What is a Consequentialist?

Tsong-kha-pa’s
Great Exposition of Special Insight
with the Four Interwoven Annotations:
Compatibly Appearing Subjects, 5

Jeffrey Hopkins

Dual language edition by Craig Preston

UMA INSTITUTE
FOR TIBETAN STUDIES
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Translating texts from the heritage of Tibetan and Inner Asian Buddhist systems, the project focuses on Great Indian Books and Tibetan commentaries from the Go-mang College syllabus as well as a related theme on the fundamental innate mind of clear light in Tantric traditions. A feature of the Project is the usage of consistent vocabulary and format throughout the translations.

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Preface

THE AUTHOR: TSONG-KHA-PA LO-SANG-DRAG-PA

The Ge-lug-pa order of Tibetan Buddhism was founded by the yogi-scholar Tsong-kha-pa Lo-sang-drag-pa\(^a\) (1357-1419), the fourth in a family of six sons in the Tsong-ka region of the northeastern province of Tibet called Am-do.\(^b\) He took layperson’s vows at the age of three from the Fourth Karma-pa Röl-pay-dor-je\(^c\) and novice monastic vows at seven. He studied and practiced in Am-do until age sixteen, when he left for central Tibet, never to return to Am-do. There, Chö-je Don-drub-rin-chen\(^d\) advised him to study the Five Great Books of Indian Buddhism, which became the basic curriculum of sūtra study in the monasteries that Tsong-kha-pa and his followers established. From childhood, his study and practice were interlaced with tantra, and thus it is only a misimpression outside of Tibetan, Mongolian, and Chinese circles that he was not deeply involved with tantrism.

He studied a great deal with masters of the Ka-gyu\(^e\) and Sa-kyā\(^f\) orders. As Stephen Batchelor says in *The Tibet Guide*:\(^g\)

Tsongkhapa was born in 1357 in Amdo, the northeastern province of Tibet. During the time of the Third Dalai Lama his birthplace was marked by the erection of the Kumbum Jampa Ling Monastery near Xining. While still very young he was recognized as possessing unusual spiritual qualities and as a young man was sent to Central Tibet to further his understanding of Buddhism in the more cultured region of the country. The first monastery he visited was that of Drigung, where he studied medicine and the doctrines

\(a\) tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa.

\(b\) a mdo.

\(c\) karma pa rol pa ’i rdo rje (1340-1383).

\(d\) chos rje rin chen don grub.

\(e\) bka’ brgyud.

\(f\) sa skya.

of the Kagyu lineage. From here he proceeded to Netang, Samye, Zhalu, and Sakya monasteries. He met his main teacher Rendawa at Tsechen Monastery just outside Gyantse. For many years he studied the full range of Buddhist philosophy, including the more esoteric tantric systems. He then retreated to Olka, north of the Brahmaputra downstream from Tsetang, and spent the next four years in intense retreat. Upon returning to society he found himself much in demand as a teacher. One place where he taught was the hill in Lhasa on which the Potala was eventually built. Together with Rendawa he stayed for some time at Reting, where he composed his most famous work, *The Great Exposition of the Stages on the Path to Enlightenment*. After another meditation and writing retreat at Chöding Hermitage (above where Sera monastery now is), he founded, in 1409, the famous annual Mönlam (prayer) festival in Lhasa, which, after a twenty-five-year hiatus, was reinaugurated in 1986. (In the political unrest that followed the demonstrations of 1987 and 1988, it was canceled in 1989 and by 1994 had not been resumed.)

After the prayer festival Tsongkhapa decided to found his own monastery. He selected Mt. Drokri, a mountain upstream from Lhasa, and called the monastery “Ganden,” Tibetan for “Tushita,” the pure land where the future Buddha Maitreya resides. Within a year seventy buildings had been completed, but it was not until 1417 that the main hall of the monastery was consecrated.

Tsongkhapa died at Ganden two years later, in 1419, and shortly before his death passed the mantle of succession to Gyeltshab Je, one of his two chief disciples. Gyeltshab Je held the position of Ganden Tripa (Throne Holder of Ganden) until his own death twelve years later, when it passed to Tsongkhapa’s other chief disciple Khedrup Je. The post of Ganden Tripa was later given to the senior Dharma Master of one of the two main Ganden Colleges, Jangtse and Shartse. It was a five-year post for which to qualify one must first have obtained a geshe degree with highest honors (*lharampa*), proceeded to the abbotship of one of the two Lhasa tantric colleges, and from there been appointed Dharma Master of either Jangtse or Shartse college. The tradition has been continued in India. It is the Ganden Tripa, *not* the Dalai Lama, who heads the Gelukpa order.

During his lifetime Tsongkhapa was regarded as a remarkable spiritual figure whose genius and saintliness held him above the sectarian differences of his times. Although greatly inspired by the
example of Atisha, to the point of attributing authorship of his own major written work to him, and by the spirit of the Kadampa tradition, Tsongkhapa nonetheless studied widely with representatives of all the major orders in Tibet and assimilated their lineages. It is uncertain whether he intended to form his own order, though he must have realized it was liable to happen. He could not have foreseen, though, the dimensions this order (the Gelukpa) would eventually assume and the political power it would wield.

Over the following centuries Ganden Monastery grew to the size of a small township, delicately perched along the high sheltered slopes of the mountain. By 1959 this calm, secluded center of learning and contemplation housed more than five thousand monks, but with the Chinese occupation the monks were forced to scatter, and by the mid-sixties the monastery was nearly deserted. The final blow came with the cultural revolution. Coerced by the Chinese and caught up in the frenzy and terror of the times, the local Tibetans demolished the buildings. For many years only jagged ruins remained. The greater religious freedom permitted after the death of Mao allowed the laborious and gradual reconstruction of the monastery to begin. One by one the buildings emerged from out of the rubble and monks trickled back to their former home. Yet, perhaps because of its symbolic power as the stronghold of the previous spiritual rule as well as its distance from the capital, Ganden has been rebuilt largely through private funds and has received scant support from the government. Four hundred monks are officially allowed to live here now, although there are around six hundred actually in residence.

It strikes me that the construction of seventy buildings in one year and Tsong-kha-pa’s later instruction to two students to build other monastic universities in the Lhasa Valley—Dre-pung coming to have 2,000 monastic residents one year after commencement of construction—suggest that he did indeed intend to form a new order. In any case, the writings of his immediate followers, such as Gyal-tshab Dar-ma-rin-chen, Khay-drub...
Ge-leg-pal-sang, and the latter’s brother Ba-so-chö-kyi-gyal-tshan, clearly indicate the raising of Tsong-kha-pa to the status of saint and founder of a new religious order.

His followers eventually came to have great influence throughout a vast region stretching from Kalmuck Mongolian areas, where the Volga empties into the Caspian Sea (in Europe), to Outer and Inner Mongolia, and the Buryat Republic of Siberia, as well as to most parts of Tibet and Ladakh. Tsong-kha-pa established a system of education centered in large monastic universities—eventually in three areas of Tibet which became some of the prime centers of religious education.

The form Buddhism took in Tibet was greatly influenced by the highly developed form of the religion present in India through the twelfth century and even later; the geographic proximity and perhaps relatively undeveloped culture of the region provided conditions for extensive, systematic transfer of highly developed scholastic commentaries and systems of practice. Unlike many of its East Asian counterparts, Tibetan Buddhism is centered not on Buddha’s word as found in sūtras and tantras but on Indian commentaries, many of which never made their way to East Asia. Scholasticism, therefore, often (but not always) occupies a more central place in aspects of Tibetan culture than it does farther east.

These Ge-lug-pa colleges came to share a curriculum that is based on Five Great Books of Buddhist India—a program of study that begins around age eighteen and lasts for about twenty-five years—but they use different textbooks that are commentaries on those Great Books. To prepare students for study of these texts, the curriculum begins with a class on introductory debate that serves to establish the procedure of outwardly combative but inwardly probing analysis used throughout the course of study. The debate format is at once individualistic, in the aim to win one-

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a mkhas grub dge legs dpal bzang, 1385-1438, born in the western province of Tibet, gtsang, in ldog gzhung; see José Ignacio Cabezón, A Dose of Emptiness: An Annotated Translation of the stong thun chen mo of mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzang (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1992), 14.
b ba so chos kyi rgyal mtshan, born 1402.
c In his condensation of Tsong-kha-pa’s biography, Geshe Ngawang Dhargey (“A Short Biography,” 9, 11) speaks of the Five Great Books as if the category with this name predates Tsong-kha-pa; this is possible, although it necessary to pursue whether Geshe Ngawang Dhargey is overlaying a system of education that developed based on Tsong-kha-pa’s advice or a system that his successors founded. For a list of the seventeen texts that Tsong-kha-pa taught in a three-month teaching, see Geshe Ngawang Dhargey, “A Short Biography,” 13-14.
on-one debates, and group-stimulated, in the sense that information and positions are acquired from fellow debaters in an ongoing network of communication and shared appreciation of insight. As further preliminaries, the classes study Awareness and Knowledge,a which is basic psychology, and Signs and Reasonings,b which is basic reasoning. Then begins the first of the Five Great Books: the coming Buddha Maitreya’s *Ornament for the Clear Realizations*,c a rendering of the hidden teaching on the path structure in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras, which, according to the tradition, were spoken by the Buddha of this age, Shākyamuni. In the standard Gelug-pa educational curriculum, six years are spent studying Maitreya’s *Ornament for the Clear Realizations*—a highly elaborate compendium on the paths that is not practiced in Tibet in its own form; rather, the long period of study is used to enrich understanding of a complex structure of spiritual development that provides an all-encompassing worldview daunting in its intricacy. Though the structure of the path, as it is presented in this text, does not provide the rubric of actual practice, much of its import is brought over to “stages of the path” literature, the practical implementation of which is certified by the great number of short texts in this genre aimed at daily meditation. The more complex system is dauntingly elaborate, such that it provides a perimeter within which the more practical teachings can be implemented.

Classes on Maitreya’s text (and the others) meet with a teacher for about two hours daily and then for two sessions of debates, each about two hours. Every year throughout the twenty-five-year program, time is taken out for pursuit of the second of the Great Books, Dharmakīrti’s *Commentary on Valid Cognition*d—largely though not only epistemological and logical studies.

Having settled the path structure through the study of Maitreya’s *Ornament for the Clear Realizations*, the class passes on to the third Great

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*c* mgon rtogs rgyan, abhisamayālaṃkāra; Peking 5184, vol. 88. A notable exception is the curriculum at the monastery of the Pan-chen Lama, Tra-shi-lhun-po Monastic University (bkra shis lhun po), where Dharmakīrti’s *Pramāṇavārttika* is the topic of this initial long period of study.

*d* tshad ma rnam ’grel, pramāṇavārttika; Peking 5709, vol. 130.
Book, Chandrakīrti’s Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle,” a to explore for two years the emptiness of inherent existence. Emptiness is the primary content of path consciousnesses and is the explicit

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a  *dbu ma la ’jug pa, madhyamakāvatāra:* Peking 5261, Peking 5262, vol. 98. Since Chandrakīrti often refers to Nāgārjuna’s *Treatise on the Middle* (*dbu ma’i bstan bcos, madhyamakaśāstra*) merely by the appellation *madhyamaka*, the *madhyamaka* of “madhyamakāvatāra” is held to refer to a text propounding the middle, specifically Nāgārjuna’s *Treatise on the Middle*. My translation of *avatāra* (’jug pa) as “supplement” is controversial; others use “introduction” or “entrance,” both of which are attested common translations in such a context. My translation is based on the explanation by Tsong-kha-pa that Chandrakīrti was filling in holes in Nāgārjuna’s *Treatise on the Middle*; see Tsong-kha-pa, Kensur Lekden, and Jeffrey Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism* (London: Rider, 1980; reprint, Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1980), 96-99. Among the many meanings of the Tibetan term for *avatāra*, ’jug pa can mean “to affix” or “to add on.” To summarize the oral teachings of the late Ngag-wang-leg-dan:

*Avatāra* means “addition” in the sense that Chandrakīrti’s text is a supplement historically necessary so as to clarify the meaning of Nāgārjuna’s *Treatise on the Middle*. He wanted to make clear that the *Treatise* should not be interpreted according to the Mind-Only system or according to the Middle Way Autonomy School (*dbu ma rang rgyud pa, sva-tantri-kamādhyamika*), the founding of which is attributed to Bhāvaviveka. During Nāgārjuna’s lifetime, Bhāvaviveka had not written his commentary on the *Treatise*, nor had he founded his system; therefore, it was necessary later to supplement Nāgārjuna’s text to show why it should not be interpreted in such a way. Moreover, it is said that Chandrakīrti sought to show that a follower of Nāgārjuna should ascend the ten grounds by practicing the vast paths necessary to do so. This is because some interpret the Middle Way perspective as nihilistic. They see it as a means of refuting the general existence of phenomena rather than just their inherent existence and conclude that it is not necessary to engage in practices such as the cultivation of compassion. Therefore, in order to show that it is important to engage in three central practices—compassion, non-dual understanding, and the altruistic mind of enlightenment—and to ascend the ten Bodhisattva grounds, Chandrakīrti—in reliance on Nāgārjuna’s *Precious Garland*—wrote this supplementary text.


teaching of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras.

The next Great Book is Vasubandhu’s *Treasury of Manifest Knowledge,*\(^a\) a compendium of the types and natures of afflicted phenomena and their causes as well as the pure phenomena that act as antidotes to them and the states of cessation brought about by these antidotes; this takes two years. The last Great Book is Guṇaprabha’s *Aphorisms on Discipline,*\(^b\) again studied for two years. At the end, there are several years for review and preliminary rounds of debate in preparation for the yearly debate competition.

Tsong-kha-pa wrote commentaries on Maitreya’s *Ornament for the Clear Realizations* and Chandrakīrti’s *Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle,”* and his two main students, Gyal-tshab and Khay-drub, wrote commentaries on Dharmakīrti’s *Commentary on Valid Cognition.* Gyal-tshab also wrote a commentary on Maitreya’s text, which is said to reflect Tsong-kha-pa’s more mature thinking later in his life.

These commentaries by Tsong-kha-pa and his two chief disciples are used by the colleges, along with Tibetan commentaries by Chim Jam-pay-yang\(^c\) and the First Dalai Lama, Gen-dün-drub,\(^d\) on Vasubandhu’s *Treasury of Manifest Knowledge* and Tso-na-wa’s and the First Dalai Lama’s commentaries on Guṇaprabha’s *Aphorisms on Discipline,* but Tsong-kha-pa’s works are not the chief textbooks in the monastic colleges. Given that the basic structure of the monastic university is to divide into camps that stimulate intellectual exchange, the main textbooks are sub-sub-commentaries written by prominent scholars, which present the aforementioned commentaries in a clearer format and attempt to resolve issues unclear (or confused) in those texts. These commentaries, called the college’s “textbook literature,”\(^f\) are the main focus, elevated even to a status of primary concern and adherence. Despite my dubbing them “sub-sub-commentaries,” their significance in the community is focal. (Perhaps due to Protestant emphasis on early Christianity, we often unwarrantedly assume that the focus of religious systems is on their founder and early history, whereas the focus in this system is on the thought of the author of the

\(^{a}\) chos mngon pa’i mdzod, abhidharmakośa; Peking 5590, vol. 115.
\(^{b}\) ‘dul ba’i mdo, vinayasūtra; Peking 5619, vol. 123.
\(^{c}\) mchims ‘jam pa’i dbyangs.
\(^{d}\) dge’ dun grub; 1391-1475, retrospectively called the First Dalai Lama when Sö-nam-gya-tso, the reincarnation of his reincarnation, received the title of Dalai.
\(^{e}\) msho na ra rin chen bsang po.
\(^{f}\) yig cha.
textbook literature, perhaps as a door to the thought of the founder of their sect but more likely as the embodiment of his thought appropriate to one’s own time. I do not deny that the “door analogy” leads back eventually to Shākyamuni Buddha; rather, it seems that the focus is on the more current.

In general, Ge-lug-pa doctrinal training can be divided into two types based on a division of texts into sūtra and tantra—both attributed to be Shākyamuni Buddha’s teachings that were committed to writing even many centuries later. The term “sūtra” can be used to refer to tantras, but here in the division of all of Buddha’s scriptures into the mutually exclusive categories of sūtra and tantra, it refers, roughly speaking, to those texts that are not based on the practice of deity yoga.⁸ “Tantra,” on the other hand, refers to texts and systems whose primary practitioners can employ deity yoga. In deity yoga, practitioners meditate on themselves as having the physical form not of an ordinary person but of a supramundane deity, an embodiment of the highest levels of wisdom and compassion.

Training in the systems that formed around sūtra-style teachings can be further divided into more practically oriented and more theoretically oriented modes of study. Both modes are concerned with both theory and practice, but the style of the former directly addresses particular meditation practices and behavior modification, whereas the style of the latter is primarily concerned with countering wrong ideas with scholastic arguments that, although they can be employed in meditation, are framed around critiques of issues largely in the format of debate—refuting others’ mistakes, presenting one’s own view, and then dispelling objections to it. Both systems are based on focal Indian books and Tibetan texts, the latter

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⁸ Here I am following Tsong-kha-pa’s presentation of the difference between sūtra and tantra in his Great Exposition of Secret Mantra (sngags rim chen mo) as found in H.H. the Dalai Lama, Tsong-kha-pa, and Jeffrey Hopkins, Tantra in Tibet (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1977; reprint, with minor corrections, Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1987). Tsong-kha-pa presents the difference between the Great Vehicle sūtra system (called the Perfection Vehicle) and the tantra system in terms of what the four classes of tantra (Action, Performance, Yoga, and Highest Yoga) present as the path for their main intended trainees. In this way, he is able to posit deity yoga as the central distinctive feature of tantra, even though a majority of the tantras included in the class of Action Tantra do not involve deity yoga, since, as he puts it, those Action Tantras that do not involve deity are not intended for the main intended trainees of that class of tantra. One would expect that the majority of Action Tantras would be for the main intended trainees of Action Tantra, but in Tsong-kha-pa’s presentation they are not. Therefore, the mere presence and absence of the practice of deity yoga cannot serve as the feature distinguishing a particular text as tantra or sūtra, for it serves only to distinguish those two in terms of the practices of their main intended trainees. This is why I have used in the qualification “roughly speaking.”
being either explicit commentaries on the Indian texts or expositions of their main themes or of issues that arise when juxtaposed with other material.

The more practical system of study is aimed at making coherent and accessible the plethora of practices that were inherited from India and are the topics of critical study in more theoretical texts. In the Ge-lug-pa sect, the more practical system of study centers on:

1. Tsong-kha-pa’s *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path,* which modestly calls itself a commentary on the *Lamp for the Path to Enlightenment* by the eleventh-century Indian scholar Atisha (who spent the last twelve years of his life in Tibet) but is much more, and
2. a commentary by one of Tsong-kha-pa’s two chief disciples, Gyal-tshab Dar-ma-rin-chen, on the Indian text *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* by the eighth-century scholar-yogi Śāntideva.

**THE TEXT: THE ** **GREAT EXPOSITION**

**OF SPECIAL INSIGHT**

The present book is the fifth of seven volumes presenting Tibetan views on the controversy that arose in Buddhist India over how to refute production from self:

1. *Buddhapālita’s Refutation of Production from Self, Bhāvaviveka’s Criticism, and Avalokītavrata’s Commentary: Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Opposite of the Consequences,* 1
2. *Chandrakīrti Defends Buddhapālita against Bhāvaviveka: Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Opposite of the Consequences,* 2
3. *Chandrakīrti Undermines Bhāvaviveka’s Assertion of Autonomy: Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Compatibly Appearing Subjects,* 3

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a lam rim chen mo / skyes bu gsum gyi nyams su blang ba’i rim pa thams cad tshang bar ston pa’i byang chub lam gyi rim pa; Peking 6001, vol. 152.
b byang chub lam gyi sgron ma, bodhipatrapradīpa; Peking 5343, vol. 103.
c rgyal tshab dar ma rin chen, 1364-1432.
4. **Decisive Analyses concerning the Refutation of Production from Self:** Jam-yang-shay-pa’s *Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six*, 4

5. **What is a Consequentialist?** Tsong-kha-pa’s *Great Exposition of Special Insight with the Four Interwoven Annotations: Compatibly Appearing Subjects*, 5.

6. **Finalizing the Meaning of Autonomist and Consequentialist:** Tsong-kha-pa’s *Great Exposition of Special Insight with the Four Interwoven Annotations*, 6.


The controversy revolves around the opening phrase of the first stanza of the first chapter of Nāgārjuna’s *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called “Wisdom”*:

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Not from self, not from others,
Not from both, not causelessly
Are any things
Ever produced anywhere.
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Uncharacteristically, Nāgārjuna says nothing more about the first leg of this reasoning—that things are not produced from self; rather, he immediately proceeds to the reasoning proving that things are not produced from other by examining the four types of conditions. His principal Indian commentators, however, explain the refutation of production from self in varying detail, the differences engendering the split between what came to be called the Autonomy School and the Consequence School.

Buddhapālita’s (c. 470-540?) commentary on the refutation of production from self provoked Bhāvaviveka (c. 500-570?) into extensive criticism and hence into a demonstration of his own preferred style of commentary. The first volume provides two Tibetan explanations of the controversy, shorter and longer, by the Tibetan scholar Jam-yang-shay-pa Ngag-wang-tsön-drü (1648-1721/1722). Included also in first volume are translations of Buddhapālita’s and Bhāvaviveka’s commentaries as well as the first translation into English of Avalokitavrata’s (flourishing mid-seventh century) extensive commentary on Bhāvaviveka’s presentation, his minute examination allowing Bhāvaviveka’s terse text to be seen in high relief.

The second volume provides Jam-yang-shay-pa’s shorter and longer explanations of how Chandrakīrti defends Buddhapālita against Bhāvaviveka’s criticisms of his Buddhapālita’s refutation of production from self. The third volume provides Jam-yang-shay-pa’s explanation of how Chandrakīrti tears apart Bhāvaviveka’s own refutation of production...
from self; the shorter version is just an abbreviated citation of
Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words* but the longer version provides Jam-yang-
shay-pa’s usual extensive elaboration. The third volume is concerned with
compatibly appearing subjects, Ge-lug-pa scholars seeing this discussion
as the prime, but not only, source showing that Bhāvaviveka accepts that
phenomena are established by way of their own character. This complex
topic is used in Tibetan monastic colleges to draw students into fascinating
reflections about how phenomena appear and thereby to explore the nature
of the reality behind appearances.

