The Topography of the Tibetan Intellectual World, and How to Debate It
Ngag-wang-tra-shi’s The Collected Topics of Epistemology: Volume 1: Chapters 1-12

Steven Weinberger
In collaboration with Lo-sang-gyal-tshan

UMA INSTITUTE FOR TIBETAN STUDIES
The Topography of the Tibetan Intellectual World,
and How to Debate It

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UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies
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Translating texts from the heritage of Tibetan and Inner Asian Buddhist systems, the project focuses on Great Indian Books and Tibetan commentaries from the Go-mang College syllabus as well as a related theme on the fundamental innate mind of clear light in Tantric traditions. A feature of the Project is the usage of consistent vocabulary and format throughout the translations.

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UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies
7330 Harris Mountain Lane
Dyke, VA 22935-1008, USA

Version: June, 2017
ISBN: 978-1-941381-29-8
Library of Congress Control Number:

1. Weinberger, Steven, 1964–
The topography of the tibetan intellectual world, and how to debate it: ngag-wang-tra-shi’s the collected topics of epistemology: volume 1: chapters 1-12.
Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN: 978-1-941381-29-8
1. Ngag dbang bkra shis, 1678-1738. Tshad ma'i dgongs 'grel gyi bstan bcos chen po ramam 'grel gyi don gcig tu dril ba blo rab 'bring tha ma gsum du ston pa legs bshad chen po mkhas pa'i mgul brgyan skal bzang re ba kun skong (Great eloquent exposition demonstrating for the three levels of intelligence—low, medium, and high—the meanings of (dharmakīrti’s) “commentary,” the great treatise commentary on the thought of valid cognition, collated into a single text: necklace for scholars, fulfilling all hopes of the fortunate). 2. Ngag dbang bkra shis. Bsdus grwa. 3. Chos kyi grags pa (Dharmakīrti). Tshad ma ram 'grel (Pramāṇavārttika). 4. Dge-lugs-pa (Sect)--Doctrines. 5. Buddhist logic--Study and teaching. 6. Debates and debating--Religious aspects--Buddhism. 7.
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Preface

The Collected Topics (bskus grwa) is the first text studied in the monastic education system of the Ge-lug-pa school of Tibetan Buddhism. This foundational text provides students with the basics of both the dialectical system that is central to the entire monastic education curriculum and the ontological system of the Indian Sūtra School. In the Go-mang (sgo mang) College of Dre-pung (bras spungs) Monastery, the curriculum uses The Collected Topics text written by Ngag-wang-tra-shi (ngag dbang bkra shis, 1678-1738), one of the most prominent disciples of Jam-yang-shay-pa ('jam dbyangs bzhad pa, 1648-1721), Go-mang’s principal textbook author. The title of Ngag-wang-tra-shi’s text indicates that it elucidates the meaning of Dharmakīrti’s (c. 600-660) Commentary on Dignāga’s “Compilation of Valid Cognition.”

Ngag-wang-tra-shi was born in the Se-nya-lung (bse nyla lung) region of Reb-gong in Amdo (northeastern Tibet), to a nomad family of the Se (bse) clan. This clan affiliation is reflected in the appellations “Se-tsang” and its abbreviation “Se” posthumously used for Ngag-wang-tra-shi (pre-pended to his name) and also used for the name of his line of incarnations. “Se” is also used in the abbreviated title of his Collected Topics text. At age sixteen, Ngag-wang-tra-shi moved from Amdo to Lhasa in central Tibet, where he studied at Go-mang College of Dre-pung Monastery from 1694 until 1709. Ngag-wang-tra-shi then returned to Amdo when his primary teacher Jam-yang-shay-pa founded La-brang Monastery. Ngag-wang-tra-shi served as disciplinarian of La-brang and then succeeded his teacher Jam-yang-shay-pa as the monastery’s second abbot, a position he held for twenty years. Ngag-wang-tra-shi also founded and taught at other monasteries in the Amdo cultural region, as did his incarnation, the second Se-tsang lama Ngag-wang-jam-yang-tra-shi.

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b An alternate Tibetan spelling of this abbreviated title is sras bsku grwa, meaning “Collected Topics of the Spiritual Son” and understood to be “of Jam-yang-shay-pa.” These variants represent a controversy that occurred during Ngag-wang-tra-shi’s lifetime at La-brang Monastery over the identification of Jam-yang-shay-pa’s incarnation, which continued during the lifetime of Ngag-wang-tra-shi’s incarnation Ngag-wang-jam-yang-tra-shi (ngag dbang 'jam dbyangs bkra shis, 1739–1813) and resulted in a split at the monastery. For more on the religious and socio-political aspects of this controversy involving Tibetans in Amdo, Tibetans in central Tibet, Mongols, Manchus, and Chinese, see Nietupski, Labrang Monastery, 121–28.
Overview of the Book

Ngag-wang-tra-shi’s *Collected Topics* presents, albeit in an abbreviated way, the process of oral debate practiced daily in the Ge-lug-pa education system. This outline of debates communicates not only specific content on the subject matter of each chapter but also the fundamental concepts of the dialectical system. One such foundation is entailment, used to delineate the relationship between two things, such as white color and color: being a white color entails being a color but being a color does not necessarily entail being a white color. Students also learn from the *Collected Topics* the dialectical format that includes logical consequence statements with a subject, predicate, and reason, and how to form these from entailment statements, as well as the variety of avenues and responses available to the challenger and the defender in oral debate practice.

Ngag-wang-tra-shi’s *Collected Topics* is divided into twenty-six chapters, each of which addresses a topic such as cause and effect, one (or same) and different, contradiction and relation, generality and instance, and so forth. The first twelve chapters are translated in this volume. Each chapter is divided into three sections, which appear in this order: refutation of others’ systems, presentation of the author’s own system, and dispelling objections. The “Refutation of Others’ Systems” section consists of debates in which views other than those held by the author are presented and then disproved. The author then presents his own system not in a dialectic format but rather in a description of the definitions (or defining characteristics), divisions, illustrations, synonyms, and so forth of the various phenomena involved in the chapter’s topic. In the “Dispelling Objections” section, the author returns to a debate format and again disproves positions contrary to his own. This section differs from the “Refutation of Objections” section in that the contrary position is stated as a dialectical argument the opponent is making, often including the opponent’s responses to objections, after which the author states his response to the opponent’s position.

While this tripartite chapter structure is the standard, some chapters omit one or two of the sections: chapter 3, “Opposite from Being [Something] and Opposite from Not Being [Something]” and chapter 4, “Identifying Isolates,” lack the “Dispelling Objections” section; chapter 10, “Definition and Definiendum,” consists solely of the “Refuting Objections” section; and chapter 11, “Cha-pa’s System of Substantial Phenomena and Isolate Phenomena,” lacks the “Dispelling Objections” section.

This work benefited greatly from the invaluable contributions of Losang-gyal-tshan (*blo bzang rgyal mtshan*), a Ge-shay at Go-mang College.
of Dre-pung Monastic University, Mundgod, Karnataka State, India, who also served a six-month term as disciplinarian at the Tantric College of Lower Lhasa in Hunsur, India. In October, 2015, he assumed the position of abbot of Go-mang College, and he has worked with translators of the UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies since 2013. He resolved the meaning of several passages and terms in The Collected Topics, answered questions about debate format and procedure with erudition and patience, and he also edited and contributed to the interpolations into the Tibetan text.
Editions Consulted

There are several editions of the Ngag-wang-tra-shi’s *Collected Topics* that I have consulted. Primary among these is a reproduction of the block-print edition from the La-brang-tra-shi-khyil Monastery printing house, which I found to consistently have preferred readings when variants between editions occur:

1. *tshad ma’i dgongs ’grel gyi bstan bcos chen po rnam ‘grel gyi don geig tu dril ba blo rab ’bring tha ma gsum du ston pa legs bshad chen po mkhas pa’i mgul brag yan skal bzang re ba kun skong*. bla brang, Gansu, China: bkra shis ’khyil par ma, 199?. TBRC W1KG12111-11KG12142-1-1-316.

There is also a reproduction of this print, without variants, made at Go-mang College in India:

2. *tshad ma’i dgongs ’grel gyi bstan bcos chen po rnam ‘grel gyi don geig tu dril ba blo rab ’bring tha ma gsum du ston pa legs bshad chen po mkhas pa’i mgul brag yan skal bzang re ba kun skong*. Mundgod, Karnataka State, India: Kalsang Thabkhes, 1984. TBRC W1KG1940-11KG1942-3-384.

I also consulted the Gandan-po-drang printing house edition, printed from a set of blocks held at Go-mang College in Lhasa and acquired in 1987 by Jeffrey Hopkins:


In addition, I consulted a typeset edition first printed in China in 1985 and reprinted in 2003:


The digital text of Ngag-wang-tra-shi’s *Collected Topics* provided in this book was generated from the 2003 Beijing edition digitized by Zach Rowinski through his proprietary optical character recognition (OCR) software for Tibetan. I then proofread the digital text against the La-brang
edition, with preferred variant readings in the other texts noted.
Technical Notes

The following conventions are employed in this work:

- for the names of Indian persons and systems used in the body of the text, ch, sh, and ṣh are used instead of the more usual c, ś, and ṣ for the sake of easy pronunciation by non-specialists; however, cch is used for cch, not chchh. Within parentheses the usual transliteration system for Sanskrit is used;

- transliteration of Tibetan is done in accordance with a system devised by Turrell Wylie; see “A Standard System of Tibetan Transcription,” *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 22 (1959): 261–67;

- the names of Tibetan authors and orders are given in essay phonetics for the sake of easy pronunciation; the system is aimed at internet searchability;

- titles of added subsections are given in square brackets;

- definitions are in **bold type**;

- square brackets hold text added to fill out abbreviations in the text.
Ngag-wang-tra-shi’s

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The Tibetan text and the translation are highlighted in three colors: black, blue, and red. Blue text presents what Ngag-wang-tra-shi considers to be correct positions, while red text represents what Ngag-wang-tra-shi considers to be incorrect positions. Words in black indicate other information or function structurally.
Great Eloquent Exposition Demonstrating for the Three Levels of Intelligence—Low, Medium, and High—the Meanings of (Dharmakīrti’s) “Commentary,” the Great Treatise Commentary on the Thought of Valid Cognition, Collated into a Single Text: Necklace for Scholars, Fulfilling All Hopes of the Fortunate

[Homage]

Homage to the lama and protector Mañjughoṣha.

[Homage]
1. Exposition of the Presentation of Shape and Color

[དེ་ཁུང་མ་དེ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ཆཚེན་བོད་དཔེ་]

[Refutation of Others’ Systems]

[གཞན་ɾགས་དགག་]

1. Someone says: Being a color entails being red.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, the color of a white religious conch shell, is red because of being a color. You have asserted the entailment [that being a color entails being red].

If you say [that the reason which is that the color of a white religious conch shell is a color] is not established, it follows that the subject, the color of a white religious conch shell, is a color because of being white.

If you say [that the reason which is that the color of a white religious conch shell is white] is not established, it follows that the subject, the color of a white religious conch shell, is white because of being one-with-the-color-of-a-white-religious-conch-shell.
If you accept the root [assertion that the color of a white religious conch shell is red], it follows that the subject, the color of a white religious conch shell, is not red because of being white.

If you say [that being white] does not entail [not being red], it follows that there is entailment [that being white entails not being red] because there is no common locus of the two, white and red.

If you say [that the reason which is that there is no common locus of the two, white and red] is not established, it follows that there is no common locus of the two, white and red, because the two, white and red, are contradictory.

Furthermore, it [absurdly] follows that the subject, the color of the Buddha Ratnasambhava, is red because of being a color. You have asserted the entailment [that being a color entails being red].
If you say [that the reason which is that the color of the Buddha Ratnasambhava is a color] is not established, it follows that the subject, the color of the Buddha Ratnasambhava, is a color because of being yellow.

If you say [that the reason which is that the color of the Buddha Ratnasambhava is yellow] is not established, it follows that the subject, the color of the Buddha Ratnasambhava, is yellow because of being one-with-the-color-of-the-Buddha-Ratnasambhava.

If you accept the root [assertion that the color of the Buddha Ratnasambhava is red], it follows that the subject, the color of the Buddha Ratnasambhava, is not red because of being yellow.

If you say [that being yellow] does not entail [not being red], it follows that there is entailment [that being yellow entails not being red] because the two, red and yellow, are contradictory.

2. *Someone says:* Being a color entails being white.
Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, the color of the Buddha Amitāyus, is white because of being a color. You have asserted the entailment [that being a color entails being white].

If you say [that the reason which is that the color of the Buddha Amitāyus is a color] is not established, it follows that the subject, the color of the Buddha Amitāyus, is a color because of being red.

If you accept the root [assertion that the color of the Buddha Amitāyus is white], it follows that the subject, the color of the Buddha Amitāyus, is not white because of being red.

If you say [that the reason which is that the color of the Buddha Amitāyus is red] is not established, it follows that the subject, the color of the Buddha Amitāyus, is red because of being the isolate of the color of the Buddha Amitāyus.
If you say [that the reason which is that the color of the Buddha Amitāyus is the isolate of the color of the Buddha Amitāyus] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, the color of the Buddha Amitāyus, it is its isolate because it is an established base.

Furthermore, it [absurdly] follows that the subject, the color of the Buddha Amoghasiddhi, is white because of being a color. You have asserted the entailment [that being a color entails being white].

If you say [that the reason which is that the color of the Buddha Amoghasiddhi is a color] is not established, it follows that the subject, the color of the Buddha Amoghasiddhi, is a color because of being green.

If you accept the root [assertion that the color of the Buddha Amoghasiddhi is white], it follows that the subject, the color of the Buddha Amoghasiddhi, is not white because of being one-with-the-color-of-the-Buddha-Amoghasiddhi.
3. Someone says: Being a primary color entails being one of the four primary colors.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, black, is one of the four primary colors because of being a primary color. You have asserted the entailment [that being a primary color entails being one of the four primary colors].

If you say [that the reason which is that black is a primary color] is not established, it follows that the subject, black, is a primary color because of being black.

If you accept the root [assertion that black is one of the four primary colors], it follows that the subject, black, is not one of the four primary colors because of (1) not being white, and also (2) not being yellow, (3) not being red, and (4) not being blue.

If you say that the first reason [which is that black is not white] is not established, it follows that the subject, black, is not white because of being black.
If you say [that being black] does not entail [not being white], it follows that there is entailment [that being black entails not being white] because there is no common locus of the two, white and black.

If you say that the second reason [which is that black is not yellow] is not established, it follows that the subject, black, is not yellow because of being black.

If you say [that being black] does not entail [not being yellow], it follows that there is entailment [that being black entails not being yellow] because the two, yellow and black, are contradictory.

It is similar for the latter two reasons [which are that (3) black is not red and (4) black is not blue].

4. Someone says: Being a secondary color entails being one of the eight secondary colors.
Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, the color of orange Mañjughoṣha, is one of the eight secondary colors because of being a secondary color. You have asserted the entailment [that being a secondary color entails being one of the eight secondary colors].

If you say [that the reason which is that the color of orange Mañjughoṣha is a secondary color] is not established, it follows that the subject, the color of orange Mañjughoṣha, is a secondary color because of being the secondary color from the two, red and yellow.

If you accept the root [assertion that the color of orange Mañjughoṣha is one of the eight secondary colors], it follows that the subject, the color of orange Mañjughoṣha, is not one of the eight secondary colors because of (1) not being any of the four: cloud and smoke, and dust and mist; and (2)
not being any of the four: illumination and darkness, and shadow and sunlight.

Each of the reasons [which are that the color of orange Mañjughoṣha (1) is not any of the four: cloud and smoke, and dust and mist; and (2) is not any of the four: illumination and darkness, and shadow and sunlight] are established because [the color of orange Mañjughoṣha] is one-with-the-color-of-orange Mañjughoṣha.

Furthermore, it [absurdly] follows that the subject, green, is one of the eight secondary colors because of being a secondary color. You have asserted the entailment [that being a secondary color entails being one of the eight secondary colors].

If you say [that the reason which is that green is a secondary color] is not established, it follows that the subject, green, is a secondary color because
of being the secondary color from the two, black and yellow.

If you say [that the reason which is that green is the secondary color from the two, black and yellow] is not established, it follows that the subject, green, is the secondary color from the two, black and yellow, because of being green.

If you accept the root [assertion that green is one of the eight secondary colors], it follows that the subject, green, is not one of the eight secondary colors because of being one-with-green.

5. Someone says: Being form entails being a color.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, the odor of sandalwood, is a color because of being form. You have asserted the entailment [that being form entails being a color].

If you say [that the reason which is that the odor of sandalwood is form] is not established, it follows that the subject, the odor of sandalwood, is form because of being that which is suitable as form.
If you say [that being that which is suitable as form] does not entail [being form], it follows that there is entailment [that being that which is suitable as form entails being form] because that which is suitable as form is the definition of form.

If you accept the root [assertion that the odor of sandalwood is a color], it follows that the subject, the odor of sandalwood, is not a color because of being an odor.

If you say [that being an odor] does not entail [not being a color], it follows that there is entailment [that being an odor entails not being a color] because there is no common locus of the two, odor and color.

If you say [that the reason which is that there is no common locus of the two, odor and color] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, the odor of sandalwood, [there is no common locus of the two, odor and color], because the two, odor and color, are contradictory.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, sound, is a form sense-sphere because of being form. You have asserted the entailment [that being form entails being a form sense-sphere].

If you say [that the reason which is that sound is form] is not established, it follows that the subject, sound, is form because of being matter.

If you say [that the reason which is that sound is matter] is not established, it follows that the subject, sound, is matter because of being that which is atomically established.

If you say [that being that which is atomically established] does not entail [being matter], it follows that there is entailment [that being that which is atomically established entails being matter] because that which is atomically established is the definition of matter.

If you accept the root [assertion that sound is a form sense-sphere], it follows that the subject, sound, is not a form sense-sphere because of not being an apprehended object of an eye consciousness.
If you say [that the reason which is that sound is not an apprehended object of an eye consciousness] is not established, it follows that the subject, sound, is not an apprehended object of an eye consciousness because of being an auditory object of an ear consciousness.

If you say [that the reason which is that sound is an auditory object of an ear consciousness] is not established, it follows that the subject, sound, is an auditory object of an ear consciousness because of being a sound sense-sphere.

Furthermore, it [absurdly] follows that the subject, the taste of molasses, is a form sense-sphere because of being form. You have asserted the entailment [that being form entails being a form sense-sphere].

If you say [that the reason which is that the taste of molasses is form] is not established, it follows that the subject, the taste of molasses, is form because of being a taste.

If you say [that being a taste] does not entail [being form], it follows that there is entailment [that being a taste entails being form] because whatever
The Collected Topics

is one of the five—a form [that is, a visible object], a sound, an odor, a
taste, or a tangible object—must be form.

If you accept the root [assertion that the taste of molasses is a form sense-
sphere], it follows that the subject, the taste of molasses, is not a form
sense-sphere because of not being an apprehended object of an eye con-
sciousness.

If you say [that not being an apprehended object of an eye consciousness]
doest not entail [not being a form sense-sphere], it follows that there is en-
tailment [that not being an apprehended object of an eye consciousness
entails not being a form sense-sphere] because apprehended object of an
eye consciousness is the definition of form sense-sphere.

Our Own System

There is a definition of form because that which is suitable as form is it.
The two, form and matter, are equivalent. When form is divided, there are
two because there are the two, external form and internal form.
There is a definition of external form because form that is not included within a being’s mental continuum is it. When external form is divided, there are five because there are the five: form sense-sphere, sound sense-sphere, odor sense-sphere, taste sense-sphere, and tangible object sense-sphere.

There is a definition of form sense-sphere because apprehended object of an eye consciousness is it. When form sense-sphere is divided, there are two because there are the two, shape and color.

When shape is divided, there are eight because there are the eight: long and short, high and low, polygonal and round, and level and unlevel. Polygonal is positable because shapes such as squares are it. Round is positable because shapes such as circles and eggs are it. Level is positable because shapes such as even surfaces are it. Non-level is positable because shapes such as uneven surfaces are it.

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\( ^a \) The Go-mang printing house edition (3b.4) reads skyes bu’i for skye ba’i.
When color is divided, there are two because there are the two, primary color and secondary color. When primary color is divided, there are four because there are the four: white, yellow, red, and blue. When secondary color is divided, there are eight because there are the eight: cloud and smoke, dust and mist, illumination and darkness, and shadow and sunlight.

There are four possibilities between being and not being the two, color and shape, because there are the four: the possibility that is color but is not shape, the possibility that is shape but is not color, the possibility that is both color and shape, and the possibility that is neither shape nor color.
There is the possibility that is color but is not shape because the four primary colors are it. There is the possibility that is shape but is not color because the four—long, short, polygonal, and round—are it. There is the possibility that is both color and shape because the four—cloud, smoke, dust, and mist—are it. There is the possibility that is neither shape nor color because the four—earth, water, fire, and wind—are it.

The three—form sense-sphere, form-constituent, and demonstrable form—are equivalent. There are illustrations of demonstrable form because the two, color and shape, are it.

With respect to the subject, the two—color and shape—there is a reason for calling them “demonstrable form” because, since they are demonstrable as objects of the eye, they are called thus.
There is a definition of sound sense-sphere because auditory object of an ear consciousness is it. When sound is divided, there are two because there are the two, sound that arises from elements which are conjoined [with consciousness] and sound that arises from elements which are not conjoined [with consciousness]. Sound that arises from elements which are conjoined [with consciousness] is positable because the sound of a being’s clapping is it. Sound that arises from elements which are not conjoined [with consciousness] is positable because the sound of water is it.

When sound is divided by way of expressive sounds, there are two because there are the two, sound that indicates [something] to sentient beings and sound that does not indicate [something] to sentient beings.

The two, sound that indicates [something] to sentient beings and expressive sound, are equivalent. There is an illustration because the sound that expresses “sound is impermanent” is it.
The two, sound that does not indicate [something] to sentient beings and sound that is not an expressive sound, are equivalent. There is an illustration because the sound of a drum, the sound of a conch, and so forth are it.

There is a definition of odor sense-sphere because apprehended object of a nose consciousness is it. When odor is divided, there are two because there are the two, natural odor and manufactured odor. Natural odor is positable because the odor of sandalwood is it. Manufactured odor is positable because the odor of prepared incense is it.

When natural odor is divided, there are two because there are the two, fragrant natural odor and unfragrant natural odor. Fragrant natural odor is positable because the two, the odor of saffron and the odor of camphor, for instance, are it. Unfragrant natural odor is positable because the two, the odor of asafoetida and the odor of sulphur, for instance, are it.
When manufactured odor is divided, there are two because there are the two, fragrant manufactured odor and unfragrant manufactured odor. Fragrant manufactured odor is positable because the two, the odor of prepared incense and the odor of Üa incense, for instance, are it. Unfragrant manufactured odor is positable because the odor of many unfragrant medicines prepared [together] is it.

There is a definition of taste sense-sphere because apprehended object of a tongue consciousness is it. When taste is divided, there are six because there are the six: sweet and sour, bitter and astringent, and pungent and salty. Sweet is positable because the taste of molasses and the taste of milk, for instance, are it. Sour is positable because the taste of olives and the taste of yogurt, for instance, are it. Bitter is positable because the taste of gentiana chiretta, for instance, is it. Astringent is positable because the taste of myrobalan arjuna, for instance, is it. Pungent is positable because the taste of the three pungent medicinals, for instance, is it. Salty is positable because the taste of batsha and the taste of Mongolian salt, for instance, are it.

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a The region of central Tibet.
b Black pepper (pho ba ri), long pepper (piper longum, pi pi ling), and ginger (sman sga).
c A medicinal salt that is found (1) near a spring that has a salty flavor or (2) in a damp place.
There is a definition of tangible object sense-sphere because *apprehended object of a body consciousness* is it. When tangible object is divided, there are two because there are the two, tangible object that is an element and tangible object that is arisen from elements.

When tangible object that is an element is divided, there are four because there are the four: earth, water, fire, and wind. There is a definition of earth because *that which is hard and obstructive* is it. There is a definition of water because *that which is wet and moistening* is it. There is a definition of fire because *that which is hot and burning* is it. There is a definition of wind because *that which is light and motile* is it.
When tangible object that is arisen from elements is divided, there are seven because there are the seven: smoothness and roughness, heaviness and lightness, cold and hunger, and thirst.

There is a definition of internal form because form that is included within the mental continuum of a being is it. When internal form is divided, there are five because there are the five: eye sense-power, ear sense-power, nose sense-power, tongue sense-power, and body sense-power.

There is a definition of eye sense-power because clear internal form qualified by acting as the uncommon empowering condition of its own effect, an eye consciousness, is it. The three—eye, eye sense-power, and eye-constituent—are equivalent. When eye sense-power is divided, there are two because there are the two, eye sense-power that is a basis and eye sense-power that is like a basis. Eye sense-power that is a basis is positable because an eye sense-power that sees white, blue, and so forth is it. Eye sense-power that is like a basis is positable because an eye sense-power in the sleep state is it.
There is a definition of ear sense-power because clear internal form qualified by acting as the uncommon empowering condition of its own effect, an ear consciousness, is it. When ear sense-power is divided, there are two because there are the two, ear sense-power that is a basis and ear sense-power that is like a basis.

There is a definition of nose sense-power because clear internal form qualified by acting as the uncommon empowering condition of its own effect, a nose consciousness, is it. When nose sense-power is divided, there are two because there are the two, nose sense-power that is a basis and nose sense-power that is like a basis.
There is a definition of tongue sense-power because clear internal form qualified by acting as the uncommon empowering condition of its own effect, a tongue consciousness, is it. When tongue sense-power is divided, there are two because there are the two, tongue sense-power that is a basis and tongue sense-power that is like a basis.

There is a definition of body sense-power because clear internal form qualified by acting as the uncommon empowering condition of its own effect, a body consciousness, is it. When body sense-power is divided, there are two because there are the two, body sense-power that is a basis and body sense-power that is like a basis.

Dispelling Objections

7. Someone says: It follows that the subject, wind, is arisen from elements because of being one of the seven tangible objects arisen from elements.
If you say [that the reason which is that wind is one of the seven tangible objects arisen from elements] is not established, it follows that the subject, wind, is one of the seven tangible objects arisen from elements because of being light.

Our response: [Being light] does not entail [being one of the seven tangible objects arisen from elements].

8. With regard to that, someone says: It follows that there is entailment because being light entails being one of the seven tangible objects arisen from elements. If you say [that the reason which is that being light entails being one of the seven tangible objects arisen from elements] is not established, it follows that being light entails being one of the seven tangible objects arisen from elements because at the time of enumerating the seven tangible objects that are arisen from elements, it is necessary to enumerate light as one.

Our response: [That at the time of enumerating the seven tangible objects
that are arisen from elements, it is necessary to enumerate light as one] does not entail [that being light entails being one of the seven tangible objects arisen from elements].

If you accept the root [assertion that wind is arisen from elements], it follows that the subject, wind, is not arisen from elements because of being an element.

If you say [that the reason which is that wind is an element] is not established, it follows that the subject, wind, is an element because of being one of the four elements.

If you say [that the reason which is that wind is one of the four elements] is not established, it follows that the subject, wind, is one of the four elements because of being wind.

9. Someone says: It follows that the subject, a white horse, is a color because of being one of the four primary colors. If you say [that the reason which is that a white horse is one of the four primary colors] is not established, it follows that the subject, a white horse, is one of the four elements because of being wind. If you say [that the reason which is that a white horse is white] is not established, it follows that the subject, a white horse, is white because it is a white horse.

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a This is the root assertion of the previous debate, of which this debate is a continuation.
Our response: [That it is a white horse] does not entail [being white].

If you accept the root [assertion that a white horse is white], a it follows that the subject, a white horse, is not white because of not being a color.

If you say [that the reason which is that a white horse is not a color] is not established, it follows that the subject, a white horse, is not a color because of not being a form.

If you say [that the reason which is that a white horse is not a form] is not established, it follows that the subject, a white horse, is not a form because of being a person.

a Here “root assertion” refers to the assertion to which the author has said “there is no entailment” (it follows that the subject, a white horse, is white because it is a white horse) rather than the initial assertion of the debate (it follows that the subject, a white horse, is a color because of being one of the four primary colors).
If you say [that the reason which is that a white horse is a person] is not established, it follows that the subject, a white horse, is a person because of being a horse.

Our response: [Not being level] does not entail [being non-level].
If you accept the root [assertion that object of knowledge is form], it follows that the subject, object of knowledge, is not form because of not being a thing.

If you say [that the reason which is that object of knowledge is not a thing] is not established, it follows that the subject, object of knowledge, is not a thing because of being a permanent phenomenon.

If you say [that the reason which is that object of knowledge is a permanent phenomenon] is not established, it follows that the subject, object of knowledge, is a permanent phenomenon because of being one-with-object-of-knowledge.
2. Exposition of the Presentation of Realizing [Something] as Existent and Realizing [Something] as Non-Existent

[Refutation of Others’ Systems]

1. Someone says: The existence of a valid cognition that realizes \([x] \) as existent entails the existence of a valid cognition that realizes \([x] \) as a thing.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, object of knowledge, there exists a valid cognition that realizes [it] as a thing because [it] is existent. You have asserted the entailment [that the existence of a valid cognition that realizes (it) as existent entails the existence of a valid cognition that realizes (it) as a thing].

If you say [that the reason which is that there exists a valid cognition that realizes object of knowledge as existent] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, object of knowledge, there exists a valid cognition that realizes [it] as existent because [it] is existent.
If you say [that the reason which is that object of knowledge is existent] is not established, it follows that the subject, object of knowledge, is existent because of being an established base.

If you accept the root [assertion that there exists a valid cognition that realizes object of knowledge as a thing], it follows that with respect to the subject, object of knowledge, there does not exist a valid cognition that realizes [it] as a thing because [it] is not a thing.

If you say [that the reason which is that object of knowledge is not a thing] is not established, it follows that the subject, object of knowledge, is not a thing because of being a non-thing.

If you say [that the reason which is that object of knowledge is a non-thing] is not established, it follows that the subject, object of knowledge, is a non-thing because of being that which is unable to perform a function.

If you say [that being that which is unable to perform a function] does not entail [being a non-thing], it follows that there is entailment [that being that which is unable to perform a function entails being a non-thing] because that which is unable to perform a function is the definition of non-thing.
2. Someone says: The existence of a valid cognition that realizes \( x \) as a non-thing entails the existence of a valid cognition that realizes \( x \) as a permanent phenomenon.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, rabbit horns, there exists a valid cognition that realizes \([\text{it}]\) as a permanent phenomenon because there exists a valid cognition that realizes \([\text{it}]\) as a non-thing. You have asserted the entailment [that the existence of a valid cognition that realizes \( (\text{it}) \) as a non-thing entails the existence of a valid cognition that realizes \( (\text{it}) \) as a permanent phenomenon].

If you say [that the reason which is that there exists a valid cognition that realizes rabbit horns as a non-thing] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, rabbit horns, there exists a valid cognition that realizes \([\text{it}]\) as a non-thing because \([\text{it}]\) is a non-thing.

If you say [that the reason which is that rabbit horns is a non-thing] is not established, it follows that the subject, rabbit horns, is a non-thing because of not being a thing.

If you say [that the reason which is that rabbit horns is not a thing] is not established, it follows that the subject, rabbit horns, is not a thing because
of being non-existent.

If you accept the root [assertion that there exists a valid cognition that realizes rabbit horns as a permanent phenomenon], it follows that with respect to the subject, rabbit horns, there does not exist a valid cognition that realizes [it] as a permanent phenomenon because [it] is not a permanent phenomenon.

If you say [that the reason which is that rabbit horns is not a permanent phenomenon] is not established, it follows that the subject, rabbit horns, is not a permanent phenomenon because of not being a common locus of phenomenon and non-momentary.

If you say [that the reason which is that rabbit horns is not a common locus of phenomenon and non-momentary] is not established, it follows that the subject, rabbit horns, is not a common locus of phenomenon and non-momentary because of not being a phenomenon.

If you say [that the reason which is that rabbit horns is not a phenomenon] is not established, it follows that the subject, rabbit horns, is not a phenomenon because of being non-existent.
If you say [that being non-existent] does not entail [not being a phenomenon], it follows that there is entailment [that being non-existent entails not being a phenomenon] because the two, phenomenon and existent, are equivalent.

3. Someone says: The existence of a valid cognition that realizes as a non-product the valid cognition that realizes \(x\) as a non-product entails the existence of a valid cognition that realizes \(x\) as a non-product.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, sound, there exists a valid cognition that realizes [it] as a non-product because there exists a valid cognition that realizes as a non-product the valid cognition that realizes [it] as a non-product. You have asserted the entailment [that the existence of a valid cognition that realizes as a non-product the valid cognition that realizes it as a non-product entails the existence of a valid cognition that realizes it as a non-product].
cognition that realizes [it] as a non-product because there does not exist a valid cognition that realizes as a product the valid cognition that realizes [it] as a non-product.

If you say [that the reason which is that there does not exist a valid cognition that realizes as a product the valid cognition that realizes sound as a non-product] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, sound, there does not exist a valid cognition that realizes as a product the valid cognition that realizes [it] as a non-product because [it] is a thing.

If you accept the root [assertion that there exists a valid cognition that realizes sound as a non-product], it follows that with respect to the subject, sound, there does not exist a valid cognition that realizes [it] as a non-product because [it] is not a non-product.

If you say [that the reason which is that sound is not a non-product] is not established, it follows that the subject, sound, is not a non-product because of being a product.

If you say [that the reason which is that sound is a product] is not established, it follows that the subject, sound, is a product because of being
form.

If you say [that being form] does not entail [being a product], it follows that there is entailment [that being form entails being a product] because being one of the three—form, consciousness, and non-associated compositional factor—entails being a product.

4. Someone says: The existence of a valid cognition realizing as non-existent a valid cognition realizing \([x]\) as non-existent entails the existence of a valid cognition realizing \([x]\) as non-existent.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, pot, there exists a valid cognition realizing \([\text{it}]\) as non-existent because there exists a valid cognition realizing as non-existent a valid cognition realizing \([\text{it}]\) as non-existent. You have asserted the entailment [that the existence of a valid cognition realizing as non-existent a valid cognition realizing it as non-existent entails the existence of a valid cognition realizing it as non-existent].
If you say [that the reason which is that there exists a valid cognition realizing as non-existent a valid cognition realizing pot as non-existent] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, pot, there exists a valid cognition realizing as non-existent a valid cognition realizing [it] as non-existent because [it] is an established base.

If you accept the root [assertion that there exists a valid cognition realizing pot as non-existent], it follows that with respect to the subject, pot, there does not exist a valid cognition realizing [it] as non-existent because there exists a valid cognition realizing [it] as existent.

If you say [that the reason which is that there exists a valid cognition realizing pot as existent] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, pot, there exists a valid cognition realizing [it] as existent because [it] is existent.

If you say [that the reason which is that pot is existent] is not established, it follows that the subject, pot, is existent because of being either a permanent phenomenon or a thing.

If you say [that the reason which is that pot is either a permanent phenomenon or a thing] is not established, it follows that the subject, pot, is either a permanent phenomenon or a thing because of being a thing.
5. Someone says: The existence of a valid cognition that realizes as non-existent a valid cognition that realizes \( x \) as a permanent phenomenon entails the existence of either a valid cognition that realizes \( x \) as a permanent phenomenon or a valid cognition that realizes \( x \) as non-existent.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, pillar, there exists either a valid cognition that realizes [it] as a permanent phenomenon or a valid cognition that realizes [it] as non-existent because there exists a valid cognition that realizes as non-existent a valid cognition that realizes [it] as a permanent phenomenon. You have asserted the entailment [that the existence of a valid cognition that realizes as non-existent a valid cognition that realizes it as a permanent phenomenon entails the existence of either a valid cognition that realizes it as a permanent phenomenon or a valid cognition that realizes it as non-existent].

If you say [that the reason which is that there exists a valid cognition that realizes as non-existent a valid cognition that realizes pillar as a permanent phenomenon] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, pillar, there exists a valid cognition that realizes as non-existent a valid cognition that realizes [it] as a permanent phenomenon because [it] is not a permanent phenomenon.
If you say [that the reason which is that pillar is not a permanent phenomenon] is not established, it follows that the subject, pillar, is not a permanent phenomenon because of not being a non-thing.

If you say [that the reason which is that pillar is not a non-thing] is not established, it follows that the subject, pillar, is not a non-thing because of being a thing.

If you say [that the reason which is that pillar is a thing] is not established, it follows that the subject, pillar, is a thing because of being that which is able to perform a function.

If you say [that being that which is able to perform a function] does not entail [being a thing], it follows that there is entailment [that being that which is able to perform a function entails being a thing] because that which is able to perform a function is the definition of thing.

If you accept the root [assertion that there exists either a valid cognition that realizes pillar as a permanent phenomenon or a valid cognition that realizes pillar as non-existent], it follows that with respect to the subject, pillar, there does not exist either a valid cognition that realizes [it] as a...
permanent phenomenon or a valid cognition that realizes [it] as non-existent because (1) there does not exist a valid cognition that realizes [it] as a permanent phenomenon and (2) there does not exist a valid cognition that realizes [it] as non-existent.

