Questioning the Buddha about Contradictions
Questioning the Buddha about Contradictions in his Teachings

Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive: 2

William Magee

In collaboration with Lo-sang-gyal-tshan

Editing and comments by Jeffrey Hopkins

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Translating texts from the heritage of Tibetan and Inner Asian Buddhist systems, the project focuses on Great Indian Books and Tibetan commentaries from the Go-mang College syllabus as well as a related theme on the fundamental innate mind of clear light in Tantric traditions. A feature of the Project is the usage of consistent vocabulary and format throughout the translations.

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1. 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa ngag dbang brtson grus, 1648-1722. Drang ba dang nges pa’i don nam par 'byed pa’i mtha’ dpyod 'khrul bral lung rigs bai dûr dkar po’i ngan mdzod skal bzung re ba kun skong. 2. Dge-lugs-pa (Sect)--Doctrines. 3. Drang nges chen mo. 4. Wisdom—Religious aspects—Buddhism.
1. Lo-sang-gyal-tshan, 1966- II. Title.
Preface

The text translated here is a portion of Jam-yang-shay-pa Ngag-wang-tson-drü’s Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive / Decisive Analysis of (Tsong-kha-pa’s) “Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive”: Storehouse of White Lapis-Lazuli of Scripture and Reasoning Free from Mistake, Fulfilling the Hopes of the Fortunate, a commentary on Tsong-kha-pa Lo-sang-drag-pa’s The Essence of Eloquence. It belongs to the debate-oriented decisive analysis (mtha’ dpyod) genre and is the textbook (yig cha) for the study of Tsong-kha-pa’s The Essence of Eloquence at Go-mang Monastic College.

This section treats Tsong-kha-pa’s analysis of the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought, including the Bodhisattva Paramārthaśamudgata’s question regarding an apparent contradiction in Buddha’s sutras. The next volume will treat the Buddha’s reply avoiding contradiction by revealing the thought behind his statements.

Readers interested in a detailed discussion of The Essence of Eloquence and an overview of Ge-lug-pa’s writings on interpretation of scripture should consult the three volumes of Jeffrey Hopkins’ Dynamic Responses to Dzong-kha-ba’s The Essence of Eloquence devoted to the section of the Mind-Only School:

- Emptiness in the Mind-Only School of Buddhism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999);
- Reflections on Reality: The Three Natures and Non-Natures in the Mind-Only School (Berkeley: University of California Press; 2002);

The present work is indebted to these three volumes.

Editions Consulted

Two basic editions of Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive were consulted:

\[a\] ’jam dbyangs bzhad pa’i rdo rje ngag dbang brtson grus, 1648-1721/1722.
\[b\] Written circa 1686. Herein called Great Exposition of the Interpretable and Definitive.
\[c\] tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa, 1357-1419.
\[d\] drang ba dang nges pa’i don rnam par phy e ba’i bstan bcos legs bshad snying po / legs bshad snying po; Peking 6142, vol. 153.
\[e\] dge lugs pa.
1. *drang ba dang nges pa'i don rnam par 'byed pa'i mtha' dpyod 'khrul bral lung rigs bai dūr dkar pa'i ngan mdzod skal bzang re ba kun skong*, TBRC W22186.10: 1-288, which is a PDF of *bla brang bkra shis 'khyil, bla brang brka shis 'khyil dgon*, publishing date unknown. Abbreviated reference: “2011 TBRC *bla brang*.”


Also a codex edition based on the *bla brang* edition was used for convenience:


The digital Tibetan text of Jam-yang-shay-pa’s *Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive* provided in this book was supplied by the Drepung Gomang Library of Go-mang College in Mundgod, Karnataka State, India, which was likely based on the 1999 Mundgod codex. It has been edited in accordance with the “2011 TBRC *bla brang*” and the “1987 Go-mang Lhasa.”
Technical Notes

It is important to recognize that:

• translations and editions of texts are given in the Bibliography;

• the names of Indian Buddhist schools of thought are translated into English in a wish to increase accessibility for non-specialists;

• for the names of Indian scholars and systems used in the body of the text, ch, sh, and śh are used instead of the more usual c, ś, and s for the sake of easy pronunciation by non-specialists; however, cch is used for cch, not chchh. Within parentheses the usual transliteration system for Sanskrit is used;

• transliteration of Tibetan is done in accordance with a system devised by Turrell Wylie; see “A Standard System of Tibetan Transcription,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 22 (1959): 261-267;

• the names of Tibetan authors and orders are given in “essay phonetics” for the sake of easy pronunciation; the system is aimed at internet searchability;

• titles of added subsections are given in square brackets;

• definitions are in bold type.
The Collaborator

Lo-sang-gyal-tshan is a Ge-she at Go-mang College of Dre-pung Monastic University, Mundgod, Karnataka State, India, who also served a six-month term as Disciplinarian at the Tantric College of Lower Lhasa in Hunsur, India. In October, 2015, he assumed the position of Abbot of Go-mang College of Dre-pung Monastic University in Mundgod, India. He has worked with translators of the UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies since 2013. In particular, he provided crucial assistance with filling in the dialectical moves throughout the text and by responding to questions about the meaning.
Jam-yang-shay-pa’s

GREAT EXPOSITION
OF THE INTERPRETABLE
AND THE DEFINITIVE: 2

Questioning the Buddha
about contradictions

Decisive Analysis of (Tsong-kha-pa’s) “Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive”: Storehouse of White Vaiḍūrya of Scripture and Reasoning Free from Mistake,
Fulfilling the Hopes of the Fortunate

Second in the series: Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive

1. Principles for Practice: The Four Reliances
2. Questioning the Buddha about Contradictions in his Teachings

Jam-yang-shay-pa’s text is at the margin; comments by Jeffrey Hopkins are indented and in a three-sided box to clearly distinguish them from Jam-yang-shay-pa’s text.

Key to the colorization: In situations of debate the Tibetan text and the translation are highlighted in three colors: black, blue, and red. Blue colored statements present what Jam-yang-shay-pa considers to be right positions, while red colored statements represent what Jam-yang-shay-pa considers to be wrong positions. Words in black are other information or
function structurally. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight indicates material added in place of ellipses, and magenta highlight sets off the ellipsis indicators when the elided part has been filled in.
II. HOW THE INTERPRETABLE AND THE DEFINITIVE ARE DIFFERENTIATED {2 PARTS}

This has two parts: the position relying on the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought and the position relying on The Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra.

THE POSITION RELYING ON THE SŪTRA
UNRAVELING THE THOUGHT {2 PARTS}

This has two parts: stating what is said in the sūtra and how Asaṅga and his [half-]brother [Vasubandhu] and so forth commented on its meaning.

Stating what is said in the sūtra {4 parts}

This has four parts: a question about dispelling contradiction in the sūtras, the answer dispelling that contradiction, identifying the entities of the three natures, and [Paramārthasamudgata’s] offering [to Buddha] the meaning established by these.
a. A question about dispelling contradiction in the sūtras

[Tsong-kha-pa paraphrases Paramārthasamudgata’s questioning of the Buddha in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought]:

The Supramundane Victor [initially] pronounced, in many ways, the own-character of the aggregates. He also pronounced their character of production, character of disintegration, abandonment, and thorough knowledge. Just as he did with respect to the aggregates, so he also pronounced with respect to the sense-spheres, dependent-arising, and the foods. In a similar fashion, he also pronounced the own-character of the [four] truths, thorough knowledge, abandonment, actualization, and meditation as well as the own-character of the constituents, the various [eighteen] constituents, and manifold [six] constituents, their abandonment, and thorough knowledge as well as the own-character of the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment [their] discords, the antidotes, production of [virtues or antidotes] that have not been produced, the abiding of those that have been produced, nonloss [of antidotes that have been produced, their] arising again, and increasing and extending.

Also, the Supramundane Victor pronounced [in the middle wheel of the teaching], “All phenomena are natureless; all phenomena are unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow.”

Therefore, I am wondering of what the Supramundane Victor was thinking when he pronounced [in the middle wheel of the teaching], “All phenomena are natureless; all phenomena are unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow.” I [explicitly] ask the Supramundane Victor about the meaning of his pronouncing [in the middle wheel of the teaching], “All phenomena are natureless; all phenomena are unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow.”
On this occasion [of a question about dispelling contradiction in the sūtras] there are three parts: refuting [mistakes], presentation of our own system, and dispelling objections [to our own system].
1) Refuting [Mistakes]

1. Someone says: There is a way in which Paramārthasamudgata questions the Teacher [Buddha] in order to dispel contradiction because [in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought, Paramārthasamudgata] explicitly questions [Buddha in this way]:

   In the first wheel as indicated here [in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought,\(b\) the Supramundane Victor] said that phenomena ranging from forms through to exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects are equally established by way of their own character. In the middle wheel as indicated here, he said that phenomena ranging from forms through to exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects are equally not established by way of their own character. Even if, left as they are verbally, these two [statements] are contradictory, the Teacher must be without contradiction, therefore thinking of what did you teach in the middle [wheel of doctrine that all phenomena are equally natureless and so forth]?

[Paramārthasamudgata] implicitly asks of what [Buddha] was thinking when in the first wheel he spoke like that [namely, that phenomena ranging from forms through to exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects are equally established by way of their own character].

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\(a\) 2011 TBRC \textit{bla brang}, 13b.3; 1987 Go-mang Lhasa, 10b.2; 2008 Taipei reprint, 17.18.

\(b\) Please note that “here” in the phrase “as indicated here” (\textit{'dir bstan}) in this text will always refer to the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought; therefore, I often omit the name of the sūtra.
Comment: Jam-yang-shay-pa draws out the significance of how the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought states Paramārthasamudgata’s question to the Buddha about the apparent contradiction between the teachings in the first two wheels of doctrines by slowly considering the elements in each description. His robust treatment is accomplished by analyzing positions of unnamed Tibetan scholars in his own and other colleges with whom he disagrees. Fortunately Jam-yang-shay-pa’s followers have identified the holders of these positions most of which have their own dynamic framework though a very small number of opinions are easily recognizable mistakes, helpful to notice.

Here, the first debate corrects an assertion by Pal-jor-lhün-drubb (1427-1514)—a textbook-author of Se-ra Jay College prior to Jay-tsün Chö-kyi-gyal-tshanc (1469-1544/1546), in his Lamp for the Teaching: Commentary on the Difficult Points of (Tsong-kha-pa’s) “The Essence of Eloquence,” a very helpful accessible condensation of Tsong-kha-pa’s The Essence of Eloquence that provides the gist of Tsong-kha-pa’s text without getting into a great deal of detail and without attempting either an expansive ex-

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b dpal 'byor lhün grub, gnyal [or gnyan] ston.
c rje btsun chos kyi rgyal mtshan.
planation or a word-by-word commentary. Making use of a correction previously made by Jay-tsün Chö-kyi-gyal-tshan as well as by Jam-yang-shay-pa’s predecessor as textbook author of Gomang College, Gung-ru Chö-jung (fl. mid 16th to early 17th centuries), a Jam-yang-shay-pa finds fault with Pal-jor-lhün-drub’s statement that in the first wheel the topics that are the substrata of Buddha’s teachings are *phenomena ranging from forms through to exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects*. Pal-jor-lhün-drub’s *Lamp for the Teaching* says:

In the first wheel, the Supramundane Victor pronounced that phenomena ranging from forms through to exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects are established by way of their own character; in the middle wheel he pronounced that phenomena are natureless, and are unproduced, unceasing, and so forth [that is, quiescent from the start, and naturally passed beyond sorrow]. The Bodhisattva Paramārthasamudgata asks, “Since, if taken literally, [these statements] are manifestly contradictory, and since the Supramundane Victor must be without contradiction, thinking of what did you teach [in the middle wheel of doctrine that all phenomena are] natureless and so forth?”

As Jay-tsün Chö-kyi-gyal-tshan and Gung-ru Chö-jung earlier
pointed out and Jam-yang-shay-pa points out just below, this is a standard list of phenomena drawn from the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras in the Great Vehicle, and hence it is inappropriate here to use it when describing first wheel sūtras.a

Our response: Well then, it [absurdly] follows that in the first wheel indicated here [in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought] all phenomena ranging from forms through to exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects, having been taken as substrata, are explicitly said to be established by way of their own character because [according to you] your way [Paramārthasamudgata] questions [the Teacher] is logically feasible.

If you [incorrectly] accept [that in the first wheel all phenomena ranging from forms through to exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects, having been taken as substrata, are explicitly said to be established by way of their own character], then it [absurdly] follows that in the first wheel as indicated here the one hundred and eight bases of exposition, having been taken as substrata, are explicitly said to be established by way of their own character because you [incorrectly] accept [that in the first wheel all phenomena ranging from forms through to exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects, having been taken as substrata, are explicitly said to be established by way of their own character].

a It is so obviously inappropriate that in a recent edition of Pal-jor-lhün-drub’s text in Lhasa this line has been emended, without mention, from gzugs nas rnam mkhyen gyi bar to gzugs nas byang phyogs so bdun gyi bar; see legs bshad snying po ’i dka’ ’grel bstan pa’i sgron me, Tibetan digital reprint edition: BDRC W1AC225, 1 vol. (PDF of Lhasa: ser gtsug nang bstan dpe rnying ’tshol bsdu phyogs sgrig khang, date unknown), 9.2. In the Tibetan communities in India a decision was made in the mid-1960s to refrain from such emendations in reprints and in new editions for the sake of historical accuracy.
Comment: The list of one hundred eight phenomena is extracted from the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras; mentioned briefly above, it begins with forms and ends with exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects, omniscience, these being the bases of the explanations of emptiness in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras, called “the one hundred and eight bases of exposition” (‘grel rkang). It is composed by fifty-three impure phenomena and fifty-five pure phenomena, but the classification does not mean that all members of each class are afflictions or pure phenomena; the groupings are rough divisions.\(^a\)

**The fifty-three phenomena of the afflicted class**

The five aggregates which are the bases for the further division of most of the other phenomena:

1. forms
2. feelings
3. discriminations
4. compositional factors
5. consciousnesses

The six senses which are the supports of their respective consciousnesses:

6. eye sense powers
7. ear sense powers
8. nose sense powers
9. tongue sense powers
10. body sense powers
11. mental sense powers

The six consciousnesses which depend on these senses:

12. eye consciousnesses

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13. ear consciousnesses
14. nose consciousnesses
15. tongue consciousnesses
16. body consciousnesses
17. mental consciousnesses

The objects of those consciousnesses:

18. visible forms
19. sounds
20. odors
21. tastes
22. tangible objects
23. phenomena

The six contacts (distinguishing objects as pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral) which arise upon the aggregations of a sense, an object, and a consciousness:

24. contacts upon the aggregation of an eye sense, a visible form, and an eye consciousness
25. contacts upon the aggregation of an ear sense, a sound, and an ear consciousness
26. contacts upon the aggregation of a nose sense, an odor, and a nose consciousness
27. contacts upon the aggregation of a tongue sense, a taste, and a tongue consciousness
28. contacts upon the aggregation of a body sense, a tangible object, and a body consciousness
29. contacts upon the aggregation of a mental sense, a phenomenon, and a mental consciousness

The six feelings which are the experiences arising from contacts:

30. feelings arising from contact upon the aggregation of an eye sense, a visible form, and an eye consciousness
31. feelings arising from contact upon the aggregation of an ear sense, a sound, and an ear consciousness
32. feelings arising from contact upon the aggregation of a nose sense, an odor, and a nose consciousness
33. feelings arising from contact upon the aggregation of a tongue sense, a taste, and a tongue consciousness
34. feelings arising from contact upon the aggregation of a body sense, a tangible object, and a body consciousness
35. feelings arising from contact upon the aggregation of a mental sense, a phenomenon, and a mental consciousness

*The six elements which are the bases of production:*

36. earth  
37. water  
38. fire  
39. wind  
40. space  
41. consciousness

*The twelve branches of dependent-arising, which are to be seen as disadvantageous:*

42. ignorance  
43. action  
44. consciousness  
45. name and form  
46. six sources  
47. contact  
48. feeling  
49. attachment  
50. grasping  
51. existence  
52. birth  
53. aging and death

*The fifty-five phenomena of the pure class*

*The six perfections which are the paths of practice:*

1. giving  
2. ethics  
3. patience  
4. effort  
5. concentration  
6. wisdom

*The eighteen emptinesses which are the paths of the view:*

7. emptiness of the internal, that is, of the five senses (*adhyātmaśūnyatā*)  
8. emptiness of the external, that is, of the six types of objects which are the objects of the five senses and of the mental consciousness (*bahirādśūnyatā*)
9. emptiness of the internal and external, that is, of the loci of the senses, the gross orbs of the eyes, and so forth (adhyātmabahirdhāṣūnyatā)
10. emptiness of emptiness, that is, of the emptiness that is the nature of phenomena (this eliminates the qualms of those who might think that emptiness truly exists because it is established by a consciousness which analyzes suchness) (ṣūnyatāṣūnyatā)
11. emptiness of the great, that is, of the ten directions (mahāṣūnyatā)
12. emptiness of the ultimate, that is, of nirvāṇa (paramārthaṣūnyatā)
13. emptiness of the compounded (sanskṛtaṣūnyatā)
14. emptiness of the un-compounded (asamskṛtaṣūnyatā)
15. emptiness of what has passed beyond the extremes, that is, of what is free of the extremes of permanence and annihilation (atyantaṣūnyatā)
16. emptiness of what is beginningless and endless, that is, of cyclic existence (anavarāgraṣūnyatā)
17. emptiness of the indestructible, that is, of the indestructible Great Vehicle (anavakāraṣūnyatā)
18. emptiness of nature, that is, of the emptinesses which are the nature of phenomena (this eliminates the qualms of those who might think that an emptiness truly exists because a final nature exists without being produced by anyone) (prakṛtiṣūnyatā)
19. emptiness of all phenomena, that is, of the eighteen constituents, and so forth (sarvadharmaṣūnyatā)
20. emptiness of definitions, that is, of the definitions of all phenomena from forms through to omniscient consciousnesses (lakṣaṇaṣūnyatā)
21. emptiness of the unapprehendable, that is, of the past, present, and future which are unapprehendable as the cessation of phenomena, their presence, and their non-production (amupalambhaṣūnyatā)
22. emptiness of the inherent existence of non-things, that is, of inherently existent non-products (abhāvasvabhāvaṣūnyatā)
23. emptiness of things, that is, of the five aggregates (bhāvaṣūnyatā)
24. emptiness of non-things, that is, of non-products (abhaśaśūnyatā)

*The thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment which are the yogic paths, divided into seven sections:*

25. four establishments in mindfulness—of body, feelings, thoughts, and phenomena—attained with the lesser path of accumulation. These are meditations on the impermanence, misery, emptiness, and selflessness of one's own body, feelings, thoughts, and other internal phenomena. Bodhisattvas would extend the field of meditation to include all sentient beings’ bodies, feelings, and so forth.

26. four thorough abandonings—the abandoning of afflictions already generated, the non-generation of afflictions not yet generated, the increasing of pure phenomena already generated, and the generation of pure phenomena not yet generated—attained with the middling path of accumulation. These are called “thorough” abandonings because the mode of practice is suitable, when supplemented by the aspiration to highest enlightenment for the sake of all sentient beings, to lead one to Buddhahood. Without changing the type of object or mode of cognition, these paths lead to final enlightenment whereas the non-Buddhist “abandonings” have to be altered in form to lead to the final aim. Even the accomplishments of virtues are 'abandonings' because their respective opposites must be forsaken.

27. four legs of manifestation—asperation, effort, thought, and analysis. These are called “legs” because they are prerequisites for magical manifestation. The four exist simultaneously when a manifestation is actually being made, and they are serial when one is practicing magical manifestation, first generating an aspiration to create a manifestation, and so forth. They are attained on the great path of accumulation.

28. five powers—faith, effort, mindfulness, meditative stabilization, and wisdom—attained on the levels of heat and peak of the path of preparation.

29. five forces—faith, effort, mindfulness, meditative stabilization, and wisdom—attained on the levels of forbearance and supreme mundane qualities of the path of preparation.
30. seven branches of enlightenment—mindfulness, discrimination of phenomena, effort, joy, pliancy, meditative stabilization, and equanimity—attained with the path of seeing.

31. eight-fold path—correct views, correct realization, correct speech, correct aims of actions, correct livelihood, correct effort, correct mindfulness, and correct meditative stabilization—attained with the path of meditation. When the state of Foe Destroyer is actualized, all thirty-seven harmonies of enlightenment have been attained.

The paths of calming:

32. four noble truths—true sufferings, true origins of suffering, true cessations of suffering, and true paths out of suffering.

33. four concentrations—first, second, third, and fourth concentrations.

34. four immeasurables—equanimity, love, compassion, and joy.

35. four formless absorptions—infinite space, infinite consciousness, nothingness, and peak of cyclic existence.

36. eight liberations: these eight are called 'liberations' not because they liberate beings from cyclic existence but because they free beings from the manifest activity of specific afflictions. They are to be distinguished from complete cessations of afflictions which involve the conquest of both the manifest appearance and the potencies of the afflictions.

1. the embodied looking at a form: yogis consider themselves to be a being with a body and cultivate any of the four concentrations which are included in the Form Realm.

