Following preliminary remarks and an overview of the course textbooks, the lecture introduces the text at the center of the course, The Essence of Eloquence (legs bshad snying po) by Dzong-ka-ba (tsong kha pa, 1357-1419), and the philosophy of Mind-Only (sems tsam; cittamātra) Buddhism. This is followed by a brief survey of the major issues: the Three Natures (rang bzhin gsum; trisvbhāva) and the Three Non-Entitynesses (ngo bo nyid med pa gsum).

The lecture begins by reviewing the life of the seventh-century Korean commentator on the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, Wonch'uk. The lecture proceeds to cover the three periods of Yogacara in China, Asanga and Vasubandhu, and assertions regarding names vs. objects.

The lecture begins by reviewing the three natures and three non-natures. This is followed by terminology discussions regarding the two types of imputation natures (kun btags; parikalpita): existent imputational natures (yod rgyu'i kun btags) and non-existent imputational natures (med rgyu'i kun btags). Additional topics discussed are: being established from its own side (rang ngos nas grub pa) vs. being established by way of its own character (rang gi mtshan nyid gyi grub pa), and the meaning of "being established from its own side" (rang ngos nas grub pa) in Cittamātra and being the basis of designation of an object in contrast with being truly established (bden par grub pa) and being ultimately established (don dam par grub pa), etc.

The lecture begins by discussing the Trisvabhāva and its Tibetan synonyms, and the order of teaching the three natures (imputational, other-powered, thoroughly established) by the Buddha in the Samdhinirmocana Sūtra. This is followed by discussions of the two types of emptiness in the Mind Only system, the idea of a phenomenon being established by way of its own character as the referent of a conceptual consciousness apprehending it (rang 'dzin rtog pa'i zhen gzhir rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa), and the category of "a determinative knower that apprehends a term [generality] and meaning [generality] in the manner of being suitable to be associated," Tibetan views on the two emptinesses, and Kensur Yeshe Thupten on a difference between subject and object.

The lecture begins by discussing the meaning of "being a referent of a conceptual consciousness," "being merely imputed by a conceptual consciousness," and "being posited through the force of name and concepts." The lecture goes on to discuss this concept as a basis of differentiating between the Mind-Only school and the lower tenet systems such as Sautrantika and Vaibhāṣika. This is followed by a discussion of what it means to realize emptiness in the Mind-Only system.

The lecture begins by discussing the difference between phenomena "being one entity with mind" and "being mind". The lecture proceeds to discuss the seventh and eighth consciousnesses in Mind-Only: the afflicted consciousness (and its conception of a self of persons), and the mind-basis-of-all. Other topics discussed are karmic seeds, and whether or not the continua of others exist in the Mind-Only system.Jeffrey Hopkins.

The lecture begins by revisiting the idea of "a form being established by way of its own character as the referent of the term 'form'," and some reflections on Tibetan grammar. The lecture the proceeds to discuss the two emptinesses in Mind-Only, the compatibility between the doctrines of emptiness and mind-only in Asaṅga's Mahāyāna-saṃgraha (theg bsdus) and Bodhisattva-bhūmi (byang sa) and how this is handled by Willis, Schmithausen, and Tsong-kha-pa, and proceeds to discuss the advanage in the Geluk system of focusing on an absence of duality of subject and object and contrast with Nyingma interpretations.

The lecture begins with questions from students and answers. Topics include: the difference between "own character" (rang bzhin) and "unique character" (rang gi mtshan nyid) in reference to Wonch'uk's commentary, the meaning of "established by way of own character" with regard to other-powered natures and thoroughly established natures, appearing objects (snang yul) in the Mind-Only system, difference between tenet systems with regard to the direct perception of emptiness, etc. The lecture then proceeds to give an overview and synopsis of some of the points of dispute in the exegesis of Tsong-kha-pa's "Essence of Eloquence." This is followed by a discussion of self-cognition (rang rig) with regard to an exalted wisdom consciousness realizing emptiness, the terminology of "non-affirming negation" in Indian Buddhist sources, and the larger issue of appearance and emptiness in Cittamatra and Tantra.

The lecture begins by revisiting the idea of emptiness as a non-affirming negation and contrasting this with the opinion of Jo-nang Dol-po-pa Shes-rab-rgyal-mtshan (1292-1361) and its similarity to the assertions of Samkhya. This proceeds to a discussion of the basis of emptiness (gtong gzhi) and the emptiness of emptiness. Following a brief discussion of monastic textbooks, the class proceeds to discuss the relationship between the three natures and the two truths. The class concludes with an introduction to the idea of other-powered natures being natureless in two ways, and the misinterpretation of the Sanskrit compound leading to thinking that other-powered natures (i.e. consciousnesses) are the ultimate.

The lecture discusses the significance of the category of "imputed existence" (rtog pas brtag tsam du yod pa) in Cittamātra and Madhyamaka, before proceeding to contetualize Cittamātra & Yogācāra in the overall Buddhist tenet systems.