If you say that the first reason [which is that there does not exist a valid cognition that realizes pillar as a permanent phenomenon] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, pillar, there does not exist a valid cognition that realizes [it] as a permanent phenomenon because [it] is not a permanent phenomenon.

If you say [that the reason which is that pillar is not a permanent phenomenon] is not established, it follows that the subject, pillar, is not a permanent phenomenon because of not being a common locus of phenomenon and non-momentary.

If you say [that the reason which is that pillar is not a common locus of phenomenon and non-momentary] is not established, it follows that the subject, pillar, is not a common locus of phenomenon and non-momentary because of being a common locus of phenomenon and momentary.
If you say [that the reason which is that pillar is a common locus of phenomenon and momentary] is not established, it follows that the subject, pillar, is a common locus of phenomenon and momentary because of (1) being a phenomenon and (2) being momentary.

If you say that the first reason [which is that pillar is a phenomenon] is not established, it follows that the subject, pillar, is a phenomenon because of being that which bears its own entity.

If you say [that being that which bears its own entity] does not entail [being a phenomenon], it follows that there is entailment [that being that which bears its own entity entails being a phenomenon] because that which bears its own entity is the definition of phenomenon.

If you say that the second reason [which is that pillar is momentary] is not established, it follows that the subject, pillar, is momentary because of being impermanent.
If you say [that being impermanent] does not entail [being momentary], it follows that there is entailment [that being impermanent entails being momentary] because \textit{that which is momentary} is the definition of impermanent.

If you say that the [earlier] second reason [which is that there does not exist a valid cognition that realizes pillar as non-existent] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, pillar, there does not exist a valid cognition that realizes [it] as non-existent because [it] is not non-existent.

If you say [that the reason which is that pillar is not non-existent] is not established, it follows that the subject, pillar, is not non-existent because of not being that which is not observed by valid cognition.

If you say [that the reason which is that pillar is not that which is not observed by valid cognition] is not established, it follows that the subject, pillar, is not that which is not observed by valid cognition because of being that which is observed by valid cognition.
If you say [that the reason which is that pillar is that which is observed by valid cognition] is not established, it follows that the subject, pillar, is that which is observed by valid cognition because of being an object of comprehension by an omniscient consciousness.

Our Own System

The two, existent valid cognition that realizes \(x\) as existent and \(x\) being existent, are coextensive because (1) the valid cognition that realizes \(x\) as existent being existent entails that \(x\) is existent and (2) \(x\) being existent entails that the valid cognition that realizes \(x\) as existent is existent.

The two, existent valid cognition that realizes \(x\) as non-existent and \(x\) being non-existent, are coextensive because (1) the valid cognition that realizes \(x\) as non-existent being existent entails that \(x\) is non-existent and (2) \(x\) being non-existent entails that the valid cognition that realizes \(x\) as non-existent is existent.
The two, existent valid cognition that realizes \([x]\) as a permanent phenomenon and \([x\ being]\) a permanent phenomenon, are coextensive because (1) \([x]\ being\ a\ permanent\ phenomenon\ entails \(x\)\ as\ a\ permanent\ phenomenon\ is\ existent\ and\ (2)\ the\ valid\ cognition\ that\ realizes\ \([x]\\)\ as\ a\ permanent\ phenomenon\ being\ existent\ entails\ that\ \([x]\\)\ is\ a\ permanent\ phenomenon.

The two, existent valid cognition that realizes \([x]\) as a thing and \([x\ being]\) a thing, are coextensive because (1) \([x]\ being\ a\ thing\ entails \(x\)\ as\ a\ thing\ is\ existent\ and\ (2)\ the\ valid\ cognition\ that\ realizes\ \([x]\\)\ as\ a\ thing\ being\ existent\ entails\ that\ \([x]\\)\ is\ a\ thing.

The two, existent valid cognition that realizes as non-existent the valid cognition that realizes \([x]\) as non-existent and \([x\ being]\) existent, are coextensive because (1) \([x]\ being\ existent\ entails \(x\)\ as\ non-existent\ the\ valid\ cognition\ that\ realizes\ as\ non-existent\ the\ valid\ cognition\ that\ realizes\ \([x]\\)\ as\ non-existent\ is\ existent\ and\ (2)\ the\ valid\ cognition\ that\ realizes\ as\ non-existent\ the\ valid\ cognition\ that\ realizes\ \([x]\\)\ as\ non-existent\ being\ existent\ entails\ that\ \([x]\\)\ is\ existent.
If you say [that the second reason which is that the valid cognition that realizes as non-existent the valid cognition that realizes \(x\) as non-existent being existent entails that \(x\) is existent] is not established, it follows that the valid cognition that realizes as non-existent the valid cognition that realizes \([x]\) as non-existent being existent entails that \([x]\) is existent because “valid cognition that realizes as non-existent the valid cognition that realizes \([x]\) as non-existent” occurring in pairs—two, four, six, and so forth—entails that \([x]\) is existent.

The two, existent valid cognition that realizes as a thing the valid cognition that realizes \([x]\) as a permanent phenomenon and \([x\) being] a permanent phenomenon, are coextensive because (1) \([x\) being] a permanent phenomenon entails that the valid cognition that realizes as a thing the valid cognition that realizes \([x]\) as a permanent phenomenon is existent and (2) the valid cognition that realizes as a thing the valid cognition that realizes \([x]\) as a permanent phenomenon being existent entails that \([x]\) is a permanent phenomenon.
The two, existent valid cognition that realizes as existent the valid cognition that realizes \([x] as a thing and [x being] a thing, are coextensive because (1) \([x] being a thing entails that the valid cognition that realizes as existent the valid cognition that realizes \([x] as a thing existent and (2) the valid cognition that realizes as existent the valid cognition that realizes \([x] as a thing being existent entails that \([x] is a thing.

It follows that there exists a valid cognition that realizes as a thing the valid cognition that realizes \([it] as existent because a valid cognition that realizes \([it] as existent is a thing.
There is a definition of existent because *that which is observed by valid cognition* is it. Existent, object of knowledge, established base, and phenomenon are equivalent.

There is a definition of object of knowledge because *that which is suitable to be taken as the object of an awareness* is it.

There is a definition of established base because *that which is established by valid cognition* is it.

There is a definition of phenomenon because *that which bears its own entity* is it.

When existent is divided, there are two because there are the two, thing and permanent phenomenon.

There is a definition of thing because *that which is able to perform a function* is it. The three—thing, product, and impermanent—are equivalent. When thing is divided, there are three because there are the three: form, consciousness, and non-associated compositional factor.
There is a definition of matter because *that which is atomically established* is it. The two, matter and form, are equivalent. When the two, matter and form, are divided there are two because there are the two, external form and internal form. When the two, external form and internal form, are divided there are five each because there are [the five] as have been explained earlier [external form: form sense-sphere, sound sense-sphere, odor sense-sphere, taste sense-sphere, and tangible object sense-sphere; internal form: eye sense-power, ear sense-power, nose sense-power, tongue sense-power, and body sense-power].

There is a definition of consciousness because *that which is luminous and cognitive* is it. The three—consciousness, awareness, and knower—are equivalent. There is an illustration because omniscient consciousness is it.
When permanent phenomenon is divided, there are two because there are the two, permanent phenomenon in all forms and occasional permanent. Permanent phenomenon in all forms is positable because the two, object of knowledge and existent, are it. Occasional permanent is positable because the two, pot’s isolate and pillar’s isolate, are it.

Dispelling Objections

6. Someone says: It follows that the subject, pot, is a permanent phenomenon because there exists a valid cognition that realizes as a thing the valid cognition that realizes as a permanent phenomenon. If you say [that the reason which is that there exists a valid cognition that realizes as a thing the valid cognition that realizes pot as a permanent phenomenon] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, pot, there exists a valid cognition that realizes as a thing the valid cognition that realizes [it] as a permanent phenomenon because there exists a valid cognition that realizes as non-existent the valid cognition that realizes as a thing the valid cognition that realizes [it] as a permanent phenomenon.

\[\text{This refers to permanent phenomena that always exist and thus are permanent in all forms or in every way. This is contrasted with occasional permanent phenomenon, such as pot’s isolate or pot’s emptiness, which although they are permanent phenomena, do not exist when pot does not exist and thus are called “occasional permanent phenomena.”}\]
Our response: [This reason] is set aside with respect to the negative entailment [that the existence of a valid cognition that realizes as non-existent the valid cognition that realizes as a thing the valid cognition that realizes \((x)\) as a permanent phenomenon entails the existence of a valid cognition that realizes as a thing the valid cognition that realizes \((x)\) as a permanent phenomenon].

7. Someone says: It follows that the subject, object of knowledge, is a thing because there exists a valid cognition that realizes as existent the valid cognition that realizes as non-existent the valid cognition that realizes [it] as a thing.

Our response: [This reason] is set aside with respect to the negative entailment [that the existence of a valid cognition that realizes as existent the valid cognition that realizes as non-existent the valid cognition that realizes \((x)\) as a thing entails that \((x)\) is a thing].
If you say [that the reason which is that there exists a valid cognition that realizes as existent the valid cognition that realizes as non-existent the valid cognition that realizes object of knowledge as a thing] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, object of knowledge, there exists a valid cognition that realizes as existent the valid cognition that realizes as non-existent the valid cognition that realizes [it] as a thing because [it] is not a thing.
3. Exposition of the Presentation of Opposite from Being [Something] and Opposite from Not Being [Something]

[Refutation of Others’ Systems]

1. Someone says: Being opposite from non-thing entails being opposite from non-consciousness.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, pot, is opposite from non-consciousness because of being opposite from non-thing. You have asserted the entailment [that being opposite from non-thing entails being opposite from non-consciousness].

If you say [that the reason which is that pot is opposite from non-thing] is not established, it follows that the subject, pot, is opposite from non-thing because of being a thing.

If you say [that the reason which is that pot is a thing] is not established, it follows that the subject, pot, is a thing because of being that which is able to perform a function.
If you say \[ \text{that being that which is able to perform a function} \] does not entail \[ \text{being a thing} \], it follows that there is entailment \[ \text{that being that which is able to perform a function entails being a thing} \] because \text{that which is able to perform a function} is the definition of thing.

If you accept the root \[ \text{assertion that pot is opposite from non-consciousness} \], it follows that the subject, pot, is not opposite from non-consciousness because of being opposite from consciousness.

If you say \[ \text{that the reason which is that pot is opposite from consciousness} \] is not established, it follows that the subject, pot, is opposite from consciousness because of not being consciousness.

If you say \[ \text{that being matter} \] does not entail \[ \text{not being consciousness} \], it
follows that there is entailment [that being matter entails not being consciousness] because there is no common locus of the two, consciousness and matter.

2. Someone says: Being opposite from non-form entails being opposite from non-pot.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, sound, is opposite from non-pot because of being opposite from non-form. You have asserted the entailment [that being opposite from non-form entails being opposite from non-pot].

If you say [that the reason which is that sound is opposite from non-form] is not established, it follows that the subject, sound, is opposite from non-form because of being non-form.

If you say [that the reason which is that sound is form] is not established, it follows that the subject, sound, is form because of being sound.
If you accept the root [assertion that sound is opposite from non-pot], it follows that the subject, sound, is not opposite from non-pot because of being opposite from pot.

If you say [that the reason which is that sound is opposite from pot] is not established, it follows that the subject, sound, is opposite from pot because of not being pot.

If you say [that the reason which is that sound is not pot] is not established, it follows that the subject, sound, is not pot because of being sound.

If you say [that being sound] does not entail [not being pot], it follows that there is entailment [that being sound entails not being pot] because there is no common locus of the two, sound and pot.

Furthermore, it [absurdly] follows that the subject, the odor of sandalwood, is opposite from non-pot because of being opposite from non-form. You have asserted the entailment [that being opposite from non-form entails being opposite from non-pot].
If you say [that the reason which is that the odor of sandalwood is opposite from non-form] is not established, it follows that the subject, the odor of sandalwood, is opposite from non-form because of being form.

If you say [that the reason which is that the odor of sandalwood is form] is not established, it follows that the subject, the odor of sandalwood, is form because of being an odor sense-sphere.

If you accept the root [assertion that the odor of sandalwood is opposite from non-pot], it follows that the subject, the odor of sandalwood, is not opposite from non-pot because of being opposite from pot.

If you say [that the reason which is that the odor of sandalwood is not pot] is not established, it follows that the subject, the odor of sandalwood, is not pot because of not being pot.
not pot because of being an odor.

If you say [that being an odor] does not entail [not being pot], it follows that there is entailment [that being an odor entails not being pot] because there is no common locus of the two, odor and pot.

3. Someone says: Being opposite from opposite from thing entails being opposite from thing.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, omniscient consciousness, is opposite from opposite from thing because of being opposite from opposite from thing. You have asserted the entailment [that being opposite from opposite from thing entails being opposite from thing].

If you say [that the reason which is that omniscient consciousness is opposite from opposite from thing] is not established, it follows that the subject, omniscient consciousness, is opposite from opposite from thing because of being a thing.
If you say [that being a thing does not entail [being opposite from opposite from thing]], it follows that there is entailment [that being a thing entails being opposite from opposite from thing] because the two, opposite from thing and thing, are coextensive.

If you accept the root [assertion that omniscient consciousness is opposite from thing], it follows that the subject, omniscient consciousness, is not opposite from thing because of being opposite from non-thing.

If you say [that the reason which is that omniscient consciousness is opposite from non-thing] is not established, it follows that the subject, omniscient consciousness, is opposite from non-thing because of being a thing.

If you say [that the reason which is that omniscient consciousness is a thing] is not established, it follows that the subject, omniscient consciousness, is a thing because of being one of the three—matter, consciousness, and non-associated compositional factor.
If you say [that the reason which is that omniscient consciousness is one of the three—matter, consciousness, and non-associated compositional factor] is not established, it follows that the subject, omniscient consciousness, is one of the three—matter, consciousness, and non-associated compositional factor—because of being consciousness.

If you say [that the reason which is that omniscient consciousness is consciousness] is not established, it follows that the subject, omniscient consciousness, is consciousness because of being valid cognition.

If you say [that the reason which is that omniscient consciousness is valid cognition] is not established, it follows that the subject, omniscient consciousness, is valid cognition because of being omniscient consciousness.

Furthermore, it [absurdly] follows that the subject, sound’s impermanence, is opposite from thing because of being opposite from opposite from thing. You have asserted the entailment [that being opposite from opposite from thing entails being opposite from thing].
If you say [that the reason which is that sound’s impermanence is opposite from opposite from thing] is not established, it follows that the subject, sound’s impermanence, is opposite from opposite from thing because of not being opposite from thing.

If you say [that the reason which is that sound’s impermanence is not opposite from thing] is not established, it follows that the subject, sound’s impermanence, is not opposite from thing because of being a thing.

If you accept the root [assertion that sound’s impermanence is opposite from thing], it follows that the subject, sound’s impermanence, is not opposite from thing because of being opposite from non-thing.
from non-thing] is not established, it follows that the subject, sound’s impermanence, is opposite from non-thing because of being a thing.

If you say [that the reason which is that sound’s impermanence is a thing] is not established, it follows that the subject, sound’s impermanence, is a thing because of being a non-associated compositional factor.

If you say [that the reason which is that sound’s impermanence is a non-associated compositional factor] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, sound, its impermanence is a non-associated compositional factor because it is a thing.


Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, existent, is opposite-from-non-non-existent because of being opposite-from-non-non-thing. You have asserted the entailment [that being opposite-from-non-non-thing entails being opposite-from-non-non-existent].
ིར་པ་དངོས་མེད་ཡིན་པ་ལས་ལོག་པ་ཡིན་པས་
ཁྱབ་པ་ཁས།

If you say [that the reason which is that existent is opposite-from-non-non-thing] is not established, it follows that the subject, existent, is opposite-from-non-non-thing because of being a non-thing.

ཡོད་པ་དངོས་མེད་མ་ཡིན་པ་ལས་ལོག་པ་ཡིན་པ་Ȧགས་མ་ǿབ་ན།

If you say [that the reason which is that existent is a non-thing] is not established, it follows that the subject, existent, is a non-thing because of being empty of being able to perform a function.

ཡོད་པ་དངོས་མེད་ཡིན་པ་Ȧགས་མ་ǿབ་ན།

If you say [that being empty of being able to perform a function] does not entail [being a non-thing], it follows that there is entailment [that being empty of being able to perform a function entails being a non-thing] because that which is empty of being able to perform a function is the definition of non-thing.

ཡོད་པ་དོན་Ɏེད་ȶས་Ȫོང་ཡིན་པ་Ȧགས་མ་ǿབ་ཟེར་ན།

If, at the above juncture of “does not entail,” you say that the reason [which is that existent is empty of being able to perform a function] is not established, it follows that the subject, existent, is empty of being able to perform a function because of not being able to perform a function.

ཡོད་པ་དོན་Ɏེད་ȶས་Ȫོང་ཡིན་པ་Ȧགས་མ་ǿབ་ཟེར་ན།

If you say [that the reason which is that existent is not able to perform a
function] is not established, it follows that the subject, existent, is not able to perform a function because of not being able to produce its own effect.

If you say [that the reason which is that existent is not able to produce its own effect] is not established, it follows that the subject, existent, is not able to produce its own effect because its effect does not exist.

If you say [that the reason which is that existent’s effect does not exist] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, existent, its effect does not exist because it is a permanent phenomenon.

If you accept the root [assertion that existent is opposite-from-non-non-existent], it follows that the subject, existent, is not opposite-from-non-non-existent because of being opposite from non-existent.

If you say [that the reason which is that existent is opposite from non-existent] is not established, it follows that the subject, existent, is opposite from non-existent because of not being non-existent.
If you say [that the reason which is that existent is not non-existent] is not established, it follows that the subject, existent, is not non-existent because of not being that which is not observed by valid cognition.

If you say [that the reason which is that existent is not that which is not observed by valid cognition] is not established, it follows that the subject, existent, is not that which is not observed by valid cognition because of being observed by valid cognition.

If you say [that the reason which is that existent is observed by valid cognition] is not established, it follows that the subject, existent, is observed by valid cognition because of being an object comprehended by valid cognition.

If you say [that the reason which is that existent is an object comprehended by valid cognition] is not established, it follows that the subject, existent, is an object comprehended by valid cognition because of being an object comprehended by an omniscient consciousness.

If you say [that the reason which is that existent is an object comprehended by valid cognition] is not established, it follows that the subject, existent, is an object comprehended by valid cognition because of being an object comprehended by an omniscient consciousness.
by an omniscient consciousness] is not established, it follows that the subject, existent, is an object comprehended by an omniscient consciousness because of being an established base.


Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, permanent phenomenon, is opposite-from-non-non-existent because of being opposite-from-non-non-product. You have asserted the entailment [that being opposite-from-non-non-product entails being opposite-from-non-non-existent].

If you say [that the reason which is that permanent phenomenon is opposite-from-non-non-product] is not established, it follows that the subject, permanent phenomenon, is opposite-from-non-non-product because of being a non-product.

If you say [that the reason which is that permanent phenomenon is a non-product] is not established, it follows that the subject, permanent phenomenon, is a non-product because of not being a product.
If you say [that the reason which is that permanent phenomenon is not a product] is not established, it follows that the subject, permanent phenomenon, is not a product because of not being impermanent.

If you say [that the reason which is that permanent phenomenon is not impermanent] is not established, it follows that the subject, permanent phenomenon, is not impermanent because of not being momentary.

If you say [that not being momentary] does not entail [not being impermanent], it follows that there is entailment [that not being momentary entails not being impermanent] because that which is momentary is the definition of impermanent.

If you accept the root [assertion that permanent phenomenon is opposite-from-non-non-existent], it follows that the subject, permanent phenomenon, is not opposite-from-non-non-existent because of being opposite-from-non-existent.

If you say [that the reason which is that permanent phenomenon is opposite-from-non-existent] is not established, it follows that the subject, permanent phenomenon, is opposite-from-non-existent because of not being non-existent.
If you say [that the reason which is that permanent phenomenon is not non-existent] is not established, it follows that the subject, permanent phenomenon, is not non-existent because of being an established base.


Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, uncompounded space, is opposite-from-non-opposite-from-permanent-phenomenon because of being opposite-from-non-opposite-from-opposite-from-non-opposite-from-permanent-phenomenon. You have asserted the entailment [that being opposite-from-non-opposite-from-opposite-from-non-opposite-from-permanent-phenomenon entails being opposite-from-non-opposite-from-permanent-phenomenon].

If you say [that the reason which is that uncompounded space is opposite-from-non-opposite-from-opposite-from-non-opposite-from-permanent-phenomenon]
If you say [that the reason which is that uncompounded space is opposite-from-opposite-from-non-opposite-from-permanent-phenomenon] is not established, it follows that [uncompounded space] is opposite-from-opposite-from-non-opposite-from-permanent-phenomenon because of being opposite-from-opposite-from-permanent-phenomenon.

If you say [that being opposite-from-opposite-from-permanent-phenomenon] does not entail [being opposite-from-opposite-from-non-opposite-from-permanent-phenomenon], it follows that there is entailment [that being opposite-from-opposite-from-permanent-phenomenon entails being opposite-from-opposite-from-non-opposite-from-permanent-phenomenon] because the two, opposite-from-opposite-from-permanent-phenomenon and opposite-from-opposite-from-non-opposite-from-permanent-phenomenon, are coextensive.
If you accept the root [assertion that uncompounded space is opposite-from-non-opposite-from-permanent-phenomenon], it follows that the subject, uncompounded space, is not opposite-from-non-opposite-from-permanent-phenomenon because of being opposite-from-opposite-from-permanent-phenomenon.

If you say [that the reason which is that uncompounded space is opposite-from-permanent-phenomenon] is not established, it follows that that subject, [uncompounded space,] is opposite-from-opposite-from-permanent-phenomenon because of not being opposite from permanent phenomenon.

If you say [that the reason which is that uncompounded space is not opposite from permanent phenomenon] is not established, it follows that the
subject, uncompounded space, is not opposite from permanent phenomenon because of being a permanent phenomenon.

If you say [that the reason which is that uncompounded space is not a permanent phenomenon] is not established, it follows that the subject, uncompounded space, is a permanent phenomenon because of being a common locus of phenomenon and non-momentary.

If you say [that being a common locus of phenomenon and non-momentary] does not entail [being a permanent phenomenon], it follows that there is entailment [that being a common locus of phenomenon and non-momentary entails being a permanent phenomenon] because a common locus of phenomenon and non-momentary is the definition of permanent phenomenon.

7. Someone says: Being existent entails being a permanent phenomenon.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, omniscient consciousness, is a permanent phenomenon because of being existent. You have asserted the entailment [that being existent entails being a permanent phenomenon].
If you say [that the reason which is that omniscient consciousness is existent] is not established, it follows that the subject, omniscient consciousness, is existent because of being a final exalted knower that directly realizes all phenomena.

8. Someone says: Being opposite from permanent phenomenon entails that opposite from permanent phenomenon is opposite from permanent phenomenon.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, pot, opposite from permanent phenomenon is opposite from permanent phenomenon because [it] is opposite from permanent phenomenon. You have asserted the entailment [that being opposite from permanent phenomenon entails that opposite from permanent phenomenon is opposite from permanent phenomenon].

If you say [that the reason which is that pot is opposite from permanent phenomenon] is not established, it follows that the subject, pot, is opposite from permanent phenomenon because [it] is reversed from permanent phenomenon.
If you say [that the reason which is that pot is reversed from permanent phenomenon] is not established, it follows that the subject, pot, is reversed from permanent phenomenon because of not being a permanent phenomenon.

If you accept the root [assertion that with respect to pot, opposite from permanent phenomenon is opposite from permanent phenomenon], it follows that with respect to the subject, pot, opposite from permanent phenomenon is not opposite from permanent phenomenon because opposite from permanent phenomenon is opposite from non-permanent phenomenon.

If you say [that the reason which is that opposite from permanent phenomenon is opposite from non-permanent phenomenon] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, pot, opposite from permanent phenomenon is opposite from non-permanent phenomenon because opposite from permanent phenomenon is a permanent phenomenon.
If you say [that the reason which is that opposite from permanent phenomenon is a permanent phenomenon] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, pot, opposite from permanent phenomenon is a permanent phenomenon because opposite from permanent phenomenon exists.

If you say [that the reason which is that non-permanent phenomenon exists] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, pot, non-permanent phenomenon exists because non-permanent phenomenon exists.

If you say [that the reason which is that non-permanent phenomenon exists] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, pot, non-permanent phenomenon exists because [it] is without a self of persons.

9. **Someone says:** Being opposite-from-non-opposite-from-non-thing entails that opposite-from-non-thing is opposite-from-non-thing.

   Our response: It [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, sound, opposite-from-non-thing is opposite-from-non-thing because [it] is opposite-from-non-opposite-from-non-thing. You have asserted the entailment
[that being opposite-from-non-opposite-from-non-thing entails that op-posite-from-non-thing is opposite-from-non-thing].

If you say [that the reason which is that sound is opposite-from-non-opposite-from-non-thing] is not established, it follows that the subject, sound, is opposite-from-non-opposite-from-non-thing because of being a thing.

If you accept the root [assertion that opposite-from-non-thing is oppo-site-from-thing], it follows that with respect to the subject, sound, opposite-from-non-thing is not opposite-from-non-thing because opposite-from-non-thing is opposite-from-thing.

If you say [that the reason which is that opposite-from-non-thing is oppo-site-from-thing] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, sound, opposite-from-non-thing is opposite-from-thing because opposite-from-non-thing is not a thing.
If you say [that the reason which is that opposite-from-non-thing is not a
ting is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, sound,
be established] is not a thing because opposite-from-non-thing
is a permanent phenomenon.

If you say [that the reason which is that opposite-from-non-thing is a per-
manent phenomenon] is not established, it follows that with respect to the
subject, thing, opposite-from-non-thing is a permanent phenomenon because
opposite-from-non-it exists.

Our Own System

The two, opposite from not being existent and being existent, are equiva-
ent and coextensive because being opposite from not being existent en-
tails being existent and being existent entails being opposite from not be-
ing existent.
The two, opposite from being existent and not being existent, are coextensive because being opposite from being existent entails not being existent and not being existent entails being opposite from being existent. It is similar for everything that is without a self.

ཡོད་པ་ཡིན་པ་ལས་ལོག་པ་དང་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་གཉིས་ཡིན་
ཁྱབ་མཉམ་ཡིན་ཏེ།
ཡོད་པ་ཡིན་པ་ལས་ལོག་པ་ཡིན་ན་ཡོད་པ་
མ་ཡིན་པས་ཁྱབ་།
ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ན་ཡོད་པ་ཡིན་པ་ལས་ལོག་པ་
ཡིན་པས་ཁྱབ་པའི་ྱིར།
བདག་མེད་ཐམས་ཅད་ལ་རིགས་འȮ།
4. Exposition of the Presentation of Identifying Isolates

[Refutation of Others’ Systems]

1. Someone says: Being thing’s illustration-isolate entails being thing’s isolate.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, sound, is thing’s isolate because of being thing’s illustration-isolate. You have asserted the entailment [that being thing’s illustration-isolate entails being thing’s isolate].

If you say [that the reason which is that sound is thing’s illustration-isolate] is not established, it follows that the subject, sound, is thing’s illustration-isolate because of being an illustration of thing.

If you accept the root [assertion that sound is thing’s isolate], it follows that the subject, sound, is not thing’s isolate because of being different-from-thing.
2. **Someone says:** Being thing’s meaning-isolate entails being thing’s isolate.

*Our response:* It [absurdly] follows that the subject, that which is able to perform a function, is thing’s meaning-isolate because of being thing’s meaning-isolate. You have asserted the entailment [that being thing’s meaning-isolate entails being thing’s isolate].

If you say [that the reason which is that that which is able to perform a function is thing’s meaning-isolate] is not established, it follows that the subject, that which is able to perform a function, is thing’s meaning-isolate because of being the definition of thing.

If you accept the root [assertion that that which is able to perform a function is thing’s isolate], it follows that the subject, that which is able to perform a function, is not thing’s isolate because of not being one-with-thing.
If you say [that the reason which is that that which is able to perform a function is not one-with-thing] is not established, it follows that the subject, that which is able to perform a function, is not one-with-thing because of being different-from-thing.

If you say [that the reason which is that that which is able to perform a function is different-from-thing] is not established, it follows that the subject, that which is able to perform a function, is different-from-thing because of being a definition.

If you say [that being a definition] does not entail [being different-from-thing], it follows that there is entailment [that being a definition entails being different-from-thing] because whatever is one-with-thing necessarily is a definiendum.

If you say [that the reason which is that whatever is one-with-thing necessarily is a definiendum] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, thing, whatever is one-with-it necessarily is a definiendum because it is a definiendum.
3. Someone says: Pot-that-is-one-with-pot is pot’s isolate.

Our response: It follows that the subject, pot-that-is-one-with-pot, is not pot’s isolate because of not being one-with-pot.

If you say [that the reason which is that pot-that-is-one-with-pot is not one-with-pot] is not established, it follows that the subject, pot-that-is-one-with-pot, is not one-with-pot because of not being coextensive with pot.

If you say [that not being coextensive with pot] does not entail [not being one-with-pot], it follows that with respect to the subject, pot, being one-with-it entails being coextensive with it because it is without a self of persons.

If, at the above juncture of “does not entail,” you say that the reason [which is that pot-that-is-one-with-pot is not coextensive with pot] is not established, it follows that the subject, pot-that-is-one-with-pot, is not coextensive with pot because there is neither of the two entailments—that being it
entails being pot and that being pot entails being it.

If you say [that the reason which is that there is neither of the two entailments—that being pot-that-is-one-with-pot entails being pot and that being pot entails being pot-that-is-one-with-pot] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, pot-that-is-one-with-pot, there is neither of the two entailments—that being it entails being pot and that being pot entails being it—because there is not the entailment that being pot entails being it.

If you say [that the reason which is that there is not the entailment that being pot entails being pot-that-is-one-with-pot] is not established, it [absurdly] follows that the subject, golden pot, is pot-that-is-one-with-pot because of being a pot. You have asserted the entailment [that being a pot entails being pot-that-is-one-with-pot].
If you say [that the reason which is that golden pot is a pot] is not established, it follows that the subject, golden pot, is a pot because of being that which is bulbous, flat-bottomed, and able to perform the function of holding water.

If you say [that being that which is bulbous, flat-bottomed, and able to perform the function of holding water] does not entail [being a pot], it follows that there is entailment [that being that which is bulbous, flat-bottomed, and able to perform the function of holding water entails being a pot] because that which is bulbous, flat-bottomed, and able to perform the function of holding water is the definition of pot.

If you accept the above [assertion that golden pot is pot-that-is-one-with-pot], it follows that the subject, golden pot, is not pot-that-is-one-with-pot because of not being one-with-pot.

If you say [that the reason which is that golden pot is not one-with-pot] is not established, it follows that the subject, golden pot, is not one-with-pot because of being different-from-pot.
If you say [that the reason which is that golden pot is different-from-pot] is not established, it follows that the subject, golden pot, is different-from-pot because of being a golden pot.

5. Also someone says: One-with-pot is pot’s isolate.

Our response: It follows that the subject, one-with-pot, is not pot’s isolate because of not being one-with-pot.
If you say [that the reason which is that one-with-pot is a permanent phenomenon] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, pot, one-with-it is a permanent phenomenon because it is an established base.

6. Someone says: Pot’s isolate is pot’s isolate.

Our response: It follows that the subject, pot’s isolate, is not pot’s isolate because of not being a pot.

If you say [that the reason which is that pot’s isolate is not a pot] is not established, it follows that the subject, pot’s isolate, is not a pot because of not being a thing.

If you say [that the reason which is that pot’s isolate is a permanent phenomenon] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, pot, its isolate is a permanent phenomenon because its isolate exists.
If you say [that the reason which is that pot’s isolate exists] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, pot, its isolate exists because it is an established base.

If you say [that the reason which is that the two, golden pot and copper pot, is reversed from non-pot] is not established, it follows that the subject, the two, golden pot and copper pot, is reversed from non-pot because of being opposite from non-pot.

7. Someone says: Reversed from non-pot entails being pot’s isolate.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, the two, golden pot and copper pot, is pot’s isolate because it is reversed from non-pot. You have asserted the entailment [that reversed from non-pot entails being pot’s isolate].

If you say [that the reason which is that the two, golden pot and copper pot, is reversed from non-pot] is not established, it follows that the subject, the two, golden pot and copper pot, is reversed from non-pot because of being opposite from non-pot.

a Read ldog for log, 16b.1.
pot, is opposite from non-pot] is not established, it follows that the subject, the two, golden pot and copper pot, is opposite from non-pot because of being a pot.

If you accept the root [assertion that the two, golden pot and copper pot, is pot’s isolate], it follows that the subject, the two, golden pot and copper pot, is not pot’s isolate because [it] is not reversed from different-from-pot.

If you say [that not reversed from different-from-pot] does not entail [not being pot’s isolate], it follows that with respect to the subject, pot, not reversed from different-from-it entails not being its isolate because it is reversed from different-from-it.

If you say [that the reason which is that pot is reversed from different-from-pot] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, pot, it is reversed from different-from-it because it is without a self.

If, at the above juncture of “does not entail,” you say that the reason [which
is that the two, golden pot and copper pot, is not reversed from different-from-pot] is not established, it follows that the subject, the two, golden pot and copper pot, is not reversed from different-from-pot because of being different-from-pot.

8. Someone says: Reversed from different-from-pot entails being pot’s isolate.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, rabbit horns, is pot’s isolate because of being reversed from different-from-pot. You have asserted the entailment [that being reversed from different-from-pot entails being pot’s isolate].

If you say [that the reason which is that rabbit horns is reversed from different-from-pot] is not established, it follows that the subject, rabbit horns, is reversed from different-from-pot because of not being different-from-pot.

If you say [that the reason which is that rabbit horns is not different-from-
pot] is not established, it follows that the subject, rabbit horns, is not different-from-pot because of being non-different-from-pot.

If you say [that the reason which is that rabbit horns is non-different-from-pot] is not established, it follows that the subject, rabbit horns, is non-different-from-pot because of being definite as non-existent.

If you accept the root [assertion that rabbit horns is pot’s isolate], it follows that the subject, rabbit horns, is not pot’s isolate because [it] is not reversed from non-one-with-pot.

If you say [that not reversed from non-one-with-pot] does not entail [not being pot’s isolate], it follows that with respect to the subject, pot, being its isolate entails being reversed from non-one-with-it because it is reversed from non-one-with-it.

If you say [that the reason which is that pot is reversed from non-one-with-pot] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, pot, it is reversed from non-one-with-it because it is opposite from non-one-with-pot.
Identifying Isolates

If you say [that the reason which is that pot is opposite from non-one-with-pot] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, pot, it is opposite from non-one-with-it because it is one-with-it.

9. Someone says: Rabbit horns is reversed from non-one-with-pot.a

Our response: It follows that the subject, rabbit horns, is not reversed from non-one-with-pot because of not being opposite-from-non-one-with-pot.

If you say [that the reason which is that rabbit horns is not opposite-from-non-one-with-pot] is not established, it follows that the subject, rabbit horns, is not opposite-from-non-one-with-pot because of not being one-with-pot.

a This position is the equivalent of saying “the reason is not established” to this statement in the previous debate: If you accept the root [assertion that rabbit horns is pot’s isolate], it follows that the subject, rabbit horns, is not pot’s isolate because [it] is not reversed from non-one-with-pot.
If you say [that the reason which is that rabbit horns is not one-with-pot] is not established, it follows that the subject, rabbit horns, is not one-with-pot because of being a non-existent.

Our Own System

Pot’s isolate is positable because pot is it. The two, pot’s isolate and one-with-pot, are coextensive because being an established base entails that it is its isolate, and being an established base entails that it is one-with-it.

If you say [that the second reason which is that being an established base entails that it is one-with-it] is not established, it follows that being an established base entails that it is one-with-it because being an established base entails that it is not different-from-it.
5. Exposition of the Presentation of One and Different

[Refutation of Others’ Systems]

1. Someone says: Being one entity entails being one.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, the two, thing and impermanent, is one because of being one entity. You have asserted the entailment [that being one entity entails being one].

If you say [that the reason which is that the two, thing and impermanent, is one entity] is not established, it follows that the subject, the two, thing and impermanent, is one entity because of being one essence.

If you say [that being one essence] does not entail [being one entity], it follows that there is entailment [that being one essence entails being one entity] because one entity, one essence, and one nature are equivalent and coextensive.
If you accept the root [assertion that the two, thing and impermanent, is one], it follows that the subject, the two, thing and impermanent, is not one because of being manifold.

If you say [that the reason which is that the two, thing and impermanent, is manifold] is not established, it follows that the subject, the two, thing and impermanent, is manifold because of being mutually different.

