kho nar*) as a faulty reading and, due to this, changed his explanation of the text, which, nevertheless, still has its prime objective the refutation of compatible appearance. It remains the passage uncovering the conflict between appearance and reality that is the ignorance behind cyclic existence and preventing omniscience, and thus the antithesis of wisdom realizing the emptiness that is the essence of all of Buddha's eloquence, sūtra and mantra.^a

^a See Jeffrey Hopkins, *Absorption in No External World: 170 Issues in Mind-Only Buddhism* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 2005), Issues #1-3, pp. 10-14.

Appendix: Khay-drub Ge-leg-pal-sang's Explanation of the Critical Passage in Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* without Mentioning a Difference between Tsong- kha-pa's Two Readings

Treatise Vividly Clarifying the Suchness of the Profound Emptiness: Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate

ཟབ་མོ་སྣང་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་དེ་ལོ་ན་ཉིད་རབ་ཏུ་གསལ་བར་བྱེད་པའི་
བསྟན་བཅོས་སྐལ་བཟང་མིག་འབྱེད། །

Key to the colorization: In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight indicates material added in place of ellipses, and magenta highlight sets off the ellipsis indicator when it has been filled in.

Here is a short biography of the Khay-drub Ge-leg-pal-sang (1385-1438) by [Namdrol Miranda Adams](#) exactly as it appears online in *The Treasury of Lives*:^a

Khedrubje Gelek Pelzang (mkhas grub rje dge legs dpal bzang) was born in Tsang in 1385. His father, Gunga Tashi Pelzang (kun dga' bkra shis dpal bzang, d.u.), was a member of the [Se](#) clan, said to have originated in Khotan, and his mother was Budren Gyelmo (bu 'dren rgyal mo, d.u.).

His name Gelek Pelzang was given to him as a child when he took novice ordination at the age of seven from [Khenchen Sengge Gyeltsen](#) (mkhen chen seng ge rgyal mtshan, d.u.). From the age of sixteen he studied at the Sakya monastery of [Ngamring Chode](#) (ngam ring chos sde), training with [Bodong Panchen Jik-drel Chokle Namgyel](#) (bo dong paN chen 'jigs bral phyogs las rnam rgyal, 1376-1451), the founder of the Bodong tradition, who taught him logic and philosophy.

When Gelek Pelzang was twenty-one he studied with [Rendawa Zhonnu Lodro](#) (red mda' ba gzhon nu blo gros, 1349-1412), with whom he took full ordination. He studied Darmakīrt's *Pramāṇavārttika*, Abhidharma, and the Five Books of Maitreya, Nāgārjuna's works on Madhyamaka, and the Vinaya.

At the age of twenty-three, in 1407, he went to U to meet with [Tsongkhapa Lobzang Drakpa](#) (tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa, 1357-1419) at [Sera Choding](#) (se ra chos sdings) a hermitage above the site where [Sera Monastery](#) (se ra dgon) would soon be established. Gelek Pelzang received instructions on both sutra and tantra from Tsongkhapa, and soon became one of his most devoted disciples, receiving teachings alongside Tsongkhapa's other disciples such as [Gyeltsabje Darma Rinchen](#) (rgyal tshab rje dar ma rin chen, 1364-1432) and [Duldzin Drakpa Gyeltsen](#) ('dul 'dzin grags pa rgyal mtshan, 1374-1434).

Gelek Pelzang returned to Tsang and assumed the abbacy of [Changra Monastery](#) (lcang ra). He also founded the monasteries of [Riwo Dangchen](#) (ri bo 'dang chen) and, at age thirty-four,

^a [Khedrubje Gelek Pelzang - The Treasury of Lives: A Biographical Encyclopedia of Tibet, Inner Asia and the Himalayan Region](#). See also the excellent short biography in José Ignacio Cabezón, *A Dose of Emptiness: An Annotated Translation of the stong thun chen mo of mkhas grub dGe legs dpal bzang* (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1992), 13-19.

was involved in the establishment of [Pelkhor Chode](#) (dpal 'khor chos sde) in Gyantse (rgyal rtse), under the patronage of the Gyantse king, [Rabten Kunzang Pak](#) (rab brtan kun bzang 'phags, 1389-1442).

At the age of forty-seven, in 1431, Gelek Pelzang was asked by Gyeltsab to take the golden throne of Ganden (dga' ldan gser khri), becoming the third man to occupy the seat after Tsongkhapa and [Gyeltsab Darma Rinchen](#) (rgyal tshab dar ma rin chen, c.1364-1432).

At Ganden Khedru taught extensively, gave many initiations, and personally guided some of the most renowned scholars of the era to mastery of the tradition. He passed away there in 1438, at the age of fifty-three.

He was posthumously given the title of First Pañchen Lama by virtue of being considered a pre-incarnation of the Fourth Pañchen, [Lobzang Chokyi Gyeltsen](#) (blo bzang chos kyi rgyal mtshan, 1570-1662).

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In the selection translated here from the *Treatise Vividly Clarifying the Suchness of the Profound Emptiness: Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate*, also called *Great Compilation on Emptiness*,^a Khay-drub Ge-leg-pal-

^a Three editions of Khay-drub Ge-leg-pal-sang's *Treatise Vividly Clarifying the Suchness of the Profound Emptiness: Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate / Great Compilation on Emptiness* (*zab mo stong pa nyid rab tu gsal bar byed pa'i bstan bcos skal bzang mig 'byed / stong thun chen mo*) are utilized:

1. BDRC W29195-5152-eBook; old Tashilhunpo blocks (bkra shis lhun po par rnying); portion translated here, 113a.7-116b.6.
2. in codex form BDRC W1KG15939-I1KG15952; portion translated here, 294.5-303.4.
3. BDRC W00EGS1016265-I00JW501183; Madhyamika Text Series, vol. 1; New Delhi, 1972; portion translated here, 161a.4-166a.2.

sang,^a one of Tsong-kha-pa's two principal students, connects to Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* his immediately preceding explanation of the reasons why it is not reasonable for Proponents of the Middle Way School to use autonomous signs.

Tsong-kha-pa (1357-1419) in 1402^b published the *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path* which has a long and complicated section on special insight into emptiness that came to be called the Great Exposition of Special Insight and in 1407-1408^c wrote *The Essence of Eloquence*. Khay-drub Ge-leg-pal-sang wrote the *Treatise Vividly Clarifying the Suchness of the Profound Emptiness: Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate* "sometime between 1424-1428,"^d beginning his commentary leading to the critical passage in Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* from the point where the Great Exposition of Special Insight begins, not from the earlier point where *The Essence of Eloquence* begins, and his commentary on the critical passage itself uses the phrase "in suchness" (*de kho nar*) and glosses it just as Tsong-kha-pa does in the Great Exposition of Special Insight, whereas Tsong-kha-pa does not use the phrase in discussing this material in Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* in *The Essence of Eloquence* except to point out that he used it in his earlier commentary in the Great Exposition of Special Insight:^e

Although the two—[my] explanation [of Chandrakīrti's passage] elsewhere [in the Great Exposition of Special Insight^f in the *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path*] in terms of [Bhāvaviveka's]

See also the excellent translation of the entire book by José Ignacio Cabezón, *A Dose of Emptiness: An Annotated Translation of the stong thun chen mo of mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzang* (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1992), the portion translated here being 279-285.

^a *mkhas grub dge legs dpal bzang*, 1385-1438.

^b Elizabeth Napper, *Dependent-Arising and Emptiness* (London: Wisdom Publications, 1989), 6.

^c Thurman, *Tsong Khapa's Speech of Gold*, 88.

^d Cabezón, *Dose of Emptiness*, 17.

^e Hopkins, *Tsong-kha-pa's Revised Presentation of Compatibly Appearing Subjects in The Essence of Eloquence with Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho's Commentary*, 7 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version April 2020: uma-tibet.org), 103 and 191. Of the eight times that Tsong-kha-pa uses the phrase *de kho nar* in *The Essence of Eloquence* the first six and eighth are all *de kho nar grub ma grub dpyod pa*, and the seventh is what appears in this citation.

^f Jig-me-dam-chö-gya-tsho's *Port of Entry*, 569.12, and Ta-drin-rab-tan's *Annotations*, 391.1.

having asserted that the subjects which are the basis [of the predicate, nonproduction from self,] degenerate from [or are not] established as [their own] suchness (*de kho nar grub pa*) and this mode [of explanation just given here in *The Essence of Eloquence*—do not agree, it is not that [my two explanations] disagree [that Chandrakīrti's passage sets forth] the tenet of refuting autonomy.

རྟེན་ཚོས་ཅན་དེ་ལོ་ནར་གྲུབ་པ་ཉམས་པར་ཁས་སྐྱབས་པའི་
 ལྷོང་ནས་ཀྱང་གཞན་དུ་བཤད་པ་དང་བཤད་ཚུལ་འདི་
 གཉིས་མི་མཐུན་ཀྱང་རང་རྒྱུད་འགོག་པའི་གྲུབ་མཐའ་མི་
 མཐུན་པ་མིན་ལོ། །

3. Explaining that very [evidence why Proponents of the Middle do not assert autonomy] within connecting it to the *Clear Words*

གསུམ་པ་[རང་རྒྱུད་ཁས་མི་ལེན་པའི་རྒྱ་མཚན་]དེ་ཉིད་ཚོག་གསལ་དང་
རྒྱུར་ཏེ་བཤད་པ་ལ།

Wanting to show the fallacies of the nonestablishment of the basal subject if a Proponent of the Middle has asserted an autonomous sign, [Chandrakīrti] states [the position of Bhāvaviveka, his] opponent; Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* says:^a

[*Depiction of Bhāvaviveka's response:*]^b It is like [on an occasion when to an opponent^c a Buddhist puts forward the thesis that]

^a Toh 3860, *sde dge, dbu ma*, vol. 'a, 9a.7-9b.3. The Sanskrit in La Vallée Poussin, *Prasannapadā*, 28.4-29.7 (which with emendations from De Jong, "Text-Critical Notes," 31) is:

atha syāt/ yathānityaḥ śabda iti dharmadharminoḥ sāmānyam eva gṛhyate na viśeṣaḥ/ viśeṣagrahaṇe hi saty anumānānumeyavyavahārābhāvaḥ syāt/ tathā hi/ yadi cāturmahābhautikāḥ śabda gṛhyate sa parasyāsiddhaḥ/ athākāśguṇo gṛhyate sa bauddhasya svato 'siddhaḥ/ tathā vaiśeṣikasyāpi śabdānityatām pratijānānasya yadi kāryaḥ śabda gṛhyate sa parato 'siddhaḥ/ atha vyaṅgyaḥ sa svato 'siddhaḥ/ evaṃ yathāsaṃbhavaṃ vināśo 'pi yadi sahetukaḥ sa bauddhasya svato 'siddhaḥ/ atha nirhetukaḥ sa parasyāsiddha iti// tasmād yathātra dharmadharmissāmānyamātram/ evam ihāpi dharmimātram utśṛṣṭaviśeṣaṇaṃ grahīṣyata iti cet/.

See Hopkins, *Chandrakīrti Undermines Bhāvaviveka's Assertion of Autonomy: Jam-yang-shay-pa's Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Compatibly Appearing Subjects*, 3 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version August, 2018: uma-tibet.org) translation of Chandrakīrti, 125-127; for Jam-yang-shay-pa's presentation of the meaning, see the same, 48-54. See also MacDonald, *In Clear Words: The Prasannapadā, Chapter One*, 104-109.

^b Tsong-kha-pa's presentation of the controversy between Buddhapālita, Bhāvaviveka, and Chandrakīrti in his Great Exposition of Special Insight in the *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path* begins with this point; see Hopkins, *What is a Consequentialist?* Tsong-kha-pa's *Great Exposition of Special Insight with the Four Interwoven Annotations: Compatibly Appearing Subjects*, 5 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version August 2018, uma-tibet.org), 37-41 and 123-126.

^c Tsong-kha-pa, as is evident below, identifies the opponent as a Vaisheshika. Kodo Yotsuya (*The Critique of Svatantra Reasoning by Chandrakīrti and Tsong-kha-pa*, 93 n.

sound is impermanent, just generalities of the two, the subject and the predicate, are to be used, not specifics. If specifics were used, the conventions of inference and object of inference^a would be nonexistent. It is as follows: If “sound that is derived from the four great elements” were used, it would not be established for the other party. However, if “sound that is a quality of space”^b were used, it would not be established for oneself, the Buddhist.

