Just What are the Two Truths in the Middle Way Consequence School?
Section 1

Jam-yang-shay-pa’s
*Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six*

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Dual language edition by Craig Preston in collaboration with Lo-sang-gyal-tshan

Edited by Jeffrey Hopkins

UMA INSTITUTE FOR TIBETAN STUDIES
Just What are the Two Truths?
Translating texts from the heritage of Tibetan and Inner Asian Buddhist systems, the project focuses on Great Indian Books and Tibetan commentaries from the Go-mang College syllabus as well as a related theme on the fundamental innate mind of clear light in Tantric traditions. A feature of the Project is the usage of consistent vocabulary and format throughout the translations.

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Preface

The first text translated here is a portion of Jam-yang-shay-pa Ngag-wangton-drü’s Decisive Analysis of (Chandrakīrti’s) “Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle,’” Treasury of Scripture and Reasoning, Thoroughly Illuminating the Profound Meaning [of Emptiness], Entrance for the Fortunate, also called Great Exposition of the Middle, a commentary on Tsong-kha-pa Lo-sang-drag-pa’s Illumination of the Thought, Extensive Explanation of (Chandrakīrti’s) “Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle Way.’” It belongs to the debate-oriented decisive analysis (mtha’ dpyod) genre and is the textbook (yig cha) for the study of Tsong-kha-pa’s The Illumination of the Thought at Go-mang Monastic College.

This initial section on the two truths treats the basis of the division into the two truths, the division into the two truths, whether the two truths are one or different, and the individual entities of the two truths. The second text translated in this book is the corresponding section of Tsong-kha-pa’s The Illumination of the Thought itself.

Readers interested in Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle may wish to consult in this series:

- Title, Translators’ Obeisance, and How Hearers and Solitary Realizers are Born from Buddhas: Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Introduction I, by Jules Levinson, uma-tibet.org;


- The Opposite of Emptiness in the Middle Way Autonomy School, Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Object of Negation 1, by Jongbok Yi, uma-tibet.org; and

- The Opposite of Emptiness in the Middle Way Consequence School, Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Object of Negation 2, by Jongbok Yi, uma-tibet.org.

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a ‘jam dbyangs bzhad pa’i rdo rje ngag dbang brson grus, 1648-1721/1722.
b dbu ma ‘jug pa’i mtha’ dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zab don kun gsal skal bzang ‘jug ngogs/dbu ma chen mo.
c tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa, 1357-1419.
d dbu ma la ‘jug pa’i rgya cher bshad pa dgongs pa rab gsal.
EDITIONS CONSULTED
Two basic editions of Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Decisive Analysis of the Middle were consulted:

1. *dbu ma la ’jug pa’i mtha’ dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zab don kun gsal skal bzang ’jug ngogs*. TBRC W22186-I1KG10676: 1-442a.3, which is a PDF of: *bla brang bka' shis 'khyil*, a mdo. a Abbreviated reference: “2011 TBRC *bla brang*.” This edition was originally printed in La-brang-tra-shi-khyil monastery founded by Jam-yang-shay-pa and is the mother edition of four other editions utilized:


   d. The digital Tibetan text of Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle provided in this book was supplied by the Drepung Gomang Library of Go-mang College in Mundgod, Karnataka State, India. It is likely a slightly revised version of the 1999 codex mentioned in item #4. It has been edited in accordance with the two basic editions but especially the “2011 TBRC *bla brang*” as well as other sources.

2. *dbu ma la ’jug pa’i mtha’ dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zab don kun***

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a This edition was provided to the UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies by the late E. Gene Smith (1936-2010) in 2010.
gsal skal bzang 'jug ngogs. Published at Go-mang College, Lhasa, Tibet, date unknown. Abbreviated reference: “2015 Go-mang Lhasa,” so named because of being acquired in Lhasa, Tibet, at Go-mang College in 2015 by Jongbok Yi for the UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies. (To be made available at UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, uma-tibet.org.)
Technical Notes
It is important to recognize that:

- translations and editions of texts are given in the Bibliography;
- the names of Indian Buddhist schools of thought are translated into English in a wish to increase accessibility for non-specialists;
- for the names of Indian scholars and systems used in the body of the text, \(ch\), \(sh\), and \(šh\) are used instead of the more usual \(c\), \(š\), and \(š\) for the sake of easy pronunciation by non-specialists; however, \(cch\) is used for \(cch\), not \(chchh\). Within parentheses the usual transliteration system for Sanskrit is used;
- transliteration of Tibetan is done in accordance with a system devised by Turrell Wylie; see “A Standard System of Tibetan Transcription,” *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 22 (1959): 261-267;
- the names of Tibetan authors and orders are given in “essay phonetics” for the sake of easy pronunciation; the system is aimed at internet searchability;
- titles of added subsections are given in square brackets.
The Collaborator
Lo-sang-gyal-tshan is a Ge-she at Go-mang College of Dre-pung Monastic University, Mundgod, Karnataka State, India, who also served a six-month term as Disciplinarian at the Tantric College of Lower Lhasa in Hunsur, India. In October, 2015, he assumed the position of Abbot of Go-mang College of Dre-pung Monastic University in Mundgod, India. He has worked with translators of the UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies since 2013. In particular, he provided crucial assistance with filling in the dialectical moves throughout the text and by responding to questions about the meaning.
PART ONE:
Jam-yang-shay-pa’s
GREAT EXPOSITION
OF THE MIDDLE:
The Two Truths in the
Middle Way Consequence School
Translated and annotated by Guy Martin Newland

Decisive Analysis of (Chandrakīrti’s) “Supplement to (Nāgār-juna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle’”: Treasury of Scripture and Reasoning, Thoroughly Illuminating the Profound Meaning [of Emptiness], Entrance for the Fortunate / Great Exposition of the Middle

Key to the colorization: The Tibetan text and the translation are highlighted in three colors: black, blue, and red. Blue colored statements represent what Jam-yang-shay-pa considers to be right positions, while red colored statements represent what Jam-yang-shay-pa considers to be wrong positions. Black words mostly are merely neutral information or function structurally. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight indicates material added in place of ellipses, and magenta highlight sets off the ellipsis indicator when it has been filled in.
I. ABANDONING DAMAGE BY THE WORLD TO THE REFUTATION OF PRODUCTION FROM OTHER \{2 PARTS\}

This\textsuperscript{a} has two parts: abandoning damage by the world \[to the refutation of production from other\] upon the assertion of production from other by worldly renown and abandoning damage \[to the refutation of production from other\] by the fact that production from other does not exist even in the conventions of the world.

\begin{itemize}
  \item A. ABANDONING DAMAGE \[TO THE REFUTATION OF PRODUCTION FROM OTHER\] UPON THE ASSERTION OF PRODUCTION FROM OTHER BY WORLDLY RENOWN \{2 PARTS\}
\end{itemize}

This\textsuperscript{b} has two parts: an objection \[that there is damage by the world\] and

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{a} 2011 TBRC \textit{bla brang}, 255b.3; 2015 Go-mang Lhasa, 188a.7; 2007 Taipei codex reprint, 347.20; Kön-chog-jig-may-wang-po’s \textit{Decisive Analysis of the Middle}, 265.3. The translation in this volume contains 2011 TBRC \textit{bla brang}, 267a.4-298b.5 (535.4-598.5); 2015 Go-mang Lhasa, 197a.4-230b.5 (596.5-442.5); 2007 Taipei codex reprint, 363.15-406.3.
  \item \textsuperscript{b} 2011 TBRC \textit{bla brang}, 255b.4; 2015 Go-mang Lhasa, 188a.7; 2007 Taipei codex reprint, 348.2.
\end{itemize}
the answer [that there is no damage by the world].\(^a\)

1. Objection [that there is damage by the world to the refutation of production from other]

\{VI.22\}

In Chandrakīrti’s Supplement there is a stanza:

\{VI.22\}\(^b\)

[Objection:] Since [all worldly beings] abiding in their own view assert as valid [what] the world [sees],
What is the use of propounding reasoning for this!
The world realizes that other arises from other;
Therefore what is the need for reasoning about this existence of production from other!

Chandrakīrti’s Autocommentary on this says [immediately before stanza VI.22]:\(^c\)

[Objection:] With regard to what is established from the world there is no use for reasons because worldly perception is very powerful. [And immediately following the stanza:]\(^d\) When the

\(^a\) Brackets from Tsong-kha-pa’s Illumination of the Thought, Sarnath, 2009, 211.4-211.5.

\(^b\) Stanza VI.22; La Vallée Poussin, Madhyamakāvatāra, 101.11-101.14; Illumination of the Thought, Sarnath 2009, 211.13-211.16.

\(^c\) Autocommentary on the “Supplement” (dbu ma la ’jug pa’i bshad pa), 2.3; Toh. 3862, dbu ma, vol. ‘a, 220a.1; Louis de La Vallée Poussin, Madhyamakāvatāra par Candrakīrti, Bibliotheca Buddhica IX (Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1970), 101.8-101.10; hereinafter, “La Vallée Poussin, Madhyamakāvatāra.”

\(^d\) La Vallée Poussin, Madhyamakāvatāra,101.15-101.19.
worldly dwell in only what they view, it is very powerful, and it also is a view of production from only other.\(^a\) Stating reasoning is only fit for nonmanifest things, it is not for the manifest; therefore, even without logical proof, the production of things from other only exists.

2. Answer [that there is no damage by the world to the refutation of production from other] {5 parts}

This\(^b\) has five parts: 1) general presentation of the two truths, 2) applying this to the meaning at this point, 3) the individual natures of the two truths, 4) the means of damaging the assertion that there is damage by the world to refutation of that [production from other], and 5) the mode of damage when there is damage by the world.\(^c\)

\(^{\text{a}}\) Tsong-kha-pa adds, “Worldly people directly realize that other effects arise from another cause that are established by its own nature.” *Illumination of the Thought*, 212.2-4.  
\(^{\text{c}}\) The first three sections are included in this translation.
ཤིང་སིང་བཟོད་པ་ལ་ཞིབ་ཟིན་ཡུལ་[L256a][L256a]
ཤིང་སིང་བཟོད་པའི་ཟིན་མོ་བ་[L256a]
a. General presentation of the two truths
{VI.23-VI.26}

To explain that phenomena have two natures and to explain the divisions
of the two truths, there is [one stanza] in the root text [Chandrakīrti’s Sup-
plement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle”]:

{VI.23}
[Buddha] said that all things hold two natures,
Those found by perceptions of reality and of falsities—
Objects of perceptions of reality are suchness,
And objects of perceptions of falsities are veil truths.

Added to Jam-yang-shay-pa’s text: Chandrakīrti’s auto-commen-
tary says:

Those depending on the loose talk of damage by the world—
who have not nonerroneously realized the meaning of the trea-
tises due to not undergoing hearing about separating from the
friend that is the manifest adherence to things, the ripened pre-
dispositions deposited from beginningless cyclic existence for
thingness—cannot counteract the loose talk of damage by the
world without a great many and vast explanations of the situ-
ation of the world, and hence in order to teach the distinctive
objects damaged by the world, [in the root text] it is explained

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a Stanza VI.23; La Vallée Poussin, Madhyamakāvatāra, 102.8-102.11; Illumination of the
Thought, Sarnath 2009, 213.14-213.17. Hopkins, Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition of Wis-
dom, 217 and 220.
b La Vallée Poussin, Madhyamakāvatāra, 101.19-103.7.
by way of briefly presenting the two truths:

[Buddha] said that all things hold two natures,
Those found by perceptions of reality and of falsities—
Objects of perceptions of reality are suchness,
And objects of perceptions of falsities are veil truths.

Concerning this, the Supramundane Victor Buddhas, unerringly knowing the natures of the two truths, teach two aspects of natures of all internal and external things—compositional phenomena and sprouts, and so forth—in this way: veilings (kun rdzob, samvyrti) and the ultimate. Concerning these, the ultimate finds its entity by way of [being] the object of a specific pristine wisdom of those who thoroughly perceive reality; it is not established by its own selfness (rang gi bdag nyid kyi grub pa ma yin). This is one nature. The other finds the existence of its own entity through the power of perceptions of falsities by common beings whose eyes of awareness are entirely covered over by darkening films of ignorance. Having a nature as objects seen by childish beings, they are not established by way of their own entities. Therefore, all things hold these two natures. Also, between those two natures, the one that is the object of a perceiver of reality is suchness; this is the meaning of “ultimate truth” (don dam bden pa, paramārtha-satya). Its entity will be explained below. The one that is the object of a perceiver of falsities is a veil truth (kun rdzob bden pa, samvṛtisatya).
To describe veilings [conventionalities]—objects of perceptions of falsities—as twofold, those that are real and unreal\textsuperscript{a} in relation to the world, there are two stanzas in the root text [the Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s)”Treatise on the Middle”]:

\{VI.24\}\textsuperscript{b}

Also, those that perceive falsities are asserted as twofold—
Those with clear sense powers and those having defective sense powers.
Consciousnesses of those having defective sense powers are asserted
As wrong in relation to those having good sense powers.

\textsuperscript{a} Roughly speaking, veilings, or conventional phenomena, are of two types—right/real conventionalities (yang dag kun rdzob) and unreal/wrong conventionalities (log pa’i kun rdzob). Unable to find a single, evocative translation equivalent for yang dag and log pa that would apply to both consciousnesses and objects, the UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies uses “right veiling” (right conventionality) and “wrong veiling” (wrong conventionality) for consciousnesses and “real veiling” (real conventionality) and “unreal veiling” (unreal conventionality) for objects.

\textsuperscript{b} Stanza VI.24; La Vallée Poussin, Madhyamakāvatāra, 103.11-103.14; Illumination of the Thought, Sarnath 2009, 220.16-220.19.
Objects realized by the world that are apprehended
By [the consciousnesses of] the six sense powers undamaged [by superficial causes of mistake]
Are true [or real] just from the world [because of being phenomena that prior to realizing emptiness cannot be realized to be a combination of appearing to be inherently existent but being empty of such].
The rest [that is, those apprehended by sense consciousnesses damaged by superficial causes of mistake such as reflections, echoes, and so forth] are posited as unreal from just the world [that is, relative to the world].

Added to Jam-yang-shay-pa’s text: Chandrakīrti’s Autocommentary (VI.24) says:

Therefore, having presented the two truths in this way, in order to indicate that since those perceiving falsities are also just two, right perceptions and false perceptions, whereby there are the two, the objects apprehended by them and the consciousnesses, [in the root text, the Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s)”Treatise on the Middle”] it is explained:

Also, those that perceive falsities are asserted as two-fold—

\[ VI.25 \]a

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\( ^{a} \) Stanza VI.25; La Vallée Poussin, Madhyamakāvatāra, 104.4-104.7; Illumination of the Thought, Sarnath 2009, 221.11-221.14; translation by Hopkins, Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom, 257.

\( ^{b} \) yang dag pa.
Those with clear sense powers and those having defective sense powers.

Consciousnesses of those having defective sense powers are asserted as wrong in relation to those having good sense powers.

Concerning that, those having clear sense powers are free from eye disease and unimpaired by jaundice and so forth, and are unerring apprehenders of external objects having such aspect [in being free from being affected by causes of error]. Those having defective sense powers are opposites from those. Regarding them, the consciousnesses of those having defective sense powers are asserted to be wrong consciousnesses in relation to consciousnesses of those with good sense powers.

In order to indicate that just as those consciousnesses are of two aspects from the viewpoint of being erroneous and non-erroneous, so their objects are also [of two aspects, in the root
text, the Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle,”] (VI.25) it is explained:a

Objects realized by the world that are apprehended
By [the consciousnesses of] the six sense powers undamaged [by superficial causes of mistake]
Are true [or real] just from the world [because of being phenomena that prior to realizing emptiness cannot be realized to be a combination of appearing to be inherently existent but being empty of such].
The rest [that is, those apprehended by sense consciousnesses damaged by superficial causes of mistake such as reflections, echoes, and so forth] are posited as unreal from just the world [that is, relative to the world].

Concerning that, eye disease, jaundice, and so forth, and having eaten thorn-apple are internal conditions that damage the sense powers. Sesame oil, water, mirrors, sounds spoken from within caverns and so forth, and the rays of the sun being impinging on a special area at a certain season, and so forth are external conditions that damage the sense powers; [even] without internal damagers to the sense powers, these are causes for the apprehension of reflections, echoes, water in mirages, and so forth. The mantras, medicine, and so forth used by magicians and so forth also should be known similarly [as cases of external causes of mistake].

Damagers of the mind are those [mantras, medicines, and so forth] and presentations of incorrectly formulated tenets and so forth, quasi-inferences, and dreams—which will be explained below. Therefore, those realizations of objects—apprehended by [any of] the six sense powers without the condition of damage by the world as explained—are true just from the world, but not in relation to Superiors. When there is damage to the sense powers, such as a reflection and so forth, the appearance as the very nature of the object is unreal in relation to just the world.

In order to explain that the conceived object of [a consciousness] that is mistaken with regard to its conceived object does not exist even in conventional terms,\(^a\) there is one stanza [in the root text, Chandrakīrti’s Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle”]:

\(^a\) tha snyad du.
(VI.26)\textsuperscript{a}

Entities [such as a permanent self, principal, and so forth] as they are imputed by [the assertions of] Forders [driven by bad tenets and quasi-reasons], Strongly affected by the sleep of ignorance, And [those horses and elephants, water, and so forth] imputed to magical illusions, mirages, and so forth Are just nonexistent even in [the conventions of] the world.

\textit{Added to Jam-yang-shay-pa’s text: Chandrakīrti’s Autocommentary (VI.26) says:}\textsuperscript{b}

Now, in order to indicate by way of an example the meaning already explained, [in the root text, the Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle,”] it is explained:

Entities [such as a permanent self, principal, and so forth] as they are imputed by [the assertions of] Forders [driven by bad tenets and quasi-reasons], Strongly affected by the sleep of ignorance, And [those horses and elephants, water, and so forth] imputed to magical illusions, mirages, and so forth Are just nonexistent even in [the conventions of] the world.


These Forders, wanting to enter suchness, do not hold onto but instead want to rise above the non-erroneous production, disintegration, and so forth of things that are renowned among untrained beings—herders, women, and so forth on up—whereby they plunge into chasms of bad views with great pain, like a person, climbing a tree, who releases the former branch without having grasped the next one, they plunge into the chasms of bad views; since they are bereft of perception of the two truths, they will not attain the fruit. Therefore, the three qualities\(^a\) and so forth imputed by them just do not exist even as worldly veilings.\(^b\)
b. The meaning at this point: The refutation of production from other does not damage the ultimate {VI.27}

In order to explain that that [our] refutation of production from other does not damage the ultimate is like the fact that one who has eye disease does not damage [that is, invalidate] one without eye disease, in the root text [Chandrakīrti’s Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle” there is one stanza]:

{VI.27}a
Just as the observations of an eye with eye disease
Do not damage a consciousness of one without eye disease,
An undefiled awareness is not damaged
By an awareness of one who has forsaken the undefiled pristine wisdom.

Added to Jam-yang-shay-pa’s text: Chandrakīrti’s Autocommentary (VI.27) says:b
Therefore, here [the root text says:]

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a Stanza VI.27 La Vallée Poussin, Madhyamakāvatāra, 106.3-106.6; Illumination of the Thought, Sarnath 2009, 226.11-226.14; translation by Hopkins, Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom, 232.
b Stanza VI.27 La Vallée Poussin, Madhyamakāvatāra, 106.3-106.18; Illumination of the Thought, Sarnath 2009, 226.11-226.14; translation by Hopkins, Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom, 232.
Just as the observations of an eye with eye disease
Do not damage a consciousness of one without eye disease,
An undefiled awareness is not damaged
By an awareness of one who has forsaken the undefiled pristine wisdom.

The refutation of production from other which was explained
is not [done] within abiding in only the world’s views. How [is it done]? It is within having asserted the perception of Superiors. When this refutation of production is qualified [in that way], just as the observations of the entities of falling hairs and so forth by one who has eye disease do not damage [that is, invalidate] the consciousness of one who has no eye disease, so also the consciousnesses of common beings, devoid of uncontaminated pristine wisdom, also do not damage the uncontaminated perception, whereby the world does not damage an object with an aspect like that [refutation of production from other]. Hence, in that way the other side are fit to be laughed at by the excellent. Therefore, this expresses that the truths are two, and through a division into veilings and ultimates, the natures of things are twofold.
c. *The individual natures of the two truths* {VI.28-VI.29}

With regard to the nature of veil truths, in the root text [Chandrakīrti’s *Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle”*] there is one stanza:

{VI.28}^a

The Subduer said that because bewilderment [that is, the apprehension of inherent existence] obscures [direct perception of] the nature [of the mode of subsistence of phenomena],

[This ignorance] is a veil (*kun rdzob, samvrtti,*^b^) and he said that those fabrications appearing

To be true due to this [ignorance] are veil truths (*kun rdzob bden, samvrtti-satya*)^c^ [because of being true in the perspective of the veiling apprehension of inherent existence].

Things that are fabrications [exist] conventionally (*kun rdzob tu, samvrtti-sat*).

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^b^ The *Four Interwoven Annotations* (357.1) gives an etymology of *kun rdzob*:

*Kun* means “all of the nature of the mode of subsistence of phenomena” (*chos kyi gnas lugs kyi rang bzhin kun*), and *rdzob* means “obstructing” (*sgrīb pa*) and “covering/veiling” (*‘gebs pa*).

^c^ Veil truths, *kun rdzob bden*.

Concerning that, in order to indicate worldly veil truths [in the root text, the Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle,”] it is explained:

The Subduer said that because bewilderment obscures the nature, it is a veil (kun rdzob, samvrti),
And he said that those fabrications appearing To be true due to it are veil truths (kun rdzob bden, samvrti-satya).
Things that are fabrications [exist] conventionally (kun rdzob tu, samvrti-sat).

Concerning that, because through it sentient beings are obscured with respect to seeing how things abide, it is [called] bewilderment, that is to say, ignorance, which has an essence of obstructing perception of the nature [of phenomena through] superimposing a nonexistent self-nature of things—the veil. Those which through that veiling [consciousness] appear as true and while not inherently existent, individually appear as inherently existent, are truths for worldly, erroneous, veiling [consciousness, namely, bewilderment]; they are fabricated dependent-arisings.

Some dependent-arisings, such as reflections, echoes, and so forth, appear as false even to those who have ignorance,

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a kun rdzob, samvrti.
whereas some—forms, such as blue, minds, and mental factors] such as feeling—appear as true; the nature [emptiness] does not appear in any way to those having ignorance. Therefore, that [nature, emptiness,] and whatever are false even conventionally are not veil truths. In that way, respectively, veil truths are posited through the force of the afflictive ignorance that is included within the [twelve] links [of a dependent-arising] of cyclic existence.

For Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and Bodhisattvas who have abandoned afflictive ignorance and who see compositional phenomena as like existents such as reflections and so forth those [forms, sounds, and so forth] moreover have a fabricated nature and are not truths because they have no conceit of them as true. These deceive children; however, for others, they are mere veilings since, like illusions and so forth, they are just dependent-arisings. Also, because [these three beings] partake of the mere ignorance that has the character of being an obstruction to omniscience, [these mere veilings] appear to Superiors acting on objects involving appearance [outside of

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a Tsong-kha-pa (below, 164) paraphrases this passage as:

Some dependent-arisings such as reflections, echoes, and so forth appear as false even to those who have ignorance, whereas some [dependent-arisings]—forms such as blue and so forth, minds, feelings, and so forth—appear as true; the nature that is the mode of being of phenomena does not appear in any way to those having ignorance. Therefore, that nature and whatever are false even conventionally are not veil truths.

b See also Hopkins, *Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom*, 240.

c See also Hopkins, *Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom*, 241.
meditative equipoise], and not to those acting on objects without appearance [within meditative equipoise]. It is asserted that because of being manifestly and completely enlightened regarding all phenomena in all aspects, in Buddhas the movement of minds and mental factors has utterly vanished. In that way, the Supramundane Victor spoke respectively of veil truths and mere veilings.

Regarding this, those which are ultimates for common beings are mere veilings for Superiors acting on objects involving appearance [outside of meditative equipoise directly realizing emptiness]; that which is the nature of those [objects]—emptiness—is the ultimate for them.\(^a\) The ultimate for Buddhas is just the nature, and it moreover is just nondeceptive, due to which it is the ultimate truth; it is that which is known by them by themselves individually.\(^b\) Since veil truths are deceptive, they are not ultimate truths.

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\(^b\) Hopkins, *Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom*, 254.
བོད་ཡིག་‘སོགས་མེས་པའི་སོ་སོ་འོག་པ་སོ་སོ་རིག་པར་ཐེག་པའི་བདེན་པ་ལོ།
དེ་ལ་འོག་པ་མེས་པའི་སོ་སོ་བི་བཞི་བཞི་ཡིན་ལ།
དེ་ལ་སོགས་མེས་པའི་སོ་སོ་འོག་པ་ལོ་གཞི་བཞི་བཞི་ཡིན་ལ།
སོགས་མེས་པའི་སོ་སོ་འོག་པ་ལོ་གཞི་བཞི་བཞི་ཡིན་ལ།
གུང་ཉིད་གོང་དོན་དམ་པའི་བདེན་པའི་གཞི་བཞི་བཞི་ལོ་
སོགས་མེས་པའི་སོ་སོ་འོག་པ་ལོ་གཞི་བཞི་བཞི་ཡིན་ལ།
གུས་ཉིད་གོང་དོན་དམ་པའི་བདེན་པའི་གཞི་བཞི་བཞི་ལོ་
With regard to the nature of ultimate truth, Chandrakīrti’s *Supplement* states:

(VI.29)\(^a\)

Where just those unreal entities such as falling hairs and so forth
Are imputed through the force of eye disease,
What is seen by one with clear eyes is the suchness [of those falling hairs].
Understand it similarly here.

*Added to Jam-yang-shay-pa’s text: [Chandrakīrti’s Autocommentary (VI.29) says:]*\(^b\)

Therefore, having taught veil truths in that way, then due to wishing to teach ultimate truth and due to the fact that the ultimate truth cannot be taught directly because of being inexplicable by terms and because of just not being objects of consciousnesses that follow upon terms, [the root text] sets forth an example for those wishing to listen that is experienced by themselves for the sake of clarifying its nature:

Where just those unreal entities such as falling hairs and so forth
Are imputed through the force of eye disease,
What is seen by one with clear eyes is the suchness [of those falling hairs].
Understand it similarly here.

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Through the force of eye disease, one who has eye disease sees what seems to be the difficulty of falling hairs and so forth within a vessel, such as a drinking horn which is held in the hand. Because of this, wishing to clear them away, he or she knows encountering the difficulties of again and again turning the vessel upside down. Someone without eye disease, noticing this, wondering what he/she is doing, and approaches, does not observe the aspects of the falling hairs—even though looking directly at the place [where the one with eye disease sees] falling hairs. He also does not conceptualize attributes having falling hairs as their substratum, such as being or not being functioning things, being or not being falling hairs, or being azure and so on.

Moreover, when the one with eye disease reveals his/her thought to the one without eye disease, saying, “I see falling hairs,” although [the one without eye disease] wishing to clear up his/her idea takes cognizance of the perspective of the one without eye disease and indeed speaks words intent upon negation: “There are no falling hairs here,” the speaker does not have a deprecatory denial of those [falling hairs]. The suchness of the falling hairs is that seen by the one without eye disease, not the other.
Similarly, the entities of the aggregates, constituents, sense spheres, and so forth observed by those who, through being damaged by the eye disease of ignorance, do not see suchness are the veiling (kun rdzob pa) entities of those [phenomena]. The nature—that Supramundane Victor Buddhas, who are separated from the predispositions of ignorance, see in the way that one who does not have eye disease sees falling hairs—is the ultimate truth of those [Buddhas].

Objection: Would not a nature with such an aspect not be unseen? Therefore, how do they perceive it?

Answer: Indeed, this is true. However, it is said that they see by way of not seeing. The Introduction to the Two Truths Sūtra, for instance, says at length:

Devaputras, ultimately if the ultimate truth were of the nature of an object of body, of speech, or of mind, it would not be counted as an “ultimate truth”; it would be just a veil truth. However, Devaputras, ultimately the ultimate
truth is passed beyond all conventions; it is not particularized, not produced, not ceasing, and devoid of object propounded and propounder as well as object known and consciousness.\(^a\)

Devaputras, the ultimate truth is beyond [the objects of all consciousnesses] ranging right through the objects of omniscient pristine wisdoms endowed with the supreme of all aspects; it is not as expressed in the phrase “ultimate truth.” All phenomena are false; they are deceptive phenomena.\(^b\)

Devaputras, the ultimate truth cannot be taught. Why? [Because] all those phenomena—[the person] by whom it is taught, what is taught, and [the person] to whom it is taught—are not at all produced ultimately. Phenomena that are not at all produced cannot describe phenomena that are not at all produced.

