The Difference Between Realizing and Not Realizing
Jam-yang-shay-pa’s
Presentation of Awareness and Knowledge, 1

Elizabeth Napper
Edited by Jeffrey Hopkins

UMA INSTITUTE FOR TIBETAN STUDIES
Presentation of Awareness and Knowledge

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Translation of texts from the heritage of Tibetan and Inner Asian Buddhist systems, the project focuses on Great Indian Books and Tibetan commentaries from the Go-mang College syllabus as well as a related theme on the fundamental innate mind of clear light in Tantric traditions. A feature of the Project is the usage of consistent vocabulary and format throughout the translations.

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Preface

JAM-YANG-SHAY-PA

Jam-yang-shay-pa Ngag-wang-tsön-drü was born in the northeastern Am-do Province of Tibet in the Earth-Mouse year of 1648 east of the Blue Lake. At the age of five he was blessed by the Fifth Dalai Lama, from whom he later received monastic vows. Having studied the alphabet at age seven with his uncle, who was a monk, he mastered reading and writing and six years later became a novice monk, excelling among his fellow students by his ability quickly to understand texts and disputationes. He went to Lhasa at age twenty-one to further his studies at the Gomang College of Dre-pung Monastic University. Arriving in Lhasa in 1668, he offered a presentation scarf to an image of Mañjushrī in the Jo-khang Temple, where the statue reportedly favored the young scholar with a smile, due to which he became known as Jam-yang-shay-pa, “Smiled Upon by Mañjushrī.” Six years later he received full ordination and at twenty-nine entered Gyumay Tantric College. From age thirty-three he spent two years in meditative retreat in a cave near Dre-pung.

At the age of thirty-eight in 1685 he published the first of his major works, Decisive Analysis of (Tsong-kha-pa’s) “Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive”: Storehouse of White Lapis-Lazuli of Scripture and Reasoning Free from Mistake, Fulfilling the Hopes of the Fortunate, commonly called Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive. In 1688 he published another of his great expositions, the Treatise on the Presentations of the Concentrative and Formless Absorptions: Adornment Beautifying the Subduer’s Teaching, Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning, Delighting the Fortunate, commonly called Great Exposition of the Concentrative and Formless Absorptions. He published the Root Text of Tenets: Lion’s Roar in 1689, and published the Great Exposition of Tenets—it’s prose auto-commentary—ten years later in 1699, and between those two, in 1695, he published the Decisive Analysis of (Chandrakīrti’s) “Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle’”: Treasury of Scripture and Reasoning, Thoroughly Illuminating the Profound Meaning

1. For a longer biography of Jam-yang-shay-pa see Derek F. Maher, “Knowledge and Authority in Tibetan Middle Way Schools of Buddhism: A Study of the Gelukha (dge lugs pa) Epistemology of Jamyang Shayba (jam dbyangs bzhad pa) In Its Historical Context” (Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, 2003), 169-196.

Of Emptiness], Entrance for the Fortunate also called the Great Exposition of the Middle. At age fifty-three in 1700 he became abbot of Go-mang College and in 1709 at sixty-two returned to Am-do Province where he founded a highly influential monastery at Tra-shi-khyil\(^a\) in 1710. Seven years later he founded a tantric college at the same place. He wrote prolifically on the full range of topics of a typical Tibetan polymath and, having received honors from the central Tibetan government and from the Chinese Emperor, died at the age of seventy-three or -four in 1721/2.\(^b\)

Partly because of the close connection between Go-mang College and the Mongolian peoples stretching from the Caspian Sea through Siberia, who were predominantly Ge-lug-pa by this time, Jam-yang-shay-pa’s influence on the Ge-lug-pa order has been considerable. His life manifests a pattern typical of many influential Tibetan religious figures—child prodigy, learned scholar, disseminator of the religion, politician, priest to political personages, monastery leader, yogi, magician, popular teacher, and prolific writer.

**EDITIONS CONSULTED**

Two main editions of Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Beautiful Golden Garland of Eloquence Illuminating a Little the Presentation of Awareness and Knowledge were consulted:

1. *blo rigs kyi rnam bzhag nyung gsal legs bshad gsar gyi phreng mdzes.* Published at Go-mang College, date unknown. Interlinear reference in the Tibetan text “[G##a/b].” Abbreviated reference such as in footnotes: “1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa,” so named because of being acquired by Jeffrey Hopkins in Lhasa, Tibet, at Go-mang College in 1987. This version was likely originally printed at Go-mang College, Lhasa, Tibet, during Jam-yang-shay-pa residence at Go-mang College. (To be made available at UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, uma-tibet.org.)

2. *blo rig gi rnam bzhag nyung gsal legs bshad gsar gyi ‘phreng mdzes,* TBRC W22186-11KG10682: 303-374, which is a PDF of: *bla brang bkra shis ’khyil,* *bla brang brka shis ’khyil dgon,* publishing date unknown. Interlinear reference in the Tibetan text “[L##a/b].” Abbreviated reference such as in footnotes: “2011 TBRC *bla brang,*” so named because of being acquired by E. Gene Smith for the Tibetan

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\(^a\) _bkra shis ’khyil._

\(^b\) See Maher, “Knowledge and Authority in Tibetan Middle Way Schools of Buddhism,” 164.
Buddhist Resource Center at the request of the UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies in 2011. This edition, which is a revision of the above edition, was published in La-brang-tra-shi-khyil monastery founded by Jam-yang-shay-pa after his return to Am-do. In general, it is the preferred edition, though not always. This edition has spawned other editions such as:


The digital Tibetan text of Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Presentation of Awareness and Knowledge provided in this book was supplied by the Drepung Gomang Library of Go-mang College in Mundgod, Karnataka State, India, which was likely based on the 1995 Mundgod codex. It has been edited in accordance with the “2011 TBRC bla brang” and the “1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa” editions.