དབུ་མ་པས་རང་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་རྟགས་ཁས་སྤངས་ན་གཞི་ཚོས་ཅན་མ་
 ལྷུང་བའི་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་སྐྱོན་བཟུན་པར་བཞིན་ནས་ཕྱོགས་ལྔ་མ་
 བཀོད་པ་ནི། ཚོག་གསལ་ལས། ཅི་སྟེ་ཇི་ལྟར་སྐྱེ་མི་རྟག་ཅེས་བྱ་བ་
 ལ་ཚོས་དང་ཚོས་ཅན་གཉིས་སྟེ་ཉིད་བཟུང་བ་ཡིན་གྱི་ཁྱུང་པར་

73) points out that since Vaisheshikas assert that sound is impermanent (as is explained two footnotes below), there is no need for a Buddhist to prove to a Vaisheshika that sound is impermanent; hence, he identifies the opponent as a Mīmāṃsaka; however, it may be that because Vaisheshikas hold that a sound is a quality of space and space is permanent, the Buddhist here is holding that Vaisheshikas are forced by reasoning to assert that a sound is permanent.

^a Gung-thang Lo-drö-gya-tsho's (*gung thang blo gros rgya mtsho*, 1851-1928/1930) *Day-making Illumination Clarifying the Meaning of the Thought of (Jam-yang-shay-pa's) "Decisive Analysis of the Middle: Treasury of Scripture and Reasoning"* (*dbu ma'i mtha' dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod kyi dgongs don gsal bar byed pa'i nyin byed snang ba zab lam la ba'i mig 'byed*) BDRC W140-11KG15988, 152.14, glosses inference (*rje su dpag pa*) with “the sign that is the means of inference” (*dpag byed rtags, anumāna*) and object of inference (*rje su dpag par bya ba, anumeya*) with “predicate of the proposition that is the object inferred” (*dpag bya bsgrub bya'i chos*).

^b *nam mkha', ākāśa*. As Ngag-wang-pal-dan's *Explanation of Obscurational and Ultimate Truths* (54.1; Hopkins, *Maps of the Profound*, 166) says about the Vaisheshika assertion that sound is a quality of space:

“Whatever has production and disintegration necessarily depends upon some substance; for example, [the flame of] a butter lamp. Sound also has production and disintegration.” By such reasoning, sound is proved to depend upon a substance. Because sound is heard apart from the four elements, earth and so on, it does not depend on those four. Also, because it is observed externally by a sense consciousness, as shared between oneself and others, it is not a quality of the self. Since it is an object of apprehension by the ear, it is not a quality of the three—direction, time, and consciousness. Hence, it is asserted to be established as a quality only of space.

Kodo Yotsuya (*The Critique of Svatantra Reasoning by Chandrakīrti and Tsong-kha-pa*, 93 n. 73) points out that Mīmāṃsakas also assert that sound is a quality of space.

འི་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། ལྷང་པར་འཛིན་ན་ནི་རྗེས་སུ་དཔག་པ་དང་རྗེས་
 ལྷང་པག་པར་བྱ་བའི་ཐ་སྐྱད་མེད་པར་འགྱུར་རོ། འདི་ལྟར་གལ་
 ཏེ་འབྱུང་བ་ཆེན་པོ་བཞི་ལས་གྱུར་པའི་སྐྱེ་འཛིན་ན་ནི་པ་རོལ་པོ་
 ལ་མ་གྱུབ་པོ། ། འོན་ཏེ་ནམ་མཁའའི་ཡོན་ཏྱན་འཛིན་ན་ནི་དེ་རང་
 ཉིད་སངས་རྒྱས་པ་ལ་མ་གྱུབ་པ་ཡིན་ལོ། །

Similarly, even when a Vaisheshika^a makes the thesis that sound is impermanent, if “sound that is a product” is used, it would not be established for the other party. However, if “manifested,” it would not be established for oneself.

Likewise, respectively, if “disintegration” is “caused,” it would not be established for oneself, a Buddhist. However, if “causeless,” it would not be established for the other party. Therefore, just as for these mere generalities of subject and predicate are to be used, so here also a mere subject for which specifics have been discarded is to be used.

དེ་བཞིན་དུ་བྱེ་བྲག་པ་སྐྱེ་མི་ཏྱག་པར་དམ་འཆའ་བ་ན་ཡང་
 ལྱས་པའི་སྐྱེ་འཛིན་ན་དེ་གཞན་ལ་མ་གྱུབ་པོ། ། འོན་ཏེ་མངོན་
 པར་གསལ་བར་བྱ་བ་ཡིན་ན་ནི་དེ་རང་ལ་མ་གྱུབ་པ་ཡིན་ལོ། །
 དེ་བཞིན་དུ་ཅི་རིགས་པར་འཛིགས་པ་ཡང་གལ་ཏེ་རྒྱ་དང་

^a Here in this second example, a Vaisheshika is proving to another party that sound is impermanent. Tsong-kha-pa, as is evident above, identifies the opponent as a Dīpaka (*gsal byed pa*), which *The Four Interwoven Annotations* (vol. 2, 526.4) explains is a type of Sāṃkhya, but Kodo Yotsuya (*The Critique of Svatantra Reasoning by Chandrakīrti and Tsong-kha-pa*, 93) here also takes the opponent to be a Mīmāṃsaka; in both cases his identifications are Mīmāṃsaka.

Jam-yang-shay-pa (see the previous volume) identifies the other party as a Nirgrantha (*gcer bu pa*), another name for Jaina; Stcherbatsky (*The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa*, 115) identifies the opponent as a Mīmāṃsaka, inserting the identification into the text as if Chandrakīrti so specified it, whereas he did not; Wayman (*Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real*, 310) goes along with Stcherbatsky; Gom-de Nam-kha-gyal-tshan (*Settling Difficult Points in the Opposite of the Consequences*, 633.2) identifies the other party as a Dīpaka. In any case, the assertion of the Vaisheshika’s opponent is that sound is pre-existent in a nonmanifest state and is made manifest by conditions, a notion that the Vaisheshika cannot accept.

{KEY: In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight indicates material added in place of ellipses, and magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis sign has been filled in.}

བཅས་པ་ཡིན་ན་ནི་དེ་སངས་རྒྱས་པ་རང་ལ་མ་གྲུབ་པ་ཡིན་ལ།
 འོན་ཏེ་རྒྱ་མེད་པ་ཡིན་ན་ནི་དེ་པ་རོལ་པོ་ལ་མ་གྲུབ་པ་ཡིན་
^[161B] རྟོ། ། དེའི་ཕྱིར་རི་ལྟར་འདིར་ཚོས་ཅན་སྤྱི་ཙམ་ཞིག་འཛིན་པ་
 དེ་བཞིན་དུ། འདིར་ཡང་ཁྱད་པར་དོར་བའི་ཚོས་ཅན་ཙམ་ཞིག་
 འཛིན་པར་འགྱུར་རོ་ཞེ་ན། ཅེས་གསུངས་ཏེ།

[Chandrakīrti thereby] expresses Bhāvaviveka’s assertion: Just as when even both (1) a Buddhist proves sound as impermanent for the perspective of a Vaisheshika and (2) a Vaisheshika proves sound as impermanent for the perspective of a Dīpaka (*gsal byed pa*), a mere general sound not qualified with the uncommon assertions of both disputants is held as the subject, so also when Proponents of the Middle (1) prove eyes, forms, and so forth as without tru[ly established] production for the perspective of Proponents of [Truly Established] Things and (2) prove them as not produced from self for the perspective of Sāṃkhyas, and so forth, mere general eyes and so forth not qualified with any uncommon assertions, truth and falsity, of the two disputants is held as the subject, whereby the fallacy of a subject established in compatible appearance does not exist.

སངས་རྒྱས་པས་བྱེ་བྲག་པའི་དོར་སྐྱ་མི་ཏྟག་པར་རྒྱབ་པ་དང་།
 ཡང་བྱེ་བྲག་པས་གསལ་བྱེད་པའི་དོར་སྐྱ་མི་ཏྟག་པར་རྒྱབ་པ་
 གཉི་གའི་ཚེ་ཡང་། ལྷ་རྟོལ་ཕྱིར་རྟོལ་གཉི་གའི་སྤུན་མོང་མ་ཡིན་
 པའི་འདོད་པས་ཁྱད་པར་དུ་མ་བྱས་པའི་སྤྱི་སྤྱི་ཙམ་ཞིག་ཚོས་
 ཅན་དུ་འཛིན་པ་དེ་བཞིན་དུ། དབུ་མས་དངོས་སྤྱི་བའི་དོར་མིག་
 དང་གཟུགས་ལ་སོགས་པ་བདེན་པའི་སྤྱི་བ་མེད་པར་རྒྱབ་པ་
 དང་། གངས་ཅན་གྱི་དོར་བདག་ལས་སྤྱི་བ་མེད་པར་རྒྱབ་པ་
 སོགས་ཀྱི་ཚེ་ཡང་། ལྷ་རྟོལ་ཕྱི་རྟོལ་གཉིས་ཀྱི་སྤུན་མོང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་
 འདོད་པ་བདེན་རྒྱུན་གང་གིས་ཀྱང་ཁྱད་པར་དུ་མ་བྱས་པའི་
 མིག་སོགས་སྤྱི་ཙམ་ཞིག་ཚོས་ཅན་དུ་འཛིན་པས། ཚོས་ཅན་

མཐུན་སྒྲུབ་དུ་སྐྱབ་པའི་སྐྱོན་མེད་དོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་ལེགས་ལྡན་
འབྱེད་ཀྱི་འདོད་པ་བརྗོད་པའོ།

Wanting to undertake a refutation of that, [Chandrakīrti] initially demonstrates that [Bhāvaviveka's] meaning is not logically feasible; his *Clear Words* says:^a

That is not so. For, at just that time [of proving that eyes and so forth are without production]^b when a negation of production is

^a Toh 3860, *sde dge, dbu ma*, vol. 'a, 9b.3ff. The Sanskrit in La Vallée Poussin, *Prasannapadā*, 29.7-30.3, is:

na caitadevam/ yasmād yadaivotpādapratīṣedho'tra sādhyadharmo'bhīpretah/ ta-
daiva dharmīnastadādhārasya viparyāsamātrāsādītātmabhāvasya pracyutiḥ
svayamevānenāngīkr̥tā/ bhinnau hi viparyāsāvīparyāsau/ tadyadā viparyāsena
asatsattvena gr̥hyate, taimirikeṇeva keśādi, tadā kutaḥ sadbhūtapadārtha-
leśasyāpyupalabdhiḥ/ yadā ca avīparyāsādabhūtaṁ nādhyāropitaṁ vitaimiri-
keṇeva keśādi, tadā kuto'sadbhūtapadārthaleśasyāpyupalabdhiḥ, yena tadānīm
saṁvṛtiḥ syāt/ ata evoktamācāryapādaiḥ - yadi kiṁcidupalameyaṁ pravartaye-
yaṁ nivartayeyaṁ vā/ pratyakṣādibhirarthaistadabhāvānme'nupālambhaḥ/ /iti/
yataścaivaṁ bhinnau viparyāsāvīparyāsau, ato viduṣāmviparītāvasthāyām
viparītasyāsaṁbhavātkutaḥ saṁvṛtaṁ cakṣuḥ yasya dharmitvaṁ syāt/ iti na
vyāvartate'siddhādhāre pakṣadoṣaḥ, āśrayāsiddho vā hetuadoṣaḥ/ ityaparīhāra
evāyam/.

For Jam-yang-shay-pa's explication of this passage according to Tsong-kha-pa's *The Essence of Eloquence* see Hopkins, *Chandrakīrti Undermines Bhāvaviveka's Assertion of Autonomy: Jam-yang-shay-pa's Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Compatibly Appearing Subjects*, 3 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version August, 2018: uma-tibet.org), 56-61. For Jam-yang-shay-pa's outline and occasional comments and Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub's copious annotations to Tsong-kha-pa's Great Exposition of Special Insight in his *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path* see Hopkins, *What is a Consequentialist? Tsong-kha-pa's Great Exposition of Special Insight with the Four Inverwoven Annotations: Compatibly Appearing Subjects*, 5 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version July, 2019: uma-tibet.org), 45-80, and without the annotations, 129ff. See also MacDonald, *In Clear Words: The Prasannapadā, Chapter One*, 104-113.

