

Lati Rinbochay:
Oral Debate

Translated by Daniel Perdue based on Jeffrey Hopkins's classes

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Colors, White and Red

April 2, 1976

Tape Side 1

Jeffrey; He has a different format for getting back to the route in which one has accepted the basic consequence (that is, the 'dod route).

Ladhi Rinbochay: Is whatever is a color necessarily red?

Opponent: I accept the pervasion.

R: It follows that whatever is a color is necessarily red.

O: I accept it.

R: It follows that the subject, the color of a white religious conch, is red because of being a color.

O: The reason is not established.

R: It follows that the subject, the color of a white religious conch, is a color because of being suitable as a hue.

O: Whatever is suitable as a hue is not necessarily a color.

R: It follows that whatever is suitable as a hue is necessarily a color because "that which is suitable as a hue" is the definition of color.

O: I accept that whatever is suitable as a hue is necessarily a color.

R: It follows that whatever is suitable as a hue is necessarily a color.

O: I accept it.

R: It follows that the subject, the color of a white religious conch, is a color because of being suitable as a hue.

O: I accept it.

R: It follows that the subject, the color of a white religious conch, is red because of being a color.

O: I accept it.

R: It follows that the subject, the color of a white religious conch, is not red because of being white.

O: Whatever is white is not necessarily not red.

R: It follows that whatever is white is necessarily not red because there is no common locus of the two, white and red.

O: The reason that there is no common locus of the two, white and red, is not established.

R: It follows that there is no common locus of the two, white and red because the two, white and red, are mutually exclusive.

Jeffrey: He says that you could go on to say that the reason is not established here, but this is where the book stops and if you do go on

it will harm you. You may get confused.

O: I accept it.

R: It follows that the two, white and red, are mutually exclusive.

O: I accept it.

R: It follows that there is no common locus of the two, white and red.

O: I accept it.

R: It follows that whatever is white is necessarily not red.

O: I accept it.

R: It follows that the subject, the color of a white religious conch, is not red because of being white.

O: I accept it.

R: It follows that the subject, the color of a white religious conch, is red because of being a color.

O: There is no pervasion.

R: It follows that whatever is a color is not necessarily red.

O: I accept it.

R: Tsa! [Amazing! Finished!] What is the difference between being red and being a color?

O: There are three possibilities.

R: It follows that there are not three possibilities. Posit something which is both (Something which is both is the subject the color of a ruby. This implies that you can go on to say that it is this and it is that. It will be alright if you say, "The subject, the color of a red flower." For the second possibility whatever is red is necessarily a color. Then, whatever is a color is not necessarily red. [For instance] the subject the color of a white religious conch. Something which is neither one nor the other is the subject the form of a cairn. So there are the three possibilities. There is something which is both. There is something which is one and is not the other. One says, "Which is necessarily the other? Which is not necessarily the other? Posit something which is one and not the other." There is something which is neither one nor the other. When one says "possibility" (mu), one is saying "limit" (mtha'). One thing that might be confusing here is that one says "It follows that there are not three possibilities." This is an expression that is the opposite of the truth. Here there are certainly three possibilities. But when one debates one will say, "It follows that it is not that" or "It follows that that does not exist." One is trying to trap the opponent. So I say, "It follows that there are not three possibilities. Posit something which is both." Once you say that there are the three possibilities, the Challenger will play with you and

say that there are not the three possibilities. He will say, "Posit something which is both" or "Posit the three possibilities." He is just playing out his trap on you.

DEBATE TWO

Challenger: Is whatever is a color necessarily red?

Defender: I accept it.

C: It follows that whatever is a color is necessarily red.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a white religious conch, is red because of being a color.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a white religious conch, is a color because of being suitable as a hue.

D: There is no pervasion.

C: Spell it out.

D: Whatever is suitable as a hue is not necessarily a color.

C: It follows that whatever is suitable as a hue is necessarily a color because "suitable as a hue" is the definition of color.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that whatever is suitable as a hue is necessarily a color.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a white religious conch, is a color because of being suitable as a hue.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject is red because of being a color.

@: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject is not red because of being white.

D: There is no pervasion.

C: Spell it out.

D: Whatever is white is not necessarily not red.

C: It follows that whatever is white is necessarily not red because there is no common locus of the two, white and red.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that there is no common locus of the two, white and red, because the two, white and red, are mutually exclusive.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the two, white and red, are mutually exclusive.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that there is no common locus of the two, white and red.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that whatever is white is necessarily not red.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a white religious conch, is not red because of being white.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a white religious conch, is red because of being a color.

D: There is no pervasion.

C: It follows that whatever is a color is not necessarily red.

D: I accept it.

C: What is the difference between the two, red and color?

D: There are three possibilities.

C: Posit something which is both.

D: The subject, the color of a ruby (pad ma ra ga'i kha doq).

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a ruby, is a color.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject, the color of a ruby, is a color-- (The Defender has to give a reason now.)

D: Because of being suitable as a hue.

C: It follows that whatever is suitable as a hue is necessarily a color.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a ruby, is red.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject, the color of a ruby, is red--

D: Because of being suitable as a red hue.

C: It follows that whatever is suitable as a red hue is necessarily red.

D: I accept it.

C: Now, which is necessarily the other? Which is not necessarily the other? Posit something which is one and not the other.

D: Whatever is red is necessarily a color. Whatever is a color is not necessarily red. The subject, the color of a white religious conch.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a white religious conch, is a color.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject, the color of a white religious conch, is a color--

D: Because of being suitable as a hue.

C: It follows that whatever is suitable as a hue is necessarily a color.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a white religious conch, is

not red.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject the color of a white religious conch, is not red--

D: Because of being white.

C: It follows that whatever is white is necessarily not red.

D: I accept it.

C: Now, posit something which is neither one nor the other.

D: The subject, a pillar.

C: It follows that the subject, a pillar, is not a color.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject, a pillar, is not a color--

D: Because of not being suitable as a hue.

C: It follows that whatever is not suitable as a hue is necessarily not a color.

D: I accept it

C: It follows that the subject, a pillar, is not red.

D: I accept it

C: The subject, a pillar, is not red--

D: Because of not being a color.

C: It follows that whatever is not a color is necessarily not red.

D: I accept it.

Rinbochay: That is the way. There are three possibilities.

April 5, 1976 [probably]

Rinbochay: [About debate] Many things that you don't know will be cleared away; you will generate understanding. As your ignorance decreases and your knowledge increases, one by one, eventually you will get to the point where you do know everything and you have no ignorance. Another virtue of it is that if you are going to meditate on the view or cultivate the altruistic mind of enlightenment, it helps you there. It helps to keep the mind from being distracted. It helps to keep the mind steady. And it keeps the mind sharp. [It helps] when you are doing analytic meditation on "I". At that time when you are meditating, doing analytic meditation on anything, you will not be generating afflictions. There is great virtue in not generating afflictions for an hour or half an hour. The purpose for studying the dharma is to stop the afflictions, and for however long you can stop them there is that much advantage.

For the fourth possibility of something which is neither one nor the

other, it does not have to be something that is an existent. It can be something that is a non-existent. This is something that is neither, it is not this and it is not that. But if there is something that is an existent, then you put in that.

There are four alternatives--three possibilities, four possibilities, mutually inclusive, and mutually exclusive. Thus, with regard to the two, human and American, you have to choose one of these four. If someone says that there are four possibilities, what would you posit that is an American and not a human? A horse. A horse? Is a horse an American? If someone says that there are three possibilities, what do you posit as something that is both? The subject, Jeffrey.

C: It follows that the subject, Jeffrey, is an American.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject, Jeffrey, is an American--

D: Because of being born in America.

Rinbochay: There is no pervasion in that. Whatever is born in America is not necessarily an American. The subject, an American deer.

Because of (1) being a human and (2) being born in America.

C: It follows that whoever (1) is a human and (2) is born in America is necessarily an American.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, Dak-dzag Rinbochay's son (Mr. Norbu's son who was born in America), is an American.

D: Why?

C: It follows that he is because of (1) being a human and (2) being born in America.

D: There is no pervasion.

C: The subject, the teacher, is an American--(You see you've lost and now he is asking for another reason.)

D: Because of (1) being a human and (2) having American parents.

C: It follows that whoever (1) is a human and (2) has American parents is necessarily an American.

(In the Tibetan custom one need not be born in the country, but one must have parents of that nationality. A child born of American parents in India would still be an American.)

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the teacher, is a human.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject, the teacher, is a human--

D: Because of being a person designated in dependence upon any of

the five aggregates of a human.

C: It follows that whoever is a person designated in dependence upon any of the five aggregates of a human is necessarily a human.

D: I accept it.

C: Which is necessarily the other? Which is not necessarily the other? Posit something which is one and not the other.

D: Whoever is an American is necessarily a human. Whoever is a human is not necessarily an American. The subject, Lati Rinbochay.

C: It follows that the subject, Lati Rinbochay, is a human.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject Lati Rinbochay is a human--

D: Because of being a Tibetan.

C: It follows that whoever is a Tibetan is necessarily a human.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, Lati Rinbochay, is not an American

D: I accept it

C: The subject Lati Rinbochay, is not an American--

D: Because his parents are not Americans.

C: It follows that whoever's parents are not Americans is necessarily not an American.

D: I accept it

C: Posit something which is neither.

D: The subject, a sheep.

C: It follows that the subject, a sheep, is not a human.

D: I accept it

C: The subject, a sheep, is not a human--

D: Because of being an animal.

C: It follows that whatever is an animal is necessarily not a human.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, a sheep, is not an American.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject a sheep, is not an American--

D: Because of not being a human.

C: It follows that whatever is not a human is necessarily not an American.

D: I accept it.

Tape Side 2

April 5, 1976

The basis for Pur-bu-jok's book on logic is Dharmakirti's Pramanavarttika which is his commentary on Dignaga's Pramana-samuchachaya or Compendium on Valid Cognition. It says in the Pramanavarttika. "Because the potencies of blue and so forth are seen as separate by the eye consciousness." Then the Challenger uses this quote to state a question to the Defender. The phyr here indicates a question. He says, "Because a presentation of colors is not explained at the point of this passage,..." Then there is the quote from the Pramanavart-tika. This is one instance in the Pramanavarttika where color is presented. There are many such instances. This is not the only one. Thus, the debate--

C: Because a presentation of colors is not explained at the point of this passage, "Because the potencies of blue and so forth are seen as separate by the eye consciousness."

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that a presentation of colors is explained at the point of this passage, "Because the potencies of blue and so forth are seen as separate by the eye consciousness."

D: I accept it

C: It follows that it is not so because the two, definitions and divisions, do not exist with respect to color.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that the two, definitions and divisions, do exist with respect to color.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that it is not so. First, posit the definition of color.

D: The subject, that which is suitable as a hue.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, that which is suitable as a hue, that it is the definition of color.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, that which is suitable as a hue, it is the definition of color--

(Leading out of this Rinbochay is going into debate on the definition of color. He is asking for the reason why "that which is suitable as a hue" is the definition of color. Then Rinbochay supplies the reason.)

D: Because (1) there is ascertainment of the eight approaches of pervasion of a definition and definiendum with respect to it and color and (2) it and color are established in the relationship of definition and definiendum.

C: It follows that if (1) there is ascertainment of the eight approaches of pervasion of a definition and definiendum with respect to it and color and (2) it and color are established in the relationship of definition and definiendum, then it is necessarily the definition of color.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject that which is suitable as a hue, that there is no ascertainment of the eight approaches of pervasion of a definition and definiendum with respect to it and color. Posit the mode of ascertainment.

D: There is [a mode of ascertainment] because (1) whatever is a color is necessarily suitable as a hue, (2) whatever is suitable as a hue is necessarily a color, (3) whatever is not a color is necessarily not suitable as a hue, (4) whatever is not suitable as a hue is necessarily not a color, (5) if color exists, then that which is suitable as a hue necessarily exists, (6) if that which is suitable as a hue exists, then color necessarily exists, (7) if color does not exist, then that which is suitable as a hue necessarily does not exist, and (8) if that which is suitable as a hue does not exist, then color necessarily does not exist.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, that which is suitable as a hue, that such is that which is posited as the mode of ascertainment of the eight approaches of pervasion of a definition and definiendum with respect to it and color

D: I accept it

C: It follows with respect to the subject that which is suitable as a hue, that it is not established in the relationship of definition and definiendum with color. Posit the mode of establishment

D: There is [a mode of establishment] because in order to ascertain color with valid cognition one must first ascertain that which is suitable as a hue with valid cognition.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, that which is suitable as a hue that such is that which is posited as the mode of establishment in the relationship of definition and definiendum of it with color.

D: I accept it.

C: Now, it follows that it is not so because if colors are divided, there are not two.

@: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that if colors are divided, there are two.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that there are not two. Posit the two.

D: There are [two]. The subjects, the two--primary color and secondary color.

C: It follows that for the expression "When colors are divided, there are two," two such are those which are to be posited.

D: I accept it.

C: Now, it follows that it is not so because the two, definitions and divisions, do not exist with respect to primary color.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that the two, definition and division, do exist with respect to primary color.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that it is not so. First, posit the definition of primary color.

D: There is [a definition of primary color]. The subject, that which is suitable as a primary hue.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, that which is suitable as a primary hue, that it is the definition of primary color.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, that which is suitable as a primary hue, it is the definition of primary color--

D: Because (1) there is ascertainment of the eight approaches of pervasion of a definition and definiendum with respect to it and primary color and also (2) it and primary color are established in the relationship of definition and definiendum.

C: It follows that if (1) there is ascertainment of the eight approaches of pervasion of a definition and definiendum with respect to it and primary color and also (2) it and primary color are established in the relationship of definition and definiendum, then it is necessarily the definition of primary color.

D: I accept it

[Note that the previous format laying out the modes of ascertainment and establishment may be reproduced here as they apply to primary color.]

C: It follows that it is not so. If primary colors are divided. how many are there?

D: There are four.

C: It follows that there are not four. Posit the four.

D: There are [four]. The subjects, the four--blue color, yellow color, white color, red color.

C: It follows that for the expression, "If primary colors are divided, there are four." four such are those which are to be posited.

D: I accept it.

[This debate is continued on Tape Side 4 of April 9, 1976.]

C: Now, it follows that it is not so because the two, definition and division, do not exist with respect to blue color.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that the two, definition and division, do exist with respect to blue color.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that it is not so. Posit the definition of blue color.

D: There is [a definition of blue color]. The subject, that which is suitable as a blue hue.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, that which is suitable as a blue hue, that it is the definition of blue color.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, that which is suitable as a blue hue, it is the definition of blue color-- [Note that here as before the Defender can give the two part reason

positing the pervasions and relationship of definition and definiendum. Rinbochay offered an alternative form:]

D: Because it is the positor of blue color.

C: It follows that if something is the positor of blue color, then it is necessarily the definition of blue color.

D: I accept it.

C: Now, it follows that it is not so because if blue colors are divided, there are not the two--natural blue color and manufactured blue color.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that if blue colors are divided, there are the two--natural blue color and manufactured blue color.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that it is not so. Posit a natural blue color.

D: There is [a natural blue color] The subject, the color of vaidurya.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of vaidurya, is a natural blue color.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject, the color of vaidurya. is a natural blue color--

D: Because of being suitable as a natural blue hue.

C: It follows that whatever is suitable as a natural blue hue is necessarily a natural blue color.

D: I accept it.

C: Now, it follows that it is not so. Posit a manufactured blue color.

D: There is [a manufactured blue color.] The subject, the color of blue cotton cloth.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, the color of blue cotton cloth, that it is a manufactured blue color.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject the color of blue cotton cloth is a manufactured blue color--

D: Because of being suitable as a manufactured blue hue.

C: It follows that whatever is suitable as a manufactured blue hue is necessarily a manufactured blue color.

D: I accept it.

C: Now, it follows that it is not so because the two, definition and division, do not exist with respect to yellow color.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that the two, definition and division, do exist with respect to yellow color.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that it is not so. Posit the definition of yellow color.

D: There is [a definition of yellow color.] The subject, that which is suitable as a yellow hue.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, that which is suitable as a yellow hue, that it is the definition of yellow color.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject that which is suitable as a yellow hue, it is the definition of yellow color--

D: Because it is the reverse of yellow color's meaning.

C: It follows that if something is the reverse of yellow color's meaning, then it is necessarily the definition of yellow color.

D: I accept it.

C: Now, it follows that it is not so because if yellow colors are divided, there are not the two--natural yellow color and manufactured yellow color.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that if yellow colors are divided, there are the two--natural yellow color and manufactured yellow color.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that it is not so. Posit a natural yellow color.

D: There is [a natural yellow color.] The subject, the color of purified gold.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of purified gold, is a natural

yellow color.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject, the color of purified gold, is a natural yellow color--

D: Because of being suitable as a natural yellow hue.

C: It follows that whatever is suitable as a natural yellow hue is necessarily a natural yellow color.

D: I accept it.

C: Now, it follows that it is not so. Posit a manufactured yellow color.

D: There is [a manufactured yellow color]. The subject, the color of a yellow silk robe.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a yellow silk robe, is a manufactured yellow color.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject, the color of a yellow silk robe, is a manufactured yellow color--

D: Because of being suitable as a manufactured yellow hue.

C: It follows that whatever is suitable as a manufactured yellow hue is necessarily a manufactured yellow color.

D: I accept it.

C: Now, it follows that it is not so because the two, definition and division, do not exist with respect to white color.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that the two, definition and division, do exist with respect to white color.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that it is not so. First, posit the definition of white color.

D: There is [a definition of white color]. The subject, that which is suitable as a white hue.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, that which is suitable as a white hue, that it is the definition of white color.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, that which is suitable as a white hue, it is the definition of white color--

D: Because it is the positor of white color.

C: It follows that if something is the positor of white color, then it is necessarily the definition of white color.

D: I accept it.

C: Now, it follows that it is not so because if white colors are divided there are not the two--natural white color and manufactured white color.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that if white colors are divided, there are the two--natural white color and manufactured white color.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that it is not so. Posit a natural white color.

D: There is [a natural white color]. The subject, the color of a white religious conch.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a white religious conch, is a natural white color

D: I accept it.

C: The subject, the color of a white religious conch, is a natural white color--

D: Because of being suitable as a natural white hue.

C: It follows that whatever is suitable as a natural white hue is necessarily a natural white color.

D: I accept it .

C: Now, it follows that it is not so. Posit a manufactured white color.

D: There is [a manufactured white color]. The subject, the color of the White House.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of the White House, is a manufactured white color.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject the color of the White House, is a manufactured white color--

D: Because of being suitable as a manufactured white hue.

C: It follows that whatever is suitable as a manufactured white hue is necessarily a manufactured white color.

D: I accept it.

C: Now, it follows that it is not so because the two, definition and division, do not exist with respect to red color.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that the two, definition and division, do exist with respect to red color.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that it is not so. Posit the definition of red color.

D: There is [a definition of red color]. The subject. that which is suitable as a red hue.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, that which is suitable as a red hue, that it is the definition of red color.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, that which is suitable as a red hue it is the definition of red color--

D: Because it is the triply qualified substantial existent of red color.

C: It follows that if something is the triply qualified substantial existent of red color, then it is necessarily the definition of red color.

D: I accept it.

C: Now, it follows that it is not so because if red colors are divided, there are not the two--natural red color and manufactured red color.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that if red colors are divided, there are the two--natural red color and manufactured red color.

D: I accept it.

C: Now, it follows that it is not so. Posit a natural red color.

D: There is [a natural red color]. The subject, the color of the Buddha Amitayus.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of the Buddha Amitayus, is a natural red color.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject, the color of the Buddha Amitayus, is a natural red color--

D: Because of being suitable as a natural red hue.

C: It follows that whatever is suitable as a natural red hue is necessarily a natural red color.

D: I accept it.

C: Now, it follows that it is not so. Posit a manufactured red color.

D: There is [a manufactured red color]. The subject, the color of a red car.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a red car, is a manufactured red color.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject the color of a red car, is a manufactured red color--

D: Because of being suitable as a manufactured red hue.

C: It follows that whatever is suitable as a manufactured red hue is necessarily a manufactured red color.

D: I accept it.

C: Now, it follows that it is not so because the two, definition and division, do not exist with respect to secondary color.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that the two, definition and division, do exist with respect to secondary color.

D: I accept it.

C: Now, it follows that it is not so. Posit the definition of secondary color.

D: There is [a definition of secondary color]. The subject, that which is suitable as a secondary hue.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, that which is suitable as a secondary hue, that it is the definition of secondary color.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, that which is suitable as a secondary hue it is the definition of secondary color--

D: Because secondary color is its definiendum.

C: It follows that if secondary color is its definiendum, then it is necessarily the definition of secondary color.

D: I accept it.

C: Now, it follows that it is not so. If secondary colors are divided, how many are there?

D: There are eight.

C: It follows that there are not eight. Posit the eight.

D: There are [eight]. The subjects, the eight--the cloud color which is that, the smoke color which is that, the dust color which is that, the mist color which is that, the illumination color which is that, the darkness color which is that, the shadow color which is that, and the sunlight color which is that.

C: It follows that for the expression, "If secondary colors are divided, there are eight," eight such are those which are to be posited.

D: I accept it.

C: Now, it follows that it is not so. Posit a cloud color which is that.

D: There is [a cloud color which is a secondary color]. The subject, the color of an orange cloud.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of an orange cloud, is cloud color which is that.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject, the color of an orange cloud, is a cloud color which is that--

D: Because of being suitable as a cloud hue which is that.

C: It follows that whatever is suitable as a cloud hue which is that is necessarily a cloud color which is that.

D: I accept it.

C: Now, it follows that it is not so. Posit a smoke color which is that.

D: There is [a smoke color which is a secondary color]. The subject,

the color of blue-black-smoke.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of blue-black smoke, is a smoke color which is that.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject, the color of blue-black smoke, is a smoke color which is that.

D: Because of being suitable as a smoke hue which is that.

C: It follows that whatever is suitable as a smoke hue which is that is necessarily a smoke color which is that.

D: I accept it.

C: Now, it follows that it is not so. Posit a dust color which is that.

D: There is [a dust color which is a secondary color]. The subject, the greyish color of dust.

C: It follows that the subject, the greyish color of dust, is a dust color which is that.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject, the greyish color of dust, is a dust color which is that--

D: Because of being suitable as a dust hue which is that.