If you say [that the reason which is that the two, thing and impermanent, is mutually different] is not established, it follows that the subject, the two, thing and impermanent, is mutually different because (1) thing is different-from-impermanent and (2) impermanent is different-from-thing.

Each reason [that thing is different-from-impermanent and that impermanent is different-from-thing] is established because [thing and impermanent] are without a self.
2. **Someone says:** Being one entity entails being one substantial entity.

**Our response:** It [absurdly] follows that the subjects, the two, object of knowledge and permanent phenomenon, are one substantial entity because of being one entity. You have asserted the entailment [that being one entity entails being one substantial entity].

If you say [that the reason which is that the two, object of knowledge and permanent phenomenon, are one entity] is not established, it follows that the subjects, the two, object of knowledge and permanent phenomenon, are one entity because of being one essence.

If you say [that the reason which is that the two, object of knowledge and permanent phenomenon, are one essence] is not established, it follows that the two, object of knowledge and permanent phenomenon, are one essence because (1) object of knowledge is one-essence-with-permanent-phenomenon and (2) permanent phenomenon is one-essence-with-object-of-knowledge.
If you say that the first reason [which is that object of knowledge is one-essence-with-permanent-phenomenon] is not established, it follows that the subject, object of knowledge, is one-essence-with-permanent-phenomenon because of being a permanent phenomenon.

If you say that the second reason [which is that permanent phenomenon is one-essence-with-object-of-knowledge] is not established, it follows that the subject, permanent phenomenon, is one-essence-with-object-of-knowledge because of being an object of knowledge.

If you accept the root [assertion that the two, object of knowledge and permanent phenomenon, are one substantial entity], it follows that the subjects, the two, object of knowledge and permanent phenomenon, are not one substantial entity because of not being substantial entities.

If you say [that the reason which is that the two, object of knowledge and permanent phenomenon, are not substantial entities] is not established, it follows that the subjects, the two, object of knowledge and permanent phenomenon, are not substantial entities because of not being things.
If you say [that not being a thing] does not entail [not being a substantial entity], it follows that there is entailment [that not being a thing entails not being a substantial entity] because the two, thing and substantial entity, are equivalent.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subjects, the two, pillar and pot, are one substantial entity because of being one-substantial-entity-with-thing. You have asserted the entailment [that being one-substantial-entity-with-thing entails being one substantial entity].

If you accept the root [assertion that the two, pillar and pot, are one substantial entity], it follows that the subjects, the two, pillar and pot, are not
one substantial entity because of being different substantial entities.

If you say [that the reason which is that the two, pillar and pot, are different substantial entities] is not established, it follows that the subjects, the two, pillar and pot, are different substantial entities because of being (1) things and (2) mutually unrelated factually other substantial entities.


Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subjects, the two, pillar and pot, are one essence because of being one-essence-with-object-of-knowledge. You have asserted the entailment [that being one-essence-with-object-of-knowledge entails being one essence].

If you say [that the reason which is that the two, pillar and pot, are one-essence-with-object-of-knowledge] is not established, it follows that the subjects, the two, pillar and pot, are one-essence-with-object-of-knowledge because of being objects of knowledge.
If you accept the root [assertion that the two, pillar and pot, are one essence], it follows that the subjects, the two, pillar and pot, are not one essence because of being unrelated factually other [things].

5. Someone says: Being one type entails being one essence.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subjects, the two, whitish ox and blackish ox, are one essence because of being one type. You have asserted the entailment [that being one type entails being one essence].

If you say [that the reason which is that the two, whitish ox and blackish ox, are one type] is not established, it follows that the subjects, the two, whitish ox and blackish ox, are one type because of being one isolate type.

If you say [that the reason which is that the two, whitish ox and blackish ox, are one isolate type] is not established, it follows that the subjects, the
two, whitish ox and blackish ox, are one isolate type because of being phe-
nomena able to generate naturally an awareness that thinks “this and that
are similar” through just being seen by whatever persons who are directing
their minds [to the phenomena].

If you accept the root [assertion that the two, whitish ox and blackish ox,
are one essence], it follows that the subjects, the two, whitish ox and black-
ish ox, are not one essence because of being different essences.

If you say [that the reason which is that the two, whitish ox and blackish
ox, are different essences] is not established, it follows that the subjects,
the two, whitish ox and blackish ox, are different essences because of be-
ing mutually unrelated factually other [things].

6. Someone says: Being the same type as object of knowledge entails be-
ing the same type.
Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subjects, the two, horse and ox, are the same type because of being the same type as object of knowledge. You have asserted the entailment [that being the same type as object of knowledge entails being the same type].

If you say [that the reason which is that the two, horse and ox, are the same type as object of knowledge] is not established, it follows that the subjects, the two, horse and ox, are the same type as object of knowledge because of being different entities.

If you accept the root [assertion that the two, horse and ox, are the same type], it follows that the subjects, the two, horse and ox, are not the same type because of being different types.

If you say [that the reason which is that the two, horse and ox, are different types] is not established, it follows that the subjects, the two, horse and ox, are different types because of being discordant types.
If you say [that the reason which is that the two, horse and ox, are discordant types] is not established, it follows that the subjects, the two, horse and ox, are discordant types because of being dissimilar types.

If you say [that the reason which is that the two, horse and ox, are dissimilar types] is not established, it follows that the two, horse and ox, are dissimilar types because there are dissimilar types to be posited.

7. Someone says: Being the same type entails being positive phenomena that are the same isolate type.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subjects, the two, pot’s space and house’s space, are positive phenomena that are one isolate type because of being the same type. You have asserted the entailment [that being the same type entails being positive phenomena that are the same isolate type].
If you say that the reason which is that the two, pot’s space and house’s space, are the same type in terms of their object of negation is not established, it follows that the subjects, the two, pot’s space and house’s space, are the same type in terms of [their] object of negation because of being different and non-affirming negatives that are mere negations of the same type of object of negation.

The first reason which is that pot’s space and house’s space are different is easy.

If you say that the second reason which is that pot’s space and house’s space are non-affirming negatives that are mere negations of the same type of object of negation is not established, it follows that the subjects, the two, pot’s space and house’s space, are non-affirming negatives that are mere negations of the same type of object of negation because of being non-affirming negatives that are mere negations of a single object of negation—obstructive contact.
If you say that the reason [which is that pot’s space and house’s space are non-affirming negatives that are mere negations of a single object of negation—obstructive contact] is not established, it follows that the subjects, the two, pot’s space and house’s space, are non-affirming negatives that are mere negations of a single object of negation—obstructive contact—because of being non-affirming negatives that are mere negations of obstructive contact.

If you say that the reason [which is that pot’s space and house’s space are non-affirming negatives that are mere negations of obstructive contact] is not established, it follows that the subjects, the two, pot’s space and house’s space, are non-affirming negatives that are mere negations of obstructive contact because of being uncompounded space.
If you say [that being uncompounded space] does not entail [being a non-affirming negative that is the mere negation of obstructive contact], it follows that there is entailment [that being uncompounded space entails being a non-affirming negative that is the mere negation of obstructive contact] because non-affirming negative that is a mere negation of obstructive contact is the definition of uncompounded space.

If you accept the root [assertion that the two, pot’s space and house’s space, are positive phenomena that are one isolate type], it follows that the subjects, the two, pot’s space and house’s space, are not positive phenomena that are one isolate type because of not being positive phenomena.

If you say [that the reason which is that the two, pot’s space and house’s space, are not positive phenomena] is not established, it follows that the subjects, the two, pot’s space and house’s space, are not positive phenomena because of being negative phenomena.

If you say [that the reason which is that the two, pot’s space and house’s space, are negative phenomena] is not established, it follows that the sub-
jects, the two, pot’s space and house’s space, are negative phenomena be-
cause of being uncompounded space.

8. Someone says: Being the same in terms of establishment and abiding
entails being the same substantial entity in terms of establishment and
abiding.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subjects, the two, the color of
molasses and the odor of molasses, are the same substantial entity in terms
of establishment and abiding because of being the same in terms of estab-
ishment and abiding. You have asserted the entailment [that being the
same substantial entity in terms of establishment and abiding entails being
the same in terms of establishment and abiding].

If you say [that the reason which is that the two, the color of molasses and
the odor of molasses, are the same in terms of establishment and abiding]
is not established, it follows that the subjects, the two, the color of molasses
and the odor of molasses, are the same in terms of establishment and abiding because of being established simultaneously, abiding simultaneously, and disintegrating simultaneously.
If you say [that the reason which is that the two, the color of molasses and the odor of molasses, are established simultaneously, abide simultaneously, and disintegrate simultaneously] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, molasses, the two, its color and its odor, are established simultaneously, abide simultaneously, and disintegrate simultaneously because it is a mass that is the collocation of the eight atomic constituents.

If you accept the root [assertion that the two, the color of molasses and the odor of molasses, are the same substantial entity in terms of establishment and abiding], it follows that the subjects, the two, the color of molasses and the odor of molasses, are not the same substantial entity in terms of establishment and abiding because of not being the same substantial entity.

If you say [that the reason which is that the two, the color of molasses and the odor of molasses, are not the same substantial entity] is not established, it follows that the subjects, the two, the color of molasses and the odor of molasses, are not the same substantial entity because of being different substantial entities.
If you say [that the reason which is that the two, the color of molasses and the odor of molasses, are different substantial entities] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, molasses, its color and its odor are different substantial entities because it is a mass that is the collocation of the eight atomic constituents.

9. Someone says: Being the same substantial type entails being the same substantial entity.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subjects, the two, a large and a small grain of barley that are produced from the same substantial cause, a barley stalk, are the same substantial entity because of being the same substantial type. You have asserted the entailment [that being the same substantial type entails being the same substantial entity].

If you say [that the reason which is that the two, a large and a small grain of barley that are produced from the same barley stalk, are the same substantial type] is not established, it follows that the subjects, the two, a large and a small grain of barley that are produced from the same substantial cause, a barley stalk, are the same substantial type because of being (1) different and (2) produced from their same substantial cause.
If you say [that being (1) different and (2) produced from their same substantial cause] does not entail [being the same substantial type], it follows that there is entailment [that being (1) different and (2) produced from their same substantial cause entails being the same substantial type] because of not being the same or non-same substantial type must be taken in terms of [having] the same or non-same substantial cause.

If you accept the root [assertion that the two, a large and a small grain of barley that are produced from the same substantial cause, a barley stalk, are the same substantial entity], it follows that the subjects, the two, a large and a small grain of barley that are produced from the same substantial cause, a barley stalk, are not the same substantial entity because of not being the same essence.
a small grain of barley that are produced from the same substantial cause, a barley stalk, are not the same essence because of being different entities.

If you say [that the reason which is that the two, a large and a small grain of barley that are produced from the same barley stalk, are different entities] is not established, it follows that the subjects, the two, a large and a small grain of barley that are produced from the same substantial cause, a barley stalk, are different entities because of being mutually unrelated factually other [things].

Our Own System

There is a definition of same because phenomena that are not distinct is it. When same is divided, there are three because there are the three: same self-isolate, same entity, and same type.

There is a definition of same self-isolate because phenomena that are not
distinct self-isolates is it. There is an illustration because the two, product and product, are it. There is a definition of same self-isolate as existent because phenomenon that is not a self-isolate distinct from existent is it. There is an illustration because existent is it. It is similar for all phenomena.

There is a definition of same entity because phenomena that are not distinct entities is it. Same entity, same nature, and same essence are equivalent. There is a definition of same entity with object of knowledge because phenomenon that is not an entity distinct from object of knowledge is it. There is an illustration because existent is it.

There is a definition of same substantial entity because phenomena that are produced as not distinct by way of substantial entity is it. There is an illustration because the two, product and impermanent, are it.
There is a definition of same type because phenomena that are not distinct types is it. When same type is divided, there are two because there are the two, same isolate type and same substantial type.

When same isolate type is divided, there are two because there are the two, positive phenomena that are the same isolate type and negative phenomena that are the same isolate type.

There is a definition of positive phenomena that are the same isolate type because phenomena able to generate naturally an awareness that thinks “this and that are similar” through just being seen by whatever persons directing their minds [to the phenomena] is it. There is an illustration because the two, golden pot and copper pot, are it. When positive phenomena that are the same isolate type are divided there are three because there are the three: consciousnesses that are the same isolate type, forms that are the same isolate type, and non-associated compositional factors that are the same isolate type.

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\(^a\) Read ngang for dang, 20a.5.
Consciousnesses that are the same isolate type are positable because the
two, Devadatta’s eye consciousness and Yajñadatta’s eye consciousness,
are it. Forms that are the same isolate type are positable because the two,
sandalwood pillar and juniper pillar, are it. Non-associated compositional
factors that are the same isolate type are positable because the two, sound’s
production and pot’s production, are it.

There is a definition of negative phenomena that are the same isolate type
because different non-affirming negatives that are mere negations of
the same type of object of negation is it. There is an illustration because
the two, pot lacking a self of persons and pillar lacking a self of persons,
are it.
There is a definition of same substantial type because different composed products that are produced from their same direct substantial cause is it. When same substantial type is divided, there are three because there are the three: forms that are the same substantial type, consciousnesses that are the same substantial type, and non-associated compositional factors that are the same substantial type.

Forms that are the same substantial type are positable because the two, white clay pot and blue clay pot that are produced from the clay that is their same substantial cause, are it.

Consciousnesses that are the same substantial type are positable because two different consciousnesses that are produced from their same direct substantial cause are it.

Non-associated compositional factors that are the same substantial type
are positable because the two, sound’s production and sound’s imperma-
nence that are produced from their same substantial cause, are it.

There is a definition of different because phenomena that are distinct is it. When different is divided, there are three because there are the three: different self-isolates, different entities, and different types.

There is a definition of different self-isolates because phenomena that are distinct self-isolates is it. There is an illustration because the two, pillar and port, are it. There is a definition of different self-isolate than object of knowledge because phenomenon that is a distinct self-isolate from object of knowledge is it. There is an illustration because pillar is it. It is similar for all phenomena.

There is a definition of different entities because phenomena that are distinct entities is it. The three—different entities, different essences, and different natures—are equivalent. There is an illustration because the two, permanent and impermanent, are it.
There is a definition of different types because phenomena that are distinct types is it. Different types, phenomena that are discordant types, phenomena that are dissimilar types, and phenomena that are non-same types are equivalent.

When [phenomena that are] dissimilar types is divided, there are two because there are the two, [phenomena that are] dissimilar isolate types and [phenomena that are] dissimilar substantial types. [Phenomena that are] dissimilar isolate types are positable because the two, horse and ox, are it. [Phenomena that are] dissimilar substantial types are positable because the two, consciousness and matter, are it.

Dispelling Objections
10. Someone says: It follows that the subjects, the two, golden pot and copper pot, are the same type because of being the same isolate type. If
you accept [that the two, golden pot and copper pot, are the same type], it follows that the subjects, the two, golden pot and copper pot, are not the same type because of being different types. If you say [that the reason which is that the two, golden pot and copper pot, are different types] is not established, it follows that the subjects, the two, golden pot and copper pot, are different types because of being different substantial types.

Our response: [Being different substantial types] does not entail [being different types].

If you say [that the reason which is that the two, golden pot and copper pot, are different substantial types] is not established, it follows that the subjects, the two, golden pot and copper pot, are different substantial types because of being different composed products that are produced from their respective distinct direct substantial causes.
pot, are different composed products that are produced from their respective distinct direct substantial causes] is not established, it follows that the subjects, the two, golden pot and copper pot, are different composed products that are produced from their respective distinct direct substantial causes because of being (1) produced from their respective distinct direct substantial causes and (2) different composed products.

If you say that the first reason [which is that the two, golden pot and copper pot, are produced from their respective distinct direct substantial causes] is not established, it follows that the subjects, the two, golden pot and copper pot, are produced from their respective distinct direct substantial causes because (1) golden pot is produced from gold but is not produced from copper and (2) copper pot is produced from copper but is not produced from gold.

11. Someone says: It follows that the subjects, the two, object of knowledge and permanent phenomenon, are the same substantial entity because of being phenomena that are not distinct substantial entities.
Our response: [Being phenomena that are not distinct substantial entities] does not entail [being the same substantial entity].

If you say [that the reason which is that the two, object of knowledge and permanent phenomenon, are phenomena that are not distinct substantial entities] is not established, it follows that the subjects, the two, object of knowledge and permanent phenomenon, are phenomena that are not distinct substantial entities because of (1) not being distinct substantial entities and (2) being phenomena.

If you say that the first reason [which is that the two, object of knowledge and permanent phenomenon, are not distinct substantial entities] is not established, it follows that the subjects, the two, object of knowledge and permanent phenomenon, are not distinct substantial entities because of not being different substantial entities.

If you say [that the reason which is that the two, object of knowledge and permanent phenomenon, are not different substantial entities] is not established, it follows that the subjects, the two, object of knowledge and permanent phenomenon, are not different substantial entities because of not being substantial entities.
If you say [that the reason which is that the two, object of knowledge and permanent phenomenon, are not substantial entities] is not established, it follows that the subjects, the two, object of knowledge and permanent phenomenon, are not substantial entities because of being permanent phenomena.

12. Someone says: It follows that the subjects, the two, existent and non-existent, are different self-isolates because of being phenomena that are distinct self-isolates. If you say [that the reason which is that the two, existent and non-existent, are phenomena that are distinct self-isolates] is not established, it follows that the subjects, the two, existent and non-existent, are phenomena that are distinct self-isolates because of being distinct self-isolates. If you say [that the reason which is that the two, existent and non-existent, are distinct self-isolates] is not established, it follows that the subjects, the two, existent and non-existent, are distinct self-isolates because of not being the same self-isolate.
Our response: [Not being the same self-isolate] does not entail [being distinct self-isolates].

If you say [that the reason which is that the two, existent and non-existent, are not the same self-isolate] is not established, it follows that the subjects, the two, existent and non-existent, are not the same self-isolate because their self-isolate does not exist.

If you say [that the reason which is that the self-isolate of the two, existent and non-existent, does not exist] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, the two, existent and non-existent, its self-isolate does not exist because it [that is, a single phenomenon that is the two, existent and non-existent] does not exist.

13. Someone says: It follows that the subjects, the two, solely thing and thing, are different substantial entities because of not being the same substantial entity.

Our response: [Not being the same substantial entity] does not entail [being different substantial entities].

If you say [that the reason which is that the two, solely thing and thing, are not the same substantial entity] is not established, it follows that the subjects, the two, solely thing and thing, are not the same substantial entity.
because of not being substantial entities.

[དངོས་པོ་ཁོ་ན་དང་དངོས་པོ་ɲས་གཅིག་མ་ཡིན་པ་Ȧགས་མ་ǿབ་ན།
དངོས་པོ་ཁོ་ན་དང་དངོས་པོ་ཆོས་ཅན།ɲས་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ།
དངོས་པོ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ɉིར།]

If you say [that the reason which is that the two, solely thing and thing, are not substantial entities] is not established, it follows that the subjects, the two, solely thing and thing, are not substantial entities because of not being things.

[དངོས་པོ་ཁོ་ན་དང་དངོས་པོ་ɲས་གཅིག་མ་ཡིན་པ་Ȧགས་མ་ǿབ་ན།
དངོས་པོ་ཁོ་ན་དང་དངོས་པོ་ཆོས་ཅན།ɲས་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ།
དངོས་པོ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ɉིར།]
6. Lesser Exposition of the Presentation of Cause and Effect

[Refutation of Others’ Systems]

I. Someone says: Being an established base entails being either a cause or an effect.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, object of knowledge, is either a cause or an effect because of being an established base. You have asserted the entailment [that being an established base entails being either a cause or an effect].

If you accept [that object of knowledge is either a cause or an effect], it follows that the subject, object of knowledge, is neither a cause nor an effect because of (1) not being a cause and (2) not being an effect.

If you say that the first reason [which is that object of knowledge is not a cause] is not established, it follows that the subject, object of knowledge, is not a cause because its effect does not exist.
བོད་ལེགས་པའི་དོན།

If you say [that the reason which is that object of knowledge’s effect does not exist] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, object of knowledge, its effect does not exist because it is a permanent phenomenon.

If you say that the second reason [which is that object of knowledge is not an effect] is not established, it follows that the subject, object of knowledge, is not an effect because its cause does not exist.

If you say [that the reason which is that object of knowledge’s cause does not exist] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, object of knowledge, its cause does not exist because its producer does not exist.

If you say [that the reason which is that object of knowledge’s producer does not exist] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, object of knowledge, its producer does not exist because it is unproduced.

If you say [that the reason which is that object of knowledge is unproduced] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, object of knowledge, it is unproduced because it is a permanent phenomenon.
2. Someone says: Being a cause entails not being an effect.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, form, is not an effect because of being a cause. You have asserted the entailment [that being a cause entails not being an effect].

If you say [that the reason which is that form is a cause] is not established, it follows that the subject, form, is a cause because of being the cause of the subsequent arising of form.

If you say [that the reason which is that form is the cause of the subsequent arising of form] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, form, it is the cause of its subsequent arising because it is a thing.

If you accept the root [assertion that form is not an effect], it follows that the subject, form, is an effect because its cause exists.

If you say [that the reason which is that form’s cause exists] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, form, its cause exists because it is produced.
If you say [that the reason which is that form is produced] is not estab-
lished, it follows that with respect to the subject, form, it is produced be-
cause it is a thing.

3. Someone says: Being a cause entails being a substantial cause.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, the last moment [of a
bolt of] lightning, is a substantial cause because of being a cause. You have
asserted the entailment [that being a cause entails being a substantial
cause].

If you say [that the reason which is that the last moment of a bolt of light-
ning is a cause] is not established, it follows that the subject, the last mo-
ment [of a bolt of] lightning, is a cause because its effect exists.

If you say [that the reason which is that the effect of the last moment of a
bolt of lightning exists] is not established, it follows that with respect to
the subject, the last moment [of a bolt of] lightning, its effect exists be-
cause it is a thing.

If you say [that the reason which is that the last moment of a bolt of light-
ning is a thing] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject,
[a bolt of] lightning, its last moment is a thing because it is form.
If you accept the root [assertion that the last moment of a bolt of lightning is a substantial cause], it follows that the subject, the last moment [of a bolt of] lightning, is not a substantial cause because of not being the main producer of its own later substantial continuum.

If you say [that the reason which is that the last moment of a bolt of lightning is not the main producer of its own later substantial continuum] is not established, it follows that the subject, the last moment [of a bolt of] lightning, is not the main producer of its own later substantial continuum because its own later substantial continuum does not exist.

If you say [that the reason which is that the last moment of a bolt of lightning’s own later substantial continuum does not exist] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, the last moment [of a bolt of] lightning, its own later substantial continuum does not exist because it is something whose substantial continuum is about to be severed.

If you say [that the reason which is that the last moment of a bolt of lightning is something whose substantial continuum is about to be severed] is
not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, [a bolt of] lightning, it is [something] whose last moment is a substantial continuum that is about to be severed because it is a thing whose continuum is definite to be severed in just one moment.

4. Someone says: Being pot’s cause entails being pot’s substantial cause.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, a person who is pot’s cause, is pot’s substantial cause because of being pot’s cause. You have asserted the entailment [that being pot’s cause entails being pot’s substantial cause].

If you say [that the reason which is that a person who is pot’s cause exists] is not established, it follows that a person who is pot’s cause exists because a person who is pot’s cause exists.

If you say [that the reason which is that a person who is pot’s cause exists] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, pot, a person who is its cause exists because it is a phenomenon arisen from the effort of a person.
If you accept the root [assertion that a person who is pot’s cause is pot’s substantial cause], it follows that the subject, a person who is pot’s cause, is not pot’s substantial cause because of not being the main producer of pot as a substantial entity that is her own substantial continuum.

If you say [that the reason which is that a person who is pot’s cause is not the main producer of pot as a substantial entity that is her own substantial continuum] is not established, it follows that the subject, a person who is pot’s cause, is not the main producer of pot as a substantial entity that is her own substantial continuum because pot is not her later substantial continuum.

If you say [that the reason which is that pot is not the later substantial continuum of a person who is pot’s cause] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, a person who is pot’s cause, pot is not her later substantial continuum because pot is not her later continuum.
If you say [that the reason which is that pot is not the later continuum of a person who is pot’s cause] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, a person who is pot’s cause, pot is not her later continuum because (1) she is a person and (2) pot is matter.

5. Someone says: It follows that pot-that-is-a-cause-of-thing exists because pot-that-is-a-prior-arising-of-thing exists.

Our response: [The existence of pot-that-is-a-prior-arising-of-thing] does not entail [the existence of pot-that-is-a-cause-of-thing].

If you accept [that pot-that-is-a-cause-of-thing exists], it [absurdly] follows that pot-that-is-a-cause-of-thing is a cause of thing because pot-that-is-a-cause-of-thing exists. You have asserted the reason [which is that pot-that-is-a-cause-of-thing exists].
If you accept [that pot-that-is-a-cause-of-thing is a cause of thing], it follows that with respect to the subject, pot-that-is-a-cause-of-thing, thing is its effect because it is a cause of thing. You have asserted the reason [which is that pot-that-is-a-cause-of-thing is a cause of thing].

If you accept [that thing is an effect of pot-that-is-a-cause-of-thing], it follows that with respect to the subject, pot-that-is-a-cause-of-thing, thing is causally related to it because thing is its effect. You have asserted the reason [which is that thing is an effect of pot-that-is-a-cause-of-thing].

If you accept [that thing is causally related to pot-that-is-a-cause-of-thing], it follows that with respect to the subject, pot-that-is-a-cause-of-thing, if it does not exist, thing must not exist because thing is causally related to it. You have asserted the reason [which is that thing is causally related to pot-that-is-a-cause-of-thing].
If you accept [that if pot-that-is-a-cause-of-thing does not exist, thing must not exist], it follows that with respect to the subject, a locus of pot’s negation, a thing does not exist because pot-that-is-a-cause-of-thing does not exist. You have asserted the entailment [that pot-that-is-a-cause-of-thing not existing entails thing not existing].

If you say [that the reason which is that with respect to a locus of pot’s negation in terms of the subject, a locus of pot’s negation, pot-that-is-a-cause-of-thing—in terms of the subject, a locus of pot’s negation—does not exist] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, a locus of pot’s negation, pot-that-is-a-cause-of-thing does not exist because pot does not exist.

If you say [that the reason which is that with respect to a locus of pot’s negation in terms of the subject, a locus of pot’s negation, pot—in terms of the subject, a locus of pot’s negation—does not exist] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, a locus of pot’s negation, pot does not exist because of being a locus of pot’s negation.

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a That is, a place where there is no pot.
If you accept the above [assertion that with respect to a locus of pot’s negation in terms of the subject, a locus of pot’s negation, thing—in terms of the subject, a locus of pot’s negation—does not exist], it follows that with respect to the subject, a locus of pot’s negation, thing exists because of being without a self of persons.

If you say [that the reason which is that smoke is not sandalwood fire’s effect] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, sandalwood fire, smoke is not its effect because smoke is not causally related to it.

If you say [that the reason which is that smoke is not sandalywood fire] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, sandalwood fire, smoke is not causally related to it because if it does not exist, it is not [the case] that smoke must not exist.
If you say [that the reason which is that if sandalwood fire does not exist, it is not the case that smoke must not exist] is not established, it [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, a place without sandalwood, there is no smoke because there is no sandalwood fire. You have asserted the entailment [that if sandalwood fire does not exist, smoke must not exist].

If you say [that the reason which is that with respect to a place without sandalwood, there is no sandalwood fire] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, a place without sandalwood, there is no sandalwood fire because there is no sandalwood.

If you say [that the reason which is that with respect to a place without sandalwood, there is no sandalwood] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, a place without sandalwood, there is no sandalwood because [it] is a locus of sandalwood’s negation.

If you accept the above [assertion that with respect to a place without sandalwood, there is no smoke], it follows that with respect to the subject, a
place without sandalwood, there is smoke because there is smoke from a juniper fire.

If you say [that the reason which is that with respect to a place without sandalwood there is smoke from a juniper fire] is not established, it follows that in a place without sandalwood there is smoke from a juniper fire because in that place without sandalwood there is a juniper fire.

7. Someone says: Being certain to become a pot entails being a cause of pot.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, the clay that is the substantial cause of a clay pot, is a cause of pot because of being certain to become a pot. You have asserted the entailment [that being certain to become a pot entails being a cause of pot].

If you say [that the reason which is that the clay that is the substantial cause of a clay pot is certain to become a pot] is not established, it follows that the subject, the clay that is the substantial cause of a clay pot, is certain to become a pot because of being certain to become a clay pot.
If you say [that the reason which is that the clay that is the substantial cause of a clay pot is certain to become a clay pot] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, a clay pot, the clay that is its substantial cause is certain to become it because the clay that is its substantial cause exists.

If you say [that the reason which is that the clay that is the substantial cause of a clay pot exists] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, a clay pot, the clay that is its substantial cause exists because it is a clay pot.

If you accept the root [assertion that the clay that is the substantial cause of a clay pot is a cause of pot], it follows that the subject, the clay that is the substantial cause of a clay pot, is not a cause of pot because pot is not its effect.
If you say [that the reason which is that pot is not an effect of the clay that is the substantial cause of a clay pot] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, the clay that is the substantial cause of a clay pot, pot is not its effect because it not existing does not entail pot not existing.

If you say [that the reason which is that the clay that is the substantial cause of a clay pot not existing does not entail pot not existing] is not established, it [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, a place where clay pot does not exist, pot does not exist because the clay that is the substantial cause of a clay pot does not exist. You have asserted the entailment [that the clay that is the substantial cause of a clay pot not existing entails that pot does not exist].

If you say [that the reason which is that with respect to a place where clay pot does not exist, the clay that is the substantial cause of a clay pot does not exist] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, a place where clay pot does not exist, the clay that is the substantial cause of a clay pot does not exist because of being a locus of clay pot’s negation.
If you accept the above [assertion that with respect to a place where clay pot does not exist, pot does not exist], it follows that with respect to the subject, a place where clay pot does not exist, pot exists because golden pot exists.

If you say [that the reason which is that with respect to a place where clay pot does not exist, golden pot exists] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, a place where clay pot does not exist, golden pot exists because of not being a locus of golden pot’s negation.

8. Someone says: Being the substantial cause of a cognition entails being a cognition.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, the seed of a cognition, is the substantial cause of a cognition because of being the substantial cause of a cognition. You have asserted the entailment [that being the substantial cause of a cognition entails being a cognition].

If you say [that the reason which is that the seed of a cognition is the substantial cause of a cognition] is not established, it follows that the subject, the seed of a cognition, is the substantial cause of a cognition because of being the main producer of that cognition as a substantial entity that is its
own substantial continuum.

If you say [that the reason which is that the seed of a cognition is the main producer of that cognition as a substantial entity that is its own substantial continuum] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, a cognition, its seed is the main producer of it as a substantial entity that is its own substantial continuum because it is a consciousness.

If you accept the root [assertion that the seed of a cognition is a cognition], it follows that the subject, the seed of a cognition, is not a cognition because of not being a consciousness.

If you say [that the reason which is that the seed of a cognition is not a consciousness] is not established, it follows that the subject, the seed of a cognition, is not a consciousness because of being a non-associated compositional factor.
If you say [that the reason which is that the seed of a cognition is a non-associated compositional factor] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, a cognition, its seed is a non-associated compositional factor because its seed exists.

If you say [that the reason which is that the seed of a cognition exists] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, a cognition, its seed exists because it is a thing.

9. Someone says: Something being thing’s direct effect entails that whatever is it is necessarily thing’s direct effect.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, thing’s subsequent arising, whatever is it is necessarily thing’s direct effect because it is thing’s direct effect. You have asserted the entailment [that something being thing’s direct effect entails that whatever is it is necessarily thing’s direct effect].

If you say [that the reason which is that thing’s subsequent arising is thing’s direct effect] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, thing’s subsequent arising, it is thing’s direct effect because thing is its direct cause.
If you say [that the reason which is that thing is the direct cause of thing’s subsequent arising] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, thing, it is the direct cause of its subsequent arising because it is a thing.

If you accept the root [assertion that being thing’s subsequent arising entails being thing’s direct effect], it [absurdly] follows that also being the prior arising of the subsequent arising of thing’s subsequent arising entails being thing’s effect because its assertion is logically feasible.

If you accept [that being the prior arising of the subsequent arising of thing’s subsequent arising entails being thing’s effect], it [absurdly] follows that the subject, thing, is thing’s effect because of being the prior arising of the subsequent arising of thing’s subsequent arising. You have asserted the entailment [that being the prior arising of the subsequent arising of thing’s subsequent arising entails being thing’s effect].
If you say [that the reason which is that thing is the prior arising of the subsequent arising of thing’s subsequent arising] is not established, it follows that the subject, thing, is the prior arising of the subsequent arising of thing’s subsequent arising because of being a cause of the subsequent arising of thing’s subsequent arising.

If you say [that the reason which is that thing is a cause of the subsequent arising of thing’s subsequent arising] is not established, it follows that the subject, thing, is a cause of the subsequent arising of thing’s subsequent arising because the subsequent arising of thing’s subsequent arising is its effect.

If you say [that the reason which is that the subsequent arising of thing’s subsequent arising is thing’s effect] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, thing, the subsequent arising of thing’s subsequent arising is its effect.
arising is its effect because it is a thing.

10. Someone says: Being form’s effect entails being either form’s direct effect or form’s indirect effect.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subjects, form’s subsequent arising and form’s subsequent arising’s subsequent arising, are either form’s direct effect or form’s indirect effect because of being form’s effect. You have asserted the entailment [that being form’s effect entails being either form’s direct effect or form’s indirect effect].

If you say [that the reason which is that both form’s subsequent arising and form’s subsequent arising’s subsequent arising are form’s effect] is not established, it follows that the subjects, both form’s subsequent arising and form’s subsequent arising’s subsequent arising, are form’s effect because form is their cause.
If you say [that the reason which is that form is the cause of both form’s subsequent arising and form’s subsequent arising’s subsequent arising] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, form, it is the cause of both its subsequent arising and its subsequent arising’s subsequent arising because it is a thing.

If you accept the root [assertion that both form’s subsequent arising and form’s subsequent arising’s subsequent arising are either form’s direct effect or form’s indirect effect], it follows that the subjects, both form’s subsequent arising and form’s subsequent arising’s subsequent arising, are neither form’s direct effect nor form’s indirect effect because of (1) not being form’s direct effect and (2) not being form’s indirect effect.
If you say that the first reason [which is that both form’s subsequent arising and form’s subsequent arising’s subsequent arising are not form’s direct effect] is not established, it [absurdly] follows that form’s subsequent arising’s subsequent arising is form’s direct effect because both form’s subsequent arising and form’s subsequent arising’s subsequent arising are form’s direct effect. You have asserted the reason [which is that both form’s subsequent arising and form’s subsequent arising’s subsequent arising are form’s direct effect].

If you accept [that form’s subsequent arising’s subsequent arising is form’s direct effect], it follows that the subject, form’s subsequent arising’s subsequent arising, is not form’s direct effect because of being form’s indirect effect.

If you say [that the reason which is that form’s subsequent arising’s subsequent arising is form’s indirect effect] is not established, it follows that the subject, form’s subsequent arising’s subsequent arising, is form’s indirect effect because form is its indirect cause.
If you say [that the reason which is that form is form’s subsequent arising’s subsequent arising’s indirect cause] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, form, it is its subsequent arising’s subsequent arising’s indirect cause because it is a thing.

If you say that the second reason [which is that both form’s subsequent arising and form’s subsequent arising’s subsequent arising are not form’s indirect effect] is not established, it [absurdly] follows that form’s subsequent arising is form’s indirect effect because both form’s subsequent arising and form’s subsequent arising’s subsequent arising are form’s indirect effect. You have asserted the reason [which is that both form’s subsequent arising and form’s subsequent arising’s subsequent arising are form’s indirect effect].
If you accept [that form’s subsequent arising is form’s indirect effect], it follows that the subject, form’s subsequent arising, is not form’s indirect effect because form is not its indirect cause.

If you say [that the reason which is that form is not form’s subsequent arising’s indirect cause] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, form, it is not its subsequent arising’s indirect cause because it is a thing.

11. **Someone says:** The prior arising of the prior arising of form’s subsequent arising is not form’s direct cause.

**Our response:** It follows that [the prior arising of the prior arising of form’s subsequent arising] is [form’s direct cause] because form’s prior arising is form’s direct cause.
prior arising of form’s subsequent arising is form’s direct cause] because
the two, the prior arising of the prior arising of form’s subsequent arising
and form’s prior arising, are produced simultaneously.

Our Own System

There is a definition of cause because producer is it. The three—cause,
effect, and thing—are equivalent.

There is a definition of thing’s cause because thing’s producer is it. It
follows that [thing’s producer is the definition of thing] because being a
thing entails that its producer is the definition of its cause.

When thing’s cause is divided, there are two because there are the two,
thing’s direct cause and thing’s indirect cause. There is a definition of
ting’s direct cause because thing’s direct producer is it. There is an il-
ustration because the prior arising of thing is it. There is a definition of
ting’s indirect cause because thing’s indirect producer is it. There is an
ustration because the prior arising of thing’s prior arising is it. It is sim-
lar for the direct cause and indirect cause of all things.