^b Gom-de Nam-kha-gyal-tshan's *Settling Difficult Points in the Opposite of the Consequences* (*thal bzlog gi dka' ba'i gnas gtan la 'bebs pa 'jam pa'i dbyang sgom sde nam mkha' rgyal mtshan gyis mdzad pa'i tshig gsal gyi lde mig*, BDRC W1KG9086-I1KG9107, 36b.4, and The Obligatory Texts [*Yig-cha*] for the Study of Madhyamika of Byes Grwa-tshan of Se-ra Monastery, Madhyamika Text Series, vol. 4 [New Delhi: Lha-mkhar yoñs-dzin bstan-pa-rgyal-mtshan, 1973], 634.4.1, glosses "at this time" (*gang gi tshes 'dir*) as "on this occasion of proving that eyes and so forth are without tru[ly established] production" (*mig sogs bden pa'i skye med du sgrub pa'i skabs 'dir*) and Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-

accepted as the predicate of the proposition, this one [Bhāvaviveka] himself indeed has asserted that the entities of the subjects—the substrata of that [predicate, the absence of production from self,] which gain their thingness through mere erroneous [consciousness]—have degenerated from [establishment] in suchness. Erroneous and nonerroneous are different .

Therefore, when, like the falling hairs and so forth [apprehended] by one with eye disease and so on, what is nonexistent is apprehended by an erroneous [consciousness] as just existing, how then could even a portion of an object existent [by way of its own character] be observed! When, like the falling hairs and so forth [not apprehended] by one without eye disease, the unreal is not superimposed by a nonerroneous [consciousness], how then could even the merest portion of nonexistent objects, veillings, be observed! Hence, the holy master [Nāgārjuna] also says [in the *Refutation of Objections*]:^a

If direct perception and so forth did observe some [inherently established] objects,
Then [it would be reasonable] to prove those or refute

drub's annotation in the *Four Interwoven Annotations*, 530.1, glosses “at this time” as “on this occasion of proving that eyes and so forth are without tru[ly established] production” (*mig sogs bden pa'i skye med du bsgrubs pa'i skabs 'dir*).

The predicate of what Bhāvaviveka is proving is an absence, or negation, of production (ultimately) with respect to the subject, eyes and so forth; in this sense, Chandrakīrti says, “when a negation of production (*utpādapraṭiṣedha*, *skye ba bkag pa*) is asserted (*abhipreta*, *'dod pa*) as the predicate of the proposition (*sādhyadharmā*, *bsgrub bya'i chos*).” Wayman (*Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real*, 311-312) misconstrues the sentence to read, “At the very time that he denies in this phase (of proof) an arising (in the absolute sense) and believes in a feature to be proved (the *sādhyadharmā*).” The Sanskrit double nominative *utpādapraṭiṣedho* and *sādhyadharmo* is rendered into Tibetan in a clear way as an objective nominative *skye ba bkag pa* and an adverbial accusative *bsgrub bya'i chos su*; the particle *su* means “as” and cannot be construed as “and”; hence, Chandrakīrti is providing the context for his following remarks—that of ultimate analysis, such as in this case when a negation of production is being asserted as, or taken as, the predicate of what one is proving.

Many Tibetan scholars take this as showing that Chandrakīrti is speaking only about occasions of debating about the final mode of subsistence of phenomena and that his remarks about no compatible subjects should not be extended to times when debating about conventional phenomena such as impermanence, since the question of whether the consciousness certifying the subject and so forth is valid with respect to the mode of subsistence is relevant only when one is debating about that mode of subsistence.

^a Stanza 30; P5228, vol. 95, 15.1.2. See also K. Bhattacharya, E. H. Johnston, and A. Kunst, *The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna* (New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978), 23.

[those in others' systems],
 But since those do not exist,
 There is no [chance for you] to censure me.

Because in that way, the erroneous and the nonerroneous are different, the erroneous do not exist in a state [directly perceiving] the nonerroneous. Therefore, how could there be a veiling, an eye, that is a subject! Hence, there is no overturning the fallacy of a position whose base is not established^a and the fallacy of a reason whose base is not established,^b and, therefore, this is just not a response.^c

དེ་ལ་དགག་པ་བརྗོད་པར་བཞིན་ནས་ཐོག་མར་དོན་མི་འཐད་
 བར་བསྟན་པ་ནི། ཚིག་གསལ་ལས་དེ་ནི་དེ་ལྟར་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། འདི་
 ལྟར་གང་གི་ཚེ་འདིར་སྐྱེ་བ་བཀག་པ་སྐྱབ་པར་བྱ་བའི་ཚས་སྲུ་
 འདོད་པ་དེའི་ཚེ་དེ་ལོ་ནར་དེའི་རྟེན་ཚས་ཅན་ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་ཅམ་
 གྱིས་བདག་གི་དངོས་པོ་རྟེན་པ་ནི་ཉམས་པར་གྱུར་པ་འདིས་
 རང་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ཁས་སྐྱབས་པ་ཉིད་དོ། ། ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་དང་ཕྱིན་ཅི་
 མ་ལོག་པ་དག་ནི་ཐ་དད་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། ། དེའི་ཕྱིར་གང་གི་ཚེ་རབ་
 རིབ་ཅན་གྱིས་སྐྱེ་ཤད་ལ་སོགས་པ་ལྟར་ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་གིས་ཡོད་པ་
 མ་ཡིན་པ་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་འཇིན་པ་དེའི་ཚེ་ནི་ཡོད་པར་གྱུར་
 པའི་དོན་ཆ་ཅམ་ཡང་དམིགས་པར་ག་ལ་འགྱུར། གང་གི་ཚེ་རབ་

^a *gzhi ma grub pa, asiddhādhāra.*

^b *gzhi ma grub pa, āśrayāsiddha.*

^c The *Four Interwoven Annotations* (533.4) makes it clear that the reference is to the hypothetical Bhāvaviveka's earlier answer, "The response that you have given is just not a response concordant with the fact (*khyed kyis lan biab pa 'di ni don dang mihun pa 'i lan ma yin pa nyid do*).” Bhāvaviveka's earlier answer was that just generalities are to be used as subject, predicate, and so forth without being qualified by the particular assertions of the two schools. Chandrakīrti's refutation of this is built around his perception that a tenet unacceptable to a Proponent of the Middle is automatically attached to the subject and so forth—inherent existence—because schools that propound inherent existence hold that the consciousness certifying the subject and so forth perform must certify their inherent existence.

{KEY: In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight indicates material added in place of ellipses, and magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis sign has been filled in.}

ཅན་མ་ཡིན་པས་སྐྱབས་པ་ལ་སོགས་པ་སྟར་བྱིན་ཅི་མ་ལོག་པས་
 ཡང་དག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་སྐྱོ་མི་འདོགས་པ་དེའི་ཚེ་ན་ཡང་། གང་
 གིས་ན་དེའི་ཚེ་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཏུ་འགྱུར་བ་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་གྱུར་
 པའི་དོན་ཆ་ཅམ་ཡང་དམིགས་པ་ག་ལ་ཡོད། དེ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ཕྱིར་
 སྐྱོབ་དཔོན་གྱི་ཞལ་ལྷན་ནས་ཀྱང་། གལ་ཏེ་མངོན་སུམ་ལ་སོགས་
 པའི། །དོན་གྱིས་འགའ་ཞིག་དམིགས་ན་ནི། །སྐྱབས་པའམ་བསྐྱོག་
 པར་བྱ་ན་དེ། །མེད་ཕྱིར་ང་ལ་ལྷན་ཀ་མེད། ། ཅེས་གསུངས་སོ། །
 གང་གི་ཕྱིར་དེ་སྟར་བྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་དང་། ཕྱིན་ཅི་མ་ལོག་པ་དག་ཐ་
 དད་པ་དེའི་ཕྱིར་བྱིན་ཅི་མ་ལོག་པའི་གནས་སྐབས་ན་ཕྱིན་ཅི་
 ལོག་པ་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ན་གང་ཞིག་ཚོས་ཅན་ཉིད་ཏུ་
 འགྱུར་བ་མིག་ཀུན་རྫོབ་པ་གལ་ཡོད། དེའི་ཕྱིར་གཞི་མ་གྲུབ་
 པའི་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་སྐྱོན་དང་གཞི་གྲུབ་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཀྱི་སྐྱོན་
 བསྐྱོག་པ་མེད་པ་ཉིད་པས་འདི་ལན་མ་ཡིན་པ་ཉིད་དོ། ཅེས་
 གསུངས་སོ།

With respect to explaining the meaning of this:

1. From “That is not so.” through “Erroneous and nonerroneous are different.” is a brief indication.
2. From “Therefore,” through “censure me.” is an extensive explanation.
3. From “Because” and below is a summary of the meaning.

འདིའི་དོན་བཤད་པ་ལ། དེ་ནི་དེ་སྟར་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། ཅེས་པ་ནས།
 ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་དང་ཕྱིན་ཅི་མ་ལོག་པ་དག་ནི་ཐ་དད་པ་ཡིན་ནོ་
 ཅེས་པའི་བར་ནི་མངོན་བསྟན་པའོ། དེའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེས་པ་ནས། ཅེས་
 གསུངས་སོ་ཅས་པའི་བར་ནི། ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་དང་ཕྱིན་ཅི་མ་ལོག་པ་

དག་ནི་ཐ་དང་པ་ཡིན་ནོ་ཅེས་པ་དེ་ཉིད་རྒྱས་པར་འཆད་པ་
 ཡིན་ནོ། གང་གི་སྤྱིར་ཅེས་པ་མན་ཆད་ནི་དོན་བསྐྱུ་བའོ། །

Concerning those, let us first explain meaning of the words of the **brief indication**. When Proponents of the Middle prove for the perspective of Proponents of [Truly Established] Things that eyes and so forth are without tru[ly established] production, the assertion that mere general eyes (*mig spyi tsam zhig*), not qualified with either truth or falsity, are held as subjects is not logically feasibly so, as follows. This Bhāvaviveka himself indeed has asserted the subjects—eyes and so forth, **the substrata of that** absence of tru[ly established] production (*de'i rten chos can*)—as having degenerated from **in suchness** (*de kho nar...nyams par*), that is, as not established **in suchness** (*de kho nar ma grub par*). The evidence for this is that here when—that is, due to, having taken eyes and so forth as the subjects, a negation of tru[ly established] production is accepted as the predicate of the proposition. In that case Proponents of the Middle must accept that those very eyes and so forth gain their thingness by mere erroneous consciousnesses polluted by ignorance, whereas Proponents of [Truly Established] Things assert eyes and so forth as objects found by nonerroneous consciousnesses not polluted by causes of mistake, whereby a subject such as eyes and so forth is not established in compatible appearance, for, objects found by erroneous consciousnesses and objects found by nonerroneous consciousnesses are different by way of mutual exclusion.

དེ་ལ་ཐོག་མར་མདོར་བསྟན་གྱི་ཚིག་དོན་བཤད། དབུ་མ་པས་
 དངོས་སྐྱུ་བའི་དོར་མིག་སོགས་བདེན་པའི་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པར་སྐྱབ་
 པའི་ཚོ། བདེན་རྒྱན་གང་གིས་ཀྱང་བྱུང་པར་དུ་མ་བྱས་བའི་མིག་
 སྐྱེ་ཙམ་པ་ཞིག་ཆས་ཅན་དུ་འཛིན་པར་འདོད་པ་དེ་ནི་འཐད་པ་
 དེ་ལྟ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ་འདི་ལྟར། དེ་ཁོ་ནར་བདེན་པའི་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་
 དེའི་དེན་ཚོས་ཅན་མིག་ལ་སོགས་པ་ཉམས་པར་གྱུར་པར་གྱུར་
 པ་སྟེ་དེ་ཁོ་ནར་མ་གྱུབ་པར་ལེགས་སྟན་འབྱེད་འདིས་རང་ཉིད་
 ཀྱིས་ཁས་སྐྱོངས་པ་ཉིད་དོ། དེའི་རྒྱ་མཚན་ནི། གང་གི་ཚོ་མིག་

{KEY: In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight indicates material added in place of ellipses, and magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis sign has been filled in.}

སོགས་ཚོས་ཅན་དུ་བྱས་པ་འདིར་བདེན་པའི་སྐྱེས་པ་བཀག་པ་
 བསྐྱབ་པར་བྱ་བའི་ཚོས་སུ་འདོད་པ་དེའི་ཚེ་སྟེ་དེའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། ། དེ་
 ལྟར་ན་དབུ་མ་པས་མིག་སོགས་དེ་ཉིད་མ་རིག་པས་བསྐྱད་པའི་
 ཤེས་པ་ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་ཙམ་གྱིས་བདག་གི་དངོས་པོ་རྟེན་པ་ཡིན་
 པར་ཁས་ལེན་དགོས་ལ། དངོས་སྐྱེ་བ་ནི་མིག་སོགས་རྣམས་
 འཇུག་རྒྱས་མ་བསྐྱད་པའི་ཕྱིན་ཅི་མ་ལོག་པའི་ཤེས་པས་རྟེན་
 དོན་ཡིན་པར་ཁས་ལེན་པས་ཚོས་ཅན་མིག་སོགས་མཐུན་སྣང་དུ་
 འགྲུབ་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་གི་ཤེས་པས་རྟེན་པའི་དོན་
 དང་ཕྱིན་ཅི་མ་ལོག་པའི་ཤེས་པས་རྟེན་པའི་དོན་དག་ནི་པན་
 ཚུན་སྤངས་པའི་སྒོ་ནས་ཐ་དང་པ་ཡིན་རོ། །

The extensive explanation of just that. Because of this difference, when valid cognitions—apprehending, that is, perceiving, forms and so forth that are **not** existent by way of their own character as just existing by way of their own character due to the error of pollution by ignorance, like the falling hairs and so forth [perceived] by one with eye disease and so on—find forms and so forth as existing, how could even a portion of an object existent by way of its own character be observed!