2. the formless looking at a form: yogis consider themselves to be a being without a body and cultivate any of the four concentrations which are included in the Form Realm.

3. beautiful form: yogis consider themselves to have an attractive body and cultivate any of the four concentrations which are included in the Form Realm. (The above three are considered prerequisites for making physical manifestations and are called the three paths.
of manifestation.)

4. infinite space: yogis concentrate on space and imagine it is infinite with just space as his object of observation

5. infinite consciousness: yogis concentrate on consciousness and imagine it is infinite with just consciousness as their object of observation

6. nothingness: yogis imagine that there is nothing to be apprehended and no apprehender

7. peak of cyclic existence: yogis imagine that there are no coarse objects to be apprehended but that there are subtle objects of apprehension

8. equipoise of cessation: yogis enter a state of meditative equipoise which is the absence of the manifest activity of the six consciousnesses

37. nine serial absorptions—first concentration, second concentration, third concentration, fourth concentration, infinite space, infinite consciousness, nothingness, peak of cyclic existence, and absorption of cessation

38. paths of insight—meditative stabilization on the three doors of liberation: wishlessness, signlessness, and emptiness. Wishlessness is the emptiness of a phenomenon from the point of view of its not inherently producing effects. Signlessness is the emptiness of a phenomenon from the point of view of its not having been inherently produced from causes. Emptiness is the emptiness of the entity of a phenomenon itself.

The paths of special qualities:

39. five clairvoyances—divine eye, divine ear, knowledge of others' minds, memory of former lives, and knowledge of the extinction of contaminations

40. four meditative stabilizations—'going as a hero', 'sky treasury', 'stainless', and 'loftily looking lion'

41. four doors of retention—the retention of patience (for the sake of fearlessness with respect to emptiness), the retention of secret speech (for the ability to make spells to pacify the injurious), the retention of words (for not forgetting names, thoughts, and meanings), the retention of meaning (for not forgetting the individual and general characteristics of phenomena)
The paths of effect:

42. ten powers:

1. knowledge of sources and non-sources. This is direct knowledge of cause and effect within cyclic existence, such as the arising of pleasure from virtues and of pain from non-virtues, and direct knowledge of causes and effects included within the class of pure phenomena, such as the paths and their fruits. This first power is achieved through steadiness with respect to ascertaining the relation of cause and effect and with respect to the two forms of the mind of enlightenment—the aspiration to highest enlightenment for the sake of all beings as well as its consequent practices and the wisdom directly cognizing emptiness.

2. knowledge of the fruition of actions. This is direct knowledge of the definiteness of actions (such as the fact that non-virtues never cause pleasure and virtues never cause pain), the increase of the potencies established by actions, the non-wasting of deeds done, and the non-meeting with the effects of actions not done by oneself. It is achieved through conviction in the relationship of actions and their effects.

3. knowledge of those who are superior and those who are inferior, or those who have faith and those having heavy afflictions and so forth. It is achieved through teaching doctrines in accordance with the faculties of trainees.

4. knowledge of the varieties of dispositions. This is the knowledge of the many different lineages in the mental continuums of trainees. It is achieved through teaching doctrines in accordance with the dispositions of trainees.

5. knowledge of the varieties of trainees' interests in the various great and small vehicles. It is achieved through teaching doctrines in accordance with the interests of trainees.

6. knowledge of the paths proceeding to cyclic existences and of the paths to the three enlightenments of Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and Bodhisattvas. It is achieved through practicing the various vehicles and
7. knowledge of the concentrations (dhyāna), liberations (vimokṣa), meditative stabilizations (samādhi), and meditative absorptions (samāpatti), and knowledge of others' afflictions and others' non-contamination. It is achieved through completing the practice of meditative stabilization.

8. knowledge mindful of former states. This is direct knowledge of all former lives of oneself and others. It is achieved through not having spoiled the roots of virtue during the paths of learning.

9. knowledge of one's own and others' deaths and births. This is included within the clairvoyance of the divine eye and is achieved through formerly giving lamps and supramundane paths to sentient beings.

10. knowledge of the extinction of all contaminations. This is achieved through formerly teaching doctrines for the sake of extinguishing contaminations and through one's own actualization of such meaning.

The six knowledges of (1) sources and non-sources, (2) fruition of actions, (3) the superior and inferior, (4) varieties of dispositions, (5) varieties of interests, and (6) paths are similar to a diamond instrument piercing the armor of the obstructions to omniscience. The three knowledges of (7) the concentrations and so forth, (8) former states, and (9) death and birth are similar to a diamond instrument destroying the wall of the obstructions to meditative absorption. The knowledge of (10) extinction of all contaminations is similar to a diamond instrument cutting the trees of the afflictive obstructions.

43. four fearlessnesses:

1. fearlessness with respect to the assertion, I am completely and perfectly enlightened with respect to all phenomena. For, one will not encounter even the name of an opponent who could correctly say that one does not know such and such a phenomenon. It is achieved through lacking any stinginess with respect to the doctrine.

2. fearlessness with respect to teaching that the afflictive obstructions are obstacles to liberation and that the
obstructions to omniscience are obstacles to simultaneous cognition of all phenomena, and that, therefore, these are to be ceased. For, one will not encounter even the name of an opponent who could correctly say that reliance on desire and so forth would not obstruct a being from liberation. It is achieved through not falling under the influence of an obstructive doctrine.

3. fearlessness with respect to teaching the paths of deliverance. For, there is no opponent who could say correctly that these paths are not paths leading to liberation. It is achieved through practicing the paths to liberation.

4. fearlessness with respect to asserting that the contaminations have been extinguished. For, one will not see even the name of an opponent who could correctly dispute the assertion that one has attained the cessation of all afflictions and their potencies. It is achieved through formerly abandoning pride.

44. four sciences—knowledge of doctrines, of the general and specific characters of phenomena, of the many languages so that appropriate definitions can be given, and of the varieties of entities, aspects, relationships, and differences of phenomena in the sense of having the bravery to make these distinctions

45. great love

46. great compassion

47. eighteen unshared attributes of Buddhas:
   1. being non-mistaken physically, such as not going on the wrong road
   2. being non-mistaken verbally
   3. not decreasing in mindfulness
   4. not ever not being in meditative equipoise
   5. not having the various discriminations of one-pointedly apprehending cyclic existence as to be forsaken and nirvana as to be attained, or, in other words, not discriminating cyclic existence and nirvāṇa, or phenomena and their emptiness, as different entities
   6. not being disinterested
   7. aspiration
   8. effort
9. mindfulness
10. wisdom
11. non-degeneration of liberation, that is, non-degeneration from the abandonment of obstructions
12. non-degeneration of the wisdom realizing liberation
13. 14. 15. governing by wisdom the activities of body, speech, and mind
16. 17. 18. unobstructed wisdom with respect to all objects of knowledge in the past, present, and future due to the absence of any impeding obstructions

The five beings who actualize the paths:
48. Stream Enterers
49. Once Returners
50. Never Returners
51. Foe Destroyers
52. Solitary Realizers

The three final fruits:
53. knowers of the bases, Hearers’ cognitions of emptiness
54. knowers of the paths, Bodhisattvas’ cognitions of emptiness
55. exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects, Buddhas’ cognitions of all phenomena simultaneously.

You cannot accept [that in the first wheel as indicated here the one hundred and eight bases of exposition, having been taken as substrata, are explicitly said to be established by way of their own character] because [Buddha], without taking the one hundred and eight bases of exposition as substrata in the explicit rendering of the first wheel as indicated here [in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought], takes a small number of phenomena such as the aggregates and so forth as the substrata because Tsong-kha-pa’s The Essence of Eloquence says:\(^{a}\)

Initially, at Varanasi, he spoke of the selflessness of persons; [thus]

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\(^{a}\) Sarnath gtsang edition (Sarnath, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1973), 87.15-20. According to Jam-yang-shay-pa, the passage should read:

Initially, at Varanasi, he spoke of the selflessness of persons; [thus] there is one cycle [of teaching], in which the true establishment of the phenomena of the aggregates and so forth—[these being] no more than a few [of the one hundred and eight phenomena]—is not refuted and true existence is mentioned frequently.
there is one cycle [of teaching], in which the true establishment of the phenomena of the aggregates and so forth, except for a few, is not refuted and true existence is mentioned frequently.

Moreover, it [absurdly] follows that in the first wheel as indicated here [in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*] the twenty emptinesses, having been taken as substrata, are explicitly said to be established by way of their own character because you [incorrectly] accept [that in the first wheel all phenomena ranging from forms through to exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects, having been taken as substrata, are explicitly said to be established by way of their own character].

If you [incorrectly] accept [that the twenty emptinesses, having been taken as substrata, are explicitly said to be established by way of their own character], then it [absurdly] follows that the twenty emptinesses are explicitly taught in the literal rendering in the first wheel as indicated here
because you [incorrectly] accept [that the twenty emptinesses, having been
taken as substrata, are explicitly said to be established by way of their own
character].

If you [incorrectly] accept [that the twenty emptinesses are explicitly
taught in the literal rendering in the first wheel as indicated here], it [ab-
surdly] follows that this [first wheel] explicitly teaches the twenty empti-
nesses, because you [incorrectly] accept [that the twenty emptinesses are
explicitly taught in the literal rendering in the first wheel]. If you [incor-
correctly] accept [that this first wheel explicitly teaches the twenty empti-
nesses], it [absurdly] follows that this [first wheel] extensively explicitly
teaches emptiness because you [incorrectly] accept [that this first wheel
explicitly teaches the twenty emptinesses in the first wheel as indicated
here].

It is not reasonable to accept [that the first wheel extensively explicitly
teaches emptiness] because those are Lesser Vehicle sūtra [passages].
Unpacking Debate 1 to reveal Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Positions [18]

1. It is mistaken to hold that in the first wheel as indicated here in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* all phenomena **ranging from forms through to exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects** are taken as substrata for Buddha’s teaching. Rather, in the first wheel as indicated here in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* all phenomena **ranging from forms through the 37 harmonies with enlightenment** are taken as the substrata of Buddha’s teaching.

2. Permutations of the above point are that in the first wheel as indicated here in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*:
   - the 108 bases of exposition in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras are not taken as substrata for the first wheel teaching; rather, Buddha takes a small number of phenomena such as the aggregates and so forth as the substrata.
   - the twenty emptinesses are not taken as substrata.

3. The twenty emptinesses are not explicitly taught in the literal rendering in the first wheel as indicated here in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*.

4. This first wheel as indicated here in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* does not explicitly teach the twenty emptinesses because those are Lesser Vehicle sūtra passages.

5. This first wheel as indicated here in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* does not extensively explicitly teach emptiness because the first wheel does not extensively teach emptiness.

2. About this formulation, someone says: It follows that this [first wheel] explicitly teaches that all phenomena from forms through to exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects are established by way of their own character because this [first wheel] explicitly teaches these [phenomena from forms through to exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects]—upon including them in the eighteen constituents—to be established by way of their own character. It

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follows [that this first wheel explicitly teaches these phenomena from forms through to exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects—upon including them in the eighteen constituents—to be established by way of their own character] because this [first wheel] explicitly teaches these [phenomena from forms through to exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects]—upon including them in the eighteen constituents—to be established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them.

Comment: Here at the end of the opponent’s position, Jam-yang-shay-pa agrees with the point that “establishment by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them” is not a subset of “establishment by way of their own character.” Thus, a teaching that phenomena are “established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them” does not have to teach that those phenomena are “established by way of their own character.”

As Jam-yang-shay-pa subsequently will explain, he holds that according to the presentation in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought

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*a* Drawn from Hopkins, Absorption in No External World, 56-57 (Issue #24: “Can this topic be trivialized?”).
the statement in the first wheel of doctrine that “all phenomena are established by way of their own character” actually means “all phenomena are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them” but this does not entail that the first wheel teaches that all phenomena are established by way of their own character. This crucial point is couched in Gung-ru Chö-jung’s and Jam-yang-shay-pa’s presentation of the seemingly counter-intuitive position that:

**Upon the one hundred and eight phenomena being included in the eighteen constituents,** first-wheel sūtras explicitly teach the one hundred and eight as established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses.

This may mean that if for the listener’s mind the one hundred and eight phenomena are included in the eighteen constituents, then when the eighteen constituents are taught as being established by way of their own character as the referents of their respective conceptual consciousnesses, the one hundred and eight phenomena are similarly taught to be established by way of their own character as the referents of their respective conceptual consciousnesses. However, it seems to me that the one hundred and eight phenomena would not be so included for the intended trainees of first wheel of doctrine; hence, there does not seem to be any intended listener of the first wheel for whom they would be included. And so I wonder to what situation they are referring?

Nevertheless, Gung-ru Chö-jung backs up this situation by drawing a parallel with two lines from the beginning of Maitreya’s *Ornament for Clear Realization* (I.3ab):

> The perfection of wisdom will be thoroughly Explained by way of eight categories.

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**a** Gung-ru Chö-jung’s *Garland of White Lotuses*, 5b.1-6a.2.

**b** Jam-yang-shay-pa’s *Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive*, 27.6-28.3.

**c** *des de rnam khams bco brgyad du bsad nas rang dzin rto pavi zhen gzhir rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub par dangos su bstan*.

**d** Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s word-commentary on these lines is:

*The perfection of wisdom, which in the expression of worship is praised and made obeisance as the subject matter, will be thoroughly, that is, entirely, explained by this treatise in the manner of a division of the means of expression into eight chapters and the subject matter into eight categories.*
Gung-ru Chö-jung holds that the two lines in Maitreya’s *Ornament* do not explicitly teach the seventy topics (which are the sub-topics of the eight categories) but does explicitly teach them upon their being included in the eight categories. However, are the inclusion of the one hundred and eight phenomena in the eighteen constituents in the context of the first-wheel teaching according to the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* and the inclusion of the seventy topics in the eight categories in this stanza in Maitreya’s *Ornament for the Clear Realizations* parallel? In Maitreya’s text the seventy topics are subsections of the eight categories which are the topics of his text, but in the scriptures of the first wheel there is no intention to teach the one hundred and eight phenomena in the first wheel according to the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*.

Gung-ru Chö-jung and Jam-yang-shay-pa may merely be making the point that the one hundred and eight phenomena are in general included in the eighteen constituents and that in the first wheel the eighteen constituents are explicitly taught to be established by way of their own character as the referents of their respective conceptual consciousnesses, and hence it must be said that upon the one hundred and eight phenomena being included in the eighteen constituents, first-wheel sūtras explicitly teach them as established by way of their own character as the referents of their respective conceptual consciousnesses. The shock-value of their presentation rests on the assumption that when in the first phrase it is said that the one hundred and eight phenomena are somehow included in the eighteen constituents, it

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\[a\] The eight categories are:

1. knowledge of all aspects (*rnam pa thams cad mkhyen pa nyid, sarvākārajñātā)*
2. knowledge of paths (*lam shes nyid, mārgajñātā)*
3. knowledge of bases (*gzhi shes, vastujñāna)*
4. complete training in all the aspects (*rnam rdzogs sbyor ba/rnam kun mngon par rdzogs par rtogs pa, sarvākārabhisambodha)*
5. peak training (*rtse sbyor, mūrdhaprayoga)*
6. serial training (*mthar gyis sbyor ba, anupārvaprayoga)*
7. momentary training (*skad cig ma i sbyor ba, kṣanikaprayoga)*
8. body of attributes, the fruit (*chos sku, dharmakāya)*.
seems that this is being said with respect to the worldview of first-wheel sūtras, but it simply is not. Their maneuver, rather than providing a counter-intuitive context for a crucial point they are about to make, is befuddling and does not measure up to the important point they are about to make, namely, that teaching any phenomenon to be established by way of its own character as the referent of a conceptual consciousness apprehending it does not entail teaching this phenomenon to be established by way of its own character.

Our response: [That this first wheel explicitly teaches these phenomena from forms through to exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects—upon including them in the eighteen constituents—to be established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them] does not entail [that this first wheel explicitly teaches these phenomena from forms through to exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects—upon including them in the eighteen constituents—to be established by way of their own character].

The sign [which is that this first wheel explicitly teaches these phenomena from forms through to exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects—upon including them in the eighteen constituents—to be established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses] is established because it is reasonable to comment on such statements [in the first wheel of establishment by way of its own character] as being of interpretable meaning because Tsong-kha-pa’s *The Essence of Eloquence* says:

> Statements that those two [that is, phenomenon-constituent and phenomenon-sense-sphere] are established by way of their own character without differentiating [from among phenomena what does and does not exist by way of its own character] also require interpretation.

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Comment: With more context, the passage is:

Since an imputational factor imputed to phenomena in the manner of entity and attribute is a phenomenon-constituent (chos kyi khams, dharmadhātu) and a phenomenon-sense-sphere (chos kyi skye mched, dharmāyatana), statements that those two [that is, phenomenon-constituent and phenomenon-sense-sphere] are established by way of their own character without differentiating [from among phenomena what does and does not exist by way of its own character] also require interpretation.

Since these two, as categories, contain instances (such as uncompounded space) that are permanent, the categories themselves are considered to be permanent and hence not established by way of their own character. Tsong-kha-pa’s more specific reference is to imputational natures that are factors imputed in the manner of entity and attribute, and when it is taught in the first wheel that all phenomena, without differentiation, are established by way of their own character, these imputational natures, being existent, also are included as being established by way of their own character. Since they exist but actually do not exist by way of their own character, such scriptures also (that is, in addition to those teaching external objects) require interpretation.

Jig-may-dam-chō-gya-tsho says that, with respect to the teaching that all phenomena are established by way of their own character, the factual basis in Buddha’s thought is that other-

a Drawn from Hopkins, Absorption in No External World, 134-135 fn. a.

b About the word “also,” see Hopkins, Absorption, Issues #52 and 53, pp. 133-141.

c Port of Entry, 699.6.
powered natures and thoroughly established natures are established by way of their own character; the **purpose** is to prevent the annihilationist view of holding that imputational natures do not exist at all; and the **damage to the literal reading** is the reasonings proving that imputational natures are not established by way of their own character.

Notice that here in the citation from Tsong-kha-pa “established by way of its own character” does not mean “established by way of their own character as the referent of a conceptual consciousness apprehending it” but only means “established by way of its own character,” and notice that the framework of “upon the 108 phenomena being included in the eighteen constituents” has been dropped—in fact never to return for further consideration. How much easier if Gung-ru Chô-jung and Jam-yang-shay-pa had not begun this discussion within this framework and instead used “phenomena ranging from forms through to the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment”! Maybe this mind-bender was current during Gung-ru Chô-jung’s time, and Jam-yang-shay-pa retained it in his editing and re-writing of the earlier Go-mang textbook.

Moreover, it [absurdly] follows that [according to you] when teaching the mode of pronouncement in the first wheel as indicated here [in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*], **there is no need** [for the Buddha] to specify these phenomena ranging from forms through to the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment.\(^\text{a}\)

The Supramundane Victor pronounced, in many ways, the own-character of the aggregates. He also pronounced their character of production, character of disintegration, abandonment, and thorough knowledge. Just as he did with respect to the aggregates, so he also pronounced with respect to the sense-spheres, dependently arising, and the [four] foods. In a similar fashion, he also pronounced the own-character of the [four] truths, thorough knowledge, abandonment, actualization, and meditation as well as the own-character of the constituents, the various [eighteen] constituents, and manifold [six] constituents, their abandonment, and thorough knowledge as well as the own-character of the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment.

\(^\text{a}\) Translation adapted from Hopkins, *Emptiness in Mind-Only*, 76-77.
because [according to you] your thesis [that this first wheel explicitly teaches that all phenomena from forms through to exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects are established by way of their own character] is logically feasible.

Comment: a “Phenomena ranging from forms through to the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment” are seven groups of phenomena called the “seven pronouncements” (bka’ stsal bdun):

- five aggregates
- twelve sense-spheres: the six objects (forms, sounds, odors, tastes, tangible objects, and other phenomena) and the six senses (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mental sense powers)
- twelve links of dependent-arising: ignorance, action, consciousness, name and form, six sense-spheres, contact, feeling, attachment, grasping, “existence,” birth, and aging and death

a For detail see Hopkins, Absorption in No External World, 30ff.
• four foods: morsels of food, contact, intention, and consciousness\(^a\)
• four noble truths
• six and eighteen constituents: respectively, earth, water, fire, wind, space, and consciousness; and the six senses (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mental sense powers), the six objects (forms, sounds, odors, tastes, tangible objects, and other phenomena), and the six consciousnesses (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mental consciousnesses)
• thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment:

I. FOUR ESTABLISHMENTS THROUGH MINDFULNESS
1. mindful establishment on body
2. mindful establishment on feeling
3. mindful establishment on mind
4. mindful establishment on phenomena

II. FOUR THOROUGH ABANDONINGS
5. generating virtuous qualities not yet generated
6. increasing virtuous qualities already generated
7. not generating non-virtuous qualities not yet generated
8. thoroughly abandoning non-virtuous qualities already generated

III. FOUR LEGS OF MANIFESTATION
9. aspiration
10. effort
11. contemplation\(^b\)
12. analytical meditative stabilization

IV. FIVE FACULTIES
13. faith
14. effort
15. mindfulness
16. meditative stabilization
17. wisdom

V. FIVE POWERS
18. faith
19. effort
20. mindfulness
21. meditative stabilization

\(^a\) For identification of the four foods see Hopkins, *Absorption in No External World*, Issue #14.
\(^b\) *sems.*
22. wisdom

VI. SEVEN BRANCHES OF ENLIGHTENMENT
23. correct mindfulness
24. correct discrimination of phenomena
25. correct effort
26. correct joy
27. correct pliancy
28. correct meditative stabilization
29. correct equanimity

VII. EIGHTFOLD PATH
30. correct view
31. correct realization
32. correct speech
33. correct aims of actions
34. correct livelihood
35. correct exertion
36. correct mindfulness
37. correct meditative stabilization

These seven groups of phenomena are contained within the longer list of the 108 of the bases of exposition in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras, given above, but it is a shorter list, this being why in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought Buddha specifies these phenomena ranging from forms through to the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment as being the bases of exposition in the first wheel of doctrine.