The first four volumes in this series are in the style of theoretically
oriented modes of study, the first three being in the form of general-mean-
ing commentaries, whereas the fourth volume is Jam-yang-shay-pa’s de-
cisive analysis on those three volumes, in the format of debate in order to
refute others’ mistakes. Tsong-kha-pa’s *Great Exposition of Special In-
sight* could be said to be in the style of more directly addressing particular
meditation practices and behavior modification since it is in stages-of-the-
path literature, being a major part of Tsong-kha-pa’s *Stages of the Path to
Enlightenment Thoroughly Teaching All the Stages of Practice of the Three
Types of Beings*; however, the style is more of a theoretically oriented
mode of study in the manner of a general-meaning commentary, even also
refuting others’ mistakes though not in the formal format the format of
debate—refuting others’ mistakes, presenting one’s own view, and then
dispelling objections to it. Nevertheless, we can see the importance Tsong-
kha-pa places on theoretical study for the process of meditation.

Since Tsong-kha-pa’s focus in the *Great Exposition of Special Insight*
begins with the material on compatibly appearing subjects, his analysis of
that phase appears here in the volume five. I have embedded it with two
commentaries to enhance its accessibility:

- Jam-yang-shay-pa’s *Golden Wheel of Annotations*, the longer title
  being *Precious Golden Wheel of Annotations to the Great Exposition of
  the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment*\(^a\)
- and Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub’s annotations to Tsong-kha-
pa’s *Great Exposition of Special Insight*.

Both of these are included in the *Four Interwoven Annotations to (Tsong-
\(^a\) mchan ’grel gser kyi ’khor lo / byang chub lam gyi rim pa chen mo mchan ’grel gser
kyi ’khor lo rin po che*, digital edition supplied by Drepung Gomang Library, Mundgod,
Karnataka, India, 2017. To date I have not found this text in an edition of Jam-yang-shay-
pa’s Collected Works.
kha-pa’s) “Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path.” In the Delhi edition of this text the four sets of annotations are identified as having been written by:

1. Ba-so Chö-kyi-gyal-tshan (ba so chos kyi rgyal mtshan, 1402-1473)
2. De-drug-khan-chen Kha-rog Ngag-wang-rab-tan (sde drug mkhan chen kha rog ngag dbang rab brtan, seventeenth century)
3. Jam-yang-shay-pa Ngag-wang-tsön-dru (’jam dbyangs bzhad pa ngag dbang brtson ’grus, 1648-1712)

At this point in the Four Interwoven Annotations relevant to this and the next volume, there are only two sets of annotations, those by Jam-yang-shay-pa Ngag-wang-tsön-drü and Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub. (Since the annotations by Jam-yang-shay-pa in the Four Interwoven Annotations are slightly more extensive in his separate text, the Golden Wheel of Annotations, I have drawn his annotations from the Golden Wheel of Annotations.)

Jam-yang-shay-pa’s intricate outline of Tsong-kha-pa’s text is particularly helpful because it details the topics that Tsong-kha-pa often moves through quickly, thereby providing great clarity by pre-announcing Tsong-kha-pa’s points. Jam-yang-shay-pa also occasionally provides longer explanatory notes as well as several shorter ones, all of which appear in the translation and in the Tibetan in yellow highlight to match the color of his title, Golden Wheel of Annotations.

The interlinear notes of Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub, a scholar from Se-ra Jey College, provide very helpful additional phrases that smooth the way through Tsong-kha-pa’s sentences. I have liberally drawn from his annotations which appear in the translation (but have not been added to the Tibetan) in aqua highlight. It is my hope that the combination of these two sets of annotations will enrich the bare translation of Tsong-kha-pa’s text at the end of these two volumes and even annotated translations such as that by the New Jersey group headed by Joshua Cutler

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\(a\) lam rim mchan bzhi shrags ma/ mnyam med rje btsun tsong kha pa chen pos mdzad pa’i byang chub lam rim chen mo’i dka’ ba’i gnad rnams mchan bu bzhi’i sgo nas legs par bshad pa theg chen lam gyi gsal sgron; see the Bibliography.

\(b\) The source is Elizabeth Napper, Dependent-Arising and Emptiness (London: Wisdom, 1989), 219; for a thorough discussion of the four annotators and how the annotations fit together with Tsong-kha-pa’s style see her discussion, 219-227.

\(c\) The single exception is noted below in the translation.
Tsong-kha-pa composed five expositions on the view of emptiness.

1. In 1402, at the age of forty-five, he published the Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path, which has a long and complicated section on special insight into emptiness.

2. Five years later, when he was fifty, he began writing a commentary on Nāgārjuna’s Treatise on the Middle, called Ocean of Reasoning, at Chöding Hermitage above what became Se-ra Monastic University on the northern outskirts of Lhasa, but in the midst of explicating the first chapter, he foresaw that there would be interruptions if he stayed there. Thus, he left Chöding Hermitage for another hermitage at Se-ra, Ra-ka Precipice, where he wrote the Treatise Differentiating Interpretable and Definitive Meanings: The Essence of Eloquence. (I imagine that he felt the need to compose his own independent work on the view of emptiness in the Great Vehicle schools as background

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My brief rehearsal of his works on the view of emptiness is drawn from Elizabeth Napper, Dependent-Arising and Emptiness (London: Wisdom Publications, 1989), 6-7.


For a translation of the part on the excessively broad object of negation, see Elizabeth Napper, Dependent-Arising and Emptiness, 153-215; for a translation of the part on the excessively narrow object of negation, see William Magee, The Nature of Things: Emptiness and Essence in the Geluk World (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 1999), 179-192.

lhag mthong, vipaśyanā.

dbu ma rtsa ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa shes rab ces bya ba, prajñānāmamālamadhyamakārikā; P5224, vol. 95.

dbu ma rtsa ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa shes rab ces bya ba'i rnam bshad rigs pa'i rgya mtsho; P6153, vol. 156. For a translation of the entire text, see Geshe Ngawang Samten and Jay L. Garfield, Ocean of Reasoning: A Great Commentary on Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakārikā (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

chos dzens.

rva kha brag; perhaps the meaning of the name is Goat-Face Crag.

for his commentary on Nāgārjuna’s treatise. If this is so, he wrote The Essence as an overarching structure in which that commentary could be understood.)

3. After completing The Essence in 1408, a he returned to commenting on Nāgārjuna’s Treatise on the Middle, completing the Ocean of Reasoning.

4. At age fifty-eight in 1415, he wrote the Medium-Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path. b

5. At age sixty-one, one year before his death, he wrote a commentary on Chandrakīrti’s Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle,” c called Illumination of the Thought. d

Tsong-kha-pa’s longest treatment of “compatibly appearing subjects” is in the “Great Exposition of Special Insight” in the Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path. Six years later, he published a slightly different reading in The Essence of Eloquence. At the end of his still later treatment of “opposite of the consequences” and “compatibly appearing subjects” in the Ocean of Reasoning, e he refers readers to the discussion in “The Essence of Eloquence and so forth” for these topics. Mention is made only in passing in his later Extensive Explanation of (Chandrakīrti’s) “Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle’”: Illumination of the Thought, and no mention at all is made in the still later “Medium-Length Exposition of

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a For the date, see Leonard W. J. van der Kuijp, “Apropos of a Recent Contribution to the History of Central Way Philosophy in Tibet: Tsong Khapa’s Speech of Gold” in Berliner Indologische Studien 1 (Reinbek, Germany: Verlag für Orientalistische Fachpublikationen, 1985), 68, n. 2.


c dbu ma la ‘jug pa, madhyamakāvatāra; P5261, vol. 98 and P5262, vol. 98.

d dbu ma la ‘jug pa’i rgya cher bshad pa dgongs pa rab gsal; P6143, vol. 154. Translations of the sections on the object of negation in the doctrine of emptiness and on the two truths are included in Hopkins, Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom, 181-213 and 215-262, respectively.

Special Insight.”

Volume Six in this series will contain Part Two of the translation of compatibly appearing subjects in the “Great Exposition of Special Insight,” followed by Tsong-kha-pa’s treatment in The Essence of Eloquence in Volume 7.

The nearly world-wide attention by scholars that these issues in Chandrākīrti’s Clear Words have received has been brilliantly documented in Anne MacDonald’s magnificent In Clear Words: The Prasannapadā, Chapter One.a

EDITIONS CONSULTED

Two basic editions of the Four Interwoven Annotations to (Tsong-kha-pa’s) “Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path” were consulted:


   Also: BDRC W29037-5048-3-1002.

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Abbreviated reference: “BDRC *bla brang,*” so named because of being printed in *bla brang.*

The digital Tibetan text of Jam-yang-shay-pa’s *Golden Wheel of Annotations* provided in this book was supplied by the Drepung Gomang Library in Mundgod, Karnataka State, India.
PART ONE:
Tsong-kha-pa’s
Great Exposition of Special Insight:
*Compatibly Appearing Subjects*
with Jam-yang-shay-pa’s
*Golden Wheel of Annotations*
and Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub’s
*Annotations*

*Stages of the Path to Enlightenment Thoroughly Teaching All the Stages of Practice of the Three Types of Beings*

*Four Interwoven Annotations to (Tsong-kha-pa’s) “Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path”*

*Precious Golden Wheel of Annotations to (Tsong-kha-pa’s) “Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment”*

Craig Preston inserted the Tibetan text for Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight into the translation by Jeffrey Hopkins, who inserted Jam-yang-shay-pa’s *Golden Wheel of Annotations* into both the Tibetan text and his translation in yellow highlight and inserted Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub’s annotations into only his translation in aqua highlight.
I. WHETHER REFUTATION OF THE OBJECT OF NEGATION IS DONE THROUGH CONSEQUENCES OR AUTONOMOUS SYLLOGISMS {2 PARTS}

This has two parts: identifying the meaning of consequences and autonomous syllogisms and following which of those two the view generated in the [mental] continuum.

A. IDENTIFYING THE MEANING OF CONSEQUENCES AND AUTONOMOUS SYLLOGISMS {2 PARTS}

This has two parts: a transitional statement and how Consequentialists and Autonomists are posited.

1. Transitional statement {3 parts}
a. Although Buddhapālita did not individually differentiate between consequences and autonomous syllogisms, he opened the way of the Consequence School.

Concerning this, in the master Buddhapālita’s commentary there is no clear statement that he uses consequences upon having differentiated consequences and autonomous syllogisms, but the following emerges implicitly from his explanation of the meaning [of the first stanza in the first chapter of Nāgārjuna’s Treatise on the Middle]:

Not from self, not from others,
Not from both, not causelessly
Do any things
Ever arise anywhere.

na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyaṁ nāpyahetutaḥ/
uppannā jātu vidyante bhāvāḥ kvacana kecana//
bdag las ma yin gzhān las min/
gnyis las ma yin rgyu med min/
dngos po gang dag gang na yang/
skye ba nam yang yod ma yin//

This stanza says:

There never exists the production of things from themselves in any way at any place, at any time, of any type, or in any [correct] system; this is to be applied to all of these.a There does not ever exist

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a That this is to be applied to all of these means that the qualifications in the first line need to be applied to the remaining three positions as follows:
• there does not exist production from other in any way at any place, at any time, of any type, or in any system that is correct;
• there does not exist production from both in any way at any place, at any time, of any type, or in any system that is correct;

(KEY: Text without highlight = Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight. Yellow highlight = Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Golden Wheel of Annotations. Aqua highlight = Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub’s annotations. Magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis has been filled in.)
production from other. There does not ever exist production from both. There does not ever exist production causelessly. The last two lines [in Nāgārjuna’s stanza] are to be connected to the former two.

In his commentary [Buddhapālita] refutes the four productions by way of expressing damage to the systems of other disputants—such as the Sāṃkhya, who assert production from self—and so forth.

b. How Bhāvaviveka opens the way of the Autonomy School upon refuting this [refutation of the four extremes of production by Buddhapālita]

• there does not exist production causelessly in any way at any place, at any time, of any type, or in any system that is correct.  

  In other words, do not take the first two lines as the reason and the last two lines as the thesis as in: Things do not ever arise anywhere because of arising not from self, not from others, not from both, and not causelessly. Rather, take all four lines as theses that in turn serve as four reasons proving the implicit thesis that things do not inherently exist.

{KEY: Text without highlight = Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight. Yellow highlight = Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Golden Wheel of Annotations. Aqua highlight = Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub’s annotations. Magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis has been filled in.}
The master Bhāvaviveka repudiates those reasonings by the master Budhāpālita refuting production from self and so forth through (1) stating proofs of his own positions—Bhāvaviveka’s own theses—and (2) stating powerless quasi-fallacies repudiating the other’s positions, Budhāpālita’s theses.

c. How Chandrakīrti answers that those fallacies do not apply due to the difference between consequences and autonomous [syllogisms]

When the master Chandrakīrti comments at length in his Clear Words on the reason why such fallacies adduced by Bhāvaviveka do not apply to Budhāpālita’s system, he answers the opponent, the master Bhāvaviveka, in this way, “A Proponent of the Middle must mainly use consequences as means of generating the view of the Middle in the continuum, and the usage of autonomous reasons is not logically feasible in all ways.” Refuting him this way, Chandrakīrti makes clear the Consequentialist position, or system, by way of proving that consequences themselves have the capacity both to directly generate an inference realizing what is being proven and to clear away the wrong conceptions of the other party.
2. How Consequentialists and Autonomists are posited {2 parts}

Therefore, with respect to how such Consequentialists and Autonomists are posited, there are two parts: refuting others’ systems and positing our own system.

This has two parts: setting forth others’ assertions and refuting those.

1) SETTING FORTH OTHERS’ ASSERTIONS ON HOW CONSEQUENTIALISTS AND AUTONOMISTS ARE POSITED {2 PARTS}

This has two parts: a brief indication and an extensive indication.

{KEY: Text without highlight = Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight. Yellow highlight = Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Golden Wheel of Annotations. Aqua highlight = Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub’s annotations. Magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis has been filled in.}
A) BRIEF INDICATION

In general, with respect to Consequentialists and Autonomists, it appears that there indeed are many modes of positing quasi-Middle Schools and tenets created by many Indians and Tibetans. About the meaning of autonomy (rang rgyud, svatantra) in the statement in Amarasinha’s Treasury, “Autonomous (rang rgyud, svatantra), own-powered (rang dbang, svairī), self-powered (bdag dbang, svairī),” there are a great many explanations—undisputed and mistaken—positing the two [Autonomists and Consequentialists].

1. from the viewpoint of whether sense direct perceptions are valid cognitions with respect to specifically characterized phenomena or not;
2. also from the viewpoint of whether direct perceptions must be free from conceptuality or not;

a There are four renowned śūtras of Sanskrit grammar (sgra mdo bzhi):
• Sarvarvarman, Kalāpasūtra (ka lā pa ’i mdo, kalāpasūtra; P5775, vol. 140)
• Chandragomīn, Chandragomīn’s Grammar (lung du ston pa tsān dra pa ’i mdo, cāndrayākaraṇaṃ; P5767, vol. 140)
• Anubhūtivarūpācārya, Sarasvatī’s Grammar Sūtra (dhyanadrāma mdo/sāravatvāyākaraṇa/ sāravatiprakriyā; P5886, vol. 148; P5911, vol. 149; P5912, vol. 149)
• Pāṇini, Pāṇini’s Grammar Sūtra (brda sprod pa pāṇini’i mdo, pāṇinivyākaraṇasūtra; P5914).

There is also a list of eight Sanskrit grammars.

b Amarakośa 3.1.32: svatantro ‘pavṛtaḥ svairī svacchando niravagrahaḥ. Among these five, svatantra is rang rgyud; svairī is rang dbang; svacchanda is rang ’dod. Svairī is also bdag dbang. The other two terms, apāvṛta and niravagraha, both mean “self-willed” and the like.

c This annotation by Jam-yang-shay-pa lists five actual differences between Autonomists and Consequentialists according to standard Ge-lug-pa explanations; thus, the mistaken ones are represented by the four major ones singled out by Tsong-kha-pa below but not translated here.

d According to standard Ge-lug-pa explanations, Consequentialists assert that direct perception can be conceptual in the sense that the second moment of an inference no longer depends on a sign and therefore is said to be a direct perception with respect to its object of comprehension, or with respect to its percept. This is not accepted in the Autonomy School and below. See Jeffrey Hopkins, Jam-yang-shay-ba’s Great Exposition of Buddhist and Non-Buddhist Views on the Nature of Reality (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications,
3. from the viewpoint of whether valid cognitions [have to be] posited as new or not; 

4. whether it is asserted or not that both parties [in a debate between a Proponent of the Middle and another holding a different system] are valid with respect to the three modes of a sign as to their being established by way of their own character; 

5. two different modes of generating the view, by autonomous [syllogisms] and consequences; 

and so forth.

B) **EXTENSIVE INDICATION**

2003), 949-951.

a According to standard Ge-lug-pa explanations, Consequentialists assert that valid cognition (*tshad ma, pramāṇa*) does not need to be new, whereas the Autonomy School, Mind-Only School, and Sūtra School Following Reasoning assert that a *pramāṇa* must be new, the *pra* of *pramāṇa* being taken as *prathama*; see Hopkins, *Maps of the Profound*, 948.
However, if too little is explained, nobody could understand it, but if all are described at length, since there are a great many, who could explain them all! Therefore, since all of them cannot be explained, from among those various systems, here a few systems will be explained [but not included in this translation].

However, if too little is explained, nobody could understand it, but if all are described at length, since there are a great many, who could explain them all! Therefore, since all of them cannot be explained, from among those various systems, here a few systems will be explained [but not included in this translation].

b. Laying out our own system about how Consequentialists and Autonomists are posited

This has two parts: transition and actual explanation.

1) TRANSITION

With respect to the subject, what is to be known [on this occasion], the meaning of autonomy exists because the meaning of autonomy is that the relevant proposition is realized in the context of the establishment—by both parties within compatible appearance—(1a) of the three modes [of the reason] that are established from their own side and (1b) of the example; nevertheless, (2) the meaning of autonomy is not that a proposition is realized through a sign endowed with the three modes or (3) that the three modes are validly established by both parties.

The latter two points will be explained below; the first reason [which is that the meaning of autonomy is that the relevant proposition is realized]...
in the context of the establishment—by both parties in compatible appearance—(1a) of the three modes (of the reason) that are established from their own side and (1b) of the example] is established because the equivalent term of rang rgyud [in Sanskrit], svatantrya, is used for “own-powered” (rang dbang) and so forth, since:

- Amarasinha’s Treasury\(^b\) says, “Autonomous (rang rgyud, svatantrya), own-powered (rang dbang, svairī), self-powered (bdag dbang, svairī),” and “Tantra (rgyud, tantra) [is used for] principal (gtso bo, padhāna), tenet (grub mtha’, siddhānta), weaving threads (thags ’thag pa, sūtravīya), and thoroughly concealed (yongs su ’gebs, paricchada).”\(^d\)
- and Bhāvaviveka’s Lamp for (Nāgārjuna’s) “Wisdom” [commenting on the thirteenth chapter] says:\(^e\) Now the thirteenth chapter was composed for the sake of demonstrating from [another] aspect that compositional

\(^a\) In the Four Interwoven Annotations, vol. 2, 524.3, reading sva tan tra for sva ran ta.
\(^b\) There are four renowned sūtras of Sanskrit grammar (sgra mdo bzhi):
- Sarvarvarman, Kalāpasūtra (ka la pa’i mdo, kalāpasūtra; P5775, vol. 140)
- Chandragomin, Chandragomin’s Grammar (lung du ston pa tsān dra pa’i mdo, cāndrayākaraṇam; P5767, vol. 140)
- Anubhūtisvarūpācārya, Sarasvatī’s Grammar Sūtra (dbyangs can sgra mdo/ dbyangs can ma, sārasvatavyākaraṇa/ sāravatīprakriyā; P5886, vol. 148; P5911, vol. 149; P5912, vol. 149)
- Pāṇini, Pāṇini’s Grammar Sūtra (brda sprod pa pāṇini’i mdo, pāṇinivyākaraṇasūtra; P5914).

There is also a list of eight Sanskrit grammars.
\(^c\) Amarakośa 3.1.32: svatantrya ‘pārvataḥ svairī svacchanda niravagrahaḥ. Among these five, svatantrya is rang rgyud; svairī is rang dbang; svacchanda is rang ′dod. In his Great Exposition of Tenets (Hopkins, Maps of the Profound, 697) Jam-yang-shay-pa says that svairī is also bdag dbang. The other two words, apāvṛta and niravagraha both mean “self-willed” and the like.
\(^d\) Amarakośa 3.3.731: tantraṃ pradhāne siddhānte sūtravīye paricchade. See also Hopkins, Maps of the Profound, 65.
\(^e\) I have filled out Jam-yang-shay-pa’s abbreviated quotation in accordance with his citation in the Great Exposition of Tenets (Hopkins, Maps of the Profound, 699).
\(^f\) rnam pa las, which Avalokitavrata (Golden Reprint, vol. 110, 835.5) glosses as “from an approach other than the aspects demonstrated earlier” (sngar bstan pa’i rnam pa’i gzan nas).

(KEY: Text without highlight = Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight. Yellow highlight = Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Golden Wheel of Annotations. Aqua highlight = Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub’s annotations. Magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis has been filled in.)
phenomena are natureless through the force of setting answers to refutations and own-powered inferences.a

and Khay-drub Ge-leg-pal-sang’s Great Compilation: Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate says:b

This “own-powered” (rang dbang) is equivalent to “autonomous” (rang rgyud, svatantra). Hence, these objects are comprehended by valid cognition as autonomous, that is to say, as being established from their own side, in compatible appearance for both parties, without [just] being bound to the assertions of the second party.

*a rang dbang du rje su dpag pa.
b Stoṅ thun chen mo of Mkhas-grub Dge-legs-dpal-bzang: and other texts on Madhyamika Philosophy, Madhyamika text series, v. 1, 334.5. This citation is extracted from a longer sentence:

This “own-powered” (rang dbang) that is translated in the statement in Bhāva-viveka’s Lamp for (Nāgārjuna’s) “Wisdom,” “Expressed in terms of being done autonomously (rang dbang du) or as a repudiation,” is equivalent to “autonomous” (rang rgyud, svatantra). Hence, the meaning of an autonomous reason is that which generates an inference realizing a proposition upon the opponent’s having ascertained* the subject, sign, example, and so forth and the three modes in the context of these objects being comprehended by valid cognition as autonomous, that is to say, as being established from their own side, in compatible appearance for both parties, without [just] being bound to the assertions of the opponent.