**TECHNICAL NOTES**

It is important to recognize that:

- translations and editions of texts are given in the Bibliography;
- the names of Indian Buddhist schools of thought are translated into English in a wish to increase accessibility for non-specialists;
- for the names of Indian scholars and systems used in the body of the text, ch, sh, and ṣh are used instead of the more usual c, ś, and .syntax for the sake of easy pronunciation by non-specialists; however, cch is used for cch, not cchh. Within parentheses the usual transliteration system for Sanskrit is used;
- transliteration of Tibetan is done in accordance with a system devised by Turrell Wylie; see “A Standard System of Tibetan Transcription,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 22 (1959): 261-267;
- the names of Tibetan authors and orders are given in “essay phonetics” for the sake of easy pronunciation; the system is aimed at internet
searchability;

• titles of added subsections are given in square brackets;
• definitions are in bold type.
Jam-yang-shay-pa’s

PRESENTATION OF

AWARENESS AND

KNOWLEDGE:

Realizing and Nonrealizing
Awarenesses

Key to the colorization: In situations of debate the Tibetan text and the translation are highlighted in three colors: black, blue, and red. Blue print presents what Jam-yang-shay-pa considers to be right positions, while red print represents what Jam-yang-shay-pa considers to be wrong positions. Words in black are other information or function structurally. In the Tibetan, a turquoise background indicates material added in place of ellipses, and a magenta highlight sets off ellipsis indicators when the elided part has been filled in.
Jam-yang-shay-pa’s

Beautiful Golden Garland of Eloquence
Illuminating a Little the Presentation of
Awareness and Knowledge

Namo śrīmañjughośāya svarasvastyai ca mahādhīme prayaccha.

Having bowed down to the Victors increasing all the abundances
of cyclic existence and peace,
And to the treasures of awareness, the gentle voiced (jam
dbyangs) father and mother [Mañjushrī and Svarasvatī],
I will shine forth (bzhad) a hundred thousand understandings
clearing away the darkness
Of the imputations by other schools and of the guesses\(^b\) of children about awareness.

Concerning this, here the explanation of the presentation of Awareness and
Knowledge has two parts: the presentation of object-possessing aware-
nesses and the presentation of objects.

\(^a\) 2011 TBRC bla brang title page reads blo rig; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa title page reads blo rigs.
\(^b\) ‘ol tshod.
\(^c\) 2011 TBRC bla brang, 1a.2, reads blo rig; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 1a.2, reads blo rigs.
Presentation of Object-Possessing Awarenesses

This section has two parts: stating the scriptural passage and explaining its meaning.

I. STATING THE SCRIPTURAL PASSAGE

With regard to explaining the meaning of awareness in our own schools, the [second] chapter, Establishment of Valid Cognition in Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid Cognition” says:

Wisdom and so forth, without [following]
The development and diminishment of the body
Develop and diminish due to the features
Of activities of awarenesses.

II. EXPLAINING THE MEANING OF THE SCRIPTURAL PASSAGE

This section has three parts: definitions, synonyms, and divisions.

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a Dharmakīrti, tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi tshig le 'ur byas pa (pramāṇavārttikakārikā), II.73, in bstan 'gyur (sde dge, 4210), TBRC W23703.174:189-304 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa chodhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 110a.6-7.
A. DEFINITIONS

Knower is the definition of awareness. Illustrations are wisdom and valid cognition, for instance. It follows with respect to the subjects, those two [wisdom and valid cognition], that the meaning of knower exists because that which that which perceives an object when it dawns (yul 'char ba dang snang ba) is the meaning of knowing that object.

B. SYNONYMS

Synonyms exist because awareness (blo), consciousness (shes pa), knower (rig pa), and illuminator (gsal ba) are equivalent.

A definition of consciousness exists because luminous non-materi-
ality (gsal ba'i bem min) is that. Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on Dignāga’s “Compilation of Valid cognition” says:

Therefore according to us an awareness (blo) itself
Is a luminous entity (gsal ba'i ngo bo) [and hence the entity of
the object] is intensely illuminated (rab gsal).

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a Correcting rigs pa in 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 1a.5, to rig pa in accordance with 2011 TBRC bla brang, 1b.1.
b Correcting rigs pa in 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 1a.5, to rig pa in accordance with 2011 TBRC bla brang, 1b.2. In subsequent uses of the term, the 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa text read rir na as does the 2011 TBRC bla brang text.
c tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi tshig le'ur byas pa, 136b.6-7.
Moreover, let us speak more extensively [about these]. Its being a knower that perceives its object is the definition of its being an awareness. Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on Dignāga’s “Compilation of Valid cognition” says:\(^a\)

When it is asserted thus that [the aspect of a former] awareness (blo) [is transferred to a later] awareness,

The [later] awareness is [itself] established as a knower (rig pa).

Its being non-matter that illuminates its object is the definition of its being a consciousness because Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on Dignāga’s “Compilation of Valid Cognition” says:\(^b\)

Because [an awareness] is itself intensely luminous,

The entity of the object is intensely illuminated.

and the Autocommentary to (Śaṅkarācārya’s) Ornament for the Middle says,\(^c\) “Since a consciousness is luminous, [the luminous] is not illuminated.”

\(^a\) tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi tshig le'ur byas pa, 136b.6.
\(^b\) tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi tshig le'ur byas pa, 136b.7.
\(^c\) Śaṅkarācārya, dbu ma rgyan gyi 'grel pa (madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti), in bstan 'gyur (sde dge, 3885), TBRC W23703.107:114-169 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 61a.6.
“Non-matter” (bem min) is an oppositional term (‘gal zla’i tshig) because Shāntideva’s Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds says, “Consciousness is the opposite, non-matter,” and Shāntarakṣhita’s Ornament for the Middle says:

Because mentalism [that is, mind] is not physical
It cannot be overcome by anyone in any way.
Due to adherence to the body
The body is harmed by sufferings.

