The Opposite of Emptiness in the Middle Way
Consequence School

Jam-yang-shay-pa’s
Great Exposition of the Middle:
Chapter Six, Object of Negation 2

Jongbok Yi
In collaboration with Lo-sang-gyal-tshan
Edited by Jeffrey Hopkins

UMA INSTITUTE FOR TIBETAN STUDIES
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Translating texts from the heritage of Tibetan and Inner Asian Buddhist systems. The project focuses on Great Indian Books and Tibetan commentaries from the Go-mang College syllabus as well as a related theme on the fundamental innate mind of clear light in Tantric traditions. A feature of the Project is the usage of consistent vocabulary and format throughout the translations.

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UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies
7330 Harris Mountain Lane
Dyke, VA 22935-1008
USA

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Technical Notes

It is important to recognize that:

- translations and editions of texts are given in the Bibliography;
- the names of Indian Buddhist schools of thought are translated into English in a wish to increase accessibility for non-specialists;
- for the names of Indian scholars and systems used in the body of the text, ch, sh, and śh are used instead of the more usual c, ś, and ś for the sake of easy pronunciation by non-specialists; however, cch is used for cch, not chchh. Within parentheses the usual transliteration system for Sanskrit is used;
- transliteration of Tibetan is done in accordance with a system devised by Turrell Wylie; see “A Standard System of Tibetan Transcription,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 22 (1959): 261-267;
- the names of Tibetan authors and orders are given in “essay phonetics” for the sake of easy pronunciation; the system is aimed at internet searchability;
- titles of added subsections are given in square brackets;
- definitions are in bold type.
The Collaborator

Lo-sang-gyal-tshan is a Ge-she at Go-mang College of Dre-pung Monastic University, Mundgod, Karnataka State, India, who also served a six-month term as Disciplinarian at the Tantric College of Lower Lhasa in Hunsur, India. In October, 2015, he assumed the position of Abbot of Go-mang College of Dre-pung Monastic University in Mundgod, India. He has worked with translators of the UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies since 2013. In particular, he provided crucial assistance with filling in the dialectical moves throughout the text and by responding to questions and engaging in discussions about the meaning.
Editions consulted

Two basic editions of Jam-yang-shay-pa’s *Decisive Analysis of the Middle* were consulted:

1. *dbu ma la 'jug pa'i mtha' dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zab don kun gsal skal bzang 'jug ngogs*. TBRC W22186-IIKG10676: 1-442a.3, which is a PDF of: *bla brang bkra shis 'khyil*, a mdo. Abbreviated reference: “2011 TBRC *bla brang.*” This edition was originally printed in La-brang-tra-shi-khyil monastery founded by Jam-yang-shay-pa and is the mother edition of four other editions available:


   d. The digital Tibetan text of Jam-yang-shay-pa’s *Great Exposition of the Middle* provided in this book was supplied by the Drepung Gomang Library of Go-mang College in Mundgod, Karnataka State, India. It is likely a slightly revised version of the 1999 codex mentioned in item #c. It has been edited in accordance with the “2011 TBRC *bla brang*” and other sources.

2. *dbu ma la 'jug pa'i mtha' dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zab don kun gsal skal bzang 'jug ngogs*. Published at Go-mang College, Lhasa,

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a This edition was provided to the UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies by the late E. Gene Smith (1936-2010) in 2010.
Tibet, date unknown. Abbreviated reference: “2015 Go-mang Lhasa,” so named because of being acquired in Lhasa, Tibet, at Go-mang College in 2015 by Jongbok Yi for the UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies. (To be made available at UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, uma-tibet.org.)
Jam-yang-shay-pa’s

**GREAT EXPOSITION OF THE MIDDLE**

On the Object of Negation in the Consequence School

*Decisive Analysis of Chandrakīrti’s “Supplement to Nāgārjuna’s ‘Treatise on the Middle’”: Treasury of Scripture and Reasoning, Thoroughly Illuminating the Meaning of the Profound, Entrance for the Fortunate*

In the Tibetan text, the superscripts in brackets with G or L immediately followed by numbers indicate the page numbers of the two main editions consulted. G stands for the 2015 Go-mang Lhasa edition, and L stands for the 2011 TBRC *bla brang* edition.
If you understand how in this system phenomena are assigned as only posited through the force of conceptuality, you will easily understand the apprehension of true existence that apprehends opposite to this. Hence, this has two parts: indicating how phenomena are posited through the force of conceptuality and indicating the apprehension of true existence that apprehends opposite to this.

The Questions of Upāli Sūtra says that phenomena are posited through the force of conceptuality.\(^c\)

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\(b\) Correcting *rtogs pa’i dbang gis ’jog tshul shes na* in 2015 Go-mang Lhasa (145b.1-145b.2) to *rtogs pa’i dbang gis bzhags pa tsam gyi* ’jog tshul shes na in accordance with 2011 TBRC bla brang (198b.3).

\(c\) *nje bar ’khor gyis zhus pa, upālīpariprccāḥ*, stanzas 69-70a; Toh. 68, vol. ca (dkon brtsegs); *Pyālī-Vināścaya-Upāli-Pariprccāḥ*, 59-60: *citra manorana sajjīta puspāḥ svarṇaṃdāna jalanti manojaśāh / tasyapi kāraku nāst’aśa κi ca sthāpiṇa kalpavaśena // kalpavaśena vikalpitu lokāḥ.*
Here the various mind-pleasing blossoming flowers
And attractive, shining, supreme golden houses
Have no [inherently existent] maker at all.
They are posited through the power of conceptuality.
Through the power of conceptuality the world is imputed.

There are also many other statements that phenomena are only imputed by conceptuality and are posited through the force of conceptuality.

Furthermore, Nāgārjuna’s Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning says:

The perfect Buddha stated that the world
Has the condition of ignorance.
Therefore, how could it not be feasible
That this world is [imputed by] conceptuality?

The meaning of this statement is explained in Chandrakīrti’s commentary as being that the worlds [that is, beings and environments] are imputed by conceptuality, not established by way of their own nature.

Moreover, Āryadeva’s Four Hundred says:

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a rigs pa drug cu pa, yuktiāṣṭikā, stanza 37; Toh. 3825, dhu ma, vol. tsa, 21b.6; Tibetan edited by Lindtner, Master of Wisdom, 84.
b rigs pa drug cu pa’i ‘grel pa, yuktiāṣṭikāvṛtti; Toh. 3864, dhu ma, vol. ya, 23a.2-23a.4; Scherrer-Schaub, Yuktiāṣṭikāvṛtti, 77.
c bsian bcos bzhi brgya pa zhes bya ba’i tshig le’ur byas pa, catuḥśatakaśāstraśikā, stanza VIII.3; P5246, vol. 95, 136.2.1; Tibetan text and Sanskrit fragments edited by Lang,
Since desire and so forth
Do not exist without conceptuality,
Who with intelligence would hold
That these are real objects and are [also] conceptual?

Also, Chandrakīrti’s *Commentary on (Āryadeva’s) “Four Hundred”* says:a

Those which exist only when the conceptuality [imputing them] exists and do not exist when conceptuality does not are without question definite as not established by way of their own nature, like a snake imputed to a coiled rope.

“Real objects” are those established by way of their own nature. “Conceptual” [means] “produced in dependence upon that [conceptuality].”

The statement in the commentary that *desire and so forth* are [imputed] like the imputation of a snake to a rope is just an illustration; all other phenomena are also described as posited by conceptuality like the imputation of a snake to a rope. [The rope’s] speckled color and mode of coiling are similar to those of a snake, and when this is perceived in a dim area, the thought arises with respect to the rope, “This is a snake.” As for the rope, at that time [when it is imputed to be a snake], the collection and parts of the rope are not even in the slightest way positable as an illustration of a snake [that is, positable as a snake]. Therefore, that snake is only imputed by conceptuality.

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a byang chub sems dpa’i rnal ’byor spyod pa bzhi brgya pa’i rgya cher ’grel pa, bodhisattva-yogacaryacatuhṣatakafkā, commenting on stanza VIII.3; P5266, vol. 98, 229.5.3. Cited in *Great Treatise*, vol. 3, 213.
In the same way, when the thought “I” arises in dependence upon the [mental and physical] aggregates, nothing in terms of the aggregates—neither the collection that is the continuum of the earlier and later [moments], nor the collection [of the parts] at one time, nor the parts of those [mental and physical aggregates]—is even in the slightest way positable as an illustration of that “I” [that is, positable as “I”]. This will be explained at length below.