* Reading phyi rgyol gyis nges for phyi rgyol gyi ma nges, 334.6. See also the clear translation in José Ignacio Cabezón, A Dose of Emptiness: An Annotated Translation of the stong thun chen mo of mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzang (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1992), 285.
The way Consequentialists refute this autonomy is as follows. In accordance with Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words* statement:

Furthermore, despite asserting the view of the Middle Way School, this logician [Bhāvaviveka], while wishing merely to demonstrate that he has great skill in treatises of logic, expresses statements of autonomous syllogisms that are realized to be the locus of collections of a great many fallacies.

If we express how the Middle Way Consequentialists repudiate the system of the Autonomists and thereupon posit their own system, both systems of the Consequentialists and the Autonomists will be realized; hence, let us first express this mode of repudiation. Although much is said in Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words* concerning this, fearing it would take too many words, here [I] will indicate the principal points, leaving aside the other ones.

{KEY: Text without highlight = Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight. Yellow highlight = Jam-yang-shay-pa’s *Golden Wheel of Annotations*. Aqua highlight = Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub’s annotations. Magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis has been filled in.}
2) ACTUAL EXPLANATION {2 PARTS}

Hence, regarding this there are two parts: the actual repudiation of autonomy and how that repudiation is not the same for our own system.

A) ACTUAL REPUDIATION OF AUTONOMY {2 PARTS}

This also has two parts: indicating the fallacy of the position in the syllogism cast by the Autonomist in that the basal subject is not established and indicating that due to this fallacy the reason also is not established.

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a phyogs; the position is the proposition, or probandum, which comprises a subject and a predicate.

b rang rgyud pas 'phangs pa'i gtan tshigs kyi; here gtan tshigs “reason” means “syllogism.”

c Translation of the second of these two is in the next volume.
1' Indicating the fallacy of the position in the syllogism flung by the Autonomist in that the basal subject is not established {2 parts}

This has two parts: expressing the other party’s assertion and refuting that assertion.

a' Expressing the other party’s assertion {2 parts}

This has two parts: stating the passage and explaining the meaning.

1” STATING THE PASSAGE

Since it appears that these passages refuting autonomy are very difficult to realize even from among the statements in Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words, let us here cite the words of the Clear Words and explain them. Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words says:

[Hypothetical response by Bhāvaviveka:] For example, on an occasion when to a Vaishēṣhika a Buddhist makes the thesis that

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a Tsong-kha-pa, as is evident below, identifies the opponent as a Vaishēṣhika, but Kodo Yotsuya (The Critique of Svatantra Reasoning by Chandrakīrti and Tsong-kha-pa, 93 n.)
sound is impermanent, just generalities of the subject and the predicate that are established in compatible appearance in the systems of the Buddhist and the Vaiśeṣhika are to be used, not specifics qualified with the uncommon tenets of their respective assertions. If specifics of such a subject and a predicate were used, the conventions of inference, that is, the reason which is the means of proof, and object of inference—object proven by that reason—would be nonexistent; in other words, if such specifics were used, they would not be feasible as proof and proposition. It is as follows: If “sound that is derived from the four great elements” were used as the subject, this subject would not be established for the system of the other party, the Vaiśeṣhika. However, if “sound that is a quality of space” were used as the subject, this subject would not be established for the system of oneself, the Buddhist.

73) avers that since Vaiśeṣhikas assert that sound is impermanent, there is no need for a Buddhist to prove to a Vaiśeṣhika that sound is impermanent; therefore, he identifies the opponent as a Mīmāṃsaka. However, it may be that because Vaiśeṣhikas hold that a sound is a quality of space and space is permanent, the Buddhist here is holding that Vaiśeṣhikas are forced by reasoning to assert that a sound is permanent.

a Gung-thang Lo-drö-gya-tsho’s (gung thang blo gros rgya mtsho, 1851-1928/1930) Sun-making Illumination Clarifying the Meaning of the Thought of (Jam-yang-shay-pa’s) “Decisive Analysis of the Middle: Treasury of Scripture and Reasoning” (dbu ma’i mtha’ dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod kyi dgongs don gsal bar byed pa’i nyin byed snang ba zab lam lta ba’i mig ’byed), BDRC W140-11KG15988, 152.14, glosses inference (rje su dpag pa, anumāṇa) with “the sign that is the means of inference” (dpag byed rtags) and object of inference (rje su dpag par bya ba, anumeyya) with “predicate of the proposition that is the object inferred” (dpag bya bsgrub bya’i chos).

b nam mkha’, ākāśa. As Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Explanation of Obscurational and Ultimate Truths (54.1; Hopkins, Maps of the Profound, 166) says about the Vaiśeṣhika assertion that sound is a quality of space:

“Whatever has production and disintegration necessarily depends upon some substance; for example, [the flame of] a butter lamp. Sound also has production and disintegration.” By such reasoning, sound is proved to depend upon a substance. Because sound is heard apart from the four elements, earth and so on, it does not depend on those four. Also, because it is observed externally by a sense consciousness, as shared between oneself and others, it is not a quality of the self. Since it is an object of apprehension by the ear, it is not a quality of the three—direction, time, and consciousness. Hence, it is asserted to be established as a quality only of space.

Kodo Yotsuya (The Critique of Svatantra Reasoning by Chandrakīrti and Tsong-kha-pa, 93 n. 73) points out that Mīmāṃsakas also assert that sound is a quality of space.
Similarly, even when to a Dipaka, a type of Sāṃkhya, a Vaishēṣhika makes the thesis that sound is impermanent, if “sound that is a product” is used as the subject, this subject would not be established for the other party, the Dipaka. However, if “previously existent sound manifested by conditions and not qualified by being a product” is used as the subject, this subject would not be established for oneself, the Vaishēṣhika.

This is likewise to be applied, respectively, to the predicate of the proposition, the sign, and so forth; if, by adding uncommon specifications to the predicate of the proposition, “disintegration,” that is, impermanence, is “caused” in the sense that the disintegration relies on causes other than the causes of the thing and that arise subsequent to the thing is used as the predicate of the proposition, such a predicate of the proposition would not be established for oneself, a Buddhist. However, if “causeless disintegration” in the sense that it does not rely on other subsequent causes is used as the predicate of the proposition, such disintegration would have the fallacy of not being established for the other party, the Vaishēṣhika.

Therefore, just as on these occasions of a Buddhist positing a thesis for a Vaishēṣhika and a Vaishēṣhika positing a thesis for a Dipaka, and so forth, mere generalities of subject and predicate

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a Kodo Yotsuya (The Critique of Svatantra Reasoning by Chandrakīrti and Tsong-kha-pa, 93) here also takes the opponent to be a Mīmāṃsaka; in both cases his identifications are Mīmāṃsaka.

b Here in this second example, a Vaishēṣhika is proving to another party that sound is impermanent. Jam-yang-shay-pa (see the third volume in this series, Jeffrey Hopkins, Chandrakīrti Undermines Bhāvaviveka’s Assertion of Autonomy: Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Compatibly Appearing Subjects, 3 [Dyke, VA: UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, August 2018, uma-tibet.org, 50] identifies the other party as a Nirgrantha (gcer bu pa), another name for Jaina; Stcherbatsky (The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa, 115) identifies the opponent as a Mīmāṃsaka, inserting the identification into the text as if Chandrakīrti so specified it, whereas he did not; Wayman (Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real, 310) goes along with Stcherbatsky; Gom-day Nam-kha-gyal-tshan (Settling Difficult Points in the Opposite of the Consequences, 633.2) identifies the other party as a Dipaka (gsal byed pa), as does the Four Interwoven Annotations here. In any case, the assertion of the Vaishēṣhika’s opponent is that sound is pre-existent in a nonmanifest state and is made manifest by conditions, something which the Vaishēṣhika cannot accept.

c The causes producing the object themselves bring about its momentary disintegration; further causes are not needed.
that are established in compatible appearance for both are to be used, so here also on occasions when Proponents of the Middle prove to our own and others’ schools that things are not produced from self and so forth, a mere general subject that is established in compatible appearance in both systems and devoid of specifics of subject and predicate that are qualified with their individual uncommon assertions is to be used.
2” EXPLAINING THE MEANING {4 PARTS}

This has four parts.

A” THE NEED FOR A COMPATIBLY ESTABLISHED SUBJECT

The meaning of this passage stating another’s assertion is as follows. When to a Vaisheṣhika a Buddhist makes the thesis that sound is impermanent, if “sound that is derived from the elements,” that is to say, qualified as being derived from the elements, were used as the subject, this subject would not be established in the system of the Vaisheṣhika; and also if “sound that is a quality of space,” that is to say, qualified as being a quality of space, were used as the subject, this subject would not be established in the system of oneself, the Buddhist. Similarly, even when to an Outsider [nonBuddhist] Dipaka a Vaisheṣhika makes the thesis that sound is impermanent, if “sound that is a product,” that is, qualified as being a product, is used as the subject, this subject would not be established for the Dipaka. Also, if “pre-existent sound manifested by conditions,” that is, qualified as being pre-existent and manifested by conditions is used as the subject,” this subject would not be established for oneself, the Vaisheshika. Therefore, it is not suitable to use as subjects uncommon individual assertions, that is, [subjects] qualified by those because since the subject is the basis for analysis by both disputants about how a specification is, it must be something established in compatible appearance by the systems of both disputants.

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a Kodo Yotsuya (The Critique of Svatantra Reasoning by Chandrakirti and Tsong-kha-pa, 93 n. 73) points out that since Vaisheṣhikas assert that sound is impermanent, there is no need for a Buddhist to prove to a Vaisheṣhika that sound is impermanent; therefore, he identifies the opponent as a Mīmāṃsaka. However, it may be that because Vaisheṣhikas hold that a sound is a quality of space and space is permanent, the Buddhist here is holding that Vaisheṣhikas are forced by reasoning to assert that a sound is permanent.

(KEY: Text without highlight = Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight. Yellow highlight = Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Golden Wheel of Annotations. Aqua highlight = Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub’s annotations. Magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis has been filled in.)
B” **[THE NEED FOR] A COMPATIBLY ESTABLISHED PREDICATE OF THE PROPOSITION**

Just as the subject must be established in the compatible appearance of both disputants, so the predicate of the proposition, impermanent, also must be a mere general impermanent established in compatible appearance by both disputants, not qualified with the uncommon assertions of the individual disputants. Moreover, the statement of an example, such as a pot and so forth, that is established in compatible appearance by both disputants must precede proving the proposition that sound is impermanent.

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Like this example\(^a\) which is how a sound is proved to be impermanent, when Proponents of the Middle—having taken as substrata the internal sense-spheres such as eyes, ears, and so forth and the external sense-spheres such as forms, sounds, and so forth—prove to others’ schools, such as Sāṃkhya, that those are not produced from self and prove to our own Proponents of [Truly Existent] Things, the Mind-Only School and below, that things are not produced from other, then if “truly established eyes and so forth” are used as subjects that are qualified with true establishment, those subjects would not be established for oneself, the Proponent of the Middle. Also, if “falsely established eyes and so forth” are used as subjects having been qualified with false establishment, those subjects would not be established for the other party, the Proponent of [Truly Existent] Things. Hence, mere eyes and forms that are established in general in compatible appearance for both the Proponent of the Middle and the Proponent of [Truly Existent] Things, devoid of such specifics as true and false, must be used as subjects because those subjects are the bases for analysis by both disputants concerning the specification of whether production from self exists, does not exist, and so forth, and consequently they must be established in the compatible appearance of both the Proponent of the Middle and the Proponent of [Truly Existent] Things. That is [Bhāvaviveka’s] thinking.

\(^a\) Having set out the example, Tsong-kha-pa now turns to its meaning—what this example exemplifies.
Moreover, well then what is the meaning of the subject and so forth being established in compatible appearance? Establishment of the subject and so forth for the proponent by the sort of valid cognition by which these are established also for the second party is a compatibly appearing mode of establishment by the valid cognitions of both parties. Hence, it is [called] establishment in compatible appearance.
b' Refuting the other party’s assertion {2 parts}

This has two parts: indicating that the meaning a is not logically feasible and indicating how the meaning differs from the example cited.

I’” INDICATING THAT THE MEANING IS NOT LOGICALLY FEASIBLE {2 PARTS}

This has two parts: stating the passage and explaining the meaning.

A” STATING THE PASSAGE {3 PARTS}

If this is set out in accordance with Khay-drub Ge-leg-pal-sang’s Great Compilation: Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate, there are three parts.

1: Brief indication

Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words says: c

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a Here “meaning” is the import exemplified by the example, not the meaning of compatible subject and so forth as in the subheading just above.

b See Cabezón, A Dose of Emptiness, 280ff.

c In The Essence of Eloquence Tsong-kha-pa reads this passage differently; see below, Part Three. The passage is discussed at length in Hopkins, Meditation on Emptiness, 508. The Sanskrit (La Vallée Poussin, Mūlamadhyakārikās avec la Prasannapadā, 29.7-30.3) reads:

na caitad eva/ yasmad yadaivot āpdapratisedho 'tra sādhyadharma 'bhipretah/

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That when Proponents of the Middle and Proponents of [Truly Established] Things debate, a compatibly established subject and so forth not qualified with either truth or falsity are asserted is not logically feasibly so. For, on this occasion of proving that eyes and so forth are without truly established production when a negation of production is asserted here as the predicate of the proposition, this one, the master Bhāvaviveka, himself just asserts that the entities of the subjects—eyes and so forth, the substrata of that predicate, the absence of truly established production, which gain their thingness by way of being taken as objects by mere erroneous consciousnesses polluted by ignorance—have degenerated from being established in suchness, that is, such subjects are not ultimately established.

What fallacy does this assertion incur? Due to this assertion there are fallacies in the reason in that (1) the subject is not established by way of compatible appearance, (2) the subject of the example is not established, and so forth. Concerning the subject not being established in compatible appearance:

- since you [Bhāvaviveka] assert that the subjects, eyes and so forth, are not ultimately established and also are not ultimates, they are established as falsities,
- and since it is very contradictory for a false object to serve as an object in the perspective of the perception of suchness by a consciousness of reality which is devoid of dualistic appearance, a false object must be an object found by an erroneous mistaken consciousness and must be an object with respect to which a mistaken consciousness itself becomes a mistaken consciousness,

The Tibetan (20.8-20.12) reads:

\[ de ni de ltar yang ma yin te/ ’di ltar gang gi tshe ’dir skye ba bkag pa bsgrub bya’i chos su ’dod pa de’i tshe kho nar de’i rten chos can phyin ci log tsam gyis bdag gi dngos po rnyed pa ni nyams par ’gyur pa ’dis rang nyid khyis khas blangs pa nyid do// phyin ci log dang phyin ci ma log pa dag ni tha dad pa yin no// \]
but Proponents of [Truly Established] Things assert that eye consciousnesses and so forth are valid cognitions not mistaken with regard to forms and so forth.

Therefore, it is very contradictory for the one object itself to be:

1. the object in relation to which a valid cognition—an eye consciousness or the like—becomes a mistaken consciousness in the system of the Proponents of the Middle, and

2. the object of such an unmistaken valid cognition in the system of the Proponents of [Truly Established] Things.

Hence, a subject established in compatible appearance for both Proponents of the Middle and Proponents of [Truly Established] Things does not occur, because the entities of erroneous mistaken consciousnesses polluted by ignorance and nonerroneous consciousnesses not polluted by ignorance that are unmistaken perceptions of suchness in the meditative equipoise of Superiors are different in the sense that their modes of engaging objects are contradictory by way of being mutually exclusive.

2: Extensive explanation

[Chandrakīrti continues:]
Because of this difference between those two as being contradictory in the sense of being mutually exclusive, objects such as forms and so forth that do not exist by way of their own character are apprehended by—that is, appear to—an erroneous, mistaken eye consciousness as just existing by way of their own character, like the nonexistent falling hairs apprehended to be existent by the eye consciousness of one with eye disease and so on; when this is the case, how then could even a portion of objects existent by way of their own character be observed and established by an eye consciousness and so forth! Like the falling hairs and so forth that, since they do not exist, are not apprehended as existent by the pure eye consciousness of one without eye disease, unreal forms and so forth that are established by way of their own character while [actually] not established by way of their own character are not superimposed—not apprehended—by a nonerroneous nonmistaken consciousness of a Superior’s meditative equipoise devoid of all dualistic appearance; when this is the case, how then could that pristine wisdom—in its perceptual perspective in which dualistic appearance has vanished—observe, that is, apprehend, even the merest portion of forms and so forth that because of being veilings, appear to be established by way of their own character, and hence such appearance does not at all exist in the perspective of a Superior’s meditative equipoise! It could not. Hence, that is, because a valid cognition comprehending an object established by way of its own character does not occur, the holy master Nāgārjuna says [in his Refutation of Objections]:

If in accordance with your thought, O Proponent of Truly Established Things, the four valid cognitions
Of direct perception and so forth did observe some inherently established objects,
Then it would be reasonable to prove those in your own system or refute those in others, but since these valid cognitions observing
Such [inherently established] objects of comprehension do not exist even in conventional terms, there is no chance for you to censure me.

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Because in that way, the two—the erroneous objects found by a mistaken consciousness and the nonerroneous objects found by a nonmistaken consciousness of a Superior’s meditative equipoise are different by way of being contradictory in the sense of being mutually exclusive, erroneous falsities that are objects found by mistaken consciousness do not exist in the perspective of meditative equipoise that is a Superior’s state of directly perceiving nonerroneous suchness. Hence, how could there be falsely established veilings such as eyes or the like that are subjects compatibly established in the systems of both a Proponent of the Middle and a Proponent of Truly Established Things! Consequently—that is, because of the nonexistence of such a compatibly appearing subject—on the occasion of taking eyes and so forth as subjects and...
proving that ultimately production does not exist a compatibly appearing basal subject, and consequently there is no method by which you could overturn the fallacy of a position whose basal subject is not established, this being the fallacy of there being no proposition, and the fallacy of a reason whose basal subject is not established, this being the fallacy of the mode of the sign not being established since there is no substratum in relation to which the reason could become the property of the position—and, therefore, this response that you have given [that is, that compatibly appearing generalities are to be used.] is just not a response concordant with the fact.

B’’ EXPLAINING THE MEANING {2 PARTS}

This has two parts: explanation of the meaning and associating it with [Chandrakīrti’s] text.

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I: Explanation of the meaning {5 parts}
This has five parts.

A: Demonstrating this in terms of a sign that is an observation of a contradictory object, in which it is demonstrated through the sign “existing” that forms are not produced from self

It is easy to realize this if it is characterized, that is, explained, in this syllogistic statement:

- “the sense-field of form” is taken as the subject;
- with respect to which “existing” is stated as a reason proving “not produced from self,”
- after which “pot manifest—that is, already established—in front” is stated for the sake of illuminating this through a similar example.

Therefore, let us explain this meaning in terms of that syllogistic statement.

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What do these passages indicate? These passages in which Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words sets forth a response to the master Bhāvaviveka’s explanation that a compatibly appearing subject and so forth are needed demonstrate how a subject is not established in compatible appearance for both disputants. Well then what is that mode of demonstration? This also is explained by way of three topics, the objects [that is, persons] to whom the nonestablishment of a compatibly appearing subject is demonstrated, how those parties assert a compatibly appearing subject, and how such a subject is not established in our own system.

Here what sort of second parties are taken to be the second parties with respect to whom it is demonstrated how a compatibly appearing subject is not established? On this occasion in Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words they are indeed taken to be the second parties on the occasion of refuting production from self [that is, the Sāṃkhyas], but in general they are taken to be both:

1. Proponents of [Truly Established] Things in our own and others’ schools who accept that things ultimately have an inherent nature in the sense of establishment from their own side, and
2. Middle Way Autonomists who accept that in conventional terms those things have an inherent nature in the sense of establishment by way of their own character.

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Well then, what are the different ways of using verbal conventions with respect to them? Concerning this, even Middle Way Autonomists are indeed called Proponents of Naturelessness which is similar in its class of meaning to Proponents of No Inherent Nature (rang bzhin med par smra ba) and which is name for all Proponents of the Middle, but here in Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words and so forth for the sake of reducing the hosts of words, that is to say, for the sake of ease of expression, the name “Proponents of No Inherent Nature” is to be understood as Middle Way Consequentialists, and the name “Proponents of Inherent Nature” is to be understood as both Proponents of [Truly Established] Things and Autonomists.
C: How in the perspective of the awarenesses of Proponents of [Truly Established] Things and of Proponents of the Middle there is no establishment in compatible appearance by valid cognition

How do those parties assert a compatibly appearing subject? On this occasion, the way those Autonomists and so forth assert that the form sense-fields which are posited as subjects are established [or confirmed as existent] is that they must be established by direct valid cognitions that are eye consciousnesses apprehending those form sense-fields themselves, and moreover if they are not established unmistakenly by those direct perceptions, those direct perceptions are not suitable to be posited as direct valid cognitions that establish objects such as forms and so forth, and therefore those direct perceptions must be nonmistaken with respect to forms and so forth. In the systems of those Autonomists and Proponents of [Truly Established] Things, the establishment of such nonconceptual direct perceptions—eye consciousnesses and so forth—as nonmistaken definitely relies on:

• the establishment by way of their own character of those objects—with respect to which those nonconceptual consciousnesses become nonmistaken—appears to those nonconceptual consciousnesses, and
• such exists in fact in accordance with how it appears.

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D: How autonomy, that is, establishment from [the object’s] own side, is not suitable for Proponents of the Middle

How is it that such subjects do not come to be in the Consequentialists’ own system? Thus it being the case that those direct valid cognitions must be nonmistaken with respect to the object’s being established by way of its own character, this master Chandrakīrti refutes autonomy, thinking that such valid cognitions as those in the systems of the opponents—the Autonomists and below—through which subjects such as forms and so forth are posited as being unmistakably established are not suitable to be posited in the system of the proponents, the Middle Way Consequentialists, because not any phenomenon even in conventional terms has an entity that is established by way of its own character, and hence there is utterly no valid cognition establishing such an entity that is established by way of its own character.
E: How although there is compatible establishment of a subject and so forth for two disputants, there is no autonomy

Concerning this refutation of autonomy, on this occasion I am explaining how to refute the proposition by the Autonomists and so forth that an autonomous reason is needed as a branch of the process of newly generating in the continuum of the opposing disputant the view realizing that things lack an inherent nature; this “newly” excludes that Consequentialists do not assert compatible appearance with respect to any and all signs.