Lo-sang-gya-tsho corrects the reading to: “Consciousness is the opposite of matter” (shes pa bem pa’i log pa ste) but declares that even this corrected line is not found in Shāntideva’s Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds. However, as Jongbok Yi points out, there is a somewhat similar line in the Chapter on Patience in Shāntideva’s Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds:

Shāntideva, byang chub sems dpa’i spyod pa la ’jug pa (bodhisattvavacaryāvatāra), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 3871), TBRC W23703.105: 84-378 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa chedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 16b.3-4.

Shāntarakṣhita’s root text reads:

Shāntarakṣhita’s autocommentary (dbu ma rgyan gvi ‘grel pa, 60b.2-4.) reads:
A consciousness is generated
Opposite from a nature of matter.

1. Here someone says: The definition of a knower (rig pa) is an awareness to which the aspect of an object dawns (yul gyi rnam pa shar ba’i blo) and says that the aspect of an object does not dawn to a self-knower.

Our response: These are internally contradictory.

Kamalashīla’s commentary (dbu ma rgyan gyi dka’ ’grel, madhyamakālamkāraṇājñā), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 3886), W23703.107:169-268 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa chodhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 94b.2-3] reads:

Footnote provided by Jongbok Yi.
a 2011 TBRC bla brang, 2b.3 reads ldog pa rab tu skye ba; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 2b.1 reads bzlogs par rab tu skye ba.
b 2011 TBRC bla brang, 2b.3; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 2b.1.
2. Someone says: It follows that the subject, a self-knower, is an awareness to which its object appears (*rang yul snang ba’i blo*) because of being a knower. It follows [that a self-knower is a knower] because of being a self-knower. You have accepted the reason [which is that a self-knower is a self-knower]. If you accept [that a self-knower is an awareness to which its object appears (*rang yul snang ba’i blo*)], it follows that the aspect of its object dawns (*rang yul gyi rnam pa shar ba*) because its object appears (*rang yul snang ba*).

Our response: [That its object appears] does not entail [that the aspect of its object dawns].

The opponent’s rejoinder: It follows [that its object appears] entails [that the aspect of its object dawns] because the aspect of its object appears (*rang yul gyi rnam pa snang ba*). It follows [that the aspect of its object appears] because its object appears (*rang yul snang ba*).

Our response: Again, [that its object appears] does not entail [that the aspect of its object appears]. You cannot accept any of those three [namely, that (1) the definition of a knower (*rig pa*) is an awareness to which the aspect of an object dawns (*yul gyi rnam pa shar ba’i blo*); (2) to a self-knower the aspect of its object dawns (*rang yul gyi rnam pa shar ba*); and (3) to a self-knower the aspect of its object appears (*rang yul gyi rnam pa snang ba*)] because a representation-aspect of the object (*yul gyi ’dra*

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*a* 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 2b.4; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 2b.2.
20 Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Awareness and Knowledge

rnam\textsuperscript{a} does not dawn (ma shar ba) [to a self-knower]. It follows [that a representation-aspect of the object does not dawn] because [a self-knower] is an awareness for which the dualistic appearance of object and subject has disappeared (yul yul can gyi gnyis snang nub pa’i blo). It follows [that a self-knower is an awareness for which the dualistic appearance of object and subject has disappeared] because of being a self-knower. [Whatever is a self-knower necessarily is [an awareness for which the dualistic appearance of object and subject has disappeared] because Shāntarakṣhita’s Ornament for the Middle says, “Its self-knower does not have a nature of object and agent.”\textsuperscript{b}

3. About this formulation someone says:\textsuperscript{c} It follows that even its aspect does not dawn to that [self-knower] because it is an aspectless consciousness (rnam med kyi shes pa). It follows [that a self-knower is an aspectless consciousness] because Shāntarakṣhita’s Autocommentary to the “Ornament for the Middle” says: \textsuperscript{d}

It is not feasible to posit an aspect for self-knowers in the manner in which it is expressed for consciousnesses having aspects.

\textsuperscript{a} Or “likeness-aspect of the object.”
\textsuperscript{b} dbu ma rgyan gyi ’grel pa, 60b.4.
\textsuperscript{c} 2011 TBRC bla brang, 3a.1; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 2b.5.
\textsuperscript{d} dbu ma rgyan gyi ’grel pa, 60b.5.
Our response: [That Shāntarakṣhitā’s Autocommentary to the “Ornament for the Middle” says this] does not entail [that a self-knower is an aspectless consciousness] because the meaning [of that passage] is that [self-knowers] do not have the dualistic appearance of object and subject. Otherwise, it [absurdly] follows that [a self-knower] is not a consciousness having an aspect (rnam can gyi shes pa ma yin pa) because [according to you] neither the aspect of itself nor its object appears. You [incorrectly] have accepted the reason [which is that neither the aspect of itself nor its object appears].

If you [incorrectly] accept [that a self-knower is not a consciousness having an aspect], it [very absurdly] follows that [a self-knower] is not even that which has the aspect of the apprehender (’dzin rnam yang ma yin pa) because you [incorrectly] have accepted [that a self-knower is not a consciousness having an aspect]. You cannot accept [that a self-knower is not even that which has the aspect of the apprehender] because with respect to a sense consciousness perceiving blue [there exist] (1) that which has the

\[\text{[72x189]de ltar}.\]

\[\text{a 2011 TBRC bla brang, 3a.2, reads de lta bu’i; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 2b.6, reads de ltar.}\]

\[\text{b 2011 TBRC bla brang, 3a.3, reads rnam can; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 3a.1, reads rnam beas.}\]
aspect of the apprehended (gzung rnam) such as the aspect of blue and is an other-knowing consciousness and (2) the mere-experiencer, the self-knower, that which has the aspect of the apprehender ('dzin rnam), because Gen-dun-drub's Ornament for Reasoning\(^a\) says:

Since in the likes of a sense consciousness perceiving blue there exist (1) a factor to which the aspect of the object dawns (yul gyi rnam pa shar ba'i cha) and (2) a factor of mere experience (myong tsam gyi cha), the first is that which was the aspect of the apprehended (gzung rnam) and the second is a self-knowing direct perception (rang rig mngon sum).

There are many such distinctions.