\(^a\) Hopkins, *Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom*, 261.

\(^b\) Hopkins, *Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom*, 262.
Therefore, in suchness the qualities of things and nonthings, one's own and others' things, truth and nontruth, everlasting and annihilated, permanent and impermanent, blissful and suffering, clean and unclean, self and selfless, empty and nonempty, definition and definiendum, same and other, produced and ceasing, and so forth do not occur because their entities are not observed. Hence, only Superiors are valid regarding the contemplation of suchness; nonsuperiors are not.
1) DECISIVE ANALYSIS {3 PARTS}

Here the decisive analysis of the two truths has three parts: refutation [of mistakes], presentation [of our own system], and dispelling [objections to our own system].

A) REFUTATION [OF MISTAKES] {5 PARTS}

Let us analyze the basis of division [into the two truths], the divisions, [whether the two truths are] one or different, the individual entities [of the two truths], and the meaning of the terms.a

1) Analyzing the basis of division [into the two truths]

There are many systems of assertion with regard to the basis of the division [into the two truths] because there are many such as:

I. Someone (Ngog the Translator)b says:c Ultimate truths are not objects of knowledge; therefore, mere appearances are the basis of the division into the two truths.

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a The first four are translated in this book.
b The three identifications in parentheses in the first three items are interlinear annotations in smaller script in the Tibetan perhaps added to the text by an editor but since they are also in the earlier Go-mang Lhasa edition, they may be after-thoughts by Jam-yang-shay-pa.
c 2011 TBRC 256b.1; 2015 Go-mang Lhasa, 189a.1; 2007 Taipei reprint, 349.3. The positions are repeated at the beginning of each response.
2. Certain (Thang-sag-pas) say: The entities of [all phenomena ranging from] forms through to and including exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects are the bases of division into the two truths.

3. Others (Tibetan elders)\(^a\) say: Non-superimposed\(^b\) objects are the basis of the division into the two truths.

4. The Translator Tag-tshang She-rab-rin-chen and so forth who fancy themselves to be scholars say: Uninvestigated and unanalyzed objects of knowledge are the basis of division into the two truths.

and so forth, because Tsong-kha-pa’s *Medium-length Exposition of the Stages of the Path*\(^c\) and *Illumination of the Thought* say, “Although there are many modes of asserting the basis of the division into the two truths among earlier [scholars…]”\(^d\)

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\(^a\) *bod rgyan* (2011 TBRC, 256b.2 interlinear); 2015 Go-mang Lhasa, 189a.2 interlinear, reads “other Tibetans” (*bod gzhan no*).

\(^b\) *sgro ma btags pa*; nonreified.

\(^c\) Tsong-kha-pa Lo-sang-drag-pa, *Medium-Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment to be Practiced by Beings of the Three Capacities* / *Medium-Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment to be Practiced by Beings of the Three Capacities together with an Outline* / *Short Exposition of the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment*, (skyes bu gsum gyis nyams su blang ba ’i byang chub lam gyi rim pa / skyes bu gsum gyi nyams su blang ba ’i byang chub lam gyi rim pa bring po sa bcad kha skong dang bcas pa / lam rim bring / lam rim chung ngu), in *gsung ṇbum*, TBRC W22273.14:5-474 (bla brang: bla brang bkra shis ’khyil, 1997); hereinafter, “Medium-Length Exposition.”

\(^d\) Quoting the *Medium-Length Exposition* (452.3), and referring to, but not exactly quoting the *Illumination of the Thought* (106b.1; see below, 133).
1. Someone (Ngog the Translator) says: Ultimate truths are not objects of knowledge; therefore, mere appearances are the basis of the division.

Ngok Loden Sherab, having been ordained by his uncle, Ngok Lekpay Sherab, was part of a contingent of Tibetan translators that the king of Western Tibet convened in 1076 and that subsequently traveled to Kashmir, where Ngok studied for seventeen years. Ngok’s most important translations were Prājñākārgupta’s *Ornament for (Dharmakīrti’s) Valid Cognition*, a commentary on one of Dharmakīrti’s most important epistemological treatises that emphasizes the influence of Dharmakīrti’s logic and Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka; Dharmakīrti’s second main work, the *Compendium of Valid Cognition*, along with Dharmottara’s commentary to it; and Maitreya’s *Sublime Continuum*, one of five texts attributed to the future Buddha, Maitreya, primarily concerned with the “Buddha nature” present in all sentient beings. Furthermore, stemming from his studies in Kashmir, Ngok is credited with establishing the Tibetan study of “The Three Madhyamikas from the East,” the main Madhyamaka writings of Jñānagarbha, Shāntarakṣita, and Kamalaśīla.

Upon his return to Central Tibet, Ngok became the abbot of Sangpu Monastery where his mastery of Dharmakīrti’s writings increased his fame to the point where he was reported to have 23,000 students. Every important figure in Central Tibet was reported to have studied Dharmakīrti’s tradition at Sangpu. In addition to establishing Sangpu as the premier institute for Buddhist epistemology, Ngok wrote summaries (*bsdus don*) of and commentaries on “The Three Madhyamikas from the East,” texts that emphasized the compatibility of Madhyamaka philosophy and Dharmakīrti’s epistemology. While only three of Ngok’s compositions are currently available, thus greatly limiting our knowledge of his views, his reported opposition to Prāsaṅgika accords well with what we see Indian champions of Candrakīrti expounding in this period: Ngok’s commitments to the epistemological tradition would place him squarely in opposition to arguments against the inapplicability of valid cognition to the ultimate.

a Ngog-lo-tsa-ba (*blo idan shes rab, r nag lo chen po*, 1059–1109). A renowned Ka-dam-pa (*bka’ gams pa*) scholar, Ngog Lo-dan-she-rab is traditionally supposed (see Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, 535) to have been a disciple of Atisha (982–1054), but their mismatched dates cast some doubt on this. Ngog Lo-dan-she-rab translated a large number of works, including Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words and Supplement*, and authored several works on Madhyamaka. His position is related in Gyal-tshab’s *Explanation of (Śāntideva’s) “Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds”* (223.6-224.2) and reiterated here by Jam-yang-shay-pa (257b-258a). About Ngog, Kevin Alan Vose writes in “The Birth of Prāsaṅgika: A Buddhist Movement in India and Tibet,” (Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, 1992), 72-74:

b 2011 TBRC 256b.1; 2015 Go-mang Lhasa, 189a.1; 2007 Taipei reprint, 349.3. The positions are repeated at the beginning of each response.
Our response: Well then, it [absurdly] follows that mere appearances are limited in number to the two truths because [according to you] it is logically feasible that [mere appearances] are the basis of division [into the two truths].

If you [incorrectly] accept [that mere appearances are limited in number to the two truths], it [absurdly] follows that a mere appearance must be one or the other of the two truths because [according to you] those [mere appearances] are limited in number to those two [truths] and [those two truths] also eliminate a further category, because Chandrakīrti’s Autocommentary (below, 140) says:

Similarly, any other truth that exists at all is also to be ascertained as only included within the two truths.

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a Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Explanation of Veilings and the Ultimate in the Four Systems of Tenets (93b.1) explains the background of Ngog’s position:

The Great Translator Ngog, in dependence upon the verbal rendering of several statements such as Shāntideva’s Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds (IX.2c) which says, “The ultimate is not an object of activity of awareness,” and sūtras which say that an ultimate truth is not an object of knowledge and say the ultimate has “passed beyond the objects of pristine wisdom knowing all,” is renowned to assert that because ultimate truth is not an object of knowledge, mere appearances are the basis of the division into the two truths.

b La Vallée Poussin, Madhyamakāvatāra, 71.5-71.7.
If you [incorrectly] accept [that a mere appearance must be one or the other of the two truths], it [absurdly] follows that the subjects, a single moon’s being two moons and a mirage’s being water, each must be one or the other of the two truths because of being mere appearances. You cannot accept [that a single moon’s being two moons and a mirage’s being water, each] must be one or the other of the two truths because [a single moon’s being two moons and a mirage’s being water each] definitely do not exist. There are many such [refutations of this position].

2. Certain (Thang-sag-pas) say: The entities of [all phenomena ranging from] forms through to and including exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects are the bases of division into the two truths.\(^a\)

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\(^a\) thang sag pa. According to George N. Roerich, *The Blue Annals* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1976), 343–344 and 650–651, Thang-sag-pa wrote several commentaries on Madhyamaka works by Nāgārjuna, Chandrakīrti, and Āryadeva. He founded a monastery, Thang-sag, that became an important center of Madhyamaka teaching. It would appear that he flourished in the latter half of the thirteenth century.

\(^b\) Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s *Explanation of Veilings and the Ultimate in the Four Systems of Tenets*, continuing from the previous citation about Ngog, traces the Thang-sag-pas’ and others’ assertion to Chandrakīrti himself:

Some Thang-sag-pas and so forth, thinking that it is the thought of Chandrakīrti’s *Supplement to (Nagarjuna’s) Treatise on the Middle* (VI.23ab) where it says:
Our response: Well then, it [absurdly] follows that the entity of form is a basis of the division into the two truths, [veil truths and ultimate truths,] because [according to you] your thesis [that the entities (of all phenomena from) forms through to and including exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects are the bases of the division into the two truths] is logically feasible. If you [incorrectly] accept [that the entity of form is a basis of the division into the two truths], it very absurdly\(^a\) follows that the two truths are a wing of entity of form because [you incorrectly] accepted [that form is a basis of the division into the two truths].\(^b\)

\(^{[L257a]}\)

\[^{a}\text{Very absurdly, } that \text{ lo.}\]
\[^{b}\text{If form were divided into the two truths, then the ultimate truth that is a division of form would have to be a form. Such an ultimate truth would therefore be impermanent. However, ultimate truths must be permanent because they are nonaffirming negatives. See Guy Newland, } The Two Truths \text{ (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, 1992), chapter 2.}\]
3. Others (Tibetan elders) say: Nonsuperimposed objects are the basis of the division into the two truths.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, a magical illusion or mirage individually, is a superimposed object because of being one or the other of the two truths. That whatever is one or the other of the two truths must be a non-superimposed object is established by the definitive enumeration [of the two truths and, according to you, the basis of the division into the two truths is non-superimposed objects]. If you [incorrectly] accept [that a magical illusion or mirage is a non-superimposed object], it very absurdly follows [that a magical or mirage is not a factor that is superimposed by a mistaken sense [consciousness].

4. The Translator Tag-tshang She-rab-rin-chen and so forth who fancy

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a sgro ma btags pa; nonreified.
b stag tshang lo tsa ba shes rab rin chen, b. 1405. A scholar made famous by Jam-yang-shay-pa’s extended refutation in his Great Exposition of Tenets of Tag-tshang’s refutation of Tsong-kha-pa’s views; Hopkins (Maps of the Profound, 15-16) says:

It is clear from Tag-tshang She-rab-rin-chen’s Commentary on “Knowing All Tenets” that the philosophical influence of Tsong-kha-pa, the founder of the Gelug-pa order, was already widespread by the middle of the fifteenth century at least in Central Tibet. Tag-tshang’s markedly different understanding of Tsong-kha-pa’s main source, the seventh-century Indian scholar-adept Chandrakīrti, caused him to take Tsong-kha-pa as his main opponent throughout his presentation of tenets but especially in a separate section in which he spells out eighteen contradictions in Tsong-kha-pa’s works with regard to Chandrakīrti’s Consequence School.

Two centuries later, the Fifth Dalai Lama suggested that a scholar refute
themselves to be scholars say: Uninvestigated and unanalyzed objects of knowledge are the basis of division into the two truths.\(^a\)

Tag-tshang, and the First Pan-chen Lama composed a forty-five folio text, *Response to Objections by the Sanskritist She-rab-rin-chen: Roar of the Lion of Scripture and Reasoning* in which he quotes Tag-tshang’s eighteen indictments one by one and gives his responses, sometimes along with invective, perhaps in response to Tag-tshang’s several outbursts. Jam-yang-shay-pa, undoubtedly aware of the First Pan-chen Lama’s text, weaves a broader response into the *Great Exposition of Tenets*, providing a sustained refutation of Tag-tshang’s presentation of tenets, citing various parts of Tag-tshang’s root text and commentary, but then devoting a section that is more than an eighth of his own book to detailing twenty-seven contradictions in Tag-tshang’s own work.

The core of Tag-tshang’s criticism of Tsong-kha-pa’s system is his predecessor’s assertion that all phenomena are established, or certified, by valid cognition…Valid certification for Tag-tshang and for Tsong-kha-pa are different; Tag-tshang sees it as implying self-institution, due to which, in the Consequence School, only the ultimate is established by valid cognition. He views Tsong-kha-pa’s assertion that all phenomena—conventional and ultimate—are certified by valid cognition as having fallen to an extreme of reification, exaggerating what does not exist as if it existed.

From Tsong-kha-pa’s perspective, however, self-institution is a synonym for inherent existence, and thus nothing—either ultimate or conventional—is self-instituting according to the Consequence School. Hence, establishment by valid cognition cannot possibly imply self-institution. As Jam-yang-shay-pa indicates, Tag-tshang has fallen to an extreme of reification by asserting that the ultimate is self-instituting and thus (in Ge-lug-pa terms) truly existent, and hence Tag-tshang has fallen to an extreme of nihilism in denying the valid establishment of conventional phenomena.

\(^a\) Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s *Explanation of Veilings and the Ultimate in the Four Systems of Tenets*, continuing from the previous citation about the Thang-sag-pas adds dependent-arisings to the list of miscellaneous assertions about the basis of division and then quotes Tag-tshang’s own root text and commentary:

Other Tibetans say that nonsuperimposed objects are the basis of the division into the two truths, and some beclouded about words say that truth is the basis of the division, and some say that the varieties of dependent-arisings are the basis of the division, and in his own commentary on the statement in *Knowing All Tenets* by the Translator Tag-tshang, “It is said that the basis of the division into the two truths is mere objects of knowledge,” he says:

*Although veilings are not objects of knowledge in the perspective of reasoning and the ultimate is not an object of knowledge in the perspective of mistake, without differentiation in the perspective of non-investigation and non-analysis it is said in sūtra that these mere objects of knowledge are the basis of division itself of the two truths.*
Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, an ultimate truth, is an uninvestigated and unanalyzed object of knowledge because [according to you] your thesis [that uninvestigated and unanalyzed objects of knowledge are the basis of the division into the two truths] is logically feasible. If you [incorrectly] accept [that an ultimate truth is an uninvestigated and unanalyzed object of knowledge], it [absurdly] follows that [an ultimate truth] is an unanalyzed object of knowledge because you [incorrectly] accepted [that an ultimate truth is an uninvestigated and unanalyzed object of knowledge]. You cannot accept [that an ultimate truth is an unanalyzed object of knowledge] because [an ultimate truth] is an object found by a rational consciousness analyzing the ultimate. You have asserted the three spheres of self-contradiction.a

In brief, in general, the three spheres are composed of three elements: the opponent’s assertion of the reason (rtags khas langs pa), the opponent’s assertion of the entailment (khyab pa khas langs pa), and the opponent’s assertion of the opposite of “thesis” of the consequence (bsal ba’i bzlog phyogs khas langs pa). Since the opponent has asserted or is forced to assert the reason and the entailment, the opponent has to accept the consequence; however, if the opponent also asserts or is forced to assert the opposite of the consequence, then the opponent is caught in a self-contradiction.

For a lengthy discussion of the three spheres, see Jongbok Yi, “Monastic Pedagogy on Emptiness in the Geluk Sect of Tibetan Buddhism: Intellectual History and Analysis of Topics Concerning Ignorance According to Svātantra-Mādhyamika in Monastic Textbooks by Jamyang Shaypa” (Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, 2013), Chapter 5.

In our text Jam-yang-shay-pa says, “It [absurdly] follows that an ultimate truth is an unanalyzed object of knowledge because you accepted that it is an unanalyzed and uninvestigated object of knowledge.” Does Tag-tshang explicitly assert all three? Or is he forced to assert one or more from Jam-yang-shay-pa’s perspective? This calls for analysis.
5. Also, someone posits: Truths are the basis of the division into the two truths.

Our response: It follows that it is not logically feasible to posit truths as the basis of the division into the two truths because whatever is a veil truth is necessarily a falsity. [That whatever is a veil truth must be a falsity] entails [that it is not logically feasible to posit truth as the basis of the division into the two truths] because it will be explained later (below, 69) how truth and falsity are explicitly contradictory.\(^a\)

\(^a\) See below, 69 in “2) [Analyzing] the divisions [of objects of knowledge]”; Tibetan, 2011
6. There are those who assert: The thought of Shāntideva’s *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds*\(^a\) is that ultimate truths are not objects of knowledge.

Our response: Let us state the [four] fallacies expressed in Khay-drub Ge-leg-pal-sang’s\(^b\) *Compilation on Emptiness [Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate]*\(^c\) with regard to those who assert this. (1) It [absurdly] follows that it is not reasonable that ultimate truths are exhausted in, that is, included within, these objects of knowledge because [according to you] your thesis [that ultimate truths are not objects of knowledge] is logically feasible. If you [incorrectly] accept [that it is not reasonable that ultimate truths here are exhausted in, that is, included within, these objects of knowledge], it [absurdly] follows that Shāntideva’s *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* and *Compendium of Instructions*\(^d\) are internally contradictory because the *Compendium of Instructions* cites a sūtra passage from the *Meeting of the Father and Son Sūtra* that says, “Objects of knowledge\(^e\) also are exhausted

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\(^b\) mkhas grub dge legs dpal bzang po, 1385-1438.


\(^d\) śikṣāsamuccaya, bslab pa kun las btus pa, in bstan ’gyur (sde dge), TBRC W23703.111 (Delhi, India: Delhi karmapa choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985).

\(^e\) shes par bya ba; or “those that are to be known.”
as these two, veil truths and ultimate truths.\textsuperscript{a}

(2) It [absurdly] follows that the Teacher [Shākyamuni Buddha] taught the ultimate while not knowing it because [according to you] those [ultimate truths] are not objects of knowledge and also not objects of any awareness. You have asserted the reason [which is that those (ultimate truths) are not objects of knowledge and also not objects of any awareness]. If you [incorrectly] accept [that the Teacher taught the ultimate while not knowing it], it [absurdly] follows that the statement from the Meeting of the Father and Son Sūtra:\textsuperscript{b}

Moreover, because Ones-Gone-Thus have thoroughly perceived, known, and actualized well [these] as [having the aspect of] emptiness, they are called “omniscient.”

\textsuperscript{a} Compendium of Instructions, 142b.3-142b.4; translation by Hopkins, Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom, 220. Cf. C. Bendall and Rouse, W.H.D., Śīkṣā Samuccaya (Delhi: Motilal, 1971), 236; hereinafter, C. Bendall, Śīkṣā Samuccaya.

\textsuperscript{b} Cited in Shāntideva’s Compendium of Instructions, bslab pa kun las btus pa, in bstan 'gyur (sde dge), TBRC W23703.111,142b.4; translation by Hopkins, Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom, 220. Cf. C. Bendall, Śīkṣā Samuccaya, 236.

\textsuperscript{c} The bracketed addition is taken from Tsong-kha-pa’s commentary below (139). Without the addition, the passage seems to say that a Buddha is called omniscient only because of having thoroughly realized emptiness; by taking the word emptiness as a \textit{bahuvr̥hi} compound meaning “those which have emptiness” or “those having the aspect of emptiness” the term comes to refer to all those that are empty and thus all veil truths and ultimate truths. The addition does indeed seem strained, but the sūtra itself, just above, speaks of both truths.
is not logically feasible because you [incorrectly] accepted [that the Teacher taught the ultimate while not knowing it].

(3) Furthermore, it [absurdly] follows that the explanations in the King of Meditative Stabilizations Sūtra and so forth that when seeking emptiness one forsakes one’s body, life, children, wife, and so forth for many eons are not logically feasible because [according to you] there is no purpose in forsaking such. You have accepted the reason [which is that there is no purpose in forsaking one’s body, life, children, wife, and so forth for many eons]. It follows [that the reason which is that there is no purpose in forsaking one’s body, life, children, wife, and so forth for many eons] because [according to you] the nature [emptiness] does not exist. You have asserted the reason [which is that the nature (emptiness) does not exist]. [That the nature does not exist] would entail [that forsaking one’s body, life, children, wife, and so forth for many eons would be senseless] because Chandrakīrti’s Autocommentarya and the Cloud of Jewels Sūtra explain that if the mode of subsistence did not exist, such endeavor would be senseless.b

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b Chandrakīrti’s Autocommentary (La Vallée Poussin, Madhyamakāvatāra, 306.9–306.12) says:

If [the ultimate] did not exist, for what purpose would Bodhisattvas cultivate the path of the perfections? Why would Bodhisattvas undertake hundreds of difficulties for the sake of realizing the noumenon?
(4) Furthermore, it [absurdly] follows that this mode of appearance of pillar, pot, and so forth is their mode of abiding, or the mode of subsistence, because [according to you] they have no mode of subsistence other than this mode of appearance. If you [incorrectly] accept [that this mode of appearance of pillar, pot, and so forth is their mode of abiding, or the mode of subsistence], it [absurdly] follows that all sentient beings are already released because [according to you] countless eons have passed since the mode of subsistence of phenomena has been manifest to them. You have asserted the reason [which is that countless eons have passed since the mode of subsistence of phenomena has been manifest to them].

It then gives a sūtra citation that concludes (La Vallée Poussin, Madhyamakāvatāra, 307.4–307.7):

Child of good lineage, if the ultimate did not exist, the life of purity (tshangs par dpyad pa) would be meaningless, and the coming of the One-Gone-Thus would be meaningless. Since the ultimate exists, Bodhisattvas are said to be skilled in the ultimate.
The Great Translator [Ngog], and so forth, explain that the thought of Shāntideva’s *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* is that ultimate truths are not objects of knowledge. This is a wrong proposition (1) because it contradicts the explanation from the sūtra cited in Shāntideva’s *Compendium of Instructions* that objects of knowledge are the basis of division of the two truths and (2) because it would [absurdly] follow that Buddhas teach ultimate truths while not knowing them and (3) because it would [absurdly] follow that the thusness that is the mode of subsistence of all phenomena would necessarily not exist, due to which the very way in which pillars, pot, and so forth appear would be their mode of abiding and (4) because it would [absurdly] follow that there is not even a slight difference between the modes of appearance of phenomena to all persons—common beings and Superiors.

These four fallacies] are the meaning of this statement from Khay-drub Ge-leg-pal-sang’s *Compilation on Emptiness [Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate]*.\(^a\)

\(^a\) 608.3–608.6.
7. About this, (Tö-lung-gya-mar and so forth) say: It follows that your mode of explanation disagrees with Shāntideva’s Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds because [according to that text] the ultimate is not an object of activity of an awareness. It follows [that the ultimate is not an the object of activity of awareness] because the reason [why the ultimate is not an the object of activity of awareness is that] whatever is an object of any conceptual or nonconceptual awareness must be a veiling. They explain the former [that is, third, line of that stanza in Shāntideva’s Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds, “The ultimate is not the object of activity of an awareness,”] as a thesis and the latter [that is, fourth, line of that stanza, “Awarenesses are said to be veilings,”] as the proof. Gyal-tshab’s Explanation of (Shāntideva’s)”Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds” states [Tö-lung-gya-mar’s] assertion.

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a stod lung rgya dmar, eleventh century; he was one of Cha-pa Chō-kyi-seng-ge’s (phya pa chos kyi seng ge; 1109-1169) teachers of the Middle Way School and of logic and epistemology. As with the identifications in parentheses in the first three items, this is an interlinear annotation in smaller script that perhaps was added to the text by an editor but since it also is in the earlier Go-mang Lhasa edition, it may be an after-thought by Jam-yang-shay-pa.
b 2011 TBRC bla brang, 287b.6; 2015 Go-mang Lhasa, 190a.1; 2007 Taipei codex reprint, 351.1.
c Object of activity of awareness, blo yi spyod yul. Shāntideva’s Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds (IX.2) says:

Veilings and ultimates,
These are asserted as the two truths.
The ultimate is not an object of activity of an awareness.
Awarenesses are said to be veilings.

d According to Jam-yang-shay-pa’s description below, 61, the first two lines of Shāntideva’s stanza (IX.2) explain the basis of the division and the definitive enumeration, the third line explains the ultimate, and the fourth line explains the entity of veil truths.
e Gyal-tshab-dar-ma-rin-chen (rgyal tshab dar ma rin chen, 1364-1432).
f byang chub sans dpa’i spyod pa la ’jug pa’i rnam bshad rgyal sras ’jug ngog, in gsung ’bum, TBRC W676.4: 7–334 (New Delhi, India: Mongolian Lama Guru, 1982), 223.6-224.2; hereinafter, Explanation of (Shāntideva’s) “Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds.”
Former scholars such as Tö-lung-gya-mar take the first line—“The ultimate is not the object of activity of awareness”—as the thesis and the latter line [“Awarenesses are said to be veilings”] as the logical sign, whereupon [the two lines] indicate that it is unsuitable for an ultimate truth to be an object of any conceptual or nonconceptual consciousness, with the latter line indicating that whatever is an awareness or an object of an awareness must be a veil truth thereby establishing the former line.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that there is no awareness in a Great Vehicle Superior’s meditative equipoise because your mode of explanation is that [given above which is that the ultimate is not an object of activity of an awareness]. If you [incorrectly] accept [that there is no awareness in a Great Vehicle Superior’s meditative equipoise], it [absurdly] follows that
it is reasonable to assert the system of the Diverged Afar\(^a\) [Nihilists] here because just as they assert that there is knowing until death, but with death the continuum of knowing is severed, you also assert that there is knowing up through the path of preparation, but there is no knowing during meditative equipoise on the mode of subsistence.

Furthermore, it [absurdly] follows that Buddhas and sentient beings who have extinguished defilements\(^b\) do not exist because [according to you] there is no object of knowledge direct realization of which extinguishes defilements. You have come to accept the reason [which is that there is no object of knowledge direct realization of which extinguishes defilements]. If you say [that the reason which is that there is no object of knowledge direct realization of which extinguishes defilements] is not established, it follows that an ultimate object and an awareness realizing it exist because [according to you the reason which is that there is no object of knowledge direct realization of which extinguishes defilements] is not established. If you accept [that an ultimate object and an awareness realizing it exist], you have explicitly [contradicted your assertion that the ultimate is not an object of activity of an awareness].

\(^a\) \(\text{rgyang 'phen pa, ayata; also called Worldly Diverged Afar (} 'jig rten rgyang 'phen pa, lokāyata)}\) and Hedonists (\(\text{tshu rol mdzes pa, cārvāka)}\).

\(^b\) Sentient beings who have extinguished defilements (\(\text{dri ma zad pa'i sems can})\) are Hearer Foe Destroyers, Solitary Realizer Foe Destroyers, and Bodhisattvas on the eighth ground and above.
Furthermore, it [absurdly] follows that the ultimate is utterly non-existent because [according to you] whatever is a veiling necessarily does not comprehend [the ultimate], and it is impossible that the ultimate itself comprehends itself.

It follows that your [Tö-lung-gya-mar’s] mode of explanation [that the ultimate is not the object of activity of an awareness] is not logically feasible because this stanza from Shāntideva’s *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds:*

\[IX.2\]a

Veilings and ultimates,
These are asserted as the two truths.
The ultimate is not an object of activityb of an awareness.
Awarenesses are assertedc to be veilings.