Also, when thing’s cause is divided, there are two because there are the
two, thing’s substantial cause and thing’s cooperative condition. There is
a definition of thing’s substantial cause because the main producer of
ting as a substantial entity that is its own substantial continuum is it.
There is an illustration because product that is thing’s cause is it. There is
a definition of thing’s cooperative condition because the main producer of
ting as a substantial entity but not as its own substantial continuum is it. There is an illustration because a person who is thing’s cause is it.

\[ \text{a Read byed for byad, 27b.1.} \]
When clay pot’s cause is divided, there are two because there are the two, clay pot’s substantial cause and clay pot’s cooperative condition. There is a definition of clay pot’s substantial cause because the main producer of clay pot as a substantial entity that is its own substantial continuum is it. There is an illustration because clay that is clay pot’s cause is it. There is a definition of clay pot’s cooperative condition because the main producer of clay pot as a substantial entity but not as its own substantial continuum is it. There is an illustration because a person who is clay pot’s cause is it.

There is a definition of effect because that which is produced is it. There is a definition of thing’s effect because that which is produced by thing is it. There is an illustration because thing’s subsequent arising is it.
When thing’s effect is divided, there are two because there are the two, thing’s direct effect and thing’s indirect effect. There is a definition of thing’s direct effect because \textit{that which is directly produced by thing} is it. There is an illustration because the subsequent arising of thing is it. There is a definition of thing’s indirect effect because \textit{that which is indirectly produced by thing} is it. There is an illustration because the subsequent arising of thing’s subsequent arising is it. It is similar for the direct effect and indirect effect of all things.

\section*{Dispelling Objections}

\textbf{12. Someone says:} It follows that the subject, object of knowledge, is thing’s cause because of being thing’s producer. If you say [that the reason
which is that object of knowledge is thing’s producer] is not established, it follows that the subject, object of knowledge, is thing’s producer because thing is a producer.

If you say [that the reason which is that thing is a producer] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, object of knowledge, thing is a producer because thing is a cause.

If you say [that the reason which is that thing is a cause] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, object of knowledge, thing is a cause because thing is a cause of thing’s subsequent arising.

If you say [that the reason which is that thing is a cause of thing’s subsequent arising] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, object of knowledge, thing is a cause of thing’s subsequent arising because thing exists.

Our response: [That thing is a producer] does not entail [being thing’s producer].

If you say [that the reason which is that thing is a producer] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, object of knowledge, thing is a producer because thing is a cause.
If you say [that the reason which is that thing exists] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, object of knowledge, thing exists because of being without a self of persons.

13. **Someone says:** It follows that the subject, thing, is not a cause of thing’s subsequent arising because of being a cause of that which arises simultaneously with thing. If you say [that the reason which is that thing is a cause of that which arises simultaneously with thing] is not established, it follows that the subject, thing, is a cause of that which arises simultaneously with thing because of being a thing that arises simultaneously with thing.

*Our response:* [Being a thing that arises simultaneously with thing] does not entail [being a cause of that which arises simultaneously with thing].

If you say [that the reason which is that thing exists] is not established, it follows that the subject, thing, is a thing that arises simultaneously with thing because it is a thing.
14. **Someone says:** It follows that the subject, thing, is not a cause of thing’s subsequent arising because of not being a thing that is thing’s subsequent arising.

Our response: [Not being a thing that is thing’s subsequent arising] does not entail [not being a cause of thing’s subsequent arising].

If you say [that the reason which is that thing is not a thing that is thing’s subsequent arising] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, thing, it is not a thing that is its subsequent arising because it is without a self of persons.

15. **Someone says:** It follows that the subject, thing, is not a cause of thing’s subsequent arising because of not being a thing that is thing’s subsequent arising.

Our response: [Not being a thing that is thing’s subsequent arising] does not entail [not being a cause of thing’s subsequent arising].
If you say [that the reason which is that thing is not a thing that is thing’s subsequent arising] is not established, it follows that the subject, thing, is not a thing that is thing’s subsequent arising because of being a thing that arises simultaneously with thing.

If you say [that the reason which is that thing is a thing that arises simultaneously with thing] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, thing, it is a thing that arises simultaneously with it because it is a thing.

16. Someone says: It follows that the subject, thing’s subsequent arising, is thing’s subsequent arising’s effect because of being (1) thing’s subsequent arising and (2) an effect.

Our response: [Being (1) thing’s subsequent arising and (2) an effect] does not entail [being thing’s subsequent arising’s effect].

If you say that the first reason [which is that thing’s subsequent arising is thing’s subsequent arising] is not established, it follows that the subject, thing’s subsequent arising, is thing’s subsequent arising because of being
thing’s effect.

If you say that the second reason [which is that thing’s subsequent arising is an effect] is not established, it follows that the subject, thing’s subsequent arising, is an effect because of being a thing.

If you accept the above [assertion that thing’s subsequent arising is thing’s subsequent arising’s effect], it follows that with respect to the subject, thing’s subsequent arising, it is not its effect because it is without a self of persons.

17. Someone says: It follows that non-permanent is an effect because non-permanent’s cause exists. If you say [that the reason which is that non-permanent’s cause exists] is not established, it follows that non-permanent’s cause exists because a cause that is non-permanent exists.
Our response: [That a cause that is non-permanent exists] does not entail [that non-permanent’s cause exists].

If you say [that the reason which is that a cause that is non-permanent exists] is not established, it follows that a cause that is non-permanent exists because form is it.

If you say [that the reason which is that form is a cause that is non-permanent] is not established, it follows that the subject, form, is a cause that is non-permanent because of being that which is both non-permanent and a cause.

If you say [that the reason which is that form is that which is both non-permanent and a cause] is not established, it follows that the subject, form, is that which is both non-permanent and a cause because of being a cause.

18. Someone says: It follows that with respect to the subject, form, that which is non-permanent is its effect because it is a cause that is non-permanent.
19. Someone says: It follows that with respect to the subject, that which is not permanent, form is not its cause because its cause does not exist.

Our response: This is a case where answering “I accept” [that form is not the cause of that which is not permanent] is suitable although there is some problem with the statement, because when [“I accept”] is enumerated, it is suitable to enumerate “I accept that form is not the cause of this that-which-is-not-permanent.”a

20. Someone says: It follows that with respect to the subject, the two, pillar and pot, its prior arising is its cause because it is a thing.

a This hinges on the different meanings of “that which is not” (ma yin par gyur pa). In this case it can mean “that which is not permanent,” meaning all impermanent phenomena, or it can mean “that-which-is-not-permanent,” meaning all phenomena which are not permanent (phenomenon) itself. Since the former includes only impermanent phenomena, they have causes; since the latter includes both impermanent and permanent phenomena, some have causes and some do not, but “that-which-is-not-permanent” itself is permanent and thus does not have a cause. Therefore, the demonstrative pronoun “this” (or “the,” de) is necessary to delimit the meaning to “that-which-is-not-permanent” itself.
With regard to accepting [that the prior arising of the two, pillar and pot, is the cause of the two, pillar and pot], someone says: It follows that the subject, the prior arising of both pillar and pot, is pillar’s cause because of being both pillar and pot’s cause.

Our response: [This reason] is set aside with respect to the negative entailment [that being both pillar and pot’s cause entails being pillar’s cause].

If you accept [that the prior arising of both pillar and pot is pillar’s cause], it follows that the subject, the prior arising of both pillar and pot, is not pillar’s cause because pillar is not its effect.

If you say [that the reason which is that pillar is not the effect of the prior arising of both pillar and pot] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, the prior arising of both pillar and pot, pillar is not its effect because it not existing does not entail that pillar does not exist.

a Read byung for byus, 29a.6.
If you say [that the reason which is that the prior arising of both pillar and pot not existing does not entail that pillar does not exist] is not established, it [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, a locus of pot’s negation, pillar does not exist because the prior arising of both pillar and pot does not exist. You have asserted the entailment [that the prior arising of both pillar and pot not existing entails that pillar does not exist].

If you say [that the reason which is that with respect to a locus of pot’s negation in terms of the subject, a locus of pot’s negation, the prior arising of both pillar and pot—in terms of the subject, a locus of pot’s negation—does not exist] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, a locus of pot’s negation, the two, pillar and pot, does not exist because pot does not exist.
If you say [that the reason which is that with respect to a locus of pot’s negation in terms of the subject, a locus of pot’s negation, pot—in terms of the subject, a locus of pot’s negation—does not exist] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, a locus of pot’s negation, pot does not exist because of being a locus of pot’s negation.

If you accept the above [assertion that with respect to a locus of pot’s negation in terms of the subject, a locus of pot’s negation, pillar—in terms of the subject, a locus of pot’s negation—does not exist], it follows that with respect to the subject, a locus of pot’s negation, pillar exists because of not being a locus of pillar’s negation.

21. Someone says: It follows that the subject, the two, pillar and pot, is not the effect of both pillar and pot’s prior arising because of not being the effect of pillar’s prior arising.

Our response: [Not being the effect of pillar’s prior arising] does not entail [not being the effect of both pillar and pot’s prior arising].
If you say [that the reason which is that the two, pillar and pot, is not the effect of pillar’s prior arising] is not established, it follows that the subject, the two, pillar and pot, is not the effect of pillar’s prior arising because pillar’s prior arising is not its cause.

If you say [that the reason which is that pillar’s prior arising is not the cause of the two, pillar and pot] is not established, it follows that the subject, pillar’s prior arising, is not both pillar and pot’s cause because being pillar’s cause.

22. **Someone says:** It follows that with respect to the subject, the prior arising of thing, thing does not exist at its time because thing is its effect. If you accept [that thing does not exist at the time of the prior arising of thing], it follows that with respect to the subject, the prior arising of thing, thing exists at its time because this prior arising of thing (1) is a thing and (2) exists.

**Our response:** [That this prior arising of thing (1) is a thing and (2) exists]
does not entail [that thing exists at the time of the prior arising of thing].

If you say that the first reason [which is that the prior arising of thing is a thing] is not established, it follows that the subject, the prior arising of thing, is a thing because of being thing’s cause.

If you say that the second reason [which is that the prior arising of thing exists] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, the prior arising of thing, it exists at its time because it is a thing.

23. Someone says: It follows that thing’s substantial cause does not exist because thing’s prior arising is not that. If you say [that the reason which is that thing’s prior arising is not its substantial cause] is not established, it follows that the subject, thing’s prior arising, is not thing’s substantial cause because of not being definite to become thing. If you say [that the reason which is that thing’s prior arising is not definite to become thing] is not established, it follows that the subject, thing’s prior arising, is not definite to become thing because of already having become a thing.
Our response: [Already having become thing] does not entail [not being definite to become thing].

If you say [that the reason which is that thing’s prior arising has already become thing] is not established, it follows that the subject, thing’s prior arising, has already become a thing because of being a thing.

24. Someone says: It follows that with respect to the subject, the two, pillar and pot, its substantial cause exists because it is a thing. You have asserted the entailment [that it being a thing entails that its substantial cause exists]. If you accept [that the substantial cause of the two, pillar and pot, exists], it follows that with respect to the subject, the two, pillar and pot, certainty to become it exists because its substantial cause exists. You have asserted the reason [which is that the substantial cause of the two, pillar and pot, exists]. If you accept [that certainty to become the two, pillar and pot, exists], it follows that with respect to the subject, the two, pillar and pot, being it exists because certainty to become it exists.
Our response: [That certainty to become it exists] does not entail [that being it exists].
7. Exposition of the Presentation of Object and Object-Possessor

[Refutation of Others’ Systems]

1. Someone says: Being an object of some particular awareness entails being an object.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, rabbit horns, is an object because of being an object of some particular awareness. You have asserted the entailment [that being an object of some particular awareness entails being an object].

If you say [that the reason which is that rabbit horns is an object of some particular awareness] is not established, it follows that the subject, rabbit horns, is an object of some particular awareness because of being the object of a conceptual consciousness apprehending rabbit horns.

If you say [that the reason which is that rabbit horns is the object of a conceptual consciousness apprehending rabbit horns] is not established, it
follows that the subject, rabbit horns, is the object of a conceptual consciousness apprehending rabbit horns because of being the referent object of a conceptual consciousness apprehending rabbit horns.

If you say [that the reason which is that rabbit horns is the referent object of a conceptual consciousness apprehending rabbit horns] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, rabbit horns, it is the referent object of a conceptual consciousness apprehending it because it is without a self of persons.

If you accept the root [assertion that rabbit horns is an object], it follows that the subject, rabbit horns, is not an object because of not being an object of comprehension.

If you say [that not being an object of comprehension] does not entail [not being an object], it follows that there is entailment [that not being an object of comprehension entails not being an object] because the two, object and object of comprehension, are equivalent.

If you say [that the reason which is that the two, object and object of comprehension, are equivalent] is not established, it follows that the two, object and object of comprehension, are equivalent because the two, object and that which is observed by valid cognition, are equivalent.
2. Someone says: Being an object-possessor entails being a consciousness.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, the sound that is the expression “pot,” is a consciousness because of being an object-possessor. You have asserted the entailment [that being an object-possessor entails being a consciousness].

If you say [that the reason which is that the sound that is the expression “pot” is an object-possessor] is not established, it follows that the subject, the sound that is the expression “pot,” is an object-possessor because its object exists.

If you say [that the reason which is that the object of the sound that is the expression “pot” exists] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, the sound that is the expression “pot,” its object exists because its expressed object\textsuperscript{a} exists.

\textsuperscript{a} “Expressed object of pot” means the object which is expressed or verbalized by the sound (or term) “pot.”
If you say [that the reason which is that the expressed object of the sound that is the expression “pot” exists] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, the sound that is the expression “pot,” its expressed object exists because pot is it.

If you say [that the reason which is that pot is the expressed object of the sound that is the expression “pot”] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, pot, it is the expressed object of the sound that is the expression “it” because it is without a self of persons.

If you accept the root [assertion that the sound that is the expression “pot” is a consciousness], it follows that the subject, the sound that is the expression “pot,” is not a consciousness because of not being that which is luminous and cognitive.

If you say [that the reason which is that the sound that is the expression “pot” is not that which is luminous and cognitive] is not established, it follows that the subject, the sound that is the expression “pot,” is not that which is luminous and cognitive because of being matter.

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a Read ma for na, 30b.7.
If you say [that the reason which is that the sound that is the expression “pot” is matter] is not established, it follows that the subject, the sound that is the expression “pot,” is matter because of being sound.

If you say [that the reason which is that the sound that is the expression “pot” is sound] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, pot, the sound that is the expression “it” is sound because it is without a self of persons.

Furthermore, it [absurdly] follows that the subject, eye sense-power, is a consciousness because of being an object-possessor. You have asserted the entailment [that being an object-possessor entails being a consciousness].

If you say [that the reason which is that eye sense-power is an object-possessor] is not established, it follows that the subject, eye sense-power, is an object-possessor because its object exists.

If you say [that the reason which is that eye sense-power’s object exists] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, eye sense-power, its object exists because blue is it.
If you say [that the reason which is that blue is eye sense-power’s object] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, blue, it is eye sense-power’s object because of being an apprehended object of an eye consciousness.

If you say [that the reason which is that blue is an apprehended object of an eye consciousness] is not established, it follows that the subject, blue, is an apprehended object of an eye consciousness because of being a form sense-sphere.

If you accept the root [assertion that eye sense-power is a consciousness], it follows that the subject, eye sense-power, is not a consciousness because of being matter.

If you say [that the reason which is that eye sense-power is matter] is not established, it follows that the subject, eye sense-power, is matter because of being form.

If you say [that the reason which is that eye sense-power is form] is not established, it follows that the subject, eye sense-power, is form because of being an eye sense-sphere.
If you say [that the reason which is that eye sense-power is an eye sense-sphere] is not established, it follows that the subject, eye sense-power, is an eye sense-sphere because of being an eye.

Furthermore, it [absurdly] follows that the subject, a Buddha Superior, is a consciousness because of being an object-possessor. You have asserted the entailment [that being an object-possessor entails being a consciousness].

If you say [that the reason which is that a Buddha Superior is an object-possessor] is not established, it follows that the subject, a Buddha Superior, is an object-possessor because its object exists.

If you say [that the reason which is that a Buddha Superior’s object exists] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, a Buddha Superior, its object exists because its object of comprehension exists.

If you say [that the reason which is that a Buddha Superior’s object of comprehension exists] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, a Buddha Superior, its object of comprehension exists because whatever is an established base is necessarily its object of comprehension.
If you accept the root [assertion that a Buddha Superior is a consciousness], it follows that the subject, a Buddha Superior, is not a consciousness because of being a non-associated compositional factor.

If you say [that the reason which is that a Buddha Superior is a non-associated compositional factor] is not established, it follows that the subject, a Buddha Superior, is a non-associated compositional factor because of being a person.

If you say [that the reason which is that a Buddha Superior is a person] is not established, it follows that the subject, a Buddha Superior, is a person because of being a Buddha Superior.

3. Someone says: Being an object entails being the explicit object of a valid perception.

"If a Buddha Superior is an object, a Buddha Superior is the explicit object of a valid perception."
Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, uncompounded space, is the explicit object of a valid perception because of being an object. You have asserted the entailment [that being an object entails being the explicit object of a valid perception].

If you say [that the reason which is that uncompounded space is the explicit object of a valid perception] is not established, it follows that the subject, uncompounded space, is the explicit object of a valid perception because of being an object of an awareness.

If you say [that the reason which is that uncompounded space is an object of an awareness] is not established, it follows that the subject, uncompounded space, is an object of an awareness because of being that which is suitable to be taken as the object of an awareness.

If you say [that the reason which is that uncompounded space is an object of an awareness] is not established, it follows that the subject, uncompounded space, is that which is suitable to be taken as the object of an awareness because of being an object of knowledge.

If you say [that being an object of knowledge] does not entail [being that
which is suitable to be taken as the object of an awareness), it follows that there is entailment [that being an object of knowledge entails being that which is suitable to be taken as the object of an awareness] because that which is suitable to be taken as the object of an awareness is the definition of object of knowledge.

If you accept the root [assertion that uncompounded space is the explicit object of a valid perception], it follows that the subject, uncompounded space, is not the explicit object of a perception because of not being the explicit object of an omniscient consciousness.

If you say [that the reason which is that uncompounded space is not the explicit object of an omniscient consciousness] is not established, it follows that the subject, uncompounded space, is not the explicit object of comprehension of an omniscient consciousness because of not being a thing.
If you say [that not being a thing] does not entail [not being the explicit object of comprehension of an omniscient consciousness], it follows that there is entailment [that not being a thing entails not being the explicit object of comprehension of an omniscient consciousness] because the two, the explicit object of comprehension of an omniscient consciousness and thing, are equivalent.

4. Someone says: Being the apprehended object of a conceptual consciousness apprehending pot entails being the referent object of a conceptual consciousness apprehending pot.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, the appearance as the opposite of non-pot to the conceptual consciousness apprehending pot, is the referent object of a conceptual consciousness apprehending pot because of being the apprehended object of a conceptual consciousness apprehending pot. You have asserted the entailment [that being the apprehended object of a conceptual consciousness apprehending pot entails being the referent object of a conceptual consciousness apprehending pot].
If you say [that the reason which is that the appearance as the opposite of non-pot to the conceptual consciousness apprehending pot is the apprehended object of a conceptual consciousness apprehending pot] is not established, it follows that the subject, the appearance as the opposite of non-pot to the conceptual consciousness apprehending pot, is the apprehended object of a conceptual consciousness apprehending pot because of being the appearing object of a conceptual consciousness apprehending pot.

If you say [that being the appearing object of a conceptual consciousness apprehending pot] does not entail [being the apprehended object of a conceptual consciousness apprehending pot], it follows that there is entailment [that being the appearing object of a conceptual consciousness apprehending pot entails being the apprehended object of a conceptual consciousness apprehending pot] because the two, the appearing object of a conceptual consciousness apprehending pot and the apprehended object of a conceptual consciousness apprehending pot, are equivalent.

If, at the above juncture of “does not entail,” you say that the reason [which is that the appearance as the opposite of non-pot to the conceptual consciousness apprehending pot is the appearing object of a conceptual consciousness apprehending pot] is not established, it follows that with respect
to the subject, pot, the appearance as the opposite of non-it to the conceptual consciousness apprehending it is the appearing object of the conceptual consciousness apprehending it because it is without a self of persons.

If you accept the root [assertion that the appearance as the opposite of non-pot to the conceptual consciousness apprehending pot is the referent object of a conceptual consciousness apprehending pot], it follows that the subject, the appearance as the opposite of non-pot to the conceptual consciousness apprehending pot, is not the referent object of a conceptual consciousness apprehending pot because of not being the object of the mode of apprehension of a conceptual consciousness apprehending pot.

If you say [that the reason which is that the appearance as the opposite of non-pot to the conceptual consciousness apprehending pot is not the object of the mode of apprehension of a conceptual consciousness apprehending pot] is not established, it follows that the subject, the appearance as the opposite of non-pot to the conceptual consciousness apprehending pot, is not the object of the mode of apprehension of a conceptual consciousness apprehending pot because of being the appearing object of the conceptual consciousness apprehending pot.
If you say [that being the appearing object of a conceptual consciousness apprehending pot] does not entail [not being the object of the mode of apprehension of a conceptual consciousness apprehending pot], it follows that there is entailment [that being the appearing object of a conceptual consciousness apprehending pot entails not being the object of the mode of apprehension of a conceptual consciousness apprehending pot] because the two, the object of the mode of apprehension of a conceptual consciousness apprehending pot and the appearing object of a conceptual consciousness apprehending pot, are contradictory.

If you say [that the reason which is that the two, the object of the mode of apprehension of a conceptual consciousness apprehending pot and the appearing object of a conceptual consciousness apprehending pot, are contradictory] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, pot, the two, the object of the mode of apprehension of a conceptual consciousness apprehending it and the appearing object of a conceptual consciousness apprehending it, are contradictory because it is without a self of persons.
5. **Someone says:** It follows that the subject, the appearance as the opposite of non-pot to the conceptual consciousness apprehending pot, is not the apprehended object of the conceptual consciousness apprehending pot because of not being apprehended by the conceptual consciousness apprehending pot.

Our response: [Not being apprehended by the conceptual consciousness apprehending pot] does not entail [not being the apprehended object of the conceptual consciousness apprehending pot].

If you say [that the reason which is that the appearance as the opposite of non-pot to the conceptual consciousness apprehending pot is not apprehended by the conceptual consciousness apprehending pot] is not established, it follows that the subject, the appearance as the opposite of non-pot to the conceptual consciousness apprehending pot, is not apprehended by the conceptual consciousness apprehending pot because of being the appearing object of the conceptual consciousness apprehending pot.

6. **Someone says:** Being a conceptual consciousness entails that its referent object exists.
Our response: It [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, a conceptual consciousness apprehending sound as permanent, its referent object exists because it is a conceptual consciousness. You have asserted the entailment [that being a conceptual consciousness entails that its referent object exists].

If you say [that the reason which is that a conceptual consciousness apprehending sound is a conceptual consciousness] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, sound, the conceptual consciousness apprehending it as permanent is a conceptual consciousness because a conceptual consciousness apprehending it as permanent exists.

If you say [that the reason which is that a conceptual consciousness apprehending sound as permanent exists] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, sound, a conceptual consciousness apprehending it as permanent exists because it is without a self of persons.

If you accept the root [assertion that the referent object of a conceptual consciousness apprehending sound as permanent exists], it follows that with respect to the subject, a conceptual consciousness apprehending sound as permanent, its referent object does not exist because the object of its mode of apprehension does not exist.
If you say [that the reason which is that the object of the mode of apprehension of a conceptual consciousness apprehending sound as permanent does not exist] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, a conceptual consciousness apprehending sound as permanent, the object of its mode of apprehension does not exist because it is a wrong consciousness.

If you say [that the reason which is that a conceptual consciousness apprehending sound as permanent is a wrong consciousness] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, sound, the conceptual consciousness apprehending it as permanent is a wrong consciousness because it is not permanent.

7. Someone says: It follows that with respect to the subject, a conceptual consciousness apprehending sound as permanent, the object of its mode of apprehension exists because its observed object exists.

Our response: [That its observed object exists] does not entail [that the object of its mode of apprehension exists].
If you say [that the reason which is that the observed object of a conceptual consciousness apprehending sound as permanent exists] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, a conceptual consciousness apprehending sound as permanent, its observed object exists because sound is it.

If you say [that the reason which is that sound is the observed object of a conceptual consciousness apprehending sound as permanent] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, sound, it is the observed object of a conceptual consciousness apprehending sound as permanent because it is the observed object of the inference realizing that sound is impermanent.

If you say [that it being the observed object of the inference realizing that sound is impermanent] does not entail [that it is the observed object of a conceptual consciousness apprehending sound as permanent], it follows that there is entailment [that it being the observed object of the inference realizing that sound is impermanent entails that it is the observed object of a conceptual consciousness apprehending sound as permanent] because the two, the conceptual consciousness apprehending sound as permanent and the inference realizing that sound is impermanent, are awarenesses that, having observed the same object of observation, engage in directly contradictory modes of apprehension.
8. Someone says: Being a conceptual consciousness apprehending pot entails that pot is its referent object.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, a conceptual consciousness apprehending pot through a mere sound-generality, pot is its referent object because it is a conceptual consciousness apprehending pot. You have asserted the entailment [that being a conceptual consciousness apprehending pot entails that pot is its referent object].

If you say [that the reason which is that a conceptual consciousness apprehending pot through a mere sound-generality is a conceptual consciousness apprehending pot] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, pot, the conceptual consciousness apprehending it through a mere sound-generality is a conceptual consciousness apprehending it because a conceptual consciousness apprehending it through a mere sound-generality exists.
If you say [that the reason which is that a conceptual consciousness apprehending pot through a mere sound-generality exists] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, pot, a conceptual consciousness apprehending it through a mere sound-generality exists because it is without a self of persons.

If you accept the root [assertion that pot is the referent object of a conceptual consciousness apprehending pot through a mere sound-generality], it follows that the subject, pot, is not the referent object of a conceptual consciousness apprehending pot through a mere sound-generality because of being the implicit object of a conceptual consciousness apprehending pot through a mere sound-generality.

If you say [that the reason which is that pot is the implicit object of a conceptual consciousness apprehending pot through a mere sound-generality] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, pot, it is the implicit object of a conceptual consciousness apprehending it through a mere sound-generality because it is a pot.
9. Someone says: Being a mental consciousness entails being a perceiver.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, a self-knower that experiences an eye consciousness apprehending blue, is a perceiver because of being a mental consciousness. You have asserted the entailment [that being a mental consciousness entails being a perceiver].

If you say [that the reason which is that a self-knower that experiences an eye consciousness apprehending blue is a mental consciousness] is not established, it follows that the subject, a self-knower that experiences an eye consciousness apprehending blue, is a mental consciousness because of being a self-knower.

If you say [that the reason which is that the self-knower that experiences an eye consciousness apprehending blue is a self-knower] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, an eye consciousness apprehending blue, the self-knower that experiences it is a self-knower because the self-knower that experiences it exists.

If you say [that the reason which is that the self-knower that experiences an eye consciousness apprehending blue is a self-knower] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, an eye consciousness apprehending blue, the self-knower that experiences it is a self-knower because the self-knower that experiences it exists.
an eye consciousness apprehending blue exists] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, an eye consciousness apprehending blue, the self-knower that experiences it exists because it is a consciousness that is an other-knower.

If you accept the root [assertion that a self-knower that experiences an eye consciousness apprehending blue is a perceiver], it follows that the subject, a self-knower that experiences an eye consciousness apprehending blue, is not a perceiver because of not being a consciousness.

If you say [that not being a consciousness] does not entail [not being a perceiver], it follows that there is entailment [that not being a consciousness entails not being a perceiver] because mind, perceiver, and consciousness are equivalent.

If, at the above juncture of “does not entail,” you say that the reason [which is that a self-knower that experiences an eye consciousness apprehending blue is not a consciousness] is not established, it follows that the subject, a self-knower that experiences an eye consciousness apprehending blue, is not a consciousness because of not being a mind.
If you say [that the reason which is that a self-knower that experiences an eye consciousness apprehending blue is not a mind] is not established, it follows that the subject, a self-knower that experiences an eye consciousness apprehending blue, is not a mind because of not being either a mind or a mental factor.

Furthermore, it [absurdly] follows that the subject, feeling that accompanies a mental consciousness, is a perceiver because of being a mental consciousness. You have asserted the entailment [that being a mental consciousness entails being a perceiver].
the subject, feeling that accompanies a mental consciousness, is a mental consciousness because of being a mental factor that accompanies a mental consciousness.

If you say [that being a mental factor that accompanies a mental consciousness] does not entail [being a mental consciousness], it follows that with respect to the subject, feeling that accompanies a mental consciousness, being a mental factor that accompanies it entails being a mental consciousness because it is a mental consciousness.

10. Someone says: Being a consciousness entails being a valid cognition.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, a sense-consciousness to which a snow mountain appears blue, is a valid cognition because of being a consciousness. You have asserted the entailment [that being a consciousness entails being a valid cognition].
appears blue, is a consciousness because of being a sense-consciousness.

If you accept the root [assertion that a sense-consciousness to which a snow mountain appears blue is a valid cognition], it follows that the subject, a sense-consciousness to which a snow mountain appears blue, is not a valid cognition because of being a wrong consciousness.

11. Someone says: Being a valid cognition entails being a valid perception.a

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, an inference which realizes that sound is impermanent, is a valid perception because of being a valid cognition. You have asserted the entailment [that being a valid cognition entails being a valid perception].

If you say [that the reason which is that an inference which realizes that sound is impermanent is a valid cognition] is not established, it follows that the subject, an inference which realizes that sound is impermanent, is a valid cognition because of being a new and incontrovertible knower.

a That is, a valid cognition which is a perception.
If you say [that being a new and incontrovertible knower does not entail being a valid cognition], it follows that there is entailment [that being a new and incontrovertible knower entails being a valid cognition] because a new and incontrovertible knower is the definition of valid cognition.

If you accept the root [assertion that an inference which realizes that sound is impermanent is a valid perception], it follows that the subject, an inference which realizes that sound is impermanent, is not a valid perception because of not being a perception.

If you say [that the reason which is that an inference which realizes that sound is impermanent is not a perception] is not established, it follows that the subject, an inference which realizes that sound is impermanent, is not a perception because of not being a non-conceptual consciousness.

If you say [that the reason which is that an inference which realizes that sound is impermanent is not a non-conceptual consciousness] is not established, it follows that the subject, an inference which realizes that sound is impermanent, is not a non-conceptual consciousness.
impermanent, is not a non-conceptual consciousness because of being a conceptual consciousness.

It follows that [an inference which realizes that sound is impermanent is a conceptual consciousness] because of being an inference.

Our Own System

There is a definition of object because that which is comprehended by valid cognition is it. Object, existent, and object of comprehension are equivalent. When object is divided, there are two because there are the two, thing and permanent phenomenon. When thing is divided, there are five because there are the five: form aggregate, feeling aggregate, discrimination aggregate, compositional factor aggregate, and consciousness aggregate.

There is a definition of form aggregate because that which is suitable as
form that is a conglomeration of its many parts is it. The two, form aggregate and form, are equivalent. When form aggregate is divided, there are two because there are the two, external form and internal form. When external form is divided, there are the five because there are the five ranging from form sense-sphere to tangible object sense-sphere.\(^a\) When internal form is divided, there are five because there are the five ranging from eye sense-power to body sense-power.\(^b\)

There is a definition of feeling aggregate because that which is (1) the conglomeration of its many parts and (2) an experiencing mental factor that experiences its object through its own power is it. The two, feeling aggregate and feeling, are equivalent. When feeling aggregate is divided, there are six because there are the six: feeling through the condition of eye-contact, feeling through the condition of ear-contact, feeling through the condition of nose-contact, feeling through the condition of tongue-contact, feeling through the condition of body-contact, and feeling through the condition of mind-contact. When [feeling] is divided extensively there are eighteen because when each of the six [feelings just enumerated] are divided, there are three: pleasure, pain, and neutral [feeling].

\(^a\) The other three are sound sense-sphere, odor sense-sphere, and taste sense-sphere.

\(^b\) The other three are ear sense-power, nose sense-power, and tongue sense-power.
There is a definition of discrimination aggregate because that which is (1) a mental factor qualified by apprehending through its own power its object as [its] characteristics and (2) the conglomeration of its many parts is it. The two, discrimination aggregate and discrimination, are equivalent. When [discrimination] is divided, there are two because there are the two, discrimination that apprehends characteristics and discrimination that apprehends diversities. Discrimination that apprehends characteristics is positable because the five—discrimination arisen from eye-contact, discrimination arisen from ear-contact, discrimination arisen from nose-contact, discrimination arisen from tongue-contact, and discrimination arisen from body-contact—are it. Discrimination that apprehends varieties is positable because discrimination arisen from mental contact is it.
There is a definition of compositional factor aggregate because that which is (1) a thing that is not any of the four, form, feeling, discrimination, and consciousness, and (2) the conglomeration of its many parts is it. The two, compositional factor aggregate and compositional factor, are equivalent. When compositional factor is divided, there are two because there are the two, non-associated compositional factor and associated compositional factor.

There is a definition of non-associated compositional factor because that which is (1) a compositional factor and (2) is thoroughly distinguished by there not being something associated with it is it. There is an illustration because thing is it. There is a definition of associated compositional factor because that which is (1) a compositional factor and (2) thoroughly distinguished by there being something associated with it is it. When associated compositional factor is divided, there are the forty-nine mental factors because all the mental factors other than the two, feeling and discrimination, are associated compositional factors.
There is a definition of consciousness aggregate because that which is (1) an other-knowing consciousness that has mental factors accompanying it and (2) a conglomeration of its many parts is it. Consciousness, perceiver, and mind are equivalent. When consciousness aggregate is divided, there are six because there are the six ranging from eye consciousness to mental consciousness.a

There is a definition of object-possessor because phenomenon that engages its object is it. When object-possessor is divided, there are three because there are the three: consciousness, object-possessor that is form, and object-possessor that is a non-associated compositional factor. There

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a The other four are ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, and body consciousness.
is a definition of consciousness because \textit{that which is luminous and cognitive} is it. The two, consciousness and awareness, are equivalent. When consciousness is divided, there are two because there are the two, self-knower and other-knower.

There is a definition of self-knower because \textit{that which has the aspect of the apprehended} is it. The two, self-knower and self-knowing perception, are equivalent. There is an illustration because self-knower that experiences an eye consciousness apprehending blue is it.

When other-knowing consciousness is divided, there are two because there are the two, mind and mental factor. The definition of mind has been explained earlier.\footnote{This likely refers to the first part of the definition of consciousness aggregate: an other-knowing consciousness which has mental factors accompanying it (\textit{rang gi 'khor du song ba'i sems byung yod pa'i gzhed rig gi shes pa}).} There is a definition of mental factor because \textit{consciousness of which there is a mind that is the object it accompanies} is it. When mental factor is divided, there are fifty-one because there are the fifty-one: five omnipresent, five determining, six root afflictions, twenty secondary afflictions, eleven virtuous, and four changeable.
There is a way of enumerating the five omnipresent [mental factors] because the five are enumerated: feeling, discrimination, intention, contact, and mental engagement.

There is a way of enumerating the five determining [mental factors] because the five are enumerated: aspiration, belief, mindfulness, meditative stabilization, and wisdom.

There is a way of enumerating the six root afflictions because the six are enumerated: desire, anger, pride, ignorance, [afflicted] view, and doubt. When [afflicted] view is divided, there are five because there are the five: view of the transitory [collection as a real I and mine], view holding to an extreme [of permanence or annihilation], wrong view, view holding a [bad] view to be supreme, and view holding ethics and modes of conduct to be supreme.
There is a way of enumerating the twenty secondary afflictions because there is a way of enumerating the two, the first group of ten and the second group of ten. There is a way of enumerating the first group of ten because the ten are enumerated: belligerence, resentment, concealment, spite, jealousy, miserliness, deceit, dissimulation, haughtiness, and harmfulness. There is a way of enumerating the second group of ten because the ten are enumerated: non-shame, non-embarrassment, lethargy, excitement, non-faith, laziness, non-conscientiousness, forgetfulness, non-introspection, and distraction.

There is a way of enumerating the eleven virtuous [mental factors] because the eleven are enumerated: shame, embarrassment, non-attachment, non-hatred, non-ignorance, faith, pliancy, conscientiousness, equanimity, effort, and non-harmfulness.
There is a way of enumerating the four changeable [mental factors] because the four are enumerated: the two, investigation and analysis, sleep, and contrition.

Object-possessor that is a non-associated compositional factor is positable because person is it. Object-possessor that is form is positable because the five ranging from eye sense-power to body sense-power are it.

When consciousness is divided, there are two because there are the two, valid cognition and awareness that is not valid cognition. There is a definition of valid cognition because new and incontrovertible knower is it. When valid cognition is divided, there are two because there are the two, valid perception and inferential valid cognition. There is a definition of valid perception because new and incontrovertible knower that is free from conceptuality is it. When valid perception is divided, there are six

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*a* The other three are ear sense-power, nose sense-power, and tongue sense-power.