\(^a\) tshad ma rigs rgyan, in gsung 'bum (dge 'dun grub pa), TBRC W759.4:101-524 (Gangtok: Dodrup Lama Sangye, 1978-1981), 37b.4.
\(^b\) 2011 TBRC bla brang, 3a.3, reads 'dod na; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 3a.2, reads 'o na.
\(^c\) 2011 TBRC bla brang, 3a.4, reads gzung rnam; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 3a.3, reads bzung rnam.
\(^d\) Correcting rig rgyan in 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 3a.3, to rigs rgyan in accordance with 2011 TBRC bla brang, 3a.4.
\(^e\) 2011 TBRC bla brang, 3a.5, reads yod pas; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 3a.4, reads yod pa'i.
\(^f\) 2011 TBRC bla brang, 3a.5, reads gzung rnam; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 3a.4, reads bzung rnam.
4. Also, in the speech of a certain chief logician of Tibet it is said: That which knows an object (yul rig par bya ba) is the definition of an awareness.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, a person (skyes bu, puruṣa), is an awareness because of being that definition [that is, that which knows an object]. The reason [which is that a person knows an object] is easy [to establish].

C. DIVISIONS

There are six divisions [of awarenesses]: division into the two, realizing awarenesses and non-realizing awarenesses; division into the seven awarenesses and knowledges; division into the two, prime [cognitions] and non-prime [consciousnesses]; into the two, conceptual and nonconceptual [consciousnesses], into the two, direct perceptions and subsequent cognitions, and division into the two, minds and mental factors.a

a The first of these six is translated in this book.

b 2011 TBRC bla brang, 3a.6, reads dbye na; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 3a.5, reads dbye ba.

c Correcting rtog blo dang ma rtogs pa’i blo in 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 3a.5, to rtogs blo dang ma rtogs pa’i blo in accordance with 2011 TBRC bla brang, 3a.6.

d 2011 TBRC bla brang, 3b.1, reads tshad ma dang tshad min gnyis su dbye ba; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 3a.5, reads only tshad ma tshad min gnyis su.
བོད་པ་ལས།
1. Realizing and non-realizing awarenesses

About realizing awarenesses, Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid cognition” says: a

Furthermore, [if] whatsoever entity [or aspect]
Is not ascertained by the ascertaining [consciousness],
How could it be the [apprehended] object of that [consciousness]?

a. Realizing awarenesses

With respect to realizing awarenesses there are two, definition and explaining the meaning of the individual divisions.

---

a. tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi tshig le'ur byas pa, 97a.1, where the full stanza reads:

sgro 'dogs med pa'i yul la ni //
jug phyir gzhin yung ngo bo gang //
nges pa rnams kyi ma nges pa//
de ni ji ltar de yul yin/

Hiroshi Nemoto identifies the stanza as I.57 and, points out that the citation should begin a half line earlier, which is how it has been translated here.

b. Correcting rto in 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 3b.1, to rtogs in accordance with 2011 TBRC bla brang, 3b.2.

c. Correcting nges pa rnams kyi in 2011 TBRC bla brang, 3b.2, to nges pa rnams kyi in accordance with 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 3b.1, and the passage as found in Dharmakīrti’s text. Also, Dharmakīrti’s text as cited above reads ma nga pa, whereas both editions of Jam-yang-shay-pa’s text consulted read ma nges la.

d. Correcting rto in 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 3b.1, to rtogs in accordance with 2011 TBRC bla brang, 3b.2.
1) DEFINITION OF REALIZING AWARENESS

That which is able to induce ascertainment with respect to that phenomenon in dependence upon the functioning of this awareness is the definition of realizing that phenomenon by this awareness,

- because when this awareness ascertains that phenomenon, it eliminates superimpositions that are its opposite (rang gi bzlog zla’i sgro ‘dogs),
- because, for example, an inferential cognition ascertaining that sound is impermanent eliminates superimpositions apprehending permanence with respect to sound;
- Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid cognition” says:

Because ascertaining and superimposing mentalities
Are entities of harmer and harmed.

2) EXPLAINING THE MEANING OF THE INDIVIDUAL DIVISIONS

1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 3b.1, omits the phrase dang po ni.

tshad ma rnam ’grel gyi tshig le’ur byas pa, 96b.3-4.
When [realizing awarenesses] are divided, there are two—explicit realizers (dngos rtogs) and implicit realizers (shugs rtogs).

A) EXPLICIT REALIZERS

Realization by way of the aspect of that object dawning to this awareness

is the definition of explicit realization of that object by this awareness. Illustrations are, for instance, the realization of blue by a direct perception apprehending blue and the realization that sound [is] a product by an inferential cognition explicitly realizing sound as a product.

Whatever is an explicit realization (dngos rtogs) is not necessarily a direct realization (mngon sum du rtogs pa) because there exists a conceptual consciousness explicitly realizing sound as impermanent. [That there exists a conceptual consciousness explicitly realizing sound as impermanent] entails [that whatever is an explicit realization is not necessarily a direct realization] because with regard to whatever is a direct realization, the object necessarily appears clearly, because Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid cognition” says:

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a 2011 TBRC bla brang, 3b.5, reads mtshan gzhi ni sngon ’dzin; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 3b.4, omits ni and reads mtshan gzhi sngon ’dzin.

b 2011 TBRC bla brang, 3b.6, reads lta bu yin no/; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 3b.4, omits no and reads lta bu yin/.

c tshad ma rnam ’grel gyi tshig le’ur byas pa, 130a.1, where the second line reads de ni rtog med gnyi gar yang.
Whatever is an awareness possessing clear appearance
Is asserted as nonconceptual with respect to that.