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b object of activity of awareness, blo yi spyod yul.
c Jam-yang-shay-pa cites the fourth line of the stanza as ending with the verb “asserts (’dod), while the sde dge bstan ’gyur ends with the verb brjod, (express, say, describe); byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa, in bstan 'gyur (sde dge), TBRC W23703.105, 31a.1.
explains the meaning of a [passage from the Meeting of the Father and Son] Sūtra that is cited in Shāntideva’s Compendium of Instructions from the viewpoint of the basis of division into the two truths, along with the divisions, and individual identifications the two truths. It follows [that this stanza from Shāntideva’s Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds explains the meaning of a (passage from the Meeting of the Father and Son) Sūtra that is cited in Shāntideva’s Compendium of Instructions from the viewpoint of the basis of division into the two truths, along with the divisions, and individual identifications the two truths] because (1) the first two lines explain the basis of the division and the definitive enumeration of the divisions in accordance with the sūtra, (2) the third line explains [the entity of] the ultimate in accordance with the sūtra, and (3) the fourth line explains the entity of veil truths in accordance with the sūtra.

a bslab pa kun las btus pa, in bstan ’gyur (sde dge), TBRC W23703.111 (Delhi, India: Delhi karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 142b.3-142b.7.
The first part of the reason which is that the first two lines explain the basis of the division and the definitive enumeration of the divisions in accordance with the sūtra is established because (a) the word “these” [at the beginning of the second line] of the Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds indicates the basis of the division, objects of knowledge, and (b) the first line [“Veilings and ultimates.”] indicates the definitive enumeration. It follows that [the word “these” in the second line indicates that the basis of division is objects of knowledge and that the first line indicates the definitive enumeration] because the meaning of the Meeting of the Father and Son Sūtra (see below, 133) where it indicates the divisions, “It is thus: Ones-Gone-Thus thoroughly understand the two, veilings and ultimates,” is indicated by the first line of [that stanza of] the Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds [“Veilings and ultimates.”] and the meaning of the sūtra, “Furthermore, objects of knowledgea are exhausted as these veil truths and ultimate truths,” is indicated by the second line [of that stanza, “These are asserted as the two truths.”] It follows [that the reason is so] because “exhausted as these” is a phrase indicating a definitive enumeration because Tsong-kha-pa’s Illumination of the Thought (see below, 137) says,c “The first two lines indicate the divisions,” and Gyal-tshab’s Explanation of (Shāntideva’s) “Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds” says:d

Therefore, these objects of knowledge are the basis of the division. When [objects of knowledge] are divided, there are the two truths; this is asserted to be a definitive enumeration.

because the word “these” [at the beginning of the second line in the Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds] is explained [by Gyal-tshab] as the basis of the division.

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a shes par bya ba; or “those that are to be known.”
b Hopkins, Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom, 220. These passages are cited in Shāntideva’s Compendium of Instructions, bslab pa kun las btsus pa, in bstan ’gyur (sde dge), TBRC W23703.111, 142b.3-142b.4. Cf. C. Bendall, Śikṣā Samuccaya, 236.
c dbu ma la ’jug pa’i rgya cher bshad pa dgongs pa rab gsal, in gsung ’bum, TBRC W22273.16: 5-582 (bla brang: bla brang bkra shis ’khyil, [199?]), 110a.4-110a.5; hereinafter, “Illumination of the Thought.”
d Explanation of (Shāntideva’s) “Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds,” 233.5.
The second root reason [which is that the third line (“The ultimate is not an object of activity of an awareness,”)] explains (the entity of) the ultimate in accordance with the sūtra] is established because the third line explains in accordance with the sūtra’s explanation that an object of knowledge that is not an object of activity of a mistaken awareness having dualistic appearance is the entity of ultimate truth. It follows [that the third line explains in accordance with the sūtra’s explanation that an object of knowledge that is not an object of activity of a mistaken awareness having dualistic appearance is the entity of ultimate truth] because both “awareness” in this [third] line [“The ultimate is not an object of activity of an awareness,”] and “awareness” in the fourth line [“Awarenesses are asserted to be veilings,”] are [awarenesses] that have dualistic appearance,
and are not mere awareness [in general]. It follows [that both awareness in this line and awareness in the fourth line are (awarenesses) that have dualistic appearance, and are not mere awareness] because in accordance with the meaning of that [Meeting of the Father and Son] Sūtra (also below, 138). \(^a\)

That which is ultimate is inexpressible, is not an object of knowledge, is not an object of individual consciousness, is not an object of thorough knowledge, is undemonstrable.

Śāntideva’s Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds says, “The ultimate is not an object of activity of an awareness,” and because Gyal-tshab’s Explanation of (Śāntideva’s) “Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds” says: \(^b\)

The former and latter awarenesses [in the third and fourth lines of the stanza] are awarenesses that have dualistic appearance but not mere awarenesses.

and Tsong-kha-pa’s Illumination of the Thought (below, 138) says: \(^c\)

Concerning that, the meaning of the explanation that the ultimate truth is not an object of knowledge is that it is not an object of an awareness according to the explanation below (215) of the meaning of a passage cited [by Chandrakīrti] from the Introduction to the Two Truths. \(^d\)

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\(^a\) As mentioned above, this is cited in Śāntideva’s Compendium of Instructions bslab pa kun las btsus pa, in bstan ’gyur (sde dge), TBRC W23703.111 (Delhi: Delhi karmapa choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 142b.5. C. Bendall, Śikṣā Samuccaya, and Vaidya’s Sanskrit (Dharbhanga: Mithila Institute) 136.26–27. Michael Sweet (1979, 83) claims that this is a “seemingly unambiguous denial of the inaccessibility [sic] of the ultimate which, significantly, goes unquoted by Geluk authors.” Despite the inadvertent negative prefix, it is clear in context that Sweet means to argue that this sūtra passage stands as incontestable proof that the ultimate is inaccessible and should not be considered an object of knowledge. Sweet has overlooked not only this citation by Jam-yang-shay-pa, but also Tsong-kha-pa’s citation of the same passage in his Illumination of the Thought (105a.6-105b.2).

\(^b\) Explanation of (Śāntideva’s) “Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds,” 235.1-235.2.

\(^c\) Illumination of the Thought, 105b.2-105b.3.

\(^d\) Discussing ultimate truth in his Autocommentary, Chandrakīrti (La Vallée Poussin, Madhyamakavatāra,110.15–111.10) cites a passage from the Introduction to the Two Truths Sūtra as a source-quote for his statement (La Vallée Poussin, Madhyamakavatāra,110.13–14) that the ultimate is “seen by way of not seeing” (ma gzigs pa’i tshul gyis gzigs pa). Tsong-kha-pa’s Illumination of the Thought (120b.3-120b.4) comments on this sūtra citation, explaining that for a pristine wisdom directly perceiving emptiness, an ultimate truth is not the object of a dualistic cognition but is known within the
vanishing of all dualistic appearances—including the appearance of its being an object.  
Making a key distinction, Tsong-kha-pa (120b.3-121a.5) writes:

It is not contradictory that:
  
  • this pristine wisdom directly seeing suchness can be posited as a knower of the ultimate and ultimate truth can be posited as its object known,
  
  • but in the perspective of that pristine wisdom those two—agent and object—are absent

because agent and object are posited only in the perspective of conventional awarenesses.
The third root reason [which is that the fourth line (“Awarenesses are asserted to be veilings,”) explains the entity of veil truths in accordance with the sūtra] is established because in the passage from that sūtra, “The One-Gone-Thus sees veilings as the province of the world,” the word “world” is taken as “awareness” in this context, and Shāntideva states the meaning of that passage. It follows [that in the passage from that sūtra, “The One-Gone-Thus sees veilings as the province of the world,” the word “world” is taken as “awareness” in this context, and Shāntideva states the meaning of that passage] because Shāntideva is explaining that the objects of the world—that is, of conventional awarenesses (blo thay snay pa)—are asserted to be veilings, because Tsong-kha-pa’s *Illumination of the Thought* says:

[Shāntideva’s] identification of veil truths does not mean that simply awarenesses are posited as veil truths; rather, they are objects of awarenesses. Moreover, since [the *Meeting of Father and Son Sūtra*] speaks of those [objects of awarenesses] as the province of the world (jig rten gyi spyod pa), they are objects found within the province, that is, as objects of activity (spyod yul), of worldly, that is, conventional, consciousnesses comprehending falsities. Hence, the meaning of [Shāntideva’s] assertion that objects of awarenesses are veilings is to be taken in that way.

and Chandrakīrti’s *Autocommentary* says: 

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a Cited by Shāntideva in his *Compendium of Instructions*, 142b.4. Cf. C. Bendall, Śīkṣā Samuccaya, 236.

b *Illumination of the Thought*, 105b.4-105b.5.

c La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra*, 31.7-31.8, in commentary on I.16ab:

Giving void of gift, giver, and receiver
Is called a supramundane perfection.
[For, the unapprehendable are supramundane, and] the apprehendable are just worldly due to being just included within conventional truths (*tha snyad kyi bden pa*).

Furthermore, it follows that the great deal of talk about the two truths without investigating or analyzing the basis of the division of the two truths, the way in which they are divided, and so forth is not logically feasible because they are elaborators of the branches of those without knowing the substrata like, for example, wanting to go out on the branches of a tree without there being any roots.
Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle
2) [Analyzing] the divisions [of objects of knowledge]

8. Also, someone asserts: Among objects of knowledge there are three—veil truths, ultimate truths, and mere veilings.

Our response: But this is not logically feasible because objects of knowledge are definitively enumerated as the two truths. The reason [which is that objects of knowledge are definitively enumerated as the two truths] is easy [to prove].

If you [incorrectly] say [that the definitive enumeration of objects of knowledge as the two truths] does not entail [that it is not logically feasible that among objects of knowledge there are three—veil truths, ultimate truths, and mere veilings], it follows that the definitive enumeration of objects of knowledge as the two truths does entail that it is not logically feasible that among objects of knowledge there are three—veil truths, ultimate truths, and mere veilings] because both scripture and reasoning establish that the definitive enumeration of objects of knowledge as the two truths is a definitive enumeration that eliminates any further category which is neither of those. It follows that scripture establishes that this is a definitive enumeration that eliminates such a further category because scripture explains that objects of knowledge are divisible into the two truths and that other than those do not exist.

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a 2011 TBRC bla brang, 259b.4; 2015 Go-mang Lhasa, 190a.6; 2007 Taipei codex reprint, 353.10.
It follows that [scripture explains that objects of knowledge are divisible into the two truths and that other than those do not exist] because the Meeting of the Father and Son Sūtra says, “Objects of knowledge also are exhausted as these two, veil truths and ultimate truths,”\(^a\) and that same sūtra says:\(^b\)

The Knower of the World, without listening to others,  
Teaches by way of just these two truths:  
Veilings and the ultimate.  
A third truth does not at all exist.

and the Superior Sūtra of the Meditative Stabilization Definitely Revealing Suchness says:\(^c\)

The conventional and likewise the ultimate—  
There is not at all a third truth.

and in accordance with this, Nāgārjuna’s Treatise on the Middle (XXIV.8)

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\(^a\) As noted above, this is cited in Shāntideva’s Compendium of Instructions (142b.3–4).

\(^b\) yab dang sras mjal ba’i mdo, pitāputrasamāgamasūtra; P760.16, vol. 23; Toh. 60, vol. nga (dkon brtsegs), cited in Chandrakīrti’s Autocommentary (La Vallée Poussin, Madhyamakāvatāra, 70.6–9, and again at 175.9–12).

\(^c\) de kho na nyid nges par bstan pa’i ting nge’dzin, tattvanirdesasamādhi. Cited in Chandrakīrti’s Commentary on the “Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle,’” commenting on stanza VI.80; Toh. 3682, dbu ma, vol. ’a, 243a.4; La Vallée Poussin, Madhyamakāvatāra, 175.11-175.12; La Vallée Poussin, “Introduction au traité du milieu,” Muséon 11 (1910): 356; translation by Hopkins, Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom, 224.
Doctrines taught by the Buddha rely wholly on the two truths.

and Chandrakīrti’s *Autocommentary* also says, “Similarly, any other truth that exists at all is also to be ascertained as only included within the two truths.”

[That these four scriptures say these] entails [that scripture explains that objects of knowledge are divisible into the two truths and that other than

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a In La Vallée Poussin’s edition of the Sanskrit (Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1970), 492.4–5.

b La Vallée Poussin, Madhyamakāvatāra, 71.5-71.7.
those do not exist] because [these scriptures] explain that “objects of knowledge are exhausted as the two truths,” and that other than the two truths a third does not exist, and so forth.

Regarding [the establishment] also by reasoning of the definitive enumeration of [objects of knowledge as] the two truths: It follows that [the definitive enumeration of objects of knowledge as the two truths] is a definitive enumeration eliminating any further category because with regard to objects of knowledge, if a base is inclusionarily distinguished as a falsity, then on the exclusionary side it must be blocked that the base is an ultimate—that is, nondeceptive. It follows [that with regard to objects of knowledge, if a base is inclusionarily distinguished as a falsity, then on the exclusionary side it must be blocked that the base is an ultimate—that is, nondeceptive] because the two, deceptive and nondeceptive, are dichotomous direct contradictories, because Kamalashīla’s b Illumination of the Middle says:c

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a zad pa.

b Kamalashīla (pad ma’i ngang tshul; ca. 740-795).

c Kamalashīla, Illumination of the Middle (dbu ma snang ba), TBRC W23703.107:268-
Phenomena that have the character of being a dichotomy are such that if something is refuted to be the one and it is not established to be the other, then it does not exist. Therefore, it also is not reasonable to think of it as in a class that is neither of those two.

[That Kamalashila’s Illumination of the Middle Way says this] entails [that the two, deceptive and nondeceptive, are dichotomous direct contradictions] because this explicitly indicates (1) how [the two truths] are directly contradictory in terms of exclusion and inclusion [such that when the one is excluded, the other is included] and (2) how a further category that is neither of those two is eliminated. Therefore, it follows with regard to any object of knowledge, that a further category that is neither deceptive nor nondeceptive and a further category that is both deceptive and nondeceptive are eliminated because direct contradictions—such that when the one is excluded, the other is included—cover all aspects of objects of knowledge.

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489 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 191a.4-191a.5; translation by Hopkins, Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom, 225.

a chos dag; in this the dag ending could be dual since this is its strict usage, in which case the translation should read “two phenomena.”

b Or, when the one is blocked, the other is affirmed.
knowledge,

because Tsong-kha-pa’s *Illumination of the Thought* says:\(^a\)

This being so,\(^b\) whatever is [a dichotomous pair] covers all objects of knowledge, hence a further category that is both and a further category that is neither are eliminated.

and Kamalashīla’s *Illumination of the Middle Way* says:\(^c\)

Two that are such that something does not exist if it is neither [of them]\(^d\) have the character of being a dichotomy. Those that have the character of being a dichotomy cover all aspects [that is, whatever exists is either one or the other]. Those that cover all aspects

\(^a\) *Illumination of the Thought*, 106a.3-106a.4; translation by Hopkins, *Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom*, 224.

\(^b\) Tsong-kha-pa has just explained:

The reasoning [why there are only two truths] is that if a certain base [that is, an object] is—on the positive side—distinguished as a falsity, a deceptive object, then on the exclusionary side it must be eliminated that it is a nondeceptive suchness, due to which the deceptive and the nondeceptive are dichotomous direct contradictories.

\(^c\) *Illumination of the Middle*, 219a.1–219a.2; translation by Hopkins, *Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom*, 225.

\(^d\) *gang zhi gyon sū gchod pa gang rnam par bcead pa med na med pa de nyis*.
eliminate other categories. Examples are, for instance, particular [pairs] such as the physical and the non-physical,\(^a\) and so forth.

\(^a\) *lus can dang lus can ma yin pa.*
3) Analyzing whether the two truths are one or different

[བེད་དེན་གཉིས་ཀྱི་ཐ་དད་ལ་དཾད་པ།]

9. Many former [scholars] (such as the father Ngog and his spiritual sons and so forth)\(^a\) say: It follows that the two truths are different in the sense of negating that they are the same because in general, there are three ways in which things can be different: different even in entity, like a pot and a cloth; one entity but different isolates, like product and impermanent thing; and different in that one of the two is not an [effective] thing, this being a case of different in the sense of negating sameness and among those three [ways of being different], the first two do not exist among non-products. Tsong-kha-pa’s [Medium-Length] Exposition of the Stages of the Path says:\(^b\)

Since the two of the division into two must be different, what kind of difference is this? With respect to this, many earlier [scholars] propounded:

Pot and woolen cloth, for instance, are different entities. Product and impermanent thing, for instance, are one entity and different isolates. In these two cases, the two that are different are both effective things; however, in cases of difference when either is a non-effective thing [that is, a permanent phenomenon] they have a difference that [merely] negates sameness. Among these three [modes of] difference, the two truths are different in the sense of negating sameness.

\(^{a}\) The words “such as the father Ngog and his spiritual sons and so forth” (rngog yab sras sogs) are an interlinear annotation present in both editions, 2011 TBRC bla brang, 260b.6, and 2015 Go-mang Lhasa, 192a.4.

\(^{b}\) Medium-Length Exposition, 452.5–453.1; translation by Hopkins, Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom, 106.
To some who [correctly] say that the two truths are one entity but different isolates, there are others who say: a It follows that the two truths are neither one entity nor different entities because each of those [positions] has four faults because there are many statements such as this from the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought: b

The character of the compositional realm and of the ultimate
Is a character devoid of sameness and difference.
Those who conceptualize them as the same or different
Are improperly engaged.

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b This is the first of two concluding stanzas to chapter three, The Questions of Suvishud-dhamati, in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought; dgongs pa nges par ’grel pa’i mdo, saṃdhinirmocana; Toh. 106, mdo sde, vol. ca; Tibetan and English in John Powers, Wisdom of Buddha (Berkeley, Calif.: Dharma Publishing, 1995); Tibetan and French in Étienne Lamotte, Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra. L’Explication des mystères (Louvain and Paris: Université de Louvain and Adrien Maisonneuve, 1935). Jam-yang-shay-pa’s citation (523.3) differs slightly from Lamotte’s edition (p. 47) and the Tog palace edition (p. 26); the latter two end the second line with de where Jam-yang-shay-pa reads do; for the fifth and sixth syllables of the third line Jam-yang-shay-pa reads nyid du, Lamotte reads du yang, and Tog reads rnam par.
Tsong-kha-pa’s *Illumination of the Thought* says, \(^a\) “Although there are many differing [assertions] regarding the meaning of the divisions,” and Khay-drub Ge-leg-pal-sang’s *Compilation on Emptiness [Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate]* says: \(^b\)

Therefore, the many former scholars who propound that the two truths are neither the same entity nor different entities propound that the two truths are not established bases.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Therefore, the many former scholars who propound that the two truths are neither the same entity nor different entities propound that the two truths are not established bases.}
\end{align*}
\]

Our response: It follows that the first system’s assertion that sameness of entity is unsuitable among the uncompounded is not logically feasible because sameness of entity exists even among the uncompounded. It follows [that sameness of entity exists even among the uncompounded] because permanent phenomenon is one entity with object of knowledge. It follows [that permanent phenomenon is one entity with object of knowledge] because the relationship of same essence (*bdag nyid gci gcig pa'i 'brel pa, tadātmya-sambandha*) between permanent phenomenon and object of knowledge is established. It follows [that the relationship of same essence

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\(^a\) *Illumination of the Thought*, 104b.5.

\(^b\) *Compilation on Emptiness*, 617.6.
(bdag nyid gcig pa'i 'brel pa, tadāmya-sambandha) between permanent phenomenon and object of knowledge is established] because [permanent phenomenon] is related to object of knowledge but is not related in the sense of having arisen in dependence upon it.\(^a\) The first part of that reason [which is that permanent phenomenon and object of knowledge are related] is established because [permanent phenomenon] is a particular of [object of knowledge]. The second [part of that reason which is that permanent phenomenon is not related to object of knowledge in the sense of having arisen in dependence upon it] is established because those two are uncompounded.

\(^a\) This relationship is often depicted as “related in the sense of arising from that (de byung 'brel, tadatpatti-sambandha) but Jam-yang-shay-pa uses rten byung 'brel. There are only two relationships—related to its causes (“related in the sense of having arisen in dependence upon them”) and to those phenomena with which it is related within one nature, or one entity, or one essence (bdag gcig 'brel). Jam-yang-shay-pa argues that since a permanent phenomenon is an instance of object of knowledge, it must be related to it, and since it is permanent, and thus uncompounded, it has no causes and cannot be related to object of knowledge in the sense of having arisen in dependence upon it; consequently, it must be related within one essence with object of knowledge.

\(^b\) Both editions, 2011 TBRC bla brang, 261a.5, and 2015 Go-mang Lhasa, 192b.2, mistakenly read 'du ma byas here and in the next occurrence but below read 'dus ma byas.
Furthermore, it follows that sameness of entity is suitable among the uncompounded because being related within one essence is possible among [the uncompounded]. It follows [that being related within one essence is possible among (the uncompounded)] because otherwise the relationship—between the sign and that which is held as the predicate of the probandum in the proof that a sprout is empty of true existence by the sign of being devoid of truly established one and many—would not exist whereas [the relationship] is established. It follows that the reason is so because the forward and reverse entailments in that proof are established.

Therefore, the establishment of a relationship of same essence is not contradictory in the uncompounded because Kamalashila’s *Illumination of the Middle Way* says:\(^a\)

*Objection:* The relationship of sameness of essence [or nature] is only among effective things and not others.

*Answer:* That is not reasonable because sameness of essence [or nature] is a synonym of non-difference. And since noneffective things are similar in selflessness, [sameness of essence] is only

\(^a\) *Illumination of the Middle*, 221a.1–221a.2.
noncontradictory.

In consideration of many such [statements], Tsong-kha-pa’s Medium-Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path says:\(^a\)

It is good to take this in accordance with the statement in Kama-lashīla’s Illumination of the Middle that the relationship of one essence is not contradictory even among non-effective things [that is, permanent phenomena]. Therefore, a oneness of entity and difference of isolates is not contradictory even in both cases—when both of the different phenomena are non-effective things or when one is.

With regard to this, there are many [unwanted] consequences such as, “It [absurdly] follows that [Chandrakīrti’s] explanation that all phenomena have two natures (ngo bo gnyis\(^b\))—the conventional and the ultimate—is

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\(^a\) Medium-Length Exposition, 453.2–453.3; translation by Hopkins, Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom, 106.

\(^b\) Also translated as “two entities.”
It follows that the refutation of the second system [which states that the two truths are one entity but different isolates] by the third system [of others who state that the two truths are neither one entity nor different entities] is not logically feasible because the two truths are either one entity or different entities. If you say [that the reason which is that the two truths are either one entity or different entities] is not established, it [absurdly] follows that entities of the two truths do not exist because [according to you] the entities of those two are not either one or different. You have asserted the reason [which is that the entities of those two are not either one or different]. [That the entities of the two truths are not either one or different] entails [that the entities of the two truths do not exist], because the existent necessarily is either singular or multiple and those two are dichotomous contradictories, because Kamalashila’s *Illumination of the Middle Way* says:

The singular and the multiple pervade all aspects [that is, all objects of knowledge] because they are dichotomous contradictories.

[and] Tsong-kha-pa’s [*Medium-Length* Exposition of the Stages of the Path* says:]

If the two truths were not one entity, then since it would also be very unreasonable for them to be different entities, the two truths would have to be entityless, whereby they would not exist, for whatever exists necessarily exists as one entity or many entities.

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*a* Ngog and his followers say that the two truths are different in the sense of negating that they are the same in order to avoid saying that the two truths are one entity, or one essence, with impermanent phenomena and because the two truths cannot be different entities.

*b* *Illumination of the Middle*, 218b.6.

*c* *Medium-Length Exposition*, 453.4–453.5; translation by Hopkins, *Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom*, 106.

*d* Tsong-kha-pa spells out this point in his *Illumination of (Chandrakirti’s) Thought:*

...if phenomena were different entities from [their respective] emptinesses of true existence, they would be truly established.

Tsong-kha-pa makes this very point after the citation from Nāgārjuna’s *Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment*. 
Furthermore, it follows that the two [truths] must be either one entity or different entities because the two [truths] are one entity but different isolates. It follows that [the two truths are one entity but different isolates] because (1) the two [truths] are one entity and (2) they are different isolates. It follows that the first [part of the reason which is that the two truths are one entity] is established because if the two [truths] are not one entity, there are four fallacies and so forth. It follows [if the two truths are not one
entity, there are four fallacies and so forth] because, for example, there are the fallacies that if forms and so forth are different entities from their own emptinesses of true existence:

1. it [absurdly] follows that the emptiness of true existence of those [forms and so forth] is not the mode of subsistence of those [forms and so forth].
2. it [absurdly] follows that the realization of those [forms so forth] as empty of true existence does not overwhelm the apprehension of signs [of true existence] of those [forms and so forth].
3. it [absurdly] follows that yogis’ meditative cultivation of high paths is pointless.
4. it [absurdly] follows that even Buddhas have not abandoned all the bonds of signs [the apprehension of true existence] and all the defilements of the assumption of bad states.
because the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* says:\(^a\)

If the character of compositional phenomena and the character of the ultimate were different, then the mere selflessness and mere naturelessness of compositional phenomena would not be the character of the ultimate.

and:\(^b\)

Similarly, if [the character of compositional phenomena and the character of the ultimate] were different, then even those who see the truth would not be separated from signs [of true existence] in compositional phenomena.

and so forth, and Prajñāmokṣha’s *Commentary on (Atisha’s) “Quintessential Instructions on the Middle Way”* says:\(^c\)

If [the character of compositional phenomena and the character of the ultimate] were different, then [the ultimate and compositional phenomena] would not be that which possesses the noumenon\(^d\) and the noumenon [respectively]. The signs [of true existence] in compositional phenomena would not be overwhelmed; it would also be pointless to meditatively cultivate the path.

\(^a\) In Lamotte’s edition (p. 45) and the Tog Palace edition (p. 24).

\(^b\) In Lamotte’s edition (p. 43) and the Tog Palace edition (pp. 20-21).


\(^d\) Or, real nature.
The second [part of the reason which is that the two truths are different isolates] is established because (1) if the two are not different isolates, there are four fallacies:

1. it [absurdly] follows that just as mistaken veilings are abandoned, the ultimate also is abandoned.
2. it [absurdly] follows that just as veilings have many dissimilar differences, so does the ultimate.
3. it [absurdly] follows that just as veilings have defilement, so the ultimate has defilement.
4. it [absurdly] follows that even ordinary beings realize the ultimate with direct perception.

and (2) therefore [the two truths] are one entity but different isolates, related within one essence, like a product and an impermanent [phenomenon] or a conch and the white [color] of a conch.
The first [part of the reason which is that if the two are not different isolates, there are four fallacies] is established because the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* says:\(^{a}\)

If the character of compositional phenomena and the character of the ultimate are not different, then just as the character of compositional phenomena is included within the character of the thoroughly afflicted, the character of the ultimate would also be included within the character of the thoroughly afflicted.

and:

Similarly, if [the two truths] are not different, then all ordinary beings would also see the truth.

and so forth, and also Prajñāmokṣha’s *Commentary on (Atisha’s) “Quintessential Instructions on the Middle Way”* says:\(^{b}\)

Just as veilings are abandoned, so the ultimate would also be abandoned. Just as veilings are diverse, so the ultimate would also be diverse. Just as the veilings are defiled, so the ultimate would also be defiled.

\(^{a}\) In Lamotte’s edition (44) and in the Tog Palace edition (22). Tog twice reads *lhung* where Jam-yang-shay-pa and Lamotte reads *gtogs* in this passage.

\(^{b}\) *Commentary on (Atisha’s) “Quintessential Instructions on the Middle Way,”* 118b.7-119a.1.
The second [part of the reason which is that the two truths are one entity but different isolates, related within one essence like a product and an impermanent [phenomenon] or a conch and the white color of a conch] is established because although the two truths are undifferentiable as empty of true establishment, they are established as different from the viewpoint of the isolate-factors of their respective bases of relation, because Nāgārjuna’s *Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment* says:

Suchness is not observed
As [an entity] different from the veilings.
Veilings are described as emptiness [that is, as empty of inherent existence]
And just emptiness is [posited in relation to] the conventional,
Because of the definiteness that [the one] would not occur without [the other],
Like product and impermanent thing.

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a T2655, Gi fol., 42b–48a; translation by Hopkins, *Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom*, 221–222. This is stanza 68 as numbered in Lindtner’s translation, *Nagarjuniana*, 205. Because this work refutes a mind-basis-of-all (kun gzhi rnam shes, ālaya-vijñāna), its attribution to Nāgārjuna (who presumably lived before the formulation of the mind-basis-of-all doctrine) has been challenged by Paul Williams (1984, 73–104). However, this is not a difficulty for Tibetan traditions, which hold in their legendary history that Nāgārjuna lived for six hundred years. For a summary of a Tibetan view of Madhyamaka history, see Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, 353–364, and Nāgārjuna’s *Precious Garland*, 9-21.
the meaning of which will be explained below (135), and a *Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra* also states:

The Supramundane Victor pronounced, “Subhūti, it is not that worldly veilings are one thing and the ultimate also is another; just that which is the suchness of the world is the suchness of the ultimate.”

and in concordance with the point [that the two truths are] different isolate-factors, Kamalashīla’s *Illumination of the Middle Way* also says:

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*a* *Illumination of the Middle*, 234b.6–234b.7. Kamalashīla’s concluding sentence suggests the “different isolate-factor” relationship. Perhaps this is why Jam-yang-shay-pa says, there is a *concordant* meaning in this passage; he does not seem to be claiming that this Indian source directly proves that the two truths are different isolatable factors within a single entity. This is because Kamalashīla is not referring to the emptiness (or ultimate truth) which is the final mode of subsistence of pristine wisdom being a different isolate within one entity with the conventional nature of that mind. Rather, he is indicating that such a pristine wisdom is ultimate when considered as a subject that knows an ultimate object, yet conventional when considered as an object that appears deceptively to other consciousnesses. Jam-yang-shay-pa sees within Kamalashīla’s statement a principle parallel to his...
The ultimate that has the nature of pristine wisdom, because it is not different from illusions and so forth [in that, like an illusion, a pristine wisdom does not exist as it appears], is an entity of a right conventionality. However, because it is concordant with the realization of suchness, it is also an entity of the ultimate. Hence, through specific points of relation, it is not contradictory for one [phenomenon] to be an entity of both [the ultimate and the conventional].