*b* That is, valid cognition which is a perception.
because there are the six ranging from valid perception that is an eye consciousness to valid perception that is a mental consciousness.\(^a\)

There is a definition of inferential valid cognition because that which is (1) a new and incontrovertible knower and (2) a determinative knower that apprehends a sound [generality] and a meaning [generality] as suitable to be associated is it. When inferential valid cognition is divided, there are three because there are the three: inference through the power of the fact, inference through renown, and inference through belief. Inference through the power of the fact is positable because an inference which realizes that sound is impermanent is it. Inference through renown is positable because an inference which realizes that it is suitable to express the rabbit-possessor with the term “moon” is it. Inference through belief is positable because a valid cognition [based on] scripture is it.

\(^a\) The other four are valid perception which is an ear consciousness, valid perception which is a nose consciousness, valid perception which is a tongue consciousness, and valid perception which is a body consciousness.
When awareness that is not valid cognition is divided, there are three because there are the three: [awareness that] does not realize [its object], wrong view, and doubt. [Awareness that] does not realize [its object] is positable because all awarenesses to which an object appears but is not ascertained are it. When wrong view is divided, there are two because there are the two, conceptual wrong consciousness and non-conceptual wrong consciousness. Conceptual wrong consciousness is positable because for instance a conceptual consciousness apprehending sound as permanent and the apprehension of a self of persons are it. Non-conceptual wrong consciousness is positable because a sense-consciousness to which a snow mountain appears blue and a sense-consciousness to which a mirage appears as water each are it. Doubt is positable because doubt that thinks, “Is sound permanent or impermanent?” is it.
There is a definition of manifest phenomenon because object realized explicitly by a valid perception is it. The two, manifest phenomenon and thing, are equivalent. There is a definition of hidden phenomenon because object realized explicitly by an inferential valid cognition is it. The two, hidden phenomenon and existent, are equivalent.

Dispelling Objections

12. Someone says: It follows that the subject, uncompounded space, is a manifest phenomenon because of being an object realized explicitly by a valid perception. If you say [that the reason which is that uncompounded space is an object realized explicitly by a valid perception] is not established, it follows that the subject, uncompounded space, is an object realized explicitly by a valid perception because of being an object realized explicitly by an omniscient consciousness. If you say [that the reason which is that uncompounded space is an object realized explicitly by an omniscient consciousness] is not established, it follows that the subject, uncompounded space, is an object realized explicitly by an omniscient consciousness because of being an object realized by an omniscient consciousness.
Our response: [Being an object realized by an omniscient consciousness] does not entail [being an object realized explicitly by an omniscient consciousness]. If you say [that the reason which is that uncompounded space is an object realized by an omniscient consciousness] is not established, it follows that the subject, uncompounded space, is an object realized by an omniscient consciousness because of being an object of comprehension by an omniscient consciousness.

It follows that [uncompounded space is an object of comprehension by an omniscient consciousness] because of being an established base.
If you accept the root [assertion that uncompounded space is a manifest phenomenon], it follows that the subject, uncompounded space, is not a manifest phenomenon because of not being a thing.

13. Someone says: It follows that the subject, sound’s impermanence, is a hidden phenomenon because of being an object realized explicitly by an inferential valid cognition. If you say [that the reason which is that sound’s impermanence is an object realized explicitly by an inferential valid cognition] is not established, it follows that the subject, sound’s impermanence, is an object realized explicitly by an inferential valid cognition because of being an object realized explicitly by an inferential valid cognition which realizes that sound is impermanent. If you say [that the reason which is that sound’s impermanence is an object realized explicitly by an inferential valid cognition which realizes that sound is impermanent] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, sound’s impermanence, it is the object realized explicitly by an inferential valid cognition that realizes it because there is an inferential valid cognition that realizes it. If you say [that the reason which is that there is an inferential valid cognition that realizes sound’s impermanence] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, sound’s impermanence, there is an inferential valid cognition that realizes it because it is an established base. If you accept the above [assertion that sound’s impermanence is a hidden phenomenon], it follows that the subject, sound’s impermanence, is not a manifest phenomenon because of being a hidden phenomenon.
Our response: [Being a hidden phenomenon] does not entail [not being a manifest phenomenon].

If you accept the root [assertion that sound’s impermanence is not a manifest phenomenon], it follows that the subject, sound’s impermanence, is a manifest phenomenon because of being a thing.

14. Someone says: It follows that the subject, sound’s impermanence, is not manifest because of being a hidden phenomenon.
Our response: [Being a hidden phenomenon] does not entail [not being manifest].

If you say [that the reason which is that sound’s impermanence is a hidden phenomenon] is not established, it follows that the subject, sound’s impermanence, is a hidden phenomenon because of being an established base.

15. Someone says: It follows that the subject, [Maitreya’s] treatise Ornament for Clear Realization, is a consciousness because of being a valid cognition. If you say [that the reason which is that (Maitreya’s) treatise Ornament for Clear Realization is a valid cognition] is not established, it follows that the subject, [Maitreya’s] treatise Ornament for Clear Realization, is a valid cognition because of being a valid cognition [based on] scripture. If you say [that the reason which is that (Maitreya’s) treatise Ornament for Clear Realization is a valid cognition (based on) scripture] is not established, it follows that the subject, [Maitreya’s] treatise Ornament for Clear Realization, is a valid cognition [based on] scripture because it is a valid scripture.

Our response: [It being a valid scripture] does not entail [being a valid cognition (based on) scripture].
If you say [that the reason which is that (Maitreya’s) treatise *Ornament for Clear Realization* is a valid scripture] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, [Maitreya’s] treatise *Ornament for Clear Realization*, it is a valid scripture because it is a pure treatise.a

འབྲག་བཅོས་མངོན་མོགས་མོགས་རིང་ཚད་མ་ཡིན་པ་མ་དབ་ན།
འབྲག་བཅོས་མངོན་མོགས་ཆོས་ཅན།ཁྱོད་རང་ཚད་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ།

16. Someone says: It follows that the subject, rabbit horns, is a hidden phenomenon because of being an object of comprehension of an inferential valid cognition. If you say [that the reason which is that rabbit horns is an object of comprehension of an inferential valid cognition] is not established, it follows that the subject, rabbit horns, is an object of comprehension of an inferential valid cognition because inference is an object of comprehension of a valid cognition.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ།
རི་བོང་ʻ་ཆོས་ཅན།
ཇོག་ǽར་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ།

Our response: [Inference being an object of comprehension of a valid cognition] does not entail [being an object of comprehension of an inferential valid cognition].

[རེ་བོང་ʻ་ཚད་མའི་གཞལ་ད་ཡིན་ན།
རེ་བོང་ʻ་ཚད་མའི་གཞལ་ད་ཡིན་པས་མཁྱབ།
]

If you say [that the reason which is that inference is an object of comprehension of a valid cognition] is not established, it follows that with respect

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a “Pure treatise” (*bstan bcos rnam dag*) here refers to three types of treatises: those for focusing on dialectics (*thos rtsod sgrub pa lhur len pa*), those for overcoming suffering (*sdug bsgnal spong ba*), and those which have the [correct] meaning (*don dang ldan pa*).
to the subject, rabbit horns, inference is an object of comprehension of a valid cognition because inference is an object of comprehension of an omniscient consciousness.

If you say [that the reason which is that inference is an object of comprehension of an omniscient consciousness] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, rabbit horns, inference is an object of comprehension of an omniscient consciousness because inference exists.

If you say [that the reason which is that inference exists] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, rabbit horns, inference exists because of being without a self of persons.

17. Someone says: It follows that the subject, pot’s meaning generality, is apprehended by the conceptual consciousness apprehending pot because of being the apprehended object of the conceptual consciousness apprehending pot.

Our response: [Being the apprehended object of the conceptual consciousness apprehending pot] does not entail [(being) apprehended by the conceptual consciousness apprehending pot].
If you say [that the reason which is that pot’s meaning generality is the apprehended object of the conceptual consciousness apprehending pot] is not established, it follows that the subject, pot’s meaning generality, is the apprehended object of the conceptual consciousness apprehending pot because of being the appearing object of the conceptual consciousness apprehending pot.

If you accept the above [assertion that pot’s meaning generality is apprehended by the conceptual consciousness apprehending pot], it follows that with respect to the subject, the conceptual consciousness apprehending pot, pot’s meaning generality is not apprehended by it because it is a conceptual consciousness apprehending pot.
8. Exposition of the Presentation of Generality and Instance

1. Someone says: Being without a self entails being either a generality or an instance.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, rabbit horns, is either a generality or an instance because of being without a self. You have asserted the entailment [that being without a self entails being either a generality or an instance].

If you accept [that rabbit horns is either a generality or an instance], it [absurdly] follows that the subject, rabbit horns, exists because of being either a generality or an instance.

If you say [that being either a generality or an instance] does not entail [existing], it follows that there is entailment [that being either a generality or an instance entails existing] because being either a generality or an instance entails existing.
If you say [that the reason which is that being either a generality or an instance entails existing] is not established, it follows that being either a generality or an instance entails existing because (1) being a generality entails existing and (2) being an instance entails existing. Each of the reasons is easy.

2. Someone says: Being a generality entails not being an instance.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, thing, is not an instance because of being a generality. You have asserted the entailment [that being a generality entails not being an instance].
If you say [that the reason which is that pot is an instance of thing] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, pot, it is an instance of thing because it is a thing; it is related as one essence with thing; and many common loci of not being it but being a thing are established.

If you say that the first reason [which is that pot is a thing] is not established, it follows that the subject, pot, is a thing because of being impermanent.

If you say that the second reason [which is that pot is related as one essence with thing] is not established, it follows that the subject, pot, is related as one essence with thing because of being different-from-thing from the viewpoint of being of one essence, and if thing does not exist it must not exist.

If you say that the first reason [which is that pot is one essence with thing] is not established, it follows that the subject, pot, is one essence with thing because of being one-with-pot.
If you say that the second reason [which is that pot is different-from-thing] is not established, it follows that the subject, pot, is different-from-thing because of being form.

If you say that the third reason [which is that if thing does not exist pot must not exist] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, pot, if thing does not exist it must not exist because if thing does not exist then whatever might be imagined must be.

If you say that the third reason above [which is that many common loci of not being pot but being a thing are established] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, pot, many common loci of not being it but being a thing are established because a sandalwood pillar is it and also a juniper pillar is it.

If you accept the root [assertion that thing is not an instance], it follows that the subject, thing, is an instance because of being an instance of object of knowledge.
If you say [that the reason which is that thing is an instance of object of knowledge] is not established, it follows that the subject, thing, is an instance of object of knowledge because it is an object of knowledge; it is related as one essence with object of knowledge; and many common loci of not being it but being an object of knowledge are established.

If you say that the first reason [which is that thing is an object of knowledge] is not established, it follows that the subject, thing, is an object of knowledge because of being an established base.

If you say that the second reason [which is that thing is related as one essence with object of knowledge] is not established, it follows that the subject, thing, is related as one essence with object of knowledge because of being different-from-object-of-knowledge from the viewpoint of being of one essence, and if object of knowledge does not exist it must not exist.

If you say that the first reason [which is that thing is of one essence with object of knowledge] is not established, it follows that the subject, thing, is of one essence with object of knowledge because of being an object of knowledge.
If you say that the second reason [which is that thing is different-from-object-of-knowledge] is not established, it follows that the subject, thing, is different-from-object-of-knowledge because of being a thing.

If you say that the third reason [which is that if object of knowledge does not exist thing must not exist] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, thing, if object of knowledge does not exist it must not exist because if object of knowledge does not exist then whatever might be imagined must be.

If you say that the third reason above [which is that many common loci of not being thing but being an object of knowledge are established] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, thing, many common loci of not being it but being an object of knowledge are established because permanent phenomenon is it and also existent is it.

3. Someone says: Being a generality of thing entails being a generality of that which is able to perform a function.
Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, definiendum, is a generality of that which is able to perform a function because of being a generality of thing. You have asserted the entailment [that being a generality of thing entails being a generality of that which is able to perform a function].

If you say [that the reason which is that definiendum is a generality of thing] is not established, it follows that the subject, definiendum, is a generality of thing because thing is an instance of it.

If you say [that the reason which is that thing is an instance of definiendum] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, thing, it is an instance of definiendum because it is a definiendum; it is related as one essence with definiendum; and many common loci of not being it but being a definiendum are established.

If you say that the first reason [which is that thing is a definiendum] is not established, it follows that the subject, thing, is a definiendum because its definition exists. The reason is easy.
If you say that the second reason [which is that thing is related as one essence with definiendum] is not established, it follows that the subject, thing, is related as one essence with definiendum because of being different-from-definiendum from the viewpoint of being of one essence, and if definiendum does not exist it must not exist.

If you say that the first reason [which is that thing is of one essence with definiendum] is not established, it follows that the subject, thing, is of one essence with definiendum because of being a definiendum.

If you say that the third reason [which is that if definiendum does not exist thing must not exist] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, thing, if definiendum does not exist it must not exist because if definiendum does not exist then whatever might be imagined must be.
If you say that the third reason above [which is that many common loci of not being thing but being a definiendum are established] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, thing, many common loci of not being it but being a definiendum are established because object of knowledge is it and also existent is it.

If you accept the root [assertion that definiendum is a generality of that which is able to perform a function], it [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, definiendum, that which is able to perform a function is an instance of it because it is a generality of that which is able to perform a function. You have asserted the reason [which is that with respect to definiendum, it is a generality of that which is able to perform a function].

If you accept [that that which is able to perform a function is an instance of definiendum, it [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, that which is able to perform a function, it is a definiendum; it is related as one essence with definiendum; and many common loci of not being it but being a definiendum are established because it is an instance of definiendum. You have asserted the reason [which is that that which is able to perform a function is an instance of definiendum].
If you accept [that that which is able to perform a function is a definien-
dum; that which is able to perform a function is related as one essence with
definiendum; and many common loci of not being that which is able to
perform a function but being a definiendum are established], it [absurdly]
follows that with respect to the subject, that which is able to perform a
function, it is a definiendum because it is a definiendum; it is related as
one essence with definiendum; and many common loci of not being it but
being a definiendum are established. You have asserted the reason [which
is that that which is able to perform a function is a definiendum; that which
is able to perform a function is related as one essence with definiendum;
and many common loci of not being that which is able to perform a func-
tion but being a definiendum are established].

If you accept [that that which is able to perform a function is a definien-
dum], it [absurdly] follows that the subject, that which is able to perform
a function, is not a definition because of being a definiendum. You have
asserted the reason [which is that that which is able to perform a function
is a definiendum].
You cannot accept [that that which is able to perform a function is not a definition] because [it] is a definition.

It follows that [that which is able to perform a function is a definition] because of being the definition of thing.

4. Someone says: Being a generality of thing entails being a generality of impermanent.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, different-from-impermanent, is a generality of thing because of being a generality of thing. You have asserted the entailment [that being a generality of thing entails being a generality of impermanent].

If you say [that the reason which is that different-from-impermanent is a generality of thing] is not established, it follows that the subject, different-from-impermanent, is a generality of thing because thing is an instance of it.
If you say [that the reason which is that thing is an instance of different-from-impermanent] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, thing, it is an instance of different-from-impermanent because it is different-from-impermanent; it is related as one essence with different-from-impermanent; and many common loci of not being it but being different-from-impermanent are established.

If you say that the first reason [which is that thing is different-from-impermanent] is not established, it follows that the subject, thing, is different-from-impermanent because of (1) existing and (2) not being one-with-impermanent.

If you say that the second reason [which is that thing is related as one essence with different-from-impermanent] is not established, it follows that the subject, thing, is related as one essence with different-from-impermanent because of being different from different-from-impermanent from the viewpoint of being of one essence, and if different-from-impermanent does not exist it must not exist.
If you say that the third reason [which is that many common loci of not being thing but being different-from-impermanent are established] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, thing, many common loci of not being it but being different-from-impermanent are established because definition is it and definiendum is also it.

If you accept the root [assertion that different-from-impermanent is a generality of impermanent], it follows that the subject, different-from-impermanent, is not a generality of impermanent because impermanent is not an instance of it.

If you say [that the reason which is that impermanent is not an instance of different-from-impermanent] is not established, it follows that the subject, impermanent, is not an instance of different-from-impermanent because of not being different-from-impermanent.

If you say [that the reason which is that impermanent is not different-from-impermanent] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject,
impermanent, it is not different-from-it because it is without a self of persons.

5. Someone says: There is no common locus of being a generality of generality and also being an instance of instance.

Our response: It follows that there is a common locus of being a generality of generality and also being an instance of instance because permanent phenomenon is it.

If you say that the reason which is that permanent phenomenon is a common locus of being a generality of generality and also being an instance of instance] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, permanent phenomenon, it is a common locus of being a generality of generality and also being an instance of instance because it (1) is a generality of generality and (2) is also an instance of instance.

If you say that the first reason [which is that permanent phenomenon is a generality of generality] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, permanent phenomenon, it is a generality of generality because generality is an instance of it.
If you say [that the reason which is that generality is an instance of permanent phenomenon] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, generality, it is an instance of permanent phenomenon because it is a permanent phenomenon; it is related as one essence with permanent phenomenon; and many common loci of not being it but being a permanent phenomenon are established.

The first reason [which is that generality is a permanent phenomenon] is easy.

If you say that the second [reason which is that generality is related as one essence with permanent phenomenon] is not established, it follows that the subject, generality, is related as one essence with permanent phenomenon because of being different-from-permanent phenomenon from the viewpoint of being of one essence, and if permanent phenomenon does not exist it must not exist.

If you say that the third reason [which is that many common loci of not being generality but being a permanent phenomenon are established] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, generality, many common loci of not being it but being a permanent phenomenon are established because the two, permanent and thing, is it and the two, definiendum
and definition, is also it.

If you say that the second reason above [which is that permanent phenomenon is an instance of instance] is not established, it follows that the subject, permanent phenomenon, is an instance of instance because it is an instance; it is related as one essence with instance; and many common loci of not being it but being an instance are established.

If you say that the first reason [which is that permanent phenomenon is an instance] is not established, it follows that the subject, permanent phenomenon, is an instance because of being an instance of object of knowledge.

If you say [that the reason which is that permanent phenomenon is an instance of object of knowledge] is not established, it follows that the subject, permanent phenomenon, is an instance of object of knowledge because it is an object of knowledge; it is related as one essence with object of knowledge; and many common loci of not being it but being an object of knowledge are established.
Each of the reasons [which are that permanent phenomenon is an object of knowledge; permanent phenomenon is related as one essence with object of knowledge; and many common loci of not being a permanent phenomenon but being an object of knowledge are established] is easy.

If you say that the second reason [which is that permanent phenomenon is related as one essence with instance] is not established, it follows that the subject, permanent phenomenon, is related as one essence with instance because of being different-from-instance from the viewpoint of being of one essence, and if instance does not exist it must not exist.

If you say that the third reason of that [which is that many common loci of not being permanent phenomenon but being an instance are established] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, permanent phenomenon, many common loci of not being it but being an instance are established because pot is it and pillar is also it.

6. Someone says: There is no common locus that is both a generality and an instance of that which is not both a generality of permanent phenomenon and an instance of permanent phenomenon.
Our response: It follows that there is [a common locus that is both a generality and an instance of that which is not both a generality of permanent phenomenon and an instance of permanent phenomenon] because permanent phenomenon is it.

If you say [that the reason which is that permanent phenomenon is a common locus that is both a generality and an instance of that which is not both a generality of permanent phenomenon and an instance of permanent phenomenon] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, permanent phenomenon, it is a common locus that is both a generality and an instance of that which is not both a generality of permanent phenomenon and an instance of permanent phenomenon because (1) it is a generality that is not both a generality of permanent phenomenon and an instance of permanent phenomenon and (2) it is an instance that is not both a generality of permanent phenomenon and an instance of permanent phenomenon.

If you say that the first reason [which is that permanent phenomenon is a generality of that which is not both a generality of permanent phenomenon and an instance of permanent phenomenon] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, permanent phenomenon, it is a generality of that which is not both a generality of permanent phenomenon and an instance of permanent phenomenon and an instance of permanent phenomenon.
instance of permanent phenomenon because that which is not both a generality of permanent phenomenon and an instance of permanent phenomenon is an instance of it.

If you say [that the reason which is that that which is not both a generality of permanent phenomenon and an instance of permanent phenomenon is an instance of permanent phenomenon] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, that which is not both a generality of permanent phenomenon and an instance of permanent phenomenon, it is a permanent phenomenon because it is a permanent phenomenon; it is related as one essence with permanent phenomenon; and many common loci of not being it but being a permanent phenomenon are established.

If you say that the first reason [which is that that which is not both a generality of permanent phenomenon and an instance of permanent phenomenon is a permanent phenomenon] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, that which is not both a generality of permanent phenomenon and an instance of permanent phenomenon, it is a permanent phenomenon because of (1) being an existent and (2) not being a thing.
If you say that the second reason [which is that which is not both a
generality of permanent phenomenon and an instance of permanent phe-
nomenon is related as one essence with permanent phenomenon] is not
established, it follows that with respect to the subject, that which is not
both a generality of permanent phenomenon and an instance of permanent
phenomenon, it is related as one essence with permanent phenomenon be-
cause of being different-from-permanent-phenomenon from the viewpoint
of being of one essence, and if permanent phenomenon does not exist it
must not exist.

If you say that the third reason [which is that many common loci of not
being that which is not both a generality of permanent phenomenon and
an instance of permanent phenomenon but being a permanent phenome-
non are established] is not established, it follows that many common loci
of (1) not being that which is not both a generality of permanent phenom-
enon and an instance of permanent phenomenon and (2) being a permanent
phenomenon are established because many common loci of (1) being both
a generality of permanent phenomenon and an instance of permanent phe-
nomenon and (2) being a permanent phenomenon are established.

If you say [that the reason which is that many common loci of (1) being
that which is both a generality of permanent phenomenon and an instance of permanent phenomenon and (2) being a permanent phenomenon are established] is not established, it follows that many common loci of (1) being which is both a generality of permanent phenomenon and an instance of permanent phenomenon and (2) being a permanent phenomenon are established because generality is it and instance is also it.

If you say that the second reason above [which is that permanent phenomenon is an instance of that which is not both a generality of permanent phenomenon and an instance of permanent phenomenon] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, permanent phenomenon, it is an instance of that which is not both a generality of permanent phenomenon and an instance of permanent phenomenon because it is that which is not both a generality of permanent phenomenon and an instance of permanent phenomenon; it is related as one essence with that which is not both a generality of permanent phenomenon and an instance of permanent phenomenon; and many common loci of not being it but being that which is not both a generality of permanent phenomenon and an instance of permanent phenomenon are established.

If you say that the first reason [which is that permanent phenomenon is
that which is not both a generality of permanent phenomenon and an instance of permanent phenomenon] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, permanent phenomenon, it is that which is not both its generality and its instance because it is without a self of persons.

The second reason [which is that permanent phenomenon is related as one essence with that which is not both a generality of permanent phenomenon and an instance of permanent phenomenon] is easy.

If you say that the third reason [which is that many common loci of not being a permanent phenomenon but being that which is not both a generality of permanent phenomenon and an instance of permanent phenomenon are established] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, permanent phenomenon, many common loci of not being it but being that which is not both a generality of permanent phenomenon and an instance of permanent phenomenon are established because form is it and sound also is it.

7. Someone says: There is a common locus that is both a generality and an instance of that which is not both a generality of thing and an instance of thing.
Our response: It follows that there is no common locus that is both a generality and an instance of that which is not both a generality of thing and an instance of thing because there is no generality of that which is not both a generality of thing and an instance of thing.

If you say [that the reason which is that there is no generality of that which is not both a generality of thing and an instance of thing] is not established, it follows that there is no generality of that which is not both a generality of thing and an instance of thing because that which is not both a generality of thing and an instance of thing is not an instance.

If you say [that the reason which is that that which is not both a generality of thing and an instance of thing is not an instance] is not established, it follows that that which is not both a generality of thing and an instance of thing is not an instance of object of knowledge.
of thing and an instance of thing is not an instance of object of knowledge] is not established, it follows that the subject, that which is not both a generality of thing and an instance of thing, is not an instance of object of knowledge because many common loci of not being it but being an object of knowledge are not established.

If you say [that the reason which is that many common loci of (1) not being that which is not both a generality of thing and an instance of thing but (2) being an object of knowledge are not established] is not established, it follows that many common loci of (1) not being that which is not both a generality of thing and an instance of thing but (2) being an object of knowledge are not established because many common loci of (1) being both a generality and an instance of thing and (2) being an object of knowledge are not established.

8. Someone says: There is no instance of that which is not either a generality or an instance of that which is not either a generality or an instance.

Our response: It follows that there is [an instance of that which is not either a generality or an instance of that which is not either a generality or an
instance] because thing is it.

If you say [that the reason which is that thing is an instance of that which is not either a generality or an instance of that which is not either a generality or an instance] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, thing, it is an instance of that which is not either a generality or an instance of that which is not either a generality or an instance because it is that which is not either a generality or an instance of that which is not either a generality or an instance; it is related as one essence with that which is not either a generality or an instance of that which is not either a generality or an instance; and many common loci of not being it but being that which is not either a generality or an instance of that which is not either a generality or an instance are established.

If you say that the first reason [which is that thing is that which is not either a generality or an instance of that which is not either a generality or an instance] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, thing, it is that which is not either a generality or an instance because of being without a self.
The second reason [which is that thing is related as one essence with that which is not either a generality or an instance of that which is not either a generality or an instance] is easy.

If you say that the third reason [which is that many common loci of not being a thing but being that which is not either a generality or an instance of that which is not either a generality or an instance are established] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, thing, many common loci of not being it but being that which is not either a generality or an instance of that which is not either a generality or an instance are established because selflessness of persons is it and existent is also it.

9. Someone says: There is no common locus that is both a generality and an instance of that which is not either a generality or an instance of that which is not either a generality of object of knowledge or an instance of object of knowledge.
Our response: It follows that there is [a common locus that is both a generality and an instance of that which is not either a generality or an instance of that which is not either a generality of object of knowledge or an instance of object of knowledge] because generality is it.

If you say [that the reason which is that generality is a common locus that is both a generality and an instance of that which is not either a generality or an instance of that which is not either a generality of object of knowledge or an instance of object of knowledge] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, generality, it is a common locus that is both a generality and an instance of that which is not either a generality or an instance of that which is not either a generality of object of knowledge or an instance of object of knowledge because (1) it is a generality of that which is not either a generality or an instance of that which is not either a generality of object of knowledge or an instance of object of knowledge and (2) it is an instance of that which is not either a generality or an instance of that which is not either a generality of object of knowledge or an instance of object of knowledge.
If you say that the first reason [which is that generality is a generality of that which is not either a generality or an instance of that which is not either a generality of object of knowledge or an instance of object of knowledge] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, generality, it is a generality of that which is not either a generality or an instance of that which is not either a generality of object of knowledge or an instance of object of knowledge because that which is not either a generality or an instance of that which is not either a generality of object of knowledge or an instance of object of knowledge is an instance of it.

If you say [that the reason which is that that which is not either a generality or an instance of that which is not either a generality of object of knowledge or an instance of object of knowledge is an instance of generality] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, that which is not either a generality or an instance of that which is not either a generality of object of knowledge or an instance of object of knowledge, it is an instance of generality because it is a generality; it is related as one essence with generality; and many common loci of not being it but being a generality are established.
Each of the first two reasons [which are that that which is not either a
generality or an instance of that which is not either a generality of object
of knowledge or an instance of object of knowledge (1) is a generality and
(2) is related as one essence with generality] is easy.

If you say that the third reason [which is that many common loci of not
being that which is not either a generality or an instance of that which is
not either a generality of object of knowledge or an instance of object of
knowledge but being a generality are established] is not established, it fol-
lows that many common loci of (1) not being that which is not either a
generality or an instance of that which is not either a generality of object
of knowledge or an instance of object of knowledge but (2) being a gener-
ality are established because existent is it and also that which is observed
by valid cognition is it.

If you say that the first reason [which is that existent is a common locus of
(1) not being that which is not either a generality or an instance of that
which is not either a generality of object of knowledge or an instance of
object of knowledge but (2) being a generality] is not established, it fol-
lows that, with respect to the subject, existent, it is a common locus of (1)
not being that which is not either a generality or an instance of that which
is not either a generality of object of knowledge or an instance of object of
knowledge but (2) being a generality because it is a common locus of (1)
being either a generality or an instance of that which is not either a gener-
ality of object of knowledge or an instance of object of knowledge and (2)
being a generality.

If you say [that the reason which is that existent is a common locus of (1) being either a generality or an instance of that which is not either a generality of object of knowledge or an instance of object of knowledge and (2) being a generality] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, existent, it is either a generality or an instance of that which is not either a generality of object of knowledge or an instance of object of knowledge and (2) a generality.

If you say that the first reason [which is that existent is either a generality or an instance of that which is not either a generality of object of knowledge or an instance of object of knowledge] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, existent, it is either a generality or an instance of that which is not either a generality of object of knowledge or an instance of object of knowledge
or an instance of object of knowledge because it is a generality of that which is not either a generality of object of knowledge or an instance of object of knowledge.

If you say [that the reason which is that existent is a generality of that which is not either a generality of object of knowledge or an instance of object of knowledge] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, existent, it is a generality of that which is not either a generality of object of knowledge or an instance of object of knowledge because that which is not either a generality of object of knowledge or an instance of object of knowledge is an instance of it.

If you say [that the reason which is that that which is not either a generality of object of knowledge or an instance of object of knowledge is an instance of existent] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, that which is not either a generality of object of knowledge or an instance of object of knowledge, it is an instance of existent because it is an existent; it is related as one essence with existent; and many common loci of not being it but being an existent are established.
Each of the first two reasons [which are that that which is not either a
generality of object of knowledge or an instance of object of knowledge
(1) is an existent and (2) is related as one essence with existent] is easy.

If you say that the third reason [which is that many common loci of not
being that which is not either a generality of object of knowledge or an
instance of object of knowledge but being an existent are established] is
not established, it follows that many common loci of (1) not being that
which is not either a generality of object of knowledge or an instance of
object of knowledge and (2) being an existent are established because
product is it and thing is also it.

If you say that the second reason above [which is that generality is an in-
stance of that which is not either a generality or an instance of that which
is not either a generality of object of knowledge or an instance of object of
knowledge] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject,
generality, it is an instance of that which is not either a generality or an
instance of that which is not either a generality of object of knowledge or
an instance of object of knowledge because it is that which is not either a
generality or an instance of that which is not either a generality of object
of knowledge or an instance of object of knowledge; it is related as one
essence with that which is not either a generality or an instance of that
which is not either a generality of object of knowledge or an instance of
object of knowledge; and many common loci of (1) not being it but (2)
being that which is not either a generality or an instance of that which is
not either a generality of object of knowledge or an instance of object of knowledge are established.

If you say that the first reason [which is that generality is that which is not either a generality or an instance of that which is not either a generality of object of knowledge or an instance of object of knowledge] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, generality, it is that which is not either a generality or an instance of that which is not either a generality of object of knowledge or an instance of object of knowledge because (1) it is not a generality of that which is not either a generality of object of knowledge or an instance of object of knowledge and (2) it is not an instance of that which is not either a generality of object of knowledge or an instance of object of knowledge.
If you say that the first reason [which is that generality is not a generality of that which is not either a generality of object of knowledge or an instance of object of knowledge] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, generality, it is not a generality of that which is not either a generality of object of knowledge or an instance of object of knowledge because that which is not either a generality of object of knowledge or an instance of object of knowledge is not an instance of it.

If you say [that the reason which is that that which is not either a generality of object of knowledge or an instance of object of knowledge is not an instance of generality] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, that which is not either a generality of object of knowledge or an instance of object of knowledge, it is not an instance of generality because it is not a generality.

If you say [that the reason which is that that which is not either a generality of object of knowledge or an instance of object of knowledge is not a generality] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, that which is not either a generality of object of knowledge or an instance of object of knowledge, it is not a generality because there are no instances of it.
It follows that [there are no instances of that which is not either a generality of object of knowledge or an instance of object of knowledge] because being an instance entails being either a generality of object of knowledge or an instance of object of knowledge.

If you say that the second reason above [which is that generality is not an instance of that which is not either a generality of object of knowledge or an instance of object of knowledge] is not established, it follows that the subject, generality, is not an instance of that which is not either a generality of object of knowledge or an instance of object of knowledge because of being an instance of either a generality of object of knowledge or an instance of object of knowledge.

If you say [that the reason which is that generality is an instance of either a generality of object of knowledge or an instance of object of knowledge] is not established, it follows that the subject, generality, is an instance of either a generality of object of knowledge or an instance of object of knowledge because it is either a generality of object of knowledge or an instance of object of knowledge; it is related as one essence with either a generality of object of knowledge or an instance of object of knowledge; and many common loci of (1) not being it but (2) being either a generality of object of knowledge or an instance of object of knowledge are established.
If you say that the first reason [which is that generality is either a generality of object of knowledge or an instance of object of knowledge] is not established, it follows that the subject, generality, is either a generality of object of knowledge or an instance of object of knowledge because of being an instance of object of knowledge.

If you say that being an instance does not entail [being an instance of object of knowledge], it follows that there is entailment [that being an instance entails being an instance of object of knowledge] because the two, instance and instance of object of knowledge, are coextensive.

If you say that the second reason above [which is that many common loci...
of (1) not being a generality but (2) being either a generality of object of knowledge or an instance of object of knowledge are established] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, generality, many common loci of (1) not being it but (2) being either a generality of object of knowledge or an instance of object of knowledge are established because the two, pillar and pot, is it and the two, permanent and thing, is also it.

10. Someone says: That which (1) is not either a generality of permanent phenomenon or a generality of thing and (2) is either a generality of pot or a generality of pillar is not a generality of pot.

Our response: It follows that with respect to the subject, that which (1) is not either a generality of permanent phenomenon or a generality of thing and (2) is either a generality of pot or a generality of pillar, it is a generality of pot because pot is an instance of it.

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a This is actually the third reason.
If you say [that the reason which is that pot is an instance of that which (1)
is not either a generality of permanent phenomenon or a generality of thing
and (2) is either a generality of pot or a generality of pillar] is not estab-
lished, it follows that with respect to the subject, pot, it is an instance of
that which (1) is not either a generality of permanent phenomenon or a
generality of thing and (2) is either a generality of pot or a generality of
pillar because it is that which (1) is not either a generality of permanent
phenomenon or a generality of thing and (2) is either a generality of pot or
a generality of pillar; it is related as one essence with that which (1) is not
either a generality of permanent phenomenon or a generality of thing and
(2) is either a generality of pot or a generality of pillar; and many common
loci of not being it but being that which (1) is not either a generality of
permanent phenomenon or a generality of thing and (2) is either a gener-
ality of pot or a generality of pillar are established.

If you say that the first reason [which is that pot is that which (1) is not
either a generality of permanent phenomenon or a generality of thing and
(2) is either a generality of pot or a generality of pillar] is not established,
it follows that with respect to the subject, pot, it is that which (1) is not
either a generality of permanent phenomenon or a generality of thing and
(2) is either a generality of pot or a generality of pillar because it is that
which is not either a generality of permanent phenomenon or a generality of thing.

If you say [that the reason which is that pot is that which is not either a generality of permanent phenomenon or a generality of thing] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, pot, it is that which is not either a generality of permanent phenomenon or a generality of thing because (1) it is not a generality of permanent phenomenon and (2) it is not a generality of thing.

Each of the reasons [which are that pot (1) is not a generality of permanent phenomenon and (2) is not a generality of thing] is easy.

11. **Someone says:** That which (1) is not either a generality of permanent phenomenon or a generality of thing, (2) is not either a generality of pot or a generality of pillar, and (3) is either a generality of definition or a generality of definiendum is a generality of definition.
Our response: It follows that with respect to the subject, that which (1) is not either a generality of permanent phenomenon or a generality of thing, (2) is not either a generality of pot or a generality of pillar, and (3) is either a generality of definition or a generality of definiendum, it is not a generality of definition because definition is not an instance of it.

If you say [that the reason which is that definition is not an instance of that which (1) is not either a generality of permanent phenomenon or a generality of thing, (2) is not either a generality of pot or a generality of pillar, and (3) is either a generality of definition or a generality of definiendum] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, definition, it is not an instance of that which (1) is not either a generality of permanent phenomenon or a generality of thing, (2) is not either a generality of pot or a generality of pillar, and (3) is either a generality of definition or a generality of definiendum because it is not any of those.

If you say [that the reason which is that definition is not that which (1) is not either a generality of permanent phenomenon or a generality of thing,
(2) is not either a generality of pot or a generality of pillar, and (3) is either a generality of definition or a generality of definiendum] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, definition, it is not that which (1) is not either a generality of permanent phenomenon or a generality of thing, (2) is not either a generality of pot or a generality of pillar, and (3) is either a generality of definition or a generality of definiendum because (1) it is not that which is not either a generality of permanent phenomenon or a generality of thing and that which is not either a generality of pot or a generality of pillar, (2) it also is not a generality of definition, and (3) it also is not a generality of definiendum.