### Unpacking Debate 2 to reveal Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Positions [35]

1 Jam-yang-shay-pa holds that the first wheel of doctrine as indicated in Sūtra Unraveling the Thought seems to say that “all phenomena are established by way of their own character,” but it is actually saying that “all phenomena are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them.” Hence, even if someone deliberately included all these (108) phenomena from forms through to exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects in the eighteen constituents mentioned in a first-wheel sūtra, still it would not teach that all (108) phenomena from forms through to exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects are established by way of their own
Because this first-wheel sūtra would be explicitly indicating that these (108) phenomena from forms through to exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects—upon their being included in the eighteen constituents—are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them.

2 Therefore, that this first wheel of doctrine explicitly indicates that these (108) phenomena from forms through to exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects—upon their being included in the eighteen constituents—are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them does not entail that this first wheel explicitly indicates that these (108) phenomena from forms through to exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects—upon their being included in the eighteen constituents—are established by way of their own character.

3 Tsong-kha-pa’s *The Essence of Eloquence* provides a source for the reasonableness of commenting on statements in the first wheel that phenomena are established by way of their own character as requiring interpretation when it says about establishment by way of its own character:

> Statements that those two [that is, phenomenon-constituent and phenomenon-sense-sphere] are established by way of their own character without differentiating from among phenomena what does and does not exist by way of its own character also require interpretation.

This is because permanent phenomena such as uncompounded space are included in the phenomenon-constituent and phenomenon-sense-sphere but are not established by way of their own character.

4 When teaching the mode of pronouncement in the first wheel as indicated here in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*, there is a need for the Buddha to specify these phenomena ranging from forms through to the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment, seven groups of phenomena called the “seven pronouncements”—the aggregates, the sense-spheres, dependent-arising, the foods, the four noble truths, the constituents, and the harmonies with enlightenment. The need is to exclude the unique members of the list of 108 phenomena that are the ba-
ses of exposition of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras. Therefore, do not make the mistake of holding that these 108 phenomena are the basis of exposition of the first-wheel teaching.

3. Also someone says: There is a way in which [Paramārthasamudgata] questions [the Teacher Buddha] because he asks this question:

In the first wheel as indicated here [in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought, the Supramundane Victor] said that phenomena ranging from forms through to the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are equally established by way of their own character; in the middle wheel as indicated here, [the Supramundane Victor] said that phenomena ranging from forms through to exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects are equally not established by way of their own character,

Comment: The first step in Jam-yang-shay-pa’s (and his predecessor Gung-ru Chö-jung’s) opening the way to show that in the first wheel requiring interpretation “established by way of its own character” means “established by way of its own character as the referent of a conceptual consciousness apprehending it,” he makes the case that since many of the phenomena taught among the seven groups of phenomena called the “seven pronouncements”—the aggregates, the sense-spheres, dependent-arising, the foods, the four noble truths, the constituents, and the harmonies with enlightenment—are impermanent and therefore are indeed established

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by way of their own character and hence do not require interpretation. So, any teaching that these are established by way of their own character could not be Buddha’s referent when he says in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* that first wheel teachings require interpretation.

Our response: Well then, it [absurdly] follows that the first wheel as indicated here [in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*] are sūtras explicitly teaching that phenomena ranging from forms through to the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are established by way of their own character because [according to you, your] way [Paramārthasamudgata] questions [the Teacher] is logically feasible.

If you [incorrectly] accept [that this first wheel as indicated here are sūtras explicitly teaching that phenomena ranging from forms through to the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are established by way of their own character], it [absurdly] follows that this [first wheel as indicated here] is a sūtra explicitly teaching that compounded phenomena ranging from forms through the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are established by way of their own character because you [incorrectly] accept [that this first wheel as indicated here are sūtras explicitly teaching that phenomena ranging from forms through to the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are established by way of their own character].
If you [incorrectly] accept that [the first wheel as indicated here are sūtras explicitly teaching that compounded phenomena ranging from forms through the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are established by way of their own character], then it [absurdly] follows that they are sūtras whose own explicit teaching is suitable to be asserted literally because you [incorrectly] accept [that the first wheel as indicated here are sūtras explicitly teaching that compounded phenomena ranging from forms through the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are established by way of their own character].

Comment:^a Gung-ru Chö-jung’s and Jam-yang-shay-pa’s basic argument is:

1. The Mind-Only School maintains that compounded phenomena are established by way of their own character.
2. Because the first-wheel sūtras explicitly teach that phenomena ranging from forms through the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are established by way of their own character, then since this list of phenomena includes both compounded (that is, impermanent) phenomena and uncompounded (permanent) phenomena, the first-wheel sūtras are sūtras explicitly teaching that compounded phenomena ranging from forms through the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are established by way of their own character.
3. Hence, it would absurdly be suitable to assert literally something that the first-wheel sūtras explicitly teach, namely, that compounded phenomena such as forms are established by

way of their own character, and thus such a first-wheel sūtra would be a sūtra whose explicit teaching is suitable to be accepted literally.

4. However, according to the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* the first wheel requires interpretation—it is unacceptable literally.

Gung-ru Chö-jung and Jam-yang-shay-pa do not establish here why in the Mind-Only School any impermanent phenomenon must be established by way of its own character, but this point is clearly expressed in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* itself. For, in explaining what is behind the teaching in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras that phenomena are not produced, Buddha says that imputational natures cannot be produced by causes and conditions because they are not established by way of their own character, whereby it is clearly indicated that establishment by way of the object’s own character is a prerequisite for the activity of production. The *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* says:

Concerning that, thinking of just character-non-natures [that is, thinking of just imputational factors which are not established by way of their own character], I taught that all phenomena are unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow.

Why? Paramārthasamudgata, it is thus: **That which does not exist by way of its own character** is not produced. That which is not produced does not cease. That which is not produced and does not cease is from the start quiescent. That which is quiescent from the start is naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow [that is, naturally devoid of the affective emotions without depending on an antidote]. That which is naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow does not have the least thing to pass beyond sorrow.

This statement is Gung-ru Chö-jung’s and Jam-yang-shay-pa’s source for their position that a sūtra explicitly teaching that compounded phenomena are established by way of their own character must be non-deceptive and therefore a literally acceptable sūtra. Consequently, they draw the conclusion that the term “own-character” that Paramārthasamudgata uses when describing the first-wheel teaching about all phenomena cannot mean “establishment

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a Chap. 7; Lamotte, *Samdhinirmocana*, 67-68 [4], and 194; Dön-drub-gyal-tshan’s *Four Intertwined Commentaries*, 7.1-7.2.
by way of their own character” but must mean “establishment by way of their own character as the referents of their respective conceptual consciousnesses”—a status that the Mind-Only School refutes with respect to each and every phenomenon.

Unpacking Debate 3 to reveal Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Positions [46]

1 Since the first wheel of the doctrine as indicated here in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* is not suitable to be asserted literally, the first wheel as indicated here cannot be sūtras explicitly teaching that the compounded phenomena ranging from forms through to the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are established by way of their own character. This is because compounded phenomena are established by way of their own character.

2 Therefore, since compounded phenomena are included among phenomena, it is wrong to claim that in the first part of Paramārthasamudgata’s question to Buddha Paramārthasamudgata means:

   In the first wheel as indicated here in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*, the Supramundane Victor said that phenomena ranging from forms through to the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are equally established by way of their own character.

   Rather, it means:

   In the first wheel as indicated here in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*, the Supramundane Victor said that phenomena ranging from forms through to the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are equally established by way of their own character as the referents of their respective conceptual consciousnesses.

4. *Someone says.*[^n] Here there is no entailment [namely, that the first wheel as indicated here are sūtras explicitly teaching that compounded phenomena ranging from forms through the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are established by way of their own character does not entail that the first wheel as indicated here are sūtras whose own explicit teaching is

suitable to be asserted literally].

Comment: Since in the Mind-Only School compounded phenomena are indeed established by way of their own character, why would anyone want to assert that a sūtra passage presenting this correct position is not literal? Unlike Gung-ru Chö-jung and Jamyang-shay-pa who say that in the context of the description in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought of the first-wheel teaching requiring interpretation “established by way of their own character” means “establishment by way of their own character as the referents of their respective conceptual consciousnesses,” there are several prominent Ge-lug-pa scholars who hold that “established by way of their own character” means “established by way of their own character” but also indicates that these phenomena are “established by way of their own character as the referents of their respective conceptual consciousnesses.” In this way, they claim that they can hold that in the first wheel the teaching that compounded phenomena are established by way of their own character is nonliteral.

Jig-may-dam-chö-gya-tsho, explains that these scholars hold that the words “established by way of their own character” do not merely express what they seem to but also express “established by way of their own character as the referents of their respective conceptual consciousnesses.” This is held to be feasible since what terms express depends on the intention of the speaker and the mind-set of the listener (this type of explanation being how Gung-thang Kön-chog-tan-pay-drön-me limits the meaning of “established by way of their own character” only to “established by way

\[ \text{[Drawn from Hopkins,}\ \textit{Absorption in No External World, intro. to chap. 6 and Issue #31, 74-76.}} \]

\[ \text{b The term “sūtra” is used for both an entire text and a passage within such a text.}\]

\[ \text{c Jig-may-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s}\ \textit{Port of Entry, 145.1-145.4 and 146.3-146.5.}\]
of its own character as the referent of a conceptual consciousness”). As the contemporary scholar Kön-chog-tshe-ring\(^a\) of the Lo-sal-ling College, a follower of Pañ-chen Sō-nam-drag-pa, clearly frames the issue:\(^b\)

Even though it is suitable to assert that forms are established by way of their own character in accordance with the first-wheel teaching that forms are established by way of their own character, such a first-wheel passage is not asserted to be literally acceptable since it also teaches that forms are established by way of their own character as the referents of their respective conceptual consciousnesses.

This explanation of a double message conveyed by the teaching of “own-character” allows room for making similarly sense of Jetsün Chō-kyi-gyal-tshan’s clearly enunciated opinions that:

1. the “own-character” of Paramārthasamudgata’s question means “established by way of its own character”
2. the first wheel teaches that compounded phenomena are established by way of their own character
3. what the first wheel teaches is not definitive.

The dual explanation is attractive in that it leaves Tsong-kha-pa’s identification of “own-character” as “established by way of its own character” untouched while, by adding to its meaning, it avoids difficulties that Tsong-kha-pa’s apparent identification entails. This reading seems benign, since it shies away from anything that looks like direct criticism of the founder of the sect; however, it has its own difficulties as Jam-yang-shay-pa will now explore.

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**Our response**: It is not reasonable to accept [that the first wheel as indicated here are sūtras whose own explicit teaching is suitable to be asserted literally] because the first unit of the Sūtra [Unraveling the Thought] on the meaning established says:\(^c\)

Furthermore, that wheel of doctrine turned [by the Supramundane Victor] is surpassable, affords an occasion [for refutation], requires interpretation, and serves as a basis for controversy.

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\(^a\) dge bshes dkon mchog tshe ring; oral communication.

\(^b\) Recorded oral teaching.

Regarding the place [where you asserted] no entailment, it follows that there is entailment [that is, if the first wheel as indicated here are sūtras explicitly teaching that compounded phenomena ranging from forms through the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are established by way of their own character, then it must be that the first wheel as indicated here are sūtras whose own explicit teaching is suitable to be asserted literally] because whatever is a sūtra explicitly teaching that compounded phenomena are established by way of their own character also must be a literal sūtra, because a sūtra explicitly teaching that compounded phenomena are impermanent [must be a literal sūtra], because a sūtra explicitly teaching the sixteen [aspects of the four noble truths.] impermanence and so forth, [must be a literal sūtra].
Comment: a Contrary to Gung-ru Chö-jung and Jam-yang-shay-pa, scholars such as Pal-jor-lhün-drub, Je-tsün Chö-kyi-gyal-tshan, and Paṇ-chen Sō-nam-drag-pa assert that the term “own-character” in Paramārthasamudgata’s question means “establishment of objects by way of their own character.” However, since all Ge-lug-pa scholars hold that in the Mind-Only School:

- what is literally unacceptable requires interpretation
- what is literally acceptable is definitive
- and all compounded phenomena are established by way of their own character

these scholars and their followers must struggle to keep from having to admit that a first-wheel sūtra explicitly teaching that compounded phenomena are established by way of their own character is a sūtra whose explicit teaching is suitable to be accepted literally. If they did, they would have to admit that a first-wheel sūtra is definitive, and this flies in the face of the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought’s clear statement that first-wheel sūtras require interpretation.

To make their predicament super-clear, Gung-ru Chö-jung and Jam-yang-shay-pa make what in other circumstances would be the obvious point that sūtras teaching doctrines that accord with the fact are literally acceptable sūtras. This is how they rub it in, supporting each reason with its own evidence:

A first-wheel sūtra explicitly teaching that compounded phenomena ranging from forms through the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are established by way of their own character is necessarily a sūtra whose explicit teaching is suitable to be asserted literally,

- because a sūtra that explicitly teaches that compounded phenomena are established by way of their own character is necessarily a sūtra whose explicit teaching is suitable to be asserted literally
- because a sūtra that explicitly teaches that compounded phenomena are impermanent is necessarily a sūtra whose explicit teaching is suitable to be asserted literally
- because a sūtra that explicitly teaches the sixteen attributes of the four noble truths is necessarily a sūtra whose explicit

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a Drawn from Hopkins, Absorption in No External World, Issue #28, 63-64.
teaching is suitable to be asserted literally
• because a sūtra that explicitly teaches the four noble truths is necessarily a sūtra whose explicit teaching is suitable to be asserted literally
• because a sūtra that explicitly teaches the four noble truths is non-deceptive with respect to the literal reading of its principal topics of explicit teaching
• because a sūtra that explicitly teaches what is to be discarded and what is to be adopted with respect to the four truths (sufferings and their origins are to be discarded, and cessations and paths are to be adopted) is a correct, concordant example that possesses the reason and the predicate in a proof that a sūtra teaching very obscure topics is non-deceptive with respect to what it teaches by reason of the fact that it is a scripture devoid of contradiction.

It follows [that a sūtra explicitly teaching the sixteen aspects of the four noble truths, impermanence and so forth, must be a literal sūtra] because a sūtra explicitly teaching the four truths [must be a literal sūtra], because a sūtra that explicitly teaches what is to be discarded and what is to be adopted with respect to the four truths is a correct, concordant example that possesses the two—the reason and the predicate—in a proof that a sūtra teaching very hidden objects of comprehension is non-deceptive with respect to what it teaches by reason of the fact that it is a scripture purified by the three analyses [that is, devoid of contradiction],

[omitted]

Jam-yang-shay-pa (Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive, 30.1/12b.6) omits this step from his cribbing of Gung-ru Chö-jung (Garland of White Lotuses, 6b.2) probably for the sake of economy of expression.
because Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid Cognition” says:

Through thorough ascertainment of just these [teachings] 
On adoption [of true cessations] and discarding [true sufferings] 
as well as [their respective] methods [or causes, that is, true 
paths and true origins of suffering respectively, 
It is established by inference through the force of the object itself 
that Buddha’s word] is non-deceptive with respect to the prin-
cipal meaning [the four noble truths]. 
Therefore, [due to similarity] it is to be inferred that [Buddha’s 
word is non-deceptive] also with respect to other [very obscure 
topics as well].

Comment: b Dharmakīrti is saying that through scriptural inference 
based on the logical sign, or reason, that a certain passage teaching 
very obscure objects of comprehension is devoid of contradiction, 
it can be concluded that the passage is non-deceptive with respect 
to what it teaches, just as Buddha’s teaching on the four truths is 
non-deceptive. He cites the teaching on the four noble truths in the 
context of showing that certain of Buddha’s teachings on very ob-
scure topics c are also non-deceptive with respect to what they 
teach because of also being purified by way of three analyses in 
that (1) what they teach about manifest objects is not contradicted 
by direct perception, (2) what they teach about slightly obscure 
objects is not contradicted by usual inference (called inference by

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a Translation by Hopkins, Absorption in No External World, 64. Chapter 1, stanza 217 (Miyasaka’s III.217, pp. 146-147): heyopādeyatattvasya sopāyasya prasiddhitāḥ / pradhānārthāvīn vyādād anumānam paratra vā /; the bracketed material in the last two lines is drawn from Khay-drub’s commentary, 135b.6. The Dalai Lama cites the last two lines in his The Buddhism of Tibet and The Key to the Middle Way (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1975; reprint, Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1987), 83.
b Quoting Hopkins, Absorption in No External World, Issue #28, 64-65.
c That is, very obscure objects of comprehension (shin tu lko gyi gzhal bya/ gzhal bya shin tu lko gyu).
the power of the fact), and (3) with respect to very obscure objects, inaccessible to either direct perception or usual inference, there are no internal contradictions within Buddha’s teachings on those topics.

Because Dharmakīrti uses a sūtra explicitly teaching what is to be adopted and what is to be discarded in terms of the four noble truths as an instance of a sūtra that is non-deceptive with respect to what it teaches, it can be concluded that such a sūtra is suitable to be asserted literally. And, if non-deceptiveness is the criterion for the suitability of asserting a text literally, one cannot claim that a sūtra that explicitly teaches that compounded phenomena ranging from forms through the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are established by way of their own character is not necessarily a sūtra whose explicit teaching is suitable to be asserted literally.

and Āryadeva’s *Four Hundred* says:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Whoever has generated doubt</th>
<th>Toward what is not obvious in Buddha's word,</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Will believe that only Buddha [is omniscient]</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Based on [his profound teaching of] emptiness.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
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\[
\text{Comment:} \text{ Āryadeva’s point is that if Buddha is correct with respect to such a profound topic as emptiness, he must also be correct with respect to less profound but more obscure topics such as minute details of the cause and effects of actions, as long as what he says is not contradicted by any of the three types of analyses described above.}
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\(a\) *dgos stobs rjes dpag.*  
(9) *bstan bcos bzhi brgya pa zhes bya ba’i tshig le’ur byas pa, catuhšatakāśāstrakārikā; Peking 5246, vol. 95; stanza 280 which occurs in Chapter 12; parenthetical additions are from Gyal-tshab’s commentary, 90b.3-91a.2; see *Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas: Gyeł-isap on Āryadeva’s Four Hundred*, commentary by Geshe Sonam Rinchen, translated and edited by Ruth Sonam (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 1994), 241-242.  
(b) *c Quoting Hopkins, Absorption in No External World, Issue #28, 66.*
The main point of these two passages is that the logical verifiability of Buddha’s special cognition of the four truths and the verifiability of emptiness become the means of validating his teachings on topics inaccessible to such verification. The principle is that if he is right about such profound topics, he must be right about less profound, even though more inaccessible topics.

Moreover, it [absurdly] follows that the Paramārthasamudgata Chapter is not a sūtra of definitive meaning because [according to you] it is not [a sūtra of definitive meaning] by reason of explicitly teaching within differentiating the true establishment and non-true establishment among the three natures. It [absurdly] follows [that the Chapter of Paramārthasamudgata is not a sūtra of definitive meaning by reason of explicitly teaching within differentiating the true establishment and non-true establishment among the three natures] because [according to you] a sūtra that explicitly teaches within differentiating the true establishment and non-true establishment among the three natures is not necessarily a sūtra of definitive meaning. It [absurdly] follows [that a sūtra that explicitly teaches within differentiating the true establishment and non-true establishment among the three natures is not necessarily a sūtra of definitive meaning] because [according to you] a sūtra that explicitly teaches that other-powered natures are established by way of their own character is not necessarily a sūtra of definitive meaning because [according to you] your mode of apprehending the boundaries of non-entailment is logically feasible.

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a See Hopkins, Absorption in No External World, 68, 74, and also 84, Issue #28: “Does non-deceptiveness require being literally acceptable?”
Comment: a Jam-yang-shay-pa’s concern is with Pañ-chen Sö-nam-drag-pa’s and Je-tsün Chö-kyi-gyal-tshan’s b insistence that the fact that such a first-wheel sūtra explicitly teaches that compounded phenomena ranging from forms through to the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are established by way of their own character does not entail that it is a sūtra whose explicit teaching is suitable to be accepted literally even though the Mind-Only School asserts that compounded phenomena are indeed established this way. Due to this, Jam-yang-shay-pa draws the absurd consequence that the “Questions of Paramārthasamudgata Chapter” of the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought could not be a sūtra of definitive meaning because it is universally accepted that in the Mind-Only School this chapter of the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought is definitive because it divides phenomena into what are and are not established by way of their own character, showing that other-powered natures—that is, compounded phenomena—and thoroughly established natures—emptinesses—are established by way of their own character but that imputational natures are not established by way of their own character.