Because of this and because there is not even the slightest something that:

- is an entity different from the parts of the aggregates or the whole, and
- is apprehendable as an illustration\(^a\) of that “[I]”

the “I” is only posited by conceptuality in dependence upon the aggregates; it is not established by way of its own nature.

This is also said in Nāgārjuna’s *Precious Garland*:\(^b\)

A being is not earth, not water,
Not fire, not wind, not space,

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\(^a\) gzhir here means mtshan gzhir.

\(^b\) rgyal po la gnam bya ba rin po che’i phreng ba, rājaparikathāratnāvali, stanza 80; Hopkins, *Nāgārjuna’s Precious Garland*, 104 and corresponding Tibetan text in Part 3. The Sanskrit is not extant.
Not consciousness, and not all of them.

What person is there other than these?

In that, a “being” is a person, sentient being, “I,” and self. “Not earth, not water, not fire, not wind, not space, not consciousness” refutes positing the parts—which are a sentient being’s six constituents—as a person, and “not all of them” refutes positing the collection of the constituents as a person. The last line [“What person is there other than these?”] refutes positing something that is a different entity from the constituents as a person.

Nevertheless, it is not that persons are not asserted [to exist]. Also, a mind-basis-of-all and so forth are not asserted to be a person. Therefore, in accordance with the commentary by the commentator [Chandrakīrti], Superiors are also asserted.

When the system of positing persons through conceptuality is understood in this way, the system of positing all other phenomena through conceptuality is also similar to that. The King of

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a skyes bu, puruṣa.
b gang zag, pudgala.
c sems can, sattva.
d nga, aham.
e bdag, ātman.
f kun gzhi rnam par shes pa, ālayavijñāna.
g ’grel pa mdzad pas bkral pa ltar. I presume this to refer to Chandrakīrti’s Commentary on (Aryadeva’s) “Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas” and most likely not to Ajitamitra’s commentary on Nāgārjuna’s Precious Garland.
Meditative Stabilizations Sūtra says:\(^a\)

Just as you know [how to generate] discrimination [taking to mind the delineation of the mode of subsistence] of a self,
Apply this mentally to all [phenomena].

and the Verse Summary of the Perfection of Wisdom also says:\(^b\)

Understand all sentient beings as like the self,
Understand all phenomena as like all sentient beings.

and Nāgārjuna’s Precious Garland clearly says:\(^c\)

Just as because of being [only imputed in dependence upon] an aggregation of the six constituents
A being is not [established as their/her own] reality,
So because of being [imputed in dependence upon] an aggregation
Each of the constituents also is not [established as its own] reality.

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\(^a\) Tīṅg nge ’dzin rgyal po ’i mdo, samādhirājasūtra, XII.7; Toh. 127, mdo sde, vol. da, 44a.2; cited in Prasannapadā, in commentary to stanza IV.9; Toh. 3860, dbu ma, vol. ’a, 43b.1-43b.2; La Vallée Poussin, Mūlamadhyamakakārikās (Mādhyamikasūtras) de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā, 128.11: yatha jñāta tayā ‘imāsām jñāta sarvatra peśītā buddhiḥ /.


\(^c\) Stanza 81; Hopkins, Nāgārjuna’s Precious Garland, 105, and corresponding Tibetan text in Part 3. The Sanskrit is not extant. The bracketed material is from Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-pa’s) “Great Exposition of Tenets” (dbu, 67b.4-67b.8; Hopkins, Maps of the Profound, 888).
The meaning of the first line [that is, “because a being is an aggregation of the six constituents”] is “because a being is imputed in dependence upon an aggregation of the six constituents.” The meaning of the third and fourth lines is that because there is no occurrence of [a phenomenon] devoid of parts and a whole, each of the constituents is also imputed in dependence upon an aggregation of its own many parts and, therefore, is not established as [its own] reality—that is to say, is not established by way of its own nature.

Furthermore, with regard to whatever is imputed in dependence upon an aggregation of parts, the parts or the whole are not suitable to be posited as an illustration of it [that is, as something that is it], and anything that is a different entity from those two also could not be an illustration of it either.

Although the mere factor of how a pot and so forth are posited by conceptuality is similar to the imputation of a rope as a snake, nevertheless whether those two—a pot, and so forth, and a rope-snake—exist or do not exist, are able or unable to perform functions, and so forth are not at all similar because they are in all ways not similar in terms of:

- whether or not the designations of those two must be made
- whether or not making those designations is invalidated [by conventional valid cognition]

and so forth.

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a If the person were the composite or aggregation of the mental and physical aggregates or even if it were designated to the composite or aggregation of the mental and physical aggregates, that composite would be the person. Rather, the person is designated in dependence upon the mental and physical aggregates.
The feasibility of [an object’s] respective functionality within the context of being posited by conceptuality is an uncommon mode of commentary by Buddhapālita, Shāntideva, and this master [Chandrakīrti] from among the commentators on the words and meaning [of the works] of the two—the father, the Superior [Nāgārjuna], and their spiritual son [Āryadeva]. Just this is also the final difficult point in the view of the Middle Way.

This being the case, Nāgārjuna’s Precious Garland says that even name-only does not exist ultimately and that nothing exists except for only being posited in conventional terms through the force of nominal conventions and, accordingly, [phenomena] abide as mere nominal imputations:a

Because the phenomena of forms are only names,b

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b gzugs kyi dngos po ming tsam phyir. Chandrakīrti’s citation of this in their Prasannapadā has a different reading, “because of being just the non-existence of form” (rūpasyābhāvamārtravād). This reading is not reflected in any of the Tibetan texts, either of the Ratnāvalī or of the Prasannapadā (Tibetan Cultural Printing Press, 346.6) or in their commentaries. Though both readings make sense, I am following the Tibetan because it was checked against three Sanskrit editions, reflected also in Gyal-tshab’s commentary (25.5).

“Only name” means “only nominally existent,” the word “only” eliminating that phenomena are established by way of their own character. In Ge-lug-pa scholastic literature it is said that “only name” does not mean “merely sounds” even though names are sounds, since otherwise the only phenomena that would exist would be sounds.
[Uncompounded] space too is only a name.
Without the elements how could forms exist?
Therefore, even name-only-ness does not [inherently] exist.\(^a\)

Feelings, discriminations, compositional factors,
And consciousnesses are to be considered
As like the elements and the self.
Hence the six constituents\(^b\) are selfless.

and: \(^c\)

Except for being a convention designated,
What world exists in fact [that is, ultimately]
Which would be “is” or “is not”?

If you understand those [points] well, you will understand well:
• that all phenomena must be posited dependently,
• that because they are just dependently imputed and dependently produced, they are not established by way of their own nature and do not have a self-powered entity,

\(^a\) Ngag-wang-pal-dan (Annotations, dbu, 67a.1) recasts this stanza as:

Because the phenomena of forms [which have the obstructiveness of which space is the absence] are only names, space also is just a name [and does not exist inherently. If someone said that forms exist inherently, then] when the elements do not exist [inherently], how could form exist [inherently]? Therefore, even name-only-ness does not exist [inherently because that which possesses a name does not exist inherently].

\(^b\) The constituents are earth, water, fire, wind, space, and consciousness, which are the basis in dependence upon which a person is imputed.

\(^c\) 114bcd.
not being posited through the force of conventions which are other [than themselves], and

- that no matter what phenomenon is posited as existing, it is posited in the context of not seeking the object imputed.

**INDICATING THE APPREHENSION OF TRUE EXISTENCE THAT APPREHENDS OPPOSITE TO THIS**

The apprehension of existence not posited only through the force of nominal conventions, which was described above, is the innate apprehension of true establishment, ultimate establishment, and establishment as [the object’s own] reality and the innate apprehension of existing by way of [the object’s] own nature, existing by way of [the object’s] own character, and existing inherently. The conceived object apprehended by that [consciousness] is the hypothetical measure of true [establishment].