C: It follows that whatever is suitable as a dust hue which is that is necessarily a dust color which is that.

D: I accept it.

C: Now, it follows that it is not so. Posit a mist color which is that.

D: There is [a mist color which is a secondary color]. The subject, the bluish color of mist in the east.

C: It follows that the subject, the bluish color of mist in the east, is a mist color which is that.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject the bluish color of mist in the east, is a mist color which is that--

D: Because of being suitable as a mist hue which is that.

C: It follows that whatever is suitable as a mist hue which is that is necessarily a mist color which is that.

D: I accept it.

C: Now, it follows that it is not so. Posit an illumination color which is that.

D: There is [an illumination color which is a secondary color]. The subject, the whitish color of illumination.

C: It follows that the subject, the whitish color of illumination, is an illumination color which is that.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject, the whitish color of illumination, is an illumination which is that--

D: Because of being suitable as an illumination hue which is that.

C: It follows that whatever is suitable as an illumination hue which is that is necessarily an illumination color which is that.

D: I accept it.

C: Now, it follows that it is not so. Posit a darkness color which is that.

D: There is [a darkness color which is a secondary color]. The subject, the color of black darkness.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of black darkness, is a darkness color which is that.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject, the color of black darkness, is a darkness color which is that--

D: Because of being suitable as a darkness hue which is that.

C: It follows that whatever is suitable as a darkness hue which is that is necessarily a darkness color which is that.

D: I accept it.

C: Now, it follows that it is not so. Posit a shadow color which is that.

D: There is [a shadow color which is a secondary color]. The subject, the color of a tree's shadow.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a tree's shadow, is a shadow color which is that.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject, the color of a tree's shadow, is a shadow color which is that--

D: Because of being suitable as a shadow hue which is that.

C: It follows that whatever is suitable as a shadow hue which is that is necessarily a shadow color which is that.

D: I accept it.

C: Now, it follows that it is not so. Posit a sunlight color which is that.

D: There is [a sunlight color which is a secondary color]. The subject, the color of orange sunlight.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of orange sunlight, is a sunlight color which is that.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject, the color of orange sunlight, is a sunlight color which is that--

D: Because of being suitable as a sunlight hue which is that.

C: It follows that whatever is suitable as a sunlight hue which is that is

necessarily a sunlight color which is that.

D: I accept it.

The primary colors were divided into natural or innate primary colors and manufactured primary colors. A natural color is not something that is made by a person. It is not the result of someone's having dyed it into a material. It is a natural color. A manufactured color is something made by a person by putting dye in and so forth.

The color of vaidurya was posited as a natural blue color. A vaidurya [Das lists bi-dru-ma, Sanskrit vidruma] is some type of precious stone. It may be a catseye stone, or according to Monier-Williams it may be some type of coral.

When we say "which is that" as in the expression "a cloud color which is that," it means "which is a secondary color" as, for example "a cloud color which is a secondary color." That is because among cloud colors there are primary colors and secondary colors; so, it has to be specified as a cloud color which is a secondary color. In the same way, with respect to smoke colors, there are primary and secondary smoke colors. It may be the same for all of the eight secondary colors. I don't know if the color of darkness has both primary and secondary colors. I don't know of any except for black darkness. Still, that is the reason for saying "which is that." You know cloud. You know smoke. Dust is like when a car or a train goes by and a lot of dust is stirred up. Mist is a smoke-like mass as near to a mountain. Illumination is a whitish brightness.

Darkness is the black color at nighttime. Even during the daytime if inside the house it is dark, that too is darkness. Shadow is like that when the sun is shining and there is a person's shadow, a mountain's shadow, and so forth. Sunlight is like that outside. There is white, whitish, reddish, orange sunlight. In the early morning it is orange, and in the evening it is orange again. During the day it is white or whitish.

Now, the two, cloud color and primary color, have three possibilities.

C: What is the difference between cloud color and primary color?

D: There are four possibilities.

C: It follows that there are not four possibilities. First, posit something which is both.

D: There is [a cloud color which is a primary color]. The subject, the color of a white cloud. The subject, the color of a yellow cloud. The subject, the color of a red cloud. The subject, the color of blue cloud.

(You can posit any of these four.)

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a white cloud, is a primary color.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject, the color of a white cloud, is a primary color--

D: Because of being suitable as a primary hue.

C: It follows that if something is suitable as a primary hue, then it is necessarily a primary color.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, the color of a white cloud, that it is a cloud color.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, the color of a white cloud, it is a cloud color--

D: Because of being suitable as a cloud hue.

C: It follows that if something is suitable as a cloud hue, then it is necessarily a cloud color.

D: I accept it.

C: Now, posit something which is a primary color and is not a cloud color.

D: There is [something which is a primary color and is not a cloud color]. The subject, the color of a white flower.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, the color of a white flower, that it is a primary color.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, the color of a white flower, it is a primary color--

D: Because it is white.

C: It follows that if something is white, then it is necessarily a primary color.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, the color of a white flower, that it is not a cloud color.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, the color of a white flower, it is not a cloud color--

D: Because it is a flower color.

C: It follows that if something is a flower color. then it is necessarily not a cloud color.

D: I accept it.

C: Now, posit something which is a cloud color and is not a primary color.

D: There is [something which is a cloud color and is not a primary color]. The subject, the color of an orange cloud.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, the color of an orange cloud, that it is a cloud color.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, the color of an orange cloud, it is a cloud color--

D: Because it is suitable as a cloud hue.

C: It follows that if something is suitable as a cloud hue, then it is necessarily a cloud color.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, the color of an orange cloud, that it is not a primary color.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, the color of an orange cloud, it is not a primary color--

D: Because it is a secondary color.

C: It follows that if something is a secondary color, then it is necessarily not a primary color.

D: I accept it.

C: Now, posit something which is neither one nor the other.

D: There is [something which is neither a cloud color nor a primary color]. The subject, the color of smoke.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, the color of smoke, that it is not a primary color.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, the color of smoke, it is not a primary color--

D: Because it is not suitable as a primary hue.

C: It follows that if something is not suitable as a primary hue, then it is necessarily not a primary color.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, the color of smoke, that it is not a cloud color.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, the color of smoke, it is not a cloud color--

D: Because it is not suitable as a cloud hue.

C: It follows that if something is not suitable as a cloud hue, then it is necessarily not a cloud color.

D: I accept it. The color of sunlight is a color of illumination, but whatever is a color of illuminating need not be the color of sunlight. There is the color of the illumination of lightning and the color of illumination of moonlight which are not colors of sunlight.

In colloquial Tibetan we say, "Then..." (an-nos, de-nas), but when debating we say, "Now,..." (da) as in the expression, "Now, it follows that it is not so."

In training new monks they are always first taught to recite the debates out loud because that brings everything together. If one just reads, the meaning does not come together and everything remains scattered.

When monks are debating, they clap their hands together. The right hand is method and the left hand is wisdom. The clapping of the hands together symbolizes a union of method and wisdom. In dependence upon the practice of a path of a union of method and wisdom one is liberating oneself from all of cyclic existence and drawing others up to the path of omniscience. There are vessels or channels of wisdom in the wrists, and when one claps these have to touch. When these two channels of wisdom meet, this generates wisdom. That is its symbolization.

When you practice debate; you should learn how to clap in this way. Only the Challenger claps his hands during the debate, and he only claps once at the end of whatever he is stating to the Defender. Of course, there is no fault in knowing how to clap in debate. Then if you have to do it somewhere, you will know how. Otherwise, I doubt that it is suitable everywhere. People might think that it is very beautiful. There are schools of definitions being established in various places like Switzerland, France, and so forth. If you go to these places, you will have to know how to clap your hands together in debate. Otherwise, you just will not know it.

[From Tape Side 3 of April 7, 1976]

It is not necessary to proceed through a debate as in the former case when debate A.1 was first done. One need not always follow the route in which the Defender first questions the establishment of the

reason in the first statement of the fundamental consequence, "It follows that the subject, the color of a white religious conch, is red because of being a color." One may follow the route in which the Defender first accepts the basic consequence. This is then in the opposite order from the way in which we did it before. Thus, if debate A 1 is done in this way, the mode of procedure is as follows:

C: Is whatever is a color necessarily red?

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that whatever is a color is necessarily red.

D: I accept it.

C: Then it follows that the subject, the color of a white religious conch, is red because of being a color.

D: I accept [that the color of a white religious conch is red].

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a white religious conch, is not red because of being white.

D: There is no pervasion.

C: It follows that whatever is white is necessarily not red because there is no common locus of the two, white and red.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that there is no common locus of the two, white and red, because the two, white and red, are mutually exclusive.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the two, white and red, are mutually exclusive.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that there is no common locus of the two, white and red.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that whatever is white is necessarily not red.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a white religious conch, is not red because of being white.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a white religious conch, is red because of being a color.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a white religious conch, is a color because of being white.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a white religious conch, is white because of being one with the color of a white religious conch.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a white religious conch, is one with the color of a white religious conch.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a white religious conch, is a color because of being one with the color of a white religious conch.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a white religious conch, is red because of being a color.

D: There is no pervasion.

C: It follows that whatever is a color is not necessarily red.

D: I accept it.

One may proceed as before to consider the difference between the two principals of the debate, color and red, by way of reckoning the possible relationships. Another mode of procedure at this point was offered by Rinbochay.]

C: If there is no pervasion, then posit [a counterexample--something that is a color and is not red].

D: The subject, the color of a white religious conch.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a white religious conch, is a color.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject, the color of a white religious conch, is a color--

D: Because of being suitable as a hue.

C: It follows that whatever is suitable as a hue is necessarily a color.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a white religious conch, is not red.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject, the color of a white religious conch, is not red--

D: Because of not being suitable as a red hue.

C: It follows that whatever is not suitable as a red hue is necessarily not red.

D: I accept it

Another format for debate A.1 results if the Defender gives the correct answer that there is no pervasion to the Challenger's original question. "Is whatever is a color necessarily red?" If the Defender gives this correct answer at the beginning of the debate, there are two possible modes of procedure corresponding to the procedures at the end of debate as in the former two presentations of A.1. These two

are as follows:

Procedure One

C: Is whatever is a color necessarily red?

D: There is no pervasion.

C: If there is no pervasion, then posit [something that is a color and is not red].

D: The subject, the color of a white religious conch.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a white religious conch, is a color.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject, the color of a white religious conch, is a color--

D: Because of being suitable as a hue.

C: It follows that whatever is suitable as a hue is necessarily a color.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a white religious conch, is not red.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject, the color of a white religious conch, is not red--

D: Because of being white.

C: It follows that whatever is white is necessarily not red.

D: I accept it.

Procedure Two

C: Is whatever is a color necessarily red?

D: There is no pervasion.

C: It follows that whatever is a color is not necessarily red.

D: I accept it.

C: If there is no pervasion, then what is the difference between those two?

D: There are three possibilities.

At this point the debate proceeds as before (see pp.) when the relationships between the two principals of the debate are posited and debated.

Lati Rinbochay has presented two new modes of procedure the second of which has two types. The first new procedure is that in which the Defender accepts the basic consequence when it is first stated. Then after the Challenger leads the Defender back to the second statement of the basic consequence, they follow the route in which the Defender questions the establishment of the reason in the basic consequence. This procedure is just as before except that the

two major routes of the debate are reversed in order. The second new procedure is that in which the Defender answers correctly the Challenger's original question by pointing out that there is no pervasion. Then within this second new way he gave two possible procedures that the debate may follow.]

No matter what the Defender answers we will know what to do. The mode of procedure is determined by the Defender's answers. Here the various procedures were applied to debate A.1, but all the others are the same.

If you meditate thinking on the debates, then you will know them all. If you do not remember it, then think about it and meditate on it. You will know it. If you do it with great strength for a month thinking on it, then you will know a lot. It will form well. You will understand well. There are signs, of whether people understand it well or not and you will gain them. If you do it well, you will become skilled, whereupon it will help a great many other people. Seeing you, they will become skilled also. It will help the country itself, which will improve due to the fact that people who were not formerly skilled in these treatises are attaining skill in them. There were six scholars called the ornaments of the world: Nagarjuna, Asanga, Vasubhandhu, Dignaga, Dharmakarti, and Aryadeva. They are adornments of the world. They are not called adornments for any other reason except that they were wise. In the same way you can become the adornments of America, of the West, and of the world. If you put great force into it, you can learn very quickly. You do not have to do it for a long time. Put great effort into it for a month, and you will become very skillful. We do not always have to be debating about, "whatever is a color is necessarily red." We can think about "whatever is a color is necessarily a thing (dnqos po, bhava)." The mode of procedure is the same.

C: Is whatever is a color necessarily the color of red cloth?

D: There is no pervasion.

C: If there is no pervasion. then posit [something that is a color and is not the color of red cloth].

D: The subject, the color of a white shirt.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a white shirt, is not the color of red cloth.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject, the color of a white shirt, is not the color of red cloth--

D: Because of not being suitable as a red cloth hue.
C: It follows that whatever is not suitable as a red cloth hue is necessarily not the color of red cloth.
D: I accept it.
C: It follows that the subject, the color of a white shirt, is not a color.
D: Why?
C: It follows that the subject, the color of a white shirt, is a color.
D: I accept it.
C: The subject, the color of a white shirt, is a color--
D: Because of being white.
C: It follows that the subject, the color of a white shirt, is white.
D: I accept it.
C: The subject, the color of a white shirt, is white--
D: Because of being suitable as a white hue.
C: It follows that whatever is suitable as a white hue is necessarily white.
D: I accept it.
C: Now then ('o na) is whatever is red necessarily the color of red cloth?
D: There is no pervasion.
C: Posit [something that is red and is not the color of red cloth].
D: The subject, the color of a red book. The subject, the color of a red flower. The subject, the color of a ruby.
C: Is whatever is red necessarily the color of a ruby?
D: There is no pervasion.
C: Posit something which is red and is not the color of a ruby].
D: The subject, the color of a red book.
C: It follows that the subject, the color of a red book, is a red color.
D: I accept it.
C: The subject, the color of a red book, is a red color--
D: Because of being suitable as a red hue.
C: It follows that whatever is suitable as a red hue is necessarily a red color.
D: I accept it.
C: It follows that the subject, the color of a red book, is not the color of a ruby.
D: I accept it.
C: The subject, the color of a red book, is not the color of a ruby--
D: Because of not being suitable as a ruby hue.
C: It follows that whatever is not suitable as a ruby hue is necessarily

not the color of a ruby.

D: I accept it.

C: What is the difference between the two, red color and the color of a ruby?

D: There are three possibilities.

C: It follows that there are not three possibilities. Posit something which is both [a red color and the color of a ruby].

D: The subject, the color of a ruby in the east. The subject, the color of a ruby in the west. The subject, the color of a ruby of the American government. The subject, the color of a ruby of the Indian government.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a ruby of the American government, is the color of a ruby.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject the color of a ruby of the American government, is the color of a ruby--

D: Because of being suitable as a ruby hue.

C: It follows that whatever is suitable as a ruby hue is necessarily the color of a ruby.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a ruby of the American government, is red.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject, the color of a ruby of the American government, is red--

D: Because of being a particularity of red.

C: It follows that whatever is a particularity of red is necessarily red.

D: I accept it.

C: Which is necessarily the other? Which is not necessarily the other? Posit something which is one and not the other.

D: Whatever is the color of a ruby is necessarily red. Whatever is red is not necessarily the color of a ruby. The subject, the color of a red flower.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a red flower, is red.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject, the color of a red flower, is red--

D: Because of being a particularity of red.

C: It follows that whatever is a particularity of red is necessarily red.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a red flower, is not the color

of a ruby.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject, the color of a red flower, is not the color of a ruby--

D: Because of not being suitable as a ruby hue.

C: It follows that whatever is not suitable as a ruby hue is necessarily not the color of a ruby.

D: I accept it.

C: Posit something which is neither.

D: The subject, the color of a white religious conch.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a white religious conch, is not red.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject, the color of a white religious conch, is not red--

D: Because of being white.

C: It follows that whatever is white is necessarily not red.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a white religious conch, is not the color of a ruby.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject, the color of a white religious conch, is not the color of a ruby--

D: Because of not being suitable as a ruby hue.

C: It follows that whatever is not suitable as a ruby hue is necessarily not the color of a ruby.

D: I accept it.

C: Now, what is the difference between the two, the color of a ruby and the color of a ruby of the American government?

D: There are three possibilities.

C: It follows that there are not three possibilities. Posit something which is both [the color of a ruby and the color of a ruby of the American government].

D: The subject, the color of a large ruby of the American government.

The subject, the color of a better ruby of the American government.

The subject, the color of a worse ruby of the American government.

(One cannot posit just the same thing here. It is not suitable to posit the color of a ruby of the American government. One must posit an instance or a particularity of the color of a ruby of the American government; therefore, the Defender posits, for instance, "the color of a large ruby of the American government.")

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a large ruby of the American

government, is the color of a ruby of the American government.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject, the color of a large ruby of the American government, is the color of a ruby of the American government--

D: Because of being a particularity of the color of a ruby of the American government.

C: It follows that whatever is a particularity of the color of a ruby of the American government is necessarily the color of a ruby of the American government.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a large ruby of the American government, is the color of a ruby.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject, the color of a large ruby of the American government, is the color of a ruby--

D: Because of being suitable as a ruby hue.

C: It follows that whatever is suitable as a ruby hue is necessarily the color of a ruby.

D: I accept it.

C: Which is necessarily the other? Which is not necessarily the other? Posit something which is one and not the other.

D: Whatever is the color of a ruby of the American government is necessarily the color of a ruby. Whatever is the color of a ruby is not necessarily the color of a ruby of the American government. The subject, the color of a ruby of the Indian government.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a ruby of the Indian government, is the color of a ruby.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject, the color of a ruby of the Indian government, is the color of a ruby--

D: Because of being suitable as a ruby hue.

C: It follows that whatever is suitable as a ruby hue is necessarily the color of a ruby.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a ruby of the Indian government, is not the color of a ruby of the American government.

D: I accept it

C: The subject, the color of a ruby of the Indian government, is not the color of a ruby of the American government--

D: Because of not being suitable as a hue of a ruby of the American

government.

C: It follows that whatever is not suitable as a hue of a ruby of the American government is necessarily not the color of a ruby of the American government.

D: I accept it.

C: Posit something that is neither.

D: The subject, the color of purified gold.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of purified gold, is not the color of a ruby.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject, the color of purified gold, is not the color of a ruby--

D: Because of not being suitable as a ruby hue.

C: It follows that whatever is not suitable as a ruby hue is necessarily not the color of a ruby.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of purified gold, is not the color of a ruby of the American government.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject, the color of purified gold, is not the color of a ruby of the American government--

D: Because of not being suitable as a hue of a ruby of the American government.

C: It follows that whatever is not suitable as a hue of a ruby of the American government is necessarily not the color of a ruby of the American government.

D: I accept it. C: Is whatever is a horse necessarily a white horse?

D: There is no pervasion.

C: Posit [something which is a horse and is not a white horse].

D: The subject, a black horse.

C: It follows that the subject, a black horse, is a horse.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject, a black horse, is a horse--

D: Because of being a particularity of horse.

C: It follows that whatever is a particularity of horse is necessarily a horse.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, a black horse, is not a white horse.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject, a black horse, is not a white horse--

D: Because of not being a person designated in dependence upon any

of the five aggregates of a white horse.

C: It follows that whatever is not a person designated in dependence upon any of the five aggregates of a white horse is necessarily not a white horse.

D: I accept it.

C: Then it follows that the subject, a black horse, is a horse.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, a black horse, is a person.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, a black horse, is a non-associated compositional factor.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, a black horse, is not a color.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, a black horse, is not black.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, a white horse, is not white.

D: I accept it.

Tape

Side 4 C: It follows that a bearded man is not a man.

D: Why?

C: It follows that a bearded man is a man.

D: I accept it

C: It follows that a white horse is white.

D: Why?

C: It follows that a white horse is not white. It follows that white cotton cloth is not white.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that white paper is not white.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that white paper does not exist.

D: Why?

C: It follows that white paper does exist.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that something which is paper and which is white exists.

D: I accept it.

C: Posit [something which is paper and which is white].

D: The subject, white paper.

C: It follows that white paper is white.

D: Why?

C: It follows that white paper is not white.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that something which is paper and which is white does not exist.

D: I accept it.

C: [Your assertion is] finished! It follows that white paper does not exist.

D: Why?

C: It follows that white paper does exist.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that white paper does not exist because something which is paper and is also white does not exist. It follows that a white horse does not exist because something which is a horse and is also white does not exist. Something which is paper and is also white does not exist because the two, paper and white, are mutually exclusive. It follows that it is so because (1) whatever is paper is necessarily an object of touch and (2) whatever is white is necessarily a color.

Search it out. Investigate it Learn it with the easy things. When you know the signs, definitions, divisions, and so on of the easy topics, then later on it will be easy also. [Continuing Tape Side 5 from April 14, 1976]

C: Now, what is the difference between the two, cloud color and secondary color?

D: There are three possibilities.

C: It follows that there are not three possibilities. Posit something which is both [a cloud color and a secondary color].

D: There is [something which is both]. The subject, the color of an orange cloud.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, the color of an orange cloud, that it is a cloud color.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, the color of an orange cloud, it is a cloud color--

D: Because it is suitable as a cloud hue.

C: It follows that if something is suitable as a cloud hue then it is necessarily a cloud color.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, the color of an orange cloud, that it is a secondary color.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, the color of an orange cloud, it is a secondary color--

D: Because it is suitable as a secondary hue.

C: It follows that if something is suitable as a secondary hue, then it is necessarily a secondary color.

D: I accept it.

C: Now, which is necessarily the other? Which is not necessarily the other? Posit something which is one and not the other.

D: Whatever is a cloud color is necessarily a secondary color. Whatever is a secondary color is not necessarily a cloud color. The subject, the color of blue-black smoke.

C: It follows that whatever is a cloud color is necessarily a secondary color.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a white cloud, is a secondary color because of being a cloud color. You asserted the reason and the pervasion.

D: I accept [that the color of a white cloud is a secondary color].