Jam-yang-shay-pa’s point is that once Pañ-chen Sö-nam-drag-pa and Je-tsün Chö-kyi-gyal-tshan refuse to assert that a sūtra that explicitly teaches that other-powered natures are established by way of their own character is necessarily a sūtra of definitive meaning despite the fact that they admit that in this system other-powered natures are established this way, they must forego the assertion that a sūtra that differentiates between what is and is not established by way of its own character is necessarily a sūtra of definitive meaning, and hence they no longer have any way to determine a sūtra to be definitive, whereby they absurdly have to

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b A-khu Lo-drö-gya-tsho (*Precious Lamp*, 66.1) identifies Jam-yang-shay-pa’s concern here as likely being with Je-tsün Chö-kyi-gyal-tshan.
give up holding that even this chapter of the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* is definitive!

Worded in Gung-ru Chō-jung’s more positive manner: a

A sūtra that explicitly teaches that compounded phenomena ranging from forms through the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are established by way of their own character is necessarily a sūtra whose explicit teaching is suitable to be asserted literally,

- because a sūtra that explicitly teaches that other-powered natures are established by way of their own character is necessarily a literally acceptable sūtra
- because a sūtra that explicitly teaches that other-powered natures and thoroughly established natures are established by way of their own character is necessarily a literally acceptable sūtra
- because a sūtra that explicitly teaches that other-powered natures and thoroughly established natures are established by way of their own character and that imputational natures are not established by way of their own character is necessarily a literally acceptable sūtra
- because a sūtra that differentiates well the three natures with respect to whether they are truly established or not is necessarily a literally acceptable sūtra
- because the “Questions of Paramārthasamudgata Chapter” is posited as a sūtra of definitive meaning from the viewpoint of its being a sūtra that explicitly teaches within differentiating well whether the three natures are truly established or not.

Once the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* is considered to be definitive because it explains that other-powered natures and thoroughly established natures are established by way of their own character and that imputational natures are not, it is indeed natural to consider that a sūtra that teaches that compounded phenomena (other-powered natures) are established by way of their own character is also definitive. Again, the principle is that what is non-deceptive is literally acceptable and hence definitive.

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a Gung-ru Chō-jung’s *Garland of White Lotuses*, 7a.1-7a.4.
Moreover, it [absurdly] follows that compounded phenomena ranging from forms through the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are established by way of their own character is a meaning of the literal rendering of first wheel as indicated here [in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought] that is literal [and thus to be interpreted] because [according to you] your way [Paramārthasamudgata] questions [the Teacher] is logically feasible. If you [incorrectly] accept [that compounded phenomena ranging from forms through the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are established by way of their own character is a meaning of the literal rendering of first wheel as indicated here in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought that is literal], then it [absurdly] follows that [the reasoning in Asaṅga’s Summary of the Great Vehicle]:b

Because an awareness does not exist prior to name,
Because manifold, and because unrestricted,
There are the contradictions of being in the essence of that, of many entities,
And of the mixture of entities. Therefore, it is proven.

refutes that those [compounded phenomena] are established by way of their own character because (1) you have [incorrectly] accepted [that compounded phenomena ranging from forms through the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are established by way of their own character is a meaning of the literal rendering of first wheel as indicated here in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought that is literal] and (2) this scriptural passage [“Because an awareness does not exist prior to name,” and so forth] is text demonstrating damage to the literality of the literal rendering of the first wheel as indicated here [in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought]. If you [incorrectly] accept [that the passage, “Because an awareness does not exist prior to name,” and so forth refutes that those compounded phenomena are established by way of their own character], it very absurdly follows that compounded phenomena are not established by way of their own character!

See Hopkins, Absorption in No External World, 63, 75.
b This reasoning refutes the acceptability of the literal rendering of the first-wheel sūtras; see Hopkins, Emptiness in Mind-Only, 208.
c According to Jam-yang-shay-pa this reasoning shows that objects are not established by way of their own character as the referents of their respective terms and conceptual consciousnesses.
Comment:  
With commentary, Asaṅga’s stanza reads:

There are the contradictions that if a bulbous flat-bottomed thing able to hold fluid, for instance, were established through the force of its own mode of subsistence as the referent of the verbal convention “pot”:

1. the imputational nature would exist in the essence of that bulbous thing because an awareness of the name of an object would have to exist prior to learning its name;
2. one object that has many names would have to be many

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a Drawn from Hopkins, *Emptiness in Mind-Only*, 324-325; the final paragraph is drawn from Issue #28, 69.
entities because many names are used for one object; and
3. the entities of many objects that have the same name
would be mixed because a name is not restricted to one
object.

Therefore, it is proven [that objects are not established by way
of their own character as the referents of terms and conceptual
consciousnesses].

**The first reasoning.** The most common example in philosophical
treatises is a pot—which is defined as that which has a bulbous
belly, a flat bottom, and is capable of holding fluid. If this bulbous
thing’s being a foundation of a term such as “pot” were established
by way of the bulbous thing’s own mode of subsistence, its being
such a foundation would not depend upon language, and thus an
awareness thinking “pot” with respect to it absurdly would be gen-
erated just through seeing it, prior to learning its name.

**The second reasoning.** If a person’s being the referent of names
is established right in the mode of being of the person, the usage
of many names—such as Shakra, Indra, Grāmaghātaka, and so
forth—for one god, the Lord of the Heaven of the Thirty-Three,
must be by way of the force of the god himself since this god is
established by way of his own character as the referent of those
names. In that case, the one god absurdly would be several gods.

**The third reasoning.** If a person’s being the referent of names is
established right in the mode of being of the person, the usage of
one name for two persons—two different people called Upagupta,
for instance—would mean that the two persons absurdly would be
just one person.

The conclusion drawn from these three fallacies is that objects
are not established by way of their own character as the objects
verbalized by their respective terms and as the referents of their
respective conceptual consciousnesses. Even babies, animals, and
so forth—who do not know language and thus do not know spe-
cific terms for articles such as pots—nevertheless have aware-
nesses conceiving that pots and so forth are established by way of
their own character as foundations of thoughts about them, and
thus the same reasoning is applicable.

Through this reasoning Asaṅga refutes the acceptability of the
literal rendering of the first-wheel sūtras, and if a meaning of the
literal rendering of the first-wheel sūtras were that compounded
phenomena ranging from forms through the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are established by way of their own character, Asaṅga absurdly would be refuting that compounded phenomena are established by way of their own character, in which case it would absurdly have to be said that in the Mind-Only School compounded phenomena are not established by way of their own character.

Moreover, it [absurdly] follows that the five aggregates’ establishment by way of their own character is the own-character pronounced\(^a\) as being established with the five aggregates on the occasion of the statement, “The Supramundane Victor pronounced, in many ways, the own-character of the aggregates,”\(^b\) because [according to you, your] way [Paramārthasamudgata] questions [the Teacher] about the first wheel as indicated here [in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought] is logically feasible. If you [incorrectly] accept [that the five aggregates’ establishment by way of their own character is the own-character pronounced as being established with the five aggregates on the occasion of the statement, “The Supramundane Victor pronounced, in many ways, the own-character of the aggregates,”] it [absurdly] follows that the five aggregates’ establishment by way of their own character is the nonexistent nature of character mentioned on the occasion of [the Buddha’s rhetorical question], “Concerning that, what are character-non-natures of phenomena?” because you [incorrectly] accepted [that the five aggregates’ establishment by way of their own character is the own-character pronounced as being established with the five aggregates on the occasion of the statement, “The Supramundane Victor pronounced, in many ways, the own-character of the aggregates,”] and the literal readings of the two—this sūtra passage [“Concerning that, what are character-non-natures of phenomena?”] that is, phenomena’s absence of establishment by way of their own character as the referents of their respective terms and conceptual consciousnesses] and the first wheel explicitly indicated on the occasion of “pronounced the own-character of the aggregates” [that is, the aggregates’ establishment by way of their own character as the referents of their respective terms and conceptual consciousnesses] are contradictory because the sūtra passage later [in Buddha’s rhetorical question] is a sūtra passage demonstrating damage to the literal reading of the literal rendering of the first wheel indicated on the occasion of the earlier sūtra passage [in Paramārthasamudgata’s question].

\(^a\) Or: announced, declared.

\(^b\) See Hopkins, *Emptiness in Mind-Only*, 76.
Refuting Mistakes about the Question

གཞན་ཡང་། ༨༦ བཏང་པོ་ཞེས་པ་དེ་བཅོམ་ཡན་འདས་ཀྱིས་ȷམ་གྲངས་ȭ་མར་བོ་ཞེས་པའི་ǰབས་ཀྱི་བོ་པར་བཀའ་ལིང་པའི་ȴེང་ȭ་ȭབ་པར་བཀའ་ལིང་པའི་ȷམ་ཡིན་པ་དེ་ཆོས་ȷམས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་མེད་པ་ཉིད་གང་ཞེ་ན། སེམས་པ་གཉིས་ཀྱི་Ȍས་ཟིན་Ȍ་ཇི་བཞིན་པ་འགལ་བའི་ɉིར།
It is not reasonable to accept [that the five aggregates’ establishment by way of their own character is the nonexistent nature of character mentioned on the occasion of [the Buddha’s rhetorical question], “Concerning that, what are character-non-natures of phenomena?”] because the distinction—that although it is reasonable to take the five aggregates’ establishment by way of their own character as the nonexistent nature of character mentioned on this occasion [of (the Buddha’s rhetorical question), “Concerning that, what are character-non-natures of phenomena?”], it is not reasonable to take the five aggregates’ establishment by way of their own character that way—is logically feasible. For, Tsong-kha-pa’s *The Essence of Eloquence* says:

Concerning that, what are character-non-natures of phenomena? Those which are imputational characters.

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*Comment:* Gung-ru Chö-jung’s and Jam-yang-shay-pa’s next reasoning is literary in nature. In answering Paramārthasamudgata’s question, Buddha asks a rhetorical question and answers it:

Paramārthasamudgata, concerning that, what are character-non-natures of phenomena? [That is, what are natureless in terms of being established by way of their own character?] Those which are imputational characters.

Why? It is thus: Those [imputational characters] are characters posited by names and terminology and do not subsist by way of their own character. Therefore, they are said to be “character-non-natures.”

If in the first wheel, when Buddha speaks of the “own-character” of the five aggregates, he were speaking of the aggregates as being established by way of their own character as Je-tsün Chö-kyi-gyaltshan and Paṇ-chen Sö-nam-drag-pa claim he is, then it would absurdly come to be that here in his answer the establishment of the mental and physical aggregates by way of their own character would be the character-nature that is non-existent!

Gung-ru Chö-jung and Jam-yang-shay-pa’s point is that this

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b c28, 70.


d Jam-yang-shay-pa’s *Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive*, 31.3-32.3.

e Hopkins, *Emptiness in Mind-Only*, 86.
Refuting Mistakes about the Question

The passage speaking of the character-non-nature demonstrates damage to the acceptability of the literal rendering of the first-wheel sūtras mentioned earlier by Paramārthasamudgata, and thus the literal meanings of the two passages must be contradictory. For the latter to damage the former, the “character-nature” of the latter (Buddha’s answer) and the “own-character” of the former (Paramārthasamudgata’s question) must mean the same thing. However, “character-non-nature” cannot refer to the five aggregates’ not being established by way of their own character simply because there is no argument that in the Mind-Only School they are established by way of their own character. Therefore, according to Gung-ru Chö-jung and Jam-yang-shay-pa, the “character-nature” that is said to be non-existent in the latter passage is the establishment of objects by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses, and hence, the “own-character” mentioned in Paramārthasamudgata’s question must also be the same.

The rest of it indicates the mode of imputation. The imputation as, “This is a form aggregate,” is the mode of imputation of an entity, and the imputation as “[This] is the production of a form aggregate,” and so forth is the mode of imputation of particulars, or attributes.

Comment: In the wheel of doctrine of the four truths, Buddha spoke of the entities of the four truths as being established by way of their own character as a referent of a conceptual consciousness. He also spoke of an attribute of each the four respectively—thorough knowledge of true sufferings as impermanent and miserable, abandonment of the sources of suffering (contaminated actions and afflictive emotions), actualization of the true cessation of contaminated actions and afflictive emotions and thereby of suffering, and meditation cultivating true paths which are the means for attaining true cessation of suffering and its causes. This

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a In an aside, Jam-yang-shay-pa (Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive, 32.4) says that the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought at the point at which it is reporting this teaching in sūtras of the first wheel is (of course!) not itself teaching (bsiun) that objects are established by way of their own character as the referents of their respective conceptual consciousnesses, for the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought itself teaches exactly the opposite.

b See Hopkins, Emptiness in Mind-Only, 104.
teaching occurs in the *Sūtra of Renunciation* at the point of turning the wheel of doctrine of the four truths for the five good ascetics. In the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* Paramārthasamudgata refers to this teaching, saying:

> The Supramundane Victor also pronounced, in many ways, the own-character of the truths as well as speaking of [their] thorough knowledge, abandonment, actualization, and meditation.

Jig-may-dam-chö-gya-tsho\(^b\) raises the interesting question of whether such a sūtra teaching the four noble truths is deceptive with respect to the meaning that it teaches\(^c\) because it teaches that the four truths are established by way of their own character as the referents of their respective conceptual consciousnesses, whereas they are not. Since it would be uncomfortable to hold that a sūtra teaching the four truths is deceptive, he resolves the issue by saying that positing a teaching as being deceptive or not about the meaning that it teaches concerns its **main** topic, which in this case is the four truths. Jig-may-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s solution is:

1. to admit that the first wheel teaches the actual four noble truths **both mainly and explicitly**
2. but to hold that **on the literal level** it teaches the four truths to be established by way of their own character as the referents of their respective conceptual consciousnesses.

He uses the tack of splitting the explicit teaching from the literal reading so as to avoid having to hold that anything the first wheel teaches on the literal level can be taken literally and hence would have to be definitive. For if anything on the literal level of the first wheel were definitive, this would contradict the statement in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* that the first wheel is not definitive and requires interpretation. In this way, a sūtra teaching the four noble truths is non-deceptive about the meaning that it teaches. This distinction preserves the basic validity of the teachings of such sūtras and yet allows that the ontological status being taught

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\(^a\) Gung-thang (*Difficult Points*, 77.3-77.5) points out that some histories and so forth refer to this teaching as the *Wheel of Doctrine Sūtra* (*chos kyi 'khor lo'i mdo*) but that in fact the latter is only an extract from the *Renunciation Sūtra*.

\(^b\) Jig-may-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s *Port of Entry*, 156.3-156.6.

\(^c\) *rang gi bstan don la slu ba*. 
Refuting Mistakes about the Question

with respect to these topics is entirely unfounded.

Unpacking Debate 4 to reveal Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Positions [50]

1 If it were that the first wheel as indicated here in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought are sūtras explicitly teaching that compounded phenomena ranging from forms through the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are established by way of their own character, then this would entail that the first wheel as indicated here are sūtras whose own explicit teaching is suitable to be asserted literally.

2 For, it is not reasonable to accept that the first wheel as indicated here in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought are sūtras whose own explicit teaching is suitable to be asserted literally because the first unit of the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought on the meaning established says:

[16b]
Furthermore, that wheel of doctrine turned by the Supra-
mundane Victor is surpassable, affords an occasion for
refutation, requires interpretation, and serves as a basis
for controversy.

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<thead>
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<th>3</th>
<th>Therefore:</th>
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<td>Whatever is a sūtra explicitly teaching that compounded</td>
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|   | phenomena are established by way of their own charac-
|   | ter must be a literal sūtra. |
|   | A sūtra explicitly teaching that compounded phenomena |
|   | are impermanent must be a literal sūtra. |
|   | A sūtra explicitly teaching the sixteen aspects of the four |
|   | noble truths, impermanence and so forth, must be a lit-
|   | eral sūtra. |
|   | A sūtra explicitly teaching the four truths must be a lit-
|   | eral sūtra. |
|   | A sūtra that explicitly teaches what is to be discarded and |
|   | what is to be adopted with respect to the four truths is a |
|   | correct, concordant example that possesses the two—the |
|   | reason and the predicate—in a proof that a sūtra teaching |
|   | very hidden objects of comprehension is non-deceptive |
|   | with respect to what it teaches by reason of the fact that |
|   | it is a scripture purified by the three analyses [that is, |
|   | devoid of contradiction]. |

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<tr>
<th>4</th>
<th>A third-wheel sūtra such as the Paramārtha­samudgata Chapter</th>
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<td>is a sūtra of definitive meaning by reason of explicitly teaching</td>
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<td>within differentiating the true establishment and absence of</td>
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<td>true establishment among the three natures.</td>
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<th>5</th>
<th>A sūtra that explicitly teaches that other-powered natures are</th>
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<td>established by way of their own character is necessarily a sūtra</td>
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<td>of definitive meaning.</td>
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<th>6</th>
<th>That compounded phenomena ranging from forms through the</th>
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<td>thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are established by</td>
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|   | way of their own character is not a meaning of the literal ren-
|   | dering of first wheel as indicated here in the Sūtra Unraveling |
|   | the Thought that is literal [and hence it must be interpreted] |

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<tr>
<th>7</th>
<th>The reasoning in Asaṅga’s Summary of the Great Vehicle:</th>
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|   | Because an awareness does not exist prior to name,
Because manifold, and because unrestricted, 
There are the contradictions of being in the essence of 
that, of many entities, 
And of the mixture of entities. Therefore, it is proven. 

does not refute that compounded phenomena are established by 
way of their own character.

| 8 | This scriptural passage, “Because an awareness does not exist prior to name,” and so forth is text demonstrating damage to the literality of the literal rendering of the first wheel as indicated here in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*. |
| 9 | According to the Mind-Only School, compounded phenomena are established by way of their own character. |
| 10 | The five aggregates’ establishment by way of their own character is not the own-character pronounced as being established with the five aggregates on the occasion of the statement, “The Supramundane Victor pronounced, in many ways, the own-character of the aggregates.” |
| 11 | The five aggregates’ establishment by way of their own character is not the nonexistent nature of character mentioned on the occasion of [the Buddha’s rhetorical question], “Concerning that, what are character-non-natures of phenomena?” |
| 12 | The literal readings of the two—this later sūtra passage [in Buddha’s rhetorical question], “Concerning that, what are character-non-natures of phenomena?” that is, phenomena’s absence of establishment by way of their own character as the referents of their respective terms and conceptual consciousnesses and the first wheel explicitly indicated on the occasion of the earlier sūtra passage [in Paramārthasamudgata’s question] “spoke of the own-character of the aggregates” [that is, the aggregates’ establishment by way of their own character as the referents of their respective terms and conceptual consciousnesses] are contradictory. |
| 13 | The sūtra passage later [in Buddha’s rhetorical question] is a sūtra passage demonstrating damage to taking literally the literal rendering of the first wheel indicated on the occasion of the earlier sūtra passage [in Paramārthasamudgata’s question]. |
5. Also, someone says: It follows that this sūtra passage, “The Supramundane Victor also pronounced, in many ways, the own-character of the aggregates,” explicitly indicates that the five aggregates are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them because it is reasonable to take the “own-character” that is part of phrase “pronounced also own-character” as “established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them.”

Our response: [That it is reasonable to take the “own-character” that is part of phrase “pronounced also own-character” as “established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them”] does not entail [that this sūtra passage, “The Supramundane Victor also pronounced, in many ways, the own-character of the aggregates,” explicitly indicates that the five aggregates are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them].

\[\text{2011 TBRC bla brang, 16b.2; 1987 Go-mang Lhasa, 12b.5; 2008 Taipei reprint, 21.18.} \]
\[\text{See Hopkins, } \textit{Emptiness in Mind-Only}, \text{ 76.} \]
You cannot accept [that this sutra passage explicitly indicates that the five aggregates are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them] because this sutra passage [“The Supramundane Victor also pronounced, in many ways, the own-character of the aggregates”] does not indicate such [that is, it does not explicitly indicate that the five aggregates are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them]. It follows [that this sutra passage (“The Supramundane Victor also pronounced, in many ways, the own-character of the aggregates”) does not explicitly indicate that the five aggregates are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them] because the distinction is logically feasible that:

- while this [sutra passage (“also pronounced the own-character of the aggregates”) does not indicate such [that is, does not explicitly indicate that the five aggregates are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them],
- the first wheel indicated here [in the Sutra Unraveling the Thought] when teaching on this occasion [of “also pronounced the own-character of the aggregates” does indicate such [that is, does explicitly indicate that the five aggregates are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them].