The need to know the two modes of the ultimate in the qualification of the object of negation with [the term] “ultimately” is also the same here [in the Consequence School as in the Autonomy School]. However, although the Middle Way Autonomists assert that the three (true, ultimate, and real establishment) do not occur in objects of knowledge, they assert that the three (establishment by way of [the object’s] own nature, establishment by way of [the object’s] own character, and inherent establishment) exist in conventional terms; this is seen to be a very skillful means for leading those—who are temporarily unable to easily realize the very subtle suchness—toward [realizing] it.
In this way, just that inherent existence—a that is an entity of phenomena not contingent upon, or not posited through the force of, another—a subjective terminological conceptual consciousness—is called the self that is the object of negation. The nonexistence of just this with a person as the substratum is said to be a selflessness of persons, and the nonexistence of it with a phenomenon such as an eye or ear [as the substratum] is said to be a selflessness of phenomena; thereby, it is implicitly understood that the apprehensions of this inherent existence as existing in persons and in phenomena are the apprehensions of the two selves [of persons and of other phenomena].

It is as Chandrakīrti’s *Commentary on Āryadeva’s* *“Four Hundred”* says:b

Concerning that, “self” is inherent existence, an entity of things that does not rely on [being posited by] others [that is, conceptuality]. The nonexistence of that [inherent

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a rang bzhin, svabhāva.
existence] is selflessness. Through the divisions of [its substrata,] phenomena and persons, it is understood as twofold, “selflessness of phenomena and selflessness of persons.”

Also, just this [Chandrakīrti’s Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle”] speaks of the two selflessnesses as divided not by way of the object negated but by way of the subjects that are the substrata [of selflessness—persons and other phenomena], a “Through a division of persons and [other] phenomena, it is said to be of two aspects.”

With respect to the innate view of the transitory collection that is a consciousness apprehending [an inherently existent] self, in the root text [Chandrakīrti’s Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle”] b it is refuted that the object of observation is the [mental and physical] aggregates, and in the commentary c [Chandrakīrti] says that the dependently imputed self is the object of observation. d Therefore, the mere “I” or mere

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a Stanza VI.179b; Toh. 3861, dbu ma, vol. ‘a, 213a.6; La Vallée Poussin, Madhyamakāvatāra, 301.20.


c P5263, vol. 98, 141.1.2; Toh. 3862, dbu ma, vol. ‘a, 292h.3-292h.4; La Vallée Poussin, Madhyamakāvatāra, 234.13; La Vallée Poussin, “Introduction au traité du milieu,” Muséon 12 (1911): 283.

d Commenting on stanza VI.120, Chandrakīrti says:

The object of observation of [a consciousness viewing the transitory collection as an inherently existent self] is the [nominally existent] self. For, that which apprehends an [inherently existent] “I” has as its object [an inherently existent] self.

Bracketed material is from Tsong-kha-pa’s Illumination, P6143, vol. 154, 82.2.8.
person, which is the object of observation generating the mere thought “I,” is to be taken as the object of observation.

With respect to the subjective aspect [of a consciousness misapprehending the inherent existence of “I”], Chandrakīrti’s Autocommentary on the “Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle’” says:\(^a\)

Having imputed that a self—which is [actually] nonexistent—exists, a [consciousness] apprehending “I” manifestly adheres to just this as true.

Hence, it apprehends the “I” to be truly established.

Moreover, Chandrakīrti’s Autocommentary says:\(^b\)

With respect to this, the view of the transitory collection is an afflicted intelligence engaged in such thoughts of [inherently existent] “I” and “mine.”

Accordingly, the object of observation of an innate view of the transitory collection must naturally generate an awareness thinking “I”; therefore, the innate apprehension of persons—who are of a different continuum [from your own continuum]—as established by way of their own character is an innate apprehension of a self of persons but not an innate view of the transitory collection [as an inherently existent “I”].

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\(^b\) Commenting on stanza VI.120; Toh. 3862, \textit{dbu ma}, vol. ‘a, 292a.7-292b.1; La Vallée Poussin, \textit{Madhyamakāvatāra}, 234.1-234.2; La Vallée Poussin, “Introduction au traité du milieu,” \textit{Muséon} 12 (1911): 282.
[In the citation, just above, from Chandrakīrti] “engaged in such thoughts of ‘I’ and ‘mine’” does not indicate that mere “I” and mere “mine” are the objects of the subjective aspect of the mode of apprehension; a rather, it indicates that [a view of the transitory collection] has the aspect of apprehending those two to be established by way of their own character.

The object of observation of an innate view of the transitory collection apprehending [inherently existent] “mine” is just the “mine”; it should not be held that one’s own eyes, and so forth, are the objects of observation. The subjective aspect is, upon observing that object of observation, to conceive the “mine” to be established by way of its own character.

Objection: In Chandrakīrti’s Autocommentary on “This is mine,”b he says, “Thinking, ‘This is mine,’ one adheres to all aspects of things other than the object of the apprehension of an

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a 'dzin stangs kyi rnam pa ’i yul.
b This is the last line of stanza I.3:

Homage to that compassion for transmigrating beings
Powerless like a bucket traveling in a well
Through initially adhering to a self, “I.”
And then generating attachment for things, “This is mine.”

[inherently existent] ‘I.’” [Given your explanation above that the object of observation of a false view of the transitory collection as inherently existent “mine” is not eyes, and so forth, but the “mine” itself,] how do you take [Chandrakirti’s] explanation that upon observing a base such as eyes and so forth, adherence to it thinking, “This is mine,” is an apprehension of [inherently existent] “mine”?

Answer: This refers to adherence to the “mine” as truly established upon perceiving eyes and so forth as “mine”; it does not indicate that illustrations of “mine”—eyes and so forth—are the objects of observation. For, if that were not the case, the two—the view of the transitory collection and the apprehension of a self of phenomena—would not be mutually exclusive [whereas they are].

The objects of observation of an innate apprehension of a self of phenomena are the form aggregate, and so on, and eyes, ears, and so on, in your own and others’ continuums, as well as the environment that is not included in the [personal] continuum. Its subjective aspect is as explained before [to apprehend these to be established by way of their own character].

In this way, the apprehension of the two selves [of persons and other phenomena] is the ignorance binding one in cyclic existence.

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\(^a\) For extended discussion of what “mine” in this context means, see Hopkins, *Maps of the Profound*, 865-875.
Nāgārjuna’s *Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness* says:

That [consciousness] which conceptualizes things produced
From causes and conditions to be real [that is, to be established by way of their own nature]
Was said by the Teacher to be ignorance.
From it the twelve links arise.

This says that the apprehension that a thing, which is a phenomenon [other than a person], is established as [its own] reality is the ignorance that is the root of cyclic existence. Since the ignorance that is the apprehension of a self of persons arises from the apprehension of a self of phenomena, the twelve [links of dependent-arising] are described as arising from it.

In order to overcome this ignorance, you must see that [phenomena] are empty of how they are apprehended by it, and you must see that self [that is, inherent existence] apprehended in this way does not exist. Nāgārjuna’s *Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness* says:

If through seeing reality one knows well
That things are empty [of inherent existence], the ignorance [mistaking inherent existence] does not arise.
That is the cessation of ignorance,

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Whereby the twelve links [of the dependent-arising of cyclic existence] cease.

and Nāgārjuna’s *Praise of the Element of Attributes* also says:

As long as “self” and “mine” are apprehended,
So long is there [false] imputation of the external.
When the two types of selflessness are seen,
The seed of cyclic existence ceases.

and:

The doctrine supremely purifying the mind
Is the absence of nature [that is, inherent existence].

and Āryadeva’s *Four Hundred* moreover says:

When selflessness [the absence of inherent establishment] is seen in objects,
[The ignorance that is] the seed of cyclic existence is ended.

and:

Therefore, all afflictive emotions are overcome
Through overcoming bewilderment.

When dependent-arising is seen,
Bewilderment does not arise.
Therefore, with all endeavor here [in this text]
I will set forth just discourse on this.

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*a* chos dbyings bstod pa, dharma dhātustotra; Toh. 1118, bstod tshogs, vol. 6a, 66a.3-66a.4 and 64b.5.

*b* XIV.25cd; Toh. 3846, dbu ma, vol. tsha, 16a.5; Lang, Āryadeva’s Catuhṣatakā, 134; Sonam Rinchen and Ruth Sonam, Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas, 275. The Sanskrit is not extant. Brackets are from *Four Interwoven Annotations*, vol. 2, 755.2. Cited in Great Treatise, vol. 3, 335.