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a white cloud, is not a secondary color because of being a primary color.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a white cloud, is not a secondary color.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a white cloud, is a secondary color because of being a cloud color. You asserted the reason and the pervasion.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a white cloud, is a cloud color because of being suitable as a cloud hue.

D: I accept [that the color of a white cloud is a cloud color].

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a white cloud, is a secondary color because of being a cloud color. You asserted the reason and the pervasion.

D: There is no pervasion.

C: It follows that whatever is a cloud color is not necessarily a secondary color.

D: I accept it.

C: [Your assertion is] finished! It follows that the two, cloud color and

secondary color, do not have three possibilities.

D: I accept it.

C: Now, what is the difference between the two, cloud color and secondary color?

D: There are four possibilities.

C: [Your assertion is] finished!

The next debate which was given by Lati Rinbochay begins with a quote from Chapter I, Shloka 10, Pada A of the Treasury of Knowledge (Abhidharmakosha) of Vasubandhu.

C: Posit the two types of form [as expressed in the passage]' "Form has two types or twenty types."

D: There are [two types of form]. The subjects, the two-- color-form and shape-form.

C: It follows with respect to the subjects, the two-color-form and shape-form, that those two[as expressed in the passage], "Form has two types or twenty types," are to be posited in that way.

C: Now, posit the twenty types of form [as expressed in the passage]. "Form has two types or twenty types."

D: There are [twenty types of form]. The subjects, the twenty--the twelve color-forms and the eight shape-forms.

C: It follows that the twenty types [as expressed in the passage], "Form has two types or twenty types," are to be posited in that way.

D: I accept it.

[Now we do not need to explain the twelve types of color-forms. We have covered those.]

C: It follows that it is not so. Posit the eight shape-forms.

D: There are [eight shape-forms]. The subjects, the eight--high form, low form, long form, short form, level form, non-level form, round form, and polygonal form.

C: It follows that the eight shape-forms are to be posited in that way.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that it is not so. Posit a high form.

D: There is [a high form]. The subject, the shape of an immeasurable palace in the fourth concentration.

C: It follows that the subject, the shape of an immeasurable palace in the fourth concentration, is a high form.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject, the shape of an immeasurable palace in the fourth concentration, is a high form--

D: Because of being suitable as a high form.

C: It follows that whatever is suitable as a high form is necessarily a high form.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that it is not so. Posit a low form.

D: There is [a low form]. The subject, the shape of the sphere of wind that is a lower basis.

[Scientists nowadays say that this does not exist. We say it exists and we have to fight for it.]

C: It follows that the subject, the shape of the sphere of wind that is a lower basis, is a low form--.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject, the shape of the sphere of wind that is a lower basis, is a low form--

D: Because of being suitable as a low form.

C: It follows that whatever is suitable as a low form is necessarily a low form.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that it is not so. Posit a long form.

D: There is [a long form]. The subject, the shape of Mount Meru.

[Proceed as before.]

C: It follows that it is not so. Posit a short form.

D: There is [a short form]. The subject, the shape of an atom.

[Proceed as before.]

C: It follows that it is not so. Posit a level form.

D: There is [a level form]. The subject, the shape of an even surface.

[Proceed as before.]

C: It follows that it is not so. Posit a non-level shape-form.

D: There is [a non-level shape-form]. The subject, the shape of an uneven surface.

[Proceed as before.]

C: It follows that it is not so. Posit a round form.

D: There is [a round form]. The subject, the shape of a ball.

[Proceed as before.]

C: It follows that it is not so. Posit a polygonal form.

D: There is [a polygonal form]. The subject, the shape of a polygonal house.

[High and low form can be posited just in terms of where one is. Thus in relation to us because the house of a person in the fourth

concentration is above us it is high. And just because the form of this sphere of wind below us, is below us, it is a low form. If one were born into the four concentrations proceeding up through them one by one higher and higher, it could happen that one would have bigger and bigger houses as one proceeded. This could happen, but it would not necessarily happen. When beings are born into those concentrations, they are born immediately with whatever size they are going to have in that lifetime and their clothing and dwelling are produced with them.

The land in the first concentration is destroyed when the land is destroyed by fire at the end of an eon. This susceptibility to fire is a fault. The second concentration has a fault that makes it susceptible to destruction by water. The third concentration has a fault that makes it susceptible to destruction by wind. The fourth concentration is immovable. Even when the world system is destroyed at the end of a great eon, the land and so forth of the fourth concentration is not destroyed. All four of the concentrations have common environments in which not just one but various people are born on that level.]

Now, the two, cloud color and primary color, have four possibilities. The two, cloud color and secondary color, have four possibilities. The two, the color of a white cloud and primary color, have three possibilities. The two, the color of a white cloud and secondary color, are mutually exclusive. The two, the color of an orange cloud and secondary color, have three possibilities. The two, the color of an orange cloud and primary color, are mutually exclusive. The two, the color of a flower and primary color, have four possibilities. The two, the color of a flower and secondary color, have four possibilities. The two, the color of a red flower and primary color, have three possibilities. The two, the color of a white flower and primary color, have three possibilities. The two, the color of a yellow flower and primary color, have three possibilities. The two, the color of an orange flower and secondary color, have three possibilities. The two, the color of a bluish flower and secondary color, have three possibilities.

The two, secondary color and primary color, are mutually exclusive. If someone asks, "What is the difference between secondary color and primary color?", they are mutually exclusive. And when he says, "The two, secondary color and primary color, are mutually exclusive--" [one must answer]

"Because of (1) being different and (2) a common locus is

not possible." [The debate runs like this.]

C: What is the difference between the two, secondary color and primary color?

D: They are mutually exclusive.

C: It follows that the two, secondary color and primary color are mutually exclusive.

D: I accept it.

C: The two, secondary color and primary color, are mutually exclusive--

D: Because (1) those two are different and (2) a common locus is not possible.

C: It follows that if (1) those two are different and (2) a common locus is not possible then they are necessarily mutually exclusive.

D: I accept it.

[Generally the definition of mutual exclusion is "(1) they are different and (2) a common locus is not possible." They are different. They are diverse or individual. They are two objects which do not have a common locus. A common locus is not possible, it does not exist.]

With regard to two phenomena that are mutually inclusive:

C: What is the difference between the two, primary color and that which is suitable as a primary hue?

D: They are mutually inclusive.

C: It follows that the two, primary color and that which is suitable as a primary hue, are mutually inclusive.

D: I accept it.

C: The two, primary color and that which is suitable as a primary hue, are mutually inclusive--

D: Because (1) a common locus of those two is possible and (2) there is ascertainment of the eight approaches of pervasion [between them].

C: It follows that if (1) a common locus of those two is possible and (2) there is ascertainment of the eight approaches of pervasion [between them], then they are necessarily mutually inclusive.

D: I accept it.

[You have to state the first part of the reason as "(1) a common locus of those two is possible" rather than the faulty "those two are different". This is because an opponent could state a counterexample of an object of knowledge of which the being is impossible such as the

two, pillar and pot, or the two, permanent phenomenon and thing. A common locus of either of these phenomenon with anything would not be possible.]

C: What is the difference between the two, color-form and color?

D: They are mutually inclusive.

C: It follows that the two, color-form and color, are mutually inclusive.

D: I accept it.

C: The two, color-form and color, are mutually inclusive--

D: Because (1) a common locus of those two is possible and (2) there is ascertainment of the eight approaches of pervasion [between them].

C: It follows that if (1) a common locus of those two is possible and (2) there is ascertainment of the eight approaches of pervasion [between them], then they are necessarily mutually inclusive.

D: I accept it.

The two, shape-form and shape, are mutually inclusive. The two, color-form and shape-form, are mutually exclusive. This is so because (1) color-form and shape-form are different and (2) a common locus is not possible. Then there is pervasion too.

[NEW DEBATE]

C: Now, it follows that it is not so because if something is (1) a permanent phenomenon and (2) has four possibilities with primary color, then it necessarily does not have three possibilities with secondary color.

D: There is no pervasion.

C: If there is no pervasion, posit [a counterexample].

D: The subject, different from primary color.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, different from primary color, that it is a permanent phenomenon.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, different from primary color, it is a permanent phenomenon--

D: Because there is a common locus of it and the non-momentary.

C: It follows that if there is a common locus of it and the non-momentary, then it is necessarily a permanent phenomenon.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, different from primary color, that it has four possibilities with primary color.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, different from primary color, that it does not have four possibilities with primary color. First, posit something which is both [a primary color and different from primary color].

D: There is [something that is a primary color and is different from primary color]. The subject, the color of a blue medicine Buddha (sanqs rgyas sman qyi bla bai tu ry'i kha doq).

C: It follows with respect to the subject, the color of a blue medicine Buddha, that it is a primary color.-

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, the color of a blue medicine Buddha it is a primary color--

D: Because it is blue.

C: It follows that if something is blue, then it is necessarily a primary color.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, the color of a blue medicine Buddha, that it is different from primary color.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, the color of a blue medicine Buddha, it is different from primary color--

D: Because it is diverse from primary color.

C: It follows that if something is diverse from primary color, then it is necessarily different from primary color.

D: I accept it.

C: Now, it follows that it is not so. Posit something which is a primary color and is not different from primary color.

D: There is [something which is a primary color and is not different from primary color]. The subject, primary color.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, primary color, that it is a primary color.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, primary color, it is a primary color--

D: Because it is suitable as a primary hue.

C: It follows that if something is suitable as a primary hue, then it is necessarily a primary color.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, primary color, that it is not different from primary color.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, primary color, it is not different from primary color--

D: Because it is one with primary color.

C: It follows that if something is one with primary color then it is necessarily not different from primary color.

D: I accept it.

C: Now, it follows that it is not so. Posit something that is different from primary color and is not a primary color.

D: There is [something that is different from primary color and is not a primary color]. The subject, a pillar.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, a pillar, that it is different from primary color.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, a pillar, it is different from primary color--

D: Because it is mutually exclusive with primary color.

C: It follows that if something is mutually exclusive with primary color, then it is necessarily different from primary color.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, a pillar, that it is not a primary color.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, a pillar, it is not a primary color--

D: Because it is not a form-source.

C: It follows that if something is not a form-source, then it is necessarily not a primary color.

D: I accept it.

C: Now, it follows that it is not so. Posit something which is neither [a primary color nor different from primary color].

D: There is [something which is neither a primary color nor different from primary color]. The subject, the horn of a rabbit.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, the horn of a rabbit, that it is not a primary color.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, the horn of a rabbit, it is not a primary color--

D: Because it is not a color.

C: It follows that if something is not a color, then it is necessarily not a primary color.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, the horn of a rabbit, that it is not different from primary color.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, the horn of a rabbit, it is not different from primary color--

D: Because it is ascertained as non-existent.

C: It follows that if something is ascertained as non-existent, then it is necessarily not different from primary color.

D: I accept it.

C: Now, it follows that it is not so. It follows with respect to the subject, different from primary color, that it does not have three possibilities with secondary color. First, posit something which is both [a secondary color and different from primary color].

D: There is [something that is both a secondary color and different from primary color]. The subject, the color of a green Amogasiddhi Buddha.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, the color of a green Amogasiddhi Buddha, that it is a secondary color.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, the color of a green Amogasiddhi Buddha, it is a secondary color--

D: Because it is suitable as a secondary hue.

C: It follows that if something is suitable as a secondary hue, then it is necessarily a secondary color.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, the color of a green Amogasiddhi Buddha, that it is different from primary color.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, the color of a green Amogasiddhi Buddha, it is different from primary color--

@: Because it is mutually exclusive with primary color.

C: It follows that if something is mutually exclusive with primary color, then it is necessarily different from primary color.

D: I accept it.

C: Which is necessarily the other? Which is not necessarily the other? Posit something which is one and not the other.

D: There is [something that is one and is not the other]. Whatever is a secondary color is necessarily different from primary color. Whatever is different from primary color is not necessarily a secondary color.

The subject a high form.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, a high form, that it is different from primary color.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, a high form, it is different from primary color

D: Because it is diverse from primary color.

C: It follows that if something is diverse from primary color then it is necessarily different from primary color.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, a high form, that it is not a secondary color.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, a high form, it is not a secondary color--

D: Because it is not a color-form.

C: It follows that if something is not a color-form, then it is necessarily not a secondary color.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that it is not so. Posit something that is neither [different from primary color nor a secondary color].

D: There is [something that is neither different from primary color nor a secondary color]. The subject, only permanent.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, only permanent, that it is not a secondary color.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, only permanent, it is not a secondary color--

D: Because it is not an existent.

C: It follows that if something is not an existent, then it is necessarily not a secondary color.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, only permanent, that it is not different from primary color.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, only permanent, it is not different from primary color--

D: Because it is non-existent.

C: It follows that if something is non-existent, then it is necessarily not different from primary color.

D: I accept it.

[NEW DEBATE]

C: It follows that it is not so because if something has three possibilities with primary color and three possibilities with secondary color, then it necessarily does not have four possibilities with shape-form.

D: There is no pervasion.

C: If there is no pervasion, posit [a counterexample].

D: The subject, different from shape-form.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, different from shape form, that it has three possibilities with primary color.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, different from shape-form, that it does not have three possibilities with primary color. Posit something which is both [a primary color and different from shape-form].

D: There is [something which is both a primary color and different from shape-form]. The subject, the color of a ruby.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, the color of a ruby, that it is a primary color.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, the color of a ruby, it is a primary color--

D: Because it is red.

C: It follows that if something is red, then it is necessarily a primary color.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, the color of a ruby, that it is different from shape-form.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, the color of a ruby, it is different from shape-form--

D: Because it is diverse from shape-form.

C: It follows that if something is diverse from shape-form, then it is necessarily different from shape-form.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that it is not so. Which is necessarily the other? Which is

not necessarily the other? Posit something which is one and not the other.

D: There is [something which is one and not the other]. Whatever is a primary color is necessarily different from shape-form. Whatever is different from shape-form is not necessarily a primary color. The subject, permanent phenomena.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, permanent phenomena, that they are different from shape-form.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, permanent phenomena, they are different from shape-form--

D: Because (1) it is an existent and (2) it is not one with shape-form.

C: It follows that if something (1) is an existent and (2) is not one with shape-form, then it is necessarily different from shape-form.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, permanent phenomena, that it is not a primary color.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, permanent phenomena, it is not a primary color--

D: Because it is not a thing.

C: It follows that if something is not a thing, then it is necessarily not a primary color.

D: I accept it.

C: Posit something which is neither [a primary color nor different from shape-form].

D: There is [something which is neither a primary color nor different from shape-form]. The subject the son of a barren woman.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, the son of a barren woman, that it is not a primary color.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, the son of a barren woman, it is not a primary color--

D: Because it is not a color.

C: It follows that if something is not a color, then it is necessarily not a primary color.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, the son of a barren woman, that it is not different from shape-form.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, the son of a barren woman, it is not different from shape-form--

D: Because it is not an existent.

C: It follows that if something is not an existent, then it is necessarily not different from shape-form.

D: I accept it.

C: Now, with respect to the subject, different from shape-form, it follows that it has three possibilities with secondary color.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, different from shape-form, that it does not have three possibilities with secondary color. First, posit something which is both [different from shape-form and a secondary color].

D: There is [something which is both different from shape-form and a secondary color]. The subject, the color of an orange Manjughosha.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, the color of an orange Manjughosha, that it is different from shape-form.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject the color of an orange Manjughosha, it is different from shape-form--

D: Because it is a particularity of that which is different from shape-form.

C: It follows that if something is a particularity of that which is different from shape-form, then it is necessarily different from shape-form.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, the color of an orange Manjughosha, that it is a secondary color.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject the color of an orange Manjughosha, it is a secondary color--

D: Because it is a secondary color which is the two red and yellow.

C: It follows that if something is a secondary color which is the two, red and yellow, then it is necessarily a secondary color.

D: I accept it.

C: Which is necessarily the other? Which is not necessarily the other? Posit something which is one and not the other.

D: There is [something which is one and not the other]. Whatever is a secondary color is necessarily different from shape-form. Whatever is different from shape-form is not necessarily a secondary color. The

subject, the non-product space.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, the non-product space, that it is different from shape-form.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, the non-product space, it is different from shape-form--

D: Because it is permanent.

C: It follows that if something is permanent, then it is necessarily different from shape-form.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, the non-product space that it is not a secondary color.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, the non-product space, it is not a secondary color--

D: Because it is not a color.

C: It follows that if something is not a color, then it is necessarily not a secondary color.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that it is not so. Posit something which is neither [a secondary color nor different from shape-form].

D: There is [something which is neither a secondary color nor different from shape-form]. The subject, a sky-flower.

C: It follows with respect to the subject a sky-flower, that it is not a secondary color.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, a sky-flower, it is not a secondary color--

D: Because it is non-existent.

C: It follows that if something is non-existent, then it is necessarily not a secondary color.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, a sky-flower, that it is not different from shape-form.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject a sky-flower, it is not different from shape-form--

D: Because it is not diverse from shape-form.

C: It follows that if something is not diverse from shape-form then it is necessarily not different from shape-form.

D: I accept it.

C: Now, it follows with respect to the subject, different from shape-form, that it has four possibilities with shape-form.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, different from shape-form that it does not have four possibilities with shape-form. Posit something which is both [a shape-form and different from shape-form.

D: There is [something which is both a shape-form and different from shape-form]. The subject, a long form.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, a long form, that it is a shape-form.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, a long form, it is a shape-form--

D: Because it is one of the eight shape-forms.

C: It follows that if something is one of the eight shape-forms, then it is necessarily a shape-form.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, a long form, that it is different from shape-form.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, a long form, it is different from shape-form--

D: Because it is diverse from shape-form. (One also might have correctly said, "Because it is a particularity of shape-form.")

C: It follows that if something is diverse from shape-form, then it is necessarily different from shape-form.

D: I accept it.

C: Posit something which is a shape-form and is not different from shape-form.

D: There is [something which is a shape-form and is not different from shape-form]. The subject, shape-form.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, shape-form, that it is a shape-form.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, shape-form. it is a shape-form--

D: Because it is suitable as a shape-form.

C: It follows that if something is suitable as a shape-form, then it is necessarily a shape-form.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, shape-form, that it is not

different from shape-form.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, shape-form, it is not different from shape-form--

D: Because it is one with shape-form.

C: It follows that if something is one with shape-form, then it is necessarily not different from shape-form.

D: I accept it.

C: Posit something which is different from shape-form and is not a shape-form.

D: There is [something which is different from shape-form and is not a shape-form]. The subject, the two-pillar and pot.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, the two-pillar and pot, that it is different from shape-form.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, the two --pillar and pot, it is different from shape-form--

D: Because it is mutually exclusive with shape-form.

C: It follows that if something is mutually exclusive with shape-form, then it is necessarily different from shape-form.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, the two--pillar and pot, that it is not a shape-form.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, the two--pillar and pot, it is not a shape-form--

D: Because it is an object of touch-source.

C: It follows that if something is an object of touch-source, then it is necessarily not a shape-form.

D: I accept it.

C: Posit something which is neither [a shape-form nor different from shape-form].

D: There is [something which is neither a shape-form nor different from shape-form]. The subject, the flower of a dry tree.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, the flower of a dry tree, that it is not a shape-form.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, the flower of a dry tree, it is not a shape-form--

D: Because it is not a form.

C: It follows that if something is not a form, then it is necessarily not a shape-form.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, the flower of a dry tree, that it is not different from shape-form.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, the flower of a dry tree, it is not different from shape-form--

D: Because it is not an existent.

C: It follows that if something is not an existent, then it is necessarily not different from shape-form.

D: I accept it.

One way of learning the relations between phenomena is to mix groups of three and four together and then debating the possibilities. Here we mixed three and two together for the sake of your getting to know them. In this way we debate on some one thing that has three possibilities with one thing and four possibilities with another. This is not very important, but if you know a portion here and a portion there then it is good. This discussion of possibilities helps one to realize the limits of pervasion (khyabmtha')

[Remainder of tape side 7, all of sides 8 and 9, and a third of side 10 are taken with the Sunday April 18, 1976 class during which all of the class members debated with each other under the guidance of Lati Rinbochay. There is a technical fault with the tape which makes it almost inaudible. Probably it was taped without the benefit of a separate microphone. All of the debates seem to be on colors]

Class- Monday April 19- Tape Side 10

C: Because form does not have the two, definition and division.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that form does have the two, definition and division.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that it is not so. Posit the definition of form.

D: There is [a definition of form]. The subject, suitable as form.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, suitable as form, that it is the definition of form.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, suitable as form, it is the definition of form--

D: Because it is the triply qualified positor of form.

C: It follows that if something is the triply qualified positor of form, then it is necessarily the definition of form.

D: I accept it.

C: Now, it follows that it is not so. If forms are divided, how many are there?

D: There are five.

C: It follows that there are not five. Posit the five.

D: There are [five types of form]. The subject, the five--form-source, sound-source, odor-source, taste-source, and tangible object-source.

C: It follows that the five [in the statement] "If forms are divided, there are five," are to be posited in that way.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that it is not so. Posit the definition of form-source.

D: There is [a definition of form-source]. The subject the object of apprehension of an eye consciousness.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, the object of apprehension of an eye consciousness, that it is the definition of form-source.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, the object of apprehension of an eye consciousness, it is the definition of form-source--

D: Because it is the triply qualified substantial existent of form-source.

C: It follows that if something is the triply qualified substantial existent of form-source, then it is necessarily the definition of form-source.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that it is not so. If forms are divided, how many are there?

D: There are two.

C: It follows that there are not two. Posit the two.

D: There are [two types of form]. The subject, the two--color-form and shape-form.

C: It follows that the two in the statment "If form-sources are divided, there are two," are to be posited in that way.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that it is not so. Posit the definition of sound-source.

D: There is [a definition of sound-source]. The subject, the object of hearing of an ear consciousness.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, the object of hearing of an ear consciousness, that it is the definition of sound-source.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, the object of hearing of an ear consciousness, it is the definition of sound-source--

D: Because it is the triply qualified substantial existent of sound-source.

C: It follows that if something is the triply qualified substantial existent of sound-source, then it is necessarily the definition of sound-source.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that it is not so. If sound-sources are divided, how many are there?

D: There are eight.

C: It follows that there are not eight. Posit the eight.