Since a proper second party^a in the proof that a stalk does not inherently exist through the sign of dependent-arising has already realized the view,^b the three modes [of a sign] that are compatibly established do exist for Consequentialists among themselves not only when establishing the diversity—as is the case with the likes of compatibly established three modes when proving that sound is impermanent—but also when establishing [emptiness,] the mode of being, but these are not autonomous signs because (1) a proper second party in the proof that a stalk does not inherently exist through the sign of dependent-arising is a Consequentialist and (2) signs established from their own side are not accepted.

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^a phyir rgol yang dag, or proper opponent.

^b As will be explained just below, when the second party in a debate ascertains with valid cognition that dependent-arising entails the absence of true existence, this person becomes a Consequentialist even though the thesis, such as that a stalk lacks inherent existence, is about to be realized and thus has not been realized.

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The first [part of the sign which is that a proper second party in the proof that a stalk does not inherently exist through the sign of dependent-arising is a Consequentialist] is established:

- because although Proponents of [Truly Established] Things exist among mere second parties in the proof that a stalk does not inherently exist through the sign of dependent-arising, the two—(a) becoming a proper second party in that proof upon having discarded the theses of Proponents of [Truly Established] Things and (b) dependent-arising becoming the correct three modes in that proof in the perspective of this second party—are simultaneous, and
- because at that time this [person] has ascertained with valid cognition that dependent-arising entails the absence of true existence.a

a When Consequentialists debate among themselves, the subject, and so forth, are accepted as appearing similarly to both parties in the sense that both assert that the subject and so forth are certified by valid cognitions that are not valid with respect to the inherent existence of the object. There is no way to have compatibly appearing subjects with respect to proving emptiness even when Consequentialists debate among themselves, because if they can validly understand that the subject and so forth are established by a valid cognition that is not valid with respect to the inherent existence of the object, they have come to be able to distinguish between existence and inherent existence, and this can only be done upon having realized emptiness. In that case, there is no need to prove emptiness to such a person. As Tsong-kha-pa’s *The Essence of Eloquence* (Varanasi 1973 edition, 194.17) says:

If the subject is posited as established by a conceptual or nonconceptual mistaken consciousness that is such that [the object] does not exist in accordance with how
and so forth—there are many such [reasons], because Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words* says:*

*our*\(^b\) inferences have the fruit of only refuting others’ theses. It is

it appears to be established by way of its own character, then the meaning of the absence of inherent existence—the proposition—has already been established. Therefore, how could [such a person] be suitable as another party for whom this would have to be proven?

Thus, Jam-yang-shay-pa appears to contradict Tsong-kha-pa here in the *Golden Wheel of Annotations* (also *Four Interwoven Annotations*, Delhi edition vol. 2, 536.5-537.2) when he speaks of compatibly appearing three modes of a sign within the context of two Consequentialists’ examining emptiness. Here he indicates that a Proponent of [Truly Established] Things who has discarded the assertion of inherent existence and become a proper second debate-party about to realize the absence of inherent existence has simultaneously become someone for whom dependent-arising is a reason having the three modes of (1) presence in the subject, (2) entailment, and (3) counter entailment, and thus this person has ascertained with valid cognition that whatever is a dependent-arising is necessarily without inherent existence and is about to realize the particular subject, such as “I” as not existing inherently. Jam-yang-shay-pa is therefore saying that at this point the other party has become a Consequentialist due to realizing that whatever is a dependent-arising is without inherent existence but has not realized emptiness, though just about to. It is only in such a hair-splitting situation that Jam-yang-shay-pa can speak of compatibly appearing three modes within the context of two Consequentialists’ examining emptiness. By speaking of compatibly established three modes of a sign Jam-yang-shay-pa may have sought to avoid speaking of a compatibly established subject, but I doubt there could be a compatibly established presence of the reason in the subject without a compatibly established subject?\(^a\)

\(^a\) The text cites only the first and last clauses with an ellipsis in the middle, which I have filled in.

\(^b\) “Our” is missing in the Tibetan. The Sanskrit (La Vallée Poussin, *Prasannapadā*, 34.5) has *asmad anumāṇānām*. The *Four Interwoven Annotations* (572.4) glosses this passage as referring to the inferences appearing in Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words* and so forth, thereby reading the statement as referring not to all syllogistic reasoning in general but to those refuting production from self such as those drawn from Buddhāpālita’s text. This reading preserves other-renowned inferences, or syllogisms, as a means also for positively communicating one’s own tenets, though the interpolation seems forced. Later in the *Four Interwoven Annotations* (573.4), the same passage is glossed this way: “but we [Consequentialists] do not use autonomous inferences because inferences [used by us Consequentialists] have the fruit [or purpose] of only refuting the [wrong] theses of other [parties].” In this version, the added commentary is not aimed at preserving the positive use of syllogisms, but I would add that Ge-lug-pa scholars could still hold that “inferences” here means not all but some inferences stated by Consequentialists. In any case, the Ge-lug-pa position is clear: other-renowned inferences are used for both positive and negative purposes.
as follows. [For example] another a who thinks that the eye [inherently] sees is refuted by an inference approved by themselves:

You assert that an eye has the attribute of not seeing its own entity and also b assert that if it does not have the attribute of [inherently] seeing other [forms such as blue, then that an eye sees] just does not occur. Therefore, whatever [substratum] does not possess [the attribute of] seeing its own entity also does not possess [the attribute of] seeing others [such as blue and so forth], as, for example, is the case with a pot [which does not inherently see others because of not seeing its own entity]. Also, an eye does not possess [the attribute of] seeing its own entity; therefore, it also does not possess [the attribute of inherently] seeing others [such as forms]. Therefore, seeing others—blue and so forth—which is contradictory with not seeing its own entity is contradicted just by inference approved by yourself.

[That Chandrakīrti says this] entails [that our inferences have the fruit of only refuting others’ theses] because he speaks of self-approved and other-approved inferences although they are not autonomous.

a La Vallée Poussin (Prasannapadā, 34.6 and n. 5) changes para caksuḥ to param caksuḥ within recognizing that the Tibetan (gzhan) does not confirm the change and preferring that the Tibetan read gzhana; however, Dr. Vaidya leaves the manuscript as is, and the Four Interwoven Annotations (573.5) follows the same reading, identifying the term as referring to other parties who assert that the eye sees. I consider La Vallée Poussin’s emendation to be unnecessary.

b In Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle (255b.1) read nyid du yang khas for nyid du khas in accordance with the Peking edition (vol. 98 7.1.7). The bracketed material in this and the next section is from the Four Interwoven Annotations, 573.6-574.2.

c Four Interwoven Annotations, 574.4.

(KEY: Text without highlight = Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight. Yellow highlight = Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Golden Wheel of Annotations. Aqua highlight = Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chens-dön-drub’s annotations. Magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis has been filled in.)
The second root sign [which is that signs established from their own side are not accepted] is established because it has already been explained that the meaning of “autonomous” (rang rgyud, svatantra) is taken to be “establishment from [the object’s] own side,” since Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words says, “we do not use autonomous inferences,” and Bhāvaviveka’s Lamp for (Nāgārjuna’s) “Wisdom” says:

Now [Nāgārjuna] composed the thirteenth chapter for the sake of

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a This comes just before the prior quote: “Proponents of autonomous inferences come to have these faults, but we do not use autonomous inferences because our inferences have the fruit of only refuting others’ theses.”

b rang rgyud kyi rjes su dpag pa, svatantra-anumāna.

c These are the initial and final statements in Bhāvaviveka’s commentary on the thirteenth chapter of Nāgārjuna’s Treatise on the Middle. I have included the entire first sentence, which is abbreviated in the Four Interwoven Annotations, vol. 2, 269a.3.

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demonstrating from [another] aspect⁹ that compositional phenomena are natureless through the force of giving answers to refutations and own-powered [or autonomous] inferences.⁸ Concerning this, here through the force of having demonstrated unblemished answers to repudiations uttered by opponents and own-powered inferences it has been demonstrated from [another] aspect that compositional phenomena are natureless.

Hence, if one wonders whether among Middle Way Consequentialists an autonomous reason is or is not needed as a branch of generating an inference realizing certain conventional meanings among the diversity of objects of knowledge, it is very much not needed, because Khay-drub Ge-leg-pal-sang’s Great Compilation: Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate says:

Therefore, when a reason is stated by two disputants—who have realized well the Consequentialist view—among themselves for the sake of delineating certain conventional presentations, the

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⁹ nram pa las, which Avalokitavrata (Golden Reprint, vol. 110, 835.5) glosses as “from an approach other than the aspects demonstrated earlier” (sngar bstan pa’i nram pa las gshan pa’i sgo nas).

⁸ rang dbang du rje su dpag pa.

⁸ See also the translation in Cabezón, A Dose of Emptiness, 285.

{KEY: Text without highlight = Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight. Yellow highlight = Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Golden Wheel of Annotations. Aqua highlight = Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub’s annotations. Magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis has been filled in.}
three modes are established in compatible appearance in the systems of both disputants, but it does not become an autonomous reason.

Let us leave aside for the time being the analysis of sources and so forth.

Let us explain this in terms of the above syllogistic statement within associating it step by step with the text of Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words*. This has thirteen parts.

{KEY: Text without highlight = Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight. Yellow highlight = Jam-yang-shay-pa’s *Golden Wheel of Annotations*. Aqua highlight = Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub’s annotations. Magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis has been filled in.}
A: The consequence that [Bhāvaviveka] has asserted that the subjects, the substrata, have degenerated [from being established] in suchness

Concerning this, initially [Chandrakīrti] describes the master Bhāvaviveka’s mode of assertion with:

That when the Proponents of the Middle Way School and the Proponents of [Truly Established] Things debate, a compatibly established subject and so forth not qualified with either truth or falsity are asserted is not feasibly so because on this occasion of proving that eyes and so forth are without truly established production when a negation of production is asserted here as the predicate of the proposition, this one, the master Bhāvaviveka, himself just asserts that the entities of the subjects—eyes and so forth, the substrata of that predicate, the absence of truly established production, which gain their thingness by way of being taken as objects by mere erroneous consciousnesses polluted by ignorance—have degenerated from [being] in suchness, that is to say, are not established in suchness, that is, such subjects are not ultimately established.

The meaning of this is that the master Bhāvaviveka himself just has asserted that eyes or forms and so forth—which are posited as the subjects that are the substrata of the predicate of the proposition, the nonexistence of production ultimately—have degenerated from being established in suchness, that is, are not established in suchness.

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a Tsong-kha-pa cites merely the beginning and the end of this passage with an ellipsis in the middle; the entire passage, along with the annotations as given above, is provided here. As explained earlier, this version includes the misreading “in suchness.”
Well then, what sort of subject is asserted as not established in suchness?

Response dispelling this qualm: Those that gain their own thingness, that is, their own entities, and are established by mere erroneous consciousnesses mistaken through the force of pollutions by ignorance are such subjects. Moreover, they are objects established by mere conventional consciousnesses such as eye consciousnesses and so forth, mistaken consciousnesses polluted by ignorance—namely, forms, sounds, and so forth that are posited as subjects.

B: How [Bhāvaviveka] has come to assert this

Question: Well then, how is it that the master Bhāvaviveka asserts that such subjects are not established in suchness?

Answer: When—that is, because—this very negation ultimately of production depends as a predicate of the proposition upon subjects, substrata, such as forms and so forth that are objects found by a mistaken consciousness, those subjects have come to be asserted as not established in suchness because if those subjects, forms and so forth, are established in suchness, or ultimately, it is very contradictory for that predicate of the proposition—“not produced ultimately”—to depend on subjects that are ultimately established.
C: Objects found by the mistaken and the nonmistaken are contradictory

With respect to how fallacies are incurred due to asserting such, the master Bhāvaviveka queries about the above: Though [I] do indeed assert thus that the subjects, forms and so forth, that are the substrata of the predicate of the proposition—“not produced ultimately”—are not established in suchness, what fallacy would that assertion incur?

Response: When that is asserted, it incurs this fallacy: Those forms, which are not established in suchness and also are not suchness, are not at all fit to be objects found by way of appearing in the perspective of non-mistaken consciousness—a Superior’s meditative equipoise—due to the fact that they are only falsities appearing to be inherently established while not being inherently existent. Hence, they are found by erroneous subjects, conventional consciousnesses apprehending only false objects, whereby those conventional consciousnesses, the finders, also are only mistaken, polluted by ignorance.

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D: How objects found by mistaken and nonmistaken [consciousnesses] are contradictory

Therefore, the nature that is suchness, the object found by the nonmistaken meditative equipoise of a Superior, does not appear to mistaken consciousness, and the false objects appearing to mistaken consciousness do not appear in the perspective of meditative equipoise and hence are not found in the perspective of the nonmistaken consciousness of meditative equipoise because the two—conventional erroneous mistaken consciousness polluted by ignorance and the meditative equipoise of a Superior, nonerroneous nonmistaken consciousness unpolluted by ignorance—are just different in terms of engaging objects from the viewpoint that their respective objects are contradictory in the sense of being mutually exclusive since their objects are discordant. This is the meaning of [Chandrakīrti’s] saying in this passage, “The erroneous and the nonerroneous are different.”a

a  phyin ci log dang phyin ci ma log pa dag ni tha dad pa yin no, bhinnau hi viparyāsāviparyāsa.
E: Through the example of eye consciousnesses having and not having an eye disease explaining that the ways the aspects of those two dawn are not shared

Having briefly indicated how [the erroneous and the nonerroneous are] different from the viewpoint of being contradictory in that way, [Chandrakīrti’s] further extensive explanation of just this meaning is in this text [the Clear Words]:

Because of this difference between those two as being contradictory in the sense of being mutually exclusive, objects such as forms and so forth that do not exist by way of their own character are apprehended by—that is to say, appear to—an erroneous, mistaken eye consciousness as just existing by way of their own character, like the nonexistent falling hairs apprehended to be existent by the eye consciousness of one with eye disease and so on; when this is the case, how then could even a portion of objects existent by way of their own character be observed and established by an eye consciousness and so forth? Like the falling hairs and so forth that, since they do not exist, are not apprehended as existent by the pure eye consciousness of one without eye disease, unreal forms and so forth that are established by way of their own character while [actually] not established by way of their own character are not superimposed—not apprehended—by a nonerroneous nonmistaken consciousness of a Superior’s meditative equipoise devoid of all dualistic appearance; when this is the case, how then could that pristine wisdom—in its perceptual perspective in which dualistic appearance has vanished—observe, that is, apprehend, even the merest portion of forms and so forth that because of being conventionalities, appear to be established by way of their own character, and hence such appearance does not at all exist in the

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a Tsong-kha-pa gives only the opening and closing phrases; I have supplied the full quote from the citation above with the respective Sanskrit and Tibetan because of his close attention to the individual words below.
As to the nonestablishment by a mistaken consciousness of even a portion of objects as they appear to those consciousnesses, [Chandrakīrti] says:

Therefore, when, like the falling hairs [apprehended] by one with eye disease and so on, what is nonexistent is apprehended by erroneous [consciousnesses] as just existing, how then could even a portion of existent objects be observed!

d‘ie phyin/ gang gi ishe rab rib can gyis skra shad la sogs pa lta phrin ci log gis yod pa ma yin pa yod pa nyid du ’dzin pa de’i ishe ni yod par gyur pa’i don cha tsam yang dmigs par ga la ’gyur/

Concerning this statement:

• The meaning of “erroneous” (phyin ci log, viparyāsa) is that since conventional sense consciousnesses such as an eye sense consciousness that are polluted by ignorance are mistaken, they are called “erroneous.”

d-events chen la dge’i khyams pa’i de kho ‘dus pa’i dang phrin ci log gis yod pa ma yin pa yod pa nyid du ’dzin pa, [viparyāsa]enāsat sattvena grhyate), a character of being established by way of their own nature is nonexistent—that is, does not exist—in forms, sounds, and so forth; while it does not exist, this character is apprehended by those (de dag gis) sense consciousnesses as existing in these forms and so forth in accordance with how it appears. The meaning of being apprehended by consciousnesses of nonconceptual direct perception must

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a The Sanskrit is from La Vallée Poussin, Prasannapada, 11.3.
be taken as merely appearing to those,\(^a\) hence, forms and so forth appear to those sense consciousnesses as having their own character established from their own side.

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\text{དེ་དག་གིས་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ཞེན་པ་ན།}
\]

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\text{གཞུག་གསོགས་ལ་རང་གི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་བཞི་བའི་མཚན་ཉིད་མེད་བཞིན་དབང་པོའི་ཤེས་པས་ཡོད་པར་བེང་བ་ེ།}
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\text{ོག་མེད་ཀྱི་ཤེས་པས་བེང་བ་ནི་ངང་བ་ཙམ་ལ་དགོས་པས་རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་གཞུག་གསོགས་ངང་བའོ།}
\]

- The statement “how then could even a portion of existent objects be observed!” (de’i tshi ni yod par gyur pa’i don cha tsam yang dmigs par ga la’gyur, tadā kutah sadbhūta-paḍārthaleśasyāpy upalabdhiḥ) indicates that due to the fact that [forms and so forth] appear and are apprehended as established by way of their own character in that way, existence by way of their own character is not established by those sense consciousnesses. Because\(^b\) in that way, as explained above, while establishment by way of their own character does not exist in forms and so forth, they appear to be established by way of their own character, how then could even a tiny part of objects existent by way of their own character be observed and established by those mistaken sense consciousnesses! That is the meaning. In brief, because those sense consciousnesses are mistaken, since objects such as forms and so forth—while not inherently existent—appear to be inherently existent, how could those sense consciousnesses establish even a tiny part of objects in accordance with how they appear to them to be inherently established!

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\(^a\) If sense consciousnesses apprehended their objects as established by way of their own character, they could not be valid cognitions, whereas, according to Tsong-kha-pa, they can be valid cognitions if not distorted by superficial causes of mistake.

\(^b\) The Four Interwoven Annotations (vol. 2, 541.3) explains:

The term “when” (tshi), although employed for time, is like the term “because” (phyir) indicating reason, and hence it is here affixed as the term “because.”
An example of an object established by way of its own character that appears to a mistaken sense consciousness while nonexistent is “like the falling hairs [apprehended] by one with eye disease and so on” (rab rib can gyis skra shad la sogs pa ltar, taimirikena va keṣadi).

Moreover, for example, due to the defects of an eye disease the eye consciousness becomes mistaken, and while there are no pieces of hair, pieces of hair appear to be falling from the sky; similarly, sense consciousnesses, become mistaken due to pollution by ignorance, and their objects, while not inherently existent, appear to be inherently existent.

Those passages say that sense consciousnesses to which forms, sounds, and so forth appear are not fit as means of establishing that objects, forms and so forth, are established by means of their own character.

F: How for the Consequentialists unmistaken direct perceptions do not perceive falsities
[Chandrakīrti’s] indication that “the unmistaken consciousnesses of a Superior’s meditative equipoise do not apprehend any conventional objects such as forms, sounds, and so forth from the viewpoint of appearing in the perspective of the perception of the ultimate” is:

When, like the falling hairs and so forth [not apprehended] by one without eye disease, the unreal is not superimposed by nonerroneous [consciousnesses], how then could even the merest portion of nonexistent objects, veilings, be observed!

\[ \text{yadā cāviparyāśād abhūtāṃ nādyāropitāṃ vitamirikēṇeva keśādī' tadā kuto 'sadbhūtapadārthaleśasyāpy upalabdhir yena tadāṅāṃ samvṛtī syātu} \]

Concerning this statement:

- The “nonerroneous” (phyin ci ma log pa, aviparyāsa) are nonmistaken consciousnesses since they do not erroneously apprehend objects.

Those nonmistaken consciousnesses exist in those who manifestly actualize suchness, that is, directly realize suchness, not in other persons.

\[ \text{a The Sanskrit is from La Vallée Poussin, Prasannapadā, 11.3.} \]
G: Explanation thus through the example of one without eye disease [of how for Consequentialists unmistakable direct perceptions do not perceive falsities]

- “the unreal are not superimposed by that pristine wisdom of a Superior’s meditative equipoise” (des’ yang dag pa ma yin pa sgro mi ’dogs pa, abhītānādhyāropitam): the unreal—falsities whose mode of appearance and mode of abiding are contradictory—forms, sounds, and so forth, which are not fit to be posited as the meaning of suchness, that is, as the ultimate truth itself, are not superimposed, that is, are not fabricatingly apprehended as existing by that pristine wisdom while not appearing in the perspective of its perceiving suchness. For example, it is just as an eye consciousness that is free of an eye disease does not see and observe an appearance of pieces of falling hairs.

\[\text{Example:} \quad \text{‘dzag means } \text{zag par 'gyur ba (falling).}\]

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a The brackets are taken from number six just above.
b Tsong-kha-pa substitutes des for phyin ci ma log pas.
c The Four Interwoven Annotations (vol. 2, 543.1) explains that ‘dzag means zag par 'gyur ba (falling).
H: The mode of falsity and the way direct perceptions that are without the dimness of ignorance do not perceive [falsities]

西藏·布達拉宮·拜歌·阿利·那多仁波切·達瓦·如巴·母次拉·札·滿完·仁波切

• “veilings” (kun rdzob tu 'gyur ba, samyrtih): those forms, sounds, and so forth are false objects in the sense that they deceive by way of a discordance between how they appear and how they abide, appearing to inherently exist while not inherently existing.a

ཀུན་ɲོབ་ȣ་འǽར་བ་ནི་གɶགས་Ȍ་སོགས་བɳན་པའི་དོན་ནོ།

• “nonexistent” (yod pa ma yin pa, 'sad): not established as existing by way of their own character.

ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ནི་རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་མ་ǿབ་པའོ།

The meaning is: Even the merest portionb of such inherently established forms and so forth is not established by a nonmistaken consciousness—a Superior’s meditative equipoise that has suchness as its object—in its perspective of perceiving suchness because since that meditative equipoise of a Superior does not perceive those forms and so forth in its perspective of perceiving suchness, all appearances of veilings have vanished for its perspective of perceiving suchness.

དེ་འȮ་བ་དེ་མ་འǺལ་བའི་ཤེས་པ་དེ་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ɺལ་ཅན་དེས་ཆ་ཙམ་ཡང་མི་འǿབ་Ȫེ།

a It can be seen from this description that “conventionalities” is an inadequate translation for kun rdzob (samyrti) since it does not convey this impact; “veilings,” “fraudulences” or “shams” are more fitting in this context. As is indicated here, the primary meaning of kun rdzob is taken to be brdzun pa (falsity, veiling), and similarly the primary meaning of kun rdzob in kun rdzob bden pa, veil truth, is taken to be sgrib byed (concealer, veil).

b cha tsam yang, leasasyäpi.