10. **About this formulation, someone says**: Well then, it follows that it is reasonable that all explanations, from any sūtra or treatise, that it is neither suitable to hold that the two truths are one nor suitable to hold that they are different should be presented in accordance with what was just explained [that (the two truths) are the same entity, difference of entity being unsuitable, and are different isolate-factors, one isolate-factor being unsuitable,] because this way of explaining the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought is logically feasible.

own argument: in relation to a single phenomenon, depending on one’s point of view, one may find either the ultimate or the conventional.

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\(^{\text{a}}\) 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 263b.1; 2015 Go-mang Lhasa, 194a.5; 2007 Taipei codex reprint, 358.12.
Our response: That this way of explaining the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought is logically feasible does not entail [that it is reasonable that all explanations, from any sūtra or treatise, that it is neither suitable to hold that the two truths are one nor suitable to hold that they are different should be presented in accordance with what was just explained [that (the two truths) are the same entity, difference of entity being unsuitable, and are different isolate-factors, one isolate-factor being unsuitable,]]. You cannot accept [that it is reasonable that all explanations, from any sūtra or treatise, that it is neither suitable to hold that the two truths are one nor suitable to hold that they are different should be presented in accordance with what was just explained [that (the two truths) are the same entity, difference of entity being unsuitable, and are different isolate-factors, one isolate-factor being unsuitable,]] because (1) the statement that if the two [truths] are held (bzung ba) or acted on (spyod) either as one or as different, [this constitutes] acting in signs (mthsan ma la spyod pa) [that is, misconceiving phenomena as truly established] and the likes of the statement from Nāgārjuna’s Treatise on the Middle,¹ “No difference, no sameness,” mean that it is not suitable for the two truths to be one or different within the context of true establishment; (2) but some statements as in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought that it is not suitable for [the two truths] to be either one or different must be explained as that it is not suitable for [the two truths] to be different entities and one isolate-factor.

¹ From the opening expression of worship of Nāgārjuna’s Treatise:

Homage to the perfect Buddha,  
The best of propounders,  
Who taught that what dependently arises  
Has no cessation, no production,  
No annihilation, no permanence,  
No coming, no going,  
No difference, no sameness,  
Is free from proliferations, and at peace.

Toh 3824, sde dge, dbu ma, vol. tsa, 1b.2-1b.3; Sanskrit in La Vallée Poussin, Prasannapadā, 11.13:

anirodhamanuttādamanuccchedamaśāvataṃ / anekārthamanānārthamanāga- 
mamanirgamaṃ // yah prayāśasamuttādāṃ prapatīcopasaṃaṃ śivaṃ / 
desayāmāśa saṃbuddhastāṃ vande vudatām varām //.
It follows that [(1) the statement that if the two truths are held (bzung ba) or acted on (spyod) either as one or as different, (this constitutes) acting in signs (mtshan ma la spyod pa) and the likes of the statement from Nāgārjuna’s Treatise on the Middle, “No difference, no sameness,” mean that it is not suitable for the two truths to be one or different within the context of true establishment; (2) but some statements as in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought that it is not suitable for the two truths to be either one or different must be explained as that it is not suitable for the two truths to be different entities and one isolate-factor] because the necessity for explaining these two will be understood if one looks into the [different] systems for demonstrating the fallacies [that would be incurred if the two truths were either held to be one or held to be different], because Tsong-kha-pa’s Medium-Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path says:a

Some texts say that the two truths are neither one nor different. Among these, some are in consideration [that the two truths lack]

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a Medium-Length Exposition, 454.1–454.2; translation by Hopkins, Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom, 107.
inherently established oneness and difference; others are in consideration [that the two truths are] not either different entities or one isolate.

The remainder is easy to understand.a

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a According to Pal-dan-drag-pa, this last remark simply means that, within this topic, there are no more difficult points requiring explanation.
4) Analyzing the individual entities of the two truths

11. Regarding the meaning of “objects of perceptions of falsities are veil truths,” (Supplement, VI.23d) and so forth the Translator Tag-tshang She-rab-rin-chen a wrongly says: Only ignorance acts as the positor of veil truths; consciousnesses subsequent to meditative equipoise of Foe Destroyers and pure ground [Bodhisattva] Superiors act as the positors of mere veilings; and Buddha Superiors utterly lack appearances of veilings because Chandrakīrti’s Autocommentary (above, 34) says: c

Veil truths are posited through the force of afflictive ignorance.

and: d

[Those, moreover, for Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and Bodhisattvas who have abandoned afflictive ignorance, and who see compositional phenomena as like existents such as reflections and so forth have a fabricated nature and] are not truths because they have no conceit of them as true.

and (above, 35): e

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a stag tshang shes rab rin chen, b. 1405.
b 2011 TBRC bla brang, 263b.6; 2015 Go-mang Lhasa, 194b.2; 2007 Taipei codex reprint, 359.4. This is a summarized restatement of positions Tag-tshang takes in his discussion of the two truths in his Explanation of the Treatise “Freedom from Extremes through Understanding All Tenets”: Ocean of Eloquence especially 271.6–274.6.
c La Vallée Poussin, Madhyamakāvatāra, 107.18-107.19. With more context (see also above, 34):

A few dependent-arisings, such as reflections, echoes, and so forth, appear as false even to those who have ignorance, whereas a few—forms, such as blue, minds, and [mental factors] such as feeling—appear as true; the nature [emptiness] does not appear in any way to those having ignorance. Therefore, that [nature, emptiness,] and whatever are false even conventionally are not veil truths. In that way, respectively, veil truths are posited through the force of the afflictive ignorance that is included within the [twelve] links [of a dependent-arising] of cyclic existence.
d Continuing from the previous citation, as cited in the previous note. La Vallée Poussin, Madhyamakāvatāra, 108.2-108.3.
e La Vallée Poussin, Madhyamakāvatāra, 108.9-108.11.
It is asserted that because of being manifestly and completely enlightened regarding all phenomena in all aspects, in Buddhas the movement of minds and mental factors has utterly vanished.

Our response: This is only the clearest contradictory entailment [for these passages from Chandrakīrti’s Autocommentary prove the opposite of the three points that Tag-tshang is trying to make]. With regard to that, well then it [absurdly] follows that whatever is a veil truth is necessarily posited by [a consciousness] apprehending true existence because [according to you] the positor of [a veil truth] is only [a consciousness] apprehending true existence. You have asserted the reason [which is that the positor of (a veil truth) is only (a consciousness) apprehending true existence].

If you [incorrectly] accept [the consequence that whatever is a veil truth is necessarily posited by (a consciousness) apprehending true existence], it [absurdly] follows that the subjects, pots, woolen cloth, and so forth, do not exist even in conventional terms because of being objects posited by [consciousnesses] apprehending true existence [according to you].

\[\text{tha snyad du}.\]
You have asserted (1) the reason [which is that pots, woolen cloth, and so forth are objects posited by (consciousnesses) apprehending true existence] and (2) that the reason entails [that pots, woolen cloth, and so forth do not exist even in conventional terms], because Tsong-kha-pa’s *Illumination of the Thought* (below, 169) says:

> [Chandrakīrti’s saying that veil truths are posited through the force of ignorance apprehending true existence indicates the mode of positing what sort of veiling (consciousness) in the perspective of which truth\(^b\) is posited, but it is not that he is saying that pots, woolen cloth, and so forth, which are veil truths, are posited by that consciousness apprehending true existence] because he himself asserts that what is posited by a [consciousness] apprehending true existence does not exist even in conventional terms.

You cannot accept the consequence [that pots, cloth, and so forth do not exist even in conventional terms] because it has already been explained that objects of knowledge [and hence existents] are definitively enumerated as the two truths.

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\(^a\) *Illumination of the Thought*, 211b.4.

\(^b\) “Truth” means “concordance between appearance and fact.”
12. About this formulation, someone says: It follows that veil truths are necessarily posited by ignorance because Chandrakīrti’s *Autocommentary* (above, 34) says, “Veil truths are posited through the force of ignorance.”

*Our response:* [That Chandrakīrti’s *Autocommentary* says, “Veil truths are posited through the force of ignorance,”] does not entail [that veil truths are necessarily posited by ignorance] because having identified the veiler for whose perspective a pot and so forth are posited as truths, (Chandrakīrti) is explaining that a pot and so forth are true only in the perspective of solely that (veiling consciousness) and in general are falsities. It follows [that having identified the veiler for whose perspective a pot and so forth are posited as truths, (Chandrakīrti) is explaining that a pot and so forth are true only in the perspective of solely that (veiling consciousness) and in general are falsities] because this is known through the explanation that (1) a pot and so forth are true due to their mode of appearance and mode of appearance...
of subsistence appearing to be concordant in the perspective of eye consciousnesses and so forth that are affected by ignorance; but (2) reflections and so forth, since their mode of appearance and mode of subsistence appear to be discordant to a language-trained person’s sense consciousness polluted by ignorance or its predispositions, a are not truths in the perspective of those consciousnesses, due to which they are not posited as veil truths in the perspective of those consciousnesses.

The first reason [which is that a pot and so forth are true due to their mode of appearance and mode of subsistence appearing to be concordant in the perspective of eye consciousnesses and so forth that are affected by ignorance] is established because Chandrakīrti’s Autocommentary (above, a Reading de’i bag chag skyis bslad pa’i for des bslad pa’i, 530.1–2. “Language-trained” (brda byang) refers to a person who has learned to use any language or symbolic system, and thus through understanding the difference between a sign and what it signifies, can also know that a reflection of a face is not a face.
34) says: “A few [dependent-arisings]—forms such as blue, minds, and [mental factors] such as feeling—appear as truths,” and (above, 34) says:

In that way, respectively, veil truths are posited through the force of the afflictive ignorance that is included within the [twelve] links [of a dependent-arising] of cyclic existence.

and Tsong-kha-pa’s *Illumination of the Thought* (below, 169) says:

[Chandrakīrti’s] saying that veil truths are posited through the force of ignorance apprehending true existence indicates the mode of positing the veiling [consciousness] in the perspective of which truth [that is, concordance between appearance and fact] is pos-ited.

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b Some (*ga’ zhiṅ*) dependent-arisings (those that are real in relation to the world, e.g., tables) deceptively seem to exist exactly as they appear, but other dependent-arisings (those that are unreal in relation to the world, e.g., reflections) can be recognized as deceptive even by those who have ignorance.


d The first of the twelve links of the dependent-arising of lifetimes in cyclic existence.

e *Illumination of the Thought*, 211b.2; translation by Hopkins, *Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom*, 241.
The second reason [which is that reflections and so forth, since their mode of appearance and mode of subsistence appear to be discordant to a language-trained person’s sense consciousness polluted by ignorance or its predispositions], are not truths in the perspective of those consciousnesses, due to which they are not posited as veil truths in the perspective of those consciousnesses] is established because Chandrakīrti’s *Autocommentary* (above, 34) says, “A few dependent-arisings—reflections, echoes, and so forth—are falsities,” and, “Therefore, that [nature, emptiness,] and whatever are false even conventionally are not veil truths,” and Tsong-kha-pa’s *Ocean of Reasoning* says:

Regarding [Chandrakīrti’s] statement that that which is false even conventionally is not a veil truth: Since a reflection of a face, for example, is not true as a face in the perspective of a worldly veiling consciousness of one who is trained in language, it is not a veil truth in relation to that.

[In the passages from Chandrakīrti’s *Autocommentary*] the phrase can zad cig [“a few”] should be ’ga’ zhig [“some” and thus “some dependent-arisings”] as translated by Nag-tsho.

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c 410.17–20.
d nag tsho lo tsa ba tshul khrims rgyal ba (b.1011) made the original translation of Chandrakīrti’s *Supplement* from Sanskrit into Tibetan, working with the Indian Krṣṇapaṇḍita. Hopkins, *Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom*, 238, note b.
13. About this formulation, someone says:\(^a\) It follows that if a base [that is, an object] is not true in the perspective of an awareness, it is necessarily not a veil truth in the perspective of that awareness because since a reflection in a mirror and so forth are not true in the perspective of a language-trained person, they are not veil truths in relation to that awareness.

\[\text{Our response:} \text{That since a reflection in a mirror and so forth are not true in the perspective of a language-trained person’s awareness, reflections and so forth are not veil truths in relation to that awareness] does not entail [that if a base (that is, an object) is not true in the perspective of an awareness, it is necessarily not a veil truth in the perspective of that awareness]. The reason [which is that since a reflection in a mirror and so forth are not true in the perspective of an awareness of one trained in language, they are not veil truths in relation to that (language-trained) awareness] is established because that [language-trained] awareness in the perspective of which [a reflection] is not true but which has not realized that [a reflection] is a truth only in the perspective of ignorance also does not realize a base, a reflection, as a veil truth.\(^b\)


\(^b\) This syllogism is the key to the debate. Jam-yang-shay-pa, without denying that a reflection is a veil truth in general, holds that it is not a veil truth for the normal, conventional
It follows [that] language-trained awareness in the perspective of which a reflection is not true but which has not realized that a reflection

mind of someone who has learned any language, and thus, through understanding the distinction between sign and signified, can grasp that a reflection of a face is not a face. Jam-yang-shay-pa distinguishes two senses in which something could be a veil truth in the perspective of a particular consciousness. First, if a consciousness takes its object to be true—that is, existing as it appears—then that object is a veil truth for that consciousness. Anyone sophisticated enough to use language will realize that a reflection of a face is not a face, and thus ordinary individuals do not have an ignorant, veiling consciousness that naively conceives the reflection to exist as it appears. Jam-yang-shay-pa is careful to say that a language-trained person does not see a reflection as “true” (bden); we can presume that this person still sees the reflection as a truth (bden pa)—that is, as a truly existent reflection of a face.

Second, if a consciousness recognizes its object as a falsity, that is, as a veil truth, then that object is a veil truth in the perspective of that consciousness. While an ordinary person may see that a reflection is false in that it deceptively appears as a face, only a person who has previously realized emptiness can recognize it as a veil truth, that is to say, a truth only for an ignorant consciousness.

Bringing Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s terminological refinement (see Newland’s Two Truths, chapter 8) into play, we might say that a reflection of a face is a veil truth in relation to the perspective (shes ngor la los te) of an ordinary educated person (because such a person is still subject to the veil, the conception of true existence), but not a veil truth in that perspective (shes ngor la) (because that person cannot recognize a reflection as a veil truth). On the other hand, a reflection of a face is a veil truth in the perspective of Foe Destroyers and pure ground Bodhisattvas, but not a veil truth in relation to their perspective.

This debate clearly shows (1) that Jam-yang-shay-pa does not differentiate the meanings of the terms “for (or in) the perspective” (shes ngor) and “in relation to the perspective” (shes ngor la los te), (2) that he is nevertheless cognizant of the ambiguity of those phrases as he employs them, and (3) that he attempts to deal with the problems arising from that ambiguity.
is a truth only in the perspective of ignorance also does not realize a base, a reflection, as a veil truth because in order to realize something as a veil truth it must be realized as a truth only in the perspective of ignorance and for that one must refute true existence. It follows [that in order to realize something as a veil truth it must be realized as a truth only in the perspective of ignorance and for that one must refute true existence] because when a pot and so forth are posited as truths in the phrase “veil truths,” one must realize that they are posited as such in the perspective of an awareness but are not posited as truths in fact.

The reason [which is that when a pot and so forth are posited as truths in the phrase “veil truths,” one must realize that they are posited as such in the perspective of an awareness but are not posited as truths in fact] is established and entails [that in order to realize something as a veil truth it must be realized as a truth only in the perspective of ignorance and for that one must refute true existence] because when one realizes thus, one must realize how it comes to be that if the perspective of a veiling awareness is not applied,\(^a\) then [a pot and so forth] are not established as truths and [instead] are falsities.\(^b\) It follows [that when one realizes thus, one must realize how it comes to be that if the perspective of a veiling awareness is

\(^a\) That is to say, “if one does not connect the question of whether a pot and so forth are truths to the context of the perspective of a veiling awareness”...

\(^b\) In other words, pots and so forth are called “truths” only when one considers the question of whether they are truths in the specific context of how they appear to ignorance.
not applied, then (a pot and so forth) are not established as truths and (instead) are falsities] because:

1. that the veiler is ignorance and
2. truth in the perspective of that [veiler ignorance]

is the mode of truth in this context [of veil truth] because Tsong-kha-pa’s *Illumination of the Thought* (below, 174) says:\(^a\)

The reason for this is by way of the essential that if it is seen that when positing the “truth” that is part of the term “veil truth” with respect to pots and so forth, it must be posited—from between an awareness and fact—as a truth in the perspective of just a veiling [consciousness] that apprehends true existence and is not posited as a truth in fact, it must be seen that if that distinction [of being in the perspective of a veiling consciousness] is not applied, it is not established as a truth and is a falsity.

\(^a\) *Illumination of the Thought*, 112b.3-112b.4; translation by Hopkins, *Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom*, 243.
If you [incorrectly] assert the root [consequence\(^a\) which is that if a base is not true in the perspective of an awareness, it is necessarily not a veil truth in the perspective of that awareness], then it [absurdly] follows that the subjects, a pot and so forth, are not veil truths in the perspective of pristine wisdom subsequent to meditative equipoise of Foe Destroyers and pure ground Learner Superiors because of not being truths in the perspective of that [pristine wisdom subsequent to meditative equipoise of Foe Destroyers and pure ground Learner Superiors]. You [incorrectly] have asserted that [not being a truth in the perspective of pristine wisdom subsequent to meditative equipoise of Foe Destroyers and pure ground Learner Superiors] entails [not being a veil truth in the perspective of pristine wisdom subsequent to meditative equipoise of Foe Destroyers and pure ground Learner Superiors].

The reason [which is that a pot and so forth are not truths in the perspective

\(^a\) At the start of debate 13.
of pristine wisdom subsequent to meditative equipoise of Foe Destroyers and pure ground Learner Superiors] follows because such a pristine wisdom subsequent to meditative equipoise [of Foe Destroyers and pure ground Learner Superiors] does not apprehend true existence. It follows [that pristine wisdom subsequent to meditative equipoise of Foe Destroyers and pure ground Learner Superiors does not apprehend true existence] because it [that is, a pristine wisdom subsequent to meditative equipoise of Foe Destroyers and pure ground Learner Superiors] is a pristine wisdom subsequent to meditative equipoise of a person who has abandoned apprehension of true existence, because Chandrakīrti’s *Autocommentary* (above, 34) says:\(^a\)

Those, moreover, for Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and Bodhisattvas who have abandoned afflictive ignorance and who see compositional phenomena as like existents such as reflections and so forth have a fabricated nature and are not truths because they have no conceit of them as true.

\(^a\) La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra*, 107.19-108.3.
14. **About this formulation, someone says:** I assert the root [consequence] which is that if a base is not true in the perspective of an awareness, it is necessarily not a veil truth in the perspective of that awareness because [Chandrakīrti] explains the distinction that [a pot and so forth] are mere veiling in the perspective of a pristine wisdom subsequent to meditative equipoise [in the continuum of a person who has abandoned the apprehension of true existence] but are not veil truths in its perspective, because Chandrakīrti’s *Autocommentary* (above, 34) says, “for others, they are mere veiling since, like illusions and so forth, they are just dependent-arising.”

Our response: [That Chandrakīrti’s *Autocommentary* (above, 34) says, “for others, they are mere veiling since, like illusions and so forth, they are just dependent-arising,”] does not entail [that Chandrakīrti explains the distinction that (a pot and so forth) are mere veiling in the perspective of a pristine wisdom subsequent to meditative equipoise (in the continuum of a person who has abandoned the apprehension of true existence) but are not veil truths in its perspective] because that passage merely explains that

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b At the start of debate 13 and which was reference just two paragraphs above.
c *kun rdzob* *tsam*, saṃvyrti-mātra.
e *kun rdzob* *tsam*. 
a pot and so forth are only falsities veilings like illusions and are not un-fabricated true existents. It follows [that this passage merely explains that a pot and so forth are only falsities veilings like illusions, and are not un-fabricated true existents] because since things [pots and so forth] are not truths in the perspective of the three—hearer Foe Destroyers and so forth—they are only fabrications by conceptuality and since things are also not true in the perspective of the veiling [awarenesses] of those three persons, [Chandrakīrti] calls them “mere veilings,” because regarding the meaning of this passage, Tsong-kha-pa’s Explanation: Illumination of the Thought (below, 164) states:

Those fabricated things—which [even though they do not inherently exist] are fabricated by conceptuality [to appear to be inherently existent] and which are not truths in the perspective of the three persons [that is, Hearer Foe Destroyers, Solitary Realizer Foe Destroyers, and Bodhisattvas on the eighth, ninth, and tenth grounds, called the three pure grounds]—are not truths in the perspective of their own veiling [consciousnesses since they are beyond such ignorance], and hence those [phenomena] are called “mere veilings.”

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a Illumination of the Thought, 110a.1-110a.2; translation by Hopkins, Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom, 235.
b mere veilings, kun rdzob tsam, samvrtimātra.
If you [incorrectly] accept the root [consequence which is that if a base is not true in the perspective of an awareness, it is necessarily not a veil truth in the perspective of that awareness], it [absurdly] follows that [those three persons] have no pristine wisdoms subsequent to meditative equipoise that understand how a pot and so forth are not established as truths [in fact], but exist as truths in the perspective of the veiler—that is, the consciousness apprehending true existence—because [according to you] a pot and so forth are not veil truths in the perspective of a pristine wisdom subsequent to meditative equipoise of such [(persons) who understand how a pot and so forth are not established as truths (in fact), but exist as truths in the perspective of the veiler—that is, the consciousness apprehending true existence]. You [incorrectly] have asserted the reason [which is that a pot and so forth are not veil truths in the perspective of a pristine wisdom subsequent to meditative equipoise of such (Foe Destroyers and Learner Superiors on the pure grounds)].
If you [incorrectly] accept the consequence [that (those three persons) have no pristine wisdoms subsequent to meditative equipoise that understand how a pot and so forth are not established as truths (in fact), but exist as truths in the perspective of the veiler—that is, the consciousness apprehending true existence], it [absurdly] follows that if an awareness does not apprehend something as a truth, then in the perspective of that awareness other awarenesses necessarily do not see it as a truth because you [incorrectly] accepted that consequence [that (those three persons) have no pristine wisdoms subsequent to meditative equipoise that understand how a pot and so forth are not established as truths (in fact), but exist as truths in the perspective of the veiler—that is, the consciousness apprehending true existence]. If you [incorrectly] accept this consequence [that if an awareness does not apprehend something as a truth, then in the perspective of that awareness other awarenesses necessarily do not see it as a truth], it [absurdly] follows that there are no clairvoyances that know the minds of others in the continuums of those persons, and because of your assertion [that if an awareness does not apprehend something as a truth, then in the perspective of that awareness other awarenesses necessarily do not see it as a truth], it very absurdly follows that the aforementioned modes of generating compassion are not logically feasible! The aforementioned modes of generating compassion are the Cloud of Jewels Sūtra and the Questions of King Dhāranīśvara Sūtra—sources cited again and again in Chandrakīrti’s Autocommentary, Shāntideva’s Compendium of Instructions, Nāgārjuna’s Compendium of Sūtra,\(^a\) and so forth—which state:\(^b\)

\(^a\) The index in the Bendall and Rouse translation of Shāntideva’s Compendium of Instructions identifies twenty-six citations from the Cloud of Jewels and none from the Questions of King Dhāranīśvara. The index to La Vallée Poussin’s edition of Chandrakīrti’s Autocommentary lists two citations of the Cloud of Jewels and eleven from the Questions of King Dhāranīśvara.

\(^b\) ‘\(\text{'phags pa tshangs pa khyad par sems kyis zhus pa zhes bya ba theg pa chen po'i mdo (ārya-brahma-visēṣacinti-pariprcchā-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra), in bka’ }\)’gyur (lha sa), TBRC W26071.59 (Lha sa: Zhol bka’ gyur par khang, [194-]), 72b.1-72b.5. The passage varies slightly:
The One-Gone-Thus’s compassion for sentient beings is generated due to [the consideration] “Whereas all phenomena are without proliferations, sentient beings like proliferations.” The One-Gone-Thus’s compassion for sentient beings is generated due to [the consideration] “Whereas all phenomena are empty, sentient beings adhere to views [of inherent existence].” The One-Gone-Thus’s compassion for sentient beings is generated due to [the consideration] “Whereas all phenomena are signless, sentient beings engage in signs.” The One-Gone-Thus’s compassion for sentient beings is generated due to [the consideration] “Whereas all phenomena are wishless, sentient beings engage in wishes.”
You cannot accept [that the aforementioned modes of generating compassion as stated earlier in the Cloud of Jewels Sūtra and the Questions of King Dhāranīśvara Sūtra are not logically feasible] because there are many such passages in the Sūtra on the Ten Grounds and so forth. Also, it is because Khay-drub Ge-leg-pal-sang’s Compilation on Emptiness [Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate] says:a

Although that awareness does not see something as truly existent, it is not necessary that in the perspective of that [awareness] seeing it as truly existent by other awarenesses does not exist.

Therefore, it follows that mere appearance to an awareness does not entail apprehension and comprehension because although forms and so forth appear as truly existent to the pristine wisdoms subsequent to meditative equipoise of the three persons, [these forms and so forth] are not apprehended as truly existent [by those consciousnesses], because Khay-drub Ge-leg-pal-sang’s Compilation on Emptiness [Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate] says:b

The meaning of this in [Chandrakīrti’s] commentary [cited next] is: The veiling awareness in the perspective of which something is true and hence is posited as a veil truth does not exist in the continuums of those [three] Superiors because since they have entirely abandoned apprehensions of true existence, they see forms and so forth as mere veilings and never see them as truly existent.

and Chandrakīrti’s Autocommentary says:c

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a Compilation on Emptiness, 616.6.
b Compilation on Emptiness, 616.4–616.6.
c La Vallée Poussin, Madhyamakāvatāra, 107.19–108.3.
Those, moreover, for Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and Bodhisattvas who have abandoned afflicting ignorance and who see compositional phenomena as like existents such as reflections and so forth have a fabricated nature and are not truths because they have no conceit of them as true.

and Tsong-kha-pa’s *Illumination of the Thought* (below, 171) says:¹

[...]direct realization that all compounded phenomena are empty of inherent existence but appear to be inherently existent, like reflections, is one qualification.

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¹ *Illumination of the Thought*, 110a.1-110a.2. With more context:

There are three persons in the perspective of whom these are not truths [that is, do not exist the way they appear]—Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and Bodhisattvas. Furthermore, because [Chandrakīrti] does not take these to be just any Hearers, Solitary Realizers, or Bodhisattvas, he mentions qualifications [“who have abandoned afflicting ignorance and who see compositional phenomena as like reflections and so forth”]; direct realization that all compounded phenomena are empty of inherent existence but appear to be inherently existent, like reflections, is one qualification. Since even Bodhisattvas on the seventh ground and below as well as Hearers and Solitary Realizers who are Learner Superiors have merely this [direct realization], in order to eliminate them [Chandrakīrti] says of the three persons that they “have abandoned ignorance.” Hence, the three persons are to be taken as Bodhisattvas on the pure grounds [that is, on the eighth, ninth, and tenth grounds] and the two Foe Destroyers, Hearer and Solitary Realizer. [Compositional phenomena] are not truths in the perspective of those three.
15. Someone says: It follows that even an omniscient consciousness has the illusion-like composite of the two, forms and so forth appearance as truly existent but emptiness of that [true existence] because of the three persons (Hearer and Solitary Realizer Foe Destroyers and Bodhisattvas on the pure grounds) having that [illusion-like composite of the two—forms

\[\text{a Or, “That Khay-drub’s Compilation on Emptiness, Chandrakirti’s Autocommentary, and Tsong-kha-pa’s Illumination of the Thought say these entails that although forms and so forth appear as truly existent to the pristine wisdoms subsequent to meditative equipoise of the three persons, these forms and so forth are not apprehended as truly existent by those consciousnesses.”}\]

\[\text{b 2011 TBRC bla brang, 268a.4; 2015 Go-mang Lhasa, 196b.7; 2007 Taipei codex reprint, 363.7.}\]
and so forth appearance as truly existent but emptiness of that (true existence)].