If you say that the first reason [which is that definition is not that which is not either a generality of permanent phenomenon or a generality of thing and that which is not either a generality of pot or a generality of pillar] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, definition, it is not that which (1) is not either a generality of permanent phenomenon or a generality of thing and (2) is not either a generality of pot or a generality of pillar because it (1) is not either a generality of permanent phenomenon or a generality of thing and (2) is either a generality of pot or a generality of pillar.
If you say [that the reason which is that definition (1) is not either a generality of permanent phenomenon or a generality of thing and (2) is either a generality of pot or a generality of pillar] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, definition, it (1) is not either a generality of permanent phenomenon or a generality of thing and (2) is either a generality of pot or a generality of pillar because it is that which is not either a generality of permanent phenomenon or a generality of thing.

If you say [that the reason which is that definition is that which is not either a generality of permanent phenomenon or a generality of thing] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, definition, it is that which is not either a generality of permanent phenomenon or a generality of thing because (1) it is not a generality of permanent phenomenon and (2) it is also not a generality of thing.
Each of the reasons [which are that definition (1) is not a generality of permanent phenomenon and (2) is also not a generality of thing] is easy.

If you say that the second reason above [which is that definition is also not a generality of definiendum] is not established, it follows that the subject, definition, is also not a generality of definiendum because definiendum is an instance of it.

Our Own System

There is a definition of generality because phenomenon that encompasses its own manifestations is it. When generality is divided, there are three because there are the three: collection generality, type generality, and meaning generality.

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a This is actually the third reason in the above statement “If you say [that the reason which is that definition is not that which (1) is not either a generality of permanent phenomenon or a generality of thing, (2) is not either a generality of pot or a generality of pillar, and (3) is a generality of definition or a generality of definiendum] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, definition, it is not that which (1) is not either a generality of permanent phenomenon or a generality of thing, (2) is not either a generality of pot or a generality of pillar, and (3) is a generality of definition or a generality of definiendum because (1) it is not that which is not either a generality of permanent phenomenon or a generality of thing and that which is not either a generality of pot or a generality of pillar, (2) it also is not a generality of definition, and (3) it also is not a generality of definiendum.”
There is a definition of collection generality because *coarse form that is a conglomeration of its many parts* is it. There is an illustration because pot is it.

There is a definition of pot’s meaning generality because *a factor of superimposition that, while not being one with pot, appears as like one [with pot] to a conceptual consciousness apprehending pot* is it. It is similar for the definition of meaning generality of everything that is without a self.

There is a definition of type generality because *phenomenon that is concomitant with many [phenomena] having its type* is it. The two, type generality and generality, are equivalent. There is an illustration because object of knowledge is it.

There are four permutations of being or not being both a type generality and a collection generality because there are the four: the permutation that is a type generality but is not a collection generality; the permutation that is a collection generality but is not a type generality; the permutation that is both a type generality and a collection generality; and the permutation that is neither a type generality nor a collection generality. There is the permutation that is a type generality but is not a collection generality because permanent phenomenon is it. There is the permutation that is a collection generality but is not a type generality because the two, pillar and
pot, is it. There is the permutation that is both a type generality and a collection generality because form is it. There is the permutation that is neither a type generality nor a collection generality because pot’s isolate is it.

Dispelling Objections

12. Someone says: It follows that the subject, thing, is the appearing object of a conceptual consciousness because of being a meaning generality. If you say [that the reason which is that thing is a meaning generality] is not established, it follows that the subject, thing, is a meaning generality because of being either a meaning generality or an instance.
Our response: [Being either a meaning generality or an instance] does not entail [being a meaning generality].

If you say [that the reason which is that object is either a generality or an instance] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, thing, object is either a generality or an instance because object exists.

If you say [that the reason which is that object exists] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, thing, object exists because of being without a self of persons.

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a This part of the debate revolves around the multivalence of the word don (“meaning,” “object” as well as “aim,” “goal,” “purpose”) and the possibility of reading a single construction in more than one way syntactically. The fulcrum of this point is the Tibetan term don spyi dang bye brag. This can be read in several ways. One is as the terms don spyi (“meaning generality”) and bye brag (“instance”). A second reading is as don (“object” rather than “meaning”) and spyi dang bye brag (“generality or instance”).
9. Exposition of the Presentation of Contradiction and Relation

[Refutation of Others’ Systems]


Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, one-with-pot, is contradictory-with-pot because of being contradictory with contradictory-with-pot. You have asserted the entailment [that being contradictory with contradictory-with-pot entails being contradictory-with-pot].

If you say [that the reason which is that one-with-pot is contradictory with contradictory-with-pot] is not established, it follows that the subject, one-with-pot, is contradictory with contradictory-with-pot because (1) it is different from contradictory-with-pot and (2) there is no common locus of being it and also being contradictory-with-pot.
The first reason [which is that one-with-pot is different from contradictory-with-pot] is easy.

If you say that the second [reason which is that there is no common locus of being one-with-pot and also being contradictory-with-pot] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, pot, there is no common locus of being one-with-it and also being contradictory-with-it because it is an established base.

If you accept the root [assertion that one-with-pot is contradictory-with-pot], it follows that the subject, one-with-pot, is not contradictory-with-pot because of being non-contradictory-with-pot.

If you say [that the reason which is that one-with-pot is non-contradictory-with-pot] is not established, it follows that the subject, one-with-pot, is non-contradictory-with-pot because there is a common locus of being it and also being pot.
It follows that [there is a common locus of being one-with-pot and also being pot] because pot is it.

If you say [that the reason which is that pot is a common locus of being one-with-pot and also being pot] is not established, it follows that the subject, pot, is a common locus of (1) it being one-with-it and also (2) it being non-contradictory-with-it because it is an established base.


Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, one-with-permanent-phenomenon, is contradictory with contradictory-with-thing because of being contradictory-with-thing. You have asserted the entailment [that being contradictory-with-thing entails being contradictory with contradictory-with-thing].
If you say [that the reason which is that one-with-permanent-phenomenon is contradictory-with-thing] is not established, it follows that the subject, one-with-permanent-phenomenon, is contradictory-with-thing because (1) it is different-from-thing and (2) there is no common locus of being it and also being a thing.

The second reason [which is that other than permanent phenomenon, there is not a single phenomenon (that is one-with-permanent-phenomenon)] is easy.

\[ Since permanent phenomenon is not a thing it is not a common locus of (1) being one-with-permanent-phenomenon and (2) also being a thing. \]
If you say that the first [reason which is that permanent phenomenon is not a common locus of being one-with-permanent-phenomenon and also being a thing] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, permanent phenomenon, it is not a common locus of being one-with-permanent-phenomenon and also being a thing because it is not a thing.

If you accept the root [assertion that one-with-permanent-phenomenon is contradictory with contradictory-with-thing], it follows that the subject, one-with-permanent-phenomenon, is not contradictory with contradictory-with-thing because of being non-contradictory with contradictory-with-thing.

If you say [that the reason which is that one-with-permanent-phenomenon is non-contradictory with contradictory-with-thing] is not established, it follows that the subject, one-with-permanent-phenomenon, is non-contradictory with contradictory-with-thing because there is a common locus of being it and also being contradictory-with-thing.

If you say [that the reason which is that there is a common locus of being one-with-permanent-phenomenon and also being contradictory-with-thing] is not established, it follows that the subject, one-with-permanent-phenomenon and also being contradictory-with-thing.
thing] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, one-with-permanent-phenomenon, there is a common locus of being it and also being contradictory-with-thing because permanent phenomenon is it.

If you say [that the reason which is that permanent phenomenon is a common locus of being one-with-permanent-phenomenon and also being contradictory-with-thing] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, permanent phenomenon, it is a common locus of being one-with-permanent-phenomenon and also being contradictory-with-thing because (1) it is one-with-permanent-phenomenon and (2) it is contradictory-with-thing.

If you say that the first reason [which is that permanent phenomenon is one-with-permanent-phenomenon] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, permanent phenomenon, it is one-with-it because it is an established base.

If you say that the second reason [which is that permanent phenomenon is contradictory-with-thing] is not established, it follows that the subject, per-
The first reason [which is that permanent phenomenon is different-from-thing] is easy.

If you say that the second reason [which is that there is no common locus of being permanent phenomenon and also being thing] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, permanent phenomenon, there is no common locus of being it and also being thing because it is one-with-permanent-phenomenon.

3. Someone says: There is no common locus of being (1) contradictory with contradictory-with-existent, (2) non-contradictory with non-contradictory-with-existent, (3) related with related-with-existent, and (4) non-related with non-related-with-existent.
Our response: It follows that [there is a common locus of being (1) contradictory with contradictory-with-existent, (2) non-contradictory with non-contradictory-with-existent, (3) related with related-with-existent, and (4) non-related with non-related-with-existent] because non-related-with-existent is it.

If you say [that the reason which is that non-related-with-existent is a common locus of being (1) contradictory with contradictory-with-existent, (2) non-contradictory with non-contradictory-with-existent, (3) related with related-with-existent, and (4) non-related with non-related-with-existent] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, non-related-with-existent, it is a common locus of being (1) contradictory with contradictory-with-existent, (2) non-contradictory with non-contradictory-with-existent, (3) related with related-with-existent, and (4) non-related with non-related-with-existent because it is (1) contradictory with contradictory-with-existent, (2) non-contradictory with non-contradictory-with-existent, (3) related with related-with-existent, and (4) non-related with non-related-with-existent.
If you say that the first reason [which is that non-related-with-existent is contradictory with contradictory-with-existent] is not established, it follows that the subject, non-related-with-existent, is contradictory with contradictory-with-existent because it is different from contradictory-with-existent and there is no common locus of being it and also being contradictory-with-existent.

The first reason [which is that non-related-with-existent is different from contradictory-with-existent] is easy.

If you say that the second [reason which is that there is no common locus of being non-related-with-existent and also being contradictory-with-existent] is not established, it follows that there is no common locus of being related-with-existent and also being contradictory-with-existent because being contradictory-with-existent entails being related-with-existent.
It follows that [being contradictory-with-existent entails being related-with-existent] because being different-from-existent entails being related-with-existent.

If you say that the second reason [which is that non-related-with-existent is non-contradictory with non-contradictory-with-existent] is not established, it follows that the subject, non-related-with-existent, is non-contradictory with non-contradictory-with-existent because there is a common locus of being it and also being non-contradictory-with-existent.

If you say [that the reason which is that existent is a common locus of being non-related-with-existent and also being non-contradictory-with-existent] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, existent, it is a common locus of being non-related-with-it and also being non-contradictory-with-it because it is an established base.
If you say that the third reason [which is that non-related with existent is related with related-with-existent] is not established, it follows that the subject, non-related with existent, is related with related-with-existent because of being related as one essence with related-with-existent.

If you say [that the reason which is that non-related with existent is related as one essence with related-with-existent] is not established, it follows that the subject, non-related with existent, is related as one essence with related-with-existent because of being an instance of existent.

If you say that the fourth reason [which is that non-related with existent is non-related with non-related-with-existent] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, non-related with existent, it is non-related-with-it because it is without a self of persons.


If you say that the first reason [which is that one-with-permanent-phenomenon is non-contradictory with contradictory-with-the-two-pillar-and-pot] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, one-with-permanent-phenomenon, it is non-contradictory with contradictory-with-the-two-pillar-and-pot because there is a common locus of being it and also being contradictory-with-the-two-pillar-and-pot.
It follows that [there is a common locus of being one-with-permanent-phenomenon and also being contradictory-with-the-two-pillar-and-pot] because permanent phenomenon is it.

If you say [that the reason which is that permanent phenomenon is a common locus of being one-with-permanent-phenomenon and also being contradictory-with-the-two-pillar-and-pot] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, permanent phenomenon, it is a common locus of being one-with-it and also being contradictory-with-the-two-pillar-and-pot because it is contradictory-with-the-two-pillar-and-pot.

If you say that the second reason [which is that one-with-permanent-phenomenon is contradictory with non-contradictory-with-the-two-pillar-and-pot] is not established, it follows that the subject, one-with-permanent-phenomenon, is contradictory with non-contradictory-with-the-two-pillar-and-pot because (1) it is different-from-non-contradictory-with-the-two-pillar-and-pot and (2) there is no common locus of being it and also being non-contradictory-with-the-two-pillar-and-pot.
If you say [that the reason which is that there is no common locus of being one-with-permanent-phenomenon and also being non-contradictory-with-the-two-pillar-and-pot] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, one-with-permanent-phenomenon, there is no common locus of being it and also being non-contradictory-with-the-two-pillar-and-pot because (1) permanent phenomenon would have to be that [common locus] but it is not\(^a\) and (2) other than permanent phenomenon, there is not a single phenomenon [that is one-with-permanent-phenomenon].

The second reason [which is that other than permanent phenomenon, there is not a single phenomenon that is one-with-permanent-phenomenon] is easy.

If you say that the first [reason which is that permanent phenomenon would have to be the common locus of being one-with-permanent-phenomenon and also being non-contradictory-with-the-two-pillar-and-pot but it is not] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, permanent phenomenon, it is not a common locus of being one-with-permanent-phenomenon and also being non-contradictory-with-the-two-pillar-and-pot because it is not non-contradictory-with-the-two-pillar-and-pot.

\(^a\) Because permanent phenomenon is the only phenomenon that is one-with-permanent-phenomenon, permanent phenomenon would have to be the common locus of (1) being one-with-permanent-phenomenon and (2) also being non-contradictory-with-the-two-pillar-and-pot, but it is not the latter.
If you say [that the reason which is that permanent phenomenon is not non-contradictory-with-the-two-pillar-and-pot] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, permanent phenomenon, it is not non-contradictory-with-the-two-pillar-and-pot because it is contradictory-with-the-two-pillar-and-pot.

If you say [that the reason which is that permanent phenomenon is contradictory-with-the-two-pillar-and-pot] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, permanent phenomenon, it is contradictory-with-the-two-pillar-and-pot because (1) it is different-from-the-two-pillar-and-pot and (2) there is no common locus of being it and also being the two, pillar and pot.

If you say that the third reason above [which is that one-with-permanent-phenomenon is non-related with related-with-the-two-pillar-and-pot] is not established, it follows that the subject, one-with-permanent-phenomenon, is non-related with related-with-the-two-pillar-and-pot because of not being related with related-with-the-two-pillar-and-pot.
If you say [that the reason which is that one-with-permanent-phenomenon is not related with related-with-the-two-pillar-and-pot] is not established, it follows that the subject, one-with-permanent-phenomenon, is not related with related-with-the-two-pillar-and-pot because if related-with-the-two-pillar-and-pot does not exist, it does not necessarily not exist.

If you say [that the reason which is that if related-with-the-two-pillar-and-pot does not exist, one-with-permanent-phenomenon does not necessarily not exist] is not established, it [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, a locus of pot’s negation, one-with-permanent-phenomenon does not exist because related-with-the-two-pillar-and-pot does not exist. You have asserted the entailment [that related-with-the-two-pillar-and-pot not existing entails one-with-permanent-phenomenon not existing].

If you accept [that with respect to a locus of pot’s negation in terms of the subject, a locus of pot’s negation, one-with-permanent-phenomenon in terms of the subject, a locus of pot’s negation, does not exist], it follows that with respect to the subject, a locus of pot’s negation, one-with-permanent-phenomenon exists because permanent phenomenon exists.
It follows that [with respect to a locus of pot’s negation in terms of the subject, a locus of pot’s negation, permanent phenomenon in terms of the subject, a locus of pot’s negation, exists] because [it] is without a self of persons.

If you say that the fourth reason [which is that one-with-permanent-phenomenon is related with non-related-with-the-two-pillar-and-pot] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, one-with-permanent-phenomenon, it is related with non-related-with-the-two-pillar-and-pot because it is related as one essence with non-related-with-the-two-pillar-and-pot.

If you say [that the reason which is that one-with-permanent-phenomenon is related as one essence with non-related-with-the-two-pillar-and-pot] is not established, it follows that the subject, one-with-permanent-phenomenon, is related as one essence with non-related-with-the-two-pillar-and-pot because of being different-from-the-two-pillar-and-pot from the viewpoint of being of one essence, and if non-related-with-the-two-pillar-and-pot does not exist it must not exist.
Each of the reasons [which are that (1) one-with-permanent-phenomenon is different-from-the-two-pillar-and-pot from the viewpoint of being of one essence, and (2) if non-related-with-the-two-pillar-and-pot does not exist, one-with-permanent-phenomenon must not exist] is easy.

Our Own System

There is a definition of contradictory because [phenomena which are] different and of which a common locus is not possible is it. There is an illustration because the two, permanent phenomenon and thing, are it.

There is a definition of contradictory-with-thing because that with respect to which (1) it is different-from-thing and (2) a common locus of being it and also being thing is not possible is it. There is an illustration because the two, pillar and pot, is it.
There is a definition of contradictory with contradictory-with-thing because that with respect to which (1) it is different from contradictory-with-thing and (2) a common locus of being it and also being contradictory-with-thing is not possible is it.

There is a definition of contradictory with non-contradictory-with-thing because that with respect to which (1) it is different from non-contradictory-with-thing and (2) a common locus of being it and also being non-contradictory-with-thing is not possible is it.

There is a definition of contradictory with non-contradictory with non-contradictory-with-thing because that with respect to which (1) it is different from non-contradictory with non-contradictory-with-thing and (2) a common locus of being it and also being non-contradictory with non-contradictory-with-thing is not possible is it.
Contradiction and Relation

There is a definition of contradictory with contradictory with contradictory-with-thing because that with respect to which (1) it is different from contradictory with contradictory-with-thing and (2) a common locus of being it and also being contradictory with contradictory-with-thing is not possible is it.

There is a definition of non-contradictory with pot because that with respect to which (1) it is non-different from pot and (2) there is a common locus of being it and also being a pot is it.

There is a definition of non-contradictory with the two, pillar and pot, because that with respect to which (1) it is non-different from the two, pillar and pot, and (2) there is a common locus of being it and also being the two, pillar and pot, is it.

There is a definition of non-contradictory with contradictory-with-pot because that with respect to which (1) it is non-different from contradictory-with-pot and (2) there is a common locus of being it and also being contradictory-with-pot is it.
There is a definition of non-contradictory with non-contradictory-with-pot because that with respect to which (1) it is non-different from non-contradictory-with-pot and (2) there is a common locus of being it and also being non-contradictory-with-pot is it.

There is a definition of related with thing because (1) that which is either related as one essence with thing or is an effect of thing and (2) for which if thing does not exist, it must not exist is it. When related with thing is divided, there are two because there are the two, related as one essence with thing and causally related with thing.
There is a definition of related as one essence with thing because (1) that which is different-from-thing from the viewpoint of being of one essence and (2) if thing does not exist, it must not exist is it. There is an illustration because pot is it.

There is a definition of causally related with thing because (1) that which is arisen in dependence upon thing and (2) if thing does not exist, it must not exist is it. There is an illustration because subsequent arising of thing is it. It is similar for other things.

Dispelling Objections
5. Someone says: It follows that the subjects, the two, existent and non-existent, are different and that a common locus [of being them] is not possible because of being contradictory. You have asserted the entailment [that being contradictory entails being different and that a common locus of being them is not possible]. If you accept the root [assertion that the two, existent and non-existent, are different and that a common locus of being them is not possible], it follows that the subjects, the two, existent and non-existent, exist because of being different.

Our response: This is an answer of a faulty system of application.

6. Someone says: It follows that the subject, smoke, is causally related because of being causally related with fire.

Our response: [Being causally related with fire] does not entail [being causally related].

If you accept [that smoke is causally related], it follows that the subject, smoke, is not causally related because of not being related.
If you say [that the reason which is that smoke is not related] is not established, it follows that the subject, smoke, is not related because of not being different.

If you say [that not being different] does not entail [not being a relation], it follows that there is entailment [that not being different entails not being related] because whatever is related necessarily is different.

If you say [that the reason which is that whatever is related necessarily is different] is not established, it follows that whatever is related necessarily is different because (1) whatever is related as one essence necessarily is different and (2) whatever is causally related necessarily is different.

Each of the reasons [which are that (1) whatever is related necessarily is different and (2) whatever is causally related necessarily is different] is easy.

7. Someone says: It follows that causally related does not exist because smoke is not that and pot also is not that.
Our response: [That smoke is not that and pot also is not that] does not entail [that causally related does not exist].

You cannot accept [that causally related does not exist] because the two, fire and smoke, are it.

If you say [that the reason which is that the two, fire and smoke, are causally related] is not established, it follows that the subject, the two, fire and smoke, are causally related because of being cause and effect.

If you say [that the reason which is that the two, fire and smoke, are cause and effect] is not established, it follows that the subject, the two, fire and smoke, are cause and effect because of being mutual produced-producer.

8. Someone says: It follows that the subject, pot, is causally related because of being cause and effect. If you say [that the reason which is that pot is cause and effect] is not established, it follows that the subject, pot, is cause and effect because of being both a cause and an effect.

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*Read bskyed bya for skyed bya, 51a.1.*
Our response: [Being both a cause and an effect] does not entail [being cause and effect].

The reason [which is that pot is both a cause and an effect] is established because [pot] is a thing.

9. Someone says: It follows that the subject, the two, pillar and pot, is a type generality because there is an instance of type.

Our response: Again, [that there is an instance of type] does not entail [being a type generality].

10. Someone says: It follows that the subject, thing, is related as one essence with pot because of being different-from-pot from the viewpoint of being of one essence.

Our response: [Being different-from-pot from the viewpoint of being of one essence] does not entail [being related as one essence with pot].
If you say [that the reason which is that thing is different-from-pot from the viewpoint of being of one essence] is not established, it follows that the subject, thing, is different-from-pot from the viewpoint of being of one essence because of being (1) one essence with pot and (2) different-from-pot.

Each of the reasons [which are that thing is (1) one essence with pot and (2) different-from-pot] is established because [thing] is a generality of pot.

If you accept the above [assertion that thing is related as one essence with pot], it follows that the subject, thing, is not related as one essence with pot because pot not existing does not entail that it does not exist.

11. Someone says: It follows that with respect to the subject, pot, there is a common locus of being it and also being pot because it is non-contradictory-with-pot.

Our response: [That it is non-contradictory-with-pot] does not entail [that there is a common locus of being it and also being pot].
If you accept [that there is a common locus of being pot and also being pot], it [absurdly] follows that there is a common locus of the two, pot and pot, because there is a common locus of (1) being pot and also of (2) being pot. You have asserted the reason [which is that there is a common locus of (1) being pot and also of (2) being pot].

If you accept [that there is a common locus of the two, pot and pot], it follows that with respect to the subject, the two, pot and pot, its common locus does not exist because it is singular.

If you say [that something being singular] does not entail [that its common locus does not exist], it follows that there is entailment [that something being singular entails that its common locus does not exist] because in order to posit the common locus of two phenomena the two phenomena must be different.
10. Exposition of the Presentation of Definition and Definiendum

[Refutation of Others’ Systems]

1. Someone says: The triply qualified imputed existent which is⁠ that which is able to perform a function is the definition of that which is able to perform a function’s definiendum, and when all three properties of the imputed existent which is that which is able to perform a function are enumerated, these three are enumerated: [it] (1) in general, is a definiendum; (2) is established in terms of its illustrations; and (3) is not a definiendum of another [phenomenon] that is not that which is able to perform a function.

Our response: In that case, it [absurdly] follows that the subject, pillar, is the definiendum of that which is able to perform a function because of being the triply qualified imputed existent which is⁠ that which is able to perform a function.

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² This debate hinges on two different uses of the genitive case, which here could be translated either as “the triply qualified imputed existent which is that which is able to perform a function” or “the triply qualified imputed existent of that which is able to perform a function.”

³ This hinges on two different uses of the genitive case, which here could be translated either as “the triply qualified imputed existent which is that which is able to perform a function.”
If you say [that the reason which is that pillar is all three properties of the imputed existent which is that which is able to perform a function] is not established, it follows that the subject, pillar, is all three properties of the imputed existent which is that which is able to perform a function because of (1) being all three: (a) in general, is a definiendum; (b) is established in terms of its illustrations; and (c) is not a definiendum of another phenomenon that is not that which is able to perform a function; and (2) when all three properties of the imputed existent of that are enumerated by it, that is enumerated. You have asserted the reason [which is that pillar (1) is all three: (a) in general, is a definiendum; (b) is established in terms of its illustrations; and (c) is not a definiendum of another phenomenon which is not that which is able to perform a function; and (2) when all three properties of the imputed existent of that are enumerated by it, that is enumerated].
If you say that the first reason [which is that pillar is all three: in general, is a definiendum; is established in terms of its illustrations; and is not a definiendum of another phenomenon which is not that which is able to perform a function] is not established, it follows that the subject, pillar is all three: in general, is a definiendum; is established in terms of its illustrations; and is not a definiendum of another phenomenon which is not that which is able to perform a function because of being (1) in general, a definiendum; (2) established in terms of its illustrations; and (3) not a definiendum of another phenomenon that is not that which is able to perform a function.
If you say that the first reason [which is that pillar in general is a definiendum] is not established, it follows that the subject, pillar, in general is a definiendum because its definition exists.

It follows that [pillar’s definition exists] because that which is able to perform the function of supporting a rafter is it.

If you say that the second reason [which is that pillar is established in terms of its illustrations] is not established, it follows that the subject, pillar, is established in terms of its illustrations because its illustration exists.

If you say that the reason [which is that with respect to pillar, its illustration exists] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, pillar, its illustration exists because that which is able to perform the function of supporting a sandalwood rafter is it.

If you say that the third reason [which is that pillar is not a definiendum of another phenomenon which is not that which is able to perform a function] is not established, it follows that the subject, pillar, is not a definiendum of another phenomenon which is not that which is able to perform a function because there is no definition of it to posit which is not that which is able to perform a function.
If you accept the root [assertion that pillar is the definiendum of that which is able to perform a function], it [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, that which is able to perform a function, many definienda of it are established because (1) thing is its definiendum and (2) pillar is its definiendum. You have asserted the latter reason [which is that pillar is the definiendum of that which is able to perform a function].

If you say that the first reason [which is that thing is the definiendum of that which is able to perform a function] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, that which is able to perform a function, thing is its definiendum because it is thing’s definition.

If you accept the above [assertion that many definienda of that which is able to perform a function are established], it follows that with respect to the subject, that which is able to perform a function, many definienda of it are not established because it is a definition.
2. **Someone says:** The triply qualified substantial existent of object of knowledge is the definition of object of knowledge’s definition, and when all three substantially existent qualifications of object of knowledge are enumerated, these three are enumerated: [it] (1) in general, is a definition; (2) is established in terms of its illustrations; and (3) is not a definition of another [phenomenon] that is not object of knowledge.

**Our response:** In that case, it [absurdly] follows that the subject, that which is suitable as form, is the triply qualified substantial existent of object of knowledge because of being all three properties of a substantial existent that is an object of knowledge.

If you say [that the reason which is that that which is suitable as form is...]

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\[ Read \textit{yin pa} for \textit{yin par}, 52a.6. \]

\[ This hinges on two different uses of the genitive case, which here could be translated either as “all three properties of a substantial existent \textit{which is} an object of knowledge” or “all three properties of a substantial existent \textit{of} object of knowledge.” \]
all three properties of a substantial existent that is an object of knowledge] is not established, it follows that the subject, that which is suitable as form, is all three properties of a substantial existent that is an object of knowledge because of (1) being these three: (a) in general, is a definition; (b) is established in terms of its illustrations; and (c) is not a definition of another [phenomenon] that is not an object of knowledge; and (2) when all three properties of a substantial existent that is an object of knowledge are enumerated by it, these three are enumerated. You have asserted the reason [which is that that which is suitable as form (1) is these three: (a) in general, is a definition; (b) is established in terms of its illustrations; and (c) is not a definition of another [phenomenon] that is not an object of knowledge; and (2) when all three properties of a substantial existent that is an object of knowledge are enumerated by it, these three are enumerated].

If you say that the first reason [which is that that which is suitable as form (1) in general, is a definition; (2) is established in terms of its illustrations; and (3) is not a definition of another [phenomenon] that is not object of knowledge] is not established, it follows that the subject, that which is suitable as form, is these three: (1) in general, is a definition; (2) is established in terms of its illustrations; and (3) is not a definition of another [phenomenon] that is not an object of knowledge because [it] (1) in general, is a definition; (2) is established in terms of its illustrations, and (3) is not a definition of another [phenomenon] that is not an object of
knowledge.

If you say that the first reason [which is that that which is suitable as form in general is a definition] is not established, it follows that the subject, that which is suitable as form, in general is a definition because of being a definition.

It follows that [that which is suitable as form is a definition] because of being the definition of form.

If you say that the second reason [which is that that which is suitable as form is established in terms of its illustrations] is not established, it follows that the subject, that which is suitable as form, is established in terms of its illustrations because (1) it is established in terms of sound and (2) sound is its illustration.
If you say that the first reason [which is that that which is suitable as form is established in terms of sound] is not established, it follows that the subject, that which is suitable as form, is established in terms of sound because sound is it.

If you say that the third reason [which is that that which is suitable as form is not a definition of another phenomenon that is not an object of knowledge] is not established, it follows that the subject, that which is suitable as form, is not a definition of another [phenomenon] that is not an object of knowledge because of being without a self of persons.

If you accept the root [assertion that that which is suitable as form is the triply qualified substantial existent of object of knowledge], it [absurdly] follows that the subject, that which is suitable as form, is the definition of object of knowledge because of being the triply qualified substantial existent of object of knowledge. You have asserted the reason [which is that that which is suitable as form is the triply qualified substantial existent of object of knowledge].
If you accept [that that which is suitable as form is the triply qualified substantial existent of object of knowledge], it [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, object of knowledge, many definitions of it are established because (1) that which is suitable to be taken as the object of an awareness is it and (2) that which is suitable as form is it.

If you accept [that many definitions of object of knowledge are established], it follows that with respect to the subject, object of knowledge, many definitions of it are not established because it is without a self of persons.

3. Someone says: Being any of the three properties of the imputed existent which is that which is able to perform a function entails not being any of the three properties of the imputed existent which is that which is suitable to be taken as the object of an awareness.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, in general being a definiendum, is not any of the three properties of the imputed existent which is that which is suitable to be taken as the object of an awareness because of being any of the three properties of the imputed existent which is that which is able to perform a function. You have asserted the entailment [that being any of the three properties of the imputed existent which is that which is able to perform a function entails not being any of the three
properties of the imputed existent which is that which is suitable to be taken as the object of an awareness].

If you say [that the reason which is that in general being a definiendum is any of the three properties of the imputed existent which is that which is able to perform a function] is not established, it follows that the subject, in general being a definiendum, is any of the three properties of the imputed existent which is that which is able to perform a function because when the three properties of the imputed existent which is that which is able to perform a function are enumerated, it must be enumerated as one [of them].

4. Someone says: There is no common locus of being coextensive with the isolate of bulbous and also being a definiendum.

Our response: It follows that there is [a common locus of being coextensive with the isolate of bulbous and also being a definiendum] because pot’s definition is it.
If you say [that the reason which is that pot’s definition is coextensive with the isolate of bulbous] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, pot’s definition, it is coextensive with the isolate of bulbous because it is (1) coextensive with the isolate of bulbous and (2) a definiendum.

If you say that the first reason [which is that being pot’s definition entails being the isolate of bulbous] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, pot, being its definition entails being the isolate of bulbous because that which is bulbous is its definition.
If you say [that the second reason above [which is that the definition of pot’s definition exists] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, pot’s definition, its definition exists because the triply qualified substantial existent of pot is it.]
If you say [that the reason which is that the triply qualified substantial existent of pot is the definition of pot’s definition] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, pot, the triply qualified substantial existent of it is the definition of its definition because it is a definiendum.

5. Someone says: There is no common locus of being coextensive with thing’s isolate and also being a definition.

Our response: It follows that there is [a common locus of being coextensive with thing’s isolate and also being a definition] because the triply qualified imputed existent of that which is able to perform a function is it.
If you say that the first reason [which is that the triply qualified imputed existent of that which is able to perform a function is coextensive with thing’s isolate] is not established, it follows that the subject, the triply qualified imputed existent of that which is able to perform a function, is coextensive with thing’s isolate because being it entails being thing’s isolate and being thing’s isolate entails being it.

If you say that the first reason [which is that being the triply qualified imputed existent of that which is able to perform a function entails being thing’s isolate] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, that which is able to perform a function, being the triply qualified imputed existent of it entails being thing’s isolate because being its definiendum entails being thing’s isolate.
If you say [that the reason which is that being the definiendum of that which is able to perform a function entails being thing’s isolate] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, that which is able to perform a function, being its definiendum entails being thing’s isolate because it is thing’s definition.

If you say that the second reason [which is that being thing’s isolate entails being the triply qualified imputed existent of that which is able to perform a function] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, thing, being its isolate entails being the triply qualified imputed existent of that which is able to perform a function because it is the triply qualified imputed existent of that which is able to perform a function.

If you say [that the reason which is that thing is the triply qualified imputed existent of that which is able to perform a function] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, thing, it is the triply qualified imputed existent of that which is able to perform a function because it is the definiendum of that which is able to perform a function.
If you say that the second reason above [which is that the triply qualified imputed existent of that which is able to perform a function is a definition] is not established, it follows that the subject, the triply qualified imputed existent of that which is able to perform a function, is a definition because of being the definition of that which is able to perform a function’s definiendum.

If you say [that the reason which is that the triply qualified imputed existent of that which is able to perform a function is the definition of that which is able to perform a function’s definiendum] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, that which is able to perform a function, the triply qualified imputed existent of it is the definition of its definiendum because it is a definition.

6. Someone says: There is no common locus of being coextensive with the isolate of the non-triply qualified substantial existent of rabbit horns and also being a definition.
Our response: It follows that there is [a common locus of being coextensive with the isolate of the non-triply qualified substantial existent of rabbit horns and also being a definition] because the triply qualified substantial existent of that which is not the definition of rabbit horns is it.

If you say [that the reason which is that the triply qualified substantial existent of that which is not the definition of rabbit horns is a common locus of being coextensive with the isolate of the non-triply qualified substantial existent of rabbit horns and also being a definition] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, the triply qualified substantial existent of that which is not the definition of rabbit horns is coextensive with the isolate of the non-triply qualified substantial existent of rabbit horns and also being a definition because it is (1) coextensive with the isolate of the non-triply qualified substantial existent of rabbit horns and (2) a definition.
If you say that the first reason [which is that the triply qualified substantial existent of that which is not the definition of rabbit horns is coextensive with the isolate of the non-triply qualified substantial existent of rabbit horns] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, the triply qualified substantial existent of that which is not the definition of rabbit horns is coextensive with the isolate of the non-triply qualified substantial existent of rabbit horns because being it entails being the isolate of the non-triply qualified substantial existent of rabbit horns.

If you say that the first reason [which is that being the triply qualified substantial existent of that which is not the definition of rabbit horns entails being the isolate of the non-triply qualified substantial existent of rabbit horns] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, that which is not the definition of rabbit horns, being its triply qualified substantial existent entails being the isolate of the non-triply qualified substantial existent of rabbit horns because being its definition entails being the isolate of the non-triply qualified substantial existent of rabbit horns.
If you say [that the reason which is that which is not the definition of rabbit horns entails being the isolate of the non-triply qualified substantial existent of rabbit horns] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, that which is not the definition of rabbit horns, being its definition entails being the isolate of the non-triply qualified substantial existent of rabbit horns because it is the definiendum of the non-triply qualified substantial existent of rabbit horns.

If you say [that the reason which is that which is not the definition of rabbit horns is the definiendum of the non-triply qualified substantial existent of rabbit horns] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, rabbit horns, that which is not its definition is the definiendum of the non-triply qualified substantial existent of it because it is without a self of persons.
If you say that the second reason [which is that being the isolate of the non-triply qualified substantial existent of rabbit horns entails being the triply qualified substantial existent of that which is not the definition of rabbit horns] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, the non-triply qualified substantial existent of rabbit horns, being its isolate entails being the triply qualified substantial existent of that which is not the definition of rabbit horns because it is the triply qualified substantial existent of that which is not the definition of rabbit horns.

If you say [that the reason which is that the non-triply qualified substantial existent of rabbit horns is the triply qualified substantial existent of that which is not the definition of rabbit horns] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, the non-triply qualified substantial existent of rabbit horns, it is the triply qualified substantial existent of that which is not the definition of rabbit horns because it is the definition of that which is not the definition of rabbit horns.
If you say [that the reason which is that the non-triply qualified substantial existent of rabbit horns is the definition of that which is not the definition of rabbit horns] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, rabbit horns, the non-triply qualified substantial existent of it is the definition of that which is not the definition of it because it is without a self of persons.

If you say that the second reason above [which is that the triply qualified substantial existent of that which is not the definition of rabbit horns is a definition] is not established, it follows that the subject, the triply qualified substantial existent of that which is not the definition of rabbit horns, is a definition because of being the definition of the definition of that which is not the definition of rabbit horns.