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I: Source making known that while inherently established objects are not established, there is no comprehension [of objects] by the four valid cognitions established in accordance with [their] appearance

For those meanings [Chandrakīrti] cites a source from the protector Nāgārjuna’s text Refutation of Objections.¹

If in accordance with your thought, O Proponent of Truly Established Things, the four valid cognitions—Direct perception and so forth—did observe some inherently established objects,

Then it would be reasonable to prove those in your own system or refute those in others, but since these valid cognitions observing Such objects of comprehension do not exist even in conventional terms, there is no chance for you to censure me.

The master [Chandrakīrti] takes the statement by this scriptural passage here—that the four valid cognitions, direct perception and so forth, do not establish any object that is established by way of its own character—as a source making known that in this text not any valid cognition, mistaken or nonmistaken, establishes at all an object that is established by way of its own character.

¹ Tsong-kha-pa cites only the beginning “If” and “and so forth.” I have added the remainder along with annotations as given above. This is stanza 30; P5228, vol. 95, 15.1.2. See also K. Bhattacharya, E. H. Johnston, and A. Kunst, The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna (New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978), 23. This was cited earlier (49).
J: Summary of the meaning

The meanings of the points above are brought together and explained by the passage:

Because in that way, the two—the erroneous objects found by a mistaken consciousness and the nonerroneous objects found by a nonmistaken consciousness of a Superior’s meditative equipoise are different by way of being contradictory in the sense of being mutually exclusive, erroneous falsities that are objects found by mistaken consciousness do not exist in the perspective of meditative equipoise that is a Superior’s state of directly perceiving nonerroneous suchness. Therefore, how could there be a falsely established veiling, such as an eye, or the like that is a subject compatibly established in the systems of both a Proponent of the Middle and a Proponent of Truly Established Things! Hence, that is to say, because of the nonexistence of such a compatibly appearing subject, on the occasion of taking eyes and so forth as subjects and proving that ultimately production does not exist, there is no compatibly appearing basal subject, and consequently there is no method by which you could overturn the fallacy of a position whose basal subject is not establishedb—this being the fallacy of there being no proposition—and the fallacy of a reason whose basal subject is not establishedc—this being the fallacy of the mode of the sign not being established since there being no substratum in relation to which the reason could become the property of the position—and, therefore, this response that you have given [that is, that compatibly appearing generalities are to be used,] is just

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a Tsong-kha-pa cites merely the first five syllables.
b gzhi ma grub pa, asiddhādhāra.
c gzhi ma grub pa, āśrayāsiddha.
not a response concordant with the fact. [For, there is no com-
monly held valid cognition, mistaken or nonmistaken, to certify
the existence of such subjects.]

This passage is a summation of the meanings explained above.

K: The established meaning is the fact that there do
not exist inherently established forms and so forth
that are objects found by a nonmistaken
consciousness

[Chandrakīrti’s] saying “how could there be a veiling, an eye, that is a
subject!” does not indicate that mere subjects that are veilings, conven-
tionally established eyes and so forth, do not exist. Then what is indicated?
It means, in accordance with the earlier explanation, that forms and so

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Wayman (Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real, 312) translates the last line as,
“You have no answer to this.” However, the Four Interwoven Annotations (533.4) cogently
makes it clear that the reference is to the hypothetical Bhāvaviveka’s earlier answer, “The
response that you have given is just not a response concordant with the fact (khyed kyis lan
btab pa’ di ni don dang mthun pa’i lan ma yin pa nyid do).” Bhāvaviveka’s earlier answer
was that just generalities are to be used as subject, predicate, and so forth without being
qualified by the particular assertions of the two schools. Chandrakīrti’s refutation of this is
built around his perception that a tenet unacceptable to a Proponent of the Middle is auto-
matically attached to the subject and so forth—inherent existence—because schools that
propound inherent existence hold that the consciousness certifying the subject and so forth
perforce must certify their inherent existence.

{KEY: Text without highlight = Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight. Yellow
highlight = Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Golden Wheel of Annotations. Aqua highlight = Dra-ti Ge-she
Rin-chen-dön-drub’s annotations. Magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis has been filled in.}
forth that are established by way of their own character, or forms and so forth that are established in the perspective of perception of suchness by nonmistaken direct perception—no matter which way it is taken the meaning is similar—are not established and do not occur as positable as subjects even in conventional terms.

L: How due to the nonexistence of a compatibly established subject, even when Proponents of [Truly Established] Things and Proponents of the Middle debate, autonomous [syllogisms] do not exist.

Then, with respect to the meaning of [Chandrakīrti’s] statement:

Therefore, when, like the falling hairs [apprehended] by one with eye disease and so on, what is nonexistent is apprehended by erroneous [consciousnesses] as just existing, how then could even a portion of existent objects be observed! When, like the falling hairs and so forth [not apprehended] by one without eye disease, the unreal is not superimposed by nonerroneous [consciousnesses], how then could even the merest portion of nonexistent veilings be observed!

Tad yadā viparyāsenāsat sattvena grhyate taimirikeṇeva keśadi /

tadā kutāḥ sadbhūtapadārthaleśasyāpy upalabdhiḥ / yadā

a Tsong-kha-pa cites merely the first two syllables and “and so forth” (de’i phyir sogs).

{KEY: Text without highlight = Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight. Yellow highlight = Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Golden Wheel of Annotations. Aqua highlight = Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub’s annotations. Magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis has been filled in.}
On an occasion when the two—a Middle Consequentialist who propounds that a nature established by way of its own entity does not exist and a Proponent of [Truly Established] Things—debate, when a form sense-field is posited as a subject, since a direct perception such as an eye consciousness and so forth that is nonmistaken with respect to that form is not established in compatible appearance, there is no valid cognition, establishing the form, that is a means of establishing a compatibly appearing subject in the systems of both the Proponent of the Middle and the Proponent of [Truly Established] Things. Since that valid cognition does not exist, such a basal subject becomes nonestablished and when the basal subject is not established, a flawless position that is to be proven for the other party by means of an autonomous reason is not at all positable. That is the meaning.

\[\text{La Vallée Poussin, Prasannapadā, 11.3.}\]
M: It is very illogical to think that such a fallacy of autonomy exists for one whose position is that there is no inherent existence, but since establishment by way of own character exists conventionally, there is no flawed position.

[The other party] might think: In your position or system, in which you assert that there does not exist even in conventional terms a nature in the sense of establishment by way of [the phenomenon’s] own entity, it is the case that there is no such compatible appearance of a subject in the systems of both parties of a debate, whereby that fallacy is incurred, but in our own system, we do not assert such—that is, we do not assert that there does not exist a nature in the sense of an establishment by way of [the phenomenon’s] own entity—in conventional terms. Hence, autonomous subjects and so forth—namely, propositions and signs—exist, due to which there are nonfallacious substrata of predicates of propositions, whereby nonfallacious positions, that is, propositions, just exist.

Answer: Even if you assert such, the illogicality of the existence of such a nature, that is, establishment from [the phenomenon’s] own side, even in conventional terms has been explained not only on this occasion but also earlier, above, and will be explained further below. Hence, your response is unreasonable.
2” HOW THE MEANING DIFFERS FROM THE EXAMPLE YOU CITED {2 PARTS}

This has two parts: stating the passage and explaining the meaning.

A” STATING THE PASSAGE

With respect to how this is not similar to proving sound to be impermanent, Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words says:

There also is no similarity between the above example, a statement of proof that sound is impermanent, and the meaning, an occasion when a Proponent of the Middle proves that forms and so

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a As given in the Chandrakīrti section without additions from the Four Interwoven Annotations:

The example also lacks similarity [with the meaning]. Even if there [in the example] a generality of sound and a generality of impermanence that are not wished to be expressed as qualified [with particular tenets] do exist for both [parties], nevertheless proponents of emptiness and proponents of non-emptiness do not assert a generality of eyes conventionally or ultimately; hence, the example lacks similarity [with the meaning].

b The Four Interwoven Annotations (vol. 2, 545.6) makes a textual comment, “This is cited in Khay-drub’s Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate as ma yin te [rather than ma yin no]; hence, it is evident that just the term te which is a continuative (lha bcas) is correct.”

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forth are not produced from self. Why? There in the example when a Buddhist is proving to a Vaishēšika that sound is impermanent and a Vaishēšika is proving such to a Dīpaka, a mere generality of sound which is just established by way of its own character but is not qualified by their individual assertions—respectively being a derivative of the elements and being a quality of space or being a product and being something previously existent that is manifested by conditions—and a mere generality of impermanence or disintegration, the predicate of the proposition, which is established by way of its own character but which is not qualified by either depending or not depending on subsequently arisen causes are stated within the context that these have been certified by valid cognition. If, not wishing to express [a subject and predicate] within affixing those qualifications of their individual assertions, they wish to express [a subject and predicate that are] established as compatibly appearing in both of their systems, there is such in the systems of both disputants. Nevertheless, what exists in the example in that fashion is not fit for the meaning exemplified as follows: A mere general eye that is not established by way of being posited by a mistaken consciousness and also is not established by way of being posited by a nonmistaken consciousness and that is posited as the subject is not asserted conventionally by the proponents of the emptiness of inherent existence, the Consequentialists, and the proponents of the non-emptiness of inherent existence, the Proponents of [Truly Established] Things and so forth, and is also not asserted ultimately; hence, the example lacks similarity with the meaning.

a This is the Buddhist assertion.
b The Vaishēšika assertion.
c The Buddhist assertion.
d The Dīpaka assertion.
e The Sūtra School on up asserts that things disintegrate without depending on causes other than the causes that produce them, whereas other schools hold that the disintegration of things requires causes subsequent to the causes that produce them.
f The example is not similar to what it is intended to exemplify.

(KEY: Text without highlight = Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight. Yellow highlight = Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Golden Wheel of Annotations. Aqua highlight = Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub’s annotations. Magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis has been filled in.)
This has two parts: explaining that unqualified generalities of the three—the sign, the predicate of the proposition, and the basis of debate in the proof that sound is impermanent due to being a product—exist; and how those three do not exist when proving the absence of true existence to a Proponent of [Truly Established] Things.

I: Explaining that unqualified generalities of the three—the sign, the predicate of the proposition, and the basis of debate in the proof that sound is impermanent due to being a product—exist {2 parts}

This has two parts.
A: Rather than the qualifications being associated verbally or mentally, how it is not logically feasible to assert that [the issue here is] whether these are qualified in general or not.

As for the meaning of this passage, someone [wrongly] says that it is indicating the following:

With respect to the subject, when a Buddhist Autonomist or below proves for a Vaisheshika that a sound is impermanent, there exists a mere general sound that is neither of the two, a derivative of the elements for the Vaisheshika or a quality of space for the Buddhist that is suitable to be posited as the basis of debate [that is, the subject] in this proof, and when a Vaisheshika proves for a Dipaka that a sound is impermanent, there exists a mere general sound that is neither of the two, a product for the Dipaka or a manifestation through conditions of what formerly existed for the Vaisheshika that is suitable to be posited as the basis of debate [that is, the subject] in this proof. And also with respect to the predicate of the proposition there exists a mere general impermanence or disintegration that is neither of the two, relying on subsequently arisen causes or not relying on subsequently arisen causes, that is suitable to be posited as the predicate of the proposition in this proof. However, when a Proponent of the Middle proves to a Proponent of [Truly Established] Things that eyes and so forth are not produced from self, there do not exist eyes and so forth that are neither true nor false.

It is not indicating such because those subjects and so forth that are not any of those specifics are not asserted by any of those parties and because not only this, if it were the case that subjects and so forth that are not any of those specifics were asserted by those parties, no one could prove that the example and the exemplified meaning are not similar.a

a If it were the case that subjects and so forth that are not any of those specifics were
asserted by those parties, no one including Chandrakīrti could prove that the example and the exemplified are not similar, but the fact that Chandrakīrti is proving that the example and the exemplified are not similar shows that subjects and so forth that are not any of those specifics are not asserted by those parties.

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B: [Sign, predicate of the proposition, and basis of debate] that are not qualified verbally or mentally by permanence or impermanence do exist, but regarding a Proponent of the Middle proving the absence of true existence to a Proponent of [Truly Established] Things, neither compatible establishment [by a consciousness] that is mistaken with respect to establishment by way of the object’s own character nor [by a consciousness] that is nonmistaken with respect to establishment by way of the object’s own character exists; hence, they are not similar.

If such is not being indicated, well then what is the meaning of this passage?

It is as follows. When a Buddhist proves to a Vaisheṣhika that sound is impermanent, ascertainment of mere sound in general as existent—without being qualified by either of the specifics by way of, for instance, “sound that is a derivative of the elements” or “sound that is a quality of space”—is doable in the systems of both those parties, Buddhist and Vaisheshika, but here in the systems of the two, the proponents of the emptiness of inherent existence and the proponents of the non-emptiness of inherent existence, there does not exist a general form or eye that is established by a mere valid cognition in general and that:

• is not established by way of being posited by a nonmistaken consciousness, that is, a Superior’s meditative equipoise and so forth, and
• also is not established by way of being posited by a mistaken consciousness.

Subjects and so forth established by a valid cognition that is a sense consciousness mistaken with respect to forms and so forth being established by way of their own character are not established for the system of the...
second party, a Proponent of [Truly Established] Things and so on, and also subjects and so forth found by a valid cognition that is a consciousness nonmistaken with respect to establishment by its own character are not established by a valid cognition in the system of the prior disputant [the proponent of the emptiness of inherent existence]. Hence, similarity between your example and the meaning does not exist on this occasion. This is the meaning [of the passage].

Since the meaning of this is very difficult to realize, let us explain it a little clearly. The two, the example and the meaning, are dissimilar because:

1. when a Buddhist a proves to a Vaisheṣhika that sound is impermanent, both assert that although [their respective consciousness] does not become a valid cognition with regard to a factor of being a derivative of the elements or of being a quality of space, it is valid cognition with respect to sound that is established by way of its own character, and

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a “Buddhist” here excludes Proponents of the Middle since sound is specified as being rang mtshan, which the following quote from Khay-drub details as “established by way of its own character” (rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa).

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2. when a Proponent of the Middle proves to a Proponent of [Truly Established] Things that eyes are without inherent existence, both do not assert [a consciousness] that is valid cognition with respect to eyes that is not a valid cognition mistaken with respect to eyes and also is not a valid cognition nonmistaken with respect to eyes.

The first [part of the sign which is that when a Buddhist proves to a Vaishēṣhika that sound is impermanent, both assert that although (their respective consciousness) does not become a valid cognition with regard to a factor of being a derivative of the elements or of being a quality of space, it is valid cognition with respect to sound that is established by way of its own character] is established because Khay-drub Ge-leg-pal-sang’s Great Compilation: Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate says:

When a Buddhist proves for a Vaishēṣhika that sound is impermanent, although [their consciousness] does not become a valid cognition with regard to a factor of sound being a derivative of the elements or being a quality of space, in the systems of both disputants there exists [a consciousness] that is a valid cognition with respect to a mere general sound that is established by way of its own character.

a BDRC, W00EGS1016265-I00JW501183, 331.1/164a.1. The abbreviated quote has been restored as per the original text; see also the translation in Cabezón, A Dose of Emissiness, 283.

{KEY: Text without highlight = Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight. Yellow highlight = Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Golden Wheel of Annotations. Aqua highlight = Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub’s annotations. Magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis has been filled in.}
The second [part of the sign which is that when a Proponent of the Middle proves to a Proponent of (Truly Established) Things that eyes are without inherent existence, both do not assert (a consciousness) that is valid cognition with respect to eyes that is not a valid cognition mistaken with respect to eyes and also is not a valid cognition nonmistaken with respect to eyes] is established because Khay-drub Ge-leg-pal-sang’s Great Compilation: Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate says:

In the systems of both the Proponents of the Middle and the Proponents of [Truly Established] Things it is impossible for there to be [a consciousness] that is not a valid cognition unmistaken with respect to eyes and is also not a valid cognition mistaken with respect to eyes but is valid cognition with respect to mere eyes.

This is in terms of Proponents of [Truly Established] Things and not in terms of Consequentialists.

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\[\text{Ibid., 331.2/164a.2; see also the translation in Cabezón, }\textit{A Dose of Emptiness}, \textit{283}.\]
2: How those three [sign, predicate of the proposition, and basis of debate] do not exist when a Proponent of the Middle proves the absence of true existence to a Proponent of [Truly Established] Things {3 parts}

This has three parts: actual exposition, differences between the assertions of the individual masters, and all assert that the root of proofs meets back to direct perception.

A: Actual exposition [of how those three—sign, predicate of the proposition, and basis of debate—do not exist when proving the absence of true existence to a Proponent of (Truly Established) Things {12 parts}

This has twelve parts.

1 * SINCE [A CONSCIOUSNESS] NONMISTAKEN WITH RESPECT TO ESTABLISHMENT BY WAY OF THE OBJECT’S OWN CHARACTER DOES NOT EXIST, OBJECTS FOUND BY A NONMISTAKEN CONSCIOUSNESS SUCH AS FORMS AND SO FORTH ARE NOT SUITABLE AS A BASIS OF DEBATE

{KEY: Text without highlight = Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight. Yellow highlight = Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Golden Wheel of Annotations. Aqua highlight = Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub’s annotations. Magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis has been filled in.}
In general although there exist forms and so forth that are objects found by a nonmistaken exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects, it is not suitable to analyze in debate whether it mistakes or does not mistake an object of direct perception because:

- Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Prime Cognition” says, “Yogis’ conceptions are inconceivable,”
- and Gyal-tshab’s Explanation of (Dharmakīrti’s) “Commentary on (Dignāga’s) ‘Compilation of Prime Cognition’”: Unerring Illumination of the Path to Liberation says:

> Because this is an occasion of identifying direct valid cognitions within a treatment of four valid cognitions, it is also not taught considering omniscient consciousness to be [this sort of] direct perception.

and Tsong-kha-pa’s Extensive Explanation of (Chandrakīrti’s) “Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle’”: Illumination of the Thought concerning the fruit [chapter eleven] also says:*

Although [at Buddhahood] there does exist the dualistic

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*a* In this annotation Jam-yang-shay-pa quotes the first and last sentences with a long ellipsis in the middle, which I have filled in.
appearance of object and object-possession appearing individually, the predispositions for mistaken dualistic appearance have been utterly eradicated, due to which it is dualistic appearance nonmistaken with respect to appearing objects but is not mistaken dualistic appearance. How this is nonmistaken has been explained well elsewhere.

Concerning the existence of both meditative equipoise and the pristine wisdom of subsequent attainment on the Buddha ground, Maitreya’s *Sublime Continuum [of the Great Vehicle]* says:

The wisdom [knowing the mode of being], the pristine wisdom [knowing the varieties], and the release [from objects of abandonment]—

Because of being clear, radiant, and pure

And because of not being different [from the nature of the one basal element]—are [respectively]

Similar to the light, rays, and [pure] disc of the sun [and the non-difference of those three].

about which Asaṅga’s commentary says:

Because the wisdom of supramundane nonconceptuality possessed in the continuum of a Buddha abides clear of darkness in the suchness of the ultimate object of knowledge, it is qualitatively similar to clear light. Because the pristine wisdom of all objects of knowledge in subsequent attainment in that [continuum of a Buddha] engages all aspects of the entire actualities of objects of knowledge, it is qualitatively similar to radiating a web of light rays.

{KEY: Text without highlight = Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight. Yellow highlight = Jam-yang-shay-pa’s *Golden Wheel of Annotations*. Aqua highlight = Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub’s annotations. Magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis has been filled in.}
"Supramundane nonconceptuality" is meditative equipoise; that it moreover is posited in relation to suchness is the meaning of "the suchness of the ultimate object of knowledge" (de yang de kho na nyid la los·nas 'jog pa ni de kho na nyid dam pa).<sup>a</sup>

The meaning of subsequent in "subsequent attainment" is not the subsequent of "prior to and subsequent to" as in "subsequent to rising from meditative equipoise" (mnyam bzhag las langs pa'i rjes) but means "attained, or arisen, by the power of that meditative equipoise" (mnyam bzhag de'i stobs kyis thob kyis thob pa'am byung ba).

The meaning of "engages all aspects of the entire actualities of objects of knowledge" (shes bya'i dngos po ma lus pa rnam pa thams cad la 'jug pas) is that this pristine wisdom of subsequent attainment is posited from the approach of engaging all of the diverse objects of knowledge. Therefore, relative to the substrata<sup>c</sup> (chos can la los te) [a nonmistaken exalted-knower-of-all-aspects] is not a knower of the mode of being, and relative to the noumenon (chos nyid la los te) it is not a knower of the

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<sup>a</sup> de kho na nyid dam pa la sogs pa, “the ultimate suchness and so forth”; I have filled in the “and so forth.” Tsong-kha-pa is explaining away the impression, given by Asanga, that the nonconceptual wisdom of meditative equipoise is the ultimate suchness; Tsong-kha-pa explains that it is called this because it is posited relative to emptiness, the ultimate suchness.

<sup>b</sup> shes bya la sogs pa, “objects of knowledge and so forth”; I have filled in the “and so forth.”

<sup>c</sup> The phenomena that are bases of the noumenon, emptiness.
If these meanings are understood well, with respect to the statements in Jñānagarbha’s *Differentiation of the Two Truths*:\(^a\)

An omniscient knower directly perceives
All the dependently produced
Just as they appear
Devoid of the superimposed entity.

and:

Because that which does not see knowers,
Objects known, and selfhood has a stable abiding
Due to the non-arising of marks,\(^b\)
[Buddhas] do not rise [from meditative stabilization].

that a Buddha directly knows all the diverse appearances [according to the first quote] and also does not see any knowers and known in the manner of dualistic appearance [according to the second quote] and statements like these also by other greats, it is not necessary to say:

That not any knowers and known are seen is done in terms of a Buddha’s own-appearance (*rang snang*), and that all objects of knowledge are directly perceived is a mode of exalted knowledge according to trainees’

\(\text{a Stanzas 37 and 39; Toh. 3881, } d\text{bu ma}, \text{ vol. } sa, \text{ 3a.4-3a.5 and 3a.5-3a.6; Eckel, } J\text{n}\text{ānagarbha’s Commentary}, \text{ 186 and 187; Eckel’s English translation is found on pp. 100-101.}\)

\(\text{b m}\text{tshan ma}; \text{ also, “constructs.”}\)
other-appearance, due to which a pristine wisdom included within the Buddha ground does not exist.