D: There are [eight sound-sources]. The subject, the eight--the two--pleasant and unpleasant sounds which indicate [meaning] to sentient beings and which are arising from elements conjoined with consciousness, the two--pleasant and unpleasant sounds which do not indicate [meaning] to sentient beings and which are arising from elements conjoined with consciousness, the two--pleasant and unpleasant sounds which indicate [meaning] to sentient beings and which are arising from elements not conjoined with consciousness, and the two--pleasant and unpleasant sounds which do not indicate [meaning] to sentient beings and which are arising from elements not conjoined with consciousness.

C: It follows that the eight [in the statement] "When sound-sources are divided, there are eight," are to be posited in that way.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that it is not so. Posit a pleasant sound indicating [meaning] to sentient beings and which is arising from elements conjoined with consciousness.

D: There is [such a sound]. The subject, the sound expressing doctrine [made] by the Wish-Granting Jewel (the Dalai Lama).

C: It follows that the subject, the sound expressing doctrine [made] by the Wish-Granting Jewel, is a pleasant sound indicating [meaning] to sentient beings and which is arising from elements conjoined with consciousness.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject, the sound expressing doctrine [made] by the Wish-

Granting Jewel, is a pleasant sound indicating [meaning] to sentient beings and which is arising from elements conjoined with consciousness--

D: Because of being an attractive (yiddu 'ong ba) sound indicating [meaning] to sentient beings and which is arising from elements conjoined with consciousness.C: It follows that whatever is an attractive sound indicating [meaning] to sentient beings and which is arising from elements conjoined with consciousness is necessarily a pleasant sound indicating [meaning] to sentient beings and which is arising from elements conjoined with consciousness.

D: I accept it.

C: Now it follows that it is not so. Posit an unpleasant sound indicating [meaning] to sentient beings and which is arising from elements conjoined with consciousness.

D: There is [such a sound]. The subject, the sound of accusation by the master.

C: It follows that the subject, the sound of accusation by the master, is an unpleasant sound indicating [meaning] to sentient beings and which is arising from elements conjoined with consciousness.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject, the sound of accusation by the master is an unpleasant sound indicating [meaning] to sentient beings and which is arising from elements conjoined with consciousness--

D: Because of being an unattractive sound indicating [meaning] to sentient beings and which is arising from elements conjoined with consciousness.

C: It follows that whatever is an unattractive sound indicating [meaning] to sentient beings and which is arising from elements conjoined with consciousness is necessarily an unpleasant sound indicating [meaning] to sentient beings and which is arising from elements conjoined with consciousness.

D: I accept it

[Yid du 'ong ba means coming to the mind pleasant' and attractive. Our speech arises from a collection of things including the palate the tongue' the throat' and various things. Amongst this collection are the four elements. Therefore our speech arises in dependence upon the four elements The elements'are said to be

conjoined with consciousness because they are conjoined with or held by the mental continuum. "Indicating to sentient beings" means that it reveals meaning to sentient beings. It has meaning. It is revelatory sound because it has meaning it reveals meaning.]

C: Now it follows that it is not so. Posit a pleasant sound not indicating [meaning] to sentient beings and which is arising from elements conjoined with consciousness.

D: There is [such a sound]. The subject' the sound of a bagpipe [made] by a player.

C: It follows that the subject. the sound of a bagpipe [made] by a player' is a pleasant sound not indicating [meaning] to sentient beings and which is arising from elements conjoined with consciousness.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject' the sound of a bagpipe [made] by a player' is a pleasant sound not indicating [meaning] to sentient beings and which is arising from elements conjoined with consciousness--

D: Because of being an attractive sound not indicating [meaning] to sentient beings and which is arising from elements conjoined with consciousness

C: It follows that whatever is an attractive sound not indicating [meaning] to sentient beings and which is arising from elements conjoined with consciousness is necessarily a pleasant sound not indicating [meaning] to sentient beings and which is arising from elements conjoined with consciousness.

D: I accept it.

C: Now it follows that it is not so. Posit an unpleasant sound not indicating [meaning] to sentient beings and which is arising from elements conjoined with consciousness.

D: There is [such a sound]. The subject' the sound of a policeman's fist hitting [someone].

C: It follows that the subject. the sound of a policeman's fist hitting [someone]' is an unpleasant sound not indicating [meaning] to sentient beings and which is arising from elements conjoined with consciousness.

D: I accept it. [Such sounds as a policeman's fist hitting someone or a person's playing a musical instrument do not reveal meaning.]

C: The subject the sound of a policeman's fist hitting [someone]' is an unpleasant sound not indicating [meaning] to sentient beings and which is arising from elements conjoined with consciousness

D: Because of being an unattractive sound not indicating [meaning] to

sentient beings and which is arising from elements conjoined with consciousness.

C: It follows that whatever is an unattractive sound not indicating [meaning] to sentient beings and which is arising from elements conjoined with consciousness is necessarily an unpleasant sound not indicating [meaning] to sentient beings and which is arising from elements conjoined with consciousness.

D: I accept it.

C: Now it follows that it is not so. Posit a pleasant sound indicating [meaning] to sentient beings and which is arising from elements not conjoined with consciousness.

D: There is [such a sound]. The subject' the sound expressing doctrine [made] by an [unembodied] emanation.

C: It follows that the subject' the sound expressing doctrine [made] by an [unembodied] emanation' is a pleasant sound indicating [meaning] to sentient beings and which is arising from elements not conjoined with consciousness.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject' the sound expressing doctrine [made] by an [unembodied] emanation' is a pleasant sound indicating [meaning] to sentient beings and which is arising from elements not conjoined with consciousness--

D: Because of being an attractive sound indicating [meaning] to sentient beings and which is arising from elements not conjoined with consciousness.

C: It follows that whatever is an attractive sound indicating [meaning] to sentient beings and which is arising from elements not conjoined with consciousness is necessarily a pleasant sound indicating [meaning] to sentient beings arising from elements and which is not conjoined with consciousness.

D: I accept it.

C: Now it follows that it is not so. Posit an unpleasant sound indicating [meaning] to sentient beings and which is arising from elements not conjoined with consciousness.

D: There is [such a sound]. The subject' the sound of coarse words spoken by an [unembodied] emanation.

[Proceed as before.]

C: Now it follows that it is not so. Posit a pleasant sound indicating [meaning] to sentient beings and which is arising from elements not conjoined with consciousness.

D: There is [such a sound]. The subject the sound of a guitar [played] by an [unembodied] emanation. [Proceed as before.]

C: Now it follows that it is not so. Posit an unpleasant sound not indicating [meaning] to sentient beings and which is arising from elements not conjoined with consciousness.

D: There is [such sound]. The subject, the sound of water. The subject the sound of a house falling down. The subject, the sound of wind.

[Proceed as before.]

C: Now it follows that it is not so. Posit the definition of odor-source.

D: There is [a definition of odor-source]. The subject' the object of smell of a nose consciousness.

C: It follows that the subject. the object of smell of a nose consciousness' is the definition of odor-source.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject' the object of smell of a nose consciousness' is the definition of odor-source -

D: Because of being the positor of odor-source.

C: It follows that whatever is the positor of odor-source is necessarily the definition of odor-source.

D: I accept it.

C: Now it follows that it is not so. If.those are divided' how many are there?

D: There are four.

C: It follows that there are not four. Posit the four.

D: There are [four types of odor-sources]. The subject' the four (consisting of) the two--pleasant (zhim bo) and unpleasant odors and the two--equal and unequal odors.

C: It follows that the four [in the statement] "When odor- sources are divided, there are four," are to be posited in that way.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that it is not so. Posit an equal odor.

D: There is [an equal odor]. The subject. the odor of rice.

C: It follows that the subject, the odor of rice, is an equal odor

D: I accept it.

C: The subject' the odor of rice. is an equal odor--

D: Because of being observed as an equal odor.

C: It follows that whatever is observed as an equal odor is necessarily an equal odor.

D: I accept it. [Uncooked rice has an equal odor. "Equal" here means that it has little odor or none. but it has an odor that will not infect other things with its smell.]

C: Posit an unequal odor.

D: There is [an unequal odor]. The subject' tne odor of garlic.

C: It follows that the subject' the odor of garlic. is an unequal odor.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject' the odor of garlic' is an unequal odor--

D: Because of being observed as an unequal odor.

[Also suitable as a sign here is' "because of being a strong (or powerful) odor." And suitable as a subject here is the odor of an effluvium.]

C: It follows that whatever is observed as an unequal odor is necessarily an unequal odor.

D: I accept it.

C: Now it follows that it is not so. Posit a pleasant odor.

D: There is [a pleasant odor]. The subject. the odor of sandalwood.

C: It follows that the subject. the odor of sandalwood' is a pleasant odor.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject. the odor of sandalwood' is a pleasant odor--

D: Because of being an attractive odor.

C: It follows that whatever is an attractive odor is necessarily a pleasant odor.

D: I accept it.

C: Now it follows that it is not so. Posit an unpleasant odor.

O: There is [an unpleasant odor]. The subject' the odor of impurity (mi tsanq ba).

C: It follows that the subject. the odor of impurity, is an unpleasant odor.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject. the odor of impurity. is an unpleasant odor--

D: Because of being an unattractive odor.

C: Now it follows that it is not so. Posit the definition of taste-source.

D: There is [a definition of taste-source]. The subject' the object of experience of a tongue consciousness.

C: It follows that the subject. the object of experience of a tongue consciousness' is the definition of taste-source.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject' the object of experience of a tongue conscious- ness, is

the definition of taste-source--

D: Because of being the meaning reverse of taste-source.

C: It follows that whatever is the meaning reverse of taste- source is necessarily the definition of taste-source.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that it is not so. If tastes are divided' how many are there?

D: There are six.

C: It follows that there are not six. Posit the six.

D: There are [six types of tastes]. The subject' the six-- sweet. sour' bitter' astringent' hot. and salty.

C: It follows that the six [in the statement] "When tastes are divided' there are six'" are to be posited in that way.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that it is not so. Posit a sweet taste.

D: There is [a sweet taste]. The subject. the taste of molasses.

C: It follows that the subject' the taste of molasses' is a sweet taste.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject' the taste of molasses' is a sweet taste- [What do you say here? The taste of molasses is a sweet taste--

Do you know why the taste is sweet? Is sugar sweet? Yes. it is sweet. How do you know that it is sweet? When you say that it is sweet' what do you mean? You know sweet. You are always drinking sweet tea. If you say that the taste of molasses is a sweet taste because its taste is sweet' then you are stating the basis of disputation (i.e..the subject) as the sign (i.e.' the reason) itself. Such an approach is shameful. The reason that it is a sweet taste is because it is observed as a sweet taste. "Observed as a sweet taste" means that it is observed or realized as sweet by a valid cognizer. Thus' either "because of being observed as a sweet taste" or "because of being realized as a sweet taste" are suit- able signs of something's being a sweet taste.]

D: Because of being observed as a sweet taste.

C: It follows that whatever is observed as a sweet taste is necessarily a sweet taste.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that it is not so. Posit a sour taste.

D: There is [a sour taste]. The subject the taste of lemon.

C: It follows that the subject, the taste of lemon, is a sour taste.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject the taste of lemon' is a sour taste--

D: Because of being observed as a sour taste.

C: It follows that whatever is observed as a sour taste is necessarily a sour taste.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that it is not so. Posit a bitter (kha ba) taste.

D: There is [a bitter taste]. The subject' the taste of dik-da (tiq ta).

[According to Das dik-da is Gentiana chiretta. "a bitter plant growing in the Himalayas which is largely used as an antidote against fever and liver complaints ...it cures all kinds of bilious fever."]

C: It follows that the subject' the taste of dik-da. is a bitter taste.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject the taste of dik-da' is a bitter taste--

D: Because of being observed as a bitter taste.

C: It follows that whatever is observed as a bitter taste is necessarily a bitter taste.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that it is not so. Posit an astringent taste.

D: There is [an astringent taste]. The subject' the taste of bread.

C: It follows that the subject, the taste of bread, is an astringent taste.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject the taste of bread' is an astringent taste--

D: Because of being observed as an astringent taste.

C: It follows that whatever is observed as an astringent taste it necessarily an astringent taste.

D: I accept it

C: It follows that it is not so. Posit a hot (i.e., pungent) taste.

D: There is[a hot taste]. The subject, the taste of pepper.

C: It follows that the subject' the taste of pepper' is a hot taste.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject, the taste of pepper, is a hot taste--

D: Because of being observed as a hot taste.

C: It follows that whatever is observed as a hot taste is necessarily a hot taste.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that it is not so. Posit a salty taste.

D: There is a [a salty taste]. The subject. the taste of salt (ljaqs tsha'i ro). [Here he posited the honorific of salt.]

C: It follows that the subject' the taste of salt' is a salty taste.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject, the taste of salt, is a salty taste--

D: Because of being observed as a salty taste.

C: It follows that whatever is observed as a salty taste is necessarily a salty taste.

D: I accept it.

C: Now it follows that it is not so. Posit the definition of tangible object-source.

D: There is [a definition of tangible object-source]. The subject' the object of touch of a body consciousness.

C: It follows that the subject. the object of touch of a body consciousness' is the definition of tangible object- source--

D: Because of being the positor of tangible object-source.

C: It follows that whatever is the positor of tangible object- source is necessarily the definition of tangible object- source.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that it is not so. If tangible object- sources are divided' how many are there?

D: There are eleven.

C: It follows that there are not eleven. Posit the eleven.

D: There are [eleven tangible object-sources]. The subject, the eleven (consisting of) the four elemental tangible objects and the seven tangible objects arisen from ele- ments.

C: It follows that the eleven [in the statement] "If tangi- ble object-sources are divided. there are eleven." are to be posited in that way.

D: I accept it.

The definition of earth is "hard and obstructive." The definition of water is "wet and moistening " The definition of fire is "hot and burning." The definition of wind is "light and moving." The mode of procedure for debating these definitions is the same as before.

There are seven tangible objects arisen from elements. They are smooth' rough. light. heavy' cold' hunger' and thirst. A smooth tangible object is satin. A rough tangible object is a rope made out of hemp. A heavy tangible object is the tangible object which is a stone or iron. A light tangible object is a feather. Cold is what you feel when you are cold. Hunger is like when the stomach is empty. Thirst is when the mouth is dry. If you do not drink water' your mouth will become dry.

The mode of procedure for debating these is the same as before. Posit a smooth tangible object. It is a smooth

tangible object-- Because of being a particularity of smooth tangible object. It is the same. It will be easy. Now comes the presentation of established bases.

Established Bases

C: Because in the text which says' "Because there are two objects of comprehension' there are two valid cognizers'" there is no explanation of the presentation of established bases.

D: The reason is not established

C: It follows that in the text which says' "Because there are two objects of comprehension' there are two valid cog- nizers'" there is an explanation of the presentation of established bases.

D: I accept it.

[This quote is from the root text of the Pramnavarttika or Dharmakrti's Commentary on (Dignaga's) "Treatise on Valid Cognition." The presentation of established bases is taken from there.

Established Bases are not taught in the same way that we did colors. The following are synonyms: established bases, established by valid cognition' object of knowledge' that which is suitable as an object of awareness' existent. observed by valid cognition. phe- nomena, holder of its own entity' object of comprehen- sion, object realized by valid cognition, object, object known by a mind, object of comprehension of an exalted knower' object realized by an exalted knower. These are mutually inclusive. Whatever is one is necessarily the other. Whatever is the other is necessarily the one. They are mutually inclusive because (1) a common locus is possible and (2) they are ascertained (as having) the eight approaches of pervasion. Further if (with respect to phenomena) a common locus is possible and

they are ascertained (as having) the eight approaches of pervasion, then they are necessarily mutually inclusive. Also synonymous with the above are hidden phenomena and (its definition) object realized in a hidden manner by the thought apprehending it. When we say that two things are mutually inclusive' it means that they have the same meaning. Their greater and lesser pervasions are the same. As with regard to the same person' we may say "Dan" or "Daniel." The

names are different, but the meaning is the same. Except for a difference of name the meaning is the same. It is like this for established base, object of knowledge, and so forth. The names are different, but the meaning is the same. If we call either name, the person will answer. In this way, object of knowledge is itself a hidden phenomenon. Established base is itself a hidden phenomenon. Phenomenon itself is a hidden phenomenon. There are many names, but the meaning is the same.

Now, if established bases are divided, there are two--permanent phenomena and things. Permanent phenomenon has the following synonyms: generally characterized phenomenon, conventional truth' common locus of the non-momentary and phenomenon, phenomenon which is a mere imputation by term or thought and is not established as a specifically characterized phenomenon, phenomenon which is not able to perform a function ultimately. These are mutually inclusive. They have the same meaning.

Generally non-thing, not produced, and not composed are mutually inclusive. Also included here are empty of the ability to perform a function, not created, unsuitable as the three--production, destruction, and abiding. These six are mutually inclusive. If we apply (the qualifier)"phenomenon to each of these' they will still be mutually inclusive. Thus, a phenomenon which is a non-thing, phenomenon which is empty of the ability to perform a function, non-composed phenomenon' phenomenon which is not suitable as the three--production, destruction, and abiding, non-produced phenomenon, non-created phenomenon, and permanent phenomenon are all mutually inclusive.

Non-thing is not mutually inclusive with permanent phenomena. If we add "phenomena" to non-thing, then it will be mutually inclusive with permanent phenomena. This is because non-thing has two types--those non-things which are permanent phenomena and those non-things which are non-existents. When we say "phenomenon which is a non-thing" except for the permanent phenomena there are none. Also, with non-composed, there are non-composed permanent phenomena and non-composed non-existents. These are different. Non-composed phenomena, however, means permanent phenomena and does not mean non-existents. The power of this word 'phenomena' is that except for permanent phenomena we do not need any other. If we do not put the word 'phenomena' with it, it will

not be mutually inclusive with permanent phenomena.

Posit the definition of permanent phenomena. The subject, that which is observed as a common locus of phenomena and the non-momentary. Posit the definition of generally characterized phenomena. The subject, phenomena which are a mere imputation by term or thought and are not

established as specifically characterized phenomena. Posit the definition of conventional truth. The subject, a phenomenon which is not able to perform a function ultimately. Posit the definition of non-thing. The subject, that which is empty of the ability to perform a function. Posit the definition of phenomenon which is a non-thing. The subject, phenomenon which is empty of the ability to perform a function. Posit the definition of the non-composed.

The subject, the non-disintegrating. Posit the definition of non-composed phenomenon. The subject, phenomenon which is non-disintegrating. Posit the definition of non-created. The subject, the non-produced.

Posit the definition of non-created phenomenon. The subject, non-produced phenomenon.

There are two definitions of the non-composed. One is the non-disintegrating. The other is unsuitable as the three--production, destruction, and abiding.

In the study of established bases the mode of procedure for debating is the same as that for colors. Here as before we ask for definitions, divisions, and illustrations. As before, we say, "Posit the definition of established base. That is the definition of established base-- Now, how many phenomena which are mutually inclusive with established base are there? Posit those. Now, if established bases are divided, there are not the two--permanent phenomena and things. It follows that it is not so. Posit the definition of permanent phenomena. How many phenomena are mutually inclusive with permanent phenomena?" This is as before.

The following are synonymous with thing: that which is able to perform a function, impermanent phenomena, the momentary, the created, the produced, the composed, suitable as the three--production, destruction, and abiding, cause, producer, helper, effect, the produced, the helped, specifically characterized phenomena, phenomena which are not established by mere imputation by term or thought, ultimate truth, phenomena which are able to perform a function ultimately, manifest phenomena, object realized directly by a

direct valid cognizer.. These are mutually inclusive. They have the same meaning.

Now. posit the definition of thing. The subject, that which is able to perform a function. Posit the definition of impermanent phenomena. The subject, the momentary. Posit the definition of composed phenomena. The subject. the disintegrating. Also, (for the definition of composed phenomena one can posit) the suitable as the three--production, destruction, and abiding. There is no difference. Posit the definition of specifically characterized phenomena. The subject, phenomena which are not mere imputations by term or thought and are established by their own nature. Also suitable as a definition of specifically characterized phenomena is an object which is not a mere imputation by term or thought and is established from the side of its own uncommon mode of subsistence. This is different from the other but it is

something that is posited. Posit the definition of ultimate truth. The subject, phenomenon which is able to perform a function ultimately. Posit the definition of manifest phenomena. The subject objects realized directly by a direct valid cognizer. Posit the definition of cause The subject, the producer. Also (for the definition of cause) is the helper. Posit the definition of effect. The subject, the produced. Also, the helped.

[Effects are helped by the causes.] Causes are helpers, producers, or contributors.]

New Debate

C: It follows that the two--established base and permanent phenomenon are mutually exclusive.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that whatever is an established base is necessarily not a permanent phenomenon.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject. the non-product space, is not permanent because of being an established base.

D: There is no pervasion.

C: It follows that whatever is an established base is not necessarily not a permanent phenomenon.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that a common locus of established base and permanent phenomenon exists.

D: I accept it

C: It follows that established base and permanent phenomenon are not mutually exclusive.

D: I accept it.

C: Finished! Now, what is the difference between established base and permanent phenomenon?

D: There are three possibilities.

C: Finished! Posit something which is both [an established base and a permanent phenomenon].

D: The subject, object of knowledge.

C: It follows that the subject, object of knowledge, is an established base.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject, object of knowledge, is an established base--

D: Because of being established by valid cognition.

[Also acceptable here is, "because of being an existent." This is because it is suitable to state the definition or to state a synonym as the sign.]

C: It follows that whatever is established by valid cognition is necessarily an established base.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, object of knowledge, is a permanent phenomenon.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject, object of knowledge, is a permanent phenom- enon--

D: Because of being a common locus of phenomena and the non-momentary.

C: It follows that whatever is a common locus of phenomena and the non-momentary is necessarily a permanent phenom- enon.

D: I accept it.

C: Now, which is necessarily the other? Which is not neces- sarily the other? Posit something which is one and not the other.

D: Whatever is a permanent phenomenon is necessarily an established base. Whatever is an established base is not necessarily a permanent phenomenon. The subject, a pot.

C: It follows that the subject, a pot, is an established base.

D: I accept it

C: The subject, a pot, is an established base--

D: Because of being an existent.

C: It follows that whatever is an existent is necessarily an established base.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, a pot, is not a permanent phenomenon.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject, a pot, is not a permanent phenomenon--

D: Because of being a thing.