The reason [which is that there exists a conceptual consciousness explicitly realizing sound as impermanent] above at the juncture of [proving] the entailment [that whatever is an explicit realization (dngos rtogs) is not necessarily a direct realization (mngon sum du rtogs pa)] is established because there exists an inferential cognition explicitly realizing sound as impermanent. [That there exists an inferential cognition explicitly realizing sound as impermanent] entails [that there exists a conceptual consciousness realizing sound as impermanent] because Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid cognition” says:

Whatever consciousness apprehends a meaning[-generality] or a sound[-generality]
Is asserted to be a conceptual consciousness with regard to that.

and also the chapter on direct perception in Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid cognition” says:

By clearing away the web of conceptuality
It appears just clearly.

\[a\] Correcting rnam 'grel in 2011 TBRC bla brang, 4a.1, to rnam 'grel in accordance with 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 3b.5.
\[b\] 2011 TBRC bla brang, 4a.1, reads ces gsungs pa'i phyir'/ 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 3b.6, reads ces byung '/
\[c\] tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi tshig le'ur byas pa. 129b.1.
\[d\] tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi tshig le'ur byas pa, 129a.4-5.
B) THE MANNER OF EXPLICIT REALIZATION AND IMPLICIT REALIZATION

This has two parts—the manner of explicit realization and implicit realization by valid cognitions and by non-prime consciousnesses.

1’ The manner of explicit and implicit realization by valid cognitions

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a Correcting de rtogs pa’i rjes dpag in 2011 TBRC bla brang, 4a.2, to de dngos su rtogs pa’i rjes dpag in accordance with 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 3b.6.
b Correcting reads ces byung / in 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 3b.7, to ces gsungs pa’i phyir/ in accordance with 2011 TBRC bla brang, 4a.3.
c 2011 TBRC bla brang, 4a.3, reads dngos rtogs dang shugs rtogs kyi tshul gnis yod/ 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 3b.7, reads dngos rtogs shugs rtogs kyi tshul gnis yod/.
d 2011 TBRC bla brang, 4a.4, reads dngos su dang shugs la; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 3b.7, reads dngos su dang shugs la.
Moreover, regarding the manner of explicit and implicit realization by valid cognitions, there are three because there are the three—(1) in general the mode of explicit and implicit realization by valid cognitions, (2) the mode of explicit and implicit realization by direct valid cognitions, and (3) the mode of explicit and implicit realization by inferential valid cognitions.

\[ \text{In general the mode of explicit and implicit realization by valid cognitions} \]

\[ [\text{In general the mode of explicit and implicit realization by valid cognitions}] \text{ exists because:} \]

\[ a. \text{inducing ascertainment by its own force—without relying on another subsequent awareness—through the force of (1) this valid cognition’s mentally turning toward that object and (2) the aspect [of that object] dawning [to it]} \]

is the meaning of explicit realization of that object by this valid cognition; and

\[ b. \text{despite not presently mentally turning to that object, merely by later mentally turning toward that object this valid cognition induces ascertainment of it—without relying on another valid cognition—through the force of its explicitly comprehending its [present] object of comprehension and due to having finished eliminating superimpositions with respect to its [present] object at this time in accordance with the context}^a \]

is the meaning of implicit realization of that object by this valid cognition. Distinctions are also needed with respect to these.

\[ a \text{ For instance, if you look inside a room and see that it is empty of any furnishings, at a later time, if asked if there is a chair in the room, you know by implicit realization that there is no chair there.} \]
b’ The mode of explicit and implicit realization by direct valid cognitions

The two meanings of explicit realization and implicit realization by direct valid cognitions, exist because:

a. that which eliminates superimpositions with respect to an object of comprehension upon the aspect of its object of comprehension actually dawning to that direct perception

is the definition of explicit realization of an object of comprehension by a direct valid cognition. An illustration, for example, is the elimination of superimpositions with respect to blue upon the aspect of blue clearly dawning to a direct valid cognition apprehending blue, and

b. that which eliminates superimpositions also with respect to another phenomenon—whose aspect does not dawn to it—through the force of having explicitly eliminated superimpositions with respect to its [present] object of comprehension by way of the aspect of that [present] object of comprehension

\[\text{L4b}\]

\[\text{L4b}\] Correcting don yir in 2011 TBRC bla brang, 4a.6 to don yin / in accordance with 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 4a.2.
explicitly having dawned [to it]

is the definition of implicit realization of another phenomenon by that direct valid cognition. An illustration, for example, is that which through the force of having induced ascertainment—upon the explicit dawning of the aspect of a place that is devoid of a pot—has eliminated superimpositions with respect to the existence of a pot and comes to ascertain the nonexistence of pot by mentally merely turning toward it even though the aspect of the nonexistence of pot in that place did not dawn [to it].
c' The mode of explicit and implicit realization by inferential valid cognitions

The two meanings of explicit and implicit realization by inferential valid cognitions, exist because:

a. that which eliminates superimpositions with respect to an object of comprehension by way of the meaningGenerality of that object of comprehension dawning to this inferential cognition

is the definition of explicit comprehension by an inferential cognition, an illustration being that which eliminates the superimpositions of apprehending sound as permanent by way of the meaningGenerality of impermanent sound explicitly appearing to an inferential cognition realizing sound as impermanent, and

b. that which eliminates superimpositions even with respect to another phenomenon—whose meaningGenerality does not dawn to that inferential cognition—through the force of having eliminated superimpositions with respect to the meaningGenerality of its object of comprehension having dawned to it

is the definition of realizing another phenomenon by the power of that inferential cognition; an illustration being that which (1) eliminates superimpositions of permanent existence with respect to sound—even though the meaningGenerality of the nonexistence of permanent sound does not dawn to it—through the force of that inferential cognition having eliminated superimpositions with respect to the meaningGenerality of its own [present] object of comprehension that has dawned to it and (2) will ascertain, without relying on another valid cognition, the nonexistence of permanence with respect to sound by merely mentally turning toward it.

_stobs kyis_ in accordance with 2011 TBRC bla brang, 4b.5.
That the meaning-generality of the phenomenon dawns to that conceptual consciousness is the meaning of the aspect of the phenomenon dawning to that conceptual consciousness.