Rather, there does not exist even a slight contradiction in two different modes of exalted knowing coming in a single pristine wisdom relative to two objects.

Objection: Well then, the definitions of the two truths that were indicated [earlier in Chandrakīrti’s “Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle’” (VI.23)] with:

[Buddha] said that all things hold two natures, Those found by perceptions of reality and of falsities— Objects of perceptions of reality are suchness, And objects of perceptions of falsities are veil truths, and this presentation are contradictory.

(KEY: Text without highlight = Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight. Yellow highlight = Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Golden Wheel of Annotations. Aqua highlight = Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub’s annotations. Magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis has been filled in.)
Response: They are not contradictory because the definitions of the two truths explained [earlier] are in consideration of the general, whereas the mode of exalted knowledge by a Buddha’s pristine wisdom is done in terms of an exception, not shared with tenth grounders and below.

Moreover, although in general the nonmistaken indeed is taken to be a meditative equipoise directly comprehending ultimate truth and so forth—that is to say, a pristine wisdom that is a Superior’s direct perception—this being because among all sense consciousnesses, conceptual consciousnesses, and so forth comprehending conventionalities there is nothing nonmistaken while a sentient being, on this occasion hypothetically it must be taken as both:

- direct valid cognitions, eye consciousnesses and so forth, nonmistaken with respect to their appearing objects which appear to be established by way of their own character and
- inferential valid cognitions nonmistaken with respect to their conceived objects which are established by way of their own character, but in our own system such direct and inferential valid cognitions establishing [that is, confirming] the subject and establishing the three modes of a sign do not at all exist. Hence, here an object found by a nonmistaken consciousness is not suitable to be posited as a subject. This is to be taken

\[\text{brtag pa mtha' zung gi tshul gyis; literally, “in the manner of holding an extreme for the sake of analysis.” Correcting riag in the Delhi edition vol. 2 (275b.1/550.1) to \textit{brtag} in accordance with the BDRC \textit{bla brang}, vol. 2, 231b.4/624.4.}\]
2* BOTH DIRECT PERCEPTIONS AND INFERENTIAL COGNITIONS ARE MISTAKEN WITH RESPECT TO OWN-CHARACTER

On this occasion the meaning of “own-character” (rang gi mtshan nyid, svalakṣaṇa) is not to be taken, in accordance with the assertions of the Logicians, as just “able to perform a function.” Well then, how is it to be taken? It is to be taken as the likes of a nature (rang bzhin, svabhāva) in the sense of establishment by way of [the object’s] own entity—this nature having been explained earlier at the time of others’ assertions on the respective natures [of objects], whether with regard to a thing or a non-thing; hence, the Proponents of Inherent Existence assert that even an inferential cognition comprehending a non-thing is nonmistaken with respect to such an inherently existent conceived object, that is to say, a conceived object established from its own side.

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a That is, the object’s being established by way of its own character.

b rtog ge pa dag.
3* HOW THERE IS NO FINDING OF A CONVENTIONALITY WITHIN ITS HAVING SUCH OWN-CHARACTER

Whatever is a consciousness nonmistaken with regard to such a nature—that is to say, establishment from its own side—comes to be nonmistaken with respect to the appearing object and/or the conceived object, but that very consciousness goes as just nonmistaken with respect to the meaning of suchness, ultimate truth, due to which the establishment of subjects and so forth by such valid cognitions of our own system utterly does not occur; hence, it is asserted that subjects and so forth are not established by such valid cognitions. It is not being asserted that there do not exist conventional valid cognitions comprehending eyes, forms, and so forth in the continuums of both disputants, the Proponent of the Middle and the Proponent of [Truly Established] Things. Hence, since there is a great difference between the two, a valid cognition in the system of the second party, the Proponent of [Truly Established] Things and so forth, and a valid cognition in the continuum of that second party, here when a Proponent of the Middle proves to a Proponent of [Truly Established] Things that eyes or forms do not inherently exist, one needs to know the distinction that although the subject is established by both parties with valid cognitions, there is no compatibly appearing mode of establishment, whereby [the subject] is not

\[\text{\textsuperscript{a} In this final clause, Jam-yang-shay-pa’s remark in his Golden Wheel of Annotations is incorporated into the longer statement of the Four Interswoven Annotations (551.2) but is attributed to Ngag-wang-rab-tan (ngag dbang rab brtan); it is the only content remark by Jam-yang-shay-pa in this string of twelve annotations.}\]
established by the Proponent of the Middle with valid cognition, but if it is proven [this way], it becomes a pretend-debate (zol rtsod) or quasi-refutation (sun ’byin ltar snang).

There is not at all reasoned harm to objects—of an ascertaining consciousness, a mental consciousness ascertaining forms and so forth as merely existing, induced by those sense consciousnesses even in the continuums of such second parties—that are without the damage, that is to say, the causes of mistake, described earlier. Let us explain the meaning of this in detail: If we illustrate this, for instance, in apprehending a stalk as existing, three modes of apprehension occur:

1. apprehending the stalk as truly existent, as in apprehending it as having a nature in the sense of being established by way of its own entity
2. apprehending the stalk as existing falsely, as in apprehending that although it does not exist in the sense of being established by way of its own entity, it does exist as like an illusion

4* CONCERNING THIS IT IS NECESSARY TO KNOW THE THREE MODES OF APPREHENSION
3. apprehending the stalk as merely existing in general without being qualified by either of those, truth or falsity.

5* HOW THOSE THREE ARE IMPORTANT HERE

In general indeed there are even many apprehensions of a stalk as existing as permanent or impermanent, as a thing or a non-thing, as a product and a non-product, and so forth, but apprehensions as those, that is, permanent and impermanent and so forth, do not exist outside of any of these three modes of apprehension above; hence, it is not necessary here to separately describe the modes of apprehending [phenomena] as permanent and impermanent and so forth.
6* ALTHOUGH PRIOR TO FINDING THE MIDDLE VIEW THERE IS NO APPREHENSION [OF OBJECTS] AS FALSE, THE OTHER TWO EXIST, WHEREBY ALL APPREHENSIONS OF EXISTENCE AT THAT TIME ARE NOT APPREHENSIONS OF TRUE EXISTENCE:

Concerning those, from among the three modes of apprehension in that way, in the continuums of sentient beings who have not generated in their continuums the view realizing things as without inherent existence there are the two, apprehension of stalks as merely existing and apprehension of stalks as truly existing, but, from among those three, apprehension of stalks as existing like a magician’s illusion—not existing by way of its own entity—does not occur at all.

7* THEREFORE,\(^{a}\) IT IS NECESSARY TO KNOW THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE FOUR,\(^{b}\) INHERENT EXISTENCE AND INHERENT NONEXISTENCE, AND EXISTENCE AND NONEXISTENCE

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\(^{a}\) The BDRC bla brang (233a.4/627.4), Delhi edition vol. 2 (276b.3/552.3), and Golden Wheel digital read des ni whereas des na seems more likely.

\(^{b}\) Correcting gzh'i khyad par shes dgos pa ni in the Delhi edition vol. 2 (276b.3/552.3) to bzhi'i khyad par shes dgos pa ni in accordance with BDRC bla brang (233a.4/627.4).

(KEY: Text without highlight = Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight. Yellow highlight = Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Golden Wheel of Annotations. Aqua highlight = Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub’s annotations. Magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis has been filled in.)
Therefore, earlier on the occasion of describing conventional valid cognition and on the occasion of distinguishing between (1) inherent existence and inherent nonexistence and (2) existence and nonexistence in general, [I] have manifoldly explained to be unsuitable in all ways the assertions by others who take it that all whatsoever apprehensions of existence—by the conceptual consciousnesses of sentient beings who have not found the view that phenomena are like illusions—are apprehensions of true existence and thereupon treat all such conceptual consciousnesses as apprehenders of true existence.

8* IF, a NOT b KNOWING SUCH, ONE [MIS]UNDERSTANDS THAT WHATSOEVER APPREHENSION PRIOR TO REALIZING THE VIEW IS AN APPREHENSION OF TRUE EXISTENCE, HOW THIS BECOMES A VIEW OF ANNIHILATION

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a  Correcting nas in the BDRC bla brang (233a.6/627.6) to na in accordance with the Delhi edition vol. 2 (276b.5/552.5).
b  Correcting ni in the BDRC bla brang (233a.6) to mi in accordance with the Delhi edition vol. 2 (552.5).

(KEY: Text without highlight = Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight. Yellow highlight = Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Golden Wheel of Annotations. Aqua highlight = Dra-Áti Ge-she Rin-chen-d ön-drub’s annotations. Magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis has been filled in.)
If, without its being as explained above, it is in accordance with your assertion that all uses of conventionalities by conceptual consciousnesses prior to understanding the view realizing the absence of inherent existence go as apprehensions of true existence, well then, damage by reasoning would descend on all those objects posited by those usual worldly conventional consciousnesses not polluted by the causes of mistakes described earlier and must be asserted in conventional terms by Proponents of the Middle, whereby there thus would come to be a great erroneous view with no difference of existence and nonexistence between the two. Íshvara—the creator of the world asserted by Outsiders [non-Buddhists]—and conventional objects, and due to such a wrong view not only would one not find the Middle Way view it would be a great obstacle to realizing the meaning of the middle.

As a sign of a wrong understanding of emptiness through such a viewpoint, a rang dga’ ba; possible alternative translations may be nonreflective/ uneducated/ immature / capricious.
nowadays here in Tibet many appear to have become like the Chinese abbot, Hva-shang, abandoning genuine doctrines in many ways due to a wrong conception viewing all conceptuality as defective. They do this when later taking on the pretense of having found the view, they [mis]understand and see all their former virtuous endeavors in the class of behavior—the practices in the class of virtuous deeds they continuously performed in many ways that had to be enacted through conceptuality—to be bonds to cyclic existence due to being apprehensions of marks [or constructs], and thereupon generate mistaken understanding, thinking, “These virtuous endeavors in the class of behavior are set forth necessarily for persons who have not found such a view of the definitive meaning, emptiness.”

10* PRIOR TO FINDING THE VIEW THE FOUR—INHERENT EXISTENCE, INHERENT NONEXISTENCE, EXISTENCE, AND NONEXISTENCE—are not individually distinguished

From among the three relevant modes of apprehension of objects described above (98), it does not occur that those persons—prior to finding the view realizing the absence of inherent existence—distinguish individually the difference between the two, (1) mere existence in general and (2)
existence that is established by way of its own character because, in accordance with the explanation of the earlier citation from Chandrakīrti’s Commentary on (Āryadeva’s) “Four Hundred,” all whatsoever things that are apprehended as existing by those persons are necessarily apprehended as being existent in the sense of being established by way of their

a Toh. 3865, *dbu ma*, vol. 3, 175b.2-175b.3; for the Sanskrit see Khangkar and Yorihito, 205 note 195. Brackets are from Four Interwoven Annotations, vol. 2, 243.6. Cited in Great Treatise, vol. 3, 142; Napper, Dependent-Arising and Emptiness, 199 and 364-365. The passage is cited by Tsong-kha-pa in the section of supramundane special insight in the Medium-Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path where he makes the same point:

It is necessary to differentiate between:

• inherent existence and mere existence
• absence of existence by way of its [the object’s] own character and non-existence.

It is as Chandrakīrti’s Commentary on the “Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle’” (commenting on VI.38ab) says:

While knowing even the presentation of causes and effects, which are reflections without inherent existence, what wise person would—through observing that forms, feelings, and so forth, which do not abide separately from causes and effects, are merely existent—ascertain them as having inherent existence? Therefore, although observed to exist, they have no inherently existent production.

When those are not differentiated, you do not pass beyond the two extremes of superimposition and deprecation since then once a thing exists, it exists by way of its own nature, and once something does not exist by way of its own nature, it is totally non-existent. Chandrakīrti’s Commentary on (Āryadeva’s) “Four Hundred” says:

According to the proponents of [inherently existent] things, as long as a thing’s existence occurs, [its establishment by way of] its own entity also exists, and when devoid of [establishment by way of] their own entity, things do not exist in all ways, like the horns of a donkey. Thereby, since they do not pass beyond propounding the two [extremes of permanence and annihilation], it is difficult to fit together all their assertions.

Therefore, you are released from all extremes of existence through the absence of inherent existence, and you are released from all extremes of non-existence through being able to posit, with respect to that, causes and effects that do not inherently exist.


(KEY: Text without highlight = Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight. Yellow highlight = Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Golden Wheel of Annotations. Aqua highlight = Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub’s annotations. Magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis has been filled in.)
own entity. Due to the essential of their apprehending them as necessarily being this way, holding that what is without inherent existence utterly does not exist, those persons also, considering as extremely amazing others even propounding that phenomena are empty of inherent existence, dispute manifoldly from many viewpoints saying, “Cause and effect are unsuitable to be posited within an emptiness of inherent existence.”

In order to understand the distinctions of these four [inherent existence and mere existence, and absence of existence by way of the object’s own character and non-existence], one should know, in accordance with Tsong-kha-pa’s *Illumination of the Thought,* a that although the appearance of a person as truly established is refuted from all points of view, it is necessary to know how to posit a person because it is like the fact that although a reflection of a face in a mirror is not established from all points of view in accordance with how it appears to be a face, a reflection does exist.
11* An Apprehension of Something as Existent by One Having Found the View Does Not Have to Be An Apprehension as a Falsity

From among those three modes of apprehension, all three modes of apprehending something as existent occur in the continuum of a person who has generated in his/her continuum the view realizing the absence of inherent existence, but once the view has been generated and as long as the manifest activity, or functioning of ascertainment, of that view has not degenerated, then when—analyzing by means of reasoning—one considers and analyzes whether [phenomena] are established or are not established by way of their own entity, for the time being, an artificial apprehension of true existence asserting establishment from the object’s own side through thinking establishment by way of its own entity is logically correct is not generated, but it is not the case that at that time an innate apprehension of true existence, which has operated beginninglessly, is not generated.

12* Even Though the View Has Been Found, Generation of an Apprehension of True Existence
OCCURS, AND ALTHOUGH FROM [THE LEVEL OF A] GREAT VEHICLE SUPERIOR THE VIEW IS FIRM AND NOT FORGOTTEN, THERE ARE A VARIETY OF LOWER SUPERIORS

Hence, for that reason it is not that even all apprehensions of stalks and so forth as existing—that occur in the continuum of a person who has generated the view realizing the absence of inherent existence, that is to say, establishment by way of the [object’s] own entity, and that view has not degenerated—are only apprehensions as existing falsely like a magician’s illusion because if it were otherwise, that is, if in the continuum of such a person all apprehensions of anything as existing were only apprehensions as existing like a magician’s illusion, there would be the fallacy that it would [absurdly] follow that in the continuums of those persons who have generated the view and in whom the view has not degenerated generation of a manifest apprehension of true existence would not occur.

B: Differences between the assertions of the individual masters {5 parts}

This has five parts.

I * THE ASSERTION OF AUTONOMY BY AUTONOMISTS, SUCH
In this way, the evidence also that these Proponents of the Middle, such as the master Bhāvaviveka and so forth, who in conventional terms assert own-character, that is, that phenomena are established their own entity, assert in their own system self-powered signs, or autonomous signs, these being equivalent, derives from just this assertion that in conventional terms own-character, that is, establishment by way of the object’s own entity, exists, and therefore the root of positing or not positing autonomous signs in one’s own system and also that even though a compatibly established subject in a proof exists for the two parties but is not autonomous meet back to this very subtle object of negation itself—the assertion or nonassertion of inherent existence, that is, establishment of objects from their own side.
Therefore—that is to say, by reason of the fact that [positing or not positing autonomous signs] meets back [to this very subtle object of negation]—in the system of the Autonomists such as Bhāvaviveka and so forth:

1. even non-defective sense consciousnesses without the harm of the causes of mistake described above to which [objects] appear to be inherently existent, that is, to be established by way of their own entities, are in conventional terms nonmistaken with respect to their appearing objects, and
2. also conceptual consciousnesses that apprehend such inherent existence, that is, establishment by way of their own character, as existing in stalks are nonmistaken with respect to their conceived objects, such as the stalk’s having inherent existence, that is, establishment by way of its own character.

Otherwise, that is to say, unlike this assertion that those are nonmistaken, if someone says that these masters assert that those sense consciousnesses and conceptual consciousnesses are mistaken with respect to their respective appearing objects and conceived objects, well then since establishment from its own side and autonomy are not suitable, what valid cognition would there be for the master Bhāvaviveka and so forth that is established as compatibly appearing in the systems of both, the Proponent of [Truly Established] Things and the Proponent of the Middle?

If there is not [any such valid cognition], it contradicts what must be Bhāvaviveka’s general assertion.
In accordance with the master Chandrakīrti’s assertion, those valid cognitions must be asserted as mistaken from the viewpoint of their objects appearing to be established by way of their own character; and if this must be asserted, valid sense consciousnesses must be asserted as mistaken by the evidence of the fact that although inherent existence does not exist in objects—forms, and so forth—in the manner of the appearance as established by way of their own character, they appear to be established by way of their own character. Thus, when one proves a proposition to a Proponent of [Truly Established] Things by way of subjects and so forth posited [that is, confirmed] by those mistaken valid cognitions, these being such sense consciousnesses, a mode of establishment by valid cognition would have to appear similarly in the systems of both parties; and the other party, the Proponent of [Truly Established] Things, would also have to establish the subject by way of just the valid cognition that in our own system posits the subject; this being the mode of establishment by an other-renowned sign, it cannot go as an autonomous sign. When the subject is established for the other party, the absence of inherent existence also would definitely be already established; hence, what is the use of an autonomous sign!

Earlier Tibetans did not realize this, and [this is the reference of Tsong-kha-pa’s] statements above (134 and 62) “let us leave this aside for the time being.”
4* A very clear explanation of the manner in which there are no autonomous reasons if the subject is not established compatibly with the Proponent of [Truly Established] Things.

However, if it is not as above and one wonders whether it is sufficient for the subject and so forth to be established for the other side him/herself, the Proponent of [Truly Established] Things, and establishment in compatible appearance is not necessary for both including the Proponent of the Middle, then you do not assert this non-necessity for establishing [the subject] in compatible appearance, and if you did assert such, it would also not be reasonable. For, if there were no such need for establishment in compatible appearance, all applications of signs set as proof statements would be only other-renowned, since they are renowned to the party who is other than the Proponent of the Middle, as explained before, whereby the master Bhāvaviveka and so forth would have to be asserted as following the Consequentialists, that is to say, the Middle Way Consequentialists who assert...

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\(a\) Jam-yang-shay-pa’s *Golden Wheel of Annotations* adds that self-renowned (rang grags) and other-renowned (gzhan grags) are equivalent because, according to context, both self and other can be the opponent.
that an inference can be generated in the other party merely through con-
sequences.

Even the Middle Autonomy School masters Shāntarakṣhita and so forth who assert that external objects do not exist in conventional terms:

• assert, in accordance with the assertions of the True Aspectarian Pro-
ponents of Mind-Only, that objects such as blue and so forth are in
conventional terms established as the substantial entity of conscious-
ness,
• and therefore assert that the sense consciousnesses to which those ob-
jects appear apprehend objects established by way of their own char-
acter in accordance with what appears relative to those objects,
• and therefore assert that those sense consciousnesses are not mistaken
in relation to only blue.

{KEY: Text without highlight = Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight. Yellow highlight = Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Golden Wheel of Annotations. Aqua highlight = Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub’s annotations. Magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis has been filled in.}
C: Explaining that the root of the proofs of all the tenets of the Proponent of [Truly Established] Things relies on direct perception

This has three parts: (1) since inference is like chain of blind persons holding hands, it is contingent upon direct perception, (2) the assertion that [direct perception] is either of the two, a directly perceiving self-knower or a directly perceiving other-knower, and (3) here [in the Consequence School] although valid cognition regarding establishment by way of the [object’s] own character does not exist, [establishment] merely renowned to others is sufficient.

I* SINCE INDUCTION IS LIKE A BLIND PERSON, IT IS CONTINGENT UPON DIRECT PERCEPTION

a Earlier this section heading was announced as “all assert that the root of proofs meets back to direct perception.”

b Correcting yin las in the Delhi edition vol. 2 (279b.2) to yin pas in accordance with the BDRC bla brang (235b.4).

(KEY: Text without highlight = Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight. Yellow highlight = Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Golden Wheel of Annotations. Aqua highlight = Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub’s annotations. Magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis has been filled in.)
On these occasions when Shāntarakṣhita and so forth posit as subjects obscure objects such as eye [sense powers] and so forth, and those subjects are not directly\(^a\) established [that is to say, certified] by direct perception,\(^b\) but when the final root of the valid cognition establishing those obscure phenomena is traced back, proponents of tenets assert that it must meet back to a direct perception. For, since inference is like a chain of many blind people [holding] hands who must proceed in dependence on one possessing sight, it is renowned and asserted among proponents of tenets that the means of establishment\(^c\) that is the root of that inference meets back to direct perception.

2* THE ASSERTION THAT [DIRECT PERCEPTION] IS EITHER OF THE TWO, A DIRECTLY PERCEIVING SELF-KNOWER OR A DIRECTLY PERCEIVING OTHER-KNOWER

\(^a\) Directly as opposed to indirectly.
\(^b\) Sometimes the subject could be certified by direct perception, but here this is a case where it has to be certified because the subject is not manifest.
\(^c\) That is to say, the consciousnesses that certify the existence of such subjects—the means of certification.
\(^d\) Correcting dngos su mi ’gyur kyang Delhi edition vol. 2 (279b.4) to dngos su mi ’ grub kyang in accordance with the BDRC bla brang (236b.6).
When the root of such means of establishment meets back to direct perception, the root direct perception is asserted necessarily to be either a nonmistaken other-knowing direct perception or a nonmistaken self-knowing direct perception, and this mode of nonmistakenness of those direct perceptions is, as explained above, that to those direct perceptions their own objects—objects established by way of their own character—appear, and this establishment by way of their own character must be established with the object in accordance with how it appears to those direct perceptions in that way. These Autonomists such as Shāntarakṣhita and so forth assert that those direct perceptions are to be posited as nonmistaken. Hence, there is utterly no nonmistaken direct perception that is established in compatible appearance for the two systems—these Autonomists such as Shāntarakṣhita and so forth and the Middle Way Consequentialists who propound the nonexistence of a nature that is established by way of its own entity.