Those valid cognitions do not find forms and so forth as existing by way of their own character. And also when a Superior's nonerroneous pristine wisdom not polluted by ignorance, the cause of mistake, does not superimpose the unreal on forms and so forth, like the falling hairs and so forth [not perceived] by one without eye disease, valid cognitions finding those very forms and so forth as existing are mistaken consciousnesses, and due to the fact that a nonmistaken valid cognition does not find forms and so forth as existing, how then could a nonerroneous pristine wisdom of a Superior observe even the merest portion of objects such as forms and so forth, veilings, not established by way of their own character, when it has been generated, that is, in its perceptual perspective! Because a valid cognition comprehending an object established by way of its own character does not exist, the holy master [Nāgārjuna] says [in his *Refutation of*

Objections]:^a

If direct perception and so forth did observe some objects,
Then those would be fit to be proved or refuted,
But since those do not exist,
There is no censuring of me.

དེ་ཉིད་རྒྱལ་པར་འཚད་པ་ནི། ཐ་དད་པ་དེའི་སྤྱིར་གང་གི་ཚེ་
རབ་རིབ་ཅན་གྱིས་སྐྱེ་ཤད་ལ་སོགས་པ་ལྟར་མ་རིག་པས་བསྐྱེད་
པའི་སྤྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་གིས་གཟུགས་སོགས་རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་
ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་འཇིན་པ་
སྟེ་སྤང་བའི་ཚད་མས་གཟུགས་སོགས་ཡོད་པར་རྟེན་པ་དེའི་ཚེ་
ནི། གཟུགས་སོགས་རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ཡོད་པའི་དོན་ཆ་
ཅམ་ཡང་དམིགས་པར་ག་ལ་འགྱུར་ཏེ། ཚད་མ་དེས་གཟུགས་
སོགས་རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ཡོད་པར་རྟེན་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཞིང་།
གང་གི་ཚེ་རབ་རིབ་ཅན་མ་ཡིན་པས་སྐྱེ་ཤད་ལ་སོགས་པ་ལྟར་
གཟུགས་སོགས་དེ་ཉིད་ཡང་དག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་སྐྱོ་མི་འདོགས་
པ་མ་རིག་པའི་འཇུལ་རྒྱལ་མ་བསྐྱེད་པའི་འཕགས་པའི་ཡེ་ཤེས་
སྤྱིན་ཅི་མ་ལོག་པས་རྟེན་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་དེའི་ཚེ་ན་ཡང་གཟུགས་
སོགས་དེ་ཉིད་ཡོད་པར་རྟེན་པའི་ཚད་མ་འཇུལ་ཤེས་ཡིན་ཅིང་།
མ་འཇུལ་བའི་ཚད་མས་གཟུགས་སོགས་ཡོད་པར་མ་རྟེན་པའི་རྒྱ་
མཚན་གང་གིས་ན་སྤྱིན་ཅི་མ་ལོག་པའི་འཕགས་པའི་ཡེ་ཤེས་
སྐྱེས་པ་དེའི་ཚེ་སྟེ་དེའི་གཟིགས་དོན་ཀུན་རྫོབ་དུ་འགྱུར་བ་རང་
གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་གྱུར་པའི་དོན་གཟུགས་

^a Stanza 30; Peking 5228, vol. 95, 15.1.2; Khay-drub cites only the first line with “and so forth”; I have filled in the rest. See also K. Bhattacharya, E. H. Johnston, and A. Kunst, *The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna* (New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978), 23.

{KEY: In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight indicates material added in place of ellipses, and magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis sign has been filled in.}

སོགས་ཆ་ཅམ་ཡང་དམིགས་པ་ག་ལ་ཡོད། རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་
 གྱིས་ཐུབ་པའི་དོན་འཇལ་བའི་ཚད་མ་མེད་པ་དེ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ཕྱིར་
 རྫོབ་དཔོན་གྱི་ཞལ་སྤྱོད་ནས་ཀྱང་། གལ་ཏེ་མངོན་སུམ་ལ་སོགས་
 པའི་[[དོན་གྱིས་འགའ་ཞིག་དམིགས་ན་ནི། །བསྐྱབ་པའམ་བསྐྱོག་པར་བྱ་ན་དེ། མེད་
 ཕྱིར་ང་ལ་ལྟན་ཀ་མེད།] ཞེས་སོགས་གསུངས་སོ། །

Summary. Because in that way, the two—the objects found by an erroneous consciousness and the objects found by a nonerroneous nonmistaken consciousness of a Superior’s meditative equipoise are different from the viewpoint of being contradictory in the sense of being mutually exclusive, objects found by mistaken consciousness do not exist in the perspective of directly perceiving nonerroneous suchness, a nonerroneous state. Consequently, the fallacies of a position whose subject is not established and the fallacy of a reason whose basal subject is not established—in which a subject established in compatible appearance for both disputants is not established—are not reversible; hence, this is just not a response.^a That is the meaning.

དོན་བསྐྱབ་ནི། གང་གི་ཕྱིར་དེ་ལྟར་ཅི་ལོག་པའི་ཚད་མས་རྙེད་
 པའི་དོན་དང་། ཕྱིན་ཅི་མ་ལོག་པ་མ་འཇུག་པའི་ཚད་མས་རྙེད་
 པའི་དོན་དག་པམ་ཚུན་སྤངས་ཏེ་གནས་པའི་སྐོན་ནས་ཐ་དད་པ་
 དེའི་ཕྱིར། ཕྱིན་ཅི་མ་ལོག་པའི་གནས་སྐབས་དེ་ལོ་ན་ཉིད་རྟོགས་
 པའི་མ་འཇུག་པའི་ཚད་མའི་གཟིགས་དོན། ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་འཇུག་
 པའི་ཚད་མས་རྙེད་དོན་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ན། གང་ཞིག་
 མོལ་བ་གཉི་ག་ལ་མཐུན་སྤང་དུ་འགྲུབ་པའི་ཚོས་ཅན་ཉིད་མ་

^a Bhāvaviveka’s earlier answer was that just generalities are to be used as subject, predicate, and so forth without being qualified by the particular assertions of the two schools. Chandrakīrti’s refutation of this is built around his perception that a tenet unacceptable to a Proponent of the Middle is automatically attached to the subject and so forth—the assertion of inherent existence—because schools that propound inherent existence hold that the consciousness certifying the subject and so forth perform must, according to their system, certify the inherent existence of the subject and so forth.

གྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་སྐྱོན་དང་། གཞི་ཚོས་ཅན་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་གཏན་
 ཚིགས་ཀྱི་སྐྱོན་བརྗོད་པ་མེད་པ་ཉིད་པས་འདི་ལན་མ་ཡིན་པ་
 ཉིད་དོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་དོན་དོ། །

Moreover, although Autonomists accept forms and so forth as not truly established even in conventional terms and accept that the eye consciousnesses and so forth of the short-sighted as valid cognitions unmistakable with respect to the own-character of forms and so forth, they must assert that if forms and so forth are not truly established in conventional terms, forms and so forth must not be established also by way of its own character in conventional terms and thus must assert that eye consciousnesses and so forth to which [forms and so forth] appear as established by way of their own character are mistaken, due to which they must accept forms and so forth as objects found by mistaken valid cognitions, and thus in the systems of Proponents of [Truly Established] Things forms and so forth are objects found by valid cognitions unmistakable with respect to objects of comprehension that are necessarily established by way of their own character, whereby since subjects established in compatible appearance are not logically feasible, it is forced by reasoning that “It is not reasonable to state autonomous signs,” thereby demonstrating the contradiction in asserting all phenomena as not truly established and asserting autonomy. The evidence why whoever is a Proponent of the Middle it is unreasonable to assert autonomy is also just this.

དེ་ཡང་དབུ་མ་རང་རྒྱུད་པ་དག་གཟུགས་སོགས་ཐ་སྐད་དུ་ཡང་
 བདེན་པར་མ་གྲུབ་པར་འདོད་ཅིང་། ཚུར་མཐོང་གི་མིག་གི་རྣམ་
 པར་ཤེས་པ་ལ་སོགས་པ་རྣམས་གཟུགས་སོགས་ཀྱི་རང་གི་མཚན་
 ཉིད་ལ་མ་འཇུག་པའི་ཚད་མར་འདོད་ཀྱང་། གཟུགས་སོགས་ཐ་
 སྐད་དུ་བདེན་པར་མ་གྲུབ་ན་ཐ་སྐད་དུ་རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་
 ཀྱང་མ་གྲུབ་དགོས་ཤིང་། དེ་ལྟར་ན་རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་
 གྲུབ་པར་སྐང་བའི་མིག་ཤེས་སོགས་འཇུག་པར་ཁས་ལེན་དགོས་
 པས། གཟུགས་སོགས་རྣམས་འཇུག་པའི་ཚད་མས་རྙེད་དོན་དུ་

{KEY: In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight indicates material added in place of ellipses, and magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis sign has been filled in.}

འདོད་དགོས་ལ། དེ་སྟར་ན་དངོས་སྣ་བའི་ལྷགས་ལ་ནི་གཟུགས་
 སོགས་རྣམས་རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་གྲུབ་པའི་གཞལ་བྱ་ལ་མ་
 འཇུག་བའི་ཚད་མས་རྙེད་དོན་ཡིན་པས་ཁྱབ་པའི་སྤྱིར་ཚོས་ཅན་
 མཐུན་སྣང་དུ་གྲུབ་པ་མི་འཐད་པས། རང་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་རྟགས་འགོད་
 པར་མི་རིགས་སོ་ཞེས་རིགས་པས་སྤུལ་ནས། ཚོས་ཐམས་ཅད་
 བདེན་མེད་དུ་ཁས་ལེན་པ་དང་རང་རྒྱུད་ཁས་ལེན་པ་ལ་འགལ་
 བ་སྟོན་ཡིན་ལ། དཔུ་མ་བ་ཡིན་ན་རང་རྒྱུད་ཁས་ལེན་པར་མི་
 རིགས་པའི་རྒྱ་མཚན་ཀྱང་འདི་ཉིད་ཡིན་ལོ། །

After that, wanting to demonstrate a qualitative dissimilarity with the example mentioned, Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* says:^a

The example also lacks similarity [with the intended meaning]. Even if there [in the example] general sound and general impermanence that are not wished to be expressed as qualified [with particular tenets] do exist for both [parties], nevertheless proponents of emptiness and proponents of non-emptiness do not assert

^a Toh 3860, *sde dge, dbu ma*, vol. 'a, 10a.1-10a.2. The Sanskrit in P. L. Vaidya, [Madh-yamakaśāstravṛtti](#), (online version of Darbhanga: The Mithila Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning, 1960), (corresponding to La Vallée Poussin, *Prasannapadā*, 30.12-30.14), is:

nidarśanasyāpi nāsti sāmyam | tatra hi śabdasāmānyamanityatāsāmānyam ca
 avivakṣita-viśeṣaṁ dvayorapi saṁvidyate | na tvevaṁ cakṣuḥ sāmānyam
 sūnyatāsūnyatāvādibhyāṁ saṁvṛtyā ṅgīkṛtaṁ nāpi paramārthataḥ | iti nāsti ni-
 darśanasya sāmyam ||

For Jam-yang-shay-pa's explication of this passage according to Tsong-kha-pa's *The Essence of Eloquence* see Hopkins, *Chandrakīrti Undermines Bhāvaviveka's Assertion of Autonomy: Jam-yang-shay-pa's Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Compatibly Appearing Subjects*, 3 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version August, 2018: [uma-tibet.org](#)), 68-78. For Jam-yang-shay-pa's outline and occasional comments and Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub's copious annotations to Tsong-kha-pa's Great Exposition of Special Insight in his *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path* see Hopkins, *What is a Consequentialist? Tsong-kha-pa's Great Exposition of Special Insight with the Four Inverwoven Annotations: Compatibly Appearing Subjects*, 5 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version July, 2019: [uma-tibet.org](#)), 80ff., and without the annotations, 144ff. See also MacDonald, *In Clear Words: The Prasannapadā, Chapter One*, 113.