*c* Stanzas VI.10c-11; Toh. 3846, dbu ma, vol. tsha, 7b.2-7b.3; Lang, Āryadeva’s Catuhṣatakā, 66; Sonam Rinchen and Ruth Sonam, Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas, 156-157. The Sanskrit is not extant.

*d* The translation of the last two lines is confirmed by Chandra kīrti’s commentary, Toh. 3865, vol. ya, 113b.2; Ren-dā wa Shōn-nu-lo-drō’s (red mda’ ba gzhon nu blo gros, 1349-1412) commentary, 172.12-13; and Gyal-tshab Dar-ma-rin-chen’s (rgyal tshab dar ma rin chen, 1364-1432) commentary, chap. 6, 8.2-8.4.
Since the bewilderment mentioned [in that stanza] is on the occasion of identifying the bewilderment that is one of the three poisons [desire, hatred, and bewilderment], it is afflictive ignorance. Also, [Āryadeva] states that in order to overcome this ignorance, one must realize the meaning of profound dependent arising in which emptiness dawns as the meaning of dependent arising.

Furthermore, the commentator\(^a\) [Chandrakīrti] says\(^b\) [when commenting on the line in their Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle”], “Yogis [seeking release] refute self [that is to say, inherent establishment],\(^c\) that selflessness must be realized in the manner of eradicating the object of the apprehension of self [that is, inherent existence]. Therefore,
although you merely withdraw the mind here from going there to its objects without eradicating the object of the apprehension of self, through this it cannot be posited that you are engaged in selflessness. The reason is this:

- When the mind operates on an object, there are three [modes of apprehension]:
  1. apprehending that the object of observation is truly established
  2. apprehending that it is not truly established
  3. apprehending it without qualifying it as either of these two.

- Therefore, although [the object] is not apprehended to be without true establishment, it is not necessarily apprehended to be truly established.

- Similarly, although [by merely withdrawing the mind] you are not engaged in [apprehending] the two selves, you are not necessarily engaged in the two selflessnesses because there are limitless [ways of] dwelling in a third category of awareness.

Having identified the two apprehensions of self in your own continuum, you need to settle that the bases with respect to which you make the mistake [of apprehending the two selves] do not exist as they are apprehended. Otherwise, refutation and proof that are directed outward are like searching for a robber on the plain after he has gone to the woods and hence are not to the point.
When, in that way, you have identified well the apprehension of true existence, you will understand that there are many apprehensions that are not the two apprehensions of self. Consequently, all wrong ideas of asserting that reasonings analyzing suchness refute all objects apprehended by conceptuality will be overcome.

Although there are many [points] stemming from these [topics] that should be explained, I will not elaborate on them here as some have already been explained at length elsewhere [in my Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment, The Essence of Eloquence, and Explanation of (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle”] and some will be discussed below.

The meaning of this [passage from Tsong-kha-pa’s Explanation of (Chandrakīrti’s) “Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle’”: Illumination of the Thought] is explicable well because it is explicable well from the four approaches of:

1. demonstrating that all phenomena are only imputed by conceptuality to over there,
2. explaining that the opposite of this [that is, existing as only imputation to over there by conceptuality and as simply-name] is the measure of true establishment,
3. explaining that all performance of functions is suitable as only imputed by names and terminology to over there, and
4. identifying the scholars who commented in that way.
A* Demonstrating that all phenomena are only imputed by conceptuality to over there

[Demonstrating that all phenomena are only imputed by conceptuality to over there] exists because with respect to all phenomena ranging from forms to exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects they exist as simply-name, only imputed over there but not even a particle exists from the side of the basis of imputation.

It follows [that with respect to all phenomena ranging from forms to exalted-knowers-of-all-aspects they exist as simply-name, only imputed over there but not even a particle exists from the side of the basis of imputation] because, except that “person” and “I” are simply-name and

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a Correcting chos thams cad rtog pas btags tsam in 2015 Go-mang Lhasa (145b.2) to chos thams cad rtog pas phur btags tsam in accordance with 2011 TBRC bla brang (198b.3).
b 2011 TBRC bla brang (198b.5) reads nas; 2015 Go-mang Lhasa (145b.3) reads sogs.
only-imputed over there to\textsuperscript{a} the aggregates and constituents that are their basis of imputation, the mere collection of the bases of imputation, the continuum [of the bases of imputation], or any of those individually are not the “person” nor “I.”

It follows that [except that “person” and “I” are simply-name and only-imputed over there to\textsuperscript{b} the aggregates and constituents that are their basis of designation, the mere collection of the bases of imputation, the continuum [of the bases of imputation], or any of those individually are not the “person” nor “I”] because it is like, for example, when having mistaken a rope on which darkness like a cave has descended and whose mode of coiling and colors and so forth are similar to a snake, [a person] thinks that this is a snake, except for being imputed upon this [rope whose mode of coiling and colors and so forth are similar to a snake] over there by the name and terminology of “snake,” a snake does not exist in any factors of the rope.

\textsuperscript{a} That is, “in dependence upon.”
\textsuperscript{b} That is, “in dependence upon.”
\textsuperscript{c} Correcting \textit{sbrul gyis} in 2015 Go-mang Lhasa (145b.5) to \textit{sbrul gyi} in accordance with
The Opposite of Emptiness in the Consequence School

For, Nāgārjuna’s *Precious Garland* says:\(^a\)

Because the phenomena of forms
Are only names, space too is only a name.
Without the elements how could forms exist?
Therefore even name only does not exist.

And Āryadeva’s *Four Hundred* says:\(^c\)

Since desire and so forth
Do not exist without conceptuality,
[Who with intelligence would hold
That these are real objects and are (also) conceptual?]


\(^b\) Correcting *bar* in 2011 TBRC *bla brang* (199a.1) to *ba las* in accordance with 2015 Gong-mang Lhasa (145b.6).

\(^c\) Hopkins, *Tsongkhapa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom*, 39; Āryadeva, *bstan bcos bzhi brgya pa zhes bya ba’i tshig le’ur byas pa* (*catuhṣatakasāstrakārikā*), in *bstan ’gyur* (*sde dge*), in TBRC W23703.97 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sugrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 9a.6. I have added the last two lines of the stanza for context.
and Chandrakīrti’s Commentary on (Āryadeva’s) “Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas” says:

Those which exist only when the conceptuality [apprehending them] exists and do not exist when conceptuality does not are without question definite as not established by way of their own nature, like a snake imputed to a coiled rope.

and the Meeting of Father and Son Sūtra says:

O Great King, a person, a being, has the six constituents, the six bases of contact, and the eighteen activities of mind. Based on what is it said that the person has the six constituents? Great King, the six constituents are these: the constituent of earth, the constituent of water, the constituent of fire, the constituent of wind, the constituent of space, and the constituent of consciousness. Great King, these are the six constituents. My saying that a person has the six constituents is based on this. Based on what is it said that a person has the six bases of contact? Great King, the six bases of contact are these: the base of contact which is the eye for seeing forms, the base of contact which is the ear for hearing sounds, the base of contact which is the nose for smelling odors, the base of contact which is the tongue for sensing tastes, the base of contact which is the body for feeling the tangible, and the base of contact which is the mind for knowing phenomena. Great King, these are the six bases of contact. My saying that the

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a Ibid., 40; Candrakīrti, byang chub sms dpa’i rnal ’byor spyod pa bzhi grva pa’i rgya chers ’grel pa (bodhisattvayogācāracatuhṣatakā), in bsan ’gyur (sde dge), TBRC W23703.97 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 133a.6-133a.7.
b Jeffrey Hopkins, Meditation on Emptiness (Boston, MA: Wisdom Publications, 1996), 627-631; ’phags pa yab dang sras mjad ba zhes bya ba theg pa chen pa’i mdo (pitāputrasamāgamanāmamahādhyānasūtra), in bka’ ’gyur (sde dge), TBRC W22084.42 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1976-1979), 128a.1-129b.4.
person has the six bases of contact is based on this.

Great King, based on what is it said that persons have the eighteen activities of mind? Great King, the eighteen activities of mind are these. When humans see a form with their eyes, they experience the form as pleasurable, painful, or neutral. When they hear a sound with their ears, they experience the sound as pleasurable, painful, or neutral. When they smell an odor with their nose, they experience the odor as pleasurable, painful, or neutral. When they sense a taste with their tongue, they experience the taste as pleasurable, painful, or neutral. When they feel the tangible with their body, they experience the tangible as pleasurable, painful, or neutral. When they realize a phenomenon with their mind, they experience it as pleasurable, painful, or neutral. Great King, these six experiences of pleasure, these six experiences of displeasure, and these six experiences of neutrality are in brief the eighteen activities of mind. Great King, these eighteen are activities of mind. Great King, my saying that these activities are the eighteen activities of mind is based on this.