3* HERE [IN THE CONSEQUENCE SCHOOL] ALTHOUGH VALID COGNITION REGARDING ESTABLISHMENT BY WAY OF
THE [OBJECT’S] OWN CHARACTER DOES NOT EXIST, [ESTABLISHMENT] MERELY RENOWNED TO OTHERS IS SUFFICIENTa

In general the root of such a proof must meet back to direct perception; however, although it actually does not meet back to a direct perception in that way, one can give an answer to the other side as follows: Autonomists and Proponents of [Truly Existent] Things who propound inherent existence indeed assert that the meaning of establishment by valid cognition—whether with respect to the compounded or the uncompounded—must involve the establishment of an entity that is their respective own mode of subsistence existing right with those objects, but because there is no direct perception that establishes the existence of such right with the objects, it does not meet back to a direct perception of such. That being the case, it can be refuted by reasoning. Hence, since there are no valid cognitions positing [that is, certifying] the existence of the above such entities [of the subject and so forth] right with the objects, such [direct perceptions as they propound] are not suitable as valid cognitions that are means of proof.

a The heading is taken from the earlier announcement of the headings (115); here it is reduced to “how other-renown is sufficient” (gzhan grags kyis chog tshul).
PART TWO:
Tsong-kha-pa’s
Great Exposition
of Special Insight:
Compatibly Appearing Subjects

Stages of the Path to Enlightenment Thoroughly Teaching All the Stages
of Practice of the Three Types of Beings

Key: Magenta highlight in the Tibetan indicates the ellipsis has been filled in.
I. WHETHER REFUTATION OF THE OBJECT OF NEGATION IS DONE THROUGH CONSEQUENCES OR AUTONOMOUS SYLLOGISMS {2 PARTS}

This has two parts: identifying the meaning of consequences and autonomous syllogisms and following which of those two the view generated in the [mental] continuum.

A. IDENTIFYING THE MEANING OF CONSEQUENCES AND AUTONOMOUS [SYLLOGISMS]

In the master Buddhapālita’s commentary there is no clear statement that he uses consequences upon having differentiated consequences and autonomous syllogisms, but in his commentary on [the first stanza in the first chapter of Nāgārjuna’s Treatise on the Middle]:

Not from self, not from others,
Not from both, not causelessly
Do any things
Ever arise anywhere.

na svato nāpi parato na dvābhvāṁ nāpyahetuḥ/
utpannā jātu vidyante bhāvāḥ kvacana kecana//

bdag las ma yin gzhan las min/
gnyis las ma yin rgyu med min/
dngos po gang dag gang na yang/
skye ba nam yang yod ma yin//

[Buddhapālita] refutes the four productions from the approach of expressing damage to others’ systems.
The master Bhāvaviveka repudiates those through stating fallacies that they lack any capacity to prove one’s own positions and repudiate other’s positions. When the master Chandrakīrti comments at length on the reason why such fallacies do not apply to Buddhapālita’s system, he refutes the opponent saying, “A Proponent of the Middle must use consequences as means of generating the view of the Middle Way in the continuum, and autonomy is not logically feasible,” thereby making clear the Consequentialist position.

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a The Four Interwoven Annotations (vol. 2, 467.3) ingeniously takes this sentence to mean (Aqua highlight = Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub’s annotations):

The master Bhāvaviveka repudiates those reasonings by the master Buddhapālita refuting production from self and so forth through (1) stating proofs of his own positions, that is, Bhāvaviveka’s own theses, and (2) stating powerless quasi-fallacies repudiating the other’s positions, Buddhapālita’s theses.

It is ingenious because it accurately represents Bhāvaviveka’s procedure, which is first to present his syllogism refuting production from self and then to show that Buddhapālita’s mode of refutation is beset with logical fallacies. However, this reading strikes me as not representing the syntax, and thus my translation does not follow the Four Interwoven Annotations here.
With respect to how such Consequentialists and Autonomists are posited, there are two parts: refuting others’ systems and positing our own system.

1. Refuting others’ systems about how Consequentialists and Autonomists are posited
{2 parts}
This has two parts: setting forth assertions and refuting those.

a. Setting forth assertions on how Consequentialists and Autonomists are posited

With respect to Consequentialists and Autonomists, it appears that there indeed are many modes of positing Middle Schools and tenets, but who could explain them all! Therefore, from among those, here a few will be explained [but not included in this translation].

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a The translation of the remainder of this section is intended for inclusion in a later volume. The translation resumes with Tsong-kha-pa’s positing his own system.
2. Laying out our own system [about how Consequentialists and Autonomists are posited] {2 parts}

If we express the Consequentialists’ repudiation of the system of the Autonomists and thereupon positing of their own system, both systems will be realized; hence, let us express this. Although much is said in Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words* concerning this, fearing it would take too many words, here [I] will indicate the principal points. Hence, regarding this there are two parts: the actual repudiation of autonomy and how those are not the same for us.

* a. Actual repudiation of autonomy {2 parts}

This has two parts: indicating the fallacy of the [Autonomist’s] position⁴
in that the basal subject is not established and indicating that due to this fallacy the reason also is not established.\textsuperscript{a}

\textbf{1) INDICATING THE FALLACY OF THE [AUTONOMIST’S] POSITION IN THAT THE BASAL SUBJECT IS NOT ESTABLISHED \{2 PARTS\}}

This has two parts: expressing the assertion and refuting it.

\textbf{A) EXPRESSING THE ASSERTION}

Since it appears that these passages are very difficult to realize even from among the statements in Chandrakīrti’s \textit{Clear Words}, let us cite the words of the \textit{Clear Words} and explain them:

\textit{[Hypothetical response by Bhāvaviveka:] It is like [on an occasion when to an opponent\textsuperscript{b} a Buddhist puts forward the thesis that] sound is impermanent, just generalities of the subject and the pred-}

\textsuperscript{a} Translation of the second of these two is in the next volume.

\textsuperscript{b} Tsong-kha-pa, as is evident below, identifies the opponent as a Vaisheṣhika, but Kodo Yotsuya (\textit{The Critique of Svatantra Reasoning by Chandrakīrti and Tsong-kha-pa}, 93 n. 73) avers that since Vaisheṣhikas assert that sound is impermanent, there is no need for a Buddhist to prove to a Vaisheṣhika that sound is impermanent; therefore, he identifies the opponent as a Mīmāṃsaka. However, it may be that because Vaisheṣhikas hold that a sound is a quality of space and space is permanent, the Buddhist here is holding that Vaisheṣhikas are forced by reasoning to assert that a sound is permanent.
icate are to be used, not specifics. If specifics were used, the conventions of inference and object of inference\textsuperscript{a} would be nonexistent. It is as follows: If “sound that is derived from the four great elements” were used, it would not be established for the other party. However, if “sound that is a quality of space”\textsuperscript{b} were used, it would not be established for oneself, the Buddhist.

Similarly, even when a Vaisheṣhika\textsuperscript{c} makes the thesis that

\begin{quote}
“Whatever has production and disintegration necessarily depends upon some substance; for example, [the flame of] a butter lamp. Sound also has production and disintegration.” By such reasoning, sound is proved to depend upon a substance. Because sound is heard apart from the four elements, earth and so on, it does not depend on those four. Also, because it is observed externally by a sense consciousness, as shared between oneself and others, it is not a quality of the self. Since it is an object of apprehension by the ear, it is not a quality of the three—direction, time, and consciousness. Hence, it is asserted to be established as a quality only of space.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{a} Gung-thang Lo-drö-gya-tsho’s (gung thang blo gros rgya mtso, 1851-1928/1930) “Decisive Analysis of the Middle: Treasury of Scripture and Reasoning” (dbu ma’i mtha’ dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod kyi dgongs don gsal bar byed pa’i nyin byed snang ba zab lam lla ba’i mig ‘byed), BDRC W140-11KG15988, 152.14, glosses inference (rje su dpag pa, anumanna) with “the sign that is the means of inference” (dpag byed rtags) and object of inference (rje su dpag par bya ba, anumeya) with “predicate of the proposition that is the object inferred” (dpag bya bsgrub bya’i chos).

\textsuperscript{b} nam mkha’, ākāśa. As Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Explanation of Obscurational and Ultimate Truths (54.1; Hopkins, Maps of the Profound, 166) says about the Vaisheṣhika assertion that sound is a quality of space:

\begin{quote}
“Whatever has production and disintegration necessarily depends upon some substance; for example, [the flame of] a butter lamp. Sound also has production and disintegration.” By such reasoning, sound is proved to depend upon a substance. Because sound is heard apart from the four elements, earth and so on, it does not depend on those four. Also, because it is observed externally by a sense consciousness, as shared between oneself and others, it is not a quality of the self. Since it is an object of apprehension by the ear, it is not a quality of the three—direction, time, and consciousness. Hence, it is asserted to be established as a quality only of space.
\end{quote}

Kodo Yotsuya (The Critique of Svatantra Reasoning by Chandrakīrti and Tsong-kha-pa, 93 n. 73) points out that Mīmāṃsakas also assert that sound is a quality of space.

\textsuperscript{c} Here in this second example, a Vaisheṣhika is proving to another party that sound is impermanent. Tsong-kha-pa, as is evident below, identifies the opponent as a Dipaka (gsal byed pa), which The Four Interwoven Annotations (below, 39; vol. 2, 526.4) explains is a type of Sāṃkhya, but Kodo Yotsuya (The Critique of Svatantra Reasoning by Chandrakīrti and Tsong-kha-pa, 93) here also takes the opponent to be a Mīmāṃsaka. In both cases his identifications are Mīmāṃsaka.

Jam-yang-shay-pa (see the previous volume, Jeffrey Hopkins, Chandrakīrti Undermines Bhāvaviveka’s Assertion of Autonomy: Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Compatibly Appearing Subjects, 3 [Dyke, VA: UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, August 2018, uma-tibet.org, 50] identifies the other party as a Nirgrantha (gcer bu pa), another name for Jaina; Stcherbatsky (The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa, 115) identifies the opponent as a Mīmāṃsaka, inserting the identification into the text as if Chandrakīrti so specified it, whereas he did not; Wayman (Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real, 310) goes along with Stcherbatsky; Gom-day Nam-kha-gyal-tshan (Settling...
sound is impermanent, if “sound that is a product” is used, it would not be established for the other party. However, if “manifested,” it would not be established for oneself.

Likewise, respectively, if “disintegration” is “caused,” it would not be established for oneself, a Buddhist. However, if “causeless,” it would not be established for the other party. Therefore, just as for these mere generalities of subject and predicate are to be used, so here also a mere subject devoid of specifics is to be used.

Difficult Points in the Opposite of the Consequences, 633.2) identifies the other party as a Dipaka. In any case, the assertion of the Vaisheṣhika’s opponent is that sound is pre-existent in a nonmanifest state and is made manifest by conditions, something which the Vaisheshika cannot accept.
With regard to the meaning of this, when to a Vaisheṣhika\(^a\) a Buddhist makes the thesis that sound is impermanent, if “sound that is derived from the elements,” were used, it would not be established for the Vaisheṣhika, and if “sound that is a quality of space,” were used, it would not be established for oneself, the Buddhist. Similarly, even when to a Dīpaka a Vaisheṣhika posits the thesis that sound is impermanent, if “sound that is a product” is used, it would not be established for the Dīpaka. Also, if “pre-existent sound manifested by conditions,” is used as the subject,” it would not be established for oneself. Therefore, it is not suitable to use as subjects uncommon individual assertions because since the subject is the basis for analysis by both disputants about a specification, it must be something established in compatible appearance for both.

\(^{a}\) Kodo Yotsuya (*The Critique of Svaṭantra Reasoning by Chandrakirti and Tsong-kha-pa*, 93 n. 73) points out that since Vaisheṣhikas assert that sound is impermanent (as is evident in the next footnote), there is no need for a Buddhist to prove to a Vaisheṣhika that sounds is impermanent; therefore, he identifies the opponent as a Mīmāṃsaka. However, it may be that because Vaisheshikas hold that a sound is a quality of space and space is permanent, the Buddhist here is holding that Vaisheshikas are forced by reasoning to assert that a sound is permanent.
Just as the subject must be established in compatible appearance, so the predicate, impermanent, also must be a mere general impermanent established in compatible appearance, without qualifications. Moreover, the statement of an example that is established in compatible appearance must precede proving the proposition.

Like this example, when Proponents of the Middle prove to others’ schools that the internal sense-spheres such as eyes and so forth and the external sense-spheres such as forms and so forth are not produced from self and prove to our own Proponents of [Truly Existent] Things that things are not produced from other, then if “true eyes and so forth” are used as subjects, they would not be established for oneself. Also, if “false eyes and so forth” are used as subjects, they would not be established for the other party. Hence, mere eyes and forms devoid of such specifics are to be used as subjects because they are the bases for analysis by both disputants concerning the specification of whether production from self exists, does not exist, and so forth, and consequently they must be established in the compatible appearance of both. That is [Bhāvaviveka’s] thinking.
Moreover, the meaning of the subject and so forth being established in compatible appearance is establishment for the proponent by the sort of valid cognition by which these are established also for the opponent.
B) Refuting theAssertion {2 Parts}

This has two parts: the meaning is not logically feasible and the meaning differs from the example cited.

1' The meaning is not logically feasible

Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words says:

Answer: That is not so. For, at this time when a negation of production is asserted here as the predicate of the proposition, this one himself just asserts that the entities of the subjects—the substrata of that [predicate] which gain their thingness by way of the mere erroneous—have degenerated from [being] in suchness. The erroneous and the nonerroneous are different.

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a Here “meaning” refers to the import exemplified by the example, not the meaning of compatible subject and so forth as in the subheading just above.
b The Sanskrit (La Vallée Poussin, Mūlamadhyamakakārikās avec la Prasannapadā, 29.7-30.3) reads:

na ca itad evam/ yasmanyadavitāpapratiṣedho ’tra sādhyaḥdharmaḥ ’bhipretah/ tadaiva dharminas taddhṛasya vipāryāsāmsādhisthavasya pratyutpāt svayam evanṛgṛh/ bhinnau hi vipāryāśāviparyśau

The Tibetan (20.8-20.12) reads:

de ni de ltar yang ma yin te/ ’di ltar gang gi tshe ’dir skye ba bkag pa bsgrub bya’i chos su ’dod pa de’i tshe kho nar de’i rten chos can phyin ci log tsam gyis bdag gi dngos po rnyed pa ni nyams par ‘gyur pa ’dis rang nyid khyis khas blangs pa nyid do// phyin ci log dang phyin ci ma log pa dag ni tha dad pa yin no//

The hi in the last line of the Sanskrit was translated into Tibetan as ni, but perhaps more appropriately could have been rendered as indicating reason. Even without such an explicit indication, Tsong-kha-pa, Jam-yang-shay-pa, and so forth understand the clause as indicating the reason for the preceding clause.
Therefore, when, like the falling hairs and so forth by one with eye disease, what is nonexistent is apprehended by the erroneous as just existing, how could even a portion of an existent object be observed? When, like the falling hairs and so forth by one without eye disease, the nonerroneous does not superimpose the unreal, how then could even the merest portion of nonexistent veiling be observed! Hence, the holy master says [in his Refutation of Objections]:

If direct perception and so forth did observe some objects, Then those would be fit to be proved or refuted, But since those do not exist, There is no censuring of me.

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Because in that way, the erroneous and the nonerroneous are different, the erroneous do not exist in the state of nonerroneousness. Therefore, how could there be a veiling, an eye, that is a subject! Hence, there is no overturning the fallacy of a position whose base is not established and the fallacy of a reason whose base is not established, and, therefore, this is just not a response. 

It is easy to realize this if it is characterized in the syllogism:

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a  gzhi ma grub pa, asiddhādhāra.
b  gzhi ma grub pa, āśrayāsiddha.
c  Wayman (Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real, 312) translates the last line as, “You have no answer to this.” However, the Four Interwoven Annotations (533.4) make it clear that the reference is to the hypothetical Bhāvaviveka’s earlier answer, “The response that you have given is just not a response concordant with the fact (khyed kyis lan btab pa ’di ni don dang mthun pa ’i lan ma yin pa nyid do).” Bhāvaviveka’s earlier answer was that just generalities are to be used as subject, predicate, and so forth without being qualified by the particular assertions of the two schools. Chandrakīrti’s refutation of this is built around his perception that a tenet unacceptable to a Proponent of the Middle is automatically attached to the subject and so forth—inherent existence—because schools that propound inherent existence hold that the consciousness certifying the subject and so forth perforce must certify their inherent existence.
The sense-field of form is not produced from self because of existing, like a pot manifest in front.

Therefore, let us explain it in terms of that.

These passages of response demonstrate how a subject is not established in compatible appearance. What is that? Here the opponents to whom it is demonstrated how a compatibly appearing subject is not established are on this occasion in Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words* indeed the opponents of the refutation of production from self [that is, the Sāṃkhyas], but in general they are both:

1. Proponents of [Truly Established] Things, who accept that things ultimately have an inherent nature, and
2. Autonomists, who accept that in conventional terms those have an inherent nature in the sense of establishment by way of their own character.
Even Middle Way Autonomists are indeed called Proponents of Naturelessness, a but here for the sake of reducing the hosts of words, “Proponents of No Inherent Nature” b is to be understood as Consequentialists, and “Proponents of Inherent Nature” c is to be understood as both Proponents of [Truly Established] Things d and Autonomists.

The way that the form sense-fields which are posited as subjects are established e is that they must be established by direct valid cognitions that are eye consciousnesses apprehending them, and moreover if those [objects] are not established unmistakenly by those, they are not suitable to be direct perceptions that establish objects, and therefore they must be nonmistaken. In their systems the establishment of nonconceptual consciousnesses as nonmistaken definitely relies on:

- the establishment by way of their own character of those—with respect to which [those nonconceptual consciousnesses] become nonmistaken—appears, and
- such exists in accordance with how it appears.

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a ngo bo nyid med par smra ba.
b rang bzhin med par smra ba.
c rang bzhin yod par smra ba.
d dngos por smra ba.
e “Established” in this context means “confirmed as existent.” These consciousnesses confirm that forms and so forth exist.
Thus, this master refutes autonomy, thinking that such valid cognitions as those of the opponents through which subjects are established are not suitable for the proponents because not any phenomenon even in conventional terms has an entity that is established by way of its own character, and hence there is no valid cognition establishing such.

Concerning this, [I] am explaining how to refute that autonomy is needed as a branch of the process of newly generating in the other party the view realizing that things lack an inherent nature. However, let us leave aside for the time being the analysis concerning whether among Middle Way Consequentialists autonomy is needed or is not needed as a branch of generating an inference realizing certain meanings among the diversity.

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a For this, see below, 159 and especially 112.
Let us explain this within associating it with the text. The meaning of the passage [cited above]:

That is not so. For, at this time when a negation of production is asserted here as the predicate of the proposition, this one himself just asserts that the entities of the subjects—the substrata of that predicate, which gain their thingness by way of mere erroneousness—have degenerated from suchness.

is that Bhāvaviveka himself has asserted that eyes or forms and so forth—which are the subjects that are the substrata of the predicate of the proposition—have degenerated from [being] in suchness, that is to say, are not established in suchness.

What sort of subjects are these? They are those that gain their own thingness by mere erroneous consciousnesses polluted by ignorance—objects established by mere conventional consciousnesses such as eye consciousnesses and so forth.

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\[a\] Tsong-kha-pa cites merely the beginning and the end of this passage with an ellipsis in the middle which I have filled in according to the citation above. As explained earlier, this version includes the misreading “in suchness.”
Concerning [his] mode of assertion: When—that is, because—this negation ultimately of production depends as a predicate of the proposition upon subjects, then if [those] are established in suchness, it is contradictory for that to depend on them.

[Bhāvaviveka] might query: Though [I] do indeed assert thus, what would that incur?

Response: Those forms, which are not established in suchness and also are not suchness, are not fit to be objects found by nonmistaken consciousness. Hence, they are found by object-possessors that are conventional consciousnesses apprehending falsities, whereby those also are mistaken, polluted by ignorance.

Therefore, the object found by nonmistaken [consciousness] does not appear to mistaken consciousness, and the false objects appearing to mistaken consciousness are not found by nonmistaken consciousness because the two—conventional erroneous mistaken consciousness and nonerroneous nonmistaken consciousness—are different in terms of engaging ob-
jects from the viewpoint that their respective objects are mutually exclusive. This is the meaning of [Chandrakīrti’s] saying, “The erroneous and the nonerroneous are different.”

Therefore, when, like the falling hairs and so forth by one with eye disease, what is nonexistent is apprehended by the erroneous as just existing, how could even a portion of an existent object be observed! When, like the falling hairs and so forth by one without eye disease, the nonerroneous does not superimpose the unreal, how then could even the merest portion of nonexistent veilings be observed!

dad yadā viparyāsenāsat sattvena gṛhyate taimirikēṇeva keśadi /
tadā kutāḥ sadbhūtapadārthaleśasāpy upalabdhiḥ / yadā
cāvivāyāsād abhūtāṃ nādhyārōpitaṃ vītaimirikēṇeva keśādi /
tadā kuto ’sadbhūtapadārthaleśasāpy upalabdhibh yena tadāṃ
dsāmyṛtiḥ svāt /
de ’i phir / gang gi itshe rib can gsis skra shad la sog pa ltar
phyin ci log gis yod pa ma yin pa yod pa nyid du ’dzin pa de ’i itshe
ni yod par gyur pa ’i don cha tsam yang dmigs par ga la ’gyur /
gang gi itshe rib can ma yin pas skra shad la sog pa ltar phyen
ci ma log pas yang dag pa ma yin pa sgro mi ’dogs pa ’i itshe na

a phyen ci log dang phyen ci ma log pa dag ni tha dad pa yin no, bhinnau hi
viparyāsāviparyāsau.
b Tsong-kha-pa gives only the opening and closing phrases. The Sanskrit and Tibetan are provided because of his close attention to the individual words below.
c The Sanskrit is from La Vallée Poussin, Prasannapadā, 11.3.
Concerning this:

• The “erroneous” (phyin ci log, viparyāsa) are conventional consciousnesses such as an eye that are polluted by ignorance.