in that fashion general eyes conventionally and also not ultimately; hence, the example lacks similarity [with the exemplified meaning].^a

དེའི་འོག་ཏུ་དབེ་སྐྱེས་པ་དེ་ཉིད་དང་ཚོས་མི་མཚུངས་པར་
བསྟན་པར་བཞིན་ནས་ཚོག་གསལ་ལས། དབེ་ལ་ཡང་འདྲ་བ་
ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། དེ་ནི་སྐྱེའི་སྐྱི་དང་མི་རྟག་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་སྐྱི་ཁྱད་
པར་བཅོལ་བར་མི་འདོད་པ་གཉིས་ཀ་ལ་ཡང་ཡོད་ན། དེ་བཞིན་
ཏུ་མིག་གི་སྐྱི་ནི་སྟོང་པ་ཉིད་དང་སྟོང་པ་ཉིད་མ་ཡིན་པར་སྐྱབ་
དག་གིས་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཏུ་ཡང་ཁས་མ་སྐྱབས་ལ། དོན་དམ་པར་ཡང་
མ་ཡིན་པས་དབེ་ལ་འདྲ་བ་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། ཅེས་གསུངས་ཏེ།

The meaning of this. Although sound that is not either a derivative of elements or a quality of space exists in conventional terms in the systems of those two disputants, the making of the distinction that forms and so forth that are not either true or false—established in compatible appearance in the systems of the two, Proponents of [Truly Established] Things and Proponents of the Middle—do not exist have no chance of coming to those whose awareness have turned a bit toward the differentiations of tenets, and above!

དེའི་དོན་ནི་འབྱུང་འབྱུར་དང་ནམ་མཁའི་ཡོན་ཏན་གང་ཡང་
མ་ཡིན་པའི་སྐྱ་ཚོལ་པ་དེ་གཉིས་ཀྱི་ལུགས་ལ་ཐ་སྟོན་ཏུ་ཡོད་
ཀྱང་བདེན་རྒྱུན་གང་ཡང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་གཟུགས་སོགས་དངོས་སྐྱབ་
བ་དང་དབུ་མ་པ་གཉིས་ཀྱི་ལུགས་ལ་མཐུན་སྐྱང་ཏུ་གྲུབ་པ་མེད་
ཅེས་འི་ཁྱད་པར་འབྱེད་པ་ནི་གྲུབ་མཐའི་རྣམ་དབྱེ་ལ་སྟོ་ཁ་ཆ་
ཅོམ་ཕྱོགས་པ་ཡན་ཆད་ལ་འོང་བའི་སྐབས་མེད་དོ། །

Hence, it is this: When a Buddhist proves for the perspective of a Vaisheshika that sound is impermanent, then although [their consciences] do not serve as a valid cognition with respect to any factor of (1)

^a The example is not similar to what it is intended to exemplify.
{KEY: In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight indicates material added in place of ellipses, and magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis sign has been filled in.}

sound being a derivative of the elements and (2) sound being a quality of space, [a consciousness] that serves as a valid cognition with respect to a mere sound *established by way of its own character* exists in the systems of both disputants, whereby the apprehension of mere sound—the object found by that valid cognition—as the subject is a deeply held assertion by both of those disputants. However, in the systems of both the Proponents of the Middle and the Proponents of [Truly Established] Things [a consciousness] that is not a valid cognition unmistaken with respect to eyes and is also not a valid cognition mistaken with respect to eyes but is a valid cognition with respect to mere eyes does not occur [that is, is impossible]; hence, general eyes that on the one hand (*yang*) are not objects found by unmistaken valid cognition and also are not objects found by mistaken valid cognition are not asserted even conventionally by proponents of emptiness and proponents of non-emptiness and are not asserted also ultimately. Therefore, [this is] the meaning of “the example lacks similarity [with the exemplified meaning].”

དེས་ན་འདི་ཡིན་ཏེ། སངས་རྒྱལ་པས་བྱེ་བྲག་པའི་ངོར་སྐྱ་མི་རྟག་
 པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་ཚེ། སྐྱ་འབྱུང་གྱུར་ཡིན་པ་དང་ནམ་མཁའི་ཡོན་
 །ཏན་ཡིན་པ་གང་གི་ཚལ་ཡང་ཚད་མར་མ་སོང་གྲང་རང་གི་
 མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་གྲུབ་པའི་སྐྱ་ཅམ་ལ་ཚད་མར་སོང་བ་སྐོལ་བ་དེ་
 གཉི་གའི་ལྷགས་ལ་ཡོད་པས། ཚད་མ་དེས་རྙེད་དོན་དུ་གྱུར་བའི་
 སྐྱ་ཅམ་ཞིག་ཚོས་ཅན་དུ་འཛིན་པ་སྐོལ་བ་དེ་གཉི་གའི་ཞེ་འདོད་
 ཡིན་ལ། མིག་ལ་མ་འབྲུལ་བའི་ཚད་མར་ཡང་མ་སོང་འབྲུལ་པའི་
 ཚད་མར་ཡང་མ་སོང་གྲང་མིག་ཅམ་ལ་ཚད་མར་སོང་བ་དབྱུ་མ་
 པ་དང་དངོས་སྐྱ་བ་གཉི་གའི་ལྷགས་ལ་མི་སྲིད་པས། མ་འབྲུལ་
 བའི་ཚད་མས་རྙེད་དོན་ཡང་མ་ཡིན་འབྲུལ་བའི་ཚད་མས་རྙེད་
 དོན་ཡང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་མིག་གི་སྐྱི་ནི་སྟོང་པ་ཉིད་དང་སྟོང་པ་
 ཉིད་མ་ཡིན་པར་སྐྱ་བ་དག་གིས་ཀུན་རྫོབ་དུ་ཡང་ཁས་མ་བླངས་

ལ་དོན་དམ་པར་ཡང་ཁས་སྒྲངས་པ་མ་ཡིན་པས་དབེ་ལ་འདྲ་བ་
ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཅོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་དོན་རྟོ། །

To show through that mode that the reason used also is not established in compatible appearance for a Proponent of [Truly Established] Things and a Proponent of the Middle, Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* says:

Just this mode of expressing the fallacy of the position [that is, thesis,] which is that the substratum [the subject] is not established is to be applied also in expressing the fallacy of nonestablishment with respect to this reason—“because of existing.”^a

It is easy to understand, in accordance with the earlier explanation, how to apply the evidence for the nonexistence of the mode of establishment—by valid cognition—of the sign in compatible appearance.

ཚུལ་དེས་དངོས་སྐྱབ་བ་དང་དབྱུ་མ་པ་ལ་སྐྱུར་བའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་
ཀྱང་མཐུན་སྒྲུང་དུ་གྱུབ་པ་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་སྟོན་པ་ནི། ཚིག་
གསལ་ལས། གཞི་མ་གྱུབ་པའི་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་ཉེས་པ་བརྗོད་པའི་ཚུལ་
གང་ཡིན་པ་འདི་ཉིད་ནི་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་གཏན་
ཚིགས་འདི་ལ་མ་གྱུབ་པའི་སྐྱུར་བརྗོད་པ་ལ་ཡང་སྐྱུར་བར་བྱའོ། །
ཞེས་གསུངས་ཏེ། ཏྲགས་ཚད་མས་གྱུབ་ཚུལ་མཐུན་སྒྲུང་བ་མེད་
པའི་རྒྱ་མཚོན་གོང་དུ་བཤད་པ་ལྟར་སྐྱུར་བ་གོ་སྐོའོ།

Immediately after that, Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* says:^b

^a Gom-de Nam-kha-gyal-tshan ends his commentary at this point.

^b Toh 3860, *sde dge, dbu ma*, vol. 'a, 10a.1-10a.2. The Sanskrit in P. L. Vaidya, *Madh-yamakaśāstravṛtti*, (online version of Darbhanga: The Mithila Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning, 1960), (corresponding to La Vallée Poussin, *Prasannapadā*, 30.15-31.13), is:

yaścāyamasiddhādhārapakṣadoṣodbhāvane vidhiḥ, eṣa eva sattvādityasya
hetorasiddhārthatodbhāvane'pi yojyaḥ || itthaṁ caitadevam, yatsvayamaśya-
nenāyaṁ yathokto'rtho'bhyupagatastārkikeṇa | santyevādhyātmikā yatanot-
pādakā hetvādayaḥ , tathā tathāgatena nirdeśāt | yaddhi yathā tathāgatenāsti
nirdiṣṭaṁ tattathā, tadyathā śāntaṁ nirvāṇamiti || asya paropakṣiptasya

For, this logician [Bhāvaviveka] himself [comes to] assert the points as explained earlier. How? Another stated this proof:

Causes and so forth producing the internal sense-spheres just exist because the One-Gone-Thus said so. Whatever the One-Gone-Thus said is that way, as, for example, is the case with his saying that nirvāṇa is peace.

དེའི་མཐུག་དེ་མ་ཐག་ཏུ་ཚིག་གསལ་ལས། གང་གི་སྲིད་ཇི་སྟོན་
 བསྟན་པའི་དོན་འདི་ནི་རྟོག་གི་པ་འདིས་རང་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ཁས་
 རྒྱུངས་པ་ཡིན་ཅོ། ། ཇི་སྟོན་ཞེ་ན། རང་གི་སྲིད་མཚེད་རྣམས་སྲིད་
 པར་བྱེད་པའི་རྒྱུ་ལ་སོགས་པ་ནི་ཡོད་པ་ཁོ་ན་ཡིན་ཏེ། དེ་སྟོན་དེ་
 བཞིན་གསེགས་པས་གསུངས་པའི་སྲིད་རོ། ། གང་དེ་བཞིན་
 གསེགས་པས་ཇི་སྟོན་གསུངས་པ་དེ་ནི་དེ་བཞིན་ཏེ། དཔེར་ན་སྲིད་
 རྣམས་འདས་པ་ནི་ཞི་བའོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་གཞན་གྱིས་བཀོད་པའི་
 རྒྱུ་བྱེད་འདི་ལ།

sādhanasyedarṅ dūṣaṇamabhihitamanena - ko hi bhavatāmabhipreto'tra hetvar-
 thah? saṃvṛtyā tathā tathāgatena nirdeśāt, uta paramārthata itī ? saṃvṛtyā cet,
 svato hetorasiddhārthatā | paramārthataścet, na sannāsanna sadasaddharmo nir-
 vartate yadā | sadasadubhayātmakakāryapratyayatvanirākaraṇāt, tadā -katham
 nirvartako heturevaṅ sati hi yujyate || naivāsau nirvartako heturiti vāk्यārthah |
 tataśca paramārthato nirvartyanirvartakatvāsiddheḥ asiddhārthatā vir-
 uddhārthatā vā hetoriti || yataścaivaṅ svayamevāmunā nyāyena hetorasid-
 dhiraṅgīkṛtānena, tasmātsarveṣvevānumāneṣu vastu dharmopanyastahetukeṣu
 svata evaṅ hetvādīnāmasiddhatvāt sarvāṅyeva sādhanāni vyāhanyante |

For Jam-yang-shay-pa's explication of this passage according to Tsong-kha-pa's *The Essence of Eloquence* see Hopkins, *Chandrakīrti Undermines Bhāvaviveka's Assertion of Autonomy: Jam-yang-shay-pa's Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Compatibly Appearing Subjects*, 3 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version August, 2018: uma-tibet.org), 79-95. For Jam-yang-shay-pa's outline and occasional comments and Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dōn-drub's copious annotations to Tsong-kha-pa's Great Exposition of Special Insight in his *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path* see Hopkins, *Finalizing the Meaning of Autonomist and Consequentialist: Tsong-kha-pa's Great Exposition of Special Insight with the Four Interwoven Annotations: Compatibly Appearing Subjects*, 6 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version September, 2019: uma-tibet.org), 25ff., and without the annotations, 91ff. See also MacDonald, *In Clear Words: The Prasannapadā, Chapter One*, 113-119.

To this, [Bhāvaviveka] set forth this fallacy with:

What are you asserting as the meaning of the reason? [Are you saying] “because the One-Gone-Thus said [such in terms of] conventional [existence]”^a or “because the One-Gone-Thus said [such in terms of] ultimate [existence]?” If conventionally, the meaning of the reason is not established for yourself, but if ultimately, [then as Nāgārjuna’s *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called “Wisdom”* says:^b]

When [one analyzes whether] the phenomena [of effects] exist,
Do not exist, or [both] exist and do not exist [at the time of their causes], they are [understood as] not established [by causes].