C: It follows that whatever is a thing is necessarily not a permanent phenomenon.

D: I accept it.

C: Posit something which is neither [an established base nor a permanent phenomenon].

D: The subject the horn of a rabbit.

C: It follows that the subject, the horn of a rabbit, is not an established base.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject, the horn of a rabbit, is not an established base--

D: Because of not being established by valid cognition.

C: It follows that whatever is not established by valid cognition is necessarily not an established base.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the horn of a rabbit, is not a permanent phenomenon.

[After some hesitation on the part of the Defender, Rin bochay said that once whatever is a permanent phenomenon is necessarily an established base and you have already said that the horn of a rabbit is not an established base, how could you have any qualm that it might be permanent? Everything that is a permanent phenomenon is an established base and this is not an established base; therefore there can be no doubt that it is not permanent.]

D: I accept it.

C: The subject, the horn of a rabbit, is not a permanent phenomenon--

D: Because of not being an existent.

C: It follows that whatever is not an existent is necessarily not a permanent phenomenon.

D: I accept it.

I have two important things to explain to you. I have to tell you some history as background and then I will tell you those two things. The dharma is something to be known. Once known if one practices it, it

can help both superficially and deeply. Even if you do not practice it, if you do come to know the dharma, then in this lifetime you will not be dull. And in the future lifetime you will not be dull either. Even if you do not (...), it will come that you seek to benefit people more and you will have less thought to harm others. For a practitioner not only will he or she help this and

future lifetimes, but a practitioner gains happiness Tape for self and country. (...change to new tape)

Side 13 However, if one practices in accordance with Buddha's way' there is no need even to explain that happiness

and comfort will come to that person and that country. I am not going to elaborate on this in detail, in brief the dharma is important. Since you know that it is important, your beginning your study of Buddhism here in this university will not only help you but will also help the university and it will help the country. Now I could even put my signature to the fact that if it is studied well, it will spread and it will help. He (referring to J.H.) is making great effort to establish this program for you. And if people come to ask you what it is like to study, whether or not it is difficult to understand, whether it is explained clearly, then you should not answer that it is difficult it is not explained well, and that it is difficult to get at. You should say that it is easy, it is easy to understand, if you understand it it will help. You should say things like that. He is attempting to establish something that is vast. You should not say things that

contradict that because since it is dharma, as many people as enter into it so much will it help. Your altruistic thought will help you and due to their entering into the dharma, it will help them too. Through this it will increase in the country more and more and then it will bring happiness and comfort to the country in general. From your own point of view I think that if you study and get it straight, then you should not say that it is difficult but you should say that it is easy. It will make it easier for you and it will help others to enter into this teaching. Your saying that it is easy will bring great virtue and benefit to you. In one sense it helps because they people will be meeting with the Buddhist teaching and in another sense it helps because it helps the country. My two things to explain are that. So the two parts are that you should study it well, you should engage in it well, and secondly that you should try to cause other people to engage in it by saying that it is easy. If you say that it is difficult, then other people will feel inferior, they will feel depressed, they will feel unable, and they will not have a

wish to look into it. Try to explain that it is advantageous and that it is very helpful. If you do engage in explaining the many good reasons for engaging in the study then it will help them, help you, and help the country. Whoever you meet with be they great people or small people, it will help a lot. I had thought to say this before but had forgotten. In our own monastery there would be thousands of monks. People would come from our own areas our own lands from far away. If we had sat there telling them that it is very difficult to read, it takes a lot of effort, there is a lot of discomfort in this and that, then the people would just run away and go back. However, when you tell them that it is easy to do, it is very comfortable, when you study the books are very interesting, that there is a lot of advantage that you can get out of it, and then even that one can become a Geshay or a lama or an abbot, that one can get a high position, then the people will think that they will do that. They have a wish to give it a try. You could explain such things also. If you study a lot, since there are a lot of universities you could get a job here and there and you could even get rich and a lot of dollars will come.

Because the mind is something that can change, it is just ready to go this way or that way. That is the truth. It is not a lie at all. It is true that there would be great benefit. It is definite that there would be great benefit if the countries of the West did pay a lot of attention to Buddhism. Since in all of these countries the people know a whole lot of different things--science, languages, and so forth if it ever started anywhere, it would be very easy for other countries to assume it, to take it.

Whatever you want to achieve you can achieve. If you want to become an emperor of the world you can become such. If you want to achieve the position of Buddhahood, you can do so.

The teacher and students have to be a group. We must take care in what we are saying.

New Debate

C: It follows that established by a valid cognizer is not the definition of established base.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that established by a valid cognizer is the definition of established base because (1) there is ascertainment of the eight approaches of pervasion of a definition and definiendum with respect to it and established base and (2) it and established base are established in the relationship of definition and definiendum.

D: The first reason is not established.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, established by a valid cognizer, that there is ascertainment of the eight approaches of pervasion of a definition and definiendum with respect to it and established base because the coextensivenesses of being, not being, existing, and not existing (as on p. 14) are established.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, established by a valid cognizer, that there is ascertainment of the eight approaches of pervasion of a definition and definiendum with respect to it and established base.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the first reason is established.

D: I accept it.

C: Finished!

D: The second reason is not established.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, established by a valid cognizer, that it is established in the relationship of definition and definiendum with established base because in order to ascertain established base with valid cognition one must first ascertain it with valid cognition.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, established by a valid cognizer, that it is established in the relationship of definition and definiendum with established base.

D: I accept it.

C: Finished! It follows that the second reason is established.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, established by a valid cognizer, is the definition of established base.

D: Why?

C: It follows with respect to the subject, established by a valid cognizer, that it is the definition of established base because (1) there is ascertainment of the eight approaches of pervasion of a definition and definiendum with respect to it and established base and (2) it and established base are established in the relationship of definition and definiendum.

D: There is no pervasion.

C: It follows that if (1) there is ascertainment of the eight approaches of pervasion of a definition and definiendum with respect to it and

established base and (2) it and established base are established in the relationship of definition and definiendum, then it is not necessarily the definition of established base.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, established by a valid cognizer, is not the definition of established base.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that there is no definition of established base.

D: Why?

C: It follows that there is a definition of established base.

D: I accept it.

C: Posit it.

D: The subject, observed by a valid cognizer./

C: It follows that the subject, observed by a valid cognizer is the definition of established base.

D: I accept it.

C: Dhi! The three spheres. It follows that the subject, observed by a valid cognizer, is not the definition of established base because of being the definition of existent. [Here some say, "Dhi! The three spheres." This is, "Om a ra ba dza na dhi! The three spheres." You have to say the first six syllables quietly and then the last is said audibly in a high voice drawing out the timing of the syllable.]

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, observed by a valid cognizer, that it is the definition of existent because it is said, "'Observed by a valid cognizer' is the definition of existent and 'established by a valid cognizer' is the definition of established base."

[This is said in the Collected Topics text. If you are going to do it more extensively, "It both follows that it is that and follows that it is that (de yin par thel yin par thel gnyis) because of being the thought of Pur-jok-cham-gya Rin-bo-chay. It follows that it is so because those two said in the Collect Topics, 'Observed by a valid cognizer is the definition of existent and established by a valid cognizer is the definition of established base.'"]

D: I accept it.

C: Finished! You have directly contradicted your basic position. (rtsa ba'i dam bca' dngos 'gal tsha) It follows that X observed by a valid cognizer is the definition of existent and established by a valid cognizer is the definition of established base.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that observed by a valid cognizer is not the definition of established base.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that established by a valid cognier is the definition of established base.

D: I accept it.

C: Finished! It follows that whatever is established by a valid cognizer is necessarily an established base.

D: I accept it.

C: Finished! It follows that whatever is established by a valid cognizer is necessarily an established base.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, pot, is an established base because of being established by a valid cognizer.

D: I accept it.

[Then on the basis of debate B.1 there is the following.]

C: It follows that the subject, pot, is a permanent phenomenon because of being an established base.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, pot, is not a permanent phenomenon because of being an impermanent phenomenon.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that the subject, pt, is an impermanent phenomenon because of being momentary.

D: There is no pervasion.

C: It follows that whatever is momentary is necessarily an impermanent phenomenon because momentary is the definition of impermanent phenomenon.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that momentary is the definition of impermanent phenomenon because momentary is the definition of impermanent phenomenon, that which is able to perform a function is the definition of thing, and disintegrating is the definition of composed phenomenon.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that momentary is not the definition of impermanent phenomenon, that which is able to perform a function is not the definition of thing, and disintegrating is not the definition of composed phenomenon.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that there is no definition of impermanent phenomenon.
[The mode of procedure here is just as before. If the Defender says that there is a definition of impermanent phenomenon, tell him to posit it.]

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that impermanent phenomenon is not a definiendum.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, impermanent phenomenon, that its illustrations do not exist.

D: Why?

C: It follows that illustrations of impermanent phenomena do exist.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that since illustrations of impermanent phenomena exist, there must be that which makes impermanent phenomena known.

[In dependence upon these illustrations, it follows that there exists that which makes impermanent phenomena known. If illustrations of impermanent phenomena exist, it must be a definiendum. If there is an illustration, there must be a definition which is that which makes known that which is defined. Pot, for instance, is an illustration of impermanent phenomena. Pot is an impermanent phenomenon. This is so because it is momentary. There must be something that is making it known (mtshon byed). That which is making it known is its momentariness. Since pot is momentary, its being impermanent must be known. This means known to the mind, it makes one understand it. That which is making known means the same thing as definition or the definer. For example, the fact that you are a being that is imputed in dependence on the five aggregates shows (mtshon), makes known, or makes one understand that you are a person. Thus, if someone says that impermanent phenomenon is not a definiendum, it follows that illustrations of impermanent phenomena do not exist. If there are illustrations, then it follows that there must exist something which makes known. In dependence on these illustrations, that which makes impermanent phenomena known is shown. If these exist, it follows that impermanent phenomenon is a definiendum. It follows that it is so because in dependence on these illustrations there is something to be known. Definiendum is what is to be known.]

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that since there is that which makes impermanent phenomena known, impermanent phenomenon must be a definiendum.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that since there is that which makes impermanent phenomena known, impermanent phenomenon must be a definiendum.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that if impermanent phenomenon is a definiendum, then the definition of impermanent phenomenon must exist. Posit it.

[When the Defender hesitated, Rinbochay asked if his head had not become bigger after the explanation. In the beginning your head will get bigger, but then tomorrow or the next day it will shrink back down to normal size. It seems that when you do not understand things, your head gets bigger. When you understand how to do this with one you can do the others. I am teaching in this way so that you can understand it quickly. Because he is interested in things being done quickly, I have been thinking about how to teach you so that you will understand quickly and understand it well. This is not the way we usually teach it in Tibet. So even if your head gets big with regard to one it will not with regard to the later. It will be easy.

Now continuing the debate after backing up a bit. It will be easy.

Now continuing the debate after backing up a bit.]

C: It follows that illustrations of impermanent phenomena do exist.

D: I accept.

C: It follows that in dependence on these illustrations, impermanent phenomenon has a definer (mi rtag par mtshon byed yod).

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that impermanent phenomenon is a definiendum.

D: I accept it.

C: Posit the definition.

D: The subject, that which does not stay for a second moment.

[This definition is in the Collected Topics of Go-mang College.]

C: It follows with respect to the subject, that which does not abide for a second moment, that it is the definition of impermanent phenomenon.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that whatever is an impermanent phenomenon necessarily does not abide for a second moment.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, you, do not abide for a second moment.

D: I accept it.

C: Where does the second moment go? If it does not stay, where will

it go? With respect to the second moment, not staying, where will it go? Then, it follows that the subject, the second moment, is not an impermanent phenomenon.

D: Why?

C: It follows that it is not because of not being something that does not stay as a second moment, because of staying as the second moment.

[The second moment abides as the second moment does it not?]

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the second moment, is a permanent phenomenon.

D: Why?

C: It follows that it is because (1) it is an existent and (2) it is not an impermanent phenomenon.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the second moment, (1) is an existent and (2) is not an impermanent phenomenon. It follows that the subject, your second moment, is a permanent phenomenon.

D: Why?

C: It follows that your second moment is a permanent phenomenon because of not being something which does not stay as the second moment.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, your second moment, is not an impermanent phenomenon.

[JH points out that this is changing from staying for a second moment to staying as a second moment. It is the second moment so it has to abide as the second moment. Abiding for a second moment would mean that it would have to abide for another moment. The reason Rinbochay is presenting this specious subject is to see if we can make up an answer to take care of the specious ones.]

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that that which does not stay for a second moment is not the definition of impermanent phenomena.

D: I accept it.

C: Now, posit the definition of impermanent phenomena.

D: The subject, the momentary.

C: Finished! It follows that the subject, the momentary, is the definition of impermanent phenomena.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that whatever is momentary is necessarily an impermanent phenomenon.

D: I accept it.

[Don't lose the original debate. That is why we are doing all of this.]

C: It follows that the subject, pot, is an impermanent phenomenon.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, pot, is a permanent phenomenon because of being an established base.

D: There is no pervasion.

C: It follows that whatever is an established base is not necessarily a permanent phenomenon.

D: I accept it.

C: Finished! Now, what is the difference between the two, established base and permanent phenomenon?

D: There are three possibilities.

C: It follows that there are not three possibilities. Posit something which is both [an established base and a permanent phenomenon].

D: The subject, the non-product space.

C: It follows that the subject, the non-product space, is an established base.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject, the non-product space, is an established base--

D: Because of being a hidden phenomenon.

C: It follows that the subject, the non-product space, is a permanent phenomenon.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject, the non-product space, is a permanent phenomenon--

D: Because of being a common locus of phenomenon and the non-momentary.

C: It follows that whatever is a common locus of phenomenon and the non-momentary is necessarily a permanent phenomenon.

D: I accept it.

C: Now, which is necessarily the other? Which is not necessarily the other? Posit something which is one and not the other.

D: Whatever is a permanent phenomenon is necessarily an established base. Whatever is an established base is not necessarily a permanent phenomenon. The subject, pot.

C: It follows that the subject, pot, is an established base.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject, pot, is an established base--

D: Because of being established by a valid cognizer.
C: It follows that whatever is established by a valid cognizer is necessarily an established base.
D: I accept it.
C: It follows that the subject, pot, is not a permanent phenomenon.
D: I accept it.
C: The subject, pot, is not a permanent phenomenon--
D: Because of being momentary.
C: It follows that whatever is momentary is necessarily not a permanent phenomenon.
D: I accept it.
C: Now, posit something which is neither [an established base nor a permanent phenomenon].
D: The subject, a sky-flower.
C: It follows that the subject, a sky-flower, is not an established base.
D: Because of not holding its own entity.
C: It follows that whatever does not hold its own entity necessarily is not an established base.
D: I accept it.
C: It follows that the subject, a sky-flower, is not a permanent phenomenon.
D: I accept it.
C: The subject, a sky-flower, is not a permanent phenomenon--
D: Because of not being an existent.
C: It follows that whatever is not an existent is necessarily not a permanent phenomenon.
D: I accept it.

New Debate off of B.1

C: Is whatever is an established base necessarily a permanent phenomenon?
D: I accept it.
C: It follows that whatever is an established base is necessarily a permanent phenomenon.
D: I accept it.
C: It follows that the subject, pot, is a permanent phenomenon because of being an established base.
D: I accept it.
C: It follows that the subject, pot, is not a permanent phenomenon because of being an impermanent phenomenon.

D: The reason is not established

C: It follows that the subject, pot, is not a permanent phenomenon because of being momentary.

D: There is no pervasion.

C: It follows that whatever is momentary is necessarily an impermanent phenomenon because momentary is the definition of impermanent phenomenon.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that momentary is the definition of impermanent phenomenon because that which is able to perform a function is the definition of thing, disintegrating is the definition of composed phenomenon, and produced is the definition of created phenomenon.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that that which is able to perform a function is the definition of thing because that which is able to perform a function is the meaning of reverse of thing.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that that which is able to perform a function is not the meaning reverse of thing.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that thing's meaning reverse does not exist.

D: Why?

C: Posit it.

D: There is [a meaning of reverse of thing]. The subject, created phenomenon.

C: It follows that the subject, created phenomenon, is the meaning reverse of thing.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, created phenomenon, is a definition.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, created phenomenon, is not a definiendum.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, created phenomenon, that it is a definiendum because its definition exists.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, created phenomenon, that it does have a definition because produced is its definition.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, produced, that it is the

definition of created phenomenon because in the Collected Topics it says, "Produced is the definition of created phenomenon."

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that produced is the definition of created phenomenon.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, created phenomenon, that its definition does exist.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, created phenomenon, that it is a definiendum.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, created phenomenon, that it is not a definition.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, created phenomenon, that it is not the definition of thing.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, created phenomenon, that it is not thing's meaning reverse.

D: I accept it.

C: Finished! Now, posit thing's meaning reverse.

D: The subject, that which is able to perform a function.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, that which is able to perform a function, that it is thing's meaning reverse.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, that which is able to perform a function, that it is the definition of thing.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that that which is able to perform a function is the definition of thing, disintegrating is the definition of composed phenomenon, and produced is the definition of created phenomenon.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that momentary is the definition of impermanent phenomenon.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that whatever is momentary is necessarily an impermanent phenomenon.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, pot, is an impermanent phenomenon.

D: I accept it.

[Proceed as before with debate B.1 as on pp. 123-126.]

If things are divided, there are three. The three are matter, consciousness, and non-associated compositional factors. In another way the three are form, consciousness, and non-associated compositional factors. In the Sautrantika system, they assert matter, consciousness, and non-associated compositional factors. In the Chittamatra system, when things are divided, they assert form, consciousness, and non-associated compositional factors. They do not assert matter. If it is done in the system of the Sautrantikas, matter and form are not mutually inclusive. In the Sautrantika system, matter, consciousness, and non-associated compositional factors are things.

The definition of matter is that which is atomically established. The mode of procedure for debating this is the same. They say, "Because matter does not have the two--definition and division. The reason is not established. Posit the definition of matter. It is the definition of matter--" When matter is said, it is understood as a collection of many particles or atoms. Usually in Tibet clothing that is made out of a lot of patches is also called matter (bem po). It is something that is made up out of a lot of things. If matter is divided, there are two--external matter and internal matter. The division in this way can also be made for form--external form and internal form. Those forms included within a continuum are internal forms. Those forms not included within the continuum are external forms. Those forms not included within the continuum of a person are external forms. Forms included within the continuum of a person are internal forms. Internal form has five types. External form has five types. We have already posited some of the five external forms. These are the forms not included within a person's continuum. These are the five--form, sound, odor, taste, and tangible object. These five are called the five external forms, the five meanings (don), the five objects, the five sources, and the five object-sources. Internal form has the five--eye sense power, ear sense power, nose sense power, tongue sense power, and body sense power. doesn't internal form have the five of form, sound, odor, taste, and tangible object? Yes, there are the five internal sources included within a continuum. These are the five internal sources of form, sound, odor, taste, and tangible object. What is the reason that we do not say that there are ten internal forms including the five sense powers and the five sources? It is probably because you

already name the five sources with regard to external form that we do not name them again for internal form. The senses cannot be perceived by someone else's senses, they cannot appear to someone else's senses, whereas one's own form, sound, odor, taste, and tangibility can appear to somebody else's senses. Thus, we say that there are five internal forms. The definition of external form is that which is established as external particles. The definition of internal form is that which is established as internal particles. They are done in that way. The definition of an eye sense power is the clear internal physical thing which is the uncommon dominant condition (bdag rkyen) for its own effect which is an eye consciousness. For the definitions of the other sense powers you can just substitute ear consciousness and so on in the place of eye consciousness. An illustration of an eye sense power is a clear internal physical thing having a shape like a sarma flower in the continuum of a person. The definition of an ear sense power is the clear internal physical thing having a shape like a cut bundle of wheat in the continuum of a person. The definition of a nose sense power is the clear internal physical thing having a shape like (the ends of two) copper needles in the continuum of a person. The definition of a tongue sense power is clear internal physical thing having a shape like a cut half moon in the continuum of a person. The definition of a body sense power is the clear internal physical thing which is the uncommon dominant condition of its own effect which is a body consciousness. An illustration of a body sense power is a clear internal physical thing having a shape like (bya reg na 'jam gyi bags palta bu). That subject is a body sense power because of being a clear internal physical thing which is a body consciousness. This is the way you have to say it. Thus, form has the two--internal form and external form. If posited as three, there are the three -- internal, external, and both internal and external. Material phenomena which are both internal and external is, for instance, the locus of the senses, in other words, these things that you see here. Because it is included within the continuum it is internal. Because it is the object of others sense consciousnesses it is external.

Now comes consciousness. Consciousness has the two-- definition and division. Clear and knowing is the definition of consciousness. If consciousnesses are divided, there are two--sense consciousnesses and mental consciousnesses. The definition of sense consciousness is a knower which is produced in dependence on a physical sense power

which is its own uncommon dominant condition. The definition of a mental consciousness is a knower which is produced in dependence on a mental sense power which is its own uncommon dominant condition.

If sense consciousnesses are divided, there are five-- eye consciousness, ear, consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, and body consciousness. The definition of an eye consciousness is a knower which is produced in dependence on its own uncommon dominant condition which is an eye sense power and its own uncommon object of observation condition which is form. The definition of an ear consciousness is a knower which is produced in dependence on its own uncommon dominant condition which is an ear sense power and its own uncommon object of observation condition which is sound. The definition of a nose consciousness is a knower which is produced in dependence on its own uncommon dominant condition which is a nose sense power and its own uncommon object of observation condition which is odor. The definition of a tongue consciousness is a knower which is produced in dependence on its own uncommon dominant condition which is a tongue sense power and its own uncommon object of observation condition which is taste. The definition of a body consciousness is a knower which is produced in dependence on its own uncommon dominant condition which is a body sense power and its own uncommon object of observation condition which is tangible objects. The definitions of the five sense consciousnesses are done in this way.

There is a difference between eye consciousness (mig shes) and a consciousness having the aspect of the eye (mig gi rnam par shes pa). We have already posited some of the consciousnesses having the aspect of the eye. They are the minds. Eye consciousnesses have both minds and mental factors. This is also true for the other five consciousnesses from ear consciousnesses through mental consciousnesses. consciousnesses having the aspect of the eye have only mind and do not have mental factors. This is true of all six of the consciousnesses having the aspect. They have only the main mind. Thus, that is consciousness.