If you say [that the reason which is that the triply qualified substantial existent of that which is not the definition of rabbit horns is the definition of the definition of that which is not the definition of rabbit horns] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, that which is not the definition of rabbit horns, the triply qualified substantial existent of it is the definition of the definition of it because it is a definiendum.
7. Someone says: There is no common locus of being coextensive with the isolate of the triply qualified imputed existent of the triply qualified imputed existent of triply qualified imputed existent and also being a definiendum.

Our response: It follows that there is [a common locus of being coextensive with the isolate of the triply qualified imputed existent of the triply qualified imputed existent of triply qualified imputed existent and also being a definiendum] because the definition of the definiendum of the triply qualified imputed existent of triply qualified imputed existent is it.

If you say [that the reason which is that the definition of the definiendum of the triply qualified imputed existent of triply qualified imputed existent is a common locus of being coextensive with the isolate of the triply qualified imputed existent of triply qualified imputed existent of]
triply qualified imputed existent and also being a definiendum] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, the definition of the definiendum of the triply qualified imputed existent of triply qualified imputed existent, it is a common locus of being coextensive with the isolate of the triply qualified imputed existent of the triply qualified imputed existent of triply qualified imputed existent and also being a definiendum because it is (1) coextensive with the isolate of the triply qualified imputed existent of the triply qualified imputed existent of triply qualified imputed existent and (2) a definiendum.

If you say that the first reason [which is that the definition of the definiendum of the triply qualified imputed existent of triply qualified imputed existent is coextensive with the isolate of the triply qualified imputed existent of the triply qualified imputed existent of triply qualified imputed existent] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, the definition of the definiendum of the triply qualified imputed existent of triply qualified imputed existent, it is coextensive with the isolate of the triply qualified imputed existent of the triply qualified imputed existent of triply qualified imputed existent because being the isolate of the triply qualified imputed existent of the triply qualified imputed existent of the triply qualified imputed existent of triply qualified imputed existent of triply qualified imputed existent...
qualified imputed existent entails being it and being it entails being the isolate of the triply qualified imputed existent of the triply qualified imputed existent of triply qualified imputed existent.

If you say that the first reason [which is that being the isolate of the triply qualified imputed existent of the triply qualified imputed existent of triply qualified imputed existent entails being the definition of the definiendum of the triply qualified imputed existent of triply qualified imputed existent] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, the triply qualified imputed existent of the triply qualified imputed existent of triply qualified imputed existent, being its isolate entails being the definition of the definiendum of the triply qualified imputed existent of triply qualified imputed existent because it is the definition of the definiendum of the triply qualified imputed existent of triply qualified imputed existent.
If you say [that the reason which is that the triply qualified imputed existent of the triply qualified imputed existent of triply qualified imputed existent is the definition of the definiendum of the triply qualified imputed existent of triply qualified imputed existent] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, the triply qualified imputed existent of triply qualified imputed existent, the triply qualified imputed existent of it is the definition of its definiendum because it is a definition.

[བཏགས་པའི་མཚོན་ཉིད་ཡིན་པས་ཁྱབ་པར་ཐལ། བཏགས་པའི་མཚོན་ཉིད་ཡིན་པའི་ཞིར།]
11. Exposition of the Presentation of Cha-pa’s System of Substantial Phenomena and Isolate Phenomena

[Refutation of Others’ Systems]

1. Someone says: It being itself entails that it is a substantial phenomenon.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, non-existent, is a substantial phenomenon because it is itself. You have asserted the entailment [that it being itself entails that it is a substantial phenomenon].

If you say [that the reason which is that non-existent is non-existent] is not established, it follows that the subject, non-existent, is non-existent because of not being existent.

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a This chapter is a presentation of substantial phenomena and isolate phenomena as found in the system of Cha-pa Chö-kyi-seng-gay (phywa pa chos kyi seng ge, 1109–1169), author of the first Collected Topics text. Ngag-wang-tra-shi holds that this system is propounded by Pur-bu-jog Jam-pa-gya-tsho (phur bu lcog byams pa rgya mtsho, 1825–1901), author of the textbooks used in the Se-ra-jay (se ra byas) and Gan-dan-jang-tsay (dga’ ldan byang rtse) monastic colleges (Daniel E. Perdue, Debate in Tibetan Buddhism [Ithaca, New York: Snow Lion Publication, 1992], xiii, 696).
If you accept the root [assertion that non-existent is a substantial phenomenon], it [absurdly] follows that the subject, non-existent, exists because of being a substantial phenomenon. You have asserted the reason [which is that non-existent is a substantial phenomenon].

You cannot accept [that non-existent exists] because of being non-established by valid cognition.

2. Someone says: (1) Being existent and (2) it being itself entails that it is a substantial phenomenon.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, permanent phenomenon, is a substantial phenomenon because (1) it is existent and (2) it is itself.

The first reason [which is that permanent phenomenon is existent] is easy.

If you say that the second [reason which is that permanent phenomenon is a permanent phenomenon] is not established, it follows that the subject, permanent phenomenon, is a permanent phenomenon because of (1) being existent and (2) not being a thing.
If you accept the root [assertion that permanent phenomenon is a substantial phenomenon], it [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, permanent phenomenon, (1) it is an established base, (2) it is itself, (3) non-it is not it, and (4) its isolate is non-contradictory with substantial phenomenon because it is a substantial phenomenon. You have asserted the reason [which is that permanent phenomenon is a substantial phenomenon].

If you accept [that (1) permanent phenomenon is an established base, (2) permanent phenomenon is a permanent phenomenon, (3) non-permanent phenomenon is not a permanent phenomenon, and (4) permanent phenomenon’s isolate is non-contradictory with substantial phenomenon], it [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, permanent phenomenon, non-it is not it because it is a substantial phenomenon. You have asserted the reason [which is that permanent phenomenon is a substantial phenomenon].

If you accept [that non-permanent phenomenon is not a permanent phenomenon], it [absurdly] follows that non-permanent phenomenon is not a permanent phenomenon because you have asserted this.
If you accept [that non-permanent phenomenon is not a permanent phenomenon], it [absurdly] follows that the subject, non-permanent phenomenon, is a thing because of (1) being existent and (2) not being a permanent phenomenon.

The second reason [which is that non-permanent phenomenon is not a permanent phenomenon] is easy.

The first [reason which is that non-permanent phenomenon is an existent] is established because sound is it.

If you accept the above [assertion that non-permanent phenomenon is a thing], it follows that with respect to the subject, permanent phenomenon, non-it is not a thing because non-it is a permanent phenomenon.

If you say [that the reason which is that non-permanent phenomenon is a permanent phenomenon] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, permanent phenomenon, non-it is a permanent phenomenon because non-it exists.

3. **Someone says:** Being an isolate phenomenon entails being one of the first three isolate phenomena.
Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, contradictory with substantial phenomenon, is one of the first three isolate phenomena because of being an isolate phenomenon. You have asserted the entailment [that being an isolate phenomenon entails being one of the first three isolate phenomena].

If you say [that the reason which is that contradictory with substantial phenomenon is an isolate phenomenon] is not established, it follows that the subject, contradictory with substantial phenomenon, is an isolate phenomenon because of being substantially concordant with substantial phenomenon.

If you say [that the reason which is that contradictory with substantial phenomenon is substantially concordant with substantial phenomenon] is not established, it follows that the subject, contradictory with substantial phenomenon, is substantially concordant with substantial phenomenon because it is an established base; it is itself; non-it is not it; and its isolate is non-contradictory with substantially-concordant-with-substantial-phenomenon.

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\(^a\) In the textbooks of other Ge-lug colleges this is *rjes mthun* ("concordant") rather than *rdzas mthun* ("substantially concordant"), but the meaning is similar.
The first reason [which is that contradictory with substantial phenomenon is an established base] is easy.

If you say that the second reason [which is that contradictory with substantial phenomenon is contradictory with substantial phenomenon] is not established, it follows that the subject, contradictory with substantial phenomenon, is contradictory with substantial phenomenon because it is different from substantial phenomenon and there is no common locus of being it and also being a substantial phenomenon.

The first reason [which is that contradictory with substantial phenomenon is different from substantial phenomenon] is easy.

If you say that the second reason [which is that there is no common locus of being contradictory with substantial phenomenon and also being a substantial phenomenon] is not established, it follows that there is no common locus of being a substantial phenomenon and also being contradictory with substantial phenomenon because being a substantial phenomenon entails being non-contradictory with substantial phenomenon.
It follows that [being a substantial phenomenon entails being non-contradictory with substantial phenomenon] because being a substantial phenomenon entails that it is a common locus of being it and also being a substantial phenomenon.

If you say that the third reason above [which is that non-contradictory with substantial phenomenon is not contradictory with substantial phenomenon] is not established, it follows that the subject, not contradictory with substantial phenomenon, is not contradictory with substantial phenomenon because of being non-contradictory with substantial phenomenon.

If you say [that the reason which is that not contradictory with substantial phenomenon is non-contradictory with substantial phenomenon] is not established, it follows that the subject, not contradictory with substantial phenomenon, is non-contradictory with substantial phenomenon because there is a common locus of being it and also being a substantial phenomenon.

If you say [that the reason which is that there is a common locus of being
not contradictory with substantial phenomenon and also being a substantial phenomenon] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, not contradictory with substantial phenomenon, there is a common locus of being it and also being a substantial phenomenon because thing is it.

If you accept the root [assertion that contradictory with substantial phenomenon is one of the first three isolate phenomena], it follows that the subject, contradictory with substantial phenomenon, is not one of the first three isolate phenomena because of (1) not being an isolate phenomenon that is itself, (2) not being an isolate phenomenon that is not itself, and (3) not being an isolate phenomenon that is a mere third possibility.

If you say that the first reason [which is that contradictory with substantial phenomenon is not an isolate phenomenon that is itself] is not established, it [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, contradictory with substantial phenomenon, it is an established base; it is itself; non-it is it; and its isolate is non-contradictory with isolate phenomenon that is itself because it is an isolate phenomenon that is itself. You have asserted the reason [which is that contradictory with substantial phenomenon is an isolate phenomenon that is itself].
If you accept [that contradictory with substantial phenomenon is an established base; contradictory with substantial phenomenon is contradictory with substantial phenomenon; not contradictory with substantial phenomenon is contradictory with substantial phenomenon; and contradictory with substantial phenomenon’s isolate is non-contradictory with isolate phenomenon that is itself], it [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, contradictory with substantial phenomenon, non-it is it because it is an isolate phenomenon that is itself. You have asserted the reason [which is that contradictory with substantial phenomenon is an isolate phenomenon that is itself].

If you accept [that not contradictory with substantial phenomenon is contradictory with substantial phenomenon], it follows that the subject, not contradictory with substantial phenomenon, is not contradictory with substantial phenomenon because there is a common locus of being it and also being a substantial phenomenon.

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If you say [that the reason which is that there is a common locus of being not contradictory with substantial phenomenon and also being a substantial phenomenon] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, not contradictory with substantial phenomenon, there is a common locus of being it and also being a substantial phenomenon because object of knowledge is it.

If you say that the second reason [which is that contradictory with substantial phenomenon is not an isolate phenomenon that is not itself] is not established, it [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, contradictory with substantial phenomenon, it is an established base; it is not itself; non-it is not it; and its isolate is non-contradictory with isolate phenomenon that is not itself because it is an isolate phenomenon that is not itself. You have asserted the reason [which is that contradictory with substantial phenomenon is an isolate phenomenon that is not itself].

If you accept [that contradictory with substantial phenomenon is an established base; contradictory with substantial phenomenon is not contradictory with substantial phenomenon; not contradictory with substantial phenomenon is not contradictory with substantial phenomenon; and contradictory with substantial phenomenon’s isolate is non-contradictory with
isolate phenomenon that is not itself], it [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, contradictory with substantial phenomenon, it is not itself because it is an isolate phenomenon that is not itself. You have asserted the reason [which is that contradictory with substantial phenomenon is an isolate phenomenon that is not itself].

If you accept [that contradictory with substantial phenomenon is not contradictory with substantial phenomenon], it follows that the subject, contradictory with substantial phenomenon, not being contradictory with substantial phenomenon is not logically feasible because of being contradictory with substantial phenomenon.

If you say [that the reason which is that contradictory with substantial phenomenon is contradictory with substantial phenomenon] is not established, it follows that the subject, contradictory with substantial phenomenon, is contradictory with substantial phenomenon because it is different from substantial phenomenon and there is no common locus of being it and also being a substantial phenomenon.
The reason [which is that contradictory with substantial phenomenon is
different from substantial phenomenon and there is no common locus of
being contradictory with substantial phenomenon and also being a sub-
stantial phenomenon] has been established previously.

If you say that the third reason [which is that contradictory with substantial
phenomenon is not an isolate phenomenon that is a mere third possibility]
is not established, it [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject,
contradictory with substantial phenomenon, it is an established base; it is
not itself; non-it is it; and its isolate is non-contradictory with isolate phe-
nomenon that is a mere third possibility because it is an isolate phenomen-
on that is a mere third possibility. You have asserted the reason [which is
that contradictory with substantial phenomenon is an isolate phenomenon
that is a mere third possibility].

If you accept [that contradictory with substantial phenomenon is an estab-
lished base; contradictory with substantial phenomenon is not contradic-
tory with substantial phenomenon; not contradictory with substantial phe-
nomenon is contradictory with substantial phenomenon; and contradictory
with substantial phenomenon’s isolate is non-contradictory with isolate phe-
nomenon that is a mere third possibility], it [absurdly] follows that with
respect to the subject, contradictory with substantial phenomenon, non-it is
it because it is an isolate phenomenon that is a mere third possibility.
You have asserted the reason [which is that contradictory with substantial
phenomenon is an isolate phenomenon that is a mere third possibility].
If you accept [that not contradictory with substantial phenomenon is contradictory with substantial phenomenon], it follows that the subject, not contradictory with substantial phenomenon, is not contradictory with substantial phenomenon because there is a common locus of being it and also being a substantial phenomenon. The reason [which is that there is a common locus of being not contradictory with substantial phenomenon and also being a substantial phenomenon] has been established previously.

Furthermore, it [absurdly] follows that the subject, isolate phenomenon that is not itself, is one of the first three isolate phenomena because of being an isolate phenomenon. You have asserted the entailment [that being an isolate phenomenon entails being one of the first three isolate phenomena].
If you say [that the reason which is that isolate phenomenon that is not itself is an isolate phenomenon] is not established, it follows that the subject, isolate phenomenon that is not itself, is an isolate phenomenon because of (1) being either a substantial phenomenon or an isolate phenomenon and (2) not being a substantial phenomenon.

If you say that the first reason [which is that isolate phenomenon that is not itself is either a substantial phenomenon or an isolate phenomenon] is not established, it follows that the subject, isolate phenomenon that is not itself, is either a substantial phenomenon or an isolate phenomenon because of being an established base.

If you say that the second reason [which is that isolate phenomenon that is not itself is not a substantial phenomenon] is not established, it [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, isolate phenomenon that is not itself, it is itself because it is a substantial phenomenon. You have asserted the reason [which is that isolate phenomenon that is not itself is a substantial phenomenon].

If you accept [that isolate phenomenon that is not itself is an isolate phenomenon that is not itself], it follows that the subject, isolate phenomenon that is not itself, is not a substantial phenomenon because of being an isolate phenomenon that is not itself. You have asserted the reason [which is that isolate phenomenon that is not itself is an isolate phenomenon that is not itself].
Whatever you do—whether you accept this [assertion that isolate phenomenon that is not itself is not a substantial phenomenon] or say [that the reason which is that isolate phenomenon that is not itself is an isolate phenomenon that is not itself] is not established—it is directly contradictory [with accepting that isolate phenomenon that is not itself is a substantial phenomenon].

If you accept the root [assertion that isolate phenomenon that is not itself is one of the first three isolate phenomena], it follows that the subject, isolate phenomenon that is not itself, is not one of the first three isolate phenomena because of (1) not being an isolate phenomenon that is itself, (2) not being an isolate phenomenon that is not itself, and also (3) not being an isolate phenomenon that is a mere third possibility.

If you say that the first reason [which is that isolate phenomenon that is not itself is not an isolate phenomenon that is itself] is not established, it
[absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, isolate phenomenon that is not itself, it is itself because it is an isolate phenomenon that is itself. You have asserted the reason [which is that isolate phenomenon that is not itself is an isolate phenomenon that is itself].

If you accept [that isolate phenomenon that is not itself is an isolate phenomenon that is itself], it follows that the subject, isolate phenomenon that is not itself, is not an isolate phenomenon that is not itself because of being an isolate phenomenon that is itself. You have asserted the reason [which is that isolate phenomenon that is not itself is an isolate phenomenon that is itself].

Whatever you do—whether you accept this [assertion that isolate phenomenon that is not itself is not an isolate phenomenon that is not itself] or say [that the reason which is that isolate phenomenon that is not itself is an isolate phenomenon that is itself] is not established—it is directly contradictory [with accepting that isolate phenomenon that is not itself is an isolate phenomenon that is itself].

If you say that the second reason [which is that isolate phenomenon that is
not itself is not an isolate phenomenon that is not itself] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, isolate phenomenon that is not itself, it is not itself because of being an isolate phenomenon that is not itself. You have asserted the reason [which is that isolate phenomenon that is not itself is an isolate phenomenon that is not itself].

If you accept [that isolate phenomenon that is not itself it not an isolate phenomenon that is not itself], it follows that the subject, isolate phenomenon that is not itself, not being an isolate phenomenon that is not itself is not logically feasible because of being an isolate phenomenon that is not itself. You have asserted the reason [which is that isolate phenomenon that is not itself is an isolate phenomenon that is not itself].

Whatever you do—whether you accept that [isolate phenomenon that is not itself is not an isolate phenomenon that is not itself] or say [that the reason which is that isolate phenomenon that is not itself is an isolate phenomenon that is not itself] is not established—it is directly contradictory [with accepting that isolate phenomenon that is not itself is an isolate phenomenon that is not itself].
If you say that the third reason [which is that isolate phenomenon that is not itself is not an isolate phenomenon that is a mere third possibility] is not established, it [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, isolate phenomenon that is not itself, non-it is it because it is an isolate phenomenon that is a mere third possibility. You have asserted the reason [which is that isolate phenomenon that is not itself is an isolate phenomenon that is a mere third possibility].

If you accept [that non-isolate-phenomenon-that-is-not-itself that is not itself is an isolate phenomenon that is not itself], it [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, non-isolate-phenomenon-that-is-not-itself, it is an established base; it is not itself; non-it is not it; and its isolate is non-contradictory with isolate phenomenon that is not itself because it is an isolate phenomenon that is not itself. You have asserted the reason [which is that non-isolate-phenomenon-that-is-not-itself is an isolate phenomenon that is not itself].
If you accept [that non-isolate-phenomenon-that-is-not-itself is an established base; non-isolate-phenomenon-that-is-not-itself is not a non-isolate-phenomenon-that-is-not-itself; non-non-isolate-phenomenon-that-is-not-itself is not a non-isolate-phenomenon-that-is-not-itself; and non-isolate-phenomenon-that-is-not-itself’s isolate is non-contradictory with isolate phenomenon that is not itself], it follows that the subject, non-non-isolate-phenomenon-that-is-not-itself, is an isolate phenomenon that is not itself because of not being a non-isolate-phenomenon-that-is-not-itself. You have asserted the reason [which is that non-non-isolate-phenomenon-that-is-not-itself is not a non-isolate-phenomenon-that-is-not-itself].

4. Someone says: Isolate phenomenon that is not itself is not either a substantial phenomenon or an isolate phenomenon.

Our response: It follows that the subject, isolate phenomenon that is not itself, is either a substantial phenomenon or an isolate phenomenon because of being an isolate phenomenon.

a Read de for da, 58b.1.
If you say [that the reason which is that isolate phenomenon that is not itself is an isolate phenomenon] is not established, it follows that the subject, isolate phenomenon that is not itself, is an isolate phenomenon because of being substantially concordant with isolate phenomenon that is not itself.

If you say [that the reason which is that isolate phenomenon that is not itself is substantially concordant with isolate phenomenon that is not itself] is not established, it follows that the subject, isolate phenomenon that is not itself, is substantially concordant with isolate phenomenon that is not itself because it is an established base; it is not itself; non-it is not it; and its isolate is non-contradictory with substantially-concordant-with-isolate-phenomenon-that-is-not-itself.

The first reason [which is that isolate phenomenon that is not itself is an established base] is easy.

If you say that the second [reason which is that isolate phenomenon that is not itself is not an isolate phenomenon that is not itself] is not established, it follows that the subject, isolate phenomenon that is not itself, is not an isolate phenomenon that is not itself because of being substantially concordant with isolate phenomenon that is not itself.
If you say that the third reason [which is that non-isolate-phenomenon-that-is-not-itself is not an isolate phenomenon that is not itself] is not established, it follows that the subject, non-isolate-phenomenon-that-is-not-itself, is not an isolate phenomenon that is not itself because of being an isolate phenomenon that is itself.

If you say [that the reason which is that non-isolate-phenomenon-that-is-not-itself is an isolate phenomenon that is itself] is not established, it follows that the subject, non-isolate-phenomenon-that-is-not-itself, is an isolate phenomenon that is itself because it is an established base; it is itself; non-it is it; and its isolate is non-contradictory with isolate phenomenon that is itself.

The first reason [which is that non-isolate-phenomenon-that-is-not-itself is an established base] is easy.
If you say that the second [reason which is that non-isolate-phenomenon-that-is-not-itself is a non-isolate-phenomenon-that-is-not-itself] is not established, it follows that the subject, non-isolate-phenomenon-that-is-not-itself, is a non-isolate-phenomenon-that-is-not-itself because of being an isolate phenomenon that is itself.

If you say that the third reason [which is that non-non-isolate-phenomenon-that-is-not-itself is a non-isolate-phenomenon-that-is-not-itself] is not established, it follows that non-non-isolate-phenomenon-that-is-not-itself is a non-isolate-phenomenon-that-is-not-itself because that which is an isolate-phenomenon-that-is-not-itself is a non-isolate-phenomenon-that-is-not-itself.

If you say [that the reason which is that that which is an isolate-phenomenon-that-is-not-itself is a non-isolate-phenomenon-that-is-not-itself] is not established, it follows that that which is an isolate-phenomenon-that-is-not-itself is a non-isolate-phenomenon-that-is-not-itself because an isolate phenomenon that is not itself is a non-isolate-phenomenon-that-is-not-itself. The reason [which is that an isolate phenomenon that is not itself is a non-isolate-phenomenon-that-is-not-itself] has been established above.
5. Someone says: Isolate phenomenon that is itself is not either a substantial phenomenon or an isolate phenomenon.

Our response: It follows that the subject, isolate phenomenon that is itself, is either a substantial phenomenon or an isolate phenomenon because of being an isolate phenomenon that is not itself.

If you say [that the reason which is that isolate phenomenon that is itself is an established base] is not established, it follows that the subject, isolate phenomenon that is itself, is an isolate phenomenon that is not itself because it is an established base; it is not itself; non-it is not it; and its isolate is non-contradictory with isolate phenomenon that is not itself.

The first reason [which is that isolate phenomenon that is itself is an established base] is easy.
itself is not an isolate phenomenon that is itself] is not established, it fol-
lows that the subject, isolate phenomenon that is itself, is not an isolate
phenomenon that is itself because of being an isolate phenomenon that is
not itself.

If you say that the third reason [which is that non-isolate-phenomenon-
that-is-itself is not an isolate phenomenon that is itself] is not established,
it follows that the subject, non-isolate-phenomenon-that-is-itself, is not an
isolate phenomenon that is itself because of being substantially concordant
with isolate phenomenon that is itself.

If you say [that the reason which is that non-isolate-phenomenon-that-is-
itself is substantially concordant with isolate phenomenon that is itself] is
not established, it follows that the subject, non-isolate-phenomenon-that-
is-itself, is substantially concordant with isolate phenomenon that is itself
because it is an established base; it is itself; non-it is it; and its isolate is
non-contradictory with substantially-concordant-with-isolate-phenomenon-
that-is-itself.

The first reason [which is that non-isolate-phenomenon-that-is-itself is an
established base] is easy.

If you say that the second [reason which is that non-isolate-phenomenon-that-is-itself is a non-isolate-phenomenon-that-is-itself] is not established, it follows that the subject, non-isolate-phenomenon-that-is-itself, is a non-isolate-phenomenon-that-is-itself because of being substantially concordant with isolate phenomenon that is itself.

If you say that the third reason [which is that non-non-isolate-phenomenon-that-is-itself is a non-isolate-phenomenon-that-is-itself] is not established, it follows that non-non-isolate-phenomenon-that-is-itself is a non-isolate-phenomenon-that-is-itself because that which is an isolate-phenomenon-that-is-itself is a non-isolate-phenomenon-that-is-itself. The reason [which is that an isolate phenomenon that is itself is a non-isolate-phenomenon-that-is-itself] has been established previously.

If you say [that the reason which is that that which is an isolate-phenomenon-that-is-itself is a non-isolate-phenomenon-that-is-itself] is not established, it follows that that which is an isolate-phenomenon-that-is-itself is a non-isolate-phenomenon-that-is-itself because an isolate phenomenon that is itself is a non-isolate-phenomenon-that-is-itself.
6. **Someone says:** That which is (1) either an isolate phenomenon that is itself or (2) substantially concordant with isolate phenomenon that is itself is an isolate phenomenon that is not itself; and that which is not either (1) an isolate phenomenon that is itself or (2) substantially concordant with isolate phenomenon that is itself is substantially concordant with isolate phenomenon that is itself.

**Our response:** Well then, it [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, that which is not either (1) an isolate phenomenon that is itself or (2) substantially concordant with isolate phenomenon that is itself, it is itself because it is substantially concordant with isolate phenomenon that is itself. You have asserted the reason [which is that that which is not either (1) an isolate phenomenon that is itself or (2) substantially concordant with isolate phenomenon that is itself is substantially concordant with isolate phenomenon that is itself].

If you accept [that that which is not either (1) an isolate phenomenon that is itself or (2) substantially concordant with isolate phenomenon that is itself is that which is not either (1) an isolate phenomenon that is itself or
(2) substantially concordant with isolate phenomenon that is itself, it follows that with respect to the subject, that which is not either (1) an isolate phenomenon that is itself or (2) substantially concordant with isolate phenomenon that is itself, it not being either (1) an isolate phenomenon that is itself or (2) substantially concordant with isolate phenomenon that is itself or (2) substantially concordant with isolate phenomenon that is itself, it not being either (1) an isolate phenomenon that is itself or (2) substantially concordant with isolate phenomenon that is itself, it is not logically feasible because it is either (1) an isolate phenomenon that is itself or (2) substantially concordant with isolate phenomenon that is itself.

If you say [that the reason which is that that which is not either (1) an isolate phenomenon that is itself or (2) substantially concordant with isolate phenomenon that is itself is either (1) an isolate phenomenon that is itself or (2) substantially concordant with isolate phenomenon that is itself] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, that which is not either (1) an isolate phenomenon that is itself or (2) substantially concordant with isolate phenomenon that is itself, it is either (1) an isolate phenomenon that is itself or (2) substantially concordant with isolate phenomenon that is itself because it is substantially concordant with isolate phenomenon that is itself. You have asserted the reason [which is that that which is not either (1) an isolate phenomenon that is itself or (2) substantially concordant with isolate phenomenon that is itself, it is either (1) an isolate phenomenon that is itself or (2) substantially concordant with isolate phenomenon that is itself] is substantially concordant with isolate phenomenon that is itself.
Whatever you do—whether you accept this [assertion that that which is not either (1) an isolate phenomenon that is itself or (2) substantially concordant with isolate phenomenon that is itself is either (1) an isolate phenomenon that is itself or (2) substantially concordant with isolate phenomenon that is itself] or say [that the reason which is that that which is not either (1) an isolate phenomenon that is itself or (2) substantially concordant with isolate phenomenon that is itself is substantially concordant with isolate phenomenon that is itself] is not established—it is directly contradictory [with accepting that that which is not either (1) an isolate phenomenon that is itself or (2) substantially concordant with isolate phenomenon that is itself is substantially concordant with isolate phenomenon that is itself].
Our Own System

This should be asserted: that which is either (1) an isolate phenomenon that is itself or (2) substantially concordant with isolate phenomenon that is itself is an isolate phenomenon that is not itself; and that which is not either (1) an isolate phenomenon that is itself or (2) substantially concordant with isolate phenomenon that is itself is substantially concordant with substantially-concordant-with-isolate-phenomenon-that-is-itself.

7. Someone says: An isolate phenomenon that is a mere third possibility is not either (1) a substantial phenomenon or (2) an isolate phenomenon.

Our response: It follows that the subject, isolate phenomenon that is a mere third possibility, is either a substantial phenomenon or an isolate phenomenon because of being an isolate phenomenon that is not itself.

If you say [that the reason which is that isolate phenomenon that is a mere third possibility is an isolate phenomenon that is not itself] is not established, it follows that the subject, isolate phenomenon that is a mere third possibility is not either...

\(^a\) Note that this refers to Cha-pa’s system since this chapter is Cha-pa’s presentation of substantial and isolate phenomena; it does not refer to Ngag-wang-tra-shi’s system, which he presents in the next chapter.
possibility, is an isolate phenomenon that is not itself because it is an established base; it is not itself; non-it is not it; and its isolate is non-contradictory with isolate phenomenon that is not itself.

Each of the first two reasons [which are that (1) isolate phenomenon that is a mere third possibility is an established base and (2) isolate phenomenon that is a mere third possibility is not an isolate phenomenon that is a mere third possibility] is easy.

If you say that the third reason [which is that non-isolate-phenomenon-that-is-a-mere-third-possibility is not an isolate phenomenon that is a mere third possibility] is not established, it follows that the subject, non-isolate-phenomenon-that-is-a-mere-third-possibility, is not an isolate phenomenon because of being an isolate phenomenon that is itself.

8. Someone says: That which is either (1) a generality of pot or (2) a phenomenon that is not itself is not either (1) a substantial phenomenon or (2) an isolate phenomenon.
Our response: It follows that the subject, that which is either (1) a generality of pot or (2) a phenomenon that is not itself, is either (1) a substantial phenomenon or (2) an isolate phenomenon because of being an isolate phenomenon that is not itself.

If you say [that the reason which is that that which is either (1) a generality of pot or (2) a phenomenon that is not itself is an isolate phenomenon that is not itself] is not established, it follows that the subject, that which is either (1) a generality of pot or (2) a phenomenon that is not itself, is an isolate phenomenon that is not itself because it is an established base; it is not itself; non-it is not it; and its isolate is non-contradictory with isolate phenomenon that is not itself.

9. Someone says: It follows that that which is either (1) a generality of pot or (2) a phenomenon that is not itself not being either (1) a generality of pot or (2) a phenomenon that is not itself is not logically feasible because that which is either (1) a generality of pot or (2) a phenomenon that is not
itself is either (1) a generality of pot or (2) a phenomenon that is not itself. If you say [that the reason which is that that which is either (1) a generality of pot or (2) a phenomenon that is not itself is either (1) a generality of pot or (2) a phenomenon that is not itself] is not established, it follows that that which is either (1) a generality of pot or (2) a phenomenon that is not itself is either (1) a generality of pot or (2) a phenomenon that is not itself because that which is either (1) a generality of pot or (2) a phenomenon that is not itself is a phenomenon that is not itself. If you say [that the reason which is that that which is either (1) a generality of pot or (2) a phenomenon that is not itself is a phenomenon that is not itself] is not established, it follows that that which is either (1) a generality of pot or (2) a phenomenon that is not itself is a phenomenon that is not itself because that which is either (1) a generality of pot or (2) a phenomenon that is not itself is an isolate phenomenon that is not itself.
Our response: [That that which is either (1) a generality of pot or (2) a phenomenon that is not itself is an isolate phenomenon that is not itself] does not entail [that that which is either (1) a generality of pot or (2) a phenomenon that is not itself is a phenomenon that is not itself].

10. Someone says: It follows that with respect to the subject, that which is either (1) a generality of pot or (2) a phenomenon that is not itself, it is either (1) a generality of pot or (2) a phenomenon that is not itself because of being a phenomenon that is not itself.a

Our response: This is a case where answering “I accept” [that that which is either (1) a generality of pot or (2) a phenomenon that is not itself is either (1) a generality of pot or (2) that which is either (a) a generality of pot or (b) a phenomenon that is not itself not being that which is either (a) a generality of pot or (b) a phenomenon that is not itself] is suitable although there is some problem with the statement, because when [“I accept”] is enumerated, it is suitable to enumerate “I accept that which is either (1) a generality of pot or (2) a phenomenon that is not itself is either (1) a generality of pot or (2) that which is either (a) a generality of pot or (b) a phenomenon that is not itself not being that which is either (a) a generality of pot or (b) a phenomenon that is not itself”b but there is some

a Like the previous debate, this position also relates to the assertion in the second part of the four-part reason given in the last statement at the end of debate 8.

b This is the opponent’s statement with respect to the subject, that which is either (1) a generality of pot or (2) a phenomenon that is not itself, it is either (1) a generality of pot or (2) a phenomenon that is not itself because of being a phenomenon that is not itself spelled out with “that which is either (1) a generality of pot or (2) a phenomenon that is not itself” inserted in place of each “it.” Note that what I have translated as “a phenomenon that is not
It follows that [it is suitable to enumerate “I accept that that which is either (1) a generality of pot or (2) a phenomenon that is not itself is either (1) a generality of pot or (2) that which is either (a) a generality of pot or (b) a phenomenon that is not itself not being that which is either (a) a generality of pot or (b) a phenomenon that is not itself” but there is some problem with the statement] because that which is either (1) a generality of pot or (2) a phenomenon that is not itself is either (1) a generality of pot or (2) that which is either (a) a generality of pot or (b) a phenomenon that is not itself not being that which is either (a) a generality of pot or (b) a phenomenon that is not itself.

"it" is literally “it not being itself” or “it not being it,” and in the spelled-out statement each “it” is replaced by “that which is either (1) a generality of pot or (2) a phenomenon that is not itself.” This debate seems to revolve around the implications of using the pronoun “it,” referring to the subject, at the beginning of the consequence when the pronoun “it” occurs elsewhere in the consequence statement in a general sense (in this case, “a phenomenon that is not itself” or, more literally, “that which is not itself”).
11. Someone says: Being a substantial phenomenon entails being permanent.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, Great Vehicle path of seeing, is permanent because of being a substantial phenomenon. You have asserted the entailment [that being a substantial phenomenon entails being permanent].

If you say [that the reason which is that Great Vehicle path of seeing is a substantial phenomenon] is not established, it follows that the subject, Great Vehicle path of seeing, is a substantial phenomenon because of being substantially existent.

If you say [that the reason which is that Great Vehicle path of seeing is substantially existent] is not established, it follows that the subject, Great Vehicle path of seeing, is substantially existent because of being a Great Vehicle superior path that accomplishes the welfare of its trainees from among those of the three lineages.
For the explication, Maitreya’s *Ornament for the Clear Realizations* says:\(^a\)

Which through knowledge of paths causes those helping beings to accomplish the welfare of the world.

\[
\text{འཆད་པར་ེད་པ་ལ།}
\]

\[
\text{མངོན་Ȧོགས་Ȅན་ལས།}
\]

\[
\text{འགྲོ་ལ་ཕན་པར་}
\]

\[
\text{ེད་ȷམས་ལམ་ཤེས་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་འཇིག་Ȧེན་དོན་Ȝབ་མཛད་པ་}
\]

\[
\text{གང་ཞེས་གྲངས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ɉིར།}
\]

12. **Someone says:** It follows that with respect to that which is either (1) a generality of pot or (2) a phenomenon that is not itself, it is itself because that which is either (1) a generality of pot or (2) a phenomenon that is not itself is not either (1) a generality of pot or (2) a phenomenon that is not itself. For those who accept this, it follows that the subject, that which is either (1) a generality of pot or (2) a phenomenon that is not itself, is not an isolate phenomenon that is not itself because it is itself.

\[
\text{ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ།}
\]

\[
\text{ɍམ་པའི་Ʉི་དང་ཁྱོད་ཁྱོད་རང་མ་ཡིན་པ་གང་}
\]

\[
\text{ɇང་ཁྱོད་ཁྱོད་རང་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ།}
\]

\[
\text{ɍམ་པའི་Ʉི་དང་ཁྱོད་ཁྱོད་རང་མ་ཡིན་}
\]

\[
\text{པ་གང་ɇང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་Ȳོག་ཆོས་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ།}
\]

\[
\text{ཁྱོད་ཁྱོད་རང་ཡིན་པའི་༠ིར་ཟེར་ན།}
\]

**Our response:** The reason [which is that that which is either (1) a generality of pot or (2) a phenomenon that is not itself is that which is either (1) a generality of pot or (2) a phenomenon that is not itself] is not established because when [“the reason is not established”] is enumerated, it is suitable to enumerate “the reason, which is that that which is either (1) a generality of pot or (2) a phenomenon that is not itself is that which is either (1) a generality of pot or (2) a phenomenon that is not itself, is not established.”