It follows [that while this sutra passage (“also pronounced the own-character of the aggregates”) does not indicate such, the first wheel indicated here on this occasion (in the Sutra Unraveling the Thought of “also pronounced the own-character of the aggregates”) does indicate such] because “pronounced” (bka’ stsal) indicates “spoken there in that first wheel indicated here,” [simply] because there is a meaning of “pronounced.”
Comment: a Many subtle distinctions about what was said in the first wheel as indicated here in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought must be made. According to Gung-ru Chö-jung, b Jam-yang-shay-pa, c and A-khu Lo-drö-gya-tsho, d when Paramārthasamudgata says, “The Supramundane Victor pronounced, in many ways, the own-character of the aggregates,” Paramārthasamudgata is saying only that Buddha pronounced the words of sūtra, e “The aggregates are established by way of their own character.” However, Buddha did not say f that the aggregates are established by way of

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a Drawn from Hopkins, Absorption in No External World, Issue #45, 102-103.
b Gung-ru Chö-jung’s Garland of White Lotuses, 15a.6-15b.2.
c Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive,” 40.3-41.1.
d A-khu Lo-drö-gya-tsho’s Precious Lamp, 61.1-63.4.
e ces pa’i mdo shig bka’ stsal pa.
f gsungs pa.
Refuting Mistakes about the Question

their own character; nor did he teach⁴ that the aggregates are established by way of their own character; nor did he even say (in quotes), “The aggregates are established by way of their own character,” since that would constitute his saying and teaching such. For, as explained above, if Buddha pronounced in the first wheel that the aggregates are established by way of their own character, such would be literally acceptable. He merely pronounced the words of sūtra, “The aggregates are established by way of their own character.”

Jam-yang-shay-pa⁵ addresses the issue through raising a parallel concern from another context: If the mere pronouncement of sūtra words entails the pronouncement of sūtra words teaching such, then the Heart of Wisdom Sūtra would absurdly teach that forms and so forth do not exist since it contains the sūtra words, “Form does not exist,” and so forth. Jam-yang-shay-pa’s cogent point is that although the Heart of Wisdom Sūtra has such words, it does not pronounce, say, or teach that forms do not exist because there simply is no purpose in teaching that forms do not exist. As the late Ge-dün-lo-drö of Go-mang College said, there is no trainee for the teaching that forms do not exist, and hence Buddha never taught such, even though those words are present in sūtras. The context must be taken into account, either as provided by other passages that specify a status of objects—such as inherent existence—as not existing or as provided by considering Buddha’s intent and his listeners’ mind-set. Early in the Heart of Wisdom Sūtra itself, Avalokiteshvara says, “Forms are to be viewed as empty of inherent existence,” and hence the qualification “inherently” must be carried over to all the other negations.

The conclusion is that in the first wheel Buddha taught and said, relative to certain trainees, that phenomena are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses despite the admitted fact that those very words, or anything resembling them, appear nowhere in such sūtras. A-khu Lo-drö-gya-tsho⁶ makes the further distinction that Buddha even spoke the words of sūtra, “Phenomena are established by way of

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⁴ bstan pa.
⁵ Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive, 40.5.
⁶ A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tsho’s Precious Lamp, 62.4-62.6. He appears to be following Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Brief Decisive Analysis, 492.4-493.3.
their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses,” his point undoubtedly being that if Buddha explicitly teaches such on the literal level, he must say it. Indeed, this must be understood within the context of Gung-thang’s brilliant discussion of Buddha’s intention to teach such and the mind-set of his listeners, since, as A-khu Lo-drö-gya-tsho himself admits, such “does not emerge [that is, appear] in words.”

Moreover, it follows that “pronounced” (bka’ stsal) is to be taken as the mode of pronunciation here [in the Paramārthasamudgata Chapter] in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought because you accept [that this sūtra passage—“The Supramundane Victor pronounced, in many ways, the own-character of the aggregates”—explicitly indicates that the five aggregates are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses]. If you accept [that “pronounced” (bka’ stsal) is to be taken as the mode of pronunciation here (in the Paramārthasamudgata Chapter) in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought] it follows that the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought is a sūtra of interpretable meaning because you [correctly] accepted [that “pronounced” (bka’ stsal) is to be taken as the mode of pronunciation here (in the Paramārthasamudgata Chapter) in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought]. [Extrapolate] in this way for later lines [of the text]; enough elaboration.

a Precious Lamp, 55.6: ‘dir dngos su bstan pa’i ‘khor lo dang po rnams kyi tshig la rang ’dzin rtog pa’i zhen gzhir rang mtsihan gvis grub pa ma thon kyang.

b The identification of this reason clause is doubtful.
Refuting Mistakes about the Question

Unpacking Debate 5 to reveal Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Positions

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<td>1</td>
<td>This sūtra passage, “The Supramundane Victor also pronounced, in many ways, the own-character of the aggregates,” does not explicitly indicate that the five aggregates are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them.</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>It is reasonable to take the “own-character” that is part of phrase “pronounced also own-character” as “established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them.”</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>That it is reasonable to take the “own-character” that is part of phrase “pronounced also own-character” as “established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them” does not entail that this sūtra passage, “The Supramundane Victor also pronounced, in many ways, the own-character of the aggregates,” explicitly indicates that the five aggregates are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them.</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>This sūtra passage [“The Supramundane Victor also pronounced, in many ways, the own-character of the aggregates”] does not explicitly indicate that the five aggregates are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them.</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>The distinction is logically feasible that while this sūtra passage (“also pronounced the own-character of the aggregates”) does not indicate, that is, does not explicitly indicate, that the five aggregates are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them, the first wheel indicated here in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought when teaching on this occasion of “also pronounced the own-character of the aggregates” does indicate, that is, does explicitly indicate, that the five aggregates are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them.</td>
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6. Also someone says: It follows that in first wheel sūtras as indicated here [in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought] it is explicitly taught that phenomena ranging from forms to the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are established by way of their own character because in middle wheel sūtras as indicated here it is explicitly taught that all phenomena ranging from forms to omniscient consciousness equally are not established by way of their own character. It follows [that in middle wheel sūtras as indicated here it is explicitly taught that all phenomena ranging from forms to omniscient consciousness equally are not established by way of their own character] because The Essence of Eloquence says,\(^a\)

The bases being posited as interpretable or definitive are the three—the statements [in the first wheel] that phenomena equally have nature in the sense of being established by way of their own character, the statements [in the middle wheel] that phenomena equally do not have such, and the good differentiation [in the final wheel] of those [phenomena] that have [such establishment] and those that do not.

\(^a\) 2011 TBRC bla brang, 16b.6; 1987 Go-mang Lhasa, 13a.2; 2008 Taipei reprint, 22.10.

\(^b\) Translation taken from Hopkins, *Emptiness in Mind-Only*, 127.
Comment: a We have seen how Gung-ru Chö-jung and Jam-yang-shay-pa hold that in Paramārtha's question in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought about the first wheel of doctrine, “The Supramundane Victor [initially] pronounced, in many ways, the own-character of the aggregates,” the term “own-character” means the establishment of objects by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses, and we have seen that, for them, the term “character” in Buddha’s answer, “Concerning that, what are character-non-natures of phenomena? Those which are imputational characters,” b means the same. But what about Tsong-kha-pa’s description (Emptiness in Mind-Only, 127), cited just above, that in the first wheel Buddha simply stated that phenomena are equally established by way of their own character and does not specify “established by way of their own character as the referents of their respective conceptual consciousnesses”? 

The bases being posited as interpretable or definitive are the three—the statements [in the first wheel] that phenomena equally have nature in the sense of being established by way of their own character, the statements [in the middle wheel] that phenomena equally do not have such, and the good differentiation [in the final wheel] of those [phenomena] that have [such establishment] and those that do not. c

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b “Imputational character” (kun btags kyi mtshan nyid, parikalpitalaṣaṇa) and “imputational nature” (kun btags kyi rang bzhin, parikalpitasvabhāva) are synonymous.
c The Tibetan (Emptiness in Mind-Only, 389) is: drang nges su ’jog pa ’i gzhi ni chos rnams la rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa ’i ngo bo nyid yod mnyam du gsgungs pa dang med mnyam du gsgungs pa dang yod med legs par phyé ba gsum yin pa.
Gung-ru Chö-jung and Jam-yang-shay-pa must show how to reconcile their explanation with this statement (and several others) by Tsong-kha-pa that seem to present exactly the opposite of what they are proposing. Below, Jam-yang-shay-pa, repeating his predecessor Gung-ru Chö-jung, answers by insisting that Tsong-kha-pa is (or should be) saying:

The first wheel indicated here [in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*] equally has statements of the words, “Phenomena ranging from forms through to the harmonies with enlightenment have the nature of being established by way of their own character,” and the middle wheel equally has statements of the words, “Phenomena ranging from forms through to exalted knowers of all aspects [that is, omniscient consciousnesses] do not have the nature of being established by way of their own character.”

The grammar (as well as the reading by all of the major commentators except Gung-ru Chö-jung, Jam-yang-shay-pa, and their followers) is that Tsong-kha-pa is saying that in the first wheel Buddha said that phenomena equally have nature in the sense of being established by way of their own character and that in the middle wheel he said that phenomena equally do not have such, but, according to Gung-ru Chö-jung and Jam-yang-shay-pa, this is simply a mis-reading because of the absurdities that such a reading would entail, as have been detailed earlier. To follow them, the above citation should be translated into English as:

The bases being posited as interpretable or definitive are the three—the statements equally [present throughout the

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b As always in this context, the reference is to the first wheel “as indicated in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*”; therefore, Jam-yang-shay-pa (33.5) corrects Gung-ru Chö-jung’s “first wheel” (*khor lo dang po*, 8a.6) to ‘*dir bstan* *khor lo dang po*.

c Gung-ru Chö-jung (8a.6) reads *ngo bo nyid* whereas Jam-yang-shay-pa (33.5/13a.5) reads *ngo bo*.

d Jam-yang-shay-pa’s *Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive*, 33.5: ‘*dir bstan* *khor lo dang por gzugs nas byang phyogs kyi bar gyi chos rnams la rang gi mishan nyid kyiis grub pa’i ngo bo nyid yod ces pa’i tshig yod mnyam dang/ bar par gzugs nas rnams mkhyen gyi bar gyi chos rnams la rang gi mishan nyid kyiis grub pa’i ngo bo nyid med ces pa’i tshig yod mnyam du gzungs zhes pa’i don yin..
sūtras of the first wheel] that phenomena have nature in the sense of being established by way of their own character, the statements equally [present throughout the sūtras of the middle wheel] that phenomena do not have such, and the good differentiation [in the final wheel] of those [phenomena] that have [such establishment] and those that do not.

The grammar does not easily yield what Gung-ru Chö-jung and Jam-yang-shay-pa see, but it is an inventive, creative way of making sense out of what Tsong-kha-pa says in the light of their decision that “own-character” has to mean the establishment of objects by way of own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses.” Since they view the rules of allegiance to the founder of their sect such that they cannot refute Tsong-kha-pa’s own words, they must make them say something that they do not seem to say. By claiming that what Tsong-kha-pa means is only that the words “Phenomena ranging from forms through to the harmonies with enlightenment have the nature of being established by way of their own character,” are equally present throughout the first wheel, they can make the further claim that what those words mean is that the first wheel teaches that these phenomena are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses. This division into words and meaning allows them to leave Tsong-kha-pa’s statement as is and yet read a different meaning into it.

Our response: [That The Essence of Eloquence says, “The bases being posited as interpretable or definitive are the three—the statements (in the first wheel) that phenomena equally have nature in the sense of being established by way of their own character, the statements (in the middle wheel) that phenomena equally do not have such, and the good differentiation (in the final wheel) of those (phenomena) that have (such establishment) and those that do not” does not entail [that in middle wheel sūtras as indicated here it is explicitly taught that all phenomena ranging from forms to omniscient consciousness equally are not established by way of their own character] because that [statement by Tsong-kha-pa] means:

The first wheel equally has statements of the words, “Phenomena ranging from forms to the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment have the nature of being established by way of their own
“Phenomena ranging from forms to exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects do not have the nature of being established by way of their own character.”

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<th>In first wheel sūtras as indicated here in the <em>Sūtra Unraveling the Thought</em> it is not explicitly taught that phenomena ranging from forms to the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are established by way of their own character.</th>
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<td>2</td>
<td>In middle wheel sūtras as indicated here in the <em>Sūtra Unraveling the Thought</em> it is not explicitly taught that all phenomena ranging from forms to omniscient consciousness equally are not established by way of their own character.</td>
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</table>
| 3 | That Tsong-kha-pa’s *The Essence of Elocution* says, “The bases being posited as interpretable or definitive are the three—the statements (in the first wheel) that phenomena equally have nature in the sense of being established by way of their own character, the statements (in the middle wheel) that phenomena equally do not have such, and the good differentiation (in the final wheel) of those phenomena that have such establishment and those that do not” does not entail that in middle wheel sūtras it is explicitly taught that all phenomena ranging
from forms to omniscient consciousness equally are not established by way of their own character.

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<th>4</th>
<th>Tsong-kha-pa’s statement means:</th>
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7. Also someone says: There is a way in which [Paramārthasamudgata] questions [the Teacher] because he asks this question:

In the first wheel as indicated here [in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*, the Supramundane Victor] said that phenomena ranging from forms through to the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are equally established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them; in the middle wheel as indicated here, [the Supramundane Victor] said that phenomena ranging from forms through to exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects are equally not established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses.

and so forth.

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a 2011 TBRC *bla brang*, 17a.4; 1987 Go-mang Lhasa, 13a.6; 2008 Taipei reprint, 22.19.
Our response: Well then, it [absurdly] follows that in the second wheel [as indicated in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought] it is explicitly taught that all phenomena, forms and so forth, are not established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses because [according to you your] way [Paramārthasamudgata] questions [the Teacher] is logically feasible.

If you [incorrectly] accept [that in the second wheel as indicated here it is explicitly taught that all phenomena, forms and so forth, are not established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses], it [absurdly] follows that the statement in the second unit of the Sūtra [Unraveling the Thought] on the meaning established, “is surpassable, provides an opportunity” is not logically feasible because you [incorrectly] accept [that in the second wheel as indicated here it is explicitly taught that all phenomena, forms and so forth, are not established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses] and because it [absurdly] follows that even the statement, “Thinking of what did you say?” has no relevance [that is, is senseless] because [according to you] a mode of the explicit teaching by the middle wheel sūtras exceeding the mode of explicit teaching by the middle wheel sūtras indicated here is not demonstrable [since the explicit teaching by the middle wheel sūtras indicated here would be literally acceptable, since all phenomena, forms and so forth, are indeed not established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses].
Unpacking Debate 7 to reveal Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Positions [83]

1. In the second wheel as indicated in the Śūtra Unraveling the Thought it is not explicitly taught that all phenomena, forms and so forth, are not established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses.

2. If it did teach the above, it would be literally acceptable and hence definitive, whereas the statement in the second unit of the Śūtra Unraveling the Thought on the meaning established says that the second wheel as indicated here “is surpassable, provides an opportunity” for refutation.

3. Paramārthasamudgata’s asking “Thinking of what did you say [in the middle wheel of doctrine that all phenomena are] natureless and so forth?” has relevance because there is a mode of the explicit teaching by the middle wheel sūtras exceeding the mode of explicit teaching by the middle wheel sūtras indicated here in the Śūtra Unraveling the Thought. For, the explicit teaching by the middle wheel sūtras indicated here is not literally acceptable. Indeed, all phenomena, forms and so forth, are not established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses, and thus the mode of explicit teaching by the middle wheel sūtras indicated here in the Śūtra Unraveling the Thought cannot be that all phenomena, forms and so forth, are not established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses.

8. Also someone says:a [Paramārthasamudgata] asks the question:

   In the first wheel as indicated here [in the Śūtra Unraveling the Thought, the Supramundane Victor] said that forms and so forth

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a 2011 TBRC bla brang, 17b.2; 1987 Go-mang Lhasa, 13b.2; 2008 Taipei reprint, 23.6.
are established as external objects and said in the middle wheel that they are not established in that way [as external objects].

and so forth.

Our response: Well then, it [absurdly] follows that the explanation, “[The Supramundane Victor] also pronounced [in many ways] the own-character [of the aggregates],” is not logically feasible because [according to you] the distinction is not logically feasible that:

• even though in the first wheel as indicated here [in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought] it is explicitly indicated that forms and so forth are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them,⁵
• establishment as an external object is not explicitly indicated because [according to you] your way [Paramārthasamudgata] questions [the Teacher] is logically feasible.

Moreover, it [absurdly] follows that it is reasonable to take own-character in the statement “[The Supramundane Victor] also pronounced [in many

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⁵ For this stance, see above in debate 5, 133.
Refuting Mistakes about the Question

ways] the own-character [of the aggregates],” as establishment as an external object” because you [incorrectly] accept [that (Paramārthasamudgata) asks the question:

In the first wheel as indicated here (in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought, the Supramundane Victor) said that forms and so forth are established as external objects and said in the middle wheel that they are not established in that way (as external objects).

and so forth. If you [incorrectly] accept [that it is reasonable to take own-character in the statement, “The Supramundane Victor also pronounced in many ways the own-character of the aggregates,” as establishment as an external object] it [absurdly] follows that this sūtra passage explicitly indicates the mode of pronunciation of establishment as an external object because you [incorrectly] accept [that it is reasonable to take own-character in the statement, “The Supramundane Victor also pronounced in many ways the own-character of the aggregates,” as establishment as an external object].

If you [incorrectly] accept [that this sūtra passage explicitly indicates the mode of pronunciation of establishment as an external object], it [absurdly] follows that the terms expressing “establishment by way of its own character as the referent of a conceptual consciousness apprehending it”
explicitly express “establishment as an external object” because you [incorrectly] accept [that this sūtra passage explicitly indicates the mode of pronouncement of establishment as an external object]. If you [incorrectly] accept [that the terms expressing “establishment by way of its own character as the referent of a conceptual consciousness apprehending it” explicitly express “establishment as an external object”], it [absurdly] follows that a conceptual consciousness apprehending in that way [establishment by way of its own character as the referent of a conceptual consciousness] is that [that is, perceives (its object) as established as an external object] because you [incorrectly] accept [that these terms expressing “establishment by way of own character as the referent of a conceptual consciousness” explicitly express “establishment as an external object”].

It is not reasonable to accept [that a conceptual consciousness apprehending establishment by way of its own character as the referent of a conceptual consciousness explicitly perceives (its object) as established as an external object] because terms and consciousnesses are eliminative engagers of their own objects.a

a Since conceptual consciousnesses are eliminative in manner, they cannot explicitly know two things at once. See Hopkins, Absorption in No External World, 138.
Comment: Since the Mind-Only School speaks of two kinds of emptiness (the absence of establishment of apprehended-object and apprehending-subject as different entities and the absence of establishment of phenomena by way of their own character as referents of terms and conceptual consciousnesses), the question arises whether the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought also speaks of both and, correspondingly, whether it describes the first wheel of doctrine as teaching the opposite of both kinds of emptiness. The Sūtra Unraveling the Thought certainly speaks of a thoroughly established nature that is the other-powered natures’ emptiness of factors imputed in the manner of entity and attribute, but does it address the emptiness of externality? Also, as explained above, the first wheel of doctrine as described by Paramārthasamudgata in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought teaches that objects are established by way of their own character as the referents of words and conceptual consciousnesses, but does this first wheel of doctrine teach that forms, for instance, are entities external to the consciousnesses apprehending them?

As Gung-ru Chö-jung surmises, one might mistakenly be led to think that Tsong-kha-pa holds that the first wheel of doctrine as described by Paramārthasamudgata even explicitly teaches that forms and so forth are external objects because in The Essence of

a Drawn from Hopkins, Absorption in No External World, Issue #52, 133-138.
b Gung-ru Chö-jung’s Garland of White Lotuses, 10b.6-11b.5, especially 11a.5-11b.5. See also Gung-thang Kün-chog-tan-pay-drön-me’s Difficult Points, 95.15-96.4, A-khu Lo-drö-gya-tsho’s Precious Lamp, 67.6-69.3, and Dön-drub-gyal-Ishan’s Four Intertwined Commentaries, 595.3.
c Jig-may-dam-chö-gya-tsho (Port of Entry, 150.1) reports that this is the position of the Lo-sel-ling College. Indeed, their textbook author, Pañ-chen Sō-nam-drag-pa (Garland of Blue Lotuses, 11b.6), at first says only that the first wheel teaches externality but later clearly says that the first wheel explicitly teaches externality (12b.6 and 13a.2). Since it is taken for granted that the first wheel explicitly teaches that phenomena are established by way of their own character as the referents of their respective conceptual consciousnesses, Jig-may-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s characterization seems to be accurate. The late Ye-she-tub-tan, despite being a follower of Pañ-chen Sō-nam-drag-pa, used the distinction that a passage that teaches the one explicitly teaches the other implicitly.
Eloquence when explaining how the first wheel requires interpretation, Tsong-kha-pa speaks about the first-wheel teaching of externality (thus indicating that the first wheel teaches external objects) and then about the teaching of imputation in the manner of entity and attribute. Tsong-kha-pa (Emptiness in Mind-Only, 234-235) initially shows that the teaching of externality requires interpretation:

When the mode of commentary on the suchness of things by the masters, the brothers [Asaṅga and Vasubandhu], is taken as given above, the description—in the first wheel—of the two, apprehended-object and apprehending-subject, in terms of externality is elucidated as requiring interpretation. The factual basis [in Buddha’s] thought is [the appearance of the six types of objects—forms and so forth—to the six types of consciousness as if they were external objects, as is] stated in Vasubandhu’s The Twenty:

The Subduer spoke about these—
The seeds from which cognitions respectively arise
And the appearances [of forms]—
In a dualistic way as [internal and external] sense-spheres of those [cognitions].