Our response: [That the three persons (Hearer and Solitary Realizer Foe Destroyers and Bodhisattvas on the pure grounds) have an illusion-like composite of the two—forms and so forth appearance as truly existent but emptiness of that (true existence)] does not entail [that even an omniscient consciousness has the illusion-like composite of the two, forms and so forth appearance as truly existent but emptiness of that (true existence).] You cannot accept [that even an omniscient consciousness has the illusion-like composite of the two, forms and so forth appearance as truly existent but emptiness of that [true existence] because that the three persons (Hearer and Solitary Realizer Foe Destroyers and Bodhisattvas on the pure grounds) come to have such a composite is through the force of the predispositions of ignorance, but all mistake has been extinguished in Buddha Superiors.

It follows [that the three persons come to have such a composite is through
the force of the predispositions of ignorance, but all mistake has been extinguished in Buddha Superiors] because although by reason of [all mistake having been extinguished in Buddha Superiors] phenomena [such as pots and so forth] do not appear as truly existent to Buddha Superiors, the appearance [to others] of phenomena [such as pots and so forth] as truly existent does appear [to Buddha Superiors]. It follows [although by reason of that phenomena do not appear as truly existent to Buddha Superiors, the appearance (to others) of phenomena as truly existent does appear (to Buddha Superiors)] because it is explained that Buddha Superiors have no conceptuality since they do not have the causes of mistake—the “movement of minds,” the wind that is the producer of conceptuality.a It follows [that Buddha Superiors have no conceptuality since they do not have the causes of mistake—the “movement of minds,” the wind that is the producer of conceptuality] because Chandrakīrti’s Autocommentary (above, 35) says:b

It is asserted that because of being manifestly and completely enlightened regarding all phenomena in all aspects, in Buddhas the movement of minds and mental factors has utterly vanished.

a Tsong-kha-pa’s Illumination of the Thought (below, 194) simply says, “The ‘movement of minds and mental factors’ is asserted to be conceptuality.” The idea that “movement” refers to the movement of winds appears to be Jam-yang-shay-pa’s own explanation; in tantra, consciousnesses are mounted on, or based in, material energies called “winds.” The Lo-sal-ling ge-she Pal-dan-drag-pa criticizes Jam-yang-shay-pa on this point for an unwarranted mixing of sūtra and tantra systems; the Lo-sal-ling khan-sur Pad-ma-gyal-tshan (352.2–5), on the other hand, points out that since there is no matter whatsoever (and therefore no coarse material wind) in the continuum of a Buddha, Jam-yang-shay-pa’s idea deserves consideration. Even a Buddha has the very subtle wind that is the mount of the mind of clear light.

b La Vallée Poussin, Madhyamakāvatāra, 108.9-108.11.
 анализируя индивидуальные существа двух истины

لا توجد معلومات يمكن قراءتها بشكل طبيعي من الصورة المقدمة.
PART TWO:
Tsong-kha-pa’s
ILLUMINATION
OF THE THOUGHT:
On the Two Truths
Translated and annotated by Jeffrey Hopkins

Extensive Explanation of the Great Treatise (Chandrakīrti’s) “Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle’”: Illumination of the Thought

Commenting on chapter six of Chandrakīrti’s Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle,” stanzas 22-29
I. ABANDONING DAMAGE BY THE WORLD TO THE REFUTATION OF PRODUCTION FROM OTHER {2 PARTS}

This has two parts: abandoning damage by the world [to the refutation of production from other] upon the assertion of production from other by worldly renown and abandoning damage [to the refutation of production from other] by the fact that production from other does not exist even in the conventions of the world.

A. ABANDONING DAMAGE [TO THE REFUTATION OF PRODUCTION FROM OTHER] UPON THE ASSERTION OF PRODUCTION FROM OTHER BY WORLDLY RENOWN {2 PARTS}

This has two parts: an objection that there is damage by the world and the answer that there is no damage by that [world].

1. Objection that there is damage by the world [to the refutation of production from other]
[Objection:] Since those reasonings propounded for the sake of establishing production from other are entirely burned away by the fire of your intelligence like dry fuel sprinkled with ghee, this lighting of the fuel of reasoning blazing the fire of your wisdom is sufficient, but lighting it now is not needed.

Well, is it not that the aim of the assertion of production from other is not accomplished without a demonstration of reasoning?

It is not so; with regard to what is established from within the world there is no use for other reasons because worldly perception is very powerful.

Added to Tsong-kha-pa’s text: To explain this, Chandrakīrti’s “Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle’” (VI.22) says: a

[Objection:] Since [all worldly beings] abiding in their own view assert as valid [what] the world [sees],

What is the use of propounding reasoning for this!

The world realizes that other arises from other;

Therefore what is the need for reasoning about this existence of production from other!

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a Tsong-kha-pa does not cite the root text, Chandrakīrti’s Supplement itself; rather, he immediately provides commentary on it; the root text is added to the translation for the sake of convenience. La Vallée Poussin, Madhyamakāvatāra, 101.11-101.14; Illumination of the Thought, Sarnath 2009, 211.13-211.16.
Since all worldly beings abiding in only their own view assert as valid the world’s perceptions, they are very powerful, and the world directly realizes that from inherently established other causes other effects arise. When reasoned proofs are stated, from between the two—the manifest and the nonmanifest—they are stated for the second [the nonmanifest], whereas because the first [the manifest] are established by direct perception, logical proofs are not stated. Hence, for this existence of production from other, what is the use of propounding other reasoning proving that it exists! Therefore, since even without other logic proving production from other, production of things from other is established, what is the need for demonstrating other reasoning about this existence of production from other! That is, there is no use because [the existence of production from other] is manifestly established.
Those who depend on the loose, that is, frivolous, talk of damage by the world:

- who have not nonerroneously realized the meaning of the high sayings
- and who have been devoid of again and again hearing about the mode of the absence of inherent existence, this being the method of separating, or causes of separation, from the friend acquainted with over a long period—the manifest adherence to the true establishment of things that has arisen from the ripening of predispositions deposited from beginningless cyclic existence for the apprehension of things as truly established—

cannot counteract the loose talk of damage by the world without explaining many situations of the world, and hence they need to be taught the distinctive objects damaged by the world, “Such-and-such objects are damaged by the world,” and the distinctive objects not damaged by the world, “Such-and-such objects are not damaged by the world.” For this, it is necessary as a prerequisite to teach the distinctions of the two truths, concerning which there are five parts: a general presentation of the two truths, applying this to the meaning at this point, explaining the individual natures of the two truths, indicating the means of damaging damage by the world to refutation [of production from other], and indicating the mode of damage when there is damage by the world.
Abandoning Damage by the World

a. General Presentation of the Two Truths {4 parts}

This has four parts: (1) expressing that because of being divided into two truths, phenomena each have two natures, (2) indicating other presentations about the two truths, (3) explaining the divisions of conventionalites relative to the world, and (4) showing that the conceived object, with respect to which [a wrong consciousness] is mistaken, does not exist even in conventional terms.
1) EXPRESSING THAT BECAUSE PHENOMENA ARE DIVIDED INTO TWO TRUTHS, PHENOMENA EACH HAVE TWO NATURES

Added to Tsong-kha-pa’s text: Chandrakīrti’s Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle” (VI.23ab) says:

[Buddha] said that all things hold two natures,
Those found by perceptions of reality and of falsities—

Concerning this, the Supramundane Victors, unerringly knowing the natures of the two truths, teach that every, all, things—internal things such as the compositional factor of intention and external things such as sprouts hold two aspects of natures. What are these? Natures that are veil truths and natures that are ultimate truths.

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VI.23ab; Toh. 3861, vol. ‘a, 205a.5-205a.6; La Vallée Poussin, Madhyamakāvatāra, 102.8-102.9; La Vallée Poussin, “Introduction au traité du milieu,” Muséon 11 (1910): 299.
This indicates that when the natures of one thing, such as a sprout, are divided, there are two natures, veilings (kun rdzob, samvr̥ti) and the ultimate, but this does not at all indicate that just a single entity of a sprout is the two truths in relation to common beings and Superiors.\(^a\) Taken that way, since there is no occurrence of a phenomenon lacking a nature, whatever are established bases [that is, are existents] do not pass beyond being either one nature or different natures [or one entity or different entities], and although natures are asserted to exist, it is not contradictory that an inherently established nature [or, more literally, nature established by way of its own nature (rang bzhin gyis grub pa’i ngo bo)] does not exist.

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\(^a\) That is, this does not at all indicate that just the single entity of a sprout is a veil truth in relation to common beings and is an ultimate truth in relation to Superiors.

forth finds its own naturea through being the object itself of a specific pristine wisdom of those who directly see the meaning of reality [that is, emptiness]; it is not established by way of its own selfness (rang gi bdag nyid kyi s ma grub pa). This is one of the two natures being explained.

[An ultimate truth] is not found by just any pristine wisdom of a Superior; rather, [it is found by] a “specific pristine wisdom” which is taken to be a specific, or particular, type of pristine wisdom. It is found, moreover, by a pristine wisdom comprehending the mode [of being of phenomena, emptiness]. Since [Chandrakīrti] has indicated that [ultimate truth] is found, or established, by that pristine wisdom, in order to refute the apprehension that “If something is established by that pristine wisdom, it is truly established,” he says, “It is not established by way of its own selfness.” Hence, those who propound that:

It is the system of this master that if a pristine wisdom of meditative equipoise comprehended ultimate truth, ultimate truth would be truly established and that, therefore, the ultimate truth is not an object of knowledge.b

have not at all realized the meaning of [Chandrakīrti’s] explanation that although [ultimate truth] is found by meditative equipoise, it is not truly established; they cause the degeneration of a wise being’s system [by claiming that the ultimate is not an object of knowledge]!

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a bdag gi rang gi ngo bo.
b The opponent here is not Döl-po-pa Shay-rab-gyal-tshan, who holds that the ultimate is an object of knowledge and, being the ultimate, must also be ultimately established.
The nature of veilings [or conventionalites], which is other than the ultimate, finds the existence of its own entity through the force of perceptions of falsities by common beings whose eyes of awareness are entirely covered over by the darkening films of ignorance. Their own nature does not exist in accordance with how it appears to be established by way of its own character as an object seen by childish beings. This is one of the two natures.

[Chandrakīrti’s] statement thus that, as regards the finding of ultimate truths, the finders are Superiors is made in consideration that the main [of

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a kun rdzob.
b rab rib kyi ling tog.
c Beings on the path of seeing and above.
those who realize ultimate truths] are Superiors. However, he is not asserting that [ultimate truths] are not also found by common beings who possess the Middle Way view in their [mental] continuums.a

Also, as regards the finding of veilings, [Chandrakīrti’s] statement that [the finders] are usual (rang dga’ ba) common beings is made in consideration that they are the main perceivers of external and internal things—illustrations of veilings—through being under the outside-influence (gzhan dbang, literally “other-power”) of ignorance. He is not asserting that these things are not found by conventional valid cognitions in the continuums of Superiors.b

The finding [that is, realization] of pots and so forth, which are illustrations of veil truths, does indeed occur among those who have not found the view of the Middle Way; however, in order to find with valid cognition

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a. A conceptual cognition of emptiness while still a common being—that is to say, while on the path of accumulation and path of preparation or even prior to any of the five paths—is also a finding, or realization, of emptiness.

b. This and the previous paragraph counter Döl-po-pa Shay-rab-gyal-tshan’s position presented in his Mountain Doctrine, 532-534, for instance:

The Buddhāvatamsaka Sūtra says that those having and not having special insight have good and bad appearances [respectively] and that what appear to those without special insight do not appear to those with special insight:

What are seen by those without special insight
Are the bad sights of phenomena.
When special insight sees,
All are not seen.
that a substratum is a veil truth [that is, to recognize an object as a veil truth], one definitely must have first found the view of the Middle Way because if a substratum has been established as a veil truth, it must be established as a falsity, and to actually establish that a substratum is a falsity, it is necessary first to refute with valid cognition that it is truly established.\(^a\) Therefore, with respect to [Chandrakīrti’s saying that “The other finds the existence of its own entity] through the force of the perceptions of falsities [by common beings],” although those usual persons see falsities, they do not necessarily establish them as falsities. This is like the fact, for example, that when an audience at a magic show sees an illusory horse or elephant, although they see falsities, they do not necessarily establish those appearances as falsities. Therefore, the meaning of being found by a perceiver of falsities that posits it as a veil truth is to be found by a conventional valid cognition that comprehends a false object of knowledge, a deceptive object [but does not necessarily realize it as a false object of knowledge, a deceptive object].

\(^a\) In simpler English, substituting “something” for “substratum”: 

In order to find with valid cognition that something is a veil truth [that is, to recognize it as a veil truth], one definitely must have first found the view of the Middle Way because if something has been established as a veil truth, it must be established as a falsity, and to actually establish that something is a falsity, it is necessary first to refute with valid cognition that it is truly established.
Furthermore, from between those two natures, or entities, described above, that object found by a rational consciousness perceiving, that is, comprehending, the meaning of reality is suchness, ultimate truth; it will be explained [below in stanza VI.29] at the point of “by the force of eye-disease” and so forth. [An object] found by a conventional valid cognition perceiving a false object of knowledge is a veil truth. That is what the Teacher [Buddha] said; he spoke of an ultimate and a veiling as two separate bases [that is, objects] that are found [by their respective valid cognitions]; it is not that there are two ways of finding a single [object].

2) INDICATING OTHER PRESENTATIONS ABOUT THE TWO TRUTHS {5 PARTS}
A) [Basis of Division of the Two Truths]

Although with regard to the basis of division of the two truths there indeed are many different modes of assertion, here it is taken to be objects of knowledge. The Meeting of Father and Son Sūtra, cited in Shāntideva’s Compendium of Instructions, says:

It is thus: Ones-Gone-Thus thoroughly understand the two, veiling and ultimates. Furthermore, objects of knowledge are exhausted as these veil truths and ultimate truths. Moreover, because Ones-Gone-Thus have thoroughly perceived, known, and actualized well these as [having the aspect of] emptiness, they are called “omniscient.”

Because [the sūtra] says “Furthermore, objects of knowledge,” objects of knowledge are the basis of division [into the two truths], and because it says “are exhausted as these,” the number is limited to the two truths, and because Ones-Gone-Thus thoroughly understand both truths, they are indicated as being omniscient. Therefore, that the thought of Shāntideva’s Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds is that ultimate truths are not objects of knowledge and that [ultimate truths] are not realized by any awareness.

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a That is to say, what is being divided into the two truths. For Jam-yang-shay-pa’s list of six incorrect assertions on the basis of division, see above, 42, and Hopkins, Meditation on Emptiness, 400-403 and 405-421, and Hopkins, Maps of the Profound, 894ff.

b shes bya, jñeya.

c yab dang sras mjal ba’i mdo, pitāputrasaṃgamasūtra; P760.16, vol. 23; Toh. 60, vol. nga (dkon brtsegs), 60b.4-60b.5.

d bslab pa kun las btus pa, śikṣāsamuccaya; Toh. 3940, vol. khi, 142b.3-142b.4; Sanskrit text, which leaves out the first sentence, in Bendall, Čikṣāsamuccaya, 256: etāvaccaitaṃ jñeyam / yaduta samvṛtiḥ paramārthaśca / tacca bhagavatā śāntataḥ sudṛṣṭaṃ susāśākrtaṃ / tene sa sarvajña ityucyaṃ / / English translation in Bendall and Rouse, Śikṣā Samuccaya, 236.

d shes par bya ba; or “those that are to be known.”

e The bracketed addition is taken from Tsong-kha-pa’s commentary below (139). Without the addition, the passage seems to say that a Buddha is called omniscient only because of having thoroughly realized emptiness; by taking the word emptiness as a bahuvrhi compound meaning “those which have emptiness” or “those having the aspect of emptiness” the term comes to refer to all those that are empty and thus all veil truths and ultimate truths. The addition does indeed seem strained, but the sūtra itself, just above, speaks of both truths.
are wrong explanations.\(^a\)

The twofold division into veil truths and ultimate truths are the natures into which [objects of knowledge] are divided.

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\(^a\) See below, 136.
C) [MEANING OF THE DIVISION]

Although there are also many different [opinions] regarding the meaning of the division [that is, the relationship between the two divisions], here both [veil truths and ultimate truths] have entities, and since there is nothing that is not either one entity or different entities and since if the attribute-possessors\textsuperscript{a} were different entities from [their respective] emptinesses of true existence, they would be truly established, [the two truths] are one entity but different isolates\textsuperscript{b} [that is, one entity but conceptually isolatable], like product and impermanent thing; Nāgārjuna’s *Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment* says:\textsuperscript{c}

Suchness is not observed
As a different [entity] from veilings.
Veilings are described as emptiness [that is, as empty of inherent existence]
And just emptiness is [posited with respect to] veiling
Because of the definiteness that [the one] would not occur without [the other],
Like product and impermanent thing.

The meaning of the first four lines is that suchnesses do not exist as different entities from veilings because veilings are empty of true [existence] and because emptinesses of true [existence] also are posited with respect to veiling, which are [their] bases. Then the next two lines indicate that:

• it is thus, and the relationship that if the one does not exist, the other does not occur is definite
• and moreover since this is a relationship of the same essence, [the two truths] are the same entity like product and impermanent thing.\textsuperscript{d}

\textsuperscript{a} chos can, which literally is “those possessing the attribute [of emptiness],” that is to say, the substrata of emptiness, all phenomena.

\textsuperscript{b} ngo bo gcig la ldog pa tha dad pa.

\textsuperscript{c} Stanzas 67cd-68; Lindtner, *Master of Wisdom*, 54; the brackets in the stanzas are from Tsong-kha-pa’s commentary following the citation.

\textsuperscript{d} For Jam-yang-shay-pa’s and Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s treatment of other assertions about the relationship of the two truths, see Hopkins, *Maps of the Profound*, 896-902.
D) **[IDENTIFYING THE INDIVIDUAL DIVISIONS]**

The identifications of the individual divisions are, as set forth earlier in their individual definitions, that they are found by the two valid cognitions.

**Question:** If you are harmoniously explaining this [work by Chandrakīrti] and Shāntideva’s *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds*, then how do you explain this statement in Shāntideva’s *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds*: a

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a Stanza IX.2; Toh. 3871, *dbu ma*, vol. la, 31a.1; Sanskrit in Swami Dwarika Das Shastri, *Bodhicaryāvatāra of Ārya Śāntideva with the Commentary Pañjikā of Shri Prajñākaramati* (Varanasi: Bauddda Bharati, 1988), 267: saṃvṛttīḥ paramārthaśca satyādvaṣayamidaṃ matam / buddheragocarastattvam buddhiḥ saṃvṛttirucyate //.
Veilings and ultimates,
These are asserted as the two truths.
The ultimate is not an object of activity of an awareness.
Awarenesses are said to be veilings.

*Answer:* In that, the first two lines indicate the divisions of the two truths, and [then] when identifying the natures of the individual divisions, [Shāntideva] indicates an identification of ultimate truths by one [line beginning with] “The ultimate,” and an identification of veil truths by one [line having] “veilings” [in it].

The assertion that [from between those two lines] the former [“The ultimate is not an object of activity of an awareness”] sets the thesis that an ultimate truth is not an object of an awareness and that the latter line [“Awarenesses are said to be veilings”] proves this thesis does not at all appear to be the meaning of those passages. Therefore, with respect to this identification of the two truths, Shāntideva is stating in his *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* the meaning of a statement in the *Meeting of Father*.

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*a* Jam-yang-shay-pa’s *Great Exposition of the Middle* (above, 57) identifies one such scholar as Tö-lung-gya-mar (stod lung rgya dmar ba byang chub grags, eleventh-twelfth century; he was one of Cha-pa Chö-kyi-seng-ge’s (phya pa chos kyi seng ge; 1109-1169) teachers of the Middle Way School and of logic and epistemology.
and *Son Sūtra*\(^a\) that he quoted in his *Compendium of Instructions*:\(^b\)

The One-Gone-Thus sees veilings as the province of the world. That which is ultimate is inexpressible, is not an object of knowledge, is not an object of individual consciousness, is not an object of thorough knowledge, is undemonstrable.

and so forth. Concerning that, the meaning of the explanation that the ultimate truth is not an object of knowledge is that it is not an object of an awareness according to the explanation below (215) of the meaning of a passage cited [by Chandrakīrti] from the *Introduction to the Two Truths Sūtra*.\(^c\)

\[^a\] yab dang sras mjal ba’i mdo, pitāпутрасамаoundingāmasūtra, P760.16, vol. 23; Toh. 60, vol. nga (dkon brtsegs), 60b.5.

\[^b\] Toh. 3940, dbu ma, vol. kḥi, 142b.4-142b.5; Sanskrit in Bendall, Čikṣāsambuccaya, 256.5: *tatra samvṛtirlokapracāratastathāgatena drṣṭā / yah punah paramārthaḥ so 'nabhilāpyah / anājeyo 'vijeyo 'deśito 'prakāśito*. English translation in Bendall and Rouse, Sīkṣā Samuccaya, 236.

\[^c\] As Ngag-wang-pal-dan (Explanation of Veilings and Ultimates in the Four Systems of Tenets, 111.6/56a.6) encapsulates this:

[Shāntideva] is saying that an ultimate truth is a phenomenon that is not an object of activity of a directly perceiving awareness having dualistic appearance and that a phenomenon that is an object of activity of directly perceiving awareness having dualistic appearance is a veil truth.
If the meaning of [Shāntideva’s statement that the ultimate is not an object of an awareness] is not posited that way but instead [is taken to mean that the ultimate] is not an object of any awareness, this would contradict the explanation [in the Meeting of Father and Son Sūtra cited above] that a Victor is posited as omniscient because of having actualized all that have the aspect of emptiness, veilings and ultimates. This will also be explained more below.

[Shāntideva’s] identification of veil truths does not mean that simply awareneses are posited as veil truths; rather, they are objects of awarenesses. Moreover, since [the Meeting of Father and Son Sūtra] speaks of those [objects of awarenesses] as the province of the world (jig rten gyi spyod pa), they are objects found within the province, that is, as objects of activity (spyod yul), of worldly, that is, conventional, consciousnesses comprehending falsities. Hence, the meaning of [Shāntideva’s] assertion that objects of awarenesses are veilings is to be taken in that way.
E) [DEFINITIVE ENUMERATION AS ONLY TWO TRUTHS]

The division of objects of knowledge into the two truths indicates that objects of knowledge are limited to those two. Scriptures for this are the Meeting of Father and Son Sūtra, quoted earlier (133), and also the Superior Sūtra of the Meditative Stabilization Definitely Revealing Suchness which clearly says:\(^a\)

The veiling and likewise the ultimate—
There is not at all a third truth.

and Chandrakīrti’s Autocommentary on the “Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle,’” also says that all the many with the name “truth” that are mentioned in the Sūtra on the Ten Grounds are included in the two truths:\(^b\)

Similarly, any other truth that exists at all is also to be ascertained as only included within the two truths.

and he explains that the truth of differentiated realization mentioned there [in the Sūtra on the Ten Grounds] is the presentation of the aggregates, constituents, and sense-spheres. Therefore, this master [Chandrakīrti] also asserts that [objects of knowledge] are limited to the two truths.

\(^a\) de kho na nyid nges par bs tan pa’i ting nge ‘dzin, tattvani ādeśasamādhi. Cited in Chandrakīrti’s Commentary on the “Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle,’” commenting on stanza VI.80; Toh. 3682, dbyu ma, vol. ‘a, 243a.4; La Vallée Poussin, Madhyamakāvatāra, 175.11-175.12; La Vallée Poussin, “Introduction au traité du milieu,” Muséon 11 (1910): 356.

\(^b\) In his commentary on stanza V.1c; Toh. 3862, dbyu ma, vol. ‘a, 243b.1; La Vallée Poussin, Madhyamakāvatāra, 71.5-71.7; La Vallée Poussin, “Introduction au traité du milieu,” Muséon 8 (1907): 313.
The reasoning\(^a\) [why there are only two truths] is that if a certain base [that is, an object] is inclusionarily distinguished as a falsity, a deceptive object, then it must be exclusionarily eliminated that it is a non-deceptive object. Jam-yang-shay-pa explains in his *Great Exposition of Tenets* how a third category is eliminated (Hopkins, *Maps of the Profound*, 895-896):

Further, objects of knowledge have those two categories, and this is a definite number eliminating a third category that is not either of those two:

- because, within the context of objects of knowledge, if something is established as any one of the two truths—for instance, an ultimate truth—then it is perforce blocked in an exclusionary way from being the other one, that is, a veil truth, and if something is established as a veil truth, it is perforce blocked in an exclusionary way from being the other one, that is, an ultimate truth, and hence the two truths are explicit contradictories by way of mutual exclusion, and

- because if any one of the two truths were not existent, then all objects of knowledge would not be included in the truths, and it is established by both scripture and reasoning that a third and so forth truth that is not any of those two does not exist.

The determination of the count is not like mere inclusion into a count, as is the case with the Four [Buddha] Bodies, but is a definite count eliminating a third category...Hence, saying that Proponents of the Middle and Consequentialists have no explicit contradictions has been refuted earlier (612).

\(^a\) Jam-yang-shay-pa explains in his *Great Exposition of Tenets* how a third category is eliminated (Hopkins, *Maps of the Profound*, 895-896):
suchness, due to which the deceptive and the non-deceptive are dichotomous explicit contradictories. This being so, whatever is [a dichotomous pair] covers all objects of knowledge, whereby a further category that is both and a further category that is neither are eliminated. It is as Kامalashila’s *Illumination of the Middle* says:

Phenomena\(^b\) that have the character of being a dichotomy are such that if something is refuted to be the one and it is not established to be the other, then it does not exist. Therefore, it also is not reasonable to think of it as in a class that is neither of those two.

and:

Two that are such that something does not exist if it is neither [of them]\(^c\) have the character of being a dichotomy. Those that have the character of being a dichotomy cover all aspects [that is, whatever exists is either one or the other]. Those that cover all aspects eliminate other categories; examples are, for instance, particular [pairs] such as the physical and the non-physical,\(^d\) and so forth.

This is also to be understood with respect to all other explicit contradictories [that is, dichotomies].

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\(^a\) Toh. 3887, *dbu ma*, vol. *sa*, 191a.4-191a.5 and 219a.1-219a.2.

\(^b\) *chos dag*: in this the *dag* ending could be dual since this is its strict usage, in which case the translation should read “two phenomena.”

\(^c\) *gang zhih yongs su gcod pa gang rnam par bcad pa med na med pa de gnyis*; the translation is loose.

\(^d\) *lus can dang lus can ma yin pa*. 
If there were no dichotomies excluding a third category to be had, there would be no way to make a refutation with analysis that limits the possibilities to two—[asking] whether it is asserted that something exists or does not exist, or is one or many, and so forth. If there are [dichotomies that exclude a third category], then when something is refuted as being one side of a dichotomy and it is not established as the other, it does not exist; therefore, to say that there are no explicit contradictories in the Middle Way Consequence School is a case of not having formed [understanding of] the presentation of refutation [of mistakes] and presentation [of one’s own system]. The Middle Way Autonomy School and the Middle Way Consequence School do not differ with respect to [asserting] that [within existents] if something is exclusionarily eliminated as being one side of a dichotomy, it must be inclusionarily distinguished as the other and that if one is refuted, the other must be established.

a \textit{dgag ge\textasciitilde{hag} gi rnam ge\textasciitilde{hag}.}
3) EXPLAINING THE DIVISIONS OF VEILINGS
RELATIVE TO THE WORLD

Among veilings there are two, objects and subjects, and initially [Chandrakīrti] indicates that in relation to worldly consciousnesses, a subjects are twofold, right and wrong:

Also, those that perceive falsities are asserted as twofold—

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a jig rten pa'i shes pa la ltos nas, whereas jig rten pa'i shes pa la ltos te is translated as “relative to worldly consciousnesses.”

b yang dag pa dang log pa. With regard to subjects I translate these terms as “right and wrong,” and with regard to objects, as “real and unreal.” For interesting distinctions on these topics, see Hopkins, Maps of the Profound, 907-911.

c Stanza VI.24; Toh. 3861, dbu ma, vol. a, 205a.6-205a.7; La Vallée Poussin, Madhyamakāvatāra, 103.11-103.14; La Vallée Poussin, “Introduction au traité du milieu,” Muséon 11 (1910): 300.
Those with clear sense powers and those having defective sense powers.

Consciousnesses of those having defective sense powers are asserted
as wrong in relation to those having good sense powers.

Not only are objects of knowledge divided into the two truths, but also subjects perceiving falsities are asserted as twofold, right and wrong:

1. clear sense powers, that is to say, sense powers that are not polluted by superficial causes of mistake and the consciousnesses that depend on them
2. defective sense powers, that is to say, subjects [consciousnesses] that are polluted by superficial causes of mistake.