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a 2011 TBRC bla brang, 4b.6, reads rjes dpag de la; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 4b.1, reads rjes dpag des.
b 2011 TBRC bla brang, 5a.1, reads mtshan gzhi ni / sgra mi rtag; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 4b.1, reads mtshan gzhi dper na sgra mi rtag.
c 2011 TBRC bla brang, 5a.1, at this juncture has a shad and reads lta bu / de la. 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 4b.2, has no such spacing, and running all the text together reads lta bu des.
d 2011 TBRC bla brang, 5a.2, reads chos gzhan la'ang; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 4b.3, reads only chos gzhan la.
e 2011 TBRC bla brang, 5a.2, reads mtshan nyid/ mtshan gzhi ni; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 4b.1, reads mtshan nyid yin/ and does not include mtshan gzhi ni.
f Both 2011 TBRC bla brang, 5a.3, and 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 4b.3, read chad ma.
2’ The manner of explicit and implicit realization by non-prime consciousnesses

This has two parts: definition and divisions.

With respect to the first, the two modes of explicit and implicit realization by non-prime cognitions exist because:

- realization of the remainder by way of the aspect dawning although superimpositions are not newly eliminated is the meaning of explicit realization
- realization [of the remainder] although the aspect does not dawn is the meaning of implicit realization.

With respect to the second [the divisions of explicit and implicit realization by non-prime consciousnesses], when those are divided, there are the two, correctly assuming consciousnesses, subsequent cognitions, and so forth. These will be explained on the occasion of the division of awarenesses into five.

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a 2011 TBRC bla brang, 5a.5, reads rnam pa shar ba’i sgo nas rtogs pa de; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 4b.5, reads only rnam pa shar ba’i sgo nas.

b 2011 TBRC bla brang, 5a.5, reads rnam pa ma shar kyang rtogs pa; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 4b.5, reads rnam pa ma shar kyang de rtogs pa.

c Lo-sang-gyal-tshan pointed out that in this situation sogs does not have a meaning of
DECISIVE ANALYSIS

5. Someone says: Whatever is an awareness realizing a phenomenon at its own time necessarily induces ascertainment with respect to that phenomenon at its own time.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows with respect to the subject, a sense direct perception apprehending a place devoid of a pot, that it induces ascertainment at its own time with respect to the nonexistence of a pot because it realizes that [nonexistence of a pot], because it realizes that [non-existence of a pot] implicitly. If you [incorrectly] accept [that a sense direct perception apprehending a place devoid of a pot induces ascertainment at its own time with respect to the nonexistence of a pot], it [absurdly] follows that even a sentient being’s ascertaining consciousness induces [ascertaintment] in this way because of being that [that is, being an ascertaining consciousness] in the continuum of a sentient being.

including more items but simply indicates multiplicity. Of the five non-prime awarenesses, only subsequent cognitions and correctly assuming consciousnesses can be said to “realize” their objects.

a 2011 TBRC bla brang, 5a.6, reads 'chad par ’gyur ro /; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 4b.6, reads only 'chad par ’gyur /.
b 2011 TBRC bla brang, 5a.6; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 4b.6.
You cannot accept [that even a sentient being’s ascertaining consciousness induces ascertainment] in this way [that is to say, at its own time] because it induces an ascertaining consciousness without interruption after itself. It follows [that it induces an ascertaining consciousness without interruption after itself] because two different ascertaining consciousnesses at one time in one continuum are not feasible, because Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid cognition” says, “Two conceptual consciousnesses are not seen at the same time.”

Similarly, it very absurdly follows that an inference realizing the impermanence of sound induces at its own time ascertainment also with respect to the nonexistence of permanent sound because it realizes that [nonexistence of permanent sound]. If you [incorrectly] accept [that an inferential cognition realizing the impermanence of sound induces at its own time ascertainment also with respect to the nonexistence of permanent sound], it is as above.

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*a* Correcting gyis in 2011 TBRC bla brang, 5b.2, and 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 4b.7, to gyi.

*b* 2011 TBRC bla brang, 5b.2, reads sms can gyis nges shes kyis kyung; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 4b.7, reads sms can ovig nges shes.

*c* tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi tshig le'ur byas pa, 125a.6.

*d* 2011 TBRC bla brang, 5b.2, reads 'dren pa'i phyir / der thal/; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 5a.1, reads 'dren pa'i phyir te /.

*e* 2011 TBRC bla brang, 5b.3, reads cig car; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 5a.1, reads geig car. TBRC bstan 'gyur (tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi tshig le'ur byas pa, 125a.6) reads eig car.

*f* Correcting cis car in 2011 TBRC bla brang, 5b.3, to eig car in accordance with the reading in Dharmakīrti’s text; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 5a.2, reads geig car.
6. Also, someone says: \(b\) Realization upon the aspect of that object dawning to an awareness is the meaning of its realization of that object.

Our response: It very absurdly follows that realization by an awareness is necessarily explicit realization by it because you have [incorrectly] accepted [that realization upon the aspect of that object dawning to an awareness is the meaning of its realization of that object]. You cannot accept [that realization by an awareness is necessarily explicit realization by it] because implicit realization by that [awareness] exists.

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\(\text{a}\) Correcting \textit{nges} in 2011 TBRC \textit{bla brang}, 5b.4, to \textit{des} in accordance with 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 5a.2.

\(\text{b}\) 2011 TBRC \textit{bla brang}, 5b.4; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 5a.2.

\(\text{c}\) 2011 TBRC \textit{bla brang}, 5b.4, reads \textit{rtogs pa’i don yin}; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 5a.3, reads \textit{rtogs pa’i don}.

\(\text{d}\) 2011 TBRC \textit{bla brang}, 5b.4, reads \textit{de’i dngos rtogs}; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 5a.3, reads only \textit{dngos rtogs}.

\(\text{e}\) 2011 TBRC \textit{bla brang}, 5b.5, reads \textit{de’i shugs rtogs}; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 5a.3, reads only \textit{shugs rtogs}. 
7. *Also, someone says:* If an awareness realizes that object, it necessarily eliminates or has eliminated superimpositions with respect to that [object].