Now comes non-associated compositional factors. There are two definitions for non-associated compositional factors. It makes no difference. The definition is either a thing which is neither form nor consciousness or a thing which is neither a material phenomenon nor a consciousness. Whichever one you posit, there is no difference. For the Chittamatra system you must posit a thing which is neither a form

nor a consciousness as this definition. An uncommon assertion of the Sautrantikas is the definition as a thing which is neither material phenomenon nor a consciousness.

If non-associated compositional factors are divided, there are two--non-associated compositional factors which are persons and non-associated compositional factors which are not persons. The definition of person is a being which is imputed in dependence on any of the five aggregates. There is some debate on this definition at the time of studying awarenesses and knowers. If persons are divided, there are two--common beings and Superiors. There are three vehicles--Hearer vehicle, Solitary Realizer vehicle, and Mahayana vehicle. A person who has not attained a Superior path of any of the three vehicles is called a common being. A Superior path is a path of seeing or higher. This is the reason for calling them common beings. In the Abhidgarmakosha it says, "Those who have not attained a Superior path (of seeing) are common beings." A person who has attained a Superior path of any of the three vehicles is called a Superior. There are three kinds of Superiors--Hearer Superiors, Solitary Realizer Superiors, and Mahayana Superiors. There are six kinds of common beings. There are six kinds of common beings having the basis of a migrator. The six are common beings having the basis of a hell being, common beings having the basis of a hungry ghost, common beings having the basis of an animal, common beings having the basis of a human, common beings having the basis of a demi-god, and common beings having the basis of a god. There are probably not any Superiors that have the basis of any of the three lower types, but there are cases of Superiors having the basis of a human, demi-god, or god. Then what about a Superior who intentionally takes rebirth as an animal? Is this not a case of a Superior who has the basis of an animal? No, because they are just assuming that appearance, assuming that form. There are four types of hell being, hot hell beings, cold hell being, neighboring hell beings, and tribelling hell beings. There are three types of hungry ghosts--those having external obstructions, those having internal obstructions, and those having both external and internal obstructions. There are two types of animals-- those living in the (watery) depths and those scattered about the surface. Those scattered about the surface are living in the places that the humans live. These are dogs, sheep, goats, horses, and so forth. Humans are of the four continents and the eight sub-continents or smaller continents. The four continents are the Eastern

called Superior Body, the Southern called Dzam-bu, the Western called Using Oxen, and the Northern called Unpleasant Sound. There are many other world systems. This is done according to the way out is, having four continents and eight sub-continents. In brief, there are three types of gods--gods of the desire realm, gods of the form realm, and gods of the formless realm. Extensively, there are twenty-seven kinds of gods--six types of gods of the desire realm, seventeen kinds of gods of the form realm, and four kinds of gods of the formless realm. we can posit these things as subject. Subjects are not rare. These are the non-associated compositional factors that are persons.

Now these are to be posited as the non-associated compositional factors which are not persons. They are thing, that which is able to perform a function, created phenomena, and so forth (refer to the phenomena which are mutually inclusive with thing on pp. 104-105). There are many synonyms. It is from the point of view of their self-reverses or the opposite of the negative of themselves that they are non-associated compositional factors which are not persons. For example, thing is a non-associated compositional factor, but whatever is a thing is not necessarily a non-associated compositional factor that is not a person. There are many such non-associated compositional factors which are not persons including cause and effect. It has to be something that is not any of the other kinds of things. Something such as a table will not fit because it is form. There are many, for instance, year, month, time, day, night, all times, the three times of past, present and future. These are all non-associated compositional factors which are not persons. We are going to mix in a lot of discussion of possibilities with this and then you will understand them.

In another way, it established bases are divided, there are the two--one and different, the two--objects of knowledge of which the being is possible an objects of knowledge of which the being is not possible, the two--definition and definiendum, the two--negative phenomena and positive phenomena, the three--virtues, non-virtues, and neutral, the two--specifically characterized phenomena and generally characterized phenomena, and the two truths. The mode of procedure for debating these is the same as before. One begins, "Because if established bases are divided, there are not the two--one and different,..." The Defender says, "The reason is not established." It follows that there are such. I accept it. You know how to debate it.

Now the first is the division into the two--one and different. The definition of one is a phenomenon that is not diverse. You know the

reason that it is the definition of one. Illustrations of one (singular phenomena?) are object of knowledge, established base, existent, thing, permanent phenomenon, pot, pillar, god, human, demi-god, common being, Superior. These are all one. Illustrations of phenomena which are different are the two--pillar and pot, the two--permanent phenomenon and thing, the two--object of knowledge and existent, the two--established base and established by a valid cognizer, the two--up and down, the two--east and west, the two--south and north, the two--America and India, the two--golden pot and copper pot. When you say it in this way, they are all different. When there is just one to each subject, it is one. For instance, if we say, "The subject, pot," it is one. A subject with two is different. When you think of different, two diverse phenomena appear to the mind.

Now comes the division of established bases into definitions and definiendums. The definition of definiendum is a triply qualified imputed existent. Another definition of definiendum is a triply qualified object of comprehension. Definiendums are, for instance, object of knowledge, established base, existent, phenomenon, hidden phenomenon, object of comprehension, object, permanent phenomenon, generally characterized phenomenon, conventional truth, non-thing, thing, ultimate truth, etc. These are all definiendums are they not? The reason that something is a definiendum is because it is a triply qualified imputed existent, because it is a triply qualified object of comprehension, or because its definition exists. If there is definition of something, then it is necessarily a definiendum. Definiendum means object to be know (mtshon par bya ba). Definition means tht which makes known (mtshon byed). For example, object of knowledge is a definiendum. Pot is an illustration (of object of knowledge). Suitable as an object of awareness is that which makes known or the definition (of object of knowledge). Pot's being an object of knowledge shows that it is established by a valid cognizer. It shows it to the mind or mkes it known to the mind. It causes the mind to know that it is an established base because it is established by a valid cognizer. That is definiendum. Illustrations of definition are established by a valid cognizer, observed by a valid cognizer, suitable as an object of awareness, etc. These are all definitions are they not? There are many definitions. That is the division of established bases into the two--definitions and definiendum.

Now comes the division into the two--objects of knowledge of which

the being is possible and objects of knowledge of which the being is not possible. the definition of object of knowledge of which the being is possible is that which is observed as a common locus of its being existing and being suitable as an object of awareness. The definition of an object of knowledge of which the being is not possible is that which is observed as a common locus of its being not existing and being suitable as an object of awareness. for example, with respect to objects of knowledge of which the being is not possible we must posit contradictories like the two--pillar and pot, the two--permanent phenomenon and thing, the two--definition and definiendum. These are all objects of knowledge of which the being is not possible. Whatever is contradictory is necessarily an object of knowledge of which the being is not possible. Whatever is a definiendum is necessarily an object of knowledge of which the being is possible. Whatever is a definition is necessarily an object of knowledge of which the being is possible. With respect to objects of knowledge of which the being is not possible, posit contradictories such as the two--north and south, the two--east and west, the two--Defender and Challenger, the two--god and human, the two--hell being and hungry ghost. You have to posit two things which do not have a common locus. You cannot posit something like two pots as a subject here because there is a common locus of two pots such as the two--golden pot and copper pot. If you must posit the being of two pots, you can posit the subject, the two--golden pot and copper pot. The being of one human exists, the being of two humans exists, the being of three humans exists. However, when you posit two contradictories, it is an object of knowledge of which the being is not possible. for example, if you say the two--established base and established by a valid cognizer, this is not an object of knowledge of which the being is not possible. (This is at odds with the use of this subject, the two--established base and established by a valid cognizer, as phenomena which are different as on p. 139, but it does not contradict what was said earlier.) Also, the two--thing and object of knowledge is not an object of knowledge of which the being is not possible.

So tomorrow and the next day we will mix this with a lot of discussion of possibilities, we will begin it. We have negative phenomena and positive phenomena left to do. You know the definitions of thing and permanent phenomena. You know the definitions of generally and specifically characterized phenomena.

Tape side 16 April 28, 1976

Generally, for a statement of which neither the pervasion nor the reason is established as for instance, "It follows that the subject, horse, is a consciousness because of being a permanent phenomenon," you say that the reason is not established. If you say that there is no pervasion, you are accepting that the reason is established.

If someone says, "It is not a human because of not being a particularity of human," there is not pervasion. Whatever is not a particularity of human is not necessarily not a human. For example, human is human, but human is not a particularity of human. (To the above statement) you would say, "It follows that the subject, human, is not human because of not being a particularity of human." You can say that something is a pot because of being a particularity of pot. You can say that something is such and such because of being a particularity of that, but you cannot say that it is not such and such because of not being a particularity of that. (One can, however, say that a horse is not a particularity of pot because of not being a pot. In this case the pervasion, whatever is not a pot is necessarily not a particularity of pot, is established.)

New Debate

C: It follows that the two, manifest phenomenon and non-hidden phenomenon, are mutually exclusive.

D: I accept it.

C: The two, manifest phenomenon and non-hidden phenomenon, are mutually exclusive--

D: Because (1) they are different and (2) a common locus of the two does not exist.

C: It follows that if (1) they are different and (2) a common locus of the two does not exist, then they are necessarily mutually exclusive.

D: I accept it.

New Debate

C: It follows that hidden phenomenon and non-manifest phenomenon are mutually exclusive.

D: Why?

C: What is the difference?

D: There are three possibilities.

C: Posit something which is both (a hidden phenomenon and a non-

manifest phenomenon).

D: The subject, the non-product space.

C: It follows that the subject, the non-product space, is a hidden phenomenon.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject, the non-product space, is a hidden phenomenon.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject, the non-product space, is a hidden phenomenon--

D: Because of being an established base.

C: It follows that whatever is an established base is necessarily a hidden phenomenon.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the non-product space, is a non-manifest phenomenon.

D: I accept it.

C: The subject, the non-product space, is a non-manifest phenomenon--

D: Because of not being a thing.

C: It follows that whatever is not a thing is necessarily a non-manifest phenomenon.

D: I accept it.

C; Now, which is necessarily the other? Which is not necessarily the other? Posit something which is one and not the other.

D: Whatever is a hidden phenomenon is necessarily a non-manifest phenomenon.

C: It follows that whatever is a hidden phenomenon is necessarily a non-manifest phenomenon.

D: Why?

C: If there is no pervasion, posit a counterexample.

D: The subject the non-product space.

C: It follows that the subject, the non-product space, is not a non-manifest phenomenon. It follows that the subject, the non-product space, is a manifest phenomenon.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the non-product space, is a thing.

D; Why?

C: Because of being a manifest phenomenon.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the non-product space, is a thing.

D: Why?

C: Because of being a manifest phenomenon.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the non-product space, is a thing.

D: Why?

C: Because of being a manifest phenomenon.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that the subject, the non-product space, is a manifest phenomenon because of not being a non-manifest phenomenon.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that the subject, the non-product space, is a non-manifest phenomenon.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that the subject, the non-product space, is a non-manifest phenomenon.

D: I accept it.

C: Finished! Now, what is the difference between the two, hidden phenomenon and non-manifest phenomenon?

D: There are three possibilities.

C: Which is necessarily the other? Which is not necessarily the other? Posit something which is one and not the other.

D: Whatever is a non-manifest phenomenon is necessarily a hidden phenomenon.

C: It follows that whatever is a non-manifest phenomenon is necessarily a hidden phenomenon.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the horn of a rabbit, is a hidden phenomenon because of being a non-manifest phenomenon.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that the subject, the horn of a rabbit, is a non-manifest phenomenon (mngon kyur ma yin pa yin par thel) because of being a non-actuality (dngos po'ma yin ba).

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the horn of a rabbit, is a non-manifest phenomenon.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the horn of a rabbit, is a hidden phenomenon.

D: Why?

C: It follows that it is because of being a non-manifest phenomenon.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that it is so because whatever is a non-manifest phenomenon is necessarily a hidden phenomenon; because you asserted the pervasion.

What does this have? There is something that is both. There is something which is a hidden phenomenon and is not a non-manifest phenomenon. There is something (to be posited) which is not a hidden phenomenon and is a non-manifest phenomenon. There is nothing which is neither (that is, not a non-manifest phenomenon and not a hidden phenomenon). There are a lot (of relationships) like this.

Something which is a hidden phenomenon and not a non-manifest phenomenon is like a pot. something which is a non-manifest phenomenon and is not a hidden phenomenon is like a non-existent. Something which is both (i.e., a non-manifest phenomenon and a hidden phenomenon) is uncaused space. There is nothing which is neither, but you might have one in America that is not either so bring it tomorrow. There is nothing which is not either. So we get three possibilities without there being something which is neither, right? There's probably one in Washington. When you went to New York, wasn't there one? Yes, there are three possibilities without there being something which is neither.

JH: Well, this is different from the usual type of three possibilities, right? So when one says, "Which is necessarily the other? Which is not necessarily the other?," what do you have to say? (LR answers) You do not need that. You do something which is one and not the other and then something which is the other and not the one as when doing four possibilities, and then something which is neither does not exist. When there are three possibilities, it does not necessarily have to occur that one pervades the other, that the other is not necessarily the one, and that there is something which is one and not the other. You can answer back that there are three possibilities. There is something that is both. There is something that is one and not the other, and there is something that is the other and not the one. There are three aspects (kha) to it, right? In the books there is no explanation of three possibilities such as this. But such a thing is implied by the Collected Topics (?). There are such three possibilities. When there are three possibilities, it is not necessary that there be one that is necessarily the other, that there be one that is not necessarily the other, and that there be only one direction in which something is one and not the other.

But there is something which harms this view. (If it is like that),

then there comes to be a difference of three possibilities in which something is one and not the other, something is the other and not the one, there is something that is neither, and there is nothing that is both. for instance, with respect to the two-permanent phenomenon and actuality. There is something which is a permanent phenomenon and not an actuality, something which is an actuality and not a permanent phenomenon, and something which is neither, but nothing which is both. We do not say that there are three possibilities between the two--permanent phenomenon and actuality. We say they are contradictory. There are a lot like that.

New Debate (Developing out of Debate B.10)

C: It follows that that which is suitable as an object of an awareness is not the definition of object of knowledge because that which is suitable as an object of an awareness the being of which is possible is not the definition of object of knowledge the being of which is possible.

D: There is no pervasion.

C: Spell it out. (LR: When you say that there is no pervasion, what are you saying? Think about it.)

D: Even though that which is suitable as an object of an awareness the being of which is possible is not the definition of object of knowledge the being of which is possible, this does not entail that that which is suitable as an object of an awareness is not the definition of object of knowledge.

(LR: You are saying like this when you say there is no pervasion : that which is suitable as an object of an awareness is the definition of object of knowledge, and that which is suitable a an object of an awareness the being of which is possible is not the definition of object of knowledge the being of which is possible. Now debate with him saying, "It follows that that which is suitable as an object of an awareness the being of which is possible is not the definition of object of knowledge the being of which is possible and that which is suitable a an object of an awareness the being of which is not possible is not the definition of object of knowledge the being of which is not possible." (When the student could not get it, he redirected:.) Well, debate this way, "It follows that that which is suitable as an object of an awareness the being of which is possible is not the definition of object of knowledge the being of which is possible.")

C: It follows that that which is suitable as an object of an awareness the being of which is possible is not the definition of object of knowledge the being of which is possible.

D: I accept it.

C: Why is that which is suitable as an object of an awareness the being of which is possible not the definition of object of knowledge the being of which is possible?

D: Because whatever is an object of an awareness the being of which is possible is not necessarily an object of knowledge the being of which is possible.

C: If there is no pervasion, posit a counterexample.

D: The subject, the two--permanent phenomenon and actuality. The subject, the two--a pillar and a pot. (All of the objects of knowledge the being of which is not possible will work.)

C: It follows that the subject, the two--a pillar and a pot, is an object of an awareness the being of which is possible.

D: I accept it.

C: Why is the subject, the two--a pillar and a pot, an object of an awareness the being of which is possible?

D: Because of being an object of comprehension of an omniscient consciousness the being of which is possible.

C: It follows that whatever is an object of comprehension of an omniscient consciousness the being of which is possible is necessarily an object of an awareness the being of which is possible.

D: I accept it.

C: Now, it follows that that which is suitable as an object of an awareness the being of which is not possible is not the definition of object of knowledge the being of which is not possible.

D: I accept it.

C: Why is the subject, that which is suitable as an object of an awareness the being of which is not possible, not the definition of object of knowledge the being of which is possible?

D: Because whatever it is not necessarily an object of knowledge the being of which is not possible.

C: It follows that whatever is suitable as an object of an awareness the being of which is not possible is not necessarily an object of knowledge the being of which is not possible.

D: I accept it.

C: Posit it. (LR: All of the objects of knowledge the being of which is possible will work, right?)

D: The subject, a pot.

C; It follows that the subject, a pot, is suitable as an object of an awareness the being of which is not possible.

D: I accept it.

C: Why is the subject, a pot, suitable as an object of an awareness the being of which is not possible?

D: Because of being suitable as an object of an omniscient consciousness the being of which is not possible.

C: It follows that whatever is suitable as an object of an omniscient consciousness the being of which is not possible is necessarily suitable as an object of an awareness the being of which is not possible.

D: I accept it.

JH: For an omniscient consciousness the being of which is not possible can you posit the two--the first and second moments of an omniscient consciousness? LR: Yes, that's alright. Also, you can say the two--the omniscient consciousness in the continuum of Shakyamuni Buddha. These are both omniscient consciousnesses but there is nothing which is both.

However, in the Ra-do Collected Topics this definition is posited in this way. It says, "That which is suitable as an object of an awareness the being of which is possible is the definition of object of knowledge the being of which is possible. That which is suitable as an object of an awareness the being of which is not possible is the definition of object of knowledge the being of which is not possible." The author of this text is Jam-yang-chok-hla-od-ser ('jam dbyangs mchog hla 'od zer). It is just called the Ra-do Collected Topics. It is very famous. Most people study the Collected Topics from that. Amongst the various Collected Topics texts of the different groups there are many disagreements.

Now when one teaches the refutation of this: that which is suitable as an object of an awareness the being of which is possible is not the definition of object of knowledge the being of which is possible. If someone asks, "Why isn't it?" (It is because) whatever is an established base is necessarily suitable as an object of an awareness the being of which is possible. If someone asks, "Why is there pervasion?" (It is because) whatever is an established base is necessarily an object of knowledge of an awareness the being of which is possible. "Why is that posited?" (Because) whatever is an established base is necessarily an object of comprehension of an omniscient consciousness the being of which is possible.

And there is one other part we have to do. That's object of knowledge the being of which is not possible. That which is suitable as an object of an awareness the being of which is not possible does not obtain as the definition of object of knowledge the being of which is not possible. And it is the same here. Whatever is an established base is necessarily suitable as an object of an awareness the being of which is not possible, but whatever is an established base is not necessarily an object of knowledge the being of which is not possible. If someone asks, "Why is whatever is an established base necessarily suitable as an object of an awareness the being of which is not possible?" (It is because) whatever is an established base is necessarily an object of knowledge of an awareness the being of which is not possible. (This is so) because whatever is an established base is necessarily an object of comprehension of an omniscient consciousness the being of which is not possible. (JH: Everything which exists would be the object of comprehension of the two--the omniscient consciousness of the Buddha Kashyapa and the omniscient consciousness of the Buddha Shakyamuni. And that is an awareness the being of which is not possible, right?)

Probably what they are understanding in the Ra-do Collected Topics is that it itself is suitable as an object of an awareness and something which is it is possible, and it itself is suitable as an object of an awareness and something which is it is not possible. They say "awareness (knowing) an object the being of which is not possible." The phrase "of which the being is not possible" goes with the object and not with the awareness. (JH: In the Ra-do Collected Topics they are understanding "of which the being is not possible" as going with the object and not with the awareness, "an awareness the being of which is not possible." It is a question of whether the genitive on possible (srid ba'i) goes with merely the next syllable, awareness, or with the whole following phrase, suitable as an object of an awareness.) When one says "of which the being is possible" it goes with the awareness itself or, in the Ra-do text, it goes with the object itself.

Now yesterday we did the two, one and different, and the two, generally and specifically characterized phenomena. Now let's look at positive (sgrub pa) and negative phenomena (dgag pa). The definition of a negative phenomenon is that which is realized by a thought apprehending it by way of explicitly eliminating its own object of negation. The definition of a positive phenomenon is a phenomenon

which is not realized by a thought apprehending it by way of explicitly eliminating its own object of negation. These definitions are posited this way in the Tutor's and the Ra-do Collected Topics. These are posited in terms of the thought apprehending them. They can also be defined from the point of view of the term expressing them. Probably Pan-chen So-nam-drak-ba posits them in this way, by the term which appears to the awareness. He gives the definition of negative phenomenon as an object such that when its meaning appears to an awareness, it appears in the aspect of a negative phenomenon. The definition of a positive phenomenon is an object such that when its meaning appears to an awareness, it appears in the aspect of a positive phenomenon. The meaning has to appear to an awareness, right? (The meaning) itself appears in the aspect of a negative phenomenon. The definitions of positive and negative phenomena are like this. This is by the term which appears to the awareness.

JH: If it is done by way of the term only, what about emptiness and impermanent phenomenon? LR: Well, impermanent phenomenon, according to the go-mang Collected Topics is a negative phenomenon. Others posit it as a positive phenomenon. Negative phenomena are such as we have discussed before: non-hidden phenomenon, non-manifest phenomenon, non-pot, non-pillar, opposite from not being pot. In the go-mang Collected Topics opposite from not being pot is not posited as a negative phenomenon. Other negative phenomena are opposite from being pot, opposite from not being a pillar, emptiness, liberation, the selflessness of persons. These are all negative phenomena.

Positive phenomena are like pot, pillar, human, god. Even demi-god (Iha ma yin) is a positive phenomenon. There are a lot of exceptions. Some say, "Well, if impermanent phenomenon is a negative phenomenon, then is permanent phenomenon a positive phenomenon?" No, it's a negative phenomenon. Demi-god has a negative particle in its name, and that should be enough to make it a negative, but it is a positive phenomenon. You understand positive phenomena, right? these are all positive phenomena--wood, house, table, rice, vegetable, meat, potatoe.