At that time, conditions [producing] effects that have a nature of existence, nonexistence, or both [at the time of their causes] are refuted. Therefore:^c

How could [an ultimately established definition, such as] “that which establishes”^d be [the definition of] causal [condition^e]?!

In that case, it is not feasible [to say that because the definition of causal condition ultimately exists, causal conditions ultimately exist].

The meaning of [Nāgārjuna’s] statement is that those [ultimately existent things] are just not causes producing [effects]. Therefore, because [we Proponents of the Middle assert that]^f what is established [that is, effects,] and establishes [that is, causes,] do not ultimately exist, this

^a The bracketed material in this sentence is from the *Four Interwoven Annotations*, 561.4ff.

^b I.7ab; the bracketed material in the stanza is from Tsong-kha-pa’s *Ocean of Reasoning*, 77.3ff. (Varanasi 1973 edition).

^c I.7cd.

^d *sgrub byed, nirvartaka*; or “that which produces.”

^e *rgyu’i rkyen, hetupratyaya*.

^f The bracketed material in this sentence and the next is from the *Four Interwoven Annotations*, 562.4, except for “effects” and “causes” which come from the context above.

{KEY: In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight indicates material added in place of ellipses, and magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis sign has been filled in.}

reason is just nonestablished [for a Proponent of the Middle if the referent is to ultimate existence], and it is just contradictory [because this ultimately existent reason is very contradictory with a predicate of the proposition that is a conventionality].

འདིར་སྤོང་གྱིས་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཀྱི་དོན་དུ་འདོད་པ་གང་ཡིན་དེ་
བཞིན་གསེགས་པས་ཀུན་རྫོབ་དུ་དེ་སྐད་གསུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར་རམ།
འོན་ཏེ་དོན་དམ་པར་གསུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར། གལ་ཏེ་ཀུན་རྫོབ་དུ་ན་
ནི་རང་ལ་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཀྱི་དོན་མ་གྲུབ་པ་ཉིད་དོ། ། འོན་ཏེ་
དོན་དམ་པར་ན་ནི། གང་ཚེ་ཚོས་ནི་ཡོད་པ་དང་། ། མེད་དང་
ཡོད་མེད་མི་འགྲུབ་པ་དེའི་ཚེ་འབྲས་བུ་ཡོད་པ་དང་མེད་པ་དང་
གཉི་གའི་བདག་ཉིད་ཀྱི་རྐྱེན་བསལ་བའི་ཕྱིར། ཇི་ལྟར་རྒྱབ་བྱེད་
རྒྱ་ཞེས་བྱ། དེ་ལྟར་ཡིན་ན་མི་རིགས་སོ། ། དེ་ནི་རྒྱབ་པར་བྱེད་
པའི་རྒྱ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ཁོ་ན་འོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་ངག་གི་དོན་ཏོ། ། དེའི་
ཕྱིར་དོན་དམ་པར་བརྒྱབ་པར་བྱ་བ་དང་རྒྱབ་པར་བྱེད་པ་ཉིད་
མ་གྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར། གཏན་ཚིགས་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་དོན་ཉིད་དང་
འགལ་བའི་དོན་ཉིད་དོ་ཞེས་འདིས་རྒྱུན་འདི་རྒྱས་པ་ཉིད་དོ། །

Because this one [Bhāvaviveka] himself [comes] in this way to assert the nonestablishment of reasons, in all inferences in which he states phenomena that are actualities (*ngos po'i chos, vastudharma*)^a as reasons, the reason and so forth are not established for him, whereby all [his] proofs are destroyed.

གང་གི་ཕྱིར་དེ་ལྟར་འདིས་རང་ཉིད་ཀྱི་རྐྱེན་འདིས་གཏན་ཚིགས་
མ་གྲུབ་པར་ཁས་སྐྱེས་པ་དེའི་ཕྱིར་དངོས་པོའི་ཚོས་གཏན་

^a The Four Interwoven Annotations on (Tsong-kha-pa's) "Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path," 569.5, identifies this term as meaning "substantially established which is established by way of its own character" (*rang gi mshan nyid kyis grub pa'i rdzas grub*).

ཚིགས་སུ་བཀོད་པའི་རྗེས་སུ་དཔག་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་ལ་གཏན་
ཚིགས་ལ་སོགས་པ་རང་ལ་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར་སྐྱབ་པར་བྱེད་པ་
ཐམས་ཅད་རྣམ་པར་འཇིག་པར་འགྱུར་རོ། ། ཞེས་གསུངས་ཤིང་།

With respect to the meaning of this, other Tibetans who assert themselves to be followers of Chandrakīrti explain: About this statement by Bhāvaviveka:

Earth is not ultimately an entity of hardness because of being an element, like wind.

if it is stating “because of being an element ultimately,” it is not established for [Bhāvaviveka] himself, and if it is stating “because of being an element conventionally,” it is not established for the opposing party,^a the Proponent of [Truly Established] Things, whereby it would incur the fallacy of a non-established reason. If due to that mode it does not become a nonestablished reason, then it contradicts Bhāvaviveka’s own utterance in response to a reason stated by another, “because the One-Gone-Thus said so”:

If you are saying “because ultimately the One-Gone-Thus said,” it is not established for us Proponents of the Middle, and if you are saying “because conventionally the One-Gone-Thus said,” it is not established for you, whereby the reason incurs the fallacy of nonestablishment.

འདིའི་དོན་ལ་ལྷོ་བ་གྲགས་པས་རྗེས་སུ་འབྲང་བར་འདོད་པའི་
བོད་གཞན་དག་ན་རེ། ལེགས་ལྡན་འབྱེད་ཀྱི་ས་ནི་དོན་དམ་པར་
སྐྱ་བའི་ངོ་བོ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། འབྲུང་བ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ལྷང་བཞིན་ནོ།
ཞེས་བཀོད་པ་འདི་ལ་དོན་དམ་པར་འབྲུང་བ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་
ཞེས་འགོད་ན་རང་ལ་མ་གྲུབ་ལ། ཀུན་རྗེས་ཏུ་འབྲུང་བ་ཡིན་
པའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེས་འགོད་ན་ཕྱིར་རྗོལ་དངོས་པོར་སྐྱབ་པ་ལ་མ་གྲུབ་
པས་གཏན་ཚིགས་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་སྐྱོན་ཏུ་འགྱུར་རོ། ། ལྷལ་དེས་

^a *phyi rgol/ phyir rgol*; literally, “latter disputant,” the opposing disputant.
{KEY: In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight indicates material added in place of ellipses, and magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis sign has been filled in.}

གང་མཚན་མ་གྱུ་བ་པའི་སྐྱོན་དུ་མི་འགྱུར་ན། དེ་ལྟར་དེ་བཞིན་གཤམ་གསུངས་པའི་སྐྱིར་ཞེས་གཞན་གྱིས་བཀོད་པའི་གང་མཚན་ལ་དོན་དམ་པར་དེ་བཞིན་གཤམ་གསུངས་པའི་སྐྱིར་ཞེས་ཟེར་ན་དེད་དབུ་མ་པ་ལ་མ་གྱུ་བ་ལ། ཀུན་རྫོབ་དུ་གསུངས་པའི་སྐྱིར་ཟེར་ན་བྱེད་རང་ལ་མ་གྱུ་བ་པས་གང་མཚན་མ་གྱུ་བ་པའི་སྐྱོན་དུ་འགྱུར་རོ་ཞེས་ལེགས་ལྡན་རང་ཉིད་གྱིས་སྐྱེས་པ་དང་འགལ་བར་རོ་ཞེས་འཆད་དོ། །

Since such a mode of analysis is solely the self-decapitation of one in whom the procedure of reasoning had not formed, it is utterly not the thought of Bhāvaviveka, and hence also a refutation by the very mode of similar strength is not the thought of this passage in Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words*. Therefore, the meaning of that text is this: When Bhāvaviveka refutes the opponent, [Bhāvaviveka] is saying:^a

With respect to the meaning of the measure of what comes to be the sign in “because the One-Gone-Thus said so,” there is no possibility of a third category that is not either ultimately established or only conventionally established; hence, as which of these two do you assert it? If [that the internal sense-spheres have causes is] ultimately established, such is not established for a Proponent of the Middle, whereas if only conventionally, it is not established for the other party. Hence, there is the fallacy of the reason not being established for both parties.

དེ་འདྲ་བའི་བརྟག་པ་བྱེད་ལུགས་ནི་རིགས་པའི་རྣམ་གཞག་མ་ཆགས་པའི་ལྷག་ཚད་འབའ་ཞིག་ཡིན་པས་ལེགས་ལྡན་འབྱེད་གྱི་དགོངས་པ་གང་མ་ཡིན་ཞིང་། དེའི་སྐྱིར་ཚུལ་དེ་ཉིད་སྟོབས་མཚུངས་དེ་འདྲ་བས་འགོག་པའང་ཚིག་གསལ་གྱི་ལུང་དེའི་

^a Jam-yang-shay-pa cites the indented material in Hopkins, *Chandrakīrti Undermines Bhāvaviveka’s Assertion of Autonomy: Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Compatibly Appearing Subjects*, 3 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version August, 2018: uma-tibet.org), 83 (Tibetan 85).

དགོངས་པ་མ་ཡིན་མོ། ། དེས་ན་གཞུང་དེའི་དོན་ནི་འདི་ཡིན་ཏེ།
 ལེགས་ལྡན་འབྲེད་ཀྱིས་པ་རོལ་པོ་འགོག་པ་ན། དེ་བཞིན་
 གཤེགས་པས་གསུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེས་པའི་རྟགས་སུ་སོང་ཚོད་
 པོའི་དོན་དེ་དོན་དམ་པར་གྲུབ་པ་དང་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཙམ་དུ་གྲུབ་
 པ་གང་ཡང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱང་གསུམ་མི་སྲིད་པས་དེ་གཉིས་གང་
 དུ་འདོད། དོན་དམ་པར་གྲུབ་པ་ཡིན་ན་དབུ་མ་པ་ལ་མ་གྲུབ་ལ།
 ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཙམ་ཡིན་ན་པ་རོལ་པོ་ལ་མ་གྲུབ་པས་གཏན་ཚིགས་
 རོལ་བ་གཉི་ག་ལ་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་སྐྱོན་དུ་འགྱུར་ཞེས་གསུངས་པ་ལ།

The glorious Chandrakīrti's meaning is: Well then,^b Bhāvaviveka himself must assert that:

- also in the signs he states to prove for a Proponent of [Truly Established] Things that there is no truly established production, a third category of the two—subjects and signs—that is neither found by mistaken valid cognition or found by nonmistaken valid cognition does not occur, and
- since if they are objects found by nonmistaken valid cognition, they are not established for Proponents of the Middle, and if they are objects found by mistaken valid cognition, they are not established for Proponents of [Truly Established] Things,

the fallacies of nonestablished subject and reason are incurred because the reasoning [for having to do so] is parallel with Bhāvaviveka's own demonstration—to an opponent—of the fallacy of a nonestablished reason upon examination [of the syllogism stated by the Hearer sectarian].

^a For *song tshod po'i don* Jam-yang-shay-pa's citation reads *song tshod ces pa'i don* in Hopkins, *Chandrakīrti Undermines Bhāvaviveka's Assertion of Autonomy: Jam-yang-shay-pa's Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Compatibly Appearing Subjects*, 3 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version August, 2018: uma-tibet.org), 85.

^b This material, except for *dpal ldan zla bas 'o na*, is cited by Jam-yang-shay-pa in Hopkins, *Chandrakīrti Undermines Bhāvaviveka's Assertion of Autonomy: Jam-yang-shay-pa's Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Compatibly Appearing Subjects*, 3 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version August, 2018: uma-tibet.org), 87-88.