The lecture introduces Tsong-kha-pa's basic approach to presenting the Mind-Only system and the three natures beyond the "Sūtra Unravelling the Thought" (Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra), and the significance of the works of the great Indian masters such as Asaṅga and others, both in relation to his overall presentation and in relation to his refutation of the ideas of the Jo-nang-pa scholar Dol-po-pa Shes-rab-rgyal-mtshan. This is followed by an overview of the chapters of Tsong-kha-pa's text and in the process, touching on ancillary issues, such as the doctrine of the Three Wheels of the Dharma in relation to the periods in which the Buddha taught, which teachings actually correspond to the Three Wheels, tathāgatagarbha theory, etc.

The lecture discusses Tsong-kha-pa's repudiation of presentations of Buddhist philosophy that amalgamate different Buddhist philosophical schools into one school, and proceeds to consider nihilism and the extremes of superimposition and annihilation, refuting the notion that the object of negation is language or words — both in the works of Asaṅga and in Yogācara and Madhyamaka in general — and the contents of Asaṅga's "Grounds of Bodhisattvas" (bodhisattva-bhūmi).

The lecture contains a discussion of the instances in Tson-kha-pa's text where he makes reference to Wön-ch'uk's commentary on the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought (Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra), which tangetially includes a discussion of entities and attributes (ngo bo dang khyad pa), imputational natures that are imputations in the nature of entity and attribute (ngo bo dang khyad par du kun btags pa'i kun btags), and the meaning of establishment by way of own character (rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa), and the referents of terms in the First and Third Turnings of the Wheel of the Dharma.

The lecture considers Asaṅga's "Compendium of Ascertainments" (viniścaya-saṃgrahanī; rnam par gtan la dbab pa bsdu ba) and his arguments against the Middle Way (Mādhyamika) School. In that context, the meaning of several terms are discussed, including: the ultimate, ultimate truth, true existence, the object of negation, imputational existence, etc.

The lecture continues the discussion of Tsong-kha-pa's presentation of Asaṅga's "Compendium of Ascertainments" (viniścaya-saṃgrahanī; rnam par gtan la dbab pa bsdu ba) and specifically looks at the handling of complex vocabulary in the Mind-Only system such as what "serves as existing" (yod pa'i go chod), etc.

The lecture begins with a discussion of Tsong-kha-pa's presentation of Maitreya's "Ornament for the Mahāyāna Sūtras" (mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra; theg pa chen po mdo sde'i rgyan) in relation to the Mind-Only school, which includes a discussion of Buddhist hermeneutics, the various meanings of "conventional existence," etc. This concludes with an overview of some of the subsequent chapters remaining to be read.

The lecture explores various topics such as: the difference between "established by way of its own character" and "established by way of its own character as the referent of terms and concepts", the difference between "established by way of its own character" and "existent from its own side", the meaning of "established by way of its own character" in Cittamātra vs. Madhyamaka, etc.

Beginning with student discussions, the lecture considers the problem of uncompounded space ('dus ma byas kyi nam mkha'; asaṃskṛtākāśa) both as categorized as one of the three natures (trisvabhāva) and with respect to which one can posit three natures, and by extension, the difficulty of positing an "other-powered nature" (gzhan dbang) with respect to uncompounded space.

Continuing with student discussions, the lecture considers the opinions on Buddhist philosophy of Dol-po-pa Shes-rab-rgyal-mtshan (1292-1361). Some issues discussed in particular are: what appears to a sense consciousness, and the role of meaning-generalities (don spyi) in Cittamātra.

Continuing student discussions, the lecture considers some "other-emptiness" (gzhan stong) and Chinese presentations of the Mind-Only system. Some issues discussed in particular are: what appears to a sense consciousness, the relationship between Cittamātra and tathāgatagarbha theory, common mistaken assertions regarding imputational natures, and the use of the third volume ("Absorption in No External World") in studying Mind-Only.

Georges Dreyfus (Guest Lecture).

Continuing student discussions, the lecture considers Alan Sponberg's theory of the evolution of Yogācāra Buddhism in India and China, and its contrast with Tsong-kha-pa's system, and the different presentations of the three natures in both ontological and epistemological terms.

Concluding student discussions, the lecture considers Alan Sponberg's interpretation of the writings of K'uei-chi (窺基, 632-682 c.e.) in relation to Sponberg's theory of a "progressive model" of the three natures. This is followed by a discussion of his teacher, Hsüan-tsang (玄奘, 602-664), which leads into a discussion of the different ways Buddhist scriptures can be said to be definitive or interpretable.

The lecture continues the discussion of the different ways Buddhist scriptures can be said to be definitive or interpretable--in terms of "the factual basis in [Buddha's] thought" (dgongs gzhi), "the thought [of the sutra]" (dgongs pa), "the purpose" (dgos pa), and "the damage to the literal meaning" (dngos la gnod byed)--followed by a discusion of how to posit the three natures with respect to any one phenomenon.

This lecture concludes the course, covering such topics as the two types of emptinesses in Mind-Only, the reasonings against an external world according to the Mind-Only School, the Mind-Only context of understanding calm abiding (śamatha; zhi gnas) and meditative equipoise (samāhita; mnyam bzhag), Dharmakīrti's reasoning for Mind-Only in relation to self-cognizing consciousnesses (rang rig), refuting partless particles as a rejection of the external world, and the presentation of the path in the Mind-Only system.