Also, the purpose [of his teaching such] is as the same text says:

That form-sense-spheres and so forth exist [as external objects]
Was said through the force of a thought (dgongs pa) behind it
With regard to beings tamed by that,
Like [the teaching of] spontaneously arisen sentient beings [as substantially established or permanent].

When it is taught that a consciousness viewing forms and so forth arises from external and internal sense-spheres, it is for the sake of realizing that there is no viewer and so forth except for those. The damage to the literal reading is the reasonings refuting external objects.

And right after that, Tsong-kha-pa (Emptiness in Mind-Only, 235) goes on to say:

Since an imputational factor imputed to phenomena in the
manner of entity and attribute is a phenomenon-constituent and a phenomenon-sense-sphere, statements that those two [that is, phenomenon-constituent and phenomenon-sense-sphere]⁴ are established by way of their own character without differentiating [from among phenomena what does and does not exist by way of its own character] also require interpretation.

Since Tsong-kha-pa first speaks about the fact that first-wheel teachings of externality require interpretation, it would seem that the first wheel that Paramārthasamudgata describes in his question would explicitly teach external objects.

However, Gung-ru Chö-jung,⁵ while admitting that there are first-wheel passages teaching externality, holds that the term “own-character” in Paramārthasamudgata’s description is only the establishment of objects by way of their own character as the referents of their respective conceptual consciousnesses. He holds that the passages teaching these two types of over-reified status of phenomena are separate⁶ because in the last line of the passage just cited, Tsong-kha-pa, by using the word “also,” separates the two topics, giving the impression that there are separate teachings in the first wheel about external objects and about establishment of objects by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses as well as separate refutations of these teachings in the third wheel. Gung-ru Chö-jung therefore holds

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⁴ Since these two, as categories, contain instances (such as uncompounded space) that are permanent, the categories themselves are considered to be permanent and hence not established by way of their own character. Tsong-kha-pa’s more specific reference is to imputational natures that are factors imputed in the manner of entity and attribute, and when it is taught in the first wheel that all phenomena, without differentiation, are established by way of their own character, these imputational natures, being existent, also are included as being established by way of their own character. Since they exist but actually do not exist by way of their own character, such scriptures also (that is, in addition to those teaching external objects) require interpretation.

⁵ Jig-may-dam-chö-gya-tsho (Port of Entry, 699.6) says that, with respect to the teaching that all phenomena are established by way of their own character, the factual basis in Buddha’s thought is that other-powered natures and thoroughly established natures are established by way of their own character; the purpose is to prevent the annihilationist view of holding that imputational natures do not exist at all; and the damage to the literal reading is the reasonings proving that imputational natures are not established by way of their own character.

⁶ Gung-ru Chö-jung’s Garland of White Lotuses, 9b.3-10b.5.

⁷ Jig-may-dam-chö-gya-tsho (Port of Entry, 150.1) reports this position.
that the first wheel is more than what Paramārthasamudgata explicitly describes.

One immediately wonders why Tsong-kha-pa chose first to discuss—as requiring interpretation—the type of reification that Paramārthasamudgata does not explicitly describe and, only after that and as an addendum, mentions the type explicitly set forth in Paramārthasamudgata’s description of the first wheel. Gung-ru Chö-jung answers this qualm by claiming that Tsong-kha-pa uses the format of how the teaching of externality requires interpretation as a model for showing how the teaching of imputation in the manner of entities and attributes requires interpretation. Gung-ru Chö-jung is attempting to suggest that, even though Tsong-kha-pa’s treatment of the teaching of externality is both first and more detailed, he intended it as a model for how the teaching of factors imputed in the manner of entity and attribute requires interpretation.

Gung-ru Chö-jung’s point is forced, but he uses it as an opportunity to show how the latter teaching fits into the threefold schema of showing (1) what was behind it in Buddha’s thought, (2) the purpose of Buddha’s teaching something that does not accord with the fact, and (3) the refutations showing that such a teaching does not accord with the fact. Thus, according to Gung-ru Chö-jung, Tsong-kha-pa cites Vasubandhu’s *The Twenty* in order that one might understand these three factors:

1. **The basis in Buddha’s thought:** Just as the factually true basis behind Buddha’s non-factual teaching in the first wheel that external objects exist is that awarenesses are generated to which external objects falsely appear, so the factually true basis behind Buddha’s non-factual teaching in the first wheel, as described by Paramārthasamudgata, that objects are established by way of their own character as the referents of their respective conceptual consciousnesses is that awarenesses are generated to which forms and so forth falsely appear to be established.

2. **The purpose:** Just as the first-wheel teaching that external objects exist is for the sake of trainees with the outlook of the Great Exposition and Sūtra schools, so the first-wheel teaching, as described by Paramārthasamudgata, that forms and so forth are established by way of their own character as the referents of their respective conceptual consciousnesses is for the sake of trainees with the outlook of the Great Exposition and
Sūtra schools.

3. **The refutations of the explicit teaching**: Just as the first wheel that teaches external objects is damaged by the reasonings refuting external objects, so the first-wheel teaching, as described by Paramārthasamudgata, that forms and so forth are established by way of their own character as the referents of their respective conceptual consciousnesses is damaged by the reasonings refuting this.\(^a\)

Gung-ru Chö-jung concludes his argument—that the first wheel, as described by Paramārthasamudgata, explicitly teaches that factors imputed in the manner of entity and attribute are established by way of their own character and does not explicitly teach externality—by using the principle of the hypothetical opponent’s objection against this adversary. The opponent claims that Tsong-kha-pa must have considered the teaching of externality to be what Paramārthasamudgata explicitly describes as the first-wheel teaching because Tsong-kha-pa mentions it in a **primary** way when he speaks about how the first wheel requires interpretation. In response, Gung-ru Chö-jung, employing the same principle, points to the fact that when in *The Essence of Eloquence* Tsong-kha-pa gives the reasonings damaging the explicit teaching of the first wheel and proving that other-powered natures are empty of the imputational nature, he **first** cites the reasoning showing that objects are not established by way of their own character as the referents of their respective names and conceptual consciousnesses. Tsong-kha-pa (*Emptiness in Mind-Only*, 208) quotes Asaṅga’s *Summary of the Great Vehicle*:\(^b\)

> Because an awareness does not exist prior to name,  
> Because manifold, and because unrestricted,  
> There are the contradictions of being in the essence of that,  
> of many entities,  
> And of the mixture of entities. Therefore, it is proven.

From the fact that Tsong-kha-pa cites this type of reasoning and

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\(^a\) Gung-ru Chö-jung does not give this third item; it is implicit to his argument, and thus I have supplied it, even though he may have meant to avoid bringing up the matter since he may have considered each of the sets of reasonings as refuting both types of reification.

\(^b\) Between the question just asked and this stanza there is another sentence, not cited by Tsong-kha-pa, that says the same in prose. For commentary on this stanza see above, 62.
not one proving the lack of externality, Gung-ru Chö-jung can cogently claim that, for Tsong-kha-pa, the type of non-factual teaching that Paramārthasamudgata describes as constituting the first wheel is that factors imputed in the manner of entity and attribute are established by way of their own character.

Once the first wheel as described by Paramārthasamudgata is explicitly concerned with imputation in the manner of entity and attribute, it cannot explicitly be concerned with externality, since “own-character” can explicitly connote only one meaning. Gung-ru Chö-jung therefore concludes that Paramārthasamudgata does not describe the first-wheel teaching of externality and that these two types of first-wheel teachings are to be found in separate sūtra passages.

I would aver that when, in chapter 12 of The Essence of Eloquence, Tsong-kha-pa addresses the issue of the three aspects of sūtra passages that require interpretation—he speaks initially and primarily of the teaching of externality because:

• there is no Indian source that clearly speaks of the three aspects for the teaching of imputation in the manner of entity and attribute and thus it was not convenient to Tsong-kha-pa’s main point, and
• in India the emphasis switched to the teaching on externality.

Unfortunately, Gung-ru Chö-jung does not give an example of a separate first-wheel sūtra passage that explicitly teaches externality, and it is likely that the search for one led Jam-yang-shay-pa, a his successor as textbook author for Go-mang, to assert two centuries later that the first wheel that Paramārthasamudgata describes as explicitly teaching that forms and so forth are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses also implicitly teaches externality. He agrees with Gung-ru Chö-jung that the terms expressing that forms and so forth are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses do not explicitly express that forms and so forth are established as external objects, but he holds that such is implicitly expressed. Similarly, he agrees that a

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a Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive, 34.4-36.1. Jam-yang-shay-pa rearranges but retains the meaning of the first part of Gung-ru Chö-jung’s explanation (Garland of White Lotuses, 9b.3-10a.6) about the fact that such a first-wheel passage cannot explicitly teach externality; however, he drops the second part (10a.6-11b.5) about there being separate sūtra passages since he disagrees with it.
conceptual consciousness conceiving that forms and so forth are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses does not explicitly conceive that these are established as external objects, but he asserts that such is implicitly conceived. The two scholars agree that terms and conceptual consciousnesses operate in an eliminative manner with respect to their referents, zeroing in on only one aspect, and hence cannot explicitly express or conceive two things at once. However, Gung-ru Chö-jung draws the conclusion that there must be separate sūtra passages teaching these two topics, whereas Jam-yang-shay-pa uses the distinction of explicit and implicit teachings to assert that one passage does both.a

Furthermore, it [absurdly] follows that [the passage in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought] “What are character-non-natures of phenomena?” and so forth explicitly refutes external objects because you [incorrectly] accept [that these terms expressing “establishment by way of own character as the referent of a conceptual consciousness” explicitly express “establishment as an external object.”] You cannot accept [that “What are character-non-natures of phenomena?” and so forth explicitly refutes external objects], because it is said that without explicitly refuting those [external objects] here [in the Questions of Paramārthasamudgata Chapter], through the force of explicitly refuting establishment by way of [objects’] own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses one enters into Cognition[-only]c that is an absence of external objectsd and because

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a These scholars are forced into their respective positions by Tsong-kha-pa’s identification of “own-character” as not referring to the unique character of objects but to establishment by way of its own character, which Gung-ru Chö-jung and Jam-yang-shay-pa take to mean a misperceived status of phenomena.

b The passage in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought is:

Concerning that, what are character-non-natures of phenomena? Those which are imputational characters.

Why? It is thus: Those [imputational characters] are characters posited by names and terminology and do not subsist by way of their own character. Therefore, they are said to be “character-non-natures.”

See Hopkins, Emptiness in Mind-Only, 86.

c rnam rig tsam, vijñāṇaptimātra.

d External objects are not explicitly refuted in the seventh chapter, the Questions of Paramārthasamudgata Chapter of the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought, but through the force of the explicit refutation of establishment by way of objects’ own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses in that chapter, one can understand cognition-only that is an
the distinction that those [external objects] are explicitly refuted in the Questions of Maitreya Chapter [of the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought] is logically feasible.

The first corner of the sign [which is that it is said that without explicitly refuting those (external objects) here (in the Questions of Paramārthasamudgata Chapter), through the force of explicitly refuting establishment by way of (objects’) own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses one enters into cognition-only that is an absence of external objects] is established because this very text [Tsong-kha-pa’s The Essence of Eloquence] says:

Asanga’s Summary of the Great Vehicle says that entry by way of this [mode of emptiness] is entry into cognition-only.

absence of external objects. Nevertheless, it is not that an explicit refutation of external objects is absent from the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought, for an explicit refutation of external objects occurs in the eighth chapter, the Questions of Maitreya Chapter.

Translation taken from Hopkins, Emptiness in Mind-Only, 200-201.
The second corner of the sign [which is that the Questions of Maitreya Chapter explicitly refutes external objects] is established because the Questions of Maitreya Chapter says:

Maitreya asks, “Is the image that is the object of activity of meditative stabilization said to be different from the mind or not different?”

[The Supramundane Victor] pronounced, “Maitreya, it is not different.”

and this very text [Tsong-kha-pa’s The Essence of Eloquence] says:

in that sūtra on the occasion of [discussing] calm abiding [in the “Questions of Maitreya Chapter”], a refutation of external objects is clearly set forth.

In Asaṅga’s Grounds of Bodhisattvas, this mode of emptiness [set forth in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought] is explained as the object observed by the exalted wisdom purifying the obstructions to omniscience and as the middle path abandoning the two extremes of which there is none higher, and his Summary of the Great Vehicle says that entry by way of this [mode of emptiness] is entry into cognition-only. Therefore, this is not already established by the Hearer Schools [that is, the Great Exposition and Sūtra Schools].

For the passage from Asaṅga’s Summary of the Great Vehicle, see Hopkins, Emptiness in Mind-Only, 213-214.

See Emptiness in Mind-Only, 217; for discussion, Reflections on Reality, part 4; and Absorption in No External World, #52, #53.
Comment: a Jam-yang-shay-pa agrees with Gung-ru Chö-jung that what is explicitly refuted here in this chapter of the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought when it speaks of the character-non-nature is that objects are not established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses. He also agrees that through the force of that refutation one understands cognition-only, the absence of external objects. Since one must enter into, or understand, cognition-only, which means the absence of external objects, in dependence upon explicitly refuting that forms and so forth are established by way of their own character as the referents of their respective terms and conceptual consciousnesses, the realization of the emptiness of such establishment is a method (and hence a precursor) for realizing the emptiness of external objects. b For Gung-ru Chö-jung and Jam-yang-shay-pa, the realization of the former does not constitute realization of the latter but leads to it, and thus it is impossible for the first wheel explicitly to teach the opposite of both kinds of emptiness, since the reasoning refuting the one would have to explicitly refute the other. c

Unpacking Debate 8 to reveal Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Positions [85]

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<table>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>In the first wheel as indicated here in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought it is explicitly indicated that forms and so forth are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them, and establishment as an external object is not explicitly taught.</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Therefore, it is not reasonable to take own-character in the statement “[The Supramundane Victor] also pronounced [in</td>
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a Drawn from Hopkins, Absorption in No External World, Issue #52, 138.
b This sentence is drawn from Gung-ru Chö-jung’s Garland of White Lotuses, 10a.4-10a.6. Not all Ge-lug-pa scholars agree that the two realizations are serial; see Hopkins, Reflections on Reality, chapter 19.
c Jig-may-dam-chö-gya-tsho’s Port of Entry, 150.5.
many ways] the own-character [of the aggregates],” as establishment as an external object.”

3 Consequently, this sūtra passage does not explicitly indicate the mode of pronouncement of establishment as an external object.

4 Hence, the terms expressing “establishment by way of its own character as the referent of a conceptual consciousness apprehending it” do not explicitly express “establishment as an external object.”

5 Similarly, a conceptual consciousness apprehending establishment by way of its own character as the referent of a conceptual consciousness does not perceive its object as established as an external object because terms and consciousnesses are eliminative engagers of their own objects.

6 The passage in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought, “What are character-non-natures of phenomena?” and so forth does not explicitly refute external objects.

7 Nevertheless, it is said that without explicitly refuting those external objects here in the Questions of Paramārthasamudgata Chapter, through the force of explicitly refuting establishment by way of own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses one enters into Cognition-only that is an absence of external objects.

8 External objects are explicitly refuted in the Questions of Maitreya Chapter of the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought.

9. Also someone says:a It follows that it is reasonable to take “own-character” in the statement, “[The Supramundane Victor] pronounced the own-character” as the unique character because the Chinese Great Commentary [on the “Sūtra Unraveling the Thought” by Wonch’ukb] explains it that way [as the unique character].


b Tib. rdzogs gsal / wen tshig / wen tshogs / wanydzeg, Ch. Yüan-ts’e, 613-696.
Our response: [That the Chinese Great Commentary (on the “Sūtra Unraveling the Thought” by Wonch’uk) explains it that way (as the unique character)] does not entail [that it is reasonable to take “own-character” in the statement, “The Supramundane Victor pronounced the own-character” as the unique character]. Although that [Chinese Great Commentary] does explain [“own-character” here] that way [as the unique character], it is not reasonable to assert it because Tsong-kha-pa’s The Essence of Eloquence says:

In the Chinese Great Commentary, and so forth, the explanation of “own-character” here as the unique character [of the aggregates and so forth] is not reasonable.

Comment: “Own-character” is read by the Korean scholar Wonch’uk in his Great Commentary on the “Sūtra Unraveling the Thought” (which was written in Chinese and translated into Tibetan) as being the unique character or definition of a phenomenon as when Buddha speaks of a phenomenon and then of its unique character that distinguishes it from other phenomena. In the case of form, for instance, this is obstructiveness. Paramārthasamudgata (Emptiness in Mind-Only, 76) describes

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a Adapted from Hopkins, Emptiness in Mind-Only, 78-79.
b Drawn from Hopkins, Absorption in No External World, Issue #48, 107-112; for more speculation see the entire Issue, 107-117.
how Buddha taught the five aggregates in the first wheel of doctrine:

The Supramundane Victor spoke, in many ways, of the own-character of the aggregates. He also spoke of [their] character of production, character of disintegration, abandonment, and thorough knowledge.

In commentary on this, Wonch’uk says:

“Own-character” is the specific character as in, for instance, the explanation, “Form is obstructive….Consciousness is the knower.” “Character of production, character of disintegration” are general characters because forms and so forth are entities that have the character\(^b\) of production and disintegration. “Utter abandonment and thorough knowledge” are characters of suffering and of origins [of suffering] because [contaminated] karma and afflictive emotions which are the true origins [of suffering] are to be utterly abandoned and because the fruits of cyclic existence which are true sufferings are to be thoroughly known. Or, “own-character” is the character of self-entity or specific character; the production and disintegration of those two characters pervade all [compounded phenomena and hence are general characters].

Wonch’uk depicts Buddha as speaking first about the character or nature of an object that is specific to it alone, as when he teaches about the obstructiveness of form, which is not shared with other phenomena such as consciousness, and then about characters of form that are shared with other compounded phenomena, such as production and disintegration, and hence are general characters.

Similarly, the Explanation of the “Sūtra Unraveling the Thought,”\(^c\) in commentary on the fourth chapter of the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought, identifies “observation of the signs of the aggregates”\(^d\) as being “from the point of view of thoroughly analyzing their own signs”\(^e\) and “observation of the production of the

\(^a\) Peking 5517, vol. 106, chap. 5, 128.5.7.
\(^b\) _mishan nyid_.
\(^c\) Delhi: Karmapa Choedhey, 1985, _cho_, vol. 205, 109.4. For discussion of the authorship of this commentary, see _Emptiness in Mind-Only_, 454.
\(^d\) _phung po'i mishan ma dmigs pa, skandhanimitopalamha_.
\(^e\) _rang gi mishan ma yongs su brtags pa'i sgo nas_.

aggregates”a and “observation of the disintegration of the aggregates”b as being “from the point of view of general characteristics and thorough investigation.”c

Tsong-kha-pa (Emptiness in Mind-Only, 78-79) rejects Wonch’uk’s explanation:

In the Chinese Great Commentaryd [on the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought by the Korean scholar Wonch’uk], and so forth, (259) {370} “own-character”e here [in this passage in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought] is explained as the unique character [of the aggregates and so forth], but this is not right.f For the sūtra itself at the point of [speaking about] imputational factorsg clearly speaks of establishment by way of [the object’s] own character [and does not speak of the unique character], and since even imputational factors have a unique characterization, there would be the fallacy that the character-non-nature could not be explained with respect to imputational factors.

Tsong-kha-pa’s point is that if “own-character” in Paramārthasamudgata’s question is the unique character of a phenomenon, then when in Buddha’s answer (Emptiness in Mind-Only, 82-83) he speaks about character-non-nature:

Paramārthasamudgata, thinking of three non-natures of phenomena—character-non-nature, production-non-nature, and ultimate-non-nature—I taught [in the middle wheel of the teaching], “All phenomena are natureless.”

the term “character” also would have to refer to the unique character of phenomena simply because of the relatedness of the answer to the question. Tsong-kha-pa (Emptiness in Mind-Only, 86) points out that the sūtra itself says not that imputational natures do not have their own unique character but that they do not subsist by way of their own character:

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a phung po’i skye ba dmigs pa, skandhotpādopalambha.
b phung po’i ’jig pa dmigs pa, skandha-vināśopalambha.
c spyi’i mishan nyid dang yongs su brtags pa’i sgo nas.
e See Hopkins, Absorption in No External World, Issues #27-55, 94.
g See Hopkins, Absorption in No External World, Issue #50.
Those [imputational characters] are characters posited by names and terminology\textsuperscript{a} and do not subsist by way of their own character. Therefore, they are said to be “character-non-natures.”

Hence, Tsong-kha-pa cogently holds that “character” in “character-non-nature” has to mean to subsist, or to be established, by way of its own character.