• “what is nonexistent is apprehended by those” (de dag gis yod pa ma yin pa yod pa nyid du ’dzin pa, [viparyāṣa]enāsat sattvena grhyate): While a character of being established by way of their own nature does not exist in forms, sounds, and so forth, it is apprehended by sense consciousnesses as existing. Being apprehended by nonconceptual consciousnesses must be taken as merely appearing; hence, forms and so forth appear as having their own character.

• “how then could even a part of existent objects be observed!” (de’i tshe ni yod par gyur pa’i don cha tsam yang dmigs par ga la ’gyur, tadā kutah sadbhūtapadārthaleśasyāpy upalabdhiḥ): This means that because in that way while own-character does not exist, it appears, how then could even tiny objects existent by way of their own character be observed by those consciousnesses!
An example of an object established by way of its own character that appears while nonexistent is “like the falling hairs [apprehended] by one with eye disease and so on” (rab rib can gyis skad la sogs pa ltar, taimirikenes eva keśādi).

Those say that sense consciousnesses to which forms, sounds, and so forth appear are not fit as means of establishing that objects are [established by means of their] own character.

[Chandrakīrti’s] indication that “unmistaken consciousnesses do not apprehend any forms, sounds, and so forth” is:

When, like the falling hairs and so forth [not apprehended] by one without eye disease, the unreal is not superimposed by nonerroneous [consciousnesses], how then could even the merest portion of nonexistent objects, veiling, be observed!

tadā kuto ‘sadbhūtapadārthaleśasyāpy upalabdhir yena tadānīṁ saṃvṛtīḥ syāt

gang gi tshe rab rib can ma yin pas skra shad la sogs pa ltar phyin ci ma log pas yang dag pa ma yin pa sgron mi ’dogs pa’i tshe na yang gang gis na de’i tshe na kun rdo’b tu ’gyur ba yod pa ma yin

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a Tsong-kha-pa cites the first few words and “and so forth.”
b The Sanskrit is from La Vallée Poussin, Prasannapadā, 11.3.
Concerning this:

- The “nonerroneous” (phyin ci ma log, aviparyāsa) are nonmistaken consciousnesses. These exist in those who manifestly actualize suchness, not in others.

- “the unreal are not superimposed by that” (desyang dag ma yin pa sgro mi ‘dogs pa): forms, sounds, and so forth, which are not fit as the meaning of suchness, are not superimposed, that is, are not apprehended as existing by that pristine wisdom. For example, it is just as an eye consciousness that is free of an eye disease does not observe an appearance of falling hairs.

- “veilings” (kun rdzob tu ‘gyur, samvṛtiḥ): false objects—forms, sounds, and so forth.
• “nonexistent” (vod pa ma yin pa, ‘sad): not established by way of their own character.

The meaning is: Even the merest portion of such is not established by a nonmistaken consciousness that has suchness as its object because it does not perceive those.

For those meanings [Chandrakīrti] cites a source from the protector Nāgārjuna’s text:

If direct perception and so forth did observe some objects, Then [it would be reasonable] to prove or refute those, But since those do not exist, There is no censuring of me.

[Chandrakīrti] takes this statement here—that the four valid cognitions, direct perception and so forth, do not establish any object that is established by way of its own character—as a source.

[Chandrakīrti states]:

\[cha\ tsam yang, le\ sasyāpi.\]

\[Tsong-kha-pa cites only the beginning “If” and “and so forth.” This is Refutation of Objections stanza 30; P5228, vol. 95, 15.1.2. See also K. Bhattacharya, E. H. Johnston, and A. Kunst, The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna (New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978), 23.\]

\[Tsong-kha-pa cites merely the first five syllables.\]
Because in that way, the erroneous and the nonerroneous are different, the erroneous do not exist in the state of nonerroneousness. Therefore, how could there be a veiling, an eye, that is a subject! Hence, there is no overturning the fallacy of a position whose base is not established and the fallacy of a reason whose base is not established, and, therefore, this is just not a response.

This passage is a summation of the meanings explained above.

[Chandrakīrti’s] saying “how could there be a veiling, an eye, that is a subject!” does not indicate that subjects that are veilings, eyes and so forth, do not exist. It means, in accordance with the earlier explanation, that forms that are established by way of their own character, or forms that are established by nonmistaken direct perception, are not established as subjects even in conventional terms.

With respect to the meaning of:

Therefore, when, like the falling hairs and so forth by one with

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a gzhi ma grub pa, asiddhādhāra.
b gzhi ma grub pa, aśrayāsiddha.
c Tsong-kha-pa cites merely the first two syllables and “and so forth” (de’i phyir sogs).
eye disease, what is nonexistent is apprehended by the erroneous as just existing, how could even a portion of an existent object be observed! When, like the falling hairs and so forth by one without eye disease, the nonerroneous does not superimpose the unreal, how then could even the merest portion of nonexistent veilings be observed!

For the two—a Proponent that a nature established by way of its own entity does not exist and a Proponent of [Truly Established] Things—when a form sense-field is posited as a subject, since a direct perception and so forth that is nonmistaken is not established in compatible appearance, there is no valid cognition that is a means of establishing a compatibly appearing subject in the systems of both, and hence a flawless position that is to be proven for the other party by means of an autonomous reason is not positable. That is the meaning.

[The other party] might think: This is the case in your position in which there does not exist even in conventional terms a nature in the sense of establishment by way of [the phenomenon’s] own entity, but we do not assert such in conventional terms. Hence, autonomous subjects and so forth exist, due to which there are nonfallacious substrata of predicates of
propositions, whereby nonfallacious positions just exist.

Answer: The illogicality of the existence of such a nature in conventional terms has been explained also earlier and will be explained further. Hence, the response is unreasonable.

The example also lacks similarity [with the intended meaning]. Even if there [in the example] a generality of sound and a generality of impermanence that are not wished to be expressed with qualifications exist for both [parties], nevertheless proponents of

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a Wayman (Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real, 316) translates this clause as, “For in that instance (of example) there is no intention to state a difference between the sound universal and the impermanence universal.” However, the reference here is not to a difference between two things but to mere sound and mere impermanence, which are not wished to be expressed as qualified (khyad par brjod par mi ’dod pa, avivakṣitaviśeṣa) with the particular tenets of the two schools. See the explanation in the corresponding section of the Four Intertwoven Annotations. As Tsong-kha-pa makes clear, “sound not qualified by being a derivative of the elements or a quality of space” refers to sound’s not being so qualified for the minds of the two disputants. In other words, the two disputants can speak of sound without putting in the qualifications of their systems even though the Buddhist holds that there is no sound that is not a derivative of the elements and the Vaisheshika holds that there is no sound that is not a quality of space. Though the Buddhist holds that sound is necessarily a derivative of the elements and the Vaisheshika holds that sound is necessarily a quality of space and thus that sound necessarily possesses those attributes (khyad par dang ldan pa), it is not necessary that sound be qualified for their minds (blo la
emptiness and proponents of non-emptiness do not assert in that fashion a generality of eyes conventionally and also not ultimately; hence, the example lacks similarity.

As for the meaning of this, it is not that:

There exists a mere general sound that is neither of the two, a derivative of the elements or a quality of space, and there exists a mere general sound that is neither of the two, a product or a manifestation—by conditions—of what formerly existed, and there exists a mere general impermanence that is neither of the two, relying on causes or not relying on causes, but there do not exist eyes and so forth that are neither true nor false.

because these are not asserted by those parties and because if that were the case, no one could prove that the example and the exemplified meaning are not similar.\(^a\)

\(^a\) If it were the case that subjects and so forth that are not any of those specifics were asserted by those parties, no one including Chandrakīrti could prove that the example and the exemplified are not similar, but the fact that Chandrakīrti is proving that the example and the exemplified are not similar shows that subjects and so forth that are not any of those specifics are not asserted by those parties.
Well then, what is? Ascertainment of sound as existent—without being qualified by either of the specifics “sound that is a derivative of the elements” or “sound that is a quality of space”—is doable in the systems of both those parties, but in the systems of the two, the proponents of the emptiness of inherent existence and the proponents of the non-emptiness of inherent existence, there does not exist a general form or eye that is established by a valid cognition and that is not established by a nonmistaken consciousness and also is not established by a mistaken consciousness. Those established by a mistaken consciousness are not established for the second party, and also those found by a consciousness nonmistaken are not established by a valid cognition of the prior disputant [that is, the proponent of the emptiness of inherent existence]. Hence, similarity with the example does not exist. This is the meaning [of the passage].
Although in general the nonmistaken indeed is a meditative equipoise directly comprehending ultimate truth, here it must be taken as both:

• direct valid cognitions nonmistaken with respect to their appearing objects [which appear to be established by way of] their own character and
• inferential valid cognitions nonmistaken with respect to their conceived objects [which are established by way of] their own character but such valid cognitions establishing [that is, confirming] the subject and the three modes of a sign do not at all exist. Hence, an object found by a nonmistaken consciousness is not suitable as a subject.

Here, “own-character” (rang gi mtshan nyid, svalakṣaṇa) is not to be taken, in accordance with the assertions of the Logicians, as just “performing a function” (don byed pa); it is to be taken as the likes of a nature (rang bzhin, svabhāva)—this nature having been explained earlier at the time of assertions on the respective natures [of objects], whether with regard to a thing or a non-thing; hence, the Proponents of Inherent Existence assert that even an inferential cognition comprehending a non-thing is non-mistaken with respect to such an inherently existent conceived object.
Whatever is a consciousness nonmistaken with regard to such a nature is nonmistaken with respect to the appearing object and/or the conceived object, but it goes as just nonmistaken with respect to the meaning of suchness, due to which it is asserted that subjects and so forth are not established by such valid cognitions of our own system. It is not being asserted that there do not exist conventional valid cognitions comprehending eyes, forms, and so forth in the continuums of both disputants.

There is no reasoned harm to objects—of an ascertaining consciousness, ascertaining forms and so forth as merely existing, induced by sense consciousnesses even in the continuums of second parties—that are without the damage described earlier. Let us explain this in detail: For instance, in apprehending a stalk as existing, there are three modes of apprehension:

1. apprehending the stalk as truly existent, apprehending it as having a nature in the sense of being established by way of its own entity
2. apprehending the stalk as existing falsely, apprehending that although
it does not exist in the sense of being established by way of its own entity, it does exist as like an illusion

3. apprehending the stalk as merely existing in general without being qualified by either of those, truth or falsity.

Indeed there are even apprehensions of a stalk as existing as permanent or impermanent, and so forth, but apprehensions as those do not exist outside of any of these three; hence, it is not necessary here to separately describe those.

Concerning those, in sentient beings who have not generated in their continuums the view realizing things as without inherent existence there are the two, apprehension as merely existing and apprehension as truly existing, but apprehension as existing like a magician’s illusion—not existing by way of [the object’s] own entity—does not occur.
Earlier on the occasion of describing conventional valid cognition and on the occasion of distinguishing between (1) inherent existence and inherent nonexistence and (2) existence and nonexistence, [I] have manifoldly explained to be unsuitable in all ways those who take it that all whatsoever apprehensions of existence—by the conceptual consciousnesses of sentient beings who have not found the view that phenomena are like illusions—are apprehensions of true existence.

If, without its being that way, it is that all uses of conventionalities by conceptual consciousnesses prior to understanding the view of the absence of inherent existence are apprehensions of true existence, then damage by reasoning would descend on all objects that are posited by usual worldly conventions not polluted by the causes of mistakes described earlier and must be asserted in conventional terms by Proponents of the Middle, whereby there would come to be an erroneous view with no difference as to whether Īśvara exists or not, due to which it would be a great obstacle to realizing the meaning of the middle.
As a sign of wrong understanding of emptiness through such ways, many appear to have become like the Chinese abbot, abandoning doctrines in many ways due to a wrong conception viewing all conceptuality as defective. They do this when later taking on the pretense of having found the view, they see all the class of virtuous deeds they performed in many ways—that had to be enacted through conceptuality—to be bonds to cyclic existence, apprehensions of marks [or constructs], and thereupon generate [mis]understanding, thinking, “These virtuous endeavors are set forth for those who have not found such a view of the definitive meaning.”

Prior to finding the view of the absence of inherent existence it does not occur that those persons distinguish individually between the two, (1) mere existence and (2) existence that is established by way of its own character because, in accordance with the citation from Chandrakīrti’s *Commentary*
on (Āryadeva’s) “Four Hundred,” whatsoever things that are apprehended as existing are necessarily apprehended as existent in the sense of being established by way of their own entity. Due to this essential, holding that what is without inherent existence does not exist, they also dispute in many ways saying, “Cause and effect are unsuitable to be posited within an emptiness of inherent existence.”

\[a\] Toh. 3865, dbu ma, vol. ya, 175b.2-175b.3; for the Sanskrit see Khangkar and Yorihito, 205 note 195. Brackets are from Four Interwoven Annotations, vol. 2, 243.6. Cited in Great Treatise, vol. 3, 142; Napper, Dependent-Arising and Emptiness, 199 and 364-365. The passage is cited by Tsong-kha-pa in the section of supramundane special insight in the Medium-Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path where he makes the same point:

It is necessary to differentiate between:

• inherent existence and mere existence
• absence of existence by way of its [the object’s] own character and non-existence.

It is as Chandrakīrti’s Commentary on the “Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle’” (commenting on VI.38ab) says:

While knowing even the presentation of causes and effects, which are reflections without inherent existence, what wise person would—through observing that forms, feelings, and so forth, which do not abide separately from causes and effects, are merely existent—ascertain them as having inherent existence? Therefore, although observed to exist, they have no inherently existent production.

When those are not differentiated, you do not pass beyond the two extremes of superimposition and deprecation since then once a thing exists, it exists by way of its own nature, and once something does not exist by way of its own nature, it is totally non-existent. Chandrakīrti’s Commentary on (Āryadeva’s) “Four Hundred” says:

According to the proponents of [inherently existent] things, as long as a thing’s existence occurs, [its establishment by way of] its own entity also exists, and when devoid of [establishment by way of] their own entity, things do not exist in all ways, like the horns of a donkey. Thereby, since they do not pass beyond propounding the two [extremes of permanence and annihilation], it is difficult to fit together all their assertions.

Therefore, you are released from all extremes of existence through the absence of inherent existence, and you are released from all extremes of non-existence through being able to posit, with respect to that, causes and effects that do not inherently exist.

All three modes of apprehending [phenomena] as existent occur in the continuum of those who have generated in their continuum the view realizing the absence of inherent existence, but once this view has been generated and as long as its manifest activity has not degenerated, then when, analyzing by means of reasoning, they consider whether [phenomena] are established or are not established by way of their own entity, for the time being an apprehension of true existence asserting establishment by way of its own entity is not generated, but it is not the case that an innate apprehension of true existence is not generated.
Hence, it is not that even all apprehensions of stalks as existing—that occur in the continuum of one who has generated the view realizing the absence of inherent existence, that is to say, establishment by way of the [object’s] own entity, and this view has not degenerated—are apprehensions as existing like a magician’s illusion because if it were otherwise, it would [absurdly] follow that for them generation of a manifest apprehension of true existence would not occur.

In this way, the evidence also that these Proponents of the Middle, such as the master Bhāvaviveka and so forth, who in conventional terms assert that phenomena are established their own entity, assert in their own system autonomous signs is this existence in conventional terms of own-character, that is, establishment by way of the object’s own entity, and therefore positing or not positing autonomous signs in one’s own system meets back to this very subtle object of negation.

Therefore, in their system:

1. even non-defective sense consciousnesses to which [objects] appear to be inherently existent, that is, to be established by way of their own
entities, are in conventional terms nonmistaken with respect to the appearing objects, and
2. also conceptual consciousnesses that apprehend such inherent existence as existing in stalks are nonmistaken with respect to the conceived objects.

Otherwise, if they asserted that those are mistaken, well then what valid cognition would there be that is established as appearing compatibly in the systems of both, including the Proponent of [Truly Established] Things!

If one makes a proof to a Proponent of [Truly Established] Things by way of sense consciousnesses to which, in accordance with Chandrakīrti’s assertion, inherent existence appears although inherent existence does not exist in the manner of the appearance of own-character, then when the subject is established for the other party, the absence of inherent existence would definitely already be established. Hence, what is the use of an autonomous sign!

However, if one wonders whether it is sufficient to be established for the other side himself, and establishment in compatible appearance is not necessary for both including the Proponent of the Middle, then you do not assert this, and it would also not be reasonable. For, if there were no such
[need], all applications of signs set as proofs would be only other-renowned, a whereby they would follow the Consequentialists.

Even the masters Shāntarakṣhita and so forth who assert that external objects do not exist in conventional terms:

- assert, in accordance with the assertions of the True Aspectarians, blue and so forth—in conventional terms—as the substantial entity of consciousness,
- and therefore the sense consciousnesses to which those appear apprehend objects established by way of their own character relative to those,
- and therefore are not mistaken in relation to merely blue.

With respect to when obscure objects such as eye [sense powers] and

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a Jam-yang-shay-pa adds that self-renowned (rang grags) and other-renowned (gzhan grags) are equivalent because, according to context, both self and other can refer to the opponent.
so forth are posited as subjects, and those subjects are not directly\textsuperscript{a} established [that is, certified] by direct perception,\textsuperscript{b} but when the final root of what establishes those is traced back, proponents of tenets assert that it must meet back to a direct perception. For, since inference is like a chain of blind people, they assert that the means of establishment\textsuperscript{c} that is its root meets back to direct perception.

When that is so, the root direct perception is asserted necessarily to be either a nonmistaken other-knower or a nonmistaken self-knower, and these assert this is, as explained above, that objects established by way of their own character—appear, and it must be established with the object in accordance with how it appears. Hence, there is no nonmistaken direct perception that is established in compatible appearance for the two systems—these and the Proponents of the Middle who propound the nonexistence of a nature that is established by way of its own entity.

\textsuperscript{a} Directly as opposed to indirectly.

\textsuperscript{b} Sometimes the subject could be certified by direct perception, but here this is a case where it has to be certified by conceptual valid cognition because it is not manifest.

\textsuperscript{c} That is to say, the consciousnesses that certify the existence of such subjects—the means of certification.
Despite not meeting back to a direct perception in this way, one can give an answer as follows: those who propound inherent existence [say] that the meaning of establishment by valid cognition—whether with respect to the compounded or the uncompounded—must involve the establishment of an entity that is their respective own mode of subsistence existing right with those objects, and this being the case, it can be refuted by reasoning. Hence, such are not suitable as valid cognitions that are means of proof.
Abbreviations

“co ne” = *co ne* bstan ’gyur. BDRC W1GS66030. *co ne* dgon chen: *co ne*, 1926.

“BDRC” = Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center (http://www.tbrc.org).

“BDRC bla brang” = blo bzang grags pa’i dpal, chos kyi rgyal mtshan, ngag dbang rab brtan, ’jam dbyangs bzhad pa’i rdo rje, rin chen don grub. "byang chub lam gyi rim pa mchan dang bcas pa las lhag mthong gi skabs/(ca mchan)." In lam rim mchan bzhi sbrags ma/ (bla brang bkra shis ’khyil par ma/). BDRC W29037. 2: 165 - 1002. [s.l.]: [bla brang bkra shis ’khyil], [1999?].

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madhyamakahṛdayavṛttitarkajvālā
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Buddhapālita (sangs rgyas bskyangs, c. 470-540?)

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P5253, vol. 95
Toh. 3853, dbu ma, vol. tsha

Buddhāpālita (sangs rgyas bskyangs, c. 470-540?)

Buddhāpālita Commentary on (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle”
buddhāpālitaśūlāmadhyamakāvṛtti
dbu ma rtṣa ba’i ’grel pa buddha pā la ti ta
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Chandrakīrti (zla ba grags pa, seventh century)

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See also references under Chandrakīrti’s [Auto]commentary on the “Supplement.”


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3. **Drop of Reasoning**

nyāyabinduprakaraṇa


Peking 5711, vol. 130.


**Four resembling limbs**

4. **Drop of Reasons**

hetubindunāmaprakaraṇa


Peking 5712, vol. 130.

5. **Analysis of Relations**

sambandhaparīkṣā

'brel pa brtag pa


Peking 5713, vol. 130.

6. **Proof of Other Continuums**

saṃtānāntarasiddhināmaprakaraṇa

rgyud gzhan grub pa zhes bya ba'i rab tu byed pa


Peking 5716, vol. 130.

7. **Reasoning for Debate**

vādanyāya

rtsod pa'i rigs pa


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mchan ’grel gser kyi ’khor lo / byang chub lam gyi rim pa chen mo mchan ’grel gser kyi ’khor lo rin po che
and Reasoning Free from Mistake, Fulfilling the Hopes of the Fortunate

drang ba dang nges pa'i don mam par 'byed pa'i mtha' dpnyod 'khrul bral lung rigs bai dü rdkar
pa'ngan mdzod skal bzang re ba kun skong

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Root Text of Tenets: Lion’s Roar / Presentation of Tenets: Roar of the Five-Faced [Lion] Eradicating Error. Precious Lamp illuminating the Good Path to Omniscience grub mtha’ rtsa ba gdong lnga’i sgra dbyangs / grub pa’i mtha’i rnam par bzhat pa’i khrul spong gdong lnga’i sgra dbyangs kun mkhyen lam bzang gsal b’a’i sgron me
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2. OTHER WORKS


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This is the fifth of six volumes presenting Tibetan views on the controversy that arose in Buddhist India over how to refute production from self. The controversy revolves around the opening phrase, “Not from self,” of the first stanza of the first chapter of Nāgārjuna’s *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called “Wisdom”*:

Not from self, not from others,
Not from both, not causelessly
Do any things
Ever arise anywhere.

Nāgārjuna’s principal Indian commentators explain the refutation of production from self in varying detail, the differences engendering the split between what came to be called the Autonomy School and the Consequence School.

Buddhapālita’s commentary on the refutation of production from self provoked Bhāvaviveka into incisive criticism and into a demonstration of his own preferred style of commentary. As explained in the second volume in this series, Chandrakīrti defended Buddhapālita, and in the third volume, Chandrakīrti attacked Bhāvaviveka’s own method for refuting production from self. This turns into a discussion of compatibly appearing subjects, which is seen as the prime, but not only, source showing that Bhāvaviveka accepts that phenomena are established by way of their own character.

Tsong-kha-pa’s focus here in the Great Exposition of Special Insight is on the fascinating topic of compatible appearance for ever-deepening reflections about how phenomena seem and thereby the nature of the reality behind appearances. His analysis is embedded with two color-coded commentaries by Jam-yang-shay-pa and Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub to enhance its accessibility.

Included is a separate translation of Tsong-kha-pa’s text.