Concerning those, the polluted consciousnesses of those having defective sense powers are asserted to be wrong consciousnesses in relation to consciousnesses having good sense powers, that is, not polluted by superficial causes of mistake. The former [that is, those with clear sense powers] are asserted to apprehend nonerroneous objects. Moreover, those two distinctions are not the Middle Way system but are in relation to worldly consciousnesses.
[Chandrakīrti] indicates that just as subjects are divided into two, erroneous and nonerroneous, so objects also are:

Objects realized by the world that are apprehended by the consciousnesses of the six sense powers undamaged by superficial causes of mistake are true [or real] just from the world [because of being phenomena that prior to realizing emptiness cannot be realized to be a combination of appearing to be inherently existent but being empty of such]. The rest [that is, those apprehended by sense consciousnesses damaged by superficial causes of mistake such as reflections, echoes, and so forth] are posited as unreal from just the world [that is, relative to the world].

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true, that is, real, from just—a—that is to say, only—the world; however, it is not that those objects are posited as true and real upon reliance on a superior. “Superior” and “Middle Way system” [in the last sentence of the previous paragraph] have similar meanings here.

The rest—that is to say, reflections and so forth—which appear as objects when sense powers are damaged are posited as being unreal in relation to just the world. The word “just” indicates that to posit those consciousnesses as mistaken just a conventional valid cognition is sufficient; such does not rely on a rational consciousness [realizing emptiness].

About that, internal conditions that damage sense powers are eye disease, jaundice, and so forth as well as having eaten da du ra and so

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a nyid.
b kho na.
c nyid.
d rab rib, likely a disease giving rise to seeing floaters and spots.
e mig ser.
f La Vallée Poussin, “Introduction au traité du milieu,” Muséon 11 (1910): 301, n.3, questions the reading, saying that M. Max Walleser suggests dārdu. Tsong-kha-pa glosses da du ra as thang-phrom, which is also spelled thang khrom. The latter is identified as dhūṣṭūra
Da du ra is thorn-apple; when its fruit has been eaten, all appears to be golden. “And so forth” includes contagion and the like. External conditions that damage sense powers are mirrors, sounds spoken from within caves, the rays of the summer sun impinging on white sand, and so forth; even though there might be no internal conditions damaging the sense powers, those serve as causes for apprehending, respectively, reflections, echoes, water in mirages, and so forth. Mantras and medicines used by magicians and so forth also should be understood similarly [as cases of external causes of mistake].

Damage to the mental sense power are those mantras, medicines, and

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in Sarat Chandra Das’s *Tibetan-English Dictionary*, 568.

a thang phrom.
b sos ka; this is variously translated as “spring” or “summer”; the reference is to the hot season before the summer rains descend.
c Ngag-wang-leg-dan identified this medicine as a salve that a magician puts on a stick or pebble that serves as the basis of conjuring and which, upon the casting of a mantra, then appears to be an elephant, and so forth.
so forth and wrong tenets, quasi-reasons, sleep, and so forth. Since [Chandrakīrti] says that sleep damages the mind from among the six sense powers, it is hugely wrong to explain that this master asserts that sense consciousnesses exist in dreams. [Chandrakīrti describes the superficial causes of mistake that damage the mental consciousness this way, and] thus the damage of being polluted by the ignorance consisting of the two apprehensions of self, which have operated beginninglessly, and so forth, is not held to be a cause of damage here [in this context]; rather, the superficial causes of mistake that damage sense powers as explained above are to be held [as the causes of damage].

The positing of a veiling object—apprehended by [any of] the six consciousnesses without such damage—as real and the positing of an object opposite to that as unreal is done upon reliance on only worldly consciousnesses because those [respectively] are not damaged and are damaged by worldly consciousnesses with respect to those existing as objects in accordance with how they appear. They do not exist as the two, real and unreal, upon reliance on Superiors because just as reflections and so forth do not exist as objects in accordance with how they appear, so although blue and so forth appear to be established by way of their own character to those who possess ignorance, they do not exist as objects in accordance

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\(^{a}\) *gtan tshigs lai snang.*  
\(^{b}\) *yid.*
with how they appear. Therefore, these two consciousnesses [that is, a consciousness of a reflection and a consciousness to which blue appears to be established by way of its own character] are not divisible even in terms of being mistaken or not mistaken [since both are mistaken with respect to their appearing objects].

Objection: Even a usual worldly awareness indeed realizes that:

- due to the physical senses having superficial damage objects appear wrongly, and
- due to the mental consciousness having damage by sleep and so forth (1) with respect to appearances as humans and so forth there is erroneous apprehension of humans and so forth, and (2) when awake there is erroneous apprehension of horses and elephants in magical illusions of horses and elephants as well as erroneous apprehension of water in mirage-appearances as water.

However, since a usual worldly awareness does not realize that objects—apprehended wrongly due to the intellect having damage by bad tenets—are erroneous, how are they posited as unreal from just the world [as Chandrakīrti says]?
Answer: Here the damage that is analyzed as to whether or not there is damage is not taken to be damage by *innate* erroneous apprehension; therefore, those that are imputed by bad tenets [and are realized to be wrong by a worldly consciousness do not include the inherent existence that is innately misapprehended but] are the principal¹ and so forth, which are wrongly imputed only by those whose awarenesses have been affected by tenets. Although those are not realized to be erroneous by a usual worldly awareness, they are realized to be wrong by conventional valid cognition that is not directed toward suchness, in which case they are realized to be wrong by a worldly consciousness.

¹ *gtso bo, pradhāna;* also called the fundamental nature (*rang bzhin, prakṛti*) in the Sāṃkhya system.
The likes of objects that are apprehended by the two innate apprehensions of self are “objects apprehended by undamaged sense powers” [since they are apprehended by a mind damaged not by superficial but by deep causes of mistake]. However, although these are indeed real, or true, in relation to usual worldly thought, they do not exist even in conventional terms.

**Objection:** Since you do not assert real veilings, you do not divide [veilings] into real and unreal, but why do you not posit objects and subjects polluted by ignorance as unreal veilings?

**Answer:** It is because veilings must be posited by conventional valid cognition, and therefore even if [objects and subjects polluted by ignorance] were to be posited [as] unreal conventionalities, [such] would have to be posited upon reliance on those [conventional valid cognitions, but objects and subjects] polluted by the predispositions of ignorance are not established by conventional valid cognitions to be mistaken.a

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a Jam-yang-shay-pa explains this passage as meaning that objects and subjects affected by predispositions of ignorance and apprehended by consciousnesses that are not damaged by superficial causes of mistake “are not veilings that are unreal in relation to the perspective of the worldly consciousness that is explicitly indicated in this context” even though they are indeed unreal veilings, since all veilings are wrong in the sense that they appear one
4) SHOWING THAT THE CONCEIVED OBJECT, WITH RESPECT TO WHICH [A WRONG CONSCIOUSNESS] IS MISTAKEN, DOES NOT EXIST EVEN IN CONVENTIONAL TERMS

[Chandrakīrti] has indicated in general that, due to damage of the mind as just explained, [certain mental consciousnesses] are mistaken with respect to their conceived objects; now he explains just this meaning in the manner of expressing specific illustrations as examples:

Added to Tsong-kha-pa’s text: Chandrakīrti’s Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle” (VI.26) says:

Entities [such as a permanent self, principal, and so forth] as they are imputed by [the assertions of] Forders [driven by bad tenets and quasi-reasons],
Strongly affected by the sleep of ignorance,
And [those horses and elephants, water, and so forth] imputed to magical illusions, mirages, and so forth are just nonexistent even in [the conventions of] the world.

These [non-Buddhist] Forders, whose intellects are strongly affected by the sleep of ignorance—their minds damaged by erroneous bad tenets and quasi-reasons—wanting to enter into suchness, do not hold onto the non-erroneous production, disintegration, and so forth that are renowned to untrained beings such as herders, women, and so forth on up but instead want to rise above worldly beings, whereby they plunge into chasms of bad views with great pain like, for example, someone who, climbing a tree, releases the former branch without having grasped the next one; since they are bereft of good perception of the two truths, they will not attain the fruit, liberation. Therefore, entities such as the three qualities$^a$ as they are imputed by these Forders$^b$ in their respective texts do not exist even as worldly veilings. This refutes well the statement that what exists in the perspective of a mistaken awareness is posited as conventionally existing by this system.

$^a$ yon tan gsum, triguna. These are mental potency (snying stobs, sattva), activity (rdul, rajas), and darkness (mun pa, tamas); for a brief exposition of the Sāṃkhya system see Hopkins, Maps of the Profound, chapter three.

$^b$ Such as in the Sāṃkhya system.
Similarly, the horse or elephant that is imputed to a magical illusion, the water that is imputed to a mirage, the face that is imputed to a reflection, and so forth also just do not exist even from [the viewpoint of] worldly conventions. Thus, for something to exist in conventional terms, it must be established by valid cognition.

Although the conceived objects of such [wrong consciousnesses] do not exist even in conventional terms, such is not asserted with regard to their appearing objects. Since the appearance of the five [sense objects]—forms, sounds, and so forth—to sense consciousnesses now as if they are established by way of their own character is polluted by ignorance, those consciousnesses and sense consciousnesses to which reflections, echoes, and so on appear, except for a difference in mere subtlety and coarseness, do not differ as to whether they are mistaken or nonmistaken with respect to their appearing objects [since both are mistaken]. Blue and so forth that
are established by way of their own character and the existence of a reflection as a face do not occur, but just as a reflection, which does not exist as a face, exists, so although blue and so forth are not established by way of their own character, they must exist. Furthermore, just as [blue and so forth] exist as external objects, so reflections also are asserted as form-sense spheres [that is, reflections are forms that are objects of apprehension by an eye consciousness]; below,¹ [Chandrakīrti] also says that a reflection generates the sense consciousness to which it appears. Those facts also should be understood with respect to magical illusions in which there is an appearance as a horse or an elephant to the eye as well as with respect to echoes, and so forth; these are uncommon presentations by this excellent system.

b. Applying this to the meaning at this point

Added to Tsong-kha-pa’s text: Chandrakīrti’s Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle” (VI.27) says:¹

Just as the observations of an eye of one with eye disease
Do not damage a consciousness of one without eye disease,
An undefiled awareness is not damaged
By an awareness of one who has forsaken undefiled pristine wisdom.

Because the meaning of suchness is not posited by a conventional consciousness, the refutation of production from other is not done within abiding in only the world’s views; rather, it is refuted ultimately within having asserted the perception of suchness by Superiors. When it is the case that the qualification “ultimately” is affixed to this refutation of production from other, then just as the observations of falling hairs and so forth by a consciousness of one whose eyes have eye disease do not damage [that is, invalidate] the nonappearance of falling hairs and so forth to a consciousness that is not polluted with eye disease, so a common being’s awareness, polluted by ignorance, that has forsaken—that is, is devoid of—undefiled, uncontaminated, pristine wisdom does not damage an undefiled, uncontaminated awareness that is not polluted with ignorance. Therefore, even if it were allowed that [production from other] is established in the perspective of the world, [the world] would not damage [that production from

¹ Stanza VI.27; Toh. 3861, dbu ma, vol. ‘a, 205b.1-205b.2; La Vallée Poussin, Madhyamakāvatāra, 106.3-106.6; La Vallée Poussin, “Introduction au traité du milieu,” Muséon 11 (1910): 302-303.
other is refuted ultimately.\(^a\) Hence, the other side [that is, those who give up what is validly held in the world in order to rise above worldly beings but plunge into chasms of bad views]\(^b\) are fit to be laughed at by the excellent wise ones.

\(^a\) Tsong-kha-pa says “even if it were allowed” because Chandrakīrti in fact does not assert that the world uses designations such as production from other.

\(^b\) See above, 154, where Tsong-kha-pa says:

These [non-Buddhist] Forders, whose intellects are strongly affected by the sleep of ignorance—their minds damaged by erroneous bad tenets and quasi-reasons—wanting to enter into suchness, do not hold onto the non-erroneous production, disintegration, and so forth that are renowned to untrained persons such as herd-ers, women, and so forth on up but instead want to rise above worldly beings, whereby plunge into chasms of bad views with great pain like, for example, someone who, in climbing a tree, releases the lower branch without having grasped a higher one; since they are bereft of good perception of the two truths, they will not attain the fruit, liberation.
c. Explaining the individual natures of the two truths {2 parts}

This has two parts: description of veil truths and description of ultimate truths.

1) DESCRIPTION OF VEIL TRUTHS {3 parts}

This has three parts: (1) the veiling [consciousness] in the perspective of which these are truths and those [persons] in the perspective of whom these are not truths, (2) the ways in which mere veilings do and do not appear to the three persons, and (3) how there come to be ultimates and veilings relative to Superiors and common beings.

A) THE VEILING [CONSCIOUSNESS] IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF WHICH THESE ARE TRUTHS AND THOSE [PERSONS] IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF WHOM THESE ARE NOT TRUTHS {2 parts}

This has two parts: the actual meaning and an explanation of [the Consequence School’s] unique presentation of afflictive emotions.
1) Actual meaning of the veiling [consciousness] in the perspective of which these are truths and those [persons] in whose perspective these are not truths

Added to Tsong-kha-pa’s text: Chandrakīrti’s Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle” (VI.28) says:

The Subduer said that because bewilderment [that is, the apprehension of inherent existence] obscures [direct perception of] the nature [of the mode of subsistence of phenomena],
[This ignorance] is a veil (kun rdzob) and he said that those fabrications appearing
To be true due to this [ignorance] are veil truths (kun rdzob bden) [because of being true in the perspective of the veiling apprehension of inherent existence].
Things that are fabrications [exist] conventionally (kun rdzob tu).

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b The Four Interwoven Annotations (357.1) gives an etymology of kun rdzob:

Kun means “all of the nature of the mode of subsistence of phenomena” (chos kyi gnas lugs kyi rang bzhin kun), and rdzob means “obstructing” (sgrib pa) and “covering/veiling” (’gebs pa).
Because, through it, sentient beings are obstructed, that is to say, obscured, with respect to viewing the nature of how things abide, it is [called] bewilderment,\(^a\) that is to say, ignorance,\(^b\) which has an essence of obstructing\(^c\) perception of the nature that is the mode of being [of phenomena through] superimposing inherent existence on the entities of things that do not inherently exist—the veil (kun rdzob, samvṛti). This is an identification of the veiling [consciousness] (kun rdzob / kun rdzob pa, samvṛti) in the perspective of which “truth” in “veil truth” is posited; it is not an identification of kun rdzob pa (samvṛti) in general [which also is etymologized below as “conventionality” and “interdependent”].

Furthermore, that identification [in Chandrakīrti’s Supplement] is the meaning of the statement in the Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra that an aware-

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\(^a\) gti mug, moha. Although Sanskrit dictionaries gloss moha by “delusion,” this text does not describe it in these terms but as obstructing, or obscuring, and thus I translate the term as “bewilderment.”

\(^b\) ma rig pa, avidyā.

\(^c\) sgrībh pa.
ness making the mistake that what ultimately lacks inherent existence exists inherently is a veil (kun rdzob pa):

The production of things [exists] conventionally (kun rdzob tu, samvṛtyā);
Ultimately it lacks inherent existence.
That [consciousness] mistaken with regard to the lack of inherent existence
Is asserted as the veil of reality (yang dag kun rdzob, satyam samvṛti).

Since the Sanskrit original for “veil” (kun rdzob, samvṛti) [does not just mean “convention” but] is also used for “obstructor” (sgrib byed), this veil (kun rdzob, samvṛti) [in the final line] is an obstructor. What does it obstruct? Since [the sūtra] says that it is “the veil of reality (yang dag kun rdzob, satyam samvṛti),” it says that since it obstructs [perception of] the meaning of reality, it is asserted as a veiler, or an obstructor. It is not indicating that it is a right veiling (yang dag kun rdzob, tathya-samvṛti) from between the two [categories of veilings], right and wrong [veilings].

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^n lang kar gshegs pa’i mdo, laṅkāvatārāsūtra, stanza X.429; Sanskrit in Bunyiu Nanjio, Laṅkāvatārā Sūtra, 319: bhāvā vidyanti samvṛtyā paramārthe na bhāvakāḥ / niḥsvabhāvēṣu ya bhārīntastat satyam samvṛtir bhavet //. This sūtra passage is given above (Error! Bookmark not defined.), from Kamalashila’s citation of it, in elucidating the Autonomy School’s understanding of true existence.

^b Veilings, or conventional phenomena, are of two types relative to worldly consciousnesses—right/real veilings (yang dag kun rdzob) and unreal/wrong veilings (log pa’i kun rdzob). Unable to find a single, evocative translation equivalent of yang dag kun rdzob that would apply to both consciousnesses and objects, I use “right conventionality” and “wrong conventionality” for consciousnesses and “real conventionality” and “unreal conventionality” for objects. Since the Tibetan for “right conventionality” or “real conventionality” is yang dag kun rdzob and the Tibetan for “obscurer of reality” is also yang dag kun rdzob, the two can be confused, and thus Tsong-kha-pa is pointing out that
The [kun rdzob (samvyrti) translated as] “conventionally” indicated in the first line and the [kun rdzob (samvyrti) translated as] “veil” indicated in the last line should not be construed to be identical. For, the first is the conventional way in which we ourselves assert things to be produced and so forth, whereas the latter is the veil—[a consciousness] apprehending true existence—in the perspective of which things are true [that is, a consciousness taking things to exist the way they appear to inherently exist].

The Subduer said that those fabricated phenomena such as blue and so forth—appearing to sentient beings as true, which are fabricated to appear as inherently established through the force of that veil [consciousness] apprehending true existence although lacking inherent establishment—are true in the perspective of the worldly, erroneous, veil [consciousness] described above, and therefore, they are truths for worldly, veil [consciousness, namely, bewilderment]. The way he said this is what is set forth in the above sūtra [passage in the Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra].

here in the Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra the term yang dag kun rdzob means “obscurer of reality.”
Those fabricated things—which [even though they do not inherently exist] are fabricated by conceptuality [to appear to be inherently existent] and which are not truths in the perspective of the three persons [Hearer Foe Destroyers, Solitary Realizer Foe Destroyers, and Bodhisattvas on the eighth, ninth, and tenth grounds, called the three pure grounds]—are not truths in the perspective of their own veiling [consciousnesses since they are beyond such ignorance], and hence those [phenomena] are called “mere veilings” (kun rdzob tsam, samyrtimātra).

Let us explain the meaning of the statement [in Chandrakīrti’s Auto-commentary cited here in paraphrase]:

A few dependent-arisings such as reflections, echoes, and so forth appear as false even to those who have ignorance, whereas a few [dependent-arisings]—forms such as blue and so forth, minds, feelings, and so forth—appear as true; the nature that is the mode of being of phenomena does not appear in any way to those having ignorance. Therefore, that nature and whatever are false even conventionally are not veil truths.

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*a* La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra*, 107.11-107.17. For Chandrakīrti’s rang bzhin, Tsong-kha-pa (101.2-101.3) reads chos rnams kyi yin lugs kyi rang bzhin, and for Chandrakīrti’s de Tsong-kha-pa reads rang bzhin de; the changes make the passage easier to read, without distorting it. Tsong-kha-pa frequently does such with citations to improve on the reading of a translation.
In that, “a few”\textsuperscript{a} (\textit{cung zad cig}) is rendered better in accordance with Nagtsho’s\textsuperscript{b} translation as “some” (\textit{’ga’ zhig}). That reflections and so forth, though false, appear is [the coarse form of] false appearance [to which Chandrakīrti is referring when he says, “Some dependent-arisings such as reflections, echoes, and so forth, appear as false even to those who have ignorance.”] Since [a reflection of a face] is a falsity that is a composite of the two—appearing to be a face and [being] empty of that [face]—its emptiness of truth [to which Chandrakīrti is referring] is its emptiness of truth as a face and does not have the meaning of a reflection’s being empty of truth in the sense of its not being established by way of its own character. Therefore, a reflection is a thing such that although it is established as empty of being a face, there is no contradiction at all in its being true in the perspective of a veiling (\textit{kun rdzob}, \textit{samvṛti}) [consciousness] apprehending it to be established by way of its own character; hence, a reflection is a veil truth.\textsuperscript{c}

\textsuperscript{a} Or, “a small amount.”
\textsuperscript{b} nag tsho lo tsa ba tshul khrims rgyal ba (b.1011) made the original translation of Chandrakīrti’s \textit{Supplement} from Sanskrit into Tibetan, working with the Indian Kṛṣṇapaṇḍita. This translation, which survives in the Peking and Narthang Translation of the Treatises (\textit{bstan ’gyur}), was gradually replaced by that of \textit{pa tshab lo tsa ba n}y\textit{i ma} grags. Nag-tsho’s translation was the basis for the commentary on Chandrakīrti’s \textit{Supplement} written by one of Tsong-kha-pa’s teachers, Ren-da-wa Shön-nu-lo-drö (\textit{red mda’ ba gzhon nu blo gros}, 1349-1412).
\textsuperscript{c} Chandrakīrti’s seems to say that a reflection is not a veil truth, but his reference is to its not being a truth \textit{as a face} for those who know about mirrors; therefore, it still is a veil truth since a veiling consciousness, ignorance, takes it to be established by way of its own character.
Therefore, [Chandrakīrti’s] statement that a reflection is not a veil truth is in consideration that concerning a reflection of a face, for instance, its being a face is false in the perspective of a conventional (kun rdzob, samvyrti) [consciousness] of worldly [persons] trained in language and hence is not a veil truth relative to that [that is, a reflection of a face is not true as a face in the perspective of a consciousness trained in language].b How could it be that [a reflection] is not posited as a veil truth described in “objects of perceptions of the false are veil truths”?c

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a Tsong-kha-pa is unpacking the two meanings of kun rdzob, samvyrti—as “veiling consciousness” and as “conventional consciousness.” See below.
b Those persons do not have the gross level of ignorance apprehending a reflection of a face to exist the way it appears to be a face.
c VI.23d. In the Dharmsala edition (101.8) and Varanasi edition (187.9), read brdzun pa for brdzun pa’i in accordance with La Vallée Poussin, Madhyamakāvatāra, 102.11, and so forth.
Otherwise, if it were contradictory for something to be a veil truth if it does not truly exist conventionally (kun rdzob tu bden par med), this would contradict:

- Chandrakīrti’s statement that establishment by way of its own character does not exist even in conventional terms (tha snyad du yang med pa), and all presentations done in conventional terms (tha snyad du byed pa'i rnam gzhag thams cad) [including] all refutations of true establishment and proofs of no true existence.

Therefore, [claims] stating that objects such as reflections, which even ordinary worldly consciousnesses understand to be mistaken, are not veil truths but are mere veilings [when in fact they are both] appear to be the talk of those who have not formed understanding concerning:

- the definitive enumeration of two truths
- truth and falsity relative to the world and truth and falsity posited by Proponents of the Middle Way.

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a Chandrakīrti’s Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle” (VI.36) says:

Through that reasoning by which [it is seen] on the occasion of analyzing suchness
That production from self and other are not reasonable,
[It is seen] that [production] is not reasonable even in conventional terms.
If so, through what [reasoning] would your production be [established]!!

b If it were contradictory for something to be a veil truth if it does not exist as a truth for a veiling consciousness, this would mean that all veil truths must be truths for a veiling consciousness, and in the absence of any criterion for removing any of these that are truths for a veiling consciousness from the class of veil truths this would amount to saying that whatever exists for a veiling consciousness is a veil truth. Since ignorance, a veiling consciousness, takes the establishment of objects by way of their own character to exist, establishment of objects by way of their own character would have to be a veil truth. Similarly, if inherent existence existed conventionally, it would be impossible to say that the refutation of inherent existence and the proof of its opposite are done conventionally.
Also, [Chandrakīrti’s] statement (above, 34) that “the nature [emptiness] does not appear in any way to those having ignorance” is in consideration that [emptiness] does not appear to consciousnesses polluted with ignorance [and is not in consideration of persons having ignorance], since he asserts that Superiors [on the first through seventh grounds] who have not [fully] abandoned ignorance directly realize suchness [that is, directly realize emptiness in meditative equipoise]. Also, because a Learner Superior’s pristine wisdom subsequent to meditative equipoise and a common being’s viewing consciousness of suchness are polluted with ignorance and its predispositions, [emptiness] does not directly appear [to those consciousnesses], but it must be asserted that, in general, ultimate truth [emptiness] does appear [to those consciousnesses].b

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a mngon sum du.

b There are conceptual consciousnesses explicitly realizing emptiness among a Learner Superior’s pristine wisdom subsequent to meditative equipoise; also, a common being’s viewing consciousnesses of suchness is necessarily a conceptual consciousness explicitly realizing emptiness. The basic rule is that any object explicitly understood must appear to that consciousness.
In that way, respectively, veil truths are posited through the force of the afflictive ignorance that is included within the [twelve] links [of a dependent-arising] of cyclic existence. Hence, he asserts that the ignorance apprehending phenomena to be truly established—renowned as [a consciousness] apprehending a self of persons and of phenomena—is the ignorance [that is the first] of the twelve links [of dependent-arising], and therefore he does not assert that it is an obstruction to omniscience [but is an afflictive obstruction. Chandrakīrti’s] saying that veil truths are posited through the force of ignorance apprehending true existence indicates the mode of positing what sort of veiling [consciousness] in the perspective of which truth b is posited, but it is not that he is saying that pots, woolen cloth, and so forth, which are veil truths, are posited by that consciousness apprehending true existence because he himself asserts that what is posited by a [consciousness] apprehending true existence does not exist even in conventional terms. Therefore, it appears that because of the similarity of name between the kun rdzob (saṃsvṛti) [veiling consciousnessc] in the perspective of which the truth that is part of kun rdzob gyi bden pa (samvṛtisatya) [veil truth] is posited and the kun rdzob (samvṛti) [conventional consciousness] in the positing of pots and so forth as kun rdzob tu yod pa (samvṛtisat) [existing conventionally], many cases of mistaking these even to have the same meaning have arisen; therefore, these should be differentiated well.

\[Immediately after that, Chandrakīrti] says: a


b “Truth” means “concordance between appearance and fact.”

c Consciousness that veils reality.
Then, are these pots and so forth truths in the perspective of veiling [consciousnesses] of all persons who have not become Buddhaed? Or, are there also cases of these not being truths in the perspective of some persons’ veiling [consciousnesses]?

Answer: Let us explain the meaning of [Chandrakīrti’s] statement (above, 34) concerning those forms, sounds, and so forth which are posited
as veil truths:

For Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and Bodhisattvas who have abandoned afflictive ignorance and who see compositional phenomena as like reflections and so forth those [forms, sounds, and so forth] moreover have a fabricated nature and are not truths because they have no conceit of them as true.

There are three persons in the perspective of whom these are not truths [that is, do not exist the way they appear]—Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and Bodhisattvas. Furthermore, because [Chandrakīrti] does not take these to be just any Hearers, Solitary Realizers, or Bodhisattvas, he mentions qualifications [“who have abandoned afflictive ignorance and who see compositional phenomena as like reflections and so forth”]; direct realization that all compounded phenomena are empty of inherent existence but appear to be inherently existent, like reflections, is one qualification. Since even Bodhisattvas on the seventh ground and below as well as Hearers and Solitary Realizers who are Learner Superiors have merely this [direct re-

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*a* Commenting on stanza VI.28; Toh. 3862, *dbyu ma*, vol. ‘a, 255a.2-255a.3; La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra*, 107.19-108.3; La Vallée Poussin, “*Introduction au traité du milieu,*” *Muséon* 11 (1910): 304. Tsong-kha-pa is paraphrasing Chandrakīrti, not quoting the text exactly as it is. Though some contemporary Ge-lug-pa scholars explain this discrepancy by claiming that Tsong-kha-pa was quoting from memory, it strikes me that Tsong-kha-pa intended to put the last part of what I have taken as a lead-in sentence, “those forms, sounds, and so forth which are posited as veil truths,” as part of the “quote” from Chandrakīrti; indeed, Chandrakīrti has “forms, sounds, and so forth” but does not have “which are posited as veil truths.”

*b* Learner Superiors are those who have reached the path of seeing but not the path of no-more-learning.
alization], in order to eliminate them [Chandrakīrti] says of the three persons that they “have abandoned ignorance.” Hence, the three persons are to be taken as Bodhisattvas on the pure grounds [that is, on the eighth, ninth, and tenth grounds,] and the two Foe Destroyers, Hearer and Solitary Realizer Foe Destroyers. [Compounded phenomena] are not truths in the perspective of those three.