{KEY: In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight indicates material added in place of ellipses, and magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis sign has been filled in.}

དཔལ་ལྷན་ལྷ་བས་འོ་ན་ལེགས་ལྷན་འབྱེད་རང་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་དངོས་
 ལྷ་བའི་དོར་བདེན་པའི་སྐྱེ་མེད་སྐྱབ་པའི་རྟགས་བཀོད་པ་རྣམས་
 ལ་ཡང་ཚོས་ཅན་དང་རྟགས་གཉི་ག་འབྲུལ་པའི་ཚད་མས་རྙེད་
 པ་དང་མ་འབྲུལ་པའི་ཚད་མས་རྙེད་པ་གང་ཡང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་
 རླང་གསུམ་མི་སྲིད་ཅིང་། མ་འབྲུལ་བའི་ཚད་མས་རྙེད་དོན་ཡིན་
 བ་དབུ་མ་པ་ལ་མ་གྲུབ་པ་དང་། འབྲུལ་པའི་ཚད་མས་རྙེད་དོན་
 ཡིན་ན་དངོས་ལྷ་བ་ལ་མ་གྲུབ་པས་ཚོས་ཅན་དང་གཏུན་ཚིགས་
 མ་གྲུབ་པའི་སྐྱོན་དུ་འབྱུང་བར་ཁས་ལེན་དགོས་ཏེ། ལེགས་ལྷན་
 འབྱེད་རང་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་པ་རོལ་པོ་ལ་བརྟག་པ་བྱས་ནས་གཏུན་
 ཚིགས་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་སྐྱོན་བཟུན་པ་དེ་དང་རིགས་པ་མཚུངས་པའི་
 ཕྱིར་རོ། ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་དོན་ཏེ།

About this moreover,^a since according to Bhāvaviveka the subject and the sign are objects found by nonmistaken valid cognitions even in the system of the Proponent of the Middle in only conventional terms, he indeed explains that there is no fallacy of their not being established in compatible appearance in the systems of both parties, but the honorable Chandrakīrti refutes this upon demonstrating that it is internally contradictory for forms and so forth to be empty of true establishment and for an eye consciousness to be a nonmistaken valid cognition with respect to forms and so forth.

འདི་ལ་ཡང་ལེགས་ལྷན་འབྱེད་ལྷར་ན། ཚོས་ཅན་དང་རྟགས་ཐ་
 རྙེད་ཅམ་དུ་དབུ་མ་པའི་ལྷགས་ལ་ཡང་མ་འབྲུལ་བའི་ཚད་མས་
 རྙེད་དོན་ཡིན་པས་རྫོལ་བ་གཉི་གའི་^[L229a]ལྷགས་ལ་མཐུན་སྣང་
 དུ་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་སྐྱོན་མེད་ཅེས་འཆད་མོད་ཀྱང་། དཔལ་ལྷན་ལྷ་

^a This material, except for 'di la yang, is cited by Jam-yang-shay-pa in Hopkins, *Chandrakīrti Undermines Bhāvaviveka’s Assertion of Autonomy: Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Compatibly Appearing Subjects*, 3 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version August, 2018: uma-tibet.org), 88-89.

བས་གཟུགས་སོགས་བདེན་པར་གྲུབ་བས་སྟོང་པ་དང་། མིག་
 ཤེས་སོགས་གཟུགས་སོགས་ལ་མ་འཇུག་པའི་ཚད་མ་ཡིན་པ་ནང་
 འགལ་བསྟན་ནས་འགོག་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །

This^a “own-powered” (*rang dbang*) that is translated in the statement in Bhāvaviveka’s *Lamp for (Nāgārjuna’s) “Wisdom,”* “Expressed in terms of being done autonomously (*rang dbang du*) or as a repudiation,” is equivalent to “autonomous” (*rang rgyud, svatantra*). Hence, the meaning of an autonomous reason is that which generates an inference realizing a proposition upon the opponent’s having ascertained the subject, sign, example, and so forth and the three modes in the context of these objects being comprehended by valid cognition as autonomous, that is to say, as being established from their own side, in compatible appearance for both parties, without [just] being bound to the assertions of the opponent.

དེས་ན་ཤེས་རབ་སྟོན་མར། རང་དབང་དུ་བྱས་ནས་སམ། སྟན་
 འབྲིན་པའི་དབང་དུ་བྱས་ནས་བརྗོད་ཅེས་བསྐྱར་བའི་རང་
 དབང་ཅེས་པ་འདི་ཉིད་རང་རྒྱུད་དང་དོན་གཅིག་ཡིན་པས་ཕྱི་
 སྐོལ་གྱིས་ཁས་སྤངས་པ་ལ་མ་འབྲིས་པར་ཚད་མས་ཡུལ་རང་
 འོས་ནས་གྲུབ་ཚུལ་རང་དབང་དུ་གཞུགས་པའི་ཚུལ་སྐོལ་བ་གཉི་
 གའི་མཐུན་སྣང་དུ་གྲུབ་པའི་སྟོན་ནས་ཚེས་ཅན་དང་རྟགས་དཔེ་
 སོགས་དང་། ཚུལ་གསུམ་ཕྱི་སྐོལ་གྱིས་ངེས་པར་བྱས་ནས་བསྐྱར་
 བྱ་རྟོགས་པའི་རྗེས་དཔག་སྐྱེ་པ་རང་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཀྱི་
 དོན་ཡིན་ནོ། །

Therefore, when a reason is stated by two disputants—who have realized well the Consequentialist view—among themselves for the sake of delineating certain conventional presentations, the subject and the three modes

^a Parts of these two sentences are cited by Jam-yang-shay-pa in Hopkins, *What is a Consequentialist? Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight with the Four Interwoven Annotations: Compatibly Appearing Subjects*, 5 (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, version July, 2019: uma-tibet.org), 34; the entire two sentences are given in footnote b, 34. {KEY: In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight indicates material added in place of ellipses, and magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis sign has been filled in.}

are established in compatible appearance in the systems of both disputants, but it does not become an autonomous reason.

དེའི་སྤྱིར་ཐལ་འགྱུར་བའི་ལྷ་བ་ལེགས་པར་རྟོགས་པའི་རྫོལ་བ་
 གཉིས་ཀྱིས་ཐ་སྐྱད་ཀྱི་རྣམ་གཞག་འགའ་ཞིག་གཏན་ལ་དབབ་
 པའི་སྤྱིར་དུ་ནང་པན་ཚུན་བཀོད་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ལ་ཚེས་ཅན་
 དང་ཚུལ་གསུམ་རྫོལ་བ་གཉི་གའི་ལུགས་ལ་མཐུན་སྐྱང་དུ་གྲུབ་
 ཀྱང་རང་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་གཏན་ཚིགས་སུ་འགྱུར་བ་མ་ཡིན་ལོ། །

Abbreviations

“co ne” = *co ne bstan 'gyur*. TBRC W1GS66030. *co ne dgon chen: co ne*, 1926.

“Dharma” = the *sde dge* edition of the Tibetan canon published by Dharma Press: the *Nying-ma Edition of the sDe-dge bKa'-'gyur and bsTan-'gyur*. Oakland, Calif.: Dharma Press, 1980.

“Golden Reprint” = *gser bris bstan 'gyur* (Sichuan, China: krung go'i mtho rim nang bstan slob gling gi bod brgyud nang bstan zhib 'jug khang, 1989).

“Grags pa & rnam rgyal” = Palden Drakpa and Damdul Namgyal. *drang nges legs bshad snying po: The Essence of Eloquent Speech on the Definitive and Interpretable*, 84.16-103.5. Mundgod, India: SOKU, 1991.

“Karmapa *sde dge*” refers to the *sde dge mtshal par bka' 'gyur: A Facsimile Edition of the 18th Century Redaction of Si tu chos kyi 'byung gnas Prepared under the Direction of H.H. the 16th rgyal dbang karma pa* (Delhi: Delhi Karmapae Chodhey Gyalwae Sungrab Partun Khang, 1977).

“Peking” = *Tibetan Tripiṭaka: Peking Edition kept in the Library of the Otani University, Kyoto*. Edited by Daisetz Teitarō Suzuki. Tokyo, Kyoto, Japan: Tibetan Tripiṭaka Research Foundation, 1955-1961.

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“*stog Palace*” = *Tog Palace Manuscript of the Tibetan Kanjur* (Leh, Ladakh: Smarntsis Shesrig Dpemdzod, 1979).

“TBRC” = Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center (<http://www.tbrc.org>).

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- Dharmakīrti (*chos kyi grags pa*, seventh century)
Seven Treatises on Valid Cognition
Three resembling a body
 1. *Commentary on Valid Cognition / Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid Cognition”*
 pramānavārttikakārikā
 tshad ma mnam ’grel gyi tshig le’ur byas pa
 Tibetan digital reprint edition: In *bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4210)*. BDRC W23703.174:189-304 (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985).
 Peking 5709, vol. 130.
 Also: Sarnath, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1974.
 Sanskrit edition of first chapter: Input by Motoi Ono available from <http://gretil.sub.uni-goettingen.de/gretil.htm>; remaining chapters: *Dharmakīrti: pramānavārttikakārikā*, chapters 2-4 (without the Svarthanumana-chapter) Input by Motoi Ono. of Y. Miyasaka, *Pramanavarttikakarika* (Sanskrit and Tibetan). *Acta Indologica* 2, 1971/72, 1-206 http://gretil.sub.uni-goettingen.de/gretil/1_sansk/6_sastra/3_phil/buddh/dhkprvku.htm; also Digital Buddhist Sanskrit Canon <http://www.dsbproject.org/node/7047>
 Sanskrit: Dwarikadas Shastri. *Pramānavārttika of Āchārya Dharmakīrti*. Varanasi, India: Bauddha Bharati, 1968. Also, Yūsho Miyasaka. “Pramānavarttika-Kārikā (Sanskrit and Tibetan),” *Acta Indologica* 2 (1971-1972): 1-206. Also, (chap. 1 and autocommentary) Raniero Gnoli. *The Pramānavārttikam of Dharmakīrti: The First Chapter with the Autocommentary*. Rome: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1960.

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2. *Ascertainment of Valid Cognition*
 pramānaviniścaya
 tshad ma rnam par nges pa
 Tibetan digital reprint edition: In *bstan 'gyur (sde dge, 4211)*. BDRC W23703.174:305-462 (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985).
 Peking 5710, vol. 130.
3. *Drop of Reasoning*
 nyāyabinduprakaraṇa
 rigs pa'i thigs pa zhes bya ba'i rab tu byed pa
 Tibetan digital reprint edition: In *bstan 'gyur (sde dge, 4212)*. BDRC W23703.174:463-477 In *bstan 'gyur (sde dge)*. BDRC W23703.174:463-477 (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985).
 Peking 5711, vol. 130.
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4. *Drop of Reasons*
 hetubindunāmaprakaraṇa
 gtan tshigs kyi thigs pa zhes bya ba rab tu byed pa
 Tibetan digital reprint edition: In *bstan 'gyur (sde dge, 4213)*. BDRC W23703.174:477-511 (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985).
 Peking 5712, vol. 130.
5. *Analysis of Relations*
 sambandhaparīkṣā
 'brel pa brtag pa
 Tibetan digital reprint edition: In *bstan 'gyur (sde dge, 4215)*. BDRC W23703.174:513-523 (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985).
 Peking 5713, vol. 130.
6. *Proof of Other Continuums*
 samtānāntarasiddhināmaprakaraṇa
 rgyud gzhan grub pa zhes bya ba'i rab tu byed pa
 Tibetan digital reprint edition: In *bstan 'gyur (sde dge, 4219)*. BDRC W23703.175:712719 (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985).
 Peking 5716, vol. 130.
7. *Reasoning for Debate*
 vādanyāya