Great King, the constituent of earth is of two types: internal and external. Great King, what is the internal constituent? It is, inside the body, any of the hard and solid aspects, the close, conjoined with consciousness. Also, what are they? The internal earth constituent is to be known as hair, mustache, nails, teeth, impurities, excrement, skin, flesh, veins, sinews, bones, marrow, heart, liver, lungs, kidneys, spleen, diaphragm, large intestine, small intestine, bladder, urinary canal, anal canal, anus, brain, veins of the brain—also, any type of hardness, solidity, and the close, conjoined with consciousness inside the body.

Great King, what is the external earth constituent? Any type of hardness, solidity, the non-close, not conjoined with consciousness is to be known as the external earth constituent. Great King, when the internal earth constituent arises, it does not come from anywhere. When it ceases, it does not go anywhere.

Great King, a woman thinks of the internal, ‘I am a woman.’ Having imputed, ‘I am a woman,’ internally, she thinks of the external with respect to a man, ‘A man.’ Having imputed ‘man’ to the man externally, she becomes desirous and wishes to join with the external man.

The man also thinks of the internal, ‘I am a man.’ Having imputed, ‘I am a man,’ internally, he thinks of the external with respect to a woman, ‘A woman.’ Having imputed ‘woman’ to the
woman externally, he becomes desirous and wishes to join with the external woman. Through desiring to join, they join together. Through the cause of joining there is the state of the fluid embryo.

Great King, both the imputed and the imputer do not [inherently] exist. There is no woman in the woman [that is, in the basis of the imputation “woman”]. There is no man in the man [that is, in the basis of the imputation “man”]. Though they are thus nonexistent, wrong thought is generated, but even this thought does not exist inherently.

Even the joining and the fluid embryo do not exist inherently as is imagined. How can that which does not exist inherently become hard?

Great King, having understood thought thus, you should understand hardness. It is to be understood that whenever hardness is produced, it does not come from anywhere. Great King, this body has a time in the end of going to the cemetery. When its hardness disintegrates and ceases, it does not go east, south, west, north, up, down, or to the intermediate directions. Great King, view thus the internal earth constituent.

Great King, there are occasions when the world abides in the sky as a heavenly mansion of Brahmā, consisting of the seven types of precious substances. O King, when its hardness arises, it does not come from anywhere. Though it abides as the massive [mountains], hard and firm, established through the cause of the diamonds of the Chakravāḍa and Mahāchakravāḍa mountains, when its hardness arises, it does not come from anywhere. Though it abides as Meru—the King of Mountains—Yugaṃdhara, Nimīṃdhara, Ṭiṣṭhāḥara, Vajradhara, Khadiraka, Vinataka, Ashvakarna, Sudarshana, Mahāsudarshana, Bare [Mountains], Gandhamādana, or the Kīṭādri which are other than those, or though it abide as the billion world systems including everything, or though it abide as an earth eighty thousand yojanas in height and sixty thousand yojanas in width, O King, when its hardness arises, it does not come from anywhere.

Great King, when this world is destroyed, there is a time when this great earth is burnt by fire, or destroyed by water, or wrecked by wind. When it is burned by fire, there will be no smoke, and there will be no remains of ashes. For instance, when the flame of a butter or oil lamp burns space, there is no smoke and no remains of ashes. Just so, when this world system of one billion worlds is burned by fire, there will be no smoke, and there will be no
remains of ashes.

Also, when it is destroyed by water, there is no remainder. For instance, when salt dissolves in water, there is no remainder. Just so, when this world system of one billion worlds is destroyed by water, there will be no remains.

When it is wrecked by wind, there will be no remainder. For instance, when a scattering wind drives about, no little birds are seen remaining. Just so, when this world system of one billion worlds is wrecked by wind, there will not be even a little remainder.

Great King, the arising of the earth constituent is thus empty. The destruction and arising of the earth constituent are also empty of inherent existence. Great King, the earth constituent, except for only being an imputation, should not be viewed as an earth constituent. Those conventions are not the woman and are not the man. Thus, O King, with wisdom realize these as they are in reality.

and also all the rest of the constituents are explained like [the earth constituent].
All Phenomena are Only Imputed by Conceptuality to Over There
The Opposite of Emptiness in the Consequence School
The meaning of this sūtra passage also exists because from the beginning of the passage up through “[Great King, the earth constituent, except for only being imputed,] should not be viewed as an earth constituent” explains that [the earth constituent] does not exist aside from only imputation by names, and “Those conventions are not the woman and are not the man” explains that the bases of imputation are not the man and not the woman.

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a 2011 TBRC bla brang (199a.5) reads min; 2015 Go-mang Lhasa (146a.1) reads ma yin.
b 2011 TBRC bla brang (199a.5) reads min; 2015 Go-mang Lhasa (146a.2) reads ma yin.
c 2011 TBRC bla brang (199a.6) reads min; 2015 Go-mang Lhasa (146a.3) reads ma yin.
d 2011 TBRC bla brang (199a.6) reads min; 2015 Go-mang Lhasa (146a.3) reads ma yin.
Summarizing its meaning, Nāgārjuna’s *Precious Garland* says:\textsuperscript{a}

If a person is not earth, not water, not fire, not wind, not space, not consciousness, and not all [of them],

What person is there in what is other than these?!

“Not consciousness” and above [that is, “a person is not earth, not water, not fire, not wind, not space, not consciousness”] explains that [a person] is not each of the bases of the imputation [earth, water, fire, wind, and space]; “not all” explains that [a person] is also not the composite of the bases of imputation “person” [that is, not the composite of the six constituents]; “in what is other than these” explains that without relying on the basis of imputation [a person] does not exist.

\textsuperscript{a} Adapted from Hopkins, *Nāgārjuna’s Precious Garland*, 104.

\textsuperscript{b} Correcting yan chad kyis gzhi in 2015 Go-mang Lhasa (146a.4) to yan chad kyis gdags gzhi in accordance with 2011 TBRC bla brang (199b.2).
**EXPLAINING THAT THE OPPOSITE OF THIS [THAT IS, EXISTING AS ONLY IMPUTATION TO OVER THERE BY CONCEPTUALITY AND AS SIMPLY-NAME] IS THE MEASURE OF TRUE ESTABLISHMENT**

The opposite of this [that is, existing as only imputation to over there by conceptuality and as simply-name] is the measure of true establishment because the nonexistence of all phenomena aside from only imputation by their respective names and conceptuality over there is their final mode of subsistence. It follows [that the nonexistence of all phenomena aside from only imputation by their respective names and conceptuality over there is their final mode of subsistence] because if one adheres [to a phenomenon] as not only imputed by names, this becomes apprehension of true existence due to which adherence [this way] is not reasonable.

For, the *Meeting of Father and Son* Sutra says:

Great King, with regard to phenomena when they are sought one by one, except for only an imputation, an eye sense-field is not

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a Correcting *ming rtog pas* in 2015 Go-mang Lhasa (146a.5) to *ming dang rtog pas* in accordance with 2011 TBRC *bla brang* (199b.3).
b *yab sras mjal ba’i mdo*, TBRC W22084.42, 133b.7-134a.1.
observed.

and also that very [sūtra] says:\(^a\)

If all phenomena are not observed in that way, what are Buddhas? What are Bodhisattvas? What are the prophesied? Forms are empty of forms, through to consciousnesses.

and likewise, it says:\(^b\)

These are convention-only, name-only, terminology-only, convention-only, expression-only, imputation-only. The wise should actualize this and not deride it.

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\(^a\) Ibid., 64a.2-64a.5. Instead of *rnam par shes pa'i bar du'o* The sūtra—’phags pa yab dang sras mjal ba zhes bya ba theg pa chen pa'i mdo (*pitāputrasamāgamanāmahāyānasūtra*), in *bka’ ’gyur* (*sde dge*), TBRC W22084.42 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1976-1979), 64a.2-64a.3, reads:

\(^b\) Ibid., 64a.5-64a.6.