Those which are not truths are external and internal phenomena, [indicated in Chandrakīrti’s text by] “Those, moreover,” (de yang; above, 34). The reason why those are not truths [in their perspective] is that they have no conceit of true existence,\(^a\) that is, they do not have the conception of true existence,\(^b\) because they have extinguished the ignorance apprehending true existence.\(^c\) Hence, it is proven that external and internal phenomena are not established as truths in the perspective of veiling [consciousnesses] of those three persons [because they do not have such ignorance]. Through commenting in that way, [Chandrakīrti] has not at all proven that [external and internal phenomena] are not veil truths in their perspective but has proven that these are not truths [in their perspective]. Those who, despite this, hold that [Chandrakīrti’s commentary] has

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\(^a\) bden par rlom pa.
\(^b\) bden zhen med pa.
\(^c\) bden ’dzin gyi ma rig pa.
proven that these are not veil truths [in the perspective of those three persons] have a bad mode of explanation, having contaminated the master [Chandrakīrti’s] thought with the defilements of their own awareness due to the very great coarseness of their mental workings.

[His] proving such also is not with respect to those three persons; that [external and internal phenomena] are not truths in the perspective of those three is being proved with respect to other persons such as ourselves. It cannot be proven that [just] because lesser beings\(^a\) who are not those three persons have innate [consciousnesses] apprehending true existence, in the perspective of all whatsoever of their conventional [consciousnesses] these [forms, sounds, and so forth] are not truly established [because such ignorance occurs among certain of their conventional consciousnesses even if they have directly realized emptiness].

\(^a\) That is to say, Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and Bodhisattvas who have directly realized emptiness but have not completed abandonment of afflictive ignorance. These are Hearers and Solitary Realizers on the paths of seeing and of meditation as well as Bodhisattvas on the first through seventh Bodhisattva grounds.
If, in contrast to the above explanation, [Chandrakīrti] were proving that [external and internal phenomena] are not veil truths in the perspective of those [three persons, the reason that he stated, “because they have no conceit of true existence,”] would be an extremely unrelated proof because for a base [that is, an object] to be established as a veil truth in the perspective of a certain awareness, that base must be established as a falsity, and hence stating as the reason [why external and internal phenomena are not veil truths in the perspective of those three persons] that they do not have the conception of true existence would be a source of laughter. In order to establish for a certain awareness that a base [that is, an object] is a veil truth, [that object] must be established [for that awareness] as a falsity; the reason for this is by way of the essential that if it is seen that when positing the “truth” that is part of the term “veil truth” with respect to pots and so forth, and so forth, it must be posited—from between an awareness and fact—as a truth in the perspective of just a veiling [consciousness] that apprehends true existence and is not posited as a truth in fact, it must be seen that if that distinction [of being in the perspective of a veiling consciousness] is not applied, it is not established as a truth and is a falsity.

That these beings do not have consciousnesses apprehending inherent existence indicates that they understand that external and internal phenomena are veil truths—objects that seem to exist the way they appear only for an ignorant consciousness. They can understand this because they no longer have such ignorance. Thus it would be ridiculous to indicate that these persons who understand that forms and so forth are falsities do not understand that these are veil truths.
2) Explanation of [the Consequence School’s] unique presentation of afflictive emotions

Since understanding the unique identification of afflictive emotions that this [Consequentialist] system has, which does not accord with the explanations from the upper and lower Manifest Knowledges, a appears to be very important, let us explain it. [Consciousnesses] apprehending that things truly exist are twofold, those apprehending persons to truly exist and those apprehending [other] phenomena to truly exist; it has already been explained that just these are also described as the two apprehensions of self. These [consciousnesses] apprehending true existence are described in both Chandrakīrti’s *Autocommentary on the “Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle’”* and his *Commentary on (Āryadeva’s) “Four Hundred”* as afflictive ignorance, and it is explained that Hearer and Solitary Realizer Foe Destroyers have abandoned this ignorance, b and

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a These are the *abhidharmas* that are primarily set forth, respectively, in Asaṅga’s *Summary of Manifest Knowledge* (*chos mgon pa kun btus, abhidharmasamuccaya;* P5550, vol. 112) and in Vasubandhu’s *Treasury of Manifest Knowledge* (*chos mgon pa’i mdzod, abhidharmakosa;* P5590, vol. 115).

b Chandrakīrti’s *Autocommentary on the “Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle’”* explains that Hearers and Solitary Realizers know that all phenomena lack inherent existence; see Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*, 150-160; and La Vallée
Chandrakīrti’s Commentary on (Āryadeva’s) “Four Hundred” explains that Bodhisattvas who have attained forbearance with respect to the doctrine of no production [this being at the beginning of the eighth Bodhisattva ground] have abandoned it. Therefore, afflictive ignorance is the class discordant with knowledge of the suchness of selflessness, and furthermore afflictive ignorance is not taken as mere absence of that knowledge [of selflessness] or as merely other than it but is the discordant class that is the contrary [of knowledge of selflessness]—a superimposition that persons and [other] phenomena are inherently established.

Taken this way, [the Consequence School’s] positing that a [consciousness] superimposing a self of phenomena is an afflictive ignorance

and its positing that the two apprehensions—that I and mine are established by way of their own character—are views of the transitory collection\(^a\) do not accord with the Proponents of Manifest Knowledge.\(^b\) The systems of the Proponents of Manifest Knowledge, as is explained in the ninth chapter of Vasubandhu’s Autocommentary on the “Treasury of Manifest Knowledge,”\(^c\) posit a [consciousness] appre hend ing that a person substantially exists in the sense of being self-sufficient\(^d\) to be a view of the transitory collection that is a [mis]apprehension of I, and they posit a [consciousness] apprehending that the mine are objects controlled by that substantially existent person to be a view of the transitory collection that is a [mis]apprehension of “mine.” These are greatly discordant [with the Con sequence School’s presentation].

Apprehension that persons substantially exist in the sense of being self-sufficient also exists among those whose awarenesses are not affected by way of their own character.\(^a\) *jig tshogs la lta ba, satkāyadrsti.*

\(^a\) *mngon pa ba,* *ābhidharmika.*

\(^b\) *chos mngon pa'i mdzod kyi bshad pa, abhidharmakośabhāṣya:* P5591, vol. 115. The passage at the very beginning of the ninth chapter may be Tsong-kha-pa’s referent (Pruden trans., 1313): “There is no liberation outside of this teaching, because other doctrines are corrupted by a false conception of a soul. The word as other doctrines conceive it is not a metaphorical expression for a series of skandhas. By the power of their belief in this soul as a substantial entity, there arises clinging to the soul, the defilements are generated, and liberation is impossible.”

\(^b\) *gang zag rang rkya thub pa'i rdzas su yod par 'dzin pa.*
by tenets, but [according to the Consequence School] apprehension that persons exist as other than the [mental and physical] aggregates in the sense of having a character discordant with them does not exist among those whose awarenesses are not affected by tenets. Thus, views holding to extremes also are of two types [innate and artificial].

Question: How does one prove to those whose position is that persons and phenomena are established by way of their own character that those [consciousnesses] apprehending are afflictive ignorance and the two apprehensions of self?

Answer: The inherent establishment of persons and [other] phenomena is negated by the reasonings refuting this, and at that time it is established that [a consciousness] apprehending such is [a consciousness] apprehending true existence mistaken with respect to its conceived object, and when this is established, it is established that the apprehensions of the two, persons and [other] phenomena, as truly established are the two apprehensions of self. When those are established, it is established that this apprehension of true existence is the discordant class that is the contrary of knowledge of suchness, whereby it is established that this is ignorance, and it can be proven that until this is extinguished, the view of the transitory [as inherently existent “I” and “mine”] is also not extinguished, due to which it is established that [these apprehensions of persons and other

a For more on this see Hopkins, Maps of the Profound, 650-654.
phenomena as truly existent] are afflictive ignorance. Hence, it is very important to understand how to posit the [Consequentialists’] unique presentation of afflictive emotions.

With respect to how other afflictive emotions such as desire and so forth also operate from the bewilderment that is a consciousness apprehending true existence, let us explain this in accordance with Chandrakīrti’s commentary on the statement in Āryadeva’s *Four Hundred*.a

Just as the body sense power [pervades] the body, Bewilderment abides in all [afflictive emotions as their basis]. Chandrakīrti’s commentary says:b

Bewilderment, due to being beclouded with respect to those [objects] from considering them to be true [that is, truly established], enters into the superimposition that things have their own true entities. Also, desire and so forth operate within the superimposition

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a Stanza VI.10ab; stanzas VI.10-11; Toh. 3846, dbu ma, vol. tsha, 7b.2-7b.3; Lang, Āryadeva’s Catuḥsataka, 66; Sonam Rinchen and Ruth Sonam, Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas, 156-157. Brackets are from *Four Interwoven Annotations*, vol. 2, 421.5. Cited in Tsong-kha-pa’s *Great Treatise*, vol. 3, 207.

of features, such as beauty and ugliness, on just the inherent nature of things imputed by bewilderment. Hence, they operate non-separately from bewilderment and also depend on bewilderment, because bewilderment is just chief.
Concerning this, [a consciousness] superimposing [inherently established] attractiveness or unattractiveness on objects is improper mental application, which is the cause producing the two, desire and hatred; therefore, [this passage] does not indicate the mode of apprehension of the two, desire and hatred. Therefore, “desire and so forth operate within the superimposition of features, such as beauty and ugliness, on just the inherent nature of things imputed by bewilderment” says that the two, desire and hatred, operate in dependence upon the superimposition of only inherently established attractiveness or unattractiveness [superimposed by improper mental application].

[Chandrakīrti] is not indicating that just the true establishment imputed by bewilderment is the object of observation [of desire and hatred] from between the two, the object of observation and the subjective aspect of desire and so forth because—from between the two, the object of ob-

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\[\text{a The Tibetan could wrongly be read as, “Also, desire and so forth engage in superimposing features, such as beauty and ugliness, on just the inherent nature of things imputed by bewilderment.” Tsong-kha-pa is saying that the passage should not be read this way, for then the mode of apprehension of desire and hatred would be to superimpose a sense of inherently existent beauty and ugliness, whereas that is the mode of apprehension of improper mental application. First ignorance superimposes inherent existence on the object; then improper mental application superimposes inherently existent beauty or ugliness, after which desire and hatred are generated.}\]
The objects of observation of both innate [consciousnesses] apprehending self\(^a\) are established bases [that is, they are existent, whereas truly established objects do not exist at all], and desire and so forth also have the same objects of observation as bewilderment, since they are in parallel association with it.

\[\text{[Consciousnesses] induced by those two improper mental applications [superimposing inherently established attractiveness or unattractiveness on the object] and that have the aspect of desiring the object or of not desiring—that is to say, turning away from—the object come to be desire and hatred. Hence, [in the Consequence School] mere [consciousnesses] that are induced by the apprehension of a person as substantially existent in the sense of being self-sufficient and that have the aspects of desiring or not desiring are not posited as [encompassing all] desire and hatred. Therefore, even the modes of positing the two, desire and hated, are different [in the Consequence School from how these are posited in the other schools].}\]

\(^a\) That is, the innate consciousness apprehending the inherent existence of persons and the innate consciousness apprehending the inherent existence of other phenomena. Tsong-kha-pa’s point in this sentence is that the objects of observation of these consciousnesses—persons and other phenomena—exist; these existent objects are misimagined to be inherently existent.
[That desire and hatred] “also depend on bewilderment” means that desire and so forth are induced by bewilderment that apprehends [objects] to be established by way of their own character and that precedes them. The example [from the Four Hundred quoted above] that “the body sense power [pervades] the body” means that just as the other four sense powers do not have bases posited separately from the body sense power, so all the other afflictive emotions operate in dependence upon bewilderment and operate without being separated from it. Therefore, all afflictive emotions are overcome through just overcoming bewilderment, and hence it is said that one should be intent on just discourse about its antidote—dependent-arising, the emptiness of inherent establishment.

\[\text{Nāgārjuna’s Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness}^a\] also says that this apprehension of things as truly existent is the ignorance that is the root of cyclic

\[\text{\textit{stonp pa nyid bdun cu pa’i tshig le’ur byas pa, snyatāsaptatikārikā, stanza 64:}}\]

That which apprehends things produced
From causes and conditions to be real
Was said by the Teacher to be ignorance.
From it the twelve links arise.

existence; also, Nāgārjuna’s *Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning* says:\(^a\)

> If any base [that is, an inherently existent object] is found, one is seized by the winding snake of the afflictive emotions. Whoever’s mind is without [such] a base is not seized [by the afflictive emotions].

He says that if one finds a base that is any focus of observation of [a consciousness] apprehending true existence, [one’s mind] is seized by the snake of the afflictive emotions. Also, right after that [Nāgārjuna] says:\(^b\)

> Why would the great poisonous afflictive emotions not arise in those whose minds have a basis [an inherently existent object]?

Therefore, this [tenet that the ignorance apprehending inherent existence is the root of cyclic existence] is the excellent assertion of the Superior [Nāgārjuna].

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In order to indicate that an abandonment of afflictive emotions does not occur in those who, although they apprehend an inherent nature of forms and so forth, want to abandon the afflictive emotions, [the text] says[...]

and his commentary following [those two lines] also says:

If one apprehends things to be truly existent, myriad irreversible afflictive emotions, such as desire, definitely arise. How? Respectively, if the thing is agreeable to the mind, it is difficult to overcome desire for it. If it is disagreeable, it is difficult to overcome aggravation and irritation toward it.

and [Chandrakīrti’s] commentary says that even if the object is neither attractive nor unattractive, ignorance is generated; [thus] it is asserted that when a consciousness apprehending an object as established by way of its own character is operating in [one’s mental] continuum, either desire or hatred is generated, and even if those two are not, a similar type of bewilderment operates.

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a Toh. 3864, dbu ma, vol. ya. 28a.5-28a.6; Scherrer-Schaub, Tuktisaṣṭikāvṛtti, 90-91.
b dngos por dmigs pa yin na ni; here dngos po is taken as meaning “true existence” and not just “thing.”
c khong khydro ba; I often translate this as “belligerence.”
d tshig pa za ba.
Moreover, Shāntideva’s *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* says:\(^{a}\)

[As long as] minds involved with apprehension [of inherent existence] remain manifestly in some [persons’ continuums, the manifest attachment induced by such minds will not be overcome]. Though [manifest afflictive emotions] are [temporarily] halted in a mind lacking [realization of] emptiness, [Manifest afflictive emotions] are again produced, As in the case of [abiding in] the absorption of nondiscrimination.

With respect to this position, the three—these two masters [Chandrakīrti and Shāntideva] as well as Buddhapālita—do not differ in how they comment on the thought of the Superior [Nāgārjuna].

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\(^{a}\) Stanza IX.48c-49c. The bracketed additions are from Gyal-tshab’s *Explanation of (Shāntideva’s) “Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds, ” Entrance for Victor’s Children* (byang chub sems dpa’i spyod pa la ’jug pa’i rnam bshad rgyal sras ’jug ngog) (Sarnath: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press, 1973), 236.19-237.4. For further discussion of this topic from an earlier chapter of Tsong-kha-pa’s *Illumination of the Thought*, see Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*, 150-171, and 157 in particular.

If one lacks realization of emptiness, then even though afflicted minds are temporarily halted through cultivating other paths, they cannot be totally overcome. Manifest afflictions are again produced, and hence wandering in cyclic existence under the power of contaminated actions is not eliminated. That afflicted minds can be halted temporarily means, as was explained earlier, that manifest afflictions can be temporarily abandoned.

Due to this essential, [Buddha’s] explanation that one [can] pass away from sorrow merely through the paths of the sixteen [attributes of the four noble truths], impermanence and so forth, a has a thought behind it. b Furthermore, the identifications of afflictive emotions in terms of those paths [is incomplete and thus requires] more [in order to identify them on a subtler level]. In dependence upon those [points], pride and so forth also can be understood [as having coarse and subtle forms]; it should be known that the uncommon ignorance, the view of the transitory collection, and extreme views also have both artificial and innate forms; fearing that such would take too many words, I will not write more.

a The sixteen aspects of the four noble truths are:
Suffering: impermanence, suffering, emptiness, and selflessness
Origins: cause, origin, strong production, condition
Cessation: cessation, pacification, auspiciousness, definite emergence
Path: path, suitability, achievement, and deliverance.


b Or “has an intention,” meaning that when Buddha taught such, he had something else in mind but could not teach it due to the inadequacies of the listeners and thus taught something else that though literally unacceptable, was helpful to his listeners. Nevertheless, from the perspective of Jam-yang-shay-pa’s distinction between coarse and subtle four noble truths, the former being formulated in terms of the coarse selflessness and the latter in terms of subtle selflessness, the absence of inherent existence, Tsong-kha-pa’s reference here is to the coarse four noble truths.
Likewise, you should know that:

- the treatment—of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending phenomena to be truly established—as nine levels of objects, [three sets each of] great, medium, and small, to be abandoned by the path of meditation and thereupon the association of these with nine levels of the path of meditation, [three sets each of] small, medium, and great, as antidotes [as is done in the Autonomy School]

- like the [Mind-Only School’s] treatment of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending apprehended-object and apprehending-subject as different substantial entities as nine levels of objects to be abandoned—great, medium, and small—by the path of meditation and thereupon the association of these with nine levels of the path of meditation—

also requires interpretation, being spoken with respect to certain trainees who temporarily are not able to realize fully both selflessnesses, coarse and subtle.
B) THE WAYS IN WHICH MERE VEILINGS DO AND DO NOT APPEAR TO THE THREE PERSONS

Furthermore, these things, while not inherently existing, appear to childish beings to inherently exist, thereby deceiving them; however, for the three persons, described earlier, who are other than them, these things become mere veilings due to being just dependent-arisings of fabricated things and do not become truths. Moreover, because [those three beings] partake of the mere non-afflictive ignorance that has the character of being an obstruction to omniscience, [these mere veilings] appear to Superiors abiding in subsequent attainment [outside of meditative equipoise directly realizing emptiness] which has objects of activity involved with appearances polluted by ignorance and its predispositions, but [these mere veilings] do not appear to Superiors abiding in meditative equipoise who have dominion over the object of activity [emptiness] that has no appearance [polluted by ignorance and the predispositions of ignorance].

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a Hearer Foe Destroyers, Solitary Realizer Foe Destroyers, and Bodhisattvas on the eighth, ninth, and tenth grounds, or in other words Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and Bodhisattvas who have abandoned the apprehension of inherent existence.
Question: What does this system take as the obstructions to omniscience?

Answer: They are as Chandrakīrti Autocommentary on the “Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle’” says:

Concerning that, the predispositions of ignorance are obstacles to thoroughly distinguishing [all] objects of knowledge [simultaneously]; existent predispositions of desire and so forth are also causes of such [uncontrollable] operations of body and speech; those predispositions of ignorance and of desire and so forth moreover are overcome only in knowledge-of-all-aspects and Buddhahood, but not in others.

The “[uncontrollable] operations of body and speech” are assumptions of bad states of body and speech that exist in Foe Destroyers, such as [uncontrollably] jumping like a monkey and calling another “bitch,” which although the Teacher [Buddha] prohibited, have not been overcome.

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a Commenting on XII.31; Toh. 3862, dbu ma, vol. ‘a, 342b.6-343a.1; La Vallée Poussin, Madhyamakāvatāra, 393.17-394.3.
b rnam pa thams cad mkyen pa, sarvākāraṇāna.
c rmangs mo, also dmangs mo, which means “woman of low caste” as in Chandrakīrti’s Autocommentary:

d Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of Tenets is more detailed on this (the ellipses in the citation are Jam-yang-shay-pa’s):

Chandrakīrti’s Autocommentary on the “Supplement” says:
The afflictive emotions are ignorance, desire, and so forth…It is thus: Although Foe Destroyers have abandoned the afflictive emotions, they have the predispositions, due to which they will jump as they did when formerly they were monkeys…Those predispositions are overcome only in knowledge-of-all-aspects and Buddhahood, but not in others.

and so forth, and as a source for this he cites the King Dhāraṇīśvara Sūtra:

A One-Gone-Thus does not have predispositions of actions, does not have predispositions of afflictive emotions, and does not have predispositions of mistaken behavior. It is thus: for example, since space naturally is thoroughly pure, it does not dwell together with dust and smoke.

and so forth.
[Chandrakīrti’s saying] “also” [in “existent predispositions of desire and so forth are also causes of such [uncontrollable] operations of body and speech’”] indicates that predispositions of desire and so forth are also obstacles to distinguishing [all] objects of knowledge [simultaneously]; therefore, predispositions [deposited] by afflicting emotions are obstructions to omniscience; all factors of mistaken dualistic appearance, which are fruits of those [predispositions], furthermore are included in those [obstructions to omniscience]. Among the seeds [deposited] by afflicting emotions, there are two, those deposited as predispositions [for further afflicting emotions] and predispositions that are not seeds of afflicting emotions; from between these two, those assigned as obstructions to omniscience are the latter. Although by having extinguished all seeds of afflicting emotions the apprehension of true existence is not generated, due to being polluted with predispositions awarenesses mistaken with respect to their appearing objects [in that their appearing objects seem to inherently exist] are generated.

Since Superiors who have not been Buddhafied have not abandoned the ignorance that is an obstruction to omniscience, they have an alterna-
tion between conceptuality involving the appearance [of inherent existence and conventional phenomena] in states subsequent to meditative equipoise and the absence of [such] appearance in meditative equipoise. However, Buddhas have completely—that is, entirely—become enlightened, that is, have realized actualization of the ultimate and conventional aspects of all phenomena; hence, all movements of conceptual minds and mental factors have utterly vanished, due to which they have no alternation between having or not having the conceptuality involving appearance [of inherent existence and conventional phenomena] in meditative equipoise and in states subsequent to meditative equipoise.

[Chandrakīrti’s saying (above, 35)] “utterly” [in “It is asserted that because of being manifestly and completely enlightened regarding all phenomena in all aspects, in Buddhas the movement of minds and mental factors has utterly vanished,”] indicates that for other Superiors the vanishing [of the movement of conceptuality] in meditative equipoise is temporary; therefore, [for other Superiors] meditative equipoise and subsequent attainment [that is, states subsequent to meditative equipoise] alternate. Hence, [Chandrakīrti’s saying (above, 35)] “because [these three beings] partake of the mere ignorance that has the character of being an obstruction
to omniscience” is not a reason for their having appearance, but is a proof for the alternating occurrence of the existence and nonexistence of appearance in meditative equipoise and subsequent attainment [that is to say, the alternating occurrence of the nonexistence of appearance in meditative equipoise and the existence of appearance in subsequent attainment].

The “movement of minds and mental factors” (above, 35) is asserted to be conceptuality, [since] Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words* explains:

> If conceptuality is the movement of the mind, due to being devoid of it suchness is non-conceptual. Sūtra says, “What is ultimate truth? If it is without even the movement of the mind, what need is there to mention letters?”

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a Tsong-kha-pa quotes this as *shes sgrīb kyi ma rig pa spyod pa’i phyir* but the edition cited above, 35, that we supplied from Chandrakīrti’s *Autocommentary* reads *shes bya’i sgrīb pa’i mtshan nyid can ma rig pa tsam kun tu spyod pa’i phyir*; the English translation is cited in accordance with the latter in the assumption that Tsong-kha-pa is working from memory.

b If the reason for their perceiving mere appearances outside of meditative equipoise were that they had obstructions to omniscience, then when those obstructions were removed, they would no longer perceive appearances. To avoid saying this, Tsong-kha-pa explains Chandrakīrti’s reason as being why they must alternate between meditative equipoise and a subsequent state in which they perceive appearances.

c Commenting on stanza XVIII.9; Toh. 3860, *dbu ma*, vol. ‘a, 120a.3-120a.4; La Vallée Poussin, *Mālamadhyamakakārikās* (Mādhyamikasūtras) de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā, 374.1-374.2: *vikalpaścittapracāraḥ / tadrhitatvattattatvaṃ nirvikalpaṃ / yathoktaṃ sūtre / paramārthaśatyaṃ katamār / yatra jīhānasyāpapracāraḥ kah punavādo / kṣaṇānāmiti* / Tibetan in de Jong, *Cinq chapitres de la Prasannapadā*, 104-105; his French translation is on p.30.

Tsong-kha-pa’s earlier *Medium-Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path* provides more commentary:

> The disappearance of the movement of minds and mental factors means that when suchness is actualized, the movement of conceptuality stops; it does not indicate that there are no minds and mental factors [at that time]. Chandrakīrti’s *Clear Words* explains that the statement that there is no movement of the mind refers to the absence of the movement of conceptuality:

> If conceptuality is the movement of the mind, due to being devoid of it suchness is non-conceptual. Sūtra says, “What is ultimate truth? If it is without even the movement of the mind, what need is there to mention letters?”

> Furthermore, Chandrakīrti’s *Commentary on the “Supplement to Nāgārjuna’s ‘Treatise on the Middle’”* says that during a Learner Superior’s meditative equipoise [the movement of conceptuality] does not stop forever but at Buddhahood stops forever.

C) **How There Come to Be Ultimates and Veilings Relative to Superiors and Common Beings**

[Chandrakīrti says (above, 35):]a


In that way also Chandrakīrti’s Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle” says:

[Buddha] said that all things hold two natures,  
Those found by perceptions of reality and of falsities—  
Objects of perceptions of reality are suchness,
And objects of perceptions of falsities are veil truths.

This indicates that with regard to the natures of a sprout there are two—the natures of the two truths—and that the ultimate is found by the former consciousness, whereas veilings are found by the latter consciousness, but it does not indicate that one nature of a sprout itself is the two truths in relation to the former and latter consciousnesses; Chandrakīrti’s Commentary on the “Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle,’” differentiating two natures for each thing, says (above, 22) that the ultimate is found by a consciousness perceiving the meaning of reality and veilings are found by a consciousness perceiving falsities, “[the Supramundane Victor Buddhas] teach two aspects of natures of all things, veiling and ultimates.”

Since a veil truth is not a truth in fact but is a truth only in the perspective of a consciousness apprehending true existence, it is necessary to ascertain it as a falsity in order to ascertain the very meaning of veil truth. In order to ascertain an illustration [of a veil truth], such as a pot, as a false object of knowledge, a deceptive object, it is necessary to find the view that—with respect to that substratum—repudiates [or causes disbelief in] (sun phyung) the conceived object of the apprehension of true existence through a rational consciousness because without having refuted trueness through reasoning, falsity cannot be established by valid cognition.
Although pots, woolen cloth, and so forth are veil truths, it is not necessary—when they are established [or certified] by an awareness [as existing]—that the meaning of veil truth be established by the awareness; it is like the fact that although pots, woolen cloth, and so forth are illusory-like appearances seeming to be inherently existent whereas they are not, an awareness that establishes them [as existing] does not have to establish the meaning of being illusory-like.

Therefore, it is not reasonable to propound that in this system pots, woolen cloth, and so forth are posited as veil truths in relation to the perspective of a consciousness of a common being who does not have the Middle Way view and that the same are posited as ultimate truths in relation to a Superior because that would be propounded opposite to what is said in Chandrakīrti’s Commentary on the “Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle’” (above, 35):

Regarding this, those which are ultimates for common beings are mere veilings for Superiors acting on objects involving appearance [outside of meditative equipoise directly realizing emptiness]; that which is the nature of those [objects]—emptiness—is the ultimate for them.

Common beings apprehend pots and so forth as true, and just that is also an apprehension [of pots and so forth] as existing ultimately, due to which in relation to the perspective of these consciousnesses of those [common beings], pots and so forth are ultimately established and are not veilings. Pots and so forth—the bases that for their perspective are ultimately established—are veilings in relation to the perception by the pristine wisdom in the continuum of a Superior comprehending illusory-like appearance. Chandrakīrti is saying that in relation to this consciousness those are not positable as true, whereby they are mere veilings.
Regarding this, those which are ultimates for common beings are mere veilings for Superiors acting on objects involving appearance [outside of meditative equipoise directly realizing emptiness]; that which is the nature of those [objects]—emptiness—is the ultimate for them.

With respect to the meaning of the earlier [part of the sentence], it indicates that just those pots and so forth that are held by common beings to be ultimately established are mere veilings for the three Superiors, described earlier, who, having risen from meditative equipoise [directly realizing emptiness], are in states of subsequent attainment that involve appearances. Therefore, it only eliminates that [pots and so forth] are truths in their perspective; it does not eliminate that these are veil truths [in their perspective], and it does not indicate that the conceived objects of common beings’ [mis]apprehensions of pots and so forth as being ultimately established are veilings for Superiors because such does not occur [that is, ultimately established pots and so forth do not exist].

Nevertheless, since he says that their nature is the ultimate truth, a differentiated expression should be made, “Pots and so forth are veilings, and their nature is Superiors’ ultimate,” but it should not be propounded that “Pots and so forth are ultimates for Superiors,” because their rational consciousesses seeing the meaning of reality do not find pots and so forth, and because that which is found by a rational consciousness seeing the meaning of reality is said to be the meaning of an ultimate truth.