*Our response:* It very absurdly follows that the subject, the two subsequent cognitions [conceptual and nonconceptual], eliminate superimpositions with respect to their object of comprehension because of realizing that [object of comprehension]. The reason [which is that the two subsequent cognitions, conceptual and nonconceptual, realize their object of comprehension] is easy [to establish]. If you [incorrectly] accept [that the two subsequent cognitions, conceptual and nonconceptual, eliminate superimpositions with respect to their object of comprehension], it follows that superimpositions with respect to that object are not eliminated by them because [superimpositions with respect to that object] have already been eliminated by an earlier valid cognition.

Furthermore, it [absurdly] follows that the subject, a correctly assuming consciousness, [eliminates superimpositions with respect to its object of comprehension] because of realizing its object of realization. You cannot accept [that a correctly assuming consciousness, eliminates superimpositions with respect to its object of comprehension] because it does not eliminate superimpositions by doubt. It follows [that it does not eliminate superimpositions by doubt] because of being a correctly assuming consciousness.

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\[\text{L6a}\] 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 5b.5; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 5a.3.
\[\text{L6b}\] 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 5b.6, reads *gcod*; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 5a.4, reads *gcad*. 
8. Also, someone says: Whatever is a nonmistaken awareness necessarily realizes its object of comprehension.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, respectively the three awarenesses to which an object appears but is not ascertained [—that is, sense, mental, and self-knowing direct perceptions which are such that an object appears but is not ascertained—realize their object of comprehension] because of being [nonmistaken awarenesses]. You cannot accept [that respectively the three awarenesses to which an object appears but is not ascertained—that is, sense, mental, and self-knowing direct perceptions which are such that an object appears but is not ascertained—realize their object of comprehension] because of being that subject [that is, being awarenesses to which an object appears but is not ascertained].

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a 2011 TBRC bla brang, 5b.6, reads *mi gcod pa'i phyir* der thal/*yid dpyod*; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 5a.5, reads *mi gcod pa'i phyir* te/*yid dpyod*.
b 2011 TBRC bla brang, 6a.1; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 5a.6.
c Once it lacks ascertainment, it does not realize an object of comprehension.
b. Non-realizing awarenesses

This has three parts: definition, divisions, and explaining the individual meanings.

1) DEFINITION OF NON-REALIZING AWARENESS

That which is an awareness unable to induce ascertainment with respect to its object of comprehension is the definition of its [being] a non-realizing awareness.

2) DIVISIONS OF NON-REALIZING AWARENESSES

When these are divided, there are three: nonconceivers, wrong conceivers, and doubting consciousnesses.

A) NON-CONCEIVERS

When the first [nonconceivers] are divided, there are two—a awarenesses to which the object appears but is not ascertained and nonconceptual wrong consciousnesses.

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\[\text{Footnotes:}\]

\(a\) 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 6a.2, reads *ma rtog*; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 5a.7, reads *ma rtog*. In the TBRC version, it may be that the secondary suffix *sa* was originally carved on the block and then later removed.

\(b\) 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 6a.3, reads *ma rtog*; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 5a.7, reads *ma rtog*.

\(c\) In this section of his text, Jam-yang-shay-pa only gives explanation of awarenesses to which the object appears but is not ascertained. He does not address at this juncture the above mentioned topics of wrong conceivers and doubting consciousnesses nor the topic mentioned here of nonconceptual wrong consciousnesses. These are discussed later in the
That which is a knower that is a common locus of (1) the specifically characterized phenomenon that is its object of operation appears clearly and (2) it also is unable to induce ascertaintment with respect to that object of operation, a specifically characterized phenomenon, is the definition of its being an awareness to which the object appears but is not ascertained.

When [awarenesses to which the object appears but is not ascertained] are divided, there are three: sense direct perceptions, mental direct perceptions, and self-knowing direct perceptions that are awarenesses to which the object appears but is not ascertained.

First, [sense direct perception to which the object appears but is not ascertained]:

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text.

a 2011 TBRC bla brang, 6a.4, reads rang mtshan la; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 5b.1, reads rang mtshan de la.

b 2011 TBRC bla brang, 6a.4-5, reads gzhi mthun par gyur pa'i rig pa yin pa de; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 5b.1-2, misreads gzhi mthun gya rag pa yin pa da.

c 2011 TBRC bla brang, 6a.5, reads snang la ma nges pa'i dbang mngon/yid mngon/rang rig mngon sum gsum yod; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 5b.2, spells this out in fuller form and reads snang la ma nges kyi dbang mngon/ snang la ma nges pa'i yid mngon/ snang la ma nges pa'i rang rig mngon sum gsum yod.
A sense direct perception unable to induce ascertainment even though its object of operation, a specifically characterized phenomenon, appears clearly is the definition of its being a sense direct perception to which the object appears but is not ascertained.

When those [sense direct perceptions to which the object appears but is not ascertained] are divided, there are five: sense direct perceptions—apprehending forms, apprehending sounds, apprehending odors, apprehending tastes, and apprehending tangible objects—that are awarenesses to which the object appears but is not ascertained; Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid cognition” says:a

The consciousness, due to engaging in another object, Is powerless [and therefore] does not apprehend the other object.

and also the chapter on direct perception in Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid Cognition” says:b

Though there is simultaneous production of [consciousnesses of] dissimilar types, The capacity degenerates Due to one mind that is very clear; Hence, other than the basis of all, others are not seen.