Tsong-kha-pa abruptly changes the topic with no further explanation of this pivotal point. Also, none of his commentators unpacks the issue, but we can speculate that his reasoning is this:

That the construction in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought itself, “does not subsist by way of its own character”\textsuperscript{b} as opposed to “its own-character [that is, unique character] does not exist,”\textsuperscript{c} indicates a certain mode or status of existence that imputational natures do not have, rather than that they lack a character that defines them. For a mode of being is indicated through the adverbial instrumental “by way of its own character,”\textsuperscript{d} whereas if the sūtra meant to indicate merely that imputational natures do not exist, it would have done so directly.

If you [incorrectly] accept [that it is reasonable to take “own-character” in the statement, “(The Supramundane Victor) pronounced the own-character” as the unique character], it [absurdly] follows that it is reasonable to take “character” in the phrase “character-non-nature” as unique character because you [incorrectly] accept [that it is reasonable to take “own-character” in the statement, “(The Supramundane Victor) pronounced the own-character” as the unique character]. If you [incorrectly] accept [that it is reasonable to take “character” in the phrase “character-non-nature” as unique character], it [absurdly] follows that the statement in the Sutra [Unraveling the Thought], “does not subsist by way of its own character,”\textsuperscript{e} is not logically feasible because you [incorrectly] accept [that it is reasonable to take “character” in the phrase “character-non-nature” as

\textsuperscript{a} See Hopkins, Absorption in No External World, Issue #104.

\textsuperscript{b} rang gi mtshan nyid gyis gnas pa ma yin.

\textsuperscript{c} rang gi mtshan nyid yod pa ma yin.

\textsuperscript{d} rang gi mtshan nyid gyis.

\textsuperscript{e} As is explained just below in connection with the citation from Tsong-kha-pa’s The Essence of Eloquence, the sūtra does not speak of lacking a unique character; see also Absorption in No External World, 94, and Emptiness in Mind-Only, 86.
the unique character]. And because Tsong-kha-pa’s *The Essence of Eloquence* says:

For the sūtra itself at the point of [speaking about] imputational factors clearly speaks of establishment by way of [the object’s] own character [and does not speak of the unique character].

Comment: Tsong-kha-pa’s cogent point is that the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*, when describing how imputational natures are character-non-natures, says that they “do not subsist by way of their own character” (*rang gi mtshan nyid kyi nams par gnas pa*).

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*a* Hopkins, *Emptiness in Mind-Only*, 79. The *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* (*Emptiness in Mind-Only*, 86) says:

Those [imputational characters] are characters posited by names and terminology and do not subsist by way of their own character. Therefore, they are said to be “character-non-natures.”
ni ma yin pa, svalakṣaṇena avyavasthitam),\(^2\) that is to say, they are not established by way of their own character; the sūtra does not speak about the defining character of an object.

This clear identification in the sūtra itself is the pivot of Tsong-kha-pa’s argument (in his chapter on the Autonomy School) that when Bhāvaviveka says, in the context of criticizing the Mind-Only reading of this passage, that to deny “character” of imputational natures is a deprecation, he indicates that he holds that existent imputational natures, such as uncompounded space, are established by way of their own character. Once Bhāvaviveka holds that even imputational natures are established by way of their own character, he must hold that all phenomena are established this way. It then becomes crucial to determine what Bhāvaviveka means by “establishment by way of its own character,” Tsong-kha-pa’s answer being that it means that an object is established from its own side, with the consequence that when an object is sought among its bases of designation, it is found.

Furthermore, it [absurdly] follows that the presentation of the character-non-nature with respect to the imputational nature is not logically feasible because the unique character of the imputational nature exists, because Tsong-kha-pa’s The Essence of Eloquence says:\(^b\)

and since even imputational factors have a unique characterization, there would be the fallacy that the character-non-nature could not be explained with respect to imputational factors.

Comment: Imputational natures have the unique characteristic, or

\(^a\) Lamotte, \emph{Samdhinirmocana}, 68 [4], n. 1.

\(^b\) Hopkins, \emph{Emptiness in Mind-Only}, 79.
definition, of that which is just imputed by conceptuality (rtog pas btags tsam). Therefore, if the absence of “character” mentioned in Buddha’s answer to Paramārthasamudgata’s question when discussing imputational natures merely referred to the non-existence of a unique characterization, such an absence could not be posited with respect to imputational natures, since they do indeed have a unique characterization. However, as is obvious in the next chapter, one of the main points of the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought is that imputational natures are non-natures in terms of “character,” and thus “character” in that context cannot refer to a unique or uncommon character.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unpacking Debate 9 to reveal Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Positions [99]</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
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</tbody>
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2) PRESENTATION OF OUR OWN SYSTEM

There is a way in which Paramārthasamudgata questions the Teacher in order to dispel contradiction in the sūtras because Paramārthasamudgata’s explicitly asks this question about the middle wheel indicated here:

[Supramundane Victor,] in the first wheel as indicated here, you pronounced many times the words of sūtra:

The entities of compounded phenomena ranging from forms through the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment as well as [their attributes of] production, cessation, and so forth that are established by way of their own character exist, exist.

In the middle wheel of the teaching as indicated here, you pronounced many times the words of sūtra:

Production, cessation, and so forth that are established by way of their own character do not exist, do not exist, in phenomena ranging from forms through exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects.

If those two were left literally as they are, they would be contradictory, but since the Teacher does not have contradiction, of what were you thinking when in the middle wheel indicated here you spoke in that way [that production, cessation, and so forth that are established by way of their own character do not exist, do not exist, in phenomena ranging from forms through exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects]? And this implicitly asks, “Of what were you thinking when in the first wheel indicated here you spoke in that way [that production, cessation, and so forth that are established by way of their own character exist, exist, in compounded phenomena ranging from forms through the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment]?”

\[a\] For some fine point, see Hopkins, Absorption in No External World, Issue #56, 143-146.
Paramārthasamudgata’s Question

Paramārthasamudgata does not ask this upon a qualm—thinking that the literal renderings of the first two wheels are discordant—having been generated in him, because he asks this in order that such [a qualm thinking that the literal renderings of the first two wheels are discordant] which will arise in later trainees might be cleared away.
གིས་པ་ བོག་པར་འཁོར་ལོ་དང་པོ་འཕེལ་བོ་མི་མེན་པའི་
བཟང་པོས་ལ་འང་བ་སེལ་བའི་ཆེད་ལས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་རིང་བོ་སེམས་པའི་
མི་འོན་གྱི་སེམས་པའི་ལྡན་མོ་གཅིག་བཤད་པ་མེ་དེ་
སེམས་པའི་མོ་གསོར་ཐོན་མོ་
3) DISPPELLING OBJECTIONS

10. Someone says: It follows that the distinction is logically feasible that in the first wheel as indicated here [in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought] it is taught that phenomena ranging from forms to the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them—without explicitly teaching that these [phenomena ranging from forms to the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment] are established by way of their own character because such a way of questioning [about the first wheel] is logically feasible. If you accept [that the distinction is logically feasible that in the first wheel as indicated here (in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought) it is taught that phenomena ranging from forms to the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them—without explicitly teaching that these (phenomena ranging from forms to the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment) are established by way of their own character], it follows that the Hearer Schools, intended trainees of that [teaching], assert in that way [that phenomena ranging from forms to the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them] because you accept [that the distinction is logically feasible that in the first wheel as indicated here (in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought) it is taught that phenomena ranging from forms to the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them—without explicitly teaching that these (phenomena ranging from forms to the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment) are established by way of their own character].

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a 2011 TBRC bla brang, 19a.4; 1987 Go-mang Lhasa, 14b.6; 2008 Taipei reprint, 25.15. See also Absorption, #51, 128-129.
Our response: [That the distinction is logically feasible that in the first wheel as indicated here (in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*) it is taught that phenomena ranging from forms to the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them—without explicitly teaching that these (phenomena ranging from forms to the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment) are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them] does not entail [that the Hearer Schools, intended trainees of that (teaching) assert in that way (that phenomena ranging from forms to the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them)].

If you [incorrectly] accept [that the Hearer Schools, the intended trainees of that (teaching), assert in that way that phenomena ranging from forms to the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them] it [absurdly] follows that those [Hearer Schools] assert the eighteen constituents in that way [as established by way of their
own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them] because you [incorrectly] accept [that the Hearer Schools, the intended trainees of that (teaching), assert in that way that phenomena ranging from forms to the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them]. If you [incorrectly] accept [that those Hearer Schools assert the eighteen constituents in that way as established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them], it [absurdly] follows that [those Hearer Schools] assert the phenomenon-constituent in that way [as established by way of its own character as the referent of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending it] because you [incorrectly] accept [that those Hearer Schools assert the eighteen constituents in that way as established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them].
Comment: The eighteen constituents (khams, dhātu) are the six objects, the six sense powers, and the six consciousnesses, each of which is called a constituent:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Object</th>
<th>Sense power</th>
<th>Consciousness</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>form</td>
<td>eye sense power</td>
<td>eye consciousness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sound</td>
<td>ear sense power</td>
<td>ear consciousness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>odor</td>
<td>nose sense power</td>
<td>nose consciousness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>taste</td>
<td>tongue sense power</td>
<td>tongue consciousness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tangible object</td>
<td>body sense power</td>
<td>body consciousness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>phenomenon</td>
<td>mind sense power</td>
<td>mental consciousness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

“Phenomenon-constituent,” the sixth category of objects, refers to other phenomena, those that are not sense objects but are objects only of the mental consciousness, such as impermanence and emptiness. Since sense objects are also objects of a mental consciousness, the category “phenomenon-constituent” does not include all objects of a mental consciousness—just its exclusive objects among which mental factors and permanent phenomena, such as uncompounded space, are included.

Jam-yang-shay-pa cites “phenomenon-constituent” here because as a category that includes both permanent and impermanent members, the category is considered to be permanent, and since the Hearer Schools do not assert that the permanent are established by way of their own character, they would not assert that the phenomenon-constituent is established by way of its own character as the referent of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending it since the very words would violate their own assertions. In the next debate Jam-yang-shay-pa proceeds to show that nevertheless the Hearer Schools come to assert such, that is to say, they are reduced to asserting this.

It is not reasonable to accept [that those Hearer Schools assert the phenomenon-constituent in that way as established by way of its own character as the referent of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending it] because the distinction is logically feasible that although those [Hearer Schools] do not assert that uncompounded phenomena such as space and so forth are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual
consciousnesses apprehending them, those [Hearer Schools] assert that those [uncompounded phenomena such as space and so forth] are established through the force of their own measure of subsistence as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them, because if those [uncompounded phenomena such as space and so forth] are not established through the force of their own measure of subsistence, those [Hearer Schools] do not know how to posit them as existing, and although [the Hearer Schools do not] impute the term “own-character” [that is, “established by way of its own character”] to those [uncompounded phenomena such as space and so forth], according to the Mind-Only School those [Hearer Schools] come to assert that those [uncompounded phenomena such as space and so forth] are established by way of their own character [as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses].

\[ rang gi gnas tshod kyi dbang gis grub pa; or “established through the force of its own status.” \]

\[ This bracketed material is from Hopkins, Absorption in No External World, 129. \]
Comment: Gung-ru Chö-jung\textsuperscript{a} and Jam-yang-shay-pa\textsuperscript{b} have made the distinction that the literal level of the first wheel of the teaching (as described here by Paramārthasamudgata in the Śūtra Unraveling the Thought) explicitly teaches that phenomena ranging from forms through the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses. This means that the intended trainees of the first wheel must assert such, in which case the Great Exposition School and the Śūtra School must do so. However, there is a problem: According to these scholars, it is clear that at least the Śūtra School Following Reasoning does not assert that permanent phenomena are established by way of their own character, and if permanent phenomena, such as uncompounded space and nirvāṇa, are not asserted to be established by way of their own character, there does not seem to be any way that this school could assert them to be \textit{established by way of their own character} as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses.

In answer to this, Gung-ru Chö-jung and Jam-yang-shay-pa make the distinction that the Śūtra School Following Reasoning asserts that such non-disintegrating permanent phenomena are established \textit{through the force of their own measure of subsistence}\textsuperscript{c} as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses. This is because for this school if any phenomenon minimally is not established through the force of its own mode of subsistence, they cannot posit it as even existing. Thus, although the Śūtra School Following Reasoning does not use the term “established by way of its own character” to depict existent imputational natures, in the eyes of the Mind-Only School the Śūtra School Following Reasoning comes to assert that all phenomena are \textit{established by way of their own character} as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses. Therefore, even though Proponents of the Great Exposition and Proponents of Śūtra who are the intended trainees of the first wheel assert that permanent phenomena are not established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses, according to the Mind-Only School they have not

\textsuperscript{a} Gung-ru Chö-jung’s \textit{Garland of White Loteses}, 13a.1-15a.6.
\textsuperscript{b} Jam-yang-shay-pa’s \textit{Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive}, 38.1-40.2.
\textsuperscript{c} rang gi gnas tshod kyi dbang gis grub pa.
realized such and thus still need to be taught it.\textsuperscript{a}

To make this distinction in a different way: Despite the fact that Proponents of Sūtra realize that permanent phenomena are not established by way of their own character, this does not entail that they have realized that permanent phenomena are not established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses. One might think that just the opposite would be true since “established by way of its own character as the referent of a conceptual consciousness” \textit{seems} to be a sub-set of “established by way of its own character,” and when, for instance, one ascertains that products are devoid of permanent sounds in general (there being no such thing as a permanent sound), one necessarily ascertains that products are devoid of specific permanent sounds such as of a guitar.\textsuperscript{b} According to these scholars, however, that principle does not apply in this case. They do not spell out their reasoning, but it must be that “established by way of its own character as the referent of a conceptual consciousness” is simply not a sub-set of “established by way of its own character” because the former is more subtle.

For, Tsong-kha-pa’s \textit{The Essence of Eloquence} says:\textsuperscript{c}

\textsuperscript{a} This is the position of the Go-mang tradition. Jay-tsün Chö-kyi-gyal-tshan holds that the Proponents of Sūtra assert that all phenomena are indeed established by way of their own character and thus they can hold that all phenomena are established by way of their own character as the referents of their respective conceptual consciousnesses. He also makes the point (\textit{General-Meaning Commentary}, 9b.3 and 10a.2-10a.5) that a sūtra explicitly teaching that phenomena are established by way of their own character is a sūtra explicitly teaching that phenomena are established by way of their own character as the referents of their respective conceptual consciousnesses. (It is apparent that the Pan-chen Sō-nam-drā-pa tradition also holds this latter point.) Since terms (\textit{sgra}) and conceptual consciousnesses (\textit{rtog pa}) are held to operate in the same way, this position raises the question of whether a conceptual consciousness apprehending forms as established by way of their own character as the referents of their respective conceptual consciousnesses apprehends forms as established by way of their own character. However, as Jay-tsün Chö-kyi-gyal-tshan says, this cannot be admitted because then one conceptual consciousness would be both incorrect and correct.

\textsuperscript{b} Gung-ru Chö-jung (15a.1) and Jam-yang-shay-pa (40.2) cite the dictum from Gyal-tshab’s \textit{Illumination of the Path to Liberation} (\textit{thar lam sel byed}), “It is established that any ascertainment of [something] as empty of a generality is necessarily an ascertainment that it is empty of a particular” (\textit{spyis stong par nges na/ bye brag gis stong par nges pas khyab pa’/ grub bo}).

\textsuperscript{c} Hopkins, \textit{Emptiness in Mind-Only}, 210.
The two Proponents of [Truly Existent External] Objects\textsuperscript{a} do not know how to posit forms and so forth as existing if their being established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses and as the foundations of imputing terminology is negated. This is not the own-character that is renowned to the Epistemologists.\textsuperscript{b}

\textit{Comment:}\textsuperscript{c} According to A-khu Lo-drö-gya-tsho,\textsuperscript{d} Tsong-kha-pa is making the point that this sort of own-character is not limited to those objects that perform functions (a category that excludes permanent phenomena) since—according to the Mind-Only School—in the Great Exposition School and the Sūtra School all phenomena, both the permanent (which are \textbf{not} able to produce effects) and the impermanent, come to be established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses and as the foundations of the imputation of terminology. Therefore, in this context “own-character” refers to establishment through the force of objects’ own status (rang gi gnas tshod kyi dbang gis grub pa) and not to the ability to perform the function of creating an effect, as it does in the system of the “Epistemologists,” which here connotes the Proponents of Sūtra Following Reasoning, who assert that the definition of own-character is that which is ultimately able to perform a function (\textit{don dam par don byed nus pa}). In other contexts, “Epistemologists” refers also to the Proponents of Mind-Only that follow Dignāga and Dharmaśīla.

\textsuperscript{a} That is, the Great Exposition School and the Sūtra School.
\textsuperscript{b} \textit{tshad ma pa}, prāmāṇika.
\textsuperscript{c} Drawn from Hopkins, \textit{Absorption in No External World}, 129. See also Issue #40, 121-124.
\textsuperscript{d} \textit{Precious Lamp}, 259.2.
and Khay-drub-ge-leg-pal-zang’s Compilation on Emptiness [Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate] says:\textsuperscript{a}

The Proponents of Sūtra themselves do not impute the name “own-character"\textsuperscript{b} in their assertion that space, nirvāṇa, and so forth are established through the force of space’s, nirvāṇa’s, and so forth’s own measure of subsistence\textsuperscript{c} as the foundations of reference of the names for space, the extinguishment of contamination, and so forth. However, according to the Proponents of Mind-Only, the Proponents of Sūtra have come to assert the meaning of own-character. This is the meaning [of Tsong-kha-pa’s statement]. Realizing this has very great import.

\textbf{Unpacking Debate 10 to reveal Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Positions [110]}

\begin{tabular}{|c|p{13.5cm}|}
\hline
1 & The distinction is logically feasible that in the first wheel as indicated here (in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought): \hspace{1cm} \\
& • it is taught that phenomena ranging from forms to the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\textsuperscript{a} mkhas grub dge legs dpal bzang, stong thun chen mo (Madhyamika Text Series, vol. 1, 1972), 58.1-2.

\textsuperscript{b} That is, “established by way of its own character.”

\textsuperscript{c} Or, “own status.”
• without explicitly teaching that these phenomena ranging from forms to the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are established by way of their own character.

Nevertheless, the Hearer Schools, who are intended trainees of the first wheel teaching, do not assert in that way that phenomena ranging from forms to the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them.

If the Hearer Schools asserted that phenomena ranging from forms to the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them, they would have to assert that the eighteen constituents in that way [as established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them, in which case they would have to assert that the phenomenon-constituent is established by way of its own character as the referent of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending it.

However, that is not reasonable because although those Hearer Schools do not assert that uncompounded phenomena such as uncompounded space and so forth are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them, those Hearer Schools do assert that those uncompounded phenomena such as uncompounded space and so forth are established through the force of their own measure of subsistence as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them, because if those uncompounded phenomena such as space and so forth are not established through the force of their own measure of subsistence, those Hearer Schools do not know how to posit them as existing.

The Hearer Schools do not impute the term “own-character,” that is, “established by way of its own character,” to those uncompounded phenomena such as space and so forth, but according to the Mind-Only School those Hearer Schools come to assert that those uncompounded phenomena such as space and so forth are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses.
11. Also, someone says: It follows that the two, Proponents of the Great Exposition and Proponents of Sūtra—who are intended trainees of the first wheel as indicated here [in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought]—do not need to be taught that the phenomenon-constituent is established by way of its own character as the referent of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending it because [both of] those [Proponents of the Great Exposition and Proponents of Sūtra] realize that [the phenomenon-constituent] is not established that way [by way of its own character as the referent of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending it] because [both of] those [Proponents of the Great Exposition and Proponents of Sūtra] assert that [the phenomenon-constituent] is not established that way [by way of its own character as the referent of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending it].

Our response: [That both of those Proponents of the Great Exposition and Proponents of Sūtra assert that the phenomenon-constituent is not established by way of its own character as the referent of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending it] does not entail [that both of those Proponents of the Great Exposition and Proponents of Sūtra realize that the phenomenon-constituent is not established by way of its own character as the referent of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending it].

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1. The two, Proponents of the Great Exposition and Proponents of Sūtra—who are intended trainees of the first wheel as indicated here in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought—need to be taught that the phenomenon-constituent is established by way of its own character as the referent of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending it despite their asserting that the phenomenon-constituent is not established that way by way of its own character as the referent of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending it, because, despite their assertion, they do not realize that the phenomenon-constituent is not established by way of its own character as the referent of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending it.

12. Also, someone says: It follows that those [Proponents of the Great Exposition and Proponents of Sūtra] realize that the phenomenon-constituent is not established that way [by way of its own character as the referent of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending it] because those [Proponents of the Great Exposition and Proponents of Sūtra] realize that the phenomenon-constituent is not established by way of its own character.

Our response: [That Proponents of the Great Exposition and Proponents of Sūtra realize that the phenomenon-constituent is not established by way of its own character] does not entail [that Proponents of the Great Exposition and Proponents of Sūtra realize that the phenomenon-constituent is not established by way of its own character as the referent of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending it].