Adapted from Hopkins, Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom, 114-115.
With respect to the meaning of the latter [part of the sentence “that which is the nature of those [objects]—emptiness—is the ultimate for them,”] it indicates that the nature, the noumenon, of veiling dependent-arisings is the ultimate for Superiors, whereby to propound opposite to [Chandrakīrti’s] text that just one base, such as a pot, is a veil [truth] in relation to common beings and an ultimate [truth] in relation to Superiors is the talk of those who do not know that in the perspective of an awareness for which something is a veil truth, it must be blocked that [this object] is a truth.

\(^a\) chos nyid, dhammatā.
[Chandrakīrti says:]a

The ultimate for Buddhas is just the nature, and it moreover is just nondeceptive, due to which it is the ultimate truth; it is that which is known by them by themselves individually.

The term “just” (nyid) in “just the nature” (rang bzhin nyid) is a delineator; with respect to what it eliminates, [the ultimate for Buddhas] is not the ultimate of other Superiors that alternates, for instance, between the nature that is without appearance in meditative equipoise and the nature that involves appearance in states subsequent to meditative equipoise; rather, it is the noumenon, the nature in which [a Buddha] is set in meditative equipoise at all times.

With respect to the meaning of “it moreover is just non-deceptive, due to which it is the ultimate truth,” [Chandrakīrti] is explaining that upon having asserted that the “truth” of “ultimate truth” does not indicate “true establishment,” “abiding non-deceptively in the perspective of perceiving suchness” is the meaning of “truth.”

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[a Commenting on VI.28; Toh. 3862, dbu ma, vol. ‘a, 255a.5-255a.6; La Vallée Poussin, Madhyamakāvatāra, 108.16-108.19; La Vallée Poussin, “Introduction au traité du milieu,” Muséon 11 (1910): 305.]
2) DESCRIPTION OF ULTIMATE TRUTH {2 PARTS}

This has two parts: an explanation of the meaning of the root text and a dispelling of objections to that.

A) EXPLANATION OF THE MEANING OF THE ROOT TEXT

[Chandrakīrti’s Autocommentary on the “Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle’”] says:a

Due to wishing to teach ultimate truth and due to the fact that the ultimate truth cannot be taught directly because of being inexpressible by terms and because of just not being objects of consciousnesses that follow upon terms, [the root text] sets forth an example experienced by common beingsb themselves for the sake of clarifying the nature of that [ultimate truth] for those wishing to listen.

In this, the meaning of [ultimate truth] not being an object of consciousness and verbalization is, as [Chandrakīrti] says, that it “cannot be taught directly” (dngos su bstan par mi nus pas); moreover, Nag-tsho’s translation reads, “cannot be manifestly taught” (mgon sum du bstan par mi

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b Tsong-kha-pa adds the term “common beings” (so skyes) to Chandrakīrti’s commentary (Poussin, 109.4) for the sake of clarity.
Regarding the meaning of this, Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words, commenting on [Nāgārjuna’s] statement that the meaning of suchness is not something known from another, says:\(^b\)

When those with eye disease see erroneous entities such as falling hairs and so forth, even though someone without eye disease has shown them, they cannot realize what is to be realized, exactly as it is, in the manner of not seeing the entities themselves of the falling hairs and so forth as those without eye disease do.

[Chandrakīrti] says that even though one without eye disease indicates to

\(^a\) nag tsho lo tsa ba tshul khrims rgyal ba (b.1011) made the original translation of Chandrakīrti’s Supplement from Sanskrit into Tibetan, working with the Indian Krṣhṇapaṇḍita. This translation, which survives in the Peking and Narthang Translation of the Treatises (bstan 'gyur), was gradually replaced by that of pa tshab lo tsa ba nyi ma grags. Nag-tsho’s translation was the basis for the commentary on Chandrakīrti’s Supplement written by one of Tsong-kha-pa’s teachers, Ren-da-wa Shön-nu-lo-drö (red mda’ ba gzhon nu blo gros, 1349-1412).

\(^b\) Commenting on stanza XVIII.9; Toh. 3860, dbu ma, vol. ’a, 119b.5; La Vallée Poussin, Mūlamadhyamakakārikās (Mādhyamikasūtras) de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā, 373.2-373.4: yathā hi taimirikā viiathāṁ keśāmaśakaṁ kāśāmūdārpāṁ paśyanto viśiṁrropadēsenāpi na sakunvanti keśānaṁ yathāviṁraśvasthitam svarūpamādārśananyāvēnādhi-gantavyamatāmirikā vādhi-gantum. Tibetan in de Jong, Cinq chapitres de la Prasannapadā, 104; his French translation is on p. 29.
those with eye disease, “There are no falling hairs,” they do not realize the nonexistence of falling hairs in the way that such is seen by the one without eye disease; hence, even though those listeners [having eye disease] do not realize such that way, it is not that they do not realize the nonexistence of falling hairs.

Taking this as an example, [Chandrakīrti] is asserting that when suchness is taught, even though [listeners] do not realize it as it is seen by one who lacks the pollution of the eye disease of ignorance, it is not that in general they do not realize suchness. Therefore, it is not that ultimate truth cannot be expressed by definitive scriptures having the profound meaning [of emptiness] and by speech teaching such, and it is not that ultimate truth cannot be realized even by an awareness following upon those. You also should understand similarly all statements that the meaning of suchness is not an object of consciousness and verbalization.
Added to Tsong-kha-pa’s text: Chandrakīrti’s Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle” (VI.29) says:\(^{a}\)

Where just those unreal entities such as falling hairs and so forth
Are imputed through the force of eye disease,
What is seen by one with clear eyes is the suchness [of those falling hairs].
Understand it similarly here.

Through the force of his or her eyes being affected by eye disease, a person with eye disease sees falling hairs as well as bees and so on—which are [included] within [Chandrakīrti’s] “and so forth”—inside a vessel for food and drink, such as rhinoceros horn and so forth, which is in the hand. Seeing these, the person wishes to clean away the erroneous entities that he or she has imputed to be falling hairs, bees, and so forth and thereupon knows encountering the difficulties of again and again turning the vessel upside down. Someone without eye disease, whose eyes are clear, realizes this and approaches the person, whereupon even though the person without eye disease aims his or her sight to that place where the one with eye disease sees the entities of those falling hairs and so forth, he or she does not observe those aspects of falling hairs and does not conceptualize any attributes having falling hairs as their substratum, that is to say, does not conceptualize any attributes of falling hairs.

\(^{a}\) Toh. 3861, vol. ‘a, 205b.3; La Vallée Poussin, Madhyamakāvatāra, 109.6-109.9; La Vallée Poussin, “Introduction au traité du milieu,” Muséon 11 (1910): 305.
Moreover, when the one with eye disease reveals his/her thought to the one without eye disease, saying, “[I] see falling hairs,” although the one without eye disease—wishing to clear up the idea of the one with eye disease—takes cognizance of his or her perspective and indeed speaks words intent on negation, saying, “There are no falling hairs here,” the speaker has no deprecatory denial of falling hairs. The suchness of the falling hairs that are seen by the one with eye disease is what is seen by the one without eye disease; it is not what is seen by the one with eye disease. Understand the meaning at this point in accordance with these two examples.
With respect to how this is to be understood, the entities of the aggregates, constituents, sense spheres, and so forth observed by those who do not see suchness because their awarenesses are damaged, that is, polluted, by the eye disease of ignorance are the veiling (kun rdzob pa) entities of those aggregates and so forth, like the hairs observed by those with eye disease. That object—which is observed by not seeing those very aggregates and so forth and which the Buddhas, being separated from the predispositions of ignorance, the obstructions to omniscience, perceive as the nature of the aggregates and so forth in the way that the eyes of one without eye disease do not see falling hairs—is the ultimate truth of those Buddhas.

**B) DISPPELLING OBJECTIONS TO THAT**

Objection: Just as the eyes of those without eye disease do not perceive
even an appearance of falling hairs, so if a Buddha does not perceive veili-
ger appearances, such as aggregates and so forth, which appear to awarenesses pol-
luted by ignorance, then those would not exist because if something exists, it must be perceived by a Buddha. If veiling appearances such as aggregates do not exist, then even the attainment of Buddhahood would not exist because a person who initially generates a mind [of altruistic aspiration to Bud-
dhahood] is one who is polluted by ignorance.

Answer: Let us explain how this fallacy does not exist. There are two
ways that a Buddha’s pristine wisdom knows objects of knowledge—a
mode of knowing all objects of knowledge that are ultimate trut hs and a
mode of knowing all objects of knowledge that are veil truths. Concerning
those, the first is knowledge of the suchness of the aggregates and so forth
in the manner of not perceiving the veiling appearances of the aggregates
and so forth. The second is knowledge [of those aggregates and so forth]
in the perspective of the pristine wisdom knowing the diversity [of phe-
nomena] in the manner of dualistic appearance as object and sub ject be-
cause it is not suitable to posit that a Buddha has implicit realization in
which something is realized even though it does not appear and hence
[everything] must be known upon its appearing.a

a This counters Döl-po-pa’s notion that a Buddha only implicitly knows veil truths. Döl-
popa Shay-rab-gyal-tshan asserts that ordinary phenomena do not appear to pristine wis-
dom and thus do not appear do not appear to Buddhas but nevertheless holds that Buddhas
are omniscient since they implicitly know these phenomena, in which case the phenomena
themselves do not have to appear. He explains implicit realization in this context to mean
that when Buddhas know the ultimate, they know that these phenomena do not exist and
in this way know them (Mountain Doctrine, 532-534):

**Objection:** In that case, a Buddha’s pristine wisdom would not know the phenomena of the three realms, but this contradicts the statements even in the Extensive and Medium-Length Mothers and so forth that [a Buddha’s pristine wisdom] knows—just as they are—minds involved with withdrawal, diffusion, and desire and so forth.

**Answer:** There is no fault because, since there are innumerable cases of knowing within not appearing, knowing does not entail appearance [of the object], like knowing the past and the future, which are separated [from the present] by many eons, and knowing selflessness and so forth, even though those do not appear. Also, the thought of such statements in the Mother [scriptures] is said to be that knowing the diffusion, withdrawal, and so forth of the mind means to know that the mind is not really established and hence to know that its diffusion, withdrawal, and so forth also are not really established and void…. Therefore, upon explicit appearance of the basis devoid of all phenomena—the noumenal thoroughly established nature—it is implicitly known that phenomena do not exist, whereby that is called “knowing all phenomena.” Also, when such is seen, the real meaning of great significance is seen.

In consideration of these [statements] in that way of knowing but not appearing, it is said:

Why? Because the Buddhās, knowing,
Do not perceive phenomena.

This means that phenomena are known, although they do not appear. Similarly, [the Verse Summary of the Perfection of Wisdom] says:

The One-Gone-Thus teaches that one who does not see forms,
Does not see feelings, does not see discriminations,
Does not see intentions, does not see consciousness,
Mind, or mentality sees reality.

Analyze how space is seen as in the expression
By sentient beings in words, “Space is seen.”

The One-Gone-Thus teaches that seeing reality is also like that.
The seeing cannot be expressed by another example.
Whoever see thus see all phenomena….

It is being said that the thought of the teachings that just not seeing is seeing is that—through just not seeing the phenomena that are the objects of negation—the basis of negation, the noumenon, is seen, and, through just knowing that all phenomena appearing in the face of mistake are not established in fact, all phenomena are known, this being inconceivable exalted knowledge….

The Buddhāvatamsaka Sūtra says that those having and not having special insight have good and bad appearances [respectively] and that what appear to those without special insight do not appear to those with special insight:

What are seen by those without special insight
Are the bad sights of phenomena.
When special insight sees,
Although with respect to a Buddha’s knowledge of the diversity the aggregates and so forth do not appear upon pollution by the predispositions of ignorance, what appears to the consciousnesses of other persons that are polluted with ignorance must appear to a Buddha because it is not suitable for those appearances to be nonexistent, and if a veiling exists, it must be observed by [a Buddha’s] knowledge of the diversity. Although the falling hairs that appear to one with eye disease do not appear to the eye consciousness of one devoid of eye disease, those appearances do not need to be nonexistent; therefore, they are unlike [the situation with] a Buddha [wherein if a veiling exists, it must appear to a Buddha, and if something does not appear to a Buddha, it must not exist].

All are not seen.

Because of this and because a Victor’s pristine wisdom is the finality of special insight, it is perforce established that these three realms do not appear to it because these appear to those without special insight.

A consequence is that a Buddha’s pristine wisdom has both explicit and implicit realization (Mountain Doctrine, 535):

Therefore, the final pristine wisdom perceiving the ultimate is a valid cognition of explicit realization with respect to knowing that the noumenon exists and is a valid cognition of implicit realization with respect to knowing that phenomena do not exist.

Drawn from Hopkins, Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom, 275ff.
Until the predispositions for mistaken dualistic appearance have been extinguished, the two direct comprehensions (1) of the mode [of being of phenomena] and (2) of the diversity [of phenomena] cannot be generated in one entity, due to which these must be comprehended within an alternation between meditative equipoise and states subsequent to meditative equipoise, and, therefore, comprehension of these two does not come within a single instant of pristine wisdom. When the predispositions for mistakenness have been completely abandoned, the generation of the two pristine wisdoms within each instant of pristine wisdom is of unbroken continuum; hence, alternation between directly comprehending and not comprehending the two [types of] objects of knowledge at one time is not necessary. Therefore, [our presentation] also does not contradict the statement:

A single instant of exalted knowledge
Pervades the full circle of objects of knowledge.
That although the two pristine wisdoms are one entity, there is not even the slightest contradiction in there coming to be two different modes of knowledge in relation to two [types of] objects is an attribute solely of a Buddha, a Supramundane Victor. Whereas that is the case, there appear to be:

1. those who take only the mode of knowledge of suchness as the mode of a Buddha’s mode of knowledge and thereupon say that knowledge of the diversity [of phenomena] does not exist in a Buddha’s mental continuum but instead is included within the continuums of trainees are deprecating a Buddha’s knowledge of the diversity, and

2. certain [other scholars] who deprecate both pristine wisdoms, saying that even knowledge of the mode [of being of phenomena] does not exist in a Buddha’s mental continuum.

Some remaining topics concerning this will be explained on the occasion of [the eleventh ground,] the fruit.
Objection: Would a nature with such an aspect of the vanishing of dualistic appearance not be unseen? Therefore, how do those Buddhas perceive it?

Answer: Since dualistic appearance has vanished in the perspective of perceiving suchness, it is true that it is not perceived in a dualistic manner, but it is said that they perceive in the manner of non-perception.

How this serves as an answer to the objection is:

- because that knowledge of the mode [of being of phenomena] directly perceives the suchness of the aggregates and so forth, and
- because the non-establishment of the aggregates and so forth in that perspective of perception is their suchness, and
- because the suchness of the aggregates and so forth must be perceived in the manner of not perceiving them.

Chandrakīrti’s Autocommentary on the “Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle’” says:

Without contacting produced things, it actualizes solely the nature, whereby suchness is understood; therefore, [a being who possesses such knowledge] is called “Buddha.”


\[b\] *rang bzhin, svabhāva*. This is not the object of negation of emptiness, but the final nature of phenomena.
Thus, Chandrakīrti says that a Buddha’s pristine wisdom knowing the ultimate realizes only the noumenon without contacting the substrata. This has the same meaning as the statement that the suchness of the aggregates and so forth is seen in the manner of not seeing them.

Also, with respect to the meaning of the statement that “Non-seeing is the ultimate seeing,” it is not being asserted that not seeing anything is to see; rather, as explained earlier, not seeing the proliferations [of inherent existence and of veilings] is posited as seeing the freedom from proliferations; therefore, the seen and the unseen are not taken as the same base. Moreover, in that way the Verse Summary of the Perfection of Wisdom says:

The One-Gone-Thus teaches that one who does not see forms, 
Does not see feelings, does not see discriminations,

\[a\] saṃcaya-gāthāprajñāpāramitā, shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa sdud pa, stanzas XII.9-10; Toh. 13, kal f (shes rab sna tshogs); Sanskrit and Tibetan texts edited by Yuyama, Saṃcaya-gāthā, 52 and 171. For the Sanskrit, see the footnote on 213. English translation in Conze, Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines, 32.
Does not see intentions, does not see
Consciousness, mind, or sentience sees the dharma.\(^a\)

Analyze how space is seen as in the expression
By sentient beings in words, “Space is seen.”
The One-Gone-Thus teaches that seeing the dharma is also like that.
The seeing cannot be expressed by another example.

This says that the unseen is the aggregates, and the seen is the dharma;\(^b\)
that means suchness,\(^c\) as in the statement, “Whoever sees dependent-arising sees the dharma.”

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\(^a\) chos, which here means noumenon (chos nyid, dharmatā), as Tsong-kha-pa says just below when he equates it with suchness.

\(^b\) chos.

\(^c\) de kho na nyid, tathātā.
Furthermore, it is like, for example, the fact that space is a mere elimination of the obstructive objects of touch, and that seeing it—or realizing it—is taken as not seeing the preventive obstruction that is the object of negation and is suitable to be observed if it were present. In that [example], the seen is space, and the unseen is preventive obstruction. The last [two] lines refute that suchness is seen while seeing blue [for instance], which would be not to see in accordance with the example [of seeing space].

As a source for seeing in the manner of not seeing, [Chandrakīrti] cites the Introduction to the Two Truths Sūtra:

Devaputras, ultimately if the ultimate truth were of the nature of an object of body, of speech, or of mind, it would not be counted as an “ultimate truth”; it would be just a veil truth. However, Devaputras, ultimately the ultimate truth is passed beyond all conventions; it is not particularized, not produced, not ceasing, and devoid of object propounded and propounder as well as object known and consciousness.

The meaning of this first part of that sūtra passage is:

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\[ bden pa gnyis la 'jug pa / bden pa po'i le'u, satyakaparivarta; P813, vol. 32. This passage is cited in Chandrakīrti’s Commentary on the “Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) Treatise on the Middle,” commenting on VI.29; Toh. 3862, vol. ‘a, 256a.2; La Vallée Poussin, Madhyamakāvatāra, 111.1-111.4; La Vallée Poussin, “Introduction au traité du milieu,” Muséon 11 (1910): 306-307. \]
If it were that the ultimate truth is not—in the perspective of seeing the ultimate—seen in the manner of not seeing veilings such as the aggregates and so forth, but is an object in the way that the aggregates and so forth become objects of body, of speech, and of mind, then since in the perspective of directly seeing suchness it would not be free from proliferations, it would not be the ultimate truth but would be a veiling proliferation.

Taken that way, [the first part of Chandrakirti’s citation] goes as a source for seeing in the manner of not seeing.
With respect to the meaning of the second part of that sūtra passage, that in the perspective of directly seeing the ultimate the ultimate truth “is not particularized,” the meaning is that it is without many different features. The other three [“not particularized, not produced, not ceasing”] are easy to understand; that in the perspective of this perception it is devoid of the objects and agents of propositions is easy [to understand]. That it is not contradictory that although this pristine wisdom directly seeing suchness can be posited as a knower of the ultimate and ultimate truth can be posited as its object known, in the perspective of that pristine wisdom those two—agent and object—are absent is because agent and object are posited only in the perspective of conventional awarenesses; it is like the fact that, for example, although an inferential rational consciousness can be posited as a subject\(^a\) and ultimate truth can be posited as [its] object, the two—the agentness and objectness of subject and object—are not posited in the perspective of the rational consciousness.

\(^a\) yul can.
Devaputras, the ultimate truth is beyond [the objects of all consciousnesses] ranging right through the objects of omniscient pristine wisdoms endowed with the supreme of all aspects; it is not as expressed in the phrase “ultimate truth.” All phenomena are false; they are deceptive phenomena.

The meaning of this citation is as follows:

• The first clause indicates that the ultimate truth is beyond the objects of omniscient pristine wisdoms.
• “It is not as expressed in the phrase ‘ultimate truth’” indicates how ultimate truth is beyond the objects of that [wisdom]. It is beyond the objects of the knowledge of the mode [of being of phenomena] by an omniscient consciousness in the sense of appearing in accordance with the individual dualistic appearance of separate subject and object to a conceptual consciousness induced by the expression “This is ultimate truth.” Since all dualistically appearing phenomena are false, deceptive phenomena, those do not exist in the perspective of the perception of the solely nondelusive suchness.

All those [statements] are sources for the nonappearance of veilings, such as the aggregates, in the perspective of directly perceiving suchness.
Therefore, none of the proliferations of dualistic phenomena such as effective thing, non-effective thing, and so forth occur in the perspective of directly perceiving suchness because the entities of those proliferations are not observed in that perspective. In that case, in actuality only Superiors are valid with respect to contemplating suchness; non-Superiors are not actually valid. Hence, the world does not damage [that is, invalidate] the refutation of production from other in the perspective of a Superior’s perception of suchness.

\[^{a}\) bsam pa.\]
Abbreviations


“2015 Go-mang Lhasa” = dbu ma la ’jug pa’i mtha’ dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zab don kun gsal skal bzang ’jug ngogs. Named “2015” because of being acquired in Lhasa, Tibet, at Go-mang College in 2015 by Jongbok Yi for the UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies; published at Go-mang College, date unknown. (To be made available at UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, uma-tibet.org.)


“co ne” = co ne bstan ’gyur. TBRC W1GS66030. co ne dgon chen: co ne, 1926.


“lha sa” = lha sa bstan ’gyur. TBRC W26071 (PDF of: Zhol bka’ ’gyur par khang, Lhasa, Tibet, 1934).


Abbreviations


“*snar thang*” = *snar thang bstan ’gyur*. TBRC W22704.89 (PDF of: Narthang: s. n., 1800?).

“TBRC” = Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center (http://www.tbrc.org).
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Buddhapālita (sangs rgyas bskyangs, c. 470-540?)

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Chandrakīrti (zla ba grags pa, seventh century)

[Auto]commentary on the “Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle’”

madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya
dbu ma la 'jug pa'i bshad pa / dbu ma la 'jug pa'i rang 'grel
Peking 5263, vol. 98.


Clear Words: Commentary on (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle”

229
mūlamadhyamakavṛttiprasannapadā
dbu ma rtsa ba ’i grel pa tshig gsal ba
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madhyamakāvatāra
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Jayānanda

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The Lam rim chen mo of the incomparable Tsong-kha-pa, with the interlinear notes of Ba-so
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lam rim mchan bzhi sbrags ma/ mnyam med rje btsun tsong kha pa chen pos mdzad pa’i byang
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legs bshad gser 'phreng / shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan 'grel pa dang bca's pa'i rgya cher bshad pa legs bshad gser gyi phreng ba


Great Exposition of Secret Mantra / The Stages of the Path to a Victor and Pervasive Master, a Great Vajradhara: Revealing All Secret Essentials

sngags rim chen mo / rgyal ba khyab bdag rje 'chang chen po'i lam gyi rim pa gsang ba kun gyi gnad mam par phyé ba


Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path / Stages of the Path to Enlightenment Thoroughly Teaching All the Stages of Practice of the Three Types of Beings

lam rim chen mo / skyes bu gsum gyi nyams su blang ba’i rim pa thams cad tshang bar ston pa’i byang chub lam gyi rim pa


Medium-Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment to be Practiced by Beings of the Three Capacities / Medium-Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment to be Practiced by Beings of the Three Capacities together with an Outline / Short Exposition of the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment

skyes bu gsam gyis nyams su blang ba’i byang chub lam gyi rim pa / skyes bu gsam gyi nyams su blang ba’i byang chub lam gyi rim pa bring po sa bcad kha skong dang beas pa / lam rim ’brin / lam rim chung ngu


English translation of the section on special insight:


Notes on [Śāntarakṣita’s] "Ornament for the Middle
dbu ma rgyan gyi zin bris
Buxa: Se-ra Jay, 196-?
(No TBRC entry)

*Words of Instruction on the Middle Way View*
dbu ma’i lta ba’i ‘khris yig bsugs (Within dbu ma’i lta khris phyogs bsdebs)
(No TBRC entry)

*Tshul-trim-gya-tsho (tshul khrims rgya mtsno, 20th century)*
Timely Mirror Illuminating the Meaning of Difficult Points
dka’ gnad kyi don gsal bar byed pa dus kyi me long
Delhi: Guru Deva, 1983.
(No TBRC entry)

Vasubandhu (dbyig gnyen, fl. 360)

Commentary on the “Sūtra on the Ten Grounds”
daśabhūmiyākhyāna
sa bcu’i ram par bshad pa
3. Other Works


Guy Newland is Professor of Religion and Chair of the Department of Philosophy and Religion at Central Michigan University, where he has taught since 1988. He studied with Jeffrey Hopkins at the University of Virginia, earning a B.A. in 1977, an M.A. in 1983 and a Ph.D. in 1988. His work has focused on translations and interpretive works on the Middle Way philosophy of Gelugpa Tibetan Buddhism.

Newland received teachings from many Tibetan scholars, including Geshe Paldan Dragpa, Geshe Losang Gyatsho, and Geshe Yeshe Thabkhy. He collaborated in translating and editing Tsongkhapa’s *Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment* and then wrote an explanation of portions of that book, *Introduction to Emptiness*. He translated and edited the Dalai Lama’s teachings on the *Great Treatise* as the book *From Here to Enlightenment*. Newland also edited the collection *Changing Minds* in celebration of the career of Jeffrey Hopkins. His other publications on Tibetan Middle Way philosophy include *The Two Truths* and *Appearance and Reality*. Under the name the Cowherds, Guy Newland collaborated with Jay Garfield and several others to produce further studies of the Middle Way School in the books *Moonshadows* and *Moonpaths*. Newland has often taught at the Tibetan Buddhist Learning Center and at Sravasti Abbey; he has been a returning guest teacher at other Tibetan Buddhist centers such as Vajrapani Institute, Ocean of Compassion, and Jewel Heart. He has also taught at centers such as Ancient Dragon Zen Gate, the Greater Boston Zen Center, and the Bodhi Mind Center, as well as in penitentiaries of the Michigan Department of Corrections.

Guy has two adult children, Gabriel and Rebecca. After the death of his wife Valerie Stephens in 2013, he published *A Buddhist Grief Observed*. In 2014 he co-founded the Central Michigan Sangha, an egalitarian and non-sectarian practice group. In 2016 he married Carolina Gutiérrez-Rivas.

Craig Preston is Visiting Professor of Tibetan Buddhism at Maitripa College of Portland, Oregon. He received his B.A. from the University of Virginia in 1982, studying Indian and Tibetan Buddhism with Professor Jeffrey Hopkins. He received his J.D. degree from the University of Virginia School of Law in 1985 and practiced law for seven years in Virginia. Preston has been teaching Tibetan language since 1993. Along with Daniel Cozort he has translated Losang Gönchok’s *Short Commentary to Jamyang Shayba’s Root Text on Tenets*, and has published two books for Tibetan language students. In 2010 he taught Tibetan and translation methodology at Maitripa College of Portland, Oregon, and is also a translator of the UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies.
This book is an annotated translation of the beginning section in the sixth chapter on the two truths in Jam-yang-shay-pa Ngag-wang-tsön-drü’s Decisive Analysis of (Chandrakīrti’s) “Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle’”: Treasury of Scripture and Reasoning, Thoroughly Illuminating the Profound Meaning [of Emptiness], Entrance for the Fortunate, also called Decisive Analysis of the Middle and Great Exposition of the Middle. A textbook for the study of the Middle Way philosophy of liberation in the Gomang College of Drepung Monastery, it has been in continuous use since its publication in 1695.

The primary Indian textual source for the study of Middle Way philosophy of liberation for the Ge-lug-pa School is Chandrakīrti’s Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle, a presentation of the explicit teaching on the emptiness of inherent existence in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras. The primary Tibetan textual source for the study of Chandrakīrti’s Supplement is Tsong-kha-pa’s Illumination of the Thought, a commentary published in 1418 late in his life. Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle is a supplementary text written almost three centuries later, analyzing specific issues often in debate format to correct errors years either by Tibetans who criticized Tsong-kha-pa or by members of his own Ge-lug School with whom he disagreed. Both Tsong-kha-pa’s and Jam-yang-shay-pa’s texts are translated in this book.

Jam-yang-shay-pa’s initial section on the two truths treats the basis of the division into the two truths, the division into the two truths, whether the two truths are one or different, and the individual entities of the two truths. Readers interested in Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle may wish to consult in this series:

• Title, Translators’ Obeisance, and How Hearers and Solitary Realizers are Born from Buddhas, by Jules Levinson;
• The Opposite of Emptiness in the Middle Way Autonomy School, by Jongbok Yi; and
• The Opposite of Emptiness in the Middle Way Consequence School, by Jongbok Yi. uma-tibet.org