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a tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi tshig le'ur byas pa, 111b.6. The passage as found here reads don gzhan chags pa rather than don gzhang zhugs pa as cited in both versions of the text consulted.
b tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi tshig le'ur byas pa, 138b.1.
c 2011 TBRC bla brang, 6b.1, reads nus med zhes dang; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 5b.4, misreads nus mad zhas dang, and so forth.
d 2011 TBRC bla brang, 6b.1, reads cig car; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 5b.4, reads gcig
Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Awareness and Knowledge

gsals ba’i sems gchig gshis | kuns ’dbang phyag ’dus ’dane | a

The final line in the passage in Dharmaṅkīrti’s text differs from both editions of Jam-yang-shay-pa consulted and reads gzhang ’byung ba min rather than gzhan mthong ba med.

a 2011 TBRC bla brang, 6b.2, reads bya ba’i; 1987 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 5b.5, reads byas pa’i.

car. Dharmakīrti’s text, as cited above, reads eig car. The final line in the passage in Dharmaṅkīrti’s text differs from both editions of Jam-yang-shay-pa consulted and reads gzhang ’byung ba min rather than gzhan mthong ba med.
Abbreviations

“1987 Old Lhasa Go-mang” = blo rigs kyi rnam bzhag nyung gsal legs bshad gser gyi phreng mdzes. Named “1987” because of being acquired in Lha-sa, Tibet, at Go-mang College in 1987; published at Go-mang College, date unknown. (Complete edition, to be made available at UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, uma-tibet.org.)

“2011 TBRC bla brang” = blo rigs kyi rnam bzhag nyung gsal legs bshad gser gyi phreng mdzes. Named because of being acquired by E. Gene Smith for the Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center in 2011; published in Labrang-tra-shi-khyil monastery, date unknown.

“co ne” = co ne bstan ’gyur. TBRC W1GS66030. co ne dgon chen: co ne, 1926.


“TBRC” = Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center (http://www.tbrc.org).
Bibliography of Works Cited

Sūtras are listed alphabetically by English title in the first section; the terms “glorious” and “supreme” at the beginning of titles are often dropped in the Bibliography. Indian and Tibetan treatises are listed alphabetically by author in the second section; other works are listed alphabetically by author in the third section. Works mentioned in the first or second sections are not repeated in the third section.

1. **SANSKRIT AND TIBETAN WORKS**

Dharmakīrti (chos kyi grags pa, seventh century)

*Auto-Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid cognition”*
pramāṇavārttikavṛtti

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Gen-dün-drub, First Dalai Lama (dge ’dun grub, 1391-1474)

*Ornament for Reasoning*

|---------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

Jam-yang-shay-pa Ngag-wang-tson-drü (jam dbyangs bzhad pa’i rdo rje ngag dbang brtson grus, 1648-1721/1722)

*Eloquent Presentation of the Eight Categories and Seventy Topics: Sacred Word of Guru Ajita*

dngos po brgyad don bdun cu’i rnam bzlag legs par bshad pa mi pham bla ma’i zhal lung

Tibetan editions:
“2011 TBRC bla brang” = In kun mkhyen ‘jam dbyangs bzhad pa’i rdo rje mchog gi gsang ’bum, vol. 14. TBRC W22186.14: 115-178, which is a PDF of: bla brang bkra shis’ khyil: bla brang bkra shis’ khyil dgon, publishing date unknown. [Preferred edition since it has not been retouched.]


“1999 Tōyō Bunko CD-ROM” = “Tibetan texts of don bdun bcu of ‘jam dbyangs bzhad pa and rigs lam’ phred gyi lde mig of dkon mchog bstana pa’i sgron me.” In the Toyo Bunko Database CD Release II. Tokyo, Japan: Tōyō Bunko, 1999. CD-ROM. [This edition is based on the 1999 Mundgod.]


Go-mang Lhasa edition:


Shāntarakṣita (śāntarakṣita, zhi ba ’tsho, 725-788)

*Autocommentary to the “Ornament for the Middle”*

madhyamakāśākāśākāravṛtti
dbu ma rgyan gyi ‘grel pa

*Ornament for the Middle*

madhyamakāśākāśākārikā
dbu ma rgyan gyi thig le’ur byas pa


Shāntideva (zhi ba lha, eighth century C.E.)
Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds
bodhi[sattva]caryāvatāra
byang chub sems dpa’i spyod pa la ’jug pa
English translations:
Contemporary commentary:
Vasubandhu (dbyig guyen, fl. 360)
The Treasury of Manifest Knowledge
abhidharmakośa
chos rnam pa’i mdzod
Peking 5590, vol. 115

2. Other Works
Elizabeth Napper is Co-Director of the Tibetan Nuns Project, a post she has held for twenty-five years, working to develop opportunities within the Tibetan Buddhist tradition for nuns to receive access to the full education of their various traditions. The first group of twenty nuns to complete the studies and take the required tests for the Geshe degree received that degree in December 2016.

She received a B.A. from University of Wisconsin in Indian Studies and an M.A. and a Ph.D. in Tibetan Buddhist Studies from the University of Virginia, where she also taught for two years as a lecturer. She taught at Stanford University and at the University of Hawaii.

Her published works include *Dependent-Arising and Emptiness* and *Mind in Tibetan Buddhism*. She was co-editor of *Kindness, Clarity, and Insight* by His Holiness the Dalai Lama and co-author of *Fluent Tibetan: A Proficiency Oriented Learning System, Novice and Intermediate Levels*, 4 volumes. In 2003 she was a recipient of the “ Unsung Heroes of Compassion” award given by Tenzin Gyatso, the Fourteenth Dalai Lama of Tibet, and received a Fulbright-Hays Doctoral Dissertation Research Grant and Charlotte W. Newcombe Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship.
This book is a translation of the first two major sections of Jam-yang-shay-pa’s *Beautiful Golden Garland of Eloquence Illuminating a Little the Presentation of Awareness and Knowledge*. It is a textbook studied in the Gomang College of Drepung Monastery during the first years of the on-going course of study of the topic of Logic and Epistemology. Based upon Dharmakīrti’s *Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid Cognition,”* it serves to introduce students to the core vocabulary and systematic layout of the structural psychology behind the movement from wrong ideas to direct perception of reality.

In these sections Jam-yang-shay-pa considers the basic definition of consciousness and then its divisions. On this basis he explains the difference between explicit and implicit realization in the context of direct perception and of inference. The presentation is enhanced by copious citation from Dharmakīrti and sharpened by debates that draw the reader into provocative situations that draw out deeper understanding.