\(^c\) Correcting *btsal ba tha snyad* in 2015 Go-mang Lhasa (146a.7) to *btsal na tha snyad* in accordance with 2011 TBRC *bla brang* (199b.3).

\(^d\) Correcting *gzugs kyi stong* in 2015 Go-mang Lhasa (146b.1) to *gzugs kyis stong* in accordance with 2011 TBRC *bla brang* (199b.3).
The measure of true establishment

The sūtra—’phags pa yab dang sras mjal ba zhes bya ba theg pa chen pa’i mdo (pitāputrasamāgamanāmamahāyānasūtra), in bka’ ’gyur (sde dge), TBRC W22084.42 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karina pa choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1976-1979), 64a.5, reads mngon par chen par bya ba’i mi phyao.

b 2011 TBRC bla brang (199b.6) reads mi phyao; 2015 Go-mang Lhasa (146b.1) reads mi cha’o. The sde dge (64a.5), co ne (76a.4), snar thang (177b.4), and dpe bsdur ma (156.3) read mi cha’o; the Peking edition (73b.3) reads mchi’o.
**C* EXPLAINING THAT ALL PERFORMANCE OF FUNCTIONS IS SUITABLE AS ONLY IMPUTED BY NAMES AND TERMINOLOGY TO OVER THERE**

All phenomena do not exist aside from being simply-name, existing only imputedly, like imputing a mottled rope as a snake, or as Šāntideva’s Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds says:\(^{a}\)

Like an awareness of a human with regard to a stone landmark\(^{b}\)
Due to features of an arrangement of shape.

Although there is no difference between [a human imputed in dependence upon mental and physical aggregates] and a human imputed from a long distance to a stone landmark, there is a difference with regard to whether these are suitable or not suitable to perform the functions [of a human] because those that are such that the respective names are only imputed over there to the respective bases of imputation of the phenomena are suitable conventions performing the functions of those phenomena, but those that are imputed to the two examples, the mottled rope and the stone landmark, as a snake and as a human are not capable of the functions of a snake and of a human.

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\(^{a}\) IX.84cd. Šāntideva, *byang chub sems dpa’i spyod pa la ‘jug pa (bodhisattvacaryāvatāra)*, in *bstan ’gyur (sde dge)*, TBRC W23703:105 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 34a.3.

\(^{b}\) A vertical pile of stones.
It follows [that those that are such that the respective names are only imputed over there to the respective bases of imputation of the phenomena are suitable conventions performing the functions of those phenomena, but those that are imputed to the two examples, the mottled rope and the stone landmark, as a snake and as a human are not capable of the functions of a snake and of a human] because without knowing how to posit the valid establishment of the conventions of action, agent, and so forth, although one propounded “is not nonexistent,” this is not helpful with regard to falling into the extreme of annihilation, because the Buddhapālita Commentary says:

Why is it so? Expressions of existence and nonexistence are by the power of view. We see things as nonexistent like horns of a rabbit. However, in order to thoroughly abandon verbal faults, do not propound “is not existent and also is not nonexistent.”

This refutes well old [scholars] of Tibet who said that phenomena are not existent and are also not nonexistent. Although there are many sources, they can be understood through the earlier explanation.

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a Buddhapālita, dbu ma rtsa ba ’i ’grel pa buddha pā li ta, in bstan ’gyur (sde dge), TBRC W23703.98 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 244a.1-244a.2.
b Tsong-kha-pa in his Medium-Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment Practiced by Persons of Three Capacities (Hopkins, Tsongkapa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom, 95) says:

Therefore, distinctions:

- between the two—that something is not existent (yod pa min pa) and that something does not exist (med pa) [whereas these actually have the same meaning], and
- between the two—that something is not non-existent (med pa min pa) and that something exists (yod pa) [whereas these actually have the same meaning]

are reduced to merely being differences in mode of expression. No matter how much one analyzes how the meanings of both of those appear to the mind, there is no difference at all; hence, to propound that one falls or does not fall to extremes through those modes [of expression] is exhausted as fixation on mere words.
The Opposite of Emptiness in the Consequence School

[ཆོས་ȷམས་ཀྱི་རང་རང་གི་གདགས་གཞི་ལ་རང་རང་གི་མིང་ཕར་བཏགས་ཙམ་དེས་ཆོས་དེའི་Ɏ་Ɏེད་ཀྱི་ཐ་ȡད་ɻང་ལ།

dཔེ་གཉིས་ལ་མིང་དེ་Ȩར་བཏགས་པས་ɝལ་དང་མིའི་Ɏ་བ་མི་Ȭབ་པ་

dེར་ཐལ། Ɏ་Ɏེད་སོགས་ཐ་ȡད་ཚད་ǿབ་

འཇོག་མ་ཤེས་པར་མེད་པ་མིན་�ེས་ɩས་ཀྱང་ཆད་མཐར་ȩང་

བ་ལ་མི་ཕན་པའི་ɉིར་ཏེ། ɍ̥་ཱͬ་ལི་ཏ་ལས། ཇི་Ȩར་ཞེ་ན།

ཡོད་པ་དང་མེད་པ་ཉིད་ȭ་བȚོད་པ་ནི་Ȩ་བའི་དབང་གིས་ཏེ།

ཁོ་བོ་ནི་དངོས་པོ་ȷམས་རི་བོང་གི་ʻ་བཞིན་ȭ་མེད་པ་དེ་ཉིད་མཐོང་

t་ཅིག་གི་Dzོན་ཡོངས་ɂེངས་པའི་ɉིར་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱང་མ་ཡིན་ལ་མེད་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱང་མ་ཡིན་ནོ།

། ། ༞ེས་ ། ། ཞེས་

གཤངས་པའི་ɉིར། ཀར་བོད་Ȃན་ȷམས་ཀྱིས་ཆོས་ȷམས་ཡོད་

པའང་མ་ཡིན་མེད་པའང་མ་ཡིན་ཟེར་བ་ལེགས་པར་བཀག་ལ་

ཤེས་Ɏེད་མང་ཡང་ȓར་

b  Correcting yang slar in 2015 Go-mang Lhasa (146b.6) to yang sngar in accordance with 2011 TBRC bla brang (200a.6).]
**D* IDENTIFYING THE SCHOLARS WHO COMMENTED IN THAT WAY**

Identifications of the scholars who commented in that way exist because from among the authors of word-commentaries and meaning-commentaries on the texts of the father Nāgārjuna and [his spiritual] son Āryadeva, the three—Buddhapālita, Shāntideva, and Chandrakīrti—showed, so to speak, the feasibility of the performance of functions within name-only.

It follows [that from among the authors of word-commentaries and meaning-commentaries on the texts of the father Nāgārjuna and [his spiritual] son Āryadeva, the three—Buddhapālita, Shāntideva, and Chandrakīrti—showed, so to speak, the feasibility of the performance of functions within name-only] because:

- Buddhapālita in dependence upon the *Heap of Jewels Sūtra*, from stating discerning what is true and false in a debate about an image of a deity as an example, proved in that way [the feasibility of the performance of functions within name-only],
- Shāntideva in dependence upon the *Meeting of Father and Son Sūtra*, from stating a magician’s illusion as an example, proved in that way [the feasibility of the performance of functions within name-only], and
- the Glorious Chandrakīrti, in dependence upon the sūtras of the Lesser Vehicle, with the example of a chariot proved in that way [the feasibility of the performance of functions within name-only].
The first [part of the reason which is that Buddhapālita in dependence upon the Heap of Jewels Sūtra, from stating discerning what is true and false in a debate about an image of a deity as an example, proved in that way (the feasibility of the performance of functions within name-only)] is established because although the imputed object is not found when sought, all actions and agents are suitable [in terms of] whether they are or are not in worldly name-only, because it is like, for example:

Two persons debate in a temple; one person propounds that the one holding a wheel is Īshvara and the one holding a trident is Viṣhṇu; the other says it is the opposite [the one holding a wheel is Viṣhṇu and the one holding a trident is Īshvara].