The opposite of being a pot is a negative phenomenon because of the portion which says "opposite." Also, opposite from being opposite from being a pot is a negative phenomenon. Once there is a negative particle in it, no matter how many you line up it is still a negative phenomenon. almost always. There are two sides on the question of

impermanent phenomenon. Probably here in the Tutor's Collected Topics and in the Ra-do Collected Topics impermanent phenomenon is a positive phenomenon, but there are other opinions. It does not make any difference where you posit it, there are two ways of thinking about it. If when you think about impermanent phenomenon what appears to the mind is something that does not stay, then it is a negative phenomenon. If what appears to the mind is momentariness and disintegrating, then it is a positive phenomenon. There is not a lot of difference. There are two ways of thinking about it. Those who say it's negative, say it's negative. Sometimes they pull the ears. (JH: I don't know if he means we should pull their ears or if they would pull our ears. Probably he means they would pull our ears for talking too much about it, making such a big deal out of it.)

Now there are the three--virtue and so forth (dge sogs gsum). These are virtue (dge ba), non-virtue (mi dge ba), and the neutral (lung ma bstan). The definition of virtue is that which is (1) indicated (as a virtue) and (2) abides in the class of that which issues forth happiness as the fruition which is its own effect. "Indicated" or "revealed" means here "that which abides as either virtue or non-virtue." Thus, in this case of defining virtue, it means that which is virtuous. It means that which is definite as virtuous or non-virtuous. It does not necessarily refer to Buddha's having said it this way or that way which is what those words often mean. "Abides in the class of that which issues forth happiness" is said because there are, for instance, virtues which have been overcome by hatred and do not issue forth happiness. But they are still virtues. This means that there are exceptions that merely "abide in the class of." I doubt that these effects have to issue forth in another lifetime. Virtues that are overcome by hatred do not have any fruition of happiness. They are not destroyed from the root.

The definition of non-virtue is that which is (1) indicated (as a non-virtue) and (2) abides in the class of that which issues forth suffering as the fruition which is its effect. JH: If the portion which says "indicated (as a non-virtue)" were left out, what fault would there be? If someone said that the definition of non-virtue is that which abides in the class of that which issues forth suffering as the fruition which is its effect, would there be anything to harm this position? LR: Probably not in terms of understanding, but it does eliminate something. For instance, as in the case of a virtue, what about the cause of a fruition which is its effect? Probably they are thinking of cause and effect. For

instance, there is a cause that issues forth happiness as its fruition which is its effect. The debate would be like this. This will come in more detail in the greater presentation of cause and effect in the "Middling Path of Reasoning." Probably "indicated" is stated in order to refute this reasoning. There is no other purpose.

For the sake of understanding you don't need the first part. These causes that lead up to virtue may be causes that issue forth happiness, but are they virtues? Maybe this is the reason it is so stated, for the sake of eliminatng such things as the prior arising (snga logs su byung ba) of happiness which is its fruition and effect. We have to make a difference between what is stated for the sake of understanding and what is stated for the sake of eliminating clever debate. It is avoiding a verbal fallacy. For instance, when one states the definition of a tenet system one begins by saying, "it is (1) one of the four proponents of tenets." This is only for the sake of refuting a verbal fallacy.

The definition of a neutral phenomenon is that which is not indicated as something which is a virtue or a non-virtue. (JH: I overuse the word "neutral" in my translation system. This is one of the many words I translate as "neutral.")

Virtues are posited as the ethics of abandoning killing, the ethics of abandoning stealing, the ethics of abandoning sexual misconduct, and so forth through the ten virtues. The ethics of abandoning killing, of abandoning stealing, of abandoning sexual misconduct, of abandoning lying, and so on are each illustrations of virtue. The non-virtues are killing, stealing, sexual misconduct, lying, harsh words, divisiveness, senseless talk, covetousness, harmfulness, and wrong view.

MISSING PAGES-----

word, "shing," may refer to either trees or to things of wood. Thus, this definition is of chon shing which is only a tree.) there are those who say that a table is not a tree/wood. It is not comfortable to say that this is not a tree/wood. A table is established from a tree, it is not a tree, they say. There ar those who say that whatever is a tree is necessarily that which has branches, veins, and leaves. If you say like

that, you have to say that what is made out of gold, these golden things, are not gold. This is not comfortable. In winter there are no leaves and veins, but it says "possesses." In general you can say that a tree has leaves and veins. (If you say this tree has flowers, that does not necessarily mean it has them now. What about pine trees? They don't have veins.) Isn't there something going at the top? (Sure, inside the needle there must be a passageway.)

Now when one says there are two valid cognizers of the two objects of comprehension, there are two objects of comprehension--specifically characterized phenomena and generally characterized phenomena. Since there are those two, there are the two, direct perceivers which take specifically characterized phenomena as their apprehended objects and inferential cognizers which take generally characterized phenomena as their apprehended objects. The enumeration of valid cognizers is definite as these two. Oh, there is a little fault in the words. For example, there are the two objects of comprehension--specifically and generally characterized phenomena. Since there are those, there are the two types of valid cognizers--direct valid cognizers which take specifically characterized phenomena as their apprehended objects and inferential valid cognizers which take generally characterized phenomena as their apprehended objects. If I did not explain the meaning of the actual scripture but only explained the ancillary topics, it would not help. (So I explained it.)

Now the two, (1) all established bases are it and (2) it is an established base, have four possibilities. something which is both is object of knowledge, existent, established base, phenomenon, and so on. You can posit all of those. (JH: Does "all established bases" mean "whatever is an established base?") No, "all established bases" is understood as the generality reverse (spyi ldog). When one says, "The subject, all established bases, is a permanent phenomenon. From among the two, actualities and permanent phenomena, it is a permanent phenomenon, right? It is that sort of thought. (The reason he is saying all established bases is that he is referring to the generality, the opposite of the negative of the generality of established base, which is a permanent phenomenon.)

Now something which is (1) all established bases are it and (2) it is not an established base is only a permanent phenomenon. All established bases is a permanent phenomenon, right? Since it is a permanent phenomenon, it has to be only a permanent phenomenon.

Only a permanent phenomenon is a non-existent, but there are things which are it. Whatever is a permanent phenomenon is necessarily only a permanent phenomenon. Whatever is a permanent phenomenon is necessarily not an actuality, right? If someone asks whether or not only a permanent phenomenon exists, it does not. Whatever is an actuality is necessarily only an actuality. All established bases are only a permanent phenomenon. Only a permanent phenomenon itself is not an established base. Only a permanent phenomenon is not an existent. Only a generally characterized phenomenon is not an existent. Only a conventional truth is not an existent. Only a non-actuality is not an existent. Only an actuality is not an existent. Only an impermanent phenomenon is not an existent. Only a product is not an existent.

Now having done this. Only object of knowledge is an existent. It is not the same. Why is only object of knowledge an existent? Non-object of knowledge is not an existent, right? Non-object of knowledge is a non-existent right? Since non-object of knowledge is a non-existent, only object of knowledge itself obtains as an existent. The others are the same. Only established base is an existent. Only existent is an existent. All the phenomena which are synonymous with established base are the same. (JH: Once you take the basis from which you divide everything, since everything is that if you consider that basis, then you can say that only that exists, right? If you say only existent, or only established base, then that does exist. But then once you divide that into two things, you cannot say that only a permanent phenomenon exists. Even though something may be only a permanent phenomenon, only a permanent phenomenon itself does not exist. So he is talking about what is the most basic category and what is not.)

Only established base is an existent. Non-established base does not exist, right? Is there anything which is not an established base and exists? No. Therefore, only established base is an existent. Do you have it? (JH: When you get the pair of opposites like permanent phenomenon and non-permanent phenomenon. If its opposite does not exist and it does, then only it exists.)

You have to understand the reason. When someone says, "Why is only a permanent phenomenon a non-existent?" you have to say it is because actuality exists. Is the subject, only a permanent phenomenon, an existent? No. Why is the subject, only a permanent phenomenon, not an existent? Because actualities also exist. Got it?

For example, only you do not exist, right? There are the others of us, right? This is the thought.

Only object of knowledge is an existent. Even one thing which is not an object of knowledge does not exist, right? There is nothing which is both not an object of knowledge and is an existent, right? The subject, only object of knowledge, exists because non-object of knowledge does not exist, non-object of knowledge is not an existent. In the same way only an actuality does not exist because permanent phenomena also exist. Okay? Others are the same. Only a pot is not an existent. Only a pillar is not an existent. The (reasoning for these) goes the same way. Only a generality is not an existent. Only an instance is not an existent. Only a generality does not exist because instances exist. Only an instance is not an existent because generalities also exist. Only a horse is not an existent because donkeys also exist. Are there any donkeys? Do you know donkeys? Are there any donkeys in America? Only a horse does not exist because mules also exist. The father of a mule is a donkey, right? The mother of a mule is a horse. Only a pot does not exist because there are many non-pots.

So something which is (1) all established bases are it and (2) it is not an established base is only a permanent phenomenon. Something which is (1) it is an established base and (2) not all established bases are it is the subject, actuality. Actuality itself is an established base. All established bases are not an actuality. All established bases (constitute?) a permanent phenomenon. All phenomena constitute a permanent phenomenon.

Well, then one state the reasons and predicates, "Well, it follows that the subject, all established bases, is a permanent phenomenon." I accept it. Then it follows that actuality is a permanent phenomenon. Why? It follows that it is so because all established bases are a permanent phenomenon. The pervasion does not arise. There is no pervasion. All established bases are being thought of from the point of view of its self-reverse. (JH: So when you say all established bases you do not mean each and every established base. You mean just that generality of all established bases.) Now, it follows that the subject, actuality, is not an established base. Why? It follows that actuality is an established base. I accept it. It follows that all established bases are not a permanent phenomenon because actuality is an established base. There is no pervasion. Now you understand. Something which is (1) it is an established base and (2)

all established bases are not it is actuality, pot, pillar, and so forth.

Now there are a lot that are neither. What is something which is (1) it is not an established base and (2) all established bases are not it? Only an actuality, only a pot, only a pillar. Then if you answer back these, it will work. If you answer the son of a barren woman, the horn of a rabbit, and so on, it will work. If you think on this relationship of four possibilities, it will help you.

Now I am going to state out some possibilities for you and you have to give the subjects. What is the difference between one and object of knowledge the being of which is possible? Give an answer. (Goes around the room and gets three different answers.) The meaning of synonymy is that one is necessarily the other and the other is necessarily the one. Something which is both and something which is neither can also be posited for two synonyms.

If you say that they are synonymous, it follows that whatever is an object of knowledge the being of which is possible is necessarily one. I accept it. Is there pervasion? Then it follows that the subject, the two--object of knowledge and established base, are one because of being an object of knowledge the being of which is possible. It follows that the subject the two--actuality and impermanent phenomenon, are one because of being an object of knowledge the being of which is possible. There are a lot like that that will come--actuality and impermanent phenomenon. actuality and that which is able to perform a function, object of knowledge and established base, permanent phenomenon and generally characterized phenomenon. (JH: Would the subject, two pots, work?) When you say two pots there is somewhat of a factor of dissimilarity. The subject, the two--a pot and a blbous flat-based phenomenon able to perform the function of holding water, would work. In general if you say two pots or the two, a pot and a pot, it would be one. A pot is one with a pot, right? Oh, but you are probably thinking of something which is two pots, right? That would probably work here.

It follows that the subject, the two--actuality and that which is able to perform a function, are one because of being an object of knowledge the being of which is possible. (JH: Now don't feel that you have to answer stupidly. You can correct yourself and answer properly. you've made a mistake but don't feel that you have to hold onto it.) Do you understand?

Those of you who said that it is three possibilities posit which is necessarily the other, which is not necessarily the other, and posit

something which is one and not the other. Whatever is one is necessarily an object of knowledge the being of which is possible. Whatever is an object of knowledge the being of which is possible is not necessarily one. The subject, the two--permanent phenomenon and actuality.

C: It follows that the subject, the two--permanent phenomenon and actuality, are an object of knowledge the being of which is possible.

D: Oh, the subject, the two--actuality and that which is able to perform a function. (JH: there is something which is both an actuality and that which is able to perform a function, right?)

C: Why is the subject, the two--actuality and that which is able to perform a function, an object of knowledge the being of which is possible?

D: Because of being observed as a common locus of (1) something which is it exists and (2) also being suitable as an object of an awareness.

C: It follows that the subject, the two--actuality and that which is able to perform a function, are not one.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the two--actuality and that which is able to perform a function, are not synonyms.

D: Why?

C: It follows that the subject, the two--actuality and that which is able to perform a function, are synonyms.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the two--actuality and that which is able to perform a function, are one.

D: Why?

C: It follows that they are because of being synonyms.

D: There is no pervasion.

There is a difference between one and synonymous. The two--actuality and that which is able to perform a function--are synonymous, they are not one. They are not one because of being different phenomena. Those two are definition and definiendum, right? They are different and diverse. They are not one, they are synonyms. It is like that. There are a lot like that. The two--established base and object of knowledge--are synonymous, they are not one. Okay? The two--object of comprehension and existent--are synonyms. Although their meaning is the same, those two are not one. They are not one. Whatever is one must have the same actual name. For example, the

sound expressing "pot" is pot's actual name. The sound expressing "pillar" is pillar's actual name. The sound expressing "object of knowledge" is the actual name of object of knowledge. The actual names of the two--actuality and that which is able to perform a function--are understood as diverse and unshared. They are diverse actual names. They are that because of being different phenomena. So there are three possibilities between one and object of knowledge the being of which is possible.

C: Now what is the difference between the two, one and definiendum? (LR: It will help you to think about the pervasions in order to understand established bases.) Say it.

D: There are three possibilities.

C: If there are three possibilities, posit which pervades the other, which does not pervade the other, and something which is one and not the other.

D: Whatever is one is necessarily a definiendum. Whatever is a definiendum is not necessarily one. The subject, the two--established base and existent.

C: (LR: Do you others agree with that? Do you say that whatever is one is necessarily a definiendum? Express your individual thought.) If you say whatever is one is necessarily a definiendum, what is the fault? You have to see the fault. Say it.

D: The subject, that which is able to perform a function.

C: Right. The subject, that which is able to perform a function. The subject, that which is suitable as an object of an awareness. These are definitions, not definiendums. They are one, not different. Do you understand? If someone says that whatever is one is necessarily a definiendum, say, "It follows that the subject, that which is able to perform function, is a definiendum because of being one. If they say it is a definiendum say, "It is not a definiendum because of being a definition." The two--definition and definiendum--are contradictory, right? They are contradictory. Do you understand? If someone says, "It follows that actuality and that which is able to perform a function are contradictory because definition and definiendum are contradictory," there is no pervasion. In general that which is called definiendum and that which is called definition are contradictory. It is not said that actuality and that which is able to perform a function are contradictory. That which is able to perform a function and actuality are synonyms, right? That which is suitable as an object of an awareness and object of knowledge are synonyms. A common locus of (1) the

non-momentary and (2) phenomenon and permanent phenomenon are synonyms. All of them are synonyms. Even so definition and definiendum are contradictory. But a specific case of definition and definiendum are not contradictory.

Now those of you who say that there are four possibilities posit something which is a definiendum but not one.

D: the subject, the two--established base and existent.

C: What do you posit as the definition of the two--established base and existent? That's good. You could say each of them is a definiendum because each has a definition and the two together has a definition because established by a valid cognizer and observed by valid cognizer is that definition. There is a lot of debate like that. Whatever is a definiendum is necessarily one. It is said that those two together are not a definiendum. Do you understand? Whatever is a definiendum is necessarily one. If someone says, "It follows that the subject, different, is one because of being a definiendum," that is right. Different itself is one. Different is not different. Different is one with different, but it is also one itself. Okay? There are a lot of unusual subjects like saying different is one, two is one, three is one, and so on. They really debate it. It follows that two persons are not two. It follows that two dollars are not two.

So what is the difference between the two, definiendum and one? There are three possibilities. Something which is both is a pot. Whatever is a definiendum is necessarily one. Whatever is one is not necessarily a definiendum. Posit those definitions. The subject, a bulbous flat-based phenomenon able to perform the function of holding water. The subject, that which is able to perform a function. Those. Okay?

Now in the same way, what is the difference between one and definition? There are three possibilities. Whatever is a definition is necessarily one. Whatever is one is not necessarily a definition. It is the same as before. Here posit the definiendums as the subjects. Okay?

Now what is the difference between one and negative phenomenon? Probably you do not know this well. There are our possibilities. Something which is both is the opposite of non-pot. Also, non-permanent phenomenon is one and also is a negative phenomenon. It is a negative phenomenon because of being an affirming negative. As I explained before, negative phenomena are of two types, affirming negatives and non-affirming negatives. Also, you

can use the definition of negative phenomenon as the reason. Or you can say it is a negative phenomenon because of being an eliminator of the other (apoha, gzhan sel). Negative phenomenon and eliminator of the other are synonyms. Put the subject as non-pot or the opposite of non-pot. The subject is one because of being a phenomenon which is non-diverse.

Now something which is one but not a negative phenomenon is the subject, a pot. The subject, a pillar. Something which is a negative phenomenon but not one is the subject, the two--non-permanent phenomenon and non-generally characterized phenomenon, or the subject, the two--non-pot and non-pillar. If you posit such subjects, it will fit. Now there are a lot which are neither. Okay?

What is the difference between one and virtue? There are four possibilities. Something which is one and is a virtue is the subject, an action of abandoning killing (srong gcod spong ba'i las). The subject, giving. The subject, ethics. You can posit those. Something which is one and not a virtue is the subject, permanent phenomenon, or the subject, object of knowledge. Something which is a virtue and not one is the subject, the ten virtues. The two, one and virtue, have four possibilities.

Something which is one and is an object of knowledge the being of which is not possible does not exist. Not even one. (This must be by way of saying that one and object of knowledge the being of which is not possible are contradictory.)

If someone says, "What is the difference between one and contradictory?" they are contradictory. Something which is one and contradictory does not exist.

So that is one. Now for different, what is the difference between the two, different and object of knowledge the being of which is possible?

D: There are four possibilities.

C: What do you posit as something which is both?

D: The subject, the two--a pillar and a pot.

C: Oh, it follows that the subject, the two--a pillar and a pot, is an object of knowledge the being of which is possible. It follows with respect to the subject, the two--a pillar and a pot that something which exists.

D: Why?

C: Finished! It follows that the two--a pillar and a pot--is not an object of knowledge the being of which is possible.

D: I accept it.

C: Finished! Now what do you posit as both?

D: The subject, the two--actuality and that which is able to perform a function.

C: Now what do you posit as something which is different and is not an object of knowledge the being of which is possible and is not different.

D: The subject, a po.

C: Now what is the difference between the two, different and object of knowledge the being of which is not possible.

D: There are three possibilities.

C: What do you propose as something which is both?

D: The subject, the two--a pillar and a pot.

C: How do you posit which is necessarily the other, which is not necessarily the other, and something which is one but not the other.

D: Whatever is different is necessarily an object of knowledge the being of which is not possible.

C: It follows that there is pervasion.

D: Why!

C: Finished! Then.

D: Whatever is an object of knowledge the being of which is not possible is necessarily different. Whatever is different is not necessarily an object of knowledge the being of which is not possible. The subject, the two--actuality and that which is able to perform a function.

Whatever is an object of knowledge the being of which is not possible must have two phenomena which are contradictory. You must have two. The two--a pillar and a pot. The two--permanent phenomenon and actuality. The two--definition and definiendum. The two--mental consciousness and sense consciousness. The two--common being and Superior. The two--god and human. The two--east and west. Like these. The two--the sky and the earth. The two--virtue and non-virtue. The two--fault and benefit. There are a lot. The two--large and small. The two--good and bad. The two--supreme and low. Do you understand?

Now what is the difference between the two, different and definiendum? What is the difference between the two, different and definition? They debate this a lot. Is the two-established base and object of knowledge--a definiendum or not? They debate like that. Probably in general they are contradictory. Whatever is a definiendum is necessarily one, right? Probably they are contradictory.

Different and definiendum are contradictory. Different and definition are contradictory. Even so, it is debated a lot. Some say whatever is a definition is necessarily not different and whatever is a definition is necessarily one, right? Then if that is so (others say), isn't the two--that which is able to perform a function and the momentary--a definition? It follows that it is because of being the definition of the two--actuality and impermanent phenomenon. (The others respond to this tht) they are definitions individually, they are not a definition of the two of them (The debate goes like this:) It follows that the subject, the two--actuality and impermanent phenomenon, is a definiendum because of being the definiendum of the two--that which is able to perform a function and the momentary. The reason is not established. Those two are individually definiendums, they are not a definiendum of those two. Having said that, they debate it back and forth a lot.

Now what is the difference between the two, different and virtue? Probably it is the same as before with the two, one and virtue. Different and virtue have four possibilities. Different and non-virtue have four possibilities. Different and non-virtue have four possibilities. Different and neutral phenomena have four possibilities. You should think about it. Then you will ascertain these established bases--objects of knowledge the being of which is not possible and those the being of which is possible, definiendum and definition, one and different, and so forth. If you understand these, you will understand.

Actuality itself is an actuality, others are reversed from this. Non-actuality is a permanent phenomenon. You have to say that non-actuality is a permanent phenomenon. The definition of actuality is itself a permanent phenomenon. The definition of that which is able to perform a function is itself a permanent phenomenon. There are a lot. The reverse of actuality is a permanent phenomenon. One with actuality is a permanent phenomenon. Different from actuality is a permanent phenomenon. Phenomenon which is diverse from actuality is a permanent phenomenon. You have to say that all of these are permanent phenomena. Got it? What is opposite from not being an actuality? It is an actuality. What is opposite from not being an actuality? It is an actuality? It is a permanent phenomenon. If you apply this to others--impermanent phenomenon, product, pot, pillar, and so forth--it is the same. One with pot is permanent phenomenon. The definition of pot is itself a permanent phenomenon. Different from pot is a permanent phenomenon. It is said like that. They ar

permanent phenomena. Got it? so now we will not go back to look at established bases and colors. Later when we enumerate the three possibilities, four possibilities, and so on you will ascertain it. We must go on. We will not go back.

Identifying Reverses

Now we are going on to identifying reverses. If there is something left over from established bases I will offer it to you later, but let's go on to the reverses. When we get to things later, we will cross-apply them.