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The opponent’s rejoinder: It follows [that realizing that the phenomenon-constituent is not established by way of its own character] entails [realizing that the phenomenon-constituent is not established by way of its own character as the referent of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending it] because ascertainment that [the phenomenon-constituent] is empty of a generality of imputational phenomena, establishment by way of its own character, entails ascertainment that it is empty of a particular, establishment by way of its own character as the referent of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending it. It follows [that ascertainment that (the phenomenon-constituent) is empty of a generality of imputational phenomena, establishment by way of its own character, entails ascertainment that it is empty of a particular, establishment by way of its own character as the referent of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending it] because ascertainment that products in general are empty of the permanence of sound\(^a\) entails ascertainment that products are empty of a particular, the permanence of the sound of a lute.

\(^a\) The permanence of sound does not exist.
Our response: [That ascertainment that products in general are empty of the permanence of sound entails ascertainment that products are empty of a particular, the permanence of the sound of a lute] does not entail [that ascertainment that (the phenomenon-constituent) is empty of a generality of imputational phenomena, establishment by way of its own character, entails ascertainment that it is empty of a particular, establishment by way of its own character as the referent of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending it]. The sign [which is that ascertainment that products in general are empty of the permanence of sound entails ascertainment that products are empty of a particular, the permanence of the sound of a lute] is established because Gyal-tshab-dar-ma-rin-chen’s Clarifying the Path to Liberation says:

It is established that ascertainment of the emptiness of a generality entails ascertainment of [its] particulars.

Unpacking Debate 12 to reveal Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Positions 12

| 1 | Realizing that the phenomenon-constituent is not established by way of its own character does not entail realizing that the phenomenon-constituent is not established by way of its own character as the referent of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending it. Hence, even though Proponents of the Great Exposition and Proponents of Sūtra realize that the phenomenon-constituent is not established by way of its own character, they |

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\(^a\) The permanence of sound does not exist.
do not realize that the phenomenon-constituent is not established by way of its own character as the referent of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending it.

2 Ascertainment that products in general are empty of the permanence of sound entails ascertainment that products are empty of a particular, the permanence of the sound of a lute because it is established that ascertainment of the emptiness of a generality entails ascertainment of its particulars.

3 However, establishment by way of its own character is not a generality of establishment by way of its own character as the referent of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending it; therefore, ascertainment that the phenomenon-constituent is empty of establishment by way of its own character does not entail ascertainment that it is empty of establishment by way of its own character as the referent of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending it.

13. Also, someone says: a It follows that [the Supramundane Victor] in the first wheel as indicated here [in the Śūtra Unraveling the Thought] pronounced the words of sūtra, “The entities of phenomena ranging from forms through the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment as well as [their attributes of] production, cessation, and so forth that are established by way of their own character exist” because you accept [that in the first wheel as indicated here (in the Śūtra Unraveling the Thought) it is taught that phenomena ranging from forms to the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them]. b If you accept [that (the Supramundane Victor) in the first wheel as indicated here (in the Śūtra Unraveling the Thought) pronounced the words of sūtra, “The entities of phenomena ranging from forms through the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment as well as (their attributes of) production, cessation, and so forth that are established by way of their own character exist”] it follows that [the Supramundane Victor] in the first wheel pronounced, “The entities of phenomena ranging from forms through the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment as well as [their attributes of] production, cessation, and so forth that are established by way of their own character exist” because you accept [that (the Supramundane Victor) in the first

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**Notes:**

a 2011 TBRC bla brang, 20a.4; 1987 Go-mang Lhasa, 15b.3; 2008 Taipei reprint, 27.2. See the Comment in Debate 5, p. 74, for discussion of issues raised in this debate.

b For this position see the beginning of Debate 10, p. 110.
Our response: [That (the Supramundane Victor) in the first wheel as indicated here (in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*) pronounced the words of *sūtra*, “The entities of phenomena ranging from forms through the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment as well as (their attributes of) production, cessation, and so forth that are established by way of their own character exist”] does not entail [that (the Supramundane Victor) in the first wheel pronounced, “The entities of phenomena ranging from forms through the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment as well as (their
The opponent’s rejoinder: [That (the Supramundane Victor) in the first wheel as indicated here (in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought) pronounced the words of sūtra. “The entities of phenomena ranging from forms through the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment as well as (their attributes of) production, cessation, and so forth that are established by way of their own character exist”] entails [that (the Supramundane Victor) in the first wheel pronounced, “The entities of phenomena ranging from forms through the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment as well as (their attributes of) production, cessation, and so forth that are established by way of their own character exist”] because [the Supramundane Victor] in that first wheel pronounced the words of sūtra teaching, “Those [phenomena ranging from forms through the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment] are established by way of their own character,” because [the Supramundane Victor] in that first wheel pronounced the words of sūtra, “Entities and so forth—that are established by way of their own character—of those [phenomena ranging from forms through the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment]” exist.
Our response: [That (the Supramundane Victor) in that first wheel pronounced the words of sūtra, “Entities and so forth—that are established by way of their own character—of those (phenomena ranging from forms through the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment) exist,”] does not entail [that (the Supramundane Victor) in that first wheel pronounced words of sūtra teaching, “Those (phenomena ranging from forms through the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment) are established by way of their own character.”]

Well then, it [absurdly] follows that (the Supramundane Victor) pronounced in the Heart Sūtra, “Forms and so forth do not exist,” because the words of sūtra, “Those [forms and so forth] do not exist,” exist in that [Heart Sūtra]. You have [incorrectly] asserted [that the words of sūtra, “Those [forms and so forth] do not exist,” existing in the Heart Sūtra] entails [that the Supramundane Victor pronounced in the Heart Sūtra, “Forms and so forth do not exist.”]

Moreover, it [absurdly] follows that [the Supramundane Victor] pronounced in that [Heart Sūtra] words of sūtra teaching, “These [forms and so forth] do not exist,” because (the Supramundane Victor) pronounced in the Heart Sūtra the words of sūtra, “These [forms and so forth] do not exist.” You have [incorrectly] asserted [that (the Supramundane Victor) pronouncing in the Heart Sūtra the words of sūtra, “These forms and so forth do not exist,”] entails [that (the Supramundane Victor) pronounced
in that Heart Sūtra words of sūtra teaching, “These forms and so forth do not exist.”] Both reasons [which are that the words of sūtra, “Those [forms and so forth] do not exist,” exist in that (Heart Sūtra) and that (the Supramundane Victor) pronounced in the Heart Sūtra the words of sūtra, “These (forms and so forth) do not exist,” are established because the words of sūtra, “Forms do not exist, sounds do not exist,” exist in the Heart Sūtra.

It is not reasonable to accept the root [consequence that (the Supramundane Victor) pronounced in the Heart Sūtra words of sūtra teaching, “Forms and so forth do not exist.”] because there is no need for such a teaching [that “Forms and so forth do not exist.”]
| 1 | That the Supramundane Victor in the first wheel as indicated here in the *Śūtra Unraveling the Thought* pronounced the **words of sūtra**, “The entities of phenomena ranging from forms through the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment as well as their attributes of production, cessation, and so forth that are established by way of their own character exist” does not entail that the Supramundane Victor in the first wheel pronounced, “The entities of phenomena ranging from forms through the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment as well as their attributes of production, cessation, and so forth that are established by way of their own character exist.” |
| 2 | That **the words of sūtra**, “Those [forms and so forth] do not exist,” exist in the *Heart Śūtra* does not entail that the Supramundane Victor pronounced in the *Heart Śūtra*, “Forms and so forth do not exist.” Nevertheless, the Supramundane Victor pronounced in the *Heart Śūtra** the words of sūtra, “These forms and so forth] do not exist.” |
| 3 | It is not reasonable to accept that the Supramundane Victor pronounced in the *Heart Śūtra* words of sūtra **teaching**, “Forms and so forth do not exist,” because there is no need for such a teaching that “Forms and so forth do not exist.” |
Abbreviations


“1987 Go-mang Lhasa” = drang ba dang nges pa’i don rnam par ’byed pa’i mtha’ dpyod ’khrul bral lung rigs bai dūr dkar pa’i gan mdzod skal bzang re ba kun skong. Named “1987” because of being acquired in Lhasa, Tibet, at Go-mang College in 1987; published at Go-mang College, date unknown. (Complete edition, available at UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, uma-tibet.org.)


“2011 TBRC bla brang” = drang ba dang nges pa’i don rnam par ’byed pa’i mtha’ dpyod ’khrul bral lung rigs bai dūr dkar pa’i gan mdzod skal bzang re ba kun skong, TBRC W22186.10: 1-288, which is a PDF of: bla brang bkra shis ’khyil, bla brang brka shis ’khyil dgon, publishing date unknown.

“lha sa” = lha sa bka’ ’gyur. TBRC W26071, which is a PDF of: Zhol bka’ ’gyur par khang, Lhasa, Tibet, 1934.

Abbreviations


“TBRC” = Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center (http://www.tbrc.org).

“Tenets” = Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of Tenets / Explanation of “Tenets” : Sun of the Land of Samantabhadra Brilliantly Illuminating All of Our Own and Others’ Tenets and the Meaning of the Profound [Emptiness], Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning Fulfilling All Hopes of All Beings (grub mtha’ chen mo / grub mtha’i rnam bshad rang gzhon grub mtha’ kun dang zab don mchog tu gsal ba kun bzang zhing gi nyi ma lung rigs rgya mtsho skye dgu ’i re ba kun skong).
Bibliography

Sūtras are listed alphabetically by English title in the first section; the terms “glorious” and “supreme” at the beginning of titles are often dropped in the Bibliography. Indian and Tibetan treatises are listed alphabetically by author in the second section; other works are listed alphabetically by author in the third section. Works mentioned in the first or second sections are not repeated in the third section.

1. SŪTRAS

Condensed Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra
prajñāpāramitāsañcayagāthā
shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa su bcad pa
P373, vol. 21.

Eight Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra
aṣṭasāhasrīśrīprajñāpāramitā
shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa brgyad stong pa
Peking 734, vol. 21.

Five Hundred Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra
ārya-prajñāpāramitānāyāsatapahāśatikāsūtra
‘phags pa shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa lnga brgya pa
P0738, vol. 21.

One Hundred Fifty Modes of the Perfection of Wisdom
prajñāpāramitānāyāsatapahāśatikāsūtra
shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa’i tshul brgya lnga bcu pa’i mdo
P121, vol. 5.
One Hundred Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra
śatasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā
shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa stong phrag brgya pa
Tibetan digital reprint edition: In bka’ ’gyur (co ne). TBRC W1PD96685.9:603-621 (PDF of co ne rdzong: [co ne dgon], 1926).

One Letter Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra
ekāksarimātāmasarvatathāgataprajñāpāramitāsūtra
de bzhin gshegs pa thams cad kyi yum shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa yi ge gcig ma’i mdo
P741, vol. 21; Dharma vol. 6.
Perfection of Wisdom in Few Letters
svalpākṣaraprajñāpāramitāsūtra
shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa yi ge nyung ngu
In bka’ ’gyur (lha sa). TBRC W26071.34:513-518 (PDF of Lhasa: zhol bka’ ’gyur par khang, [194-]).
P159, vol. 6.

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pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā
shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa stong phrag nyi shu lnga pa

Verse Summary of the Perfection of Wisdom
prajñāpāramitāsañcayagāthā
shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa sdud pa tshigs su bcad pa
Peking 735, vol. 21; sde dge 13, vol. ka (shes rab sna tshogs)

White Lotus of Excellent Doctrine Sūtra
dam pa’i chos pad ma dkar po zhes bya ba theg pa chen po’i mdo
saddharmapuṇḍarīka
2. OTHER SANSKRIT AND TIBETAN WORKS

Abhayākaragupta (‘jigs med ’byung gnas sbas pa)

Commentary on the “Eight Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra”: Moonlight of Essential Points
aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāvṛttimarmakaumudi
shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa brgyad stong pa’i ’grel pa gnad kyi zla ’od
Peking 5202, vol. 92.

Ornament to the Subduer’s Thought
munimatālāṃkāra
thub pa’i dngongs rgyan

Āryavimuktisena (’phags pa rnam grol sde, ca. 6th century C.E.)

Commentary on (Maitreya’s) “Treatise of Quintessential Instructions on the ‘Superior Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra’: Ornament for the Clear Realizations”
pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikāprajñāpāramitopadeśaśāstrābhisamayālāṃkāravṛtti
’phags pa shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa stong phrag nyi shu lnga pa’i man ngag gi bstan bcos mgon par rtogs pa’i rgyan gyi ’grel pa; abbr. nyi ’khris snang ba
Peking 5185, vol. 88.


Subcommentary on (Maitreya’s) “Treatise of Quintessential Instructions on the ‘Superior Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra’: Ornament for the Clear Realizations”
āryapañcaviṃśatisāhasrikāprajñāpāramitopadeśaśāstrābhisamayālāṃkārakārikāvārttika
nyi khrid nam ’grel / ’phags pa shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa stong phrag nyi shu lnga pa’i man ngag gi bstan bcos mgon par rtogs pa’i rgyan gyi tshig le’ur byas pa’i rnam par ’grel pa
In bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 3788). TBRC W23703.81:- 364 (PDF of Delhi, India: Karmapa choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985).
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Asaṅga (thogs med, fourth century)

Commentary on (Maitreya’s) “Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle” / Explanation of (Maitreya’s) “Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle”
Mahāyānottaratantrasāstravyākhyā
theg pa ehen po’i rgyud bla ma’i bstan bcos kyi rnam par bshad pa
Peking 5526, vol. 108.

Five Treatises on the Grounds

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   - *yogācārabhūmi*

2. **Compendium of Synonyms**
   - *paryāyasamgrahaṇī*

3. **Grounds of Bodhisattvas**
   - *bodhisattvabhūmi*

4. **Grounds of Hearers**
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4. Compendium of Enumerations
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Bodhibhadra (*byang chub bzang po*)

_Conscious Explanation of (Āryadeva’s) “Compilation of the Essence of Wisdom”*_

jñānasārasamuccayanāmanibandhana

ye shes snying po kun las btus pa shes bya ba’i bshad sbyar


Buddhashrījñāna

_Commentary on (Maitreya’s) “Treatise of Quintessential Instructions on the Supramundane Victorious Mother Perfection of Wisdom: Ornament for the Clear Realizations”: Wisdom Lamp Garland_

abhisamayālanākārabhāvavatiprajñāpāramitopadeśaśāstravṛttiprajñāpādānāvali

bcom ldan ’das ma shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa’i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa’i rgyan gyi ’grel pa shes rab sgron ma’i phreng ba


Peking 5198, vol. 91.

_Commentary on the Difficult Points of the “Verse Summary”_

sañcayagāthāpañjikā

bsdus pa tshig su bcad pa’i dka’ ’grel


Peking 5196, vol. 91.

Chandrakīrti (*zla ba grags pa*, seventh century)

_Autocommentary on the “Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle’”_

madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya

dbu ma la ’jug pa’i bshad pa / dbu ma la ’jug pa’i rang ’grel


_Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle”_ madhyamakāvatāra

dbu ma la ’jug pa

Peking 5261, P5262, vol. 98; Toh. 3861, Toh. 3862, vol. ’a


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1. Analysis of Relations
sambandhaparīkṣā
‘brel pa brtag pa

2. Ascertainment of Prime Cognition
pramāṇavinīscaya
tshad ma rnam par nges pa

3. Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Prime Cognition”
pramāṇavārttikakārikā
tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi tshig le'ur byas pa

4. Drop of Reasoning
nyāyabinduprakaraṇa
rigs pa'i thigs pa zhes bya ba'i rab tu byed pa

5. Drop of Reasons
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vādanyāya
rtsod pa’i rigs pa

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saṃtānāntarasiddhināmaprakaraṇa
rgyud gzhan grub pa zhes bya ba’i rab tu byed pa

Dharmakīrtiṣṭhī (chos kyi grags pa dpal / gser gling pa)
Explanation of (Haribhadra’s) “Commentary on (Maitreya’s) ‘Treatise of Quintessential Instructions on the Perfection of Wisdom: Ornament for the Clear Realizations’: Illumination of the Difficult to Realize
prajñāpāramitopadeśaśāstrābhisamayālaṃkāraśāstraśāstrābhisamayālaṃkāravṛttidurbodhālokānāmaṭīkā
dshes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa’i man ngag gi bstan bcos mgon par rtogs pa’i rgyan gyi ’grel pa rtogs par dka’ ba’i snang ba zhes bya ba’i ’grel bshad
Peking 5192, vol. 91.

Dharmamitra (chos kyi bshes gnyen)
Explanation of (Haribhadra’s) Commentary on (Maitreya’s) “Ornament for the Clear Realizations”: Very Clear Words
abhisamayālaṃkāraśāstraśāstraśāstraśāstrābhisamayālaṃkārābhisamayālaṃkāraśāstraśāstrābhisamayālaṃkāraśāstraśāstraśāstraśāstraśāstraśāstraśāstra
ndsches rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa’i man ngag gi bstan bcos mgon par rtogs pa’i rgyan gyi tshig le’ur byas pa’i ’grel bshad tshig rab tu gsal ba
Peking 5194, vol. 91.

Dharmashrī
Explanation of the “Eight Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra”
satāsāhasrīśākāśīvavaranā
stong phag brya pa’i rnam par bshad pa
Peking 5203, vol. 92.

Key to the Treasury of the Perfection of Wisdom
prajñāpāramitopadeśaśāstrābhisamayālaṃkāraśāstrābhisamayālaṃkāraśāstrābhisamayālaṃkārasuchānāmaṭīkā
dsches rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa’i mdzod kyi lde mig
Peking 5204, vol. 92.

Döl-po-pa Shay-rab-gyal-tshan (dol po pa shes rab rgyal mtshan; 1292-1361)
The Great Calculation of the Doctrine, Which Has the Significance of a Fourth Council
bka’ bsdu bzhis pa’i don bstan rtis chen po


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puṣṭivimśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā
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Also: New Delhi: Chos-phel-legs-ladan, 1972


Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path / Stages of the Path to Enlightenment Thoroughly Teaching All the Stages of Practice of the Three Types of Beings

lam rim chen mo / skyes bu gsum gyi nyams su blang ba’i rim pa thams cad tshang bar ston pa’i byang chub lam gyi rim pa


*Praise of Dependent-Arising / Praise of the Supramundane Victor Buddha from the Approach of His Teaching the Profound Dependent-Arising: The Essence of Eloquence / Praise of the Supramundane Buddha from the Viewpoint of Dependent-Arising*

rten 'brel bstod pa / sang rgyas bcom ldan 'das la zab mo rten cing 'brel bar 'byung ba bsung ba'i sgo nas bstod pa legs par bshad pa'i snying po


*Three Principal Aspects of the Path*


*Treatise Differentiating Interpretable and Definitive Meanings: The Essence of Eloquence*

drang ba dang nges pa’i don rnam par phyte ba’i bstan bcos legs bshad snying po


Editions: see the preface to my critical edition of the Introduction and section on the Mind-Only School, *Emptiness in Mind-Only*, 355. Also:


Vasubandhu (dbyig gnyen, fl. 360)

*Commentary on (Asaṅga’s) “Summary of the Great Vehicle”*

mahāyānasamgrahabhāṣya

theg pa chen po bsdus pa’i ’grel pa


Peking 5551, vol. 112
Commentary on (Maitreya’s) “Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes”
madhyāntavibhāgatīkā
dbus dang mtha’ rnam par ’byed pa’i ’grel pa / dbus mtha’i ’grel pa
Peking 5528, vol. 108

Commentary on the “Sūtra on Dependent-Arising”
pratītyasamutpadādivibhaṅganirdeśa
rten ’brel mdo ’grel / rten cing ’brel par ’byung ba dang po dang rnam par dbye ba bshad pa
Peking 5496, vol. 107

Commentary on the “Sūtra on the Ten Grounds”
dasabhūmivyākhyāna
sa bcu’i rnam par bshad pa
Peking 5494, vol. 104

Commentary on the “Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra”
āryākṣayamatinirdeśaṭīkā
’phags pa blo gros mi zad pas bstan pa rgya cher ’grel pa

Explanation of (Maitreya’s) “Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras”
sūtrālaṃkāraḥbhāṣya
mdo sde’i rgyan gyi bshad pa
Peking 5527, vol. 108

Extensive Explanation of the Superior One Hundred Thousand Stanza, Twenty-five Thousand Stanza, and Eighteen Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras / Conquest Over Objections about the Three Mothers
āryāśatasāhasrikāpañcaviṃsatisāhasrikā-aṣṭadaśasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitābhṛṭīkā
’phags pa shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa ’bum pa dang nyi khri lnga stong pa dang khri brgyad stong pa’i rgya cher bshad pa / yum gsum gnod ’joms
No TBRC data found.
Peking 5206, vol. 93

Principles of Explanation
vyākyhayuktī
rnam par bshad pa’i rigs pa

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a This text is attributed by Tsong-kha-pa to Damṣṭasena (damṣṭasena).
The Thirty Treatise on Cognition-Only in Thirty Stanzas
triṃśikākārikā / sarvavijñānamātradeśakatriṃśakakārikā
sum cu pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa / thams cad mnam rig tsam du ston pa sum cu pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa
Peking 5556, vol. 113

The Twenty
viṃśatikā / viṃśikākārikā
nyi shu pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa
Peking 5557, vol. 113


Treasury of Manifest Knowledge
abhidharmakośa
chos nangon pa’i mdzod
Peking 5590, vol. 115
3. OTHER WORKS