\(^a\) *mgon riogs rgyan, abhisamayālaṃkāra; sde dge 3786, shes phyin, vol. *ka*, 1a.3.*
13. Concerning that, someone says: That which is not itself is an isolate phenomenon that is not itself, and that which is itself is a substantial phenomenon.

Our response: Well then, it [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, that which is itself, non-it is not it because it is a substantial phenomenon. You have asserted the reason [which is that that which is itself is a substantial phenomenon].

14. With regard to that, someone says: I accept that that which is not itself is that which is not itself.\(^a\)

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, that which is not itself, is not an isolate phenomenon that is not itself because it is itself. You have

\(^a\) This position accepts the absurd consequence leveled in the previous debate, namely, with respect to the subject, that which is itself, non-it is not it, because in Tibetan substituting “that which is itself” for each “it” in “non-it is not it” yields “that which is not itself is that which is not itself.”
asserted the reason [which is that that which is not itself is that which is not itself].

Whatever you do—whether you accept this [assertion that that which is not itself is not an isolate phenomenon that is not itself] or say [that the reason which is that that which is not itself is that which is not itself] is not established—it is directly contradictory [with the assertion that that which is not itself is an isolate phenomenon that is not itself and that which is itself is a substantial phenomenon].

15. Someone says: A common locus of being contradictory-with-contradictory-with-pot and also being non-contradictory-with-non-contradictory-with-pot is an isolate phenomenon that is itself.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, a common locus of being contradictory-with-contradictory-with-pot and also being non-contradictory-with-non-contradictory-with-pot, it is itself because it is an isolate phenomenon that is itself. You have asserted the reason [which is that a common locus of being contradictory-with-contradictory-with-pot and also being non-contradictory-with-non-contradictory-with-pot is an isolate phenomenon that is itself].

These assertions are made in debate 13, from which the current debate proceeds.
If you accept [that a common locus of being contradictory-with-contradictory-with-pot and also being non-contradictory-with-non-contradictory-with-pot is a common locus of being contradictory-with-contradictory-with-pot and also being non-contradictory-with-non-contradictory-with-pot], it [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, a common locus of being contradictory-with-contradictory-with-pot and also being non-contradictory-with-non-contradictory-with-pot, it is contradictory-with-contradictory-with-pot because it is a common locus of being contradictory-with-contradictory-with-pot and also being non-contradictory-with-non-contradictory-with-pot. You have asserted the reason [which is that a common locus of being contradictory-with-contradictory-with-pot and also being non-contradictory-with-non-contradictory-with-pot is a common locus of being contradictory-with-contradictory-with-pot and also being non-contradictory-with-non-contradictory-with-pot].
If you accept [that a common locus of being contradictory-with-contradictory-with-pot and also being non-contradictory-with-non-contradictory-with-pot is contradictory-with-contradictory-with-pot], it follows that with respect to the subject, a common locus of being contradictory-with-contradictory-with-pot and also being non-contradictory-with-non-contradictory-with-pot, it is not contradictory-with-contradictory-with-pot because there is a common locus of being it and also being contradictory with pot.

If you say [that the reason which is that there is a common locus of (1) being a common locus of being contradictory-with-contradictory-with-pot and also being non-contradictory-with-non-contradictory-with-pot and also (2) being contradictory with pot] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, a common locus of being contradictory-with-contradictory-with-pot and also being non-contradictory-with-non-contradictory-with-pot, there is a common locus of being it and also being contradictory with pot because one-with-one-with-pot is it.
Furthermore, it [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, a common locus of being contradictory-with-contradictory-with-pot and also being non-contradictory-with-non-contradictory-with-pot, non-it is it because it is an isolate phenomenon that is itself. You have asserted the reason [which is that a common locus of being contradictory-with-contradictory-with-pot and also being non-contradictory-with-non-contradictory-with-pot is an isolate phenomenon that is itself].

If you accept [that that which is not a common locus of being contradictory-with-contradictory-with-pot and also being non-contradictory-with-non-contradictory-with-pot is a common locus of being contradictory-with-contradictory-with-pot and also being non-contradictory-with-non-contradictory-with-pot], it [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, that which is not a common locus of being contradictory-with-contradictory-with-pot and also being non-contradictory-with-non-contradictory-with-pot, it is contradictory-with-contradictory-with-pot because it is a common locus of being contradictory-with-contradictory-with-pot and also being non-contradictory-with-non-contradictory-with-pot. You have asserted the reason [which is that that which is not a common locus of being contradictory-with-contradictory-with-pot and also being non-contradictory-with-non-contradictory-with-pot is a common locus of being contradictory-with-contradictory-with-pot and also being non-contradictory-with-non-contradictory-with-pot].
If you accept [that that which is not a common locus of being contradictory-with-contradictory-with-pot and also being non-contradictory-with-non-contradictory-with-pot is contradictory-with-contradictory-with-pot], it [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, that which is not a common locus of being contradictory-with-contradictory-with-pot and also being non-contradictory-with-non-contradictory-with-pot, there is no common locus of being it and also being contradictory with pot because it is contradictory-with-contradictory-with-pot. You have asserted the reason [which is that that which is not a common locus of being contradictory-with-contradictory-with-pot and also being non-contradictory-with-non-contradictory-with-pot is contradictory-with-contradictory-with-pot].
You cannot accept [that there is no common locus of (1) being that which is not a common locus of (a) being contradictory-with-contradictory-with-pot and also (b) being non-contradictory-with-non-contradictory-with-pot and (2) also being contradictory with pot] because the two, pillar and pot, is it.

16. Someone says: A common locus of being contradictory-with-contradictory-with-existent and also being non-contradictory-with-non-contradictory-with-existent is an isolate phenomenon that is not itself.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, a common locus of being contradictory-with-contradictory-with-existent and also being non-contradictory-with-non-contradictory-with-existent, it is not itself because it is an isolate phenomenon that is not itself. You have asserted the reason [which is that a common locus of being contradictory-with-contradictory-with-existent and also being non-contradictory-with-non-contradictory-with-existent is an isolate phenomenon that is not itself].
If you accept that a common locus of being contradictory-with-contradictory-with-existent and also being non-contradictory-with-non-contradictory-with-existent is not a common locus of being contradictory-with-contradictory-with-existent and also being non-contradictory-with-non-contradictory-with-existent, it follows that with respect to the subject, a common locus of being contradictory-with-contradictory-with-existent and also being non-contradictory-with-non-contradictory-with-existent, it not being a common locus of being contradictory-with-contradictory-with-existent and also being non-contradictory-with-non-contradictory-with-existent is not feasible because it is a common locus of being contradictory-with-contradictory-with-existent and also being non-contradictory-with-non-contradictory-with-existent.

If you say that the reason which is that a common locus of being contradictory-with-contradictory-with-existent and also being non-contradictory-with-non-contradictory-with-existent is a common locus of being
contradictory-with-contradictory-with-existent and also being non-contradictory-with-non-contradictory-with-existent] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, a common locus of being contradictory-with-contradictory-with-existent and also being non-contradictory-with-non-contradictory-with-existent, it is a common locus of being contradictory-with-contradictory-with-existent and also being non-contradictory-with-non-contradictory-with-existent because it is (1) contradictory-with-contradictory-with-existent and (2) non-contradictory-with-non-contradictory-with-existent.

If you say that the first reason [which is that a common locus of being contradictory-with-contradictory-with-existent and also being non-contradictory-with-non-contradictory-with-existent is contradictory-with-contradictory-with-existent] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, a common locus of being contradictory-with-contradictory-with-existent and also being non-contradictory-with-non-contradictory-with-existent, it is contradictory-with-contradictory-with-existent because it is different-from-contradictory-with-existent and there is no common locus of being it and also being contradictory-with-existent.
The first reason [which is that a common locus of being contradictory-with-contradictory-with-existent and also being non-contradictory-with-non-contradictory-with-existent is different from contradictory-existent] is easy.

If you say that the second [reason which is that there is no common locus of (1) being a common locus of (a) being contradictory-with-contradictory-with-existent and also (b) being non-contradictory-with-non-contradictory-with-existent and (2) also being contradictory-with-existent] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, a common locus of being contradictory-with-contradictory-with-existent and also being non-contradictory-with-non-contradictory-with-existent, there is no common locus of being it and also being contradictory-with-existent because being it entails being non-contradictory-with-existent.
If you say that the second reason above [which is that a common locus of being contradictory-with-contradictory-with-existent and also being non-contradictory-with-non-contradictory-with-existent is non-contradictory-with-non-contradictory-with-existent] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, a common locus of being contradictory-with-contradictory-with-existent and also being non-contradictory-with-non-contradictory-with-existent, it is non-contradictory-with-non-contradictory-with-existent because there is a common locus of being it and also being non-contradictory-with-existent.

If you say [that the reason which is that there is a common locus of (1) being a common locus of (a) being contradictory-with-contradictory-with-existent and also (b) being non-contradictory-with-non-contradictory-with-existent and (2) also being non-contradictory-with-existent] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, a common locus of being contradictory-with-contradictory-with-existent and also being non-contradictory-with-non-contradictory-with-existent, there is a common locus of being it and also being non-contradictory-with-existent because one-with-existent is it.
If you say [that the reason which is that one-with-existent is a common locus of (1) being a common locus of (a) being contradictory-with-contradictory-with-existent and also (b) being non-contradictory-with-non-contradictory-with-existent and (2) also being non-contradictory-with-existent] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, one-with-existent, it is a common locus of (1) being a common locus of being contradictory-with-contradictory-with-existent and also being non-contradictory-with-non-contradictory-with-existent and (2) also being non-contradictory-with-existent because it is (1) a common locus of (a) being contradictory-with-contradictory-with-existent and also (b) being non-contradictory-with-non-contradictory-with-existent and (2) non-contradictory-with-existent.

Each of the reasons [which are that one-with-existent is (1) a common locus of (a) being contradictory-with-contradictory-with-existent and also (b) being non-contradictory-with-non-contradictory-with-existent and (2) non-contradictory-with-existent] is easy.
17. **Someone says:** A common locus of being a generality of generality and also being an instance of instance is a substantial phenomenon.

**Our response:** It [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, a common locus of being a generality of generality and also being an instance of instance, it is itself because it is a substantial phenomenon. You have asserted the reason [which is that a common locus of being a generality of generality and also being an instance of instance is a substantial phenomenon].

If you accept [that a common locus of being a generality of generality and also being an instance of instance is a common locus of being a generality of generality and also being an instance of instance], it [absurdly] follows that the subject, a common locus of being a generality of generality and also being an instance of instance, is a generality of generality because of being a common locus of being a generality of generality and also being an instance of instance. You have asserted the reason [which is that a common locus of being a generality of generality and also being an instance of instance is a common locus of being a generality of generality and also being an instance of instance].
If you accept [that a common locus of being a generality of generality and also being an instance of instance is a generality of generality], it [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, a common locus of being a generality of generality and also being an instance of instance, generality is an instance of it because it is a generality of generality. You have asserted the reason [which is that a common locus of being a generality of generality and also being an instance of instance is a generality of generality].

If you accept [that generality is an instance of a common locus of being a generality of generality and also being an instance of instance], it [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, generality, it is a common locus of being a generality of generality and also being an instance of instance because it is an instance of a common locus of being a generality of generality and also being an instance of instance. You have asserted the reason [which is that generality is an instance of a common locus of being a generality of generality and also being an instance of instance].
If you accept [that generality is a common locus of being a generality of generality and also being an instance of instance], it [absurdly] follows that the subject, generality, is a generality of generality because of being a common locus of being a generality of generality and also being an instance of instance. You have asserted the reason [which is that generality is a common locus of being a generality of generality and also being an instance of instance].

Furthermore, it [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, a common locus of being a generality of generality and also being an instance of instance, non-it is not it because it is a substantial phenomenon. You have asserted the reason [which is that a common locus of being a generality of generality and also being an instance of instance is a substantial phenomenon].
If you accept [that that which is not a common locus of being a generality of generality and also being an instance of instance is not a common locus of being a generality of generality and also being an instance of instance], it [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, that which is not a common locus of being a generality of generality and also being an instance of instance, it not being a common locus of being a generality of generality and also being an instance of instance is not feasible because it is a common locus of being a generality of generality and also being an instance of instance.

If you say [that the reason which is that that which is not a common locus of being a generality of generality and also being an instance of instance is a common locus of being a generality of generality and also being an instance of instance] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, that which is not a common locus of being a generality of generality and also being an instance of instance, it is a common locus of being a generality of generality and also being an instance of instance because it is (1) a generality of generality and (2) an instance of instance.
If you say that the first reason [which is that which is not a common locus of being a generality of generality and also being an instance of instance is a generality of generality] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, that which is not a common locus of being a generality of generality and also being an instance of instance, it is a generality of generality because generality is an instance of it.

If you say [that the reason which is that generality is an instance of that which is not a common locus of being a generality of generality and also being an instance of instance] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, generality, it is an instance of that which is not a common locus of being a generality of generality and also being an instance of instance because it is that which is not such a common locus; it is related as one essence with that which is not such a common locus; and many common loci of not being it but being that which is not a common locus of being a generality of generality and also being an instance of instance are established.

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a “Such a common locus” is an abbreviation for “a common locus of being a generality of generality and also being an instance of instance.”
Each of the first two reasons [which are that (1) generality is that which is not a common locus of being a generality of generality and also being an instance of instance and (2) generality is related as one essence with that which is not a common locus of being a generality of generality and also being an instance of instance] is easy.

If you say that the third reason [which is that many common loci of not being a generality but being that which is not a common locus of being a generality of generality and also being an instance of instance are established] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, generality, many common loci of not being it but being that which is not a common locus of being a generality of generality and also being an instance of instance are established because the two, pillar and pot, is it; and the two, permanent and thing, is also it.

18. Someone says: A common locus of being an instance of a generality of permanent phenomenon and also being an instance of a generality of thing is an isolate phenomenon that is itself.
Our response: It [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, a common locus of being an instance of a generality of permanent phenomenon and also being an instance of a generality of thing, it is itself because it is an isolate phenomenon that is itself. You have asserted the reason [which is that a common locus of being an instance of a generality of permanent phenomenon and also being an instance of a generality of thing is an isolate phenomenon that is itself].

If you accept [that a common locus of being an instance of a generality of permanent phenomenon and also being an instance of a generality of thing is a common locus of being an instance of a generality of permanent phenomenon and also being an instance of a generality of thing], it [absurdly] follows that the subject, a common locus of being an instance of a generality of permanent phenomenon and also being an instance of a generality of thing, is an instance of a generality of thing because of being a common locus of being an instance of a generality of permanent phenomenon and also being an instance of a generality of thing. You have asserted the reason [which is that a common locus of being an instance of a generality of permanent phenomenon and also being an instance of a generality of thing is a common locus of being an instance of a generality of permanent phenomenon and also being an instance of a generality of thing].
If you accept [that a common locus of being an instance of a generality of permanent phenomenon and also being an instance of a generality of thing is an instance of a generality of thing], it follows that the subject, a common locus of being an instance of a generality of permanent phenomenon and also being an instance of a generality of thing, is not an instance of a generality of thing because of not being a generality of thing.

If you say [that the reason which is that a common locus of being an instance of a generality of permanent phenomenon and also being an instance of a generality of thing is not a generality of thing] is not established, it follows that the subject, a common locus of being an instance of a generality of permanent phenomenon and also being an instance of a generality of thing, is not a generality of thing because thing is not an instance of it.
If you say [that the reason which is that thing is not an instance of a common locus of being an instance of a generality of permanent phenomenon and also being an instance of a generality of thing] is not established, it follows that the subject, thing, is not an instance of a common locus of being an instance of a generality of permanent phenomenon and also being an instance of a generality of thing because it is not a common locus of being an instance of a generality of permanent phenomenon and also being an instance of a generality of thing.

The reason [which is that thing is not a common locus of being an instance of a generality of permanent phenomenon and also being an instance of a generality of thing] is easy.
12. Exposition of the Presentation of Our Own System of Substantial Phenomena and Isolate Phenomena

[Refutation of Others’ Systems]

1. Someone says: It follows that with respect to the subject, the two, pillar and pot, it is itself because it is a substantial phenomenon.

Our response: [That it is a substantial phenomenon] does not entail [that it is itself].

If you say [that the reason which is that the two, pillar and pot, is a substantial existent] is not established, it follows that the subject, the two, pillar and pot, is a substantial phenomenon because of being a substantial existent.

If you say [that the reason which is that the two, pillar and pot, is a substantial existent] is not established, it follows that the subject, the two, pillar and pot, is a substantial existent because of being a substantial existent in the sense of being that which is able to perform a function.
If you say [that being a substantial existent in the sense of being that which is able to perform a function] does not entail [being a substantial existent], it follows that there is entailment [that being a substantial existent in the sense of being that which is able to perform a function entails being a substantial existent] because thing, substantial phenomenon, and substantial existent are equivalent.

2. Someone says: It follows that the subject, the two, pillar and pot, is not a substantial phenomenon because of being an isolate phenomenon. If you say [that the reason which is that the two, pillar and pot, is an isolate phenomenon] is not established, it follows that the subject, the two, pillar and pot, is an isolate phenomenon because of being an isolate phenomenon that is not itself.

Our response: [Being an isolate phenomenon that is not itself] does not entail [being an isolate phenomenon].

If you accept the above [assertion that the two, pillar and pot, is an isolate phenomenon], it follows that the subject, the two, pillar and pot, is not an isolate phenomenon because of not being an imputed existent.

If you say [that the reason which is that the two, pillar and pot, is not an
imputed existent] is not established, it follows that the subject, the two, pillar and pot, is not an imputed existent because of not being a permanent phenomenon.

If you say [that not being a permanent phenomenon] does not entail [not being an imputed existent], it follows that there is entailment [that not being a permanent phenomenon entails not being an imputed existent] because the three—isolate phenomenon, imputed existent, and permanent phenomenon—are equivalent.

3. Someone says: Being one of the four substantial existents entails being a substantial existent.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, uncompounded space, is a substantial existent because of being one of the four substantial existents. You have asserted the entailment [that being one of the four substantial existents entails being a substantial existent].

If you say [that the reason which is that uncompounded space is one of the four substantial existents] is not established, it follows that the subject, uncompounded space, is one of the four substantial existents because of being a substantial existent in the sense of being established by reasoning.
If you say [that the reason which is that uncompounded space is a substantial existent in the sense of being established by reasoning] is not established, it follows that the subject, uncompounded space, is a substantial existent in the sense of being established by reasoning because of being a phenomenon established by reasoning.

If you say [that the reason which is that uncompounded space is a phenomenon established by reasoning] is not established, it follows that the subject, uncompounded space, is a phenomenon established by reasoning because of being a phenomenon established by valid cognition.

If you say [that the reason which is that uncompounded space is a phenomenon established by valid cognition] is not established, it follows that the subject, uncompounded space, is a phenomenon established by valid cognition because of being an established base.
If you accept the root assertion that uncompounded space is a substantial existent, it follows that the subject, uncompounded space, is not a substantial existent because of being an imputed existent.

If you say that the reason which is that uncompounded space is an imputed existent is not established, it follows that the subject, uncompounded space, is an imputed existent because of being a phenomenon merely imputed by thought.

If you say that the reason which is that uncompounded space is a phenomenon merely imputed by thought is not established, it follows that the subject, uncompounded space, is a phenomenon merely imputed by thought because of being a permanent phenomenon.

Furthermore, it [absurdly] follows that the subject, permanent phenomenon, is a substantial existent because of being one of the four substantial existents. You have asserted the entailment that being one of the four substantial existents entails being a substantial existent.

If you say that the reason which is that permanent phenomenon is one of
the four substantial existents] is not established, it follows that the subject, permanent phenomenon, is one of the four substantial existents because of being a substantial existent in the sense of being statically unchanging.

If you say [that the reason which is that permanent phenomenon is a substantial existent in the sense of being statically unchanging] is not established, it follows that the subject, permanent phenomenon, is a substantial existent in the sense of being statically unchanging because of being a permanent phenomenon.

If you say [that being a permanent phenomenon] does not entail [being a substantial existent in the sense of being statically unchanging], it follows that there is entailment [that being a permanent phenomenon entails being a substantial existent in the sense of being statically unchanging] because the two, substantial existent in the sense of being statically unchanging and permanent phenomenon, are equivalent.

If you accept the root [assertion that permanent phenomenon is a substantial existent], it follows that the subject, permanent phenomenon, is not a substantial existent because of not being a substantial phenomenon.
If you say [that the reason which is that permanent phenomenon is not a substantial phenomenon] is not established, it follows that the subject, permanent phenomenon, is not a substantial phenomenon because of not being both substantial and a phenomenon.

If you say [that the reason which is that permanent phenomenon is not both substantial and a phenomenon] is not established, it follows that the subject, permanent phenomenon, is not both substantial and a phenomenon because of not being substantial.

If you say [that the reason which is that permanent phenomenon is not substantial] is not established, it follows that the subject, permanent phenomenon, is not substantial because of not being a thing.

4. Someone says: Being a substantial existent entails being a substantial existent in the sense of being self-sufficiently apprehensible.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, person, is a substantial existent in the sense of being self-sufficiently apprehensible because of being a substantial existent. You have asserted the entailment [that being a substantial existent entails being a substantial existent in the sense of being self-sufficiently apprehensible].
The Collected Topics

If you say [that the reason which is that person is a substantial existent] is not established, it follows that the subject, person, is a substantial existent because of being a substantial existent in the sense of being that which is able to perform a function.

If you say [that the reason which is that person is a substantial existent in the sense of being that which is able to perform a function] is not established, it follows that the subject, person, is a substantial existent in the sense of being that which is able to perform a function because of being a thing.

If you say [that being a thing] does not entail [being a substantial existent in the sense of being that which is able to perform a function], it follows that there is entailment [that being a thing entails being a substantial existent in the sense of being that which is able to perform a function] because the four—thing, substantial phenomenon, substantial existent, and substantial existent in the sense of being that which is able to perform a function—are equivalent.

If you accept the root [assertion that person is a substantial existent in the sense of being self-sufficiently apprehensible], it follows that the subject, person, is not a substantial existent in the sense of being self-sufficiently apprehensible because of being an imputed existent in the sense of not
being self-sufficiently apprehensible.

If you say [that the reason which is that person is an imputed existent in the sense of not being self-sufficiently apprehensible] is not established, it follows that the subject, person, is an imputed existent in the sense of not being self-sufficiently apprehensible because of being a phenomenon whose ascertainment by valid cognition must depend upon ascertainment by valid cognition of another phenomenon that is not its own entity.

If you say [that the reason which is that person is a phenomenon whose ascertainment by valid cognition must depend upon ascertainment by valid cognition of another phenomenon that is not its own entity] is not established, it follows that the subject, person, is a phenomenon whose ascertainment by valid cognition must depend upon ascertainment by valid cognition of another phenomenon that is not its own entity because of being a non-associated compositional factor.

5. Someone says: Being a thing entails being an imputed existent in the
sense of not being self-sufficiently apprehensible.

Our response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, sound, is an imputed existent in the sense of not being self-sufficiently apprehensible because of being a thing. You have asserted the entailment [that being a thing entails being an imputed existent in the sense of not being self-sufficiently apprehensible].

If you accept [that sound is an imputed existent in the sense of not being self-sufficiently apprehensible], it follows that the subject, sound, is not an imputed existent in the sense of not being self-sufficiently apprehensible because of being a substantial existent in the sense of being self-sufficiently apprehensible.

If you say [that the reason which is that sound is a substantial existent in the sense of being self-sufficiently apprehensible] is not established, it follows that the subject, sound, is a substantial existent in the sense of being self-sufficiently apprehensible because of being a phenomenon whose ascertainment by valid cognition need not depend upon ascertainment by valid cognition of another phenomenon that is not its own entity.
If you say [that the reason which is that sound is a phenomenon whose ascertainment by valid cognition need not depend upon ascertainment by valid cognition of another phenomenon that is not its own entity] is not established, it follows that the subject, sound, is a phenomenon whose ascertainment by valid cognition need not depend upon ascertainment by valid cognition of another phenomenon that is not its own entity because of being one of the five [sense-spheres] ranging from form sense-sphere to tangible object sense-sphere.

If you say [that being one of the five (sense-spheres) ranging from form sense-sphere to tangible object sense-sphere] does not entail [being a phenomenon whose ascertainment by valid cognition need not depend upon ascertainment by valid cognition of another phenomenon that is not its own entity], it follows that there is entailment [that being one of the five (sense-spheres) ranging from form sense-sphere to tangible object sense-sphere entails being a phenomenon whose ascertainment by valid cognition need not depend upon ascertainment by valid cognition of another phenomenon that is not its own entity] because being one of the six—the five [sense-spheres] ranging from form sense-sphere to tangible object sense-sphere and consciousness—entails being that whose ascertainment by valid cognition need not depend upon ascertainment by valid cognition of another phenomenon that is not its own entity.
6. *Someone says:* Being one of the three imputed existents entails being an imputed existent.

*Our response:* It [absurdly] follows that the subject, rabbit horns, is an imputed existent because of being one of the three imputed existents. You have asserted the entailment [that being one of the three imputed existents entails being an imputed existent].

If you say [that the reason which is that rabbit horns is one of the three imputed existents] is not established, it follows that the subject, rabbit horns, is one of the three imputed existents because of being an imaginary.

If you say [that the reason which is that rabbit horns is an imaginary] is not established, it follows that the subject, rabbit horns, is an imaginary because of being an imaginary whose character is thoroughly nil.
If you say [that the reason which is that rabbit horns is an imaginary whose character is thoroughly nil] is not established, it follows that the subject, rabbit horns, is an imaginary whose character is thoroughly nil because of being a non-existent imaginary.

If you say [that the reason which is that rabbit horns is a non-existent imaginary] is not established, it follows that the subject, rabbit horns, is a non-existent imaginary because of being a non-existent.

If you accept the root [assertion that rabbit horns is an imputed existent], it follows that the subject, rabbit horns, is not an imputed existent because of not being a phenomenon merely imputed by thought.

If you say [that the reason which is that rabbit horns is not a phenomenon merely imputed by thought] is not established, it follows that the subject, rabbit horns, is not a phenomenon merely imputed by thought because of not being a phenomenon.
Furthermore, it [absurdly] follows that the subject, thing, is an imputed existent because of being one of the three imputed existents. You have asserted the entailment [that being one of the three imputed existents entails being an imputed existent].

If you say [that the reason which is that thing is one of the three imputed existents] is not established, it follows that the subject, thing, is one of the three imputed existents because of being a non-associated compositional factor.

If you say [that being a non-associated compositional factor] does not entail [being one of the three imputed existents], it follows that there is entailment [that being a non-associated compositional factor entails being one of the three imputed existents] because when the three imputed existents are enumerated, these three must be enumerated: imaginary, non-associated compositional factor, and thoroughly established phenomenon.

If you accept the root [assertion that thing is an imputed existent], it follows that the subject, thing, is not an imputed existent because of being a substantial existent.
If you say [that the reason which is that thing is a substantial existent] is not established, it follows that the subject, thing, is a substantial existent because of being a substantial phenomenon.

If you say [that the reason which is that thing is a substantial phenomenon] is not established, it follows that the subject, thing, is a substantial phenomenon because of (1) being substantial and (2) being a phenomenon.

Each of the reasons [which are that thing is substantial and thing is a phenomenon] is easy.

7. Someone says: It follows that the subject, uncompounded space, is a substantial existent because of being a thing. If you say [that the reason which is that uncompounded space is a thing] is not established, it follows that the subject, uncompounded space, is a thing because of being other-powered. If you say [that the reason which is that uncompounded space is other-powered] is not established, it follows that the subject, uncompounded space, is other-powered because of being other-powered in terms of uncompounded space.
Our response: [Being other-powered in terms of uncompounded space] does not entail [being other-powered].

If you say [that the reason which is that uncompounded space is other-powered in terms of uncompounded space] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, uncompounded space, it is other-powered in terms of it because it is an established base.

Our Own System

There is a definition of substantial phenomenon because thing that is able to perform a function ultimately and that is an object established from its own side without being merely imputed by thought is it. The three—substantial phenomenon, substantial existent, and thing—are equivalent. There is an illustration because form is it.
With respect to the subject, form, there is a reason for calling it “a substantial phenomenon” because it is called such since it is a common locus of being substantial and also being a phenomenon.

When substantial existent is divided terminologically there are four because there are the four: substantial existent in the sense of being established by reasoning, substantial existent in the sense of being statically unchanging, substantial existent in the sense of being able to perform a function, and substantial existent in the sense of being self-sufficiently apprehensible.

The two, substantial existent in the sense of being established by reasoning and existent, are equivalent. The two, substantial existent in the sense of being statically unchanging and permanent, are equivalent. The two, substantial existent in the sense of being able to perform a function and thing, are equivalent.
There is a definition of substantial existent in the sense of being self-sufficiently apprehensible because phenomenon whose ascertainment by valid cognition need not depend upon ascertainment by valid cognition of another phenomenon that is not its own entity is it. There is an illustration because the five external sense-spheres and all consciousnesses are it.

There is a definition of imputed existent because phenomenon that is an object established merely through imputation by thought without being an entity whose mode of abiding is established from its own side is it. The three—imputed existent, isolate phenomenon, and permanent—are equivalent. When imputed existent is divided terminologically there are three because there are the three: imaginary, non-associated compositional factor, and thoroughly established phenomenon.
Dispelling Objections

8. Someone says: It follows that the subject, sound’s impermanence, is an imputed existent because of being an isolate phenomenon. If you say [that the reason which is that sound’s impermanence is an isolate phenomenon] is not established, it follows that the subject, sound’s impermanence, is an isolate phenomenon because of being a common locus of being an isolate and also being a phenomenon.

Our response: [Being a common locus of being an isolate and also being a phenomenon] does not entail [being an isolate phenomenon].

If you say [that the reason which is that sound’s impermanence is a common locus of being an isolate and also being a phenomenon] is not established, it follows that the subject, sound’s impermanence, is a common locus of being an isolate and also being a phenomenon because of (1) being an isolate and (2) being a phenomenon.

If you say that the first reason [which is that sound’s impermanence is an
isolate] is not established, it follows that the subject, sound’s impermanence, is an isolate because of being a negative phenomenon.

If you say [that the reason which is that sound’s impermanence is a negative phenomenon] is not established, it follows that the subject, sound’s impermanence, is a negative phenomenon because of being an affirming negative.

If you say [that the reason which is that sound’s impermanence is an affirming negative] is not established, it follows that with respect to the subject, sound, its impermanence is an affirming negative because it is impermanent.

If you say that the second reason [which is that sound’s impermanence is a phenomenon] is not established, it follows that the subject, sound’s impermanence, is a phenomenon because of being an established base.

If you accept the above [assertion that sound’s impermanence is an imputed existent], it follows that the subject, sound’s impermanence, is not an imputed existent because of being a thing.

9. Someone says: It follows that whatever is a common locus of being an
isolate and also being a phenomenon must be an isolate phenomenon because whatever is a common locus of being substantial and also being a phenomenon must be a substantial phenomenon.

Our response: [That whatever is a common locus of being substantial and also being a phenomenon must be a substantial phenomenon] does not entail [that whatever is a common locus of being an isolate and also being a phenomenon must be an isolate phenomenon] because those two are dissimilar.

10. Someone says: It follows that the subject, uncompounded space, is a substantial existent in the sense of being established by reasoning because of being an established base. You have asserted the entailment [that being an established base entails being a substantial existent in the sense of being established by reasoning]. If you accept [that uncompounded space is a substantial existent in the sense of being established by reasoning], it follows that the subject, uncompounded space, is not a substantial existent in the sense of being established by reasoning because of being an imputed existent in the sense of being established by reasoning. If you say [that the reason which is that uncompounded space is an imputed existent in the sense of being established by reasoning] is not established, it follows that the subject, uncompounded space, is an imputed existent in the sense of being established by reasoning because of being an imputed existent in the sense of being established by valid cognition.
Our response: [Being an imputed existent in the sense of being established by valid cognition] does not entail [being an imputed existent in the sense of being established by reasoning].

If you say [that the reason which is that uncompounded space is an imputed existent in the sense of being established by valid cognition] is not established, it follows that the subject, uncompounded space, is an imputed existent in the sense of being established by valid cognition because of being an imputed existent.

11. Someone says: It follows that the subject, permanent phenomenon, is not a substantial existent in the sense of being statically unchanging because of being an imputed existent in the sense of being statically unchanging. If you say [that the reason which is that permanent phenomenon is an imputed existent in the sense of being statically unchanging] is not established, it follows that the subject, permanent phenomenon, is an imputed existent in the sense of being statically unchanging because of (1) being
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Our response: [(1) Being statically unchanging and (2) being an imputed existent] does not entail [being an imputed existent in the sense of being statically unchanging].

If you say that the first reason [which is that permanent phenomenon is statically unchanging] is not established, it follows that the subject, permanent phenomenon, is statically unchanging because of being statically non-disintegrating.

If you say [that the reason which is that permanent phenomenon is statically non-disintegrating] is not established, it follows that the subject, permanent phenomenon, is statically non-disintegrating because of being statically permanent.

If you say that the second reason [which is that permanent phenomenon is...
an imputed existent] is not established, it follows that the subject, perma-
nent phenomenon, is an imputed existent because of being a permanent
phenomenon.

藏文：[དེ་དག་དེ་དག་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་ད་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་ད་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེ་དེę..
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Ngag-wang-tra-shi (ngag dbang bkra shis)

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Steven Weinberger is a scholar and researcher of Tibetan and Indian Buddhism. He received a B.A. from Amherst College in Anthropology and an M.A. and Ph.D. in Tibetan and Buddhist Studies from the University of Virginia, where he has taught literary and spoken Tibetan. Since 1986 he has spent almost four years in Asia, studying and practicing Buddhism. His involvement in Buddhism extends to the four main traditions of Tibet as well as those of other Asian cultures.

Steven wrote his dissertation on the history, importance, and innovations of the Compendium of Reality, the central tantra-text in a corpus that came to be known in India and Tibet as Yoga Tantra. He is currently working on translations of this text and the explanatory tantra of its second section, the Conquest over the Three Worlds, and he served as a co-editor of Volume Three of The Great Exposition of Secret Mantra, Yoga Tantra, Jeffrey Hopkins’ translation and study of Tsong-kha-pa’s and the Dalai Lama’s presentations of Yoga Tantra.

Steven worked for more than ten years for the Tibetan and Himalayan Library, managing the development of innovative technologies and the creation of content in tools, resources, and scholarship for the study of Tibetan religion and culture, while also serving as managing editor of the Journal of the International Association of Tibetan Studies. He continues to serve as a consultant and repository of institutional knowledge for THL.
The Collected Topics of Epistemology (*bsdus grwa*) is the first text studied in the monastic education system of the Ge-lug-pa school of Tibetan Buddhism. This foundational text provides students with the basics of both the system of debate that is central to the entire monastic educational curriculum and the layout of existence according to the Indian Sūtra School. The Go-mang College of Dre-pung Monastery’s curriculum uses *The Collected Topics* text written by Ngag-wang-tra-shi (1678-1738), one of the most prominent disciples of Jam-yang-shay-pa (1648-1721), Go-mang’s principal textbook author. The longer title of Ngag-wang-tra-shi’s text, *Great Eloquent Exposition Demonstrating for the Three Levels of Intelligence—Low, Medium, and High—the Meanings of (Dharmakīrti’s) “Commentary, ” the Great Treatise Commentary on the Thought of Valid Cognition, Collated into a Single Text: Necklace for Scholars, Fulfilling All Hopes of the Fortunate*, indicates that it elucidates the meaning of Dharmakīrti’s (c. 600-660) *Commentary on Dignāga’s “Compilation of Valid Cognition.”*

Ngag-wang-tra-shi was born in the Se-nya-lung (*bse nya lung*) region of Reb-gong in Amdo (northeastern Tibet), to a nomad family of the Se clan. At age sixteen, he moved from Amdo to Lhasa in central Tibet, where he studied at Go-mang College of Dre-pung Monastery from 1694 until 1709. Ngag-wang-tra-shi then returned to Amdo when his primary teacher Jam-yang-shay-pa founded La-brang Monastery. Ngag-wang-tra-shi served as disciplinarian of La-brang and then succeeded his teacher Jam-yang-shay-pa to become the monastery’s second abbot, a position he held for twenty years. Ngag-wang-tra-shi also founded and taught at other monasteries in the Amdo region, as did his incarnation, the second Se-tsang lama Ngag-wang-jam-yang-tra-shi.

Ngag-wang-tra-shi’s *Collected Topics* presents in an abbreviated way the process of oral debate practiced daily in the Ge-lug-pa education system. This outline of debates communicates both the specific content that is the subject matter of each chapter and the fundamental procedures of the dialectical system. The *Collected Topics* is divided into twenty-six chapters, each of which addresses an individual topic such as cause and effect, one (or same) and different, contradiction and relation, generality and instance, and so forth. The first twelve chapters are translated in this volume.

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