A mediator does not say that these two gods [Īshvara and Viṣhṇu] do not exist in this [temple] and that these [ones holding a trident and holding a wheel] are paintings; rather, in conformity with the world, the mediator tells the second [who said that the one holding a wheel is Viṣhṇu and the one holding a trident is Īshvara], “You are true,” and the other, the first, who propounded [that the one holding a wheel is Īshvara and the one holding a trident is Viṣhṇu], “You are not true.”

a Correcting ’byed par in 2015 Go-mang Lhasa (146a.5) to ’byed pa in accordance with 2011 TBRC bla brang (200b.2).
b 2015 Go-mang Lhasa (148a.1) reads sgrub; 2011 TBRC bla brang (200b.2) reads bsgrubs.
The *Buddhapālita Commentary* says:

In this way, the Supramundane Victor also says, “Whatever is renowned to the world as existent, I also propound as existent. Whatever is renowned to the world as nonexistent, I also propound as nonexistent.” Therefore, it is said that when acting in the conventions of the world, what is renowned as real in the world the Supramundane Victor also says is real, and what is renowned as unreal in the world the Supramundane Victor also says is unreal.

and it says:

For example, when two villagers went to a city for some matters, they entered into a temple for the spectacle, and when they began to look at the paintings, one said, “The one holding a trident in his hand is Nārāyaṇa; the one holding a wheel is Maheshvara.” The other said, “You misunderstood; the one holding a trident is Maheshvara; the one holding a wheel is Nārāyaṇa.” Debating, they went to a wanderer [holy man] who was nearby. Having paid homage, they told him their respective thoughts, and he told one, “What you said is true,” and told the other, “What you said is not true.” When he propounded like this, although the wanderer knew that Maheshvara did not at all exist in this [temple] and Nārāyaṇa also did not, but these were paintings dependent on the wall, through the power of worldly convention he said, “This is true and that is not true.”

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a Buddhapālita, *buddha pā li ta*, 244b.1-244b.2.
b Ibid., 244b.4-244b.7.
c An avatar of Viṣhṇu.
d As Jang-kyā (Hopkins, *Emptiness Yoga*, 368-369) paraphrases this part of the story:

A wandering holy man was nearby. They went up to him, and each spoke his thought. The wanderer thought, “Being murals on a wall, these are neither Maheshvara nor Narayana.” Although he knew that, still he did not say, “These are not gods, but paintings.” Instead, in conformity with the conventions of the world, he told the two villagers that one of them was right and the other wrong. Through his speaking thus, the wishes of the two villagers were fulfilled, and the wanderer also did not incur the fault of telling a lie.

Likewise, although all phenomena do not have objective establishment, presentations such as, “This is correct, and that is incorrect,” are feasible within the context of mere nominalities. Although the Supramundane Victor [Buddha] sees that all phenomena do not truly exist, even he teaches the adopting [of virtues] and discarding [of non-virtues] using terminology as the world does, thereby bringing about the welfare of transmigrants.
The Opposite of Emptiness in the Consequence School

[The text is in Tibetan and contains detailed explanations and references to sources.]

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a 2015 Go-mang Lhasa (147a.4) reads gzhan de’i dang po; 2011 TBRC bla brang (200b.5) reads gzhan dang po.
b Correcting dang po mras pa in 2015 Go-mang Lhasa (147a.4) to dang po des mras pa in accordance with 2011 TBRC bla brang (200b.5).
c In the sde dge edition the three occurrences of ’jig rten na read ’jig rten la. The sogs is filled in from Jam-yang-shay-pa’s grub chen.
The second [part of the reason which is that Śāntideva in dependence upon the Meeting of Father and Son Sūtra, from stating a magician’s illusion as an example, proved in that way (the feasibility of the performance of functions within name-only)] is established because although persons not existing aside from name-only with respect to the six constituents that are the bases of imputation are similar to [persons of] a magical illusion, whether the sin of killing exists or does not exist differs due to killing those two, a magical illusion or a person. It follows [that

\[\text{a 2015 Go-mang Lhasa (147a.6) reads zhi-g} ; \text{ 2011 TBRC bla brang (201a.1) reads shig.}\]
although persons not existing aside from simply-name with respect to the
six constituents that are the bases of imputation are similar to (persons of)
a magical illusion, whether the sin of killing exists or does not exist differs
due to killing those two, a magical illusion or a person] because the
distinction that although both of those [a human of a magical creation and
a person] do not exist aside from name-only, there is no sin of [killing] a
human with respect to a human of a magical creation due to its not having
a mind, whereas since a person has a mind, if a person is killed, incurring
the sin of killing exists, because Shāntideva’s *Engaging in the Bodhisattva
Deeds* says:

> In killing a person of a magical illusion and so forth
> There is no sin due to its not having a mind.
> Toward what possess an illusory-like mind
> Merit and sin arise.

and Shāntideva’s *Compendium of Learnings* says:

> Concerning, how although all phenomena are selfless, there is no
> contradiction with the relationship between actions and [their] effects
> and how although there is no inherent existence, there is no
> contradiction with all phenomena as they are being seen are taught in the
> *Meeting of Father and Son Sūtra*.

This scripture [the *Meeting of Father and Son Sūtra*] explains that
although a self of persons does not exist, actions, effects, and so forth are
suitable, and that although from their own side phenomena are not at all
established and are not established as perceived, perceived forms and so
forth are established.

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b Shāntideva, *bslab pa kun las btus pa’i tshig le’u byas pa (ṣikṣāsamuccayārikā)*, in *bstan ’gyur (sde dge)*, TBRC W23703:111 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapa Choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 134a.4.
The third [part of the reason which is that the glorious Chandrakīrti, in dependence upon the sūtras of the Lesser Vehicle, with the example of a chariot proved in that way (the feasibility of the performance of functions within name-only)] will be explained [later],\(^c\) and this explanation of such

\(^a\) 2015 Go-mang Lhasa (148b.1-148b.2) reads med mod/’on kyang; 2011 TBRC bla brang (201a.3) reads med kyang.

\(^b\) 2015 Go-mang Lhasa (147b.4) reads bstan to; 2011 TBRC bla brang (201a.6) reads bstan te.

\(^c\) This will be explained later in Jam-yang-shay-pa’s treatise in this chapter in connection with Chandrakīrti’s Supplement beginning from VI.151ff. As Jang-kyia’s Presentations of Tenets (Hopkins, Emptiness Yoga, 394-398) says:
Chandrakīrti’s *Supplement* says that although upon analyzing a chariot in the seven ways—whether it is one with its own parts, different from them, and so forth—it is not found, it is permissible for valid cognition to posit, without invalidation, a chariot imputed in dependence upon the parts of the chariot, and that likewise the self, the aggregates, and so forth are posited in a similar manner. The *Supplement* (VI.151) says:*

> A chariot is not asserted to be other than its parts,
> Nor non-other. It also does not possess them.
> It is not in the parts, nor are the parts in it.
> It is not the mere collection [of its parts], nor is it [their] shape. [The self and the aggregates are] similar.

...  

*Objection:* When sought thus in these seven ways, a chariot is not found, and therefore a chariot does not exist. However, this is not feasible, for such [expressions as] “Bring the chariot!” “Buy a chariot!” and “Prepare the chariot!” are renowned in the conventions of the world.  

*Answer:* There is no such fallacy. In our system, when a chariot is analyzed in these seven ways, it is not found, and it is not found either an ultimate truth or as a conventional truth, but this does not make a chariot nonexistent. For, (1) the assertion of a chariot is not made upon its being established by the reasoning analyzing whether it inherently exists or not but is established by only a non-defective, ordinary, worldly—that is, conventional—consciousness without any analysis that searches for the object imputed, and (2) moreover, the way in which [a chariot] is posited is that it is established as only existing imputedly in the sense of being imputed in dependence upon its parts, wheels and so forth. Chandrakīrti’s *Supplement* (VI.158) says:*

> That [chariot] is not established in these seven ways
> Either as [its own] suchness or in the world,
> But without analysis it is imputed here
> From [the viewpoint of] the world in dependence upon its parts.

Chandrakīrti’s *Autocommentary on the “Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle Way’”* clearly speaks of how [phenomena] are established in a nominal way:  

> Not only does this position just very clearly establish the imputation of the convention, chariot, from the viewpoint of what is renowned in the world, but also these nominalities should be asserted from the viewpoint of worldly renown without analysis.