- rtsod pa'i rigs pa
Tibetan digital reprint edition: In *bstan 'gyur* (*sde dge*, 4218). BDRC W23703.175:654-712 (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985).
Peking 5715, vol. 130.
- Auto-Commentary on the "Commentary on Valid Cognition"*
tshad ma nram 'grel gyi 'grel pa
pramānavārttikavṛtti
Tibetan digital reprint edition: In *bstan 'gyur* (*sde dge*, 4216), BDRC W23703.174:523-732 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985).
- Dignāga (*phyogs kyi glangs po*, sixth century)
Compilation of Valid Cognition
pramānasamuccaya
tshad ma kun las btus pa
Tibetan digital reprint edition: In *bstan 'gyur* (*sde dge*, 4203). TBRC W23703.174:3-29 (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985).
Peking 5700, vol. 130.
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- Dra-ti (or, Pra-ti) Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub (*bra sti* [or, *par sti*] *dge bshes rin chen don grub*, 17-18th century)
Ornament for the Thought of (Tsong-kha-pa's) "Interpretable and Definitive: The Essence of Eloquence"^a / *Ornament for the Thought*
drang nges legs bshad snying po'i dgongs rgyan
Bylakuppe, India: Sera Je Printing Press: 1989.
- Treatise Commenting Completely on the Profound Difficult Points of the Great Treatise Differentiating Interpretable and Definitive Meanings: Ornament for the Thought of (Tsong-kha-pa's) "The Essence of Eloquence"*
drang ba dang nges pa'i don don nram par 'byed pa'i bstan bcos chen po legs par bshad pa'i snying po'i dka' gnas zab mo cha tshang bar 'grel pa'i bstan bcos legs par bshad pa'i snying po'i dgongs rgyan. BDRC W1CZ1982 (PDF of Sku 'bum byams pa gling edition, n.d.)
- Gen-dün-gya-tsho, Second Dalai Lama (*dge 'dun rgya mtsho*, 1476-1542)
Commentary on the Difficult Points of (Tsong-kha-pa's) "Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive": Lamp thoroughly Illuminating the Meaning of the Thought
drang nges nram 'byed kyi dka' 'grel dgongs pa'i don rab tu gsal bar byed pa'i sgron me
Tibetan digital reprint editions: BDRC W3MS878 (PDF of bkra shis chos sdings kyi par khang edition, Reb gong, n.d.). Also, in *gsung 'bum* (*dge 'dun rgya mtsho*). BDRC W861.2:607-817 (PDF of dkar mdzes par ma: [s.n.], [199-]).
- Ornament Vividly Clarifying the Thought of (Tsong-kha-pa's) "Explanation of (Chandrakīrti's) 'Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle"'"*
(*gsung 'bum thor bu las*) dbu ma 'jug pa'i nram bshad dgongs pa'i don rab tu gsal ba'i rgyan (dbu ma) (ya)
Tibetan digital reprint edition: in *gsung 'bum* (*dge 'dun rgya mtsho*). BDRC W861. 2: 819-1044. (PDF of *dkar mdzes par ma*: [s.n.], [199-]). Also, in *gsung 'bum* (*dge 'dun rgya mtsho*). TBRC W1CZ2857. 4: 313-562. (PDF of Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works & Archives, 2006). Also, BDRC W1CZ2258 (PDF of *ser smad dpe mdzod khang*, Bylakuppe, Mysore Distt., Karnataka, 1999), 101-347.
- Gom-de Nam-kha-gyal-tshan (*sgom sde nam mkha' rgyal mtshan*, 1532-1592)

^a Perhaps an earlier version of the next entry.

^b In Gen-dün-gya-tsho's Collected Works this immediately follows his *drang nges*, the previous work.

- Explanation of (Chandrakīrti's) "Supplement," Ford for Those Seeking Liberation: Ornament for the Thought of Chandrakīrti*
 dbu ma la 'jug pa'i nram bshad thar 'dod 'jug ngogs zla ba'i dgongs rgyan section within dga' ldan byang rtse'i dbu ma'i yig cha
 Tibetan digital reprint edition: In BDRC W30179. 1 vol. (PDF of New Delhi: Lha mkhar yongs 'dzin bstan pa rgyal mtshan, 1974).
- Settling Difficult Points in the Opposite of the Consequences: Key to (Chandrakīrti's) "Clear Words," Written by Jam-pay-yang Gom-de Nam-kha-gyal-tshan*
 thal bzlog gi dka' ba'i gnas gtan la 'bebs pa 'jam pa'i dbyang sgom sde nam mkha' rgyal mtshan gyis mdzad pa'i tshig gsal gyi lde mig (in the colophon Gom-de Nam-kha-gyal-tshan himself calls this: *Neck Ornament for the Fortunate Clarifying Difficult Points in the Indications of the Clear Words* [tshig gsal gyi tshig 'bru dka' ba'i gnad rnam gsal bar byed pa'i skal bzang mgul rgyan])
 In *The Obligatory Texts (Yig-cha) for the Study of Madhyamika of Byes Grwa-tshang of Se-ra Monastery, Madhyamika Text Series*, vol. 4, 563-641.
 New Delhi: Lha-mkhar yoñs-dzin bstan-pa-rgyal-mtshan, 1973.
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- Gung-thang Kön-chog-tan-pay-drön-me (*gung thang dkon mchog bstan pa'i sgron me, 1762-1823*)
Difficult Points / Beginnings of a Commentary on the Difficult Points of (Tsong-kha-pa's) "Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive": Quintessence of "The Essence of Eloquence"
 drang nges mam 'byed kyi dka' 'grel rtsom 'phro legs bshad snying po'i yang snying
 Tibetan digital reprint edition: In *gsung 'bum (dkon mchog bstan pa'i sgron me)*. BDRC W22185.2:369-686 (PDF of bla brang bkra shis 'khyil: bla brang dgon pa, 199-).
 New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1975
- Gung-thang Lo-drö-gya-tsho/ A-khu Lo-drö-gya-tsho (*gung thang blo gros rgya mtsho/ a khu blo gros rgya mtsho, 1851-1928/1930*)
Day-making Illumination Clarifying the Meaning of the Thought of (Jam-yang-shay-pa's) "Decisive Analysis of the Middle: Treasury of Scripture and Reasoning"
 dbu ma'i mtha' dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod kyi dgongs don gsal bar byed pa'i nyin byed snang ba zab lam lta ba'i mig 'byed
 Tibetan digital reprint edition: BDRC W140-11KG15988 (PDF of Lhasa: Ser gtsung nang bstan dpe nying 'tshol bsdu phyogs sgrig khang, 2009.)
- Gyal-tshab-dar-ma-rin-chen (*rgyal tshab dar ma rin chen, 1364-1432*)
Explanation of (Dharmakīrti's) Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Valid Cognition": Unerring Illumination of the Path to Liberation / Illumination of the Path to Liberation
 tshad ma nram 'grel gyi tshig le'ur byas pa'i nram bshad thar lam phyin ci ma log par gsal bar byed pa / nram 'grel thar lam gsal byed
 Tibetan editions: In *gsung 'bum (rgyal tshab rje, bla brang par ma)* TBRC W4CZ2710.5:229-410 (PDF of bla brang: bla brang bkra shis 'khyil, 1999).
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- Jam-yang-shay-pa Ngag-wang-tson-drü (*'jam dbyangs bzhad pa'i rdo rje ngag dbang brtson grus, 1648-1721/1722*)
Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive / Decisive Analysis of (Tsong-kha-pa's) "Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive": Storehouse of White Beryl of Scripture and Reasoning Free from Mistake, Fulfilling the Hopes of the Fortunate

- drang ba dang nges pa'i don mam par 'byed pa'i mtha' dpyod 'khrul bral lung rigs bai dūr dkar pa'i ngan mdzod skal bzang re ba kun skong
- Tibetan digital reprint edition: TBRC W22186.10:1-288 (PDF of bla brang bkra shis 'khyil, bla brang brka shis 'khyil dgon, publishing date unknown).
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- Great Exposition of the Middle / Decisive Analysis of (Chandrakīrti's) "Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle'" : Treasury of Scripture and Reasoning, Thoroughly Illuminating the Profound Meaning [of Emptiness], Entrance for the Fortunate*
 dbu ma chen mo / dbu ma 'jug pa'i mtha' dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zab don kun gsal skal bzang 'jug ngogs
- Tibetan digital reprint edition: In *gsung 'bum ('jam dbyangs bzhad pa'i rdo rje)*. TBRC W21503.9:11-894 (PDF of South India?: Gomang College?, 1997?).
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- Great Exposition of Tenets / Explanation of Tenets: Sun of the Land of Samantabhadra Brilliantly Illuminating All of Our Own and Others' Tenets and the Meaning of the Profound [Emptiness], Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning Fulfilling All Hopes of All Beings*
 grub mtha' chen mo / grub mtha'i mam bshad rang gzhan grub mtha' kun dang zab don mchog tu gsal ba kun bzang zhing gi nyi ma lung rigs rgya mtsho skye dgu'i re ba kun skong

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- Root Text of Tenets: Lion's Roar / Presentation of Tenets: Roar of the Five-Faced [Lion] Eradicating Error, Precious Lamp Illuminating the Good Path to Omniscience*
grub mtha' rtsa ba gdong lnga'i sgra dbyaṅs / grub pa'i mtha'i rnam par bzhag pa 'khrul spong gdong lnga'i sgra dbyaṅs kun mkhyen lam bzang gsal ba'i sgron me
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Clear Exposition of the Presentations of Tenets: Beautiful Ornament for the Meru of the Subduer's Teaching / Presentations of Tenets
grub mtha'i rnam bzhag / grub pa'i mtha'i rnam par bzhag pa gsal bar bshad pa thub bstan lhun po'i mdzes rgyan
- Tibetan digital reprint edition: In *gsung 'bum (rol pa'i rdo rje)*. TBRC W28833.7:7-220 (PDF of Pe Cin: krung go bod brgyud mtho rim nang bstan slob gling nang bstan zhib 'jug khang,

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- English translation of part of Consequence School chapter: Jeffrey Hopkins. *Emptiness Yoga: The Tibetan Middle Way*, 355-428. Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 1983.
- Je-drung She-rab-wang-po (*rje drung shes rab dbang po*)
- Delineation of the Difficult Points of (Tsong-kha-pa's) "Explanation of (Chandrakīrti's) 'Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle": Illumination of the Thought": Pellucid Clarification of (Tsong-kha-pa's) Thought*
- dbu ma la 'jug pa'i rnam bshad dgongs pa rab gsal gyi dka' gnad gtan la 'bebs pa dgongs pa yang gsal/ dbu ma'i spyi don dgongs pa yang gsal
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 dbu ma'i bstan bcos / dbu ma rtsa ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa shes rab ces bya ba
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 blo gsal gling dang bkra shis sgo mang grwa tshang gi dbu phar gyi yig cha'i bshad tshul bkod pa blo gsal dga' ston
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 Prajñāmokṣha (*shes rab thar pa*)
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 dbu ma'i man ngag ces bya ba'i 'grel ba
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 dbu ma rtsa ba'i 'grel pa 'thad pa'i snang ba
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Notes / Notes on (Tsong-kha-pa's) "Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive": Lamp Illuminating the Profound Meaning
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Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds
 bodhi[sattva]caryāvatāra
 byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa
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lam rim mchan bzhi sbrags ma/ mnyam med rje btsun tsong kha pa chen pos mdzad pa'i byang chub lam rim chen mo'i dka' ba'i gnad nmams mchan bu bzhi'i sgo nas legs par bshad pa theg chen lam gyi gsal sgron
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lam rim chen mo / skyes bu gsum gyi nyams su blang ba'i rim pa thams cad tshang bar ston pa'i byang chub lam gyi rim pa
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skyes bu gsum gyis nyams su blang ba'i byang chub lam gyi rim pa / skyes bu gsum gyi nyams su blang ba'i byang chub lam gyi rim pa bring po sa bcad kha skong dang bcas pa / lam rim 'bring / lam rim chung ngu
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Jeffrey Hopkins is Professor Emeritus of Tibetan Buddhist Studies at the University of Virginia where he taught Tibetan Buddhist Studies and Tibetan language for thirty-two years from 1973. He received a B.A. *magna cum laude* from Harvard University in 1963, trained for five years at the Lamaist Buddhist Monastery of America in Freewood Acres, New Jersey, USA (now the Tibetan Buddhist Learning Center in Washington, New Jersey), and received a Ph.D. in Buddhist Studies from the University of Wisconsin in 1973. He served as His Holiness the Dalai Lama's chief interpreter into English on lecture tours for ten years, 1979-1989.

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This book is the last of eight volumes presenting Tibetan views on the controversy that arose in Buddhist India over how to refute production from self. The dispute revolves around the opening phrase of the first stanza of the first chapter of Nāgārjuna’s *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called “Wisdom”*:

Not from self, not from others,
Not from both, not causelessly
Do any things
Ever arise anywhere.

Nāgārjuna’s principal Indian commentators explain the refutation of production from self in varying detail, the differences engendering the split between what came in Tibet to be called the Autonomy School and the Consequence School.

Buddhapālita’s commentary on the refutation of production from self provoked Bhāvaviveka into extensive criticism and into a demonstration of his own preferred style of commentary. Chandrakīrti defended Buddhapālita, counterattacking Bhāvaviveka’s way of refuting production from self; this turns into a discussion of compatibly appearing subjects, a source showing that Bhāvaviveka accepts that phenomena inherently exist.

This book is in some ways the most introductory of the eight volumes because it opens with the Second Dalai Lama Gen-dün-gyatsho’s lucid distillation of the core issue, showing how Chandrakīrti exposes Bhāvaviveka’s assertion of inherent existence. Then even though in the next three parts it examines how several Tibetan scholars read just a few words in the same passage in Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words*, this minute attention, because it focuses within the main issue, serves to provide further immersion in it. The impact is momentous as it reveals the conflict between how phenomena appear and actually exist, and thereby points to an identification of systemic ignorance and to the path of wisdom.

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