The Autonomists and the other lower tenets systems—having seen that if the collection of parts, etc., were not posited as an illustration of a whole, etc., [no phenomenon could be posited at all since] there is no whole, etc., which is a separate entity from those—assert that [something] from within the bases of imputation is posited as this and that phenomenon. They do not know how to posit a phenomenon if an object that is imputed as that phenomenon is not found when sought. Therefore, because they do not accept that chariots and so forth are
[feasibility of the performance of functions within only being posited by conceptuality] is the final difficult point of the middle way view because:

- although an object of negation coarser than only imputation by names to over there is refuted, since the extreme of permanence is not blocked, the genuine meaning of the middle way is not found, [and]
- when a meaning-generality of “aside from simply-name, non-establishment from within the basis of imputation” dawns, if—like the horns of a rabbit—you do not know how to posit valid establishment, having fallen to the extreme of annihilation, you do not know the meaning of the middle way

because Tsong-kha-pa’s *Illumination of Thought* says.\(^a\)

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mere nominal imputations, they assert that chariots and so forth conventionally are established by way of their own character.

Although this supreme system does not hold that anything such as the collection of parts or something within it is an illustration of the whole and so forth, it is able to present well all actions and agents within the context of mere nominal imputation of whole, etc. The Foremost Omnisicent [Tsong-kha-pa] advised that since this mode of commenting on the meaning of the scriptures is the Subduer [Buddha’s] own uncommon thought, those who are discriminating should train in this system of interpreting Buddha’s thought. It appears that this way [of positing phenomena within the context of mere nominal imputation] is a supremely difficult point that was not in the province of mind of many who were famed as great pandits in the land of the Superiors [India], and except for the Omnisicent Father [Tsong-kha-pa] and his spiritual sons [Gyal-tshab and Khay-drub] most of the scholars and adepts in snowy Tibet also were unable to see even a part of this.

This mode of analysis is a profound means of quickly finding the view of emptiness. Chandrakīrti’s *Autocommentary on the “Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle Way’”* says.***

Because these worldly conventionalities do not exist when investigated in this way but do exist by way of nonanalytical renown, yogis, when they analyze these in these stages, will penetrate very quickly to the depths of suchness.

\(^a\) *Tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa, d[bu ma la ’jug pa ’i rnam bshad dgongs pa rab gsal, in gsung bum/ tsong kha pa (bkras lhun par rnying / d+ha sar bskyar par brgyab pa), TBRC*
The feasibility of [an object’s] respective functionality within the context of being posited by conceptuality is an uncommon mode of commentary by Buddhapālita, Shāntideva, and this master [Chandrakīrti] from among the commentators on the words and meaning [of the works] of the two—the father, the Superior [Nāgārjuna], and his spiritual son [Āryadeva]. The final difficult point in the view of the Middle Way also is just this.

W29193.16 (Dharamsala, India: Sherig parkhang, 1997), 87b.1-87b.2. See Hopkins, Tsongkhapa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom, 205.

a Correcting ming gi in 2015 Go-mang Lhasa (147b.5) to ming gis in accordance with 2011 TBRC bla brang (201b.1).

b Correcting las rigs in 2015 Go-mang Lhasa (147b.5) to las rags in accordance with 2011 TBRC bla brang (201b.2).
The meaning of “simply-name, existing only imputedly” (ming rkyang btags yod) exists because “simply-name” (ming rkyang) blocks establishment from its own side and the extreme of permanence, and “existing only imputedly” (btags yod) having indicated that since the object, the convention, is positable, it is unlike the horn of a rabbit, clears away the extreme of annihilation and the extreme of nonexistence. Therefore, although whatever is only imputed by names is not necessarily existent, whatever is simply-name, existing only imputedly is necessarily existent because the two—existent (yod pa) and this [simply-name, existing only imputedly (ming rkyang btags yod)] are necessarily mutually inclusive. It follows [that the two—existent and simply-name, existing only imputedly—are necessarily mutually inclusive] because the two—existent (yod pa) and imputedly existent (btags yod)—are necessarily mutually inclusive [that is, the two—existent (yod pa) and imputedly existent (btags yod)—are mutually pervasive].

If you think, “Well then, since conceptuality does not exist on the Buddha ground, an exalted-knower-of-all-aspects and so forth would not be posited by conceptuality,” it follows that this fallacy does not exist because there are no nameless phenomena, and since terms and conceptuality engage their objects similarly, all means of positing an exalted-knower-of-all-aspects do not have to exist on the Buddha ground. It follows [that there are no nameless phenomena, and since terms and conceptuality engage
their objects similarly, all means of positing an exalted-knower-of-all-aspects do not have to exist on the Buddha ground] because although sentient beings who possess the name of the exalted-knower-of-all-aspects in [their mental] continuum exist, a sentient being who possesses an exalted-knower-of-all-aspects does not have to exist.

Saying [in conclusion]:

Through extensive explanation of the Autonomists’ and Consequentialists’ coarse and subtle objects of negation The masses of becloudiness polluting the eyes of awareness of the fortunate Though not driven away, run away Into the sphere of reality like the stars at dawn and disappear. Marvelous!

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\(^a\) 2015 Go-mang Lhasa (148a.4) reads \textit{bslad}; 2011 TBRC \textit{bla brang} (202a.2) reads \textit{slod}. 
Wow! Like a rainbow adorning space without obstructing it,
In this magical illusion projecting the supreme of all aspects
without preventing emptiness
A limit to the spectacle does not appear.
All whatsoever aspects are there! Wonderful!!

The sovereigns of yoga are the Proponents of the Middle Way
Who realize that the two—emptiness, the mode of subsistence
that is the extinguishment of appearance,
And conventionalities, the qualificandsa dawning in all sorts of
ways—
Are without coming together and separating like forms and
space.

These are transitional stanzas [after the section on the objects of negation
in the Autonomy School and the Consequence School].

a That is, those having the attribute of emptiness.
Abbreviations


“2011 TBRC bla brang” and “L” in pagination in brackets in Tibetan text = dbu ma la ’jug pa’i mtha’ dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zab don kun gsal skal bzang ’jug ngogs. TBRC W22186-11KG10676: 1-442a.3, which is a PDF of: bla brang bkra shis ’khyil, a mdo.


“co ne” = co ne bstan ’gyur. TBRC W1GS66030. co ne dgon chen: co ne, 1926.


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Jongbok Yi is Assistant Professor of Asian Philosophy at Stockton University. He received a B.A. from Sungkyunkwan University in 1997 and received an M.A. from Seoul National University in 2000 in Seoul, South Korea. He studied Indian and Tibetan Buddhism with Professor Jeffrey Hopkins and Professor David Germano from 2002 at the University of Virginia where he received an M.A. in 2005 and a Ph.D. in 2013. The title of his dissertation is “Monastic Pedagogy on Emptiness in the Gelug Sect of Tibetan Buddhism: Intellectual History and Analysis of Topics Concerning Ignorance According to Svātantrika-Mādhyamika in Monastic Textbooks by Jam-yang-shay-pa.” He has translated a few books including Stages of Meditation and Mind of Clear Light: Advice on Living Well and Dying Consciously by His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama, etc., into Korean. With Jeffrey Hopkins he published The Hidden Teaching of the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras: Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Seventy Topics and Kon-chog-jig-may-wang-po’s 173 Aspects and Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Explanation of the Treatise “Ornament for the Clear Realizations” From the Approach of the Meaning of the Words: The Sacred Word of Maitreyanātha (Dyke, VA: uma-tibet.org, 2014). He has been teaching at Stockton University since 2013 and is also a translator of the UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies.
The Opposite of Emptiness in the Middle Way Consequence School

This book provides an analyzed translation of part of Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Decisive Analysis of the Middle, also called Great Exposition of the Middle, which came to be the normative textbook for the study of Chandrakīrti’s Middle Way treatise in the Go-mang College of Dre-pung Monastery. Translated here is the section on what is negated in the Middle Way Consequence School. The book provides the first translation of this section of Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Decisive Analysis of (Chandrakīrti’s) “Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle’”: Treasury of Scripture and Reasoning, Thoroughly Illuminating the Profound Meaning [of Emptiness], Entrance of the Fortunate. It is a dramatic expansion on this topic by Tsong-kha-pa Lo-sang-drag-pa, whose seminal treatise is also included.

Jam-yang-shay-pa’s exposition is in four parts:

1. demonstrating that all phenomena are only imputed by conceptuality
2. explaining that the opposite of existing as only imputation by conceptually and as simply name is the measure of true establishment
3. explaining that all performance of function is suitable as only imputed by names and terminology
4. identifying the scholars who made commentaries this way.