Now the basic source quote for identifying reverses is "Because all things naturally abide in their own entities." It is clear. someone asks what the reason is. All things naturally are not mixed with others and abide in their own entities: therefore, they are reversed from all similar and dissimilar things. (JH: So because all things naturally abide without being mixed with other things, with things other than themselves, therefore they abide in their own entities.) There is a definition, but at the moment I do not remember it. At the end it says "depends on a reversal," but I don't remember the first part. Don't write it now. If you don't have it all, it is not a definition. (JH: Because all phenomena abide naturally in their own entities they are not mixed with others and so forth.) All things abide naturally as themselves, not mixed with others. They do not become diverse but abide naturally in their own entities. Thus, for each and every phenomenon one can posit a reverse. there is a reverse which is a reversal from all that is not itself for each phenomenon.

With respect to reverses, there are the four reverses: general-reverse (spyi ldog), self-reverse (rang ldog), meaning-reverse (don ldog), and illustration-reverse (gzhi ldog). Got it? Now if we apply this to a basis, for instance, to actuality. If you apply it to actuality, actuality is itself the general-reverse and the self-reverse of object of knowledge and the general-reverse of object of knowledge. Permanent phenomenon is itself the self-reverse of permanent phenomenon and the general-reverse of permanent phenomenon. That which is able to perform a function is the meaning-reverse of actuality. Earlier we said, "this is the definition of that because this is the meaning of that," right? This is it. That which is suitable as an object of an awareness is the meaning-reverse of object of knowledge. That which is a common locus of being a phenomenon and being non-momentary is the meaning-reverse of permanent phenomenon. Apply

it to the others in the same way. Okay?

A pot is an illustration-reverse of actuality and an illustration-reverse of object of knowledge. Uncaused space is an illustration-reverse of permanent phenomenon. Got it? You say, "This is an illustration-reverse of that because of being an illustration of that." This is the meaning of being an illustration. You say, "There is an example of this on page 19 line 5. With respect to the subject, actuality, it is not an illustration of itself because having ascertained it by a valid cognizer there is no possibility of not having ascertained actuality by a valid cognizer. This is what is said here, "It follows that it is an illustration of actuality because (1) it is an actuality and (2) having ascertained it by a valid cognizer, there is a non-ascertaining of actuality by a valid cognizer. That non-ascertaining is the meaning of actuality's illustration and the illustration-reverse of actuality. That something is (1) an actuality and (2) there is someone who has ascertained it by a valid cognizer but has not ascertained actuality by a valid cognizer is the meaning of being an illustration of actuality. It is an illustration (not shown by) of something's being an actuality. There is an ascertaining of a pot without having ascertained actuality, right? There is someone who has ascertained pot but has not ascertained actuality, right? In dependence on pot there is a place for establishing other actualities. In the same way, pot is an illustration of object of knowledge, right? It is an object of knowledge. There is an ascertaining of it without having ascertained object of knowledge. One ascertains a pot. There is a non-ascertaining of pot as being an object of knowledge. In dependence on a pot ... Got it?

Now uncaused space is an illustration of permanent phenomenon. It is something which is a permanent phenomenon. There is an ascertaining of uncaused space without there being an ascertaining of permanent phenomena in dependence on that. There is a basis for establishing it. If someone asks how it establishes it, it is because it implies the meaning of it. For example, the subject, a pot, is an actuality because of being something which is able to perform a function. The subject, a pot, is an object of knowledge because of being something which is suitable as an object of an awareness. The subject, uncaused space, is a permanent phenomenon because of being something which is able to perform a function. The subject, a pot, is an object of knowledge because of being something which is suitable as an object of an awareness. The subject, uncaused space, is a permanent phenomenon because of being a common locus of the

non-momentary and phenomena. This is the way in which they establish it. Got it? It is like that. This is what is understood by illustration-reverse and meaning-reverse. Got it?

Now when one says pot's reverse, actuality's reverse, the reverse of object of knowledge pillar's reverse, and so on this is to be understood as the self-reverse. It is not understood as the illustration-reverse, nor is it understood as the meaning-reverse. It is understood as the general-reverse or the self-reverse.

When someone says, "Posit the reverse of object of

MISSING SOMETHING!!

_____ies.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that the two, blue and yellow, are indirect contradictories because they indirectly abide as mutually dissimilar.

D: There is no pervasion.

C: It follows that whatever phenomena indirectly abide as mutually dissimilar are necessarily indirect contradictories because that which indirectly abides as mutually dissimilar is the definition of indirect contradictories.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the two, blue and yellow, indirectly abide as mutually dissimilar.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the two, blue and yellow, are indirect contradictories.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the two, blue and yellow, are contradictories.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that a common locus of the two, blue and yellow, is not possible.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that whatever is blue is necessarily not yellow.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a sapphire, is not yellow because of being blue.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a sapphire, is yellow because of being blue.

D: There is no pervasion.

C: It follows that whatever is a color is not necessarily yellow.

D: I accept it.

C: Amazing!

Debate A.4 Extended

C: Is whatever is a color necessarily blue?

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that whatever is a color is necessarily blue.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of purified gold, is blue because of being a color.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of purified gold, is a color because of being an instance of color.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of purified gold, is an instance of color because the three signs of its being an instance of color are complete.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, the color of purified gold, that the three signs of its being an instance of color are complete because (1) it is a color, (2) it is related with color as a phenomenon which is the same essence and (3) many common locuses of being other than it and also being colors are established.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, the color of purified gold, that the three signs of its being an instance of color are complete.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of purified gold, is an instance of color.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of purified gold, is a color.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of purified gold, is blue because of being a color.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of purified gold, is not blue because of being yellow.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of purified gold, is yellow because of being the color of purified gold.

D: It follows that the color of purified gold is the color of purified gold because the color of purified gold exists.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that the color of purified gold exists because the color of purified gold is an established base.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that the color of purified gold is an established base because the color of purified gold is established by a valid cognizer.

D: There is no pervasion.

C: It follows that whatever is established by a valid cognizer is necessarily an established base because established by a valid cognizer is the definition of established base.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that established by a valid cognizer is the definition of established base because established by a valid cognizer is the positor of established base.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that established by a valid cognizer is the positor of established base because established by a valid cognizer is the triply qualified positor of established base.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that the subject, established by a valid cognizer, is the triply qualified positor of established base because of being the triply qualified substantial existent of established base.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, established by a valid cognizer, that it is the triply qualified substantial existent of established base.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, established by a valid cognizer, that it is the triply qualified substantial existent of established base.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, established by a valid cognizer, that it is the triply qualified positor of established base.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, established by a valid cognizer, that it is the positor of established base.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that whatever is established by a valid cognizer is necessarily an established base.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of purified gold, is an established base.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the color of purified gold is an established base.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the color of purified gold exists.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the color of purified gold is the color of purified gold.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of purified gold, is yellow.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of purified gold, is yellow.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of purified gold, is not blue.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of purified gold, is blue because of being a color.

D: There is no pervasion.

C: It follows that whatever is a color is not necessarily blue.

D: I accept it.

C: Amazing!

LR: Primary colors are of four types--blue, yellow, white, and red. These are its divided phenomena. Those things which are primary colors must be put as four types. You have to posit four types of

primary colors. Thus, you have to say it is because of this.

C: It follows that white is a primary color because it is a phenomenon which is a division of primary colors.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, white, that it is not a phenomenon which is a division of primary colors.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that if primary colors are divided, there are not four.

D: Why?

C: It follows that if primary colors are divided, there are four.

D: I accept it.

C: Posit the four.

D: The four--blue, yellow, red, and green.

C: It follows that the subject, green, is a primary color.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that respect to the subject, green, that it is not a primary color because it is a secondary color.

D: There is no pervasion.

C: It follows that there is pervasion because the two, primary color and secondary color, are contradictory.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that the two, primary color and secondary color, are contradictory because the two, primary and secondary are

contradictory.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that the two, primary and secondary, are contradictory. What is the meaning of "primary?" What is the meaning of "secondary?" What is to be understood by "primary?" What is to be understood by "secondary?"

(LR: The primary or root part of the body is the trunk and the secondary or branch parts are the hands, the feet, the head. These are the branches. The primary and secondary parts are contradictory. For a tree, the trunk is the primary part and the branches are the secondary parts.) Are the two, primary and secondary, contradictory?)

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the two, primary color and secondary color, are contradictory.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, green, is not a primary color because of being a secondary color.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that it is not so. Posit the four primary colors.

D: The subject, the four--blue, yellow, white, and red.

C: It follows that the four--blue, yellow, white, and red--are the phenomena which are the divisions of primary colors.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, white, is a phenomenon which is a division of primary color.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a white religious conch, is a color because of being white.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a white religious conch, is red because of being a color.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a white religious conch, is not red because of being white.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a white religious conch, is white because of being suitable as a white hue.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a white religious conch, is suitable as a white hue because of being an instance of white.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a white flower, is not an instance of white.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, the color of a white cloth, that it is not an instance of white.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that an instance of white does not exist.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, white, that it is not a generality.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, red, that it is not a generality.

D: I accept it.

(LR: If white is not a generality, red must not be a generality. Yellow must not be a generality. It follows that color is not a generality. It follows that there is no generality.)

C: It follows with respect to the subject, color, that it is not a generality.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, actuality, is not a generality. It follows that permanent phenomenon is not a generality. It follows that object of knowledge is not a generality. It follows that there is no generality.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the two, generality and instance, do not exist. It follows that if objects of knowledge are divided, there are not the two, generalities and instances.

(LR: I forgot one division earlier. If established bases are divided, there are the two, generalities and instances. I forgot this one.)

It follows that if established bases are divided, there are not the two, generalities and instances.

D: Why?

C: It follows that if established bases are divided, there are the two, generalities and instances.

D: I accept it.

C: Posit one.

D: The subject, actuality.

C: It follows that the subject, color, is a generality.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, red, that it is a generality.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, white, that it is a generality.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that instances of white exist.

D: I accept it.

C: Posit it.

D: The subject, the color of a white flower.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a white flower, is an instance of white.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a white religious conch, is an instance of white.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a white religious conch, is white.

D: Why?

C: It follows with respect to the subject, the color of a white religious conch, that it is white because it is an instance of white.

D: There is no pervasion.

C: It follows that there is pervasion because whatever is an instance of white is necessarily complete in the three signs of being an instance of white.

D: There is no pervasion.

C: It follows that there is pervasion because if something is an instance of white, then (1) it is necessarily white, (2) it is necessarily related with white as a phenomenon which is the same essence, and (3) many common locuses of being other than it and also being white are necessarily established.

(LR: The first requirement of something's being an instance of white is that it be white. It is just the same when applied to others. An instance of blue is such because (1) it is blue, (2) it is related with blue as a phenomenon which is the same essence, and (3) many common locuses of being other than it and also being blue are established. Then what is it for red? If you apply this to red, an instance of red is such because (1) it is red, (2) it is related with red as a phenomenon which is the same essence, and (3) many common locuses of being other than it and also being red are established. Now if this is applied to yellow, an instance of yellow is such because (1) it is yellow, (2) it is related with yellow as a phenomenon which is the same essence, and (3) many common locuses of being other than it and also being yellow are established. It is done the same way for pillar, pot, actuality, and object of knowledge, permanent phenomenon, person. Do you understand? You are an instance of human, right? You are a human. You are related with human as a phenomenon which is the same essence. When you say, "related with human as a phenomenon which is the same essence," it means that if there were no humans then you would not exist. And many common locuses of being other than you and also being human are established. There are a lot, right? Common locuses which are other than you and also human are a lot. All of us are humans, but we are not you. There are a lot of

humans who are not you, right? You understand, right? In general, if three signs of something's being an instance are complete, they are these three, right?)

It follows that if something is an instance of white, then (1) it is necessarily white, (2) it is necessarily related with white as a phenomenon which is the same essence, and (3) many common locuses of being other than it and also being white are necessarily established.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that whatever is an instance of white is necessarily white.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a white religious conch, is white.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a white religious conch, is not red because of being white.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a white religious conch, is red because of being a color.

D: There is no pervasion.

C: It follows that whatever is a color is not necessarily red.

D: I accept it.

C: Amazing!

Have you learned how to go between? (JH: I think he means have you learned how to go the other way.) From the section on dispelling objections:

C: It follows that the subject, a white religious conch, is a color because of being white.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that the subject, a white religious conch, is not white because of not being arisen from the elements.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that the subject, a white religious conch, is not arisen from the elements because of being an element.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that the subject, a white religious conch, is an element because of being a religious conch.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, a white religious conch, that it is an element because it is the element which is earth.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that the subject, a white religious conch, is the element which is earth because of being hard and obstructive.

D: There is no pervasion.

C: It follows that whatever is hard and obstructive is necessarily the element which is earth because hard and obstructive is the definition of earth.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that hard and obstructive is the definition of earth because in the Collected Topics it says, "Hard and obstructive is the definition of earth."

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that hard and obstructive is the definition of earth.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that whatever is hard and obstructive is necessarily earth.

D: I accept it.

C: it follows that the subject, a white religious conch, is earth.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, vegetable, is earth.

D: Why?

C: Because of being hard and obstructive.

D: The reason is not established.

C: What is it that it is not? Is it not hard? Is it not obstructive?

D: It is not hard.

C: What does it mean when you say "hard?" Isn't a vegetable hard?

D: Not all of them are hard.

C: It follows that the subject, vegetable, is not earth.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, metal, is not hard and obstructive.

D: Why?

C: It follows that the subject, metal, is earth.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, earth, is earth.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, silver, is earth.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, vegetable, is earth.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, metal, is earth.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, metal, is a tangible object which is an element. It follows that the subject, gold, is a tangible object which is an element.

D: Why?

C: Because of being earth.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, gold, is a tangible object which is an element.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, gold, is not a tangible object which is arisen from the elements. It follows that the subject, metal, is not a tangible object which is arisen from the elements.

D: Why?

C: It follows that the subject, metal, is not a tangible object arisen from the elements because of being a tangible object which is an element.

D: There is no pervasion.

C: It follows that there is pervasion because the two, tangible objects arisen from the elements and tangible objects which are the elements, are contradictory.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that it is so because whatever is a tangible object which is an element is necessarily something which is an element and something which is a tangible object, and whatever is a tangible object arisen from the elements is something which is arisen from the elements and is a tangible object. This is what is to be said.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the two, tangible objects arisen from the elements and tangible objects which are the elements, are contradictory.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, gold, is not a tangible object arisen from the elements because of being a tangible object which is an element.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, gold, is a tangible object arisen from the elements because of being heavy. There are the seven tangible objects arisen from the elements -- heavy, light, smooth, rough, cold, hunger, and thirst -- right?

D: There is no pervasion.

C: It follows that the subject, a white religious conch, is a tangible object arisen from the elements because of being heavy.

D: There is no pervasion.

C: There is pervasion. It follows that the subject, a white religious conch, is not arisen from the elements because of being an element; because of being a religious conch. Doesn't the text say this?

D: Yes.

D: Oh! Whatever is a tangible object arisen from the elements must be arisen from the elements. This is not arisen from the elements. It is an element, right? Metal, gold and so on. Think about it.

Wet and moistening is the definition of water, right? It follows that whatever is wet and moistening is necessarily water.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, alcohol, is water.

D: I accept it.

C: Oh! Alcohol is water. It follows that tea is water.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that beer is water. It follows the milk is water.

D: I accept it.

C: Oh! Milk is water?

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that milk is water.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, boiled butter, is water.

D: I accept it.

C: Boiled butter is water? It follows that the subject, milk, is water.

D: I accept it.

C: When a person wells milk, are they selling water? When you buy milk, do you buy water?

D: Yes.

C: You are always drinking tea. Are you drinking a lot of water?

D: Yes.

C: Is it water? Is tea water?

D: It is water.

C: Oh! Tea is water. Beer too is water. Boiled butter too is water. Alcohol too is water. Is all of it water?

Have you ascertained it? Have you ascertained the colors? You have to listen to the last one and think about what answer to give. Think about it.

JH: You should debate with me. Otherwise I am sitting here like a fool.

Debate A.5 Extended

C: Is whatever is a color necessarily a primary color?

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that whatever is a color is necessarily a primary color.

D: I accept it.

C: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, the color of green Amoghasiddhi, is a primary color because of being a color.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of green Amoghasiddhi, is not a primary color because of being a secondary color.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of green Amoghasiddhi, is secondary color because of being the secondary color which is the two, blue and yellow.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of green Amoghasiddhi, is the secondary color which is the two, blue and yellow, because of being green.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of green Amoghasiddhi, is green because of being a color which is a mixture of blue and yellow.

D: There is no pervasion.

C: It follows that whatever is a color which is a mixture of blue and yellow is necessarily green because a mixture of blue and yellow is posited as green, a mixture of red and yellow is posited as orange, and a mixture of red and blue is posited as black.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that a mixture of blue and yellow is not to be posited as green, a mixture of red and yellow is not to be posited as orange, and

a mixture of red and blue is not to be posited as black.

(LR: When he says that the reason is not established, he is saying that they are not so, right?)

It follows that with respect to color, it is not to be posited as the two, primary colors and secondary colors.

D: Why?

C: It follows that with respect to color, it is to be posited as the two, primary colors and secondary colors.

D: I accept it.

C: Well, posit what is to be understood (go don tshul gsum) by primary color and secondary color.

D: The primary colors are the colors of the four elements. The secondary colors are those arisen in dependence on the primary colors.

C: It follows that secondary colors are said to be arisen in dependence upon primary colors.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that there is nothing which is to be posited as a secondary color which is a mixture of primary colors. How is it posited?

D: I have already explained what is to be posited as a secondary color which is a mixture of primary colors.

C: Please repeat what you said.

D: The colors of the four elements are to be put as the four primary colors. Colors which are arisen from a mixture of the primary colors are to be posited as the secondary colors.

C: Now since it is like that, it follows that secondary colors are to be

posited from a mixture of primary colors.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that there is a secondary color to be posited from a mixture of blue and yellow.

D: I accept it.

C: Posit the color which is a mixture of blue and yellow.

D: The subject, green.

C: It follows that green is to be posited from a mixture of blue and yellow.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that whatever is a color which is a mixture of blue and yellow is necessarily green.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of green Amoghasiddhi, is green because of being a color which is a mixture of blue and yellow. You asserted the reason and the pervasion.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of green Amoghasiddhi, is a secondary color which is composed of the two, blue and yellow.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of green Amoghasiddhi, is a secondary color.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the color green Amoghasiddhi, is a color.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of green Amoghasiddhi, is not a primary color.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of green Amoghasiddhi, is a primary color because of being a color.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of green Amoghasiddhi, is a color because of being that subject.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, the color of green Amoghasiddhi, that it is the color of green Amoghasiddhi because it is itself.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, the color of green Amoghasiddhi,; that it is itself because it is a substantial phenomenon (rdzas chos).

(LR: There are substantial phenomena and reverse phenomena, ldog chos. You have not gotten to this yet. It is the last in this text.)

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, the color of green Amoghasiddhi, that it is itself.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of green Amoghasiddhi, is the color of green Amoghasiddhi.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of green Amoghasiddhi, is that subject.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of green Amoghasiddhi is a color.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of green Amoghasiddhi, is a primary color because of being a color.

D: There is no pervasion.

C: It follows that whatever is a color is not necessarily a primary color.

D: I accept it.

C: Amazing!

Identifying Reverses

(At 23.156 a new class begins. It is apparently the class of May 5, 1976, and begins with debates on the topics in identifying reverses.)

(With regard to a debate on the difference between (1) the phenomena coextensive with the reverse of that which is able to perform a function and (2) definition, Lati Rinbochay says that) having ascertained this one you can then use it as an example of the others. What is the difference between the two, the phenomena coextensive with the reverse of that which is able to perform a function and definiendum? What is the difference between the two, the phenomena coextensive with the reverse of that which is able to perform a function and a permanent phenomenon? What is the

difference between the two, the phenomena coextensive with the reverse of that which is able to perform a function and actuality? It is like that. Apply it over to these.

C: What is the difference between the two, the phenomena coextensive with the reverse of that which is able to perform a function and definition?

D: There are four possibilities.

C: It follows that there are not four possibilities. Posit something which is both.

D: The subject, the triply qualified substantial existent of actuality.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, the triply qualified substantial existent of actuality, that it is coextensive with the reverse of that which is able to perform a function.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, the triply qualified substantial existent of actuality, why is it coextensive with the reverse of that which is able to perform a function?

D: Because it is synonymous with the reverse of that which is able to perform a function.

C: It follows that if something is synonymous with the reverse of that which is able to perform a function, then it is necessarily coextensive with the reverse of that which is able to perform a function.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, the triply qualified substantial existent of actuality, that it is a definition.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, the triply qualified substantial existent of actuality, why is it a definition?

D: Because it is a positor ('jog byed'); because of being the positor of actuality's definition.

C: It follows that if it is the positor of actuality's definition, then it is necessarily a definition.

D: I accept it.

C: Now it follows that it is not so. Posit something which is coextensive with the reverse of that which is able to perform a function but is not a definition.

D: The subject, one with tat which is able to perform a function.

(LR: One with that which is able to perform a function will not work. With respect to one there is something to be debated. For example, the definition of one is:

a phenomenon which is not diverse.

Now when that is applied to a basis, the definition of one with actuality is:

a phenomenon which is not diverse from actuality.

The definition of one with which is able to perform a function is:

a phenomenon which is not diverse from that which is able to perform a function.

It may be that way, right? It is something to debate about. What you have posited here, something which is coextensive with reverse of that which is able to perform a function but is not a definition? It is okay.)

C: It follows with respect to the subject, one with that which is able to perform a function, that it is not a definition.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, one with that which is able to perform a function, why is it not a definition?

D: Because of being a definiendum.

C: It follows that if something is a definiendum, then it is necessarily not a definition.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, one with that which is able to perform a function, that it is coextensive with the reverse of that which is able to perform a function.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, one with that which is able to perform a function, why is it coextensive with the reverse of that which is able to perform a function?

D: Because (1) it is different from the reverse of that which is able to perform a function and (2) whatever is it is necessarily the reverse of that which is able to perform a function and whatever is the reverse of that which is able to perform a function is necessarily it.

C: It follows that if something (1) is different from the reverse of that which is able to perform a function and (2) whatever is it is necessarily the reverse of that which is able to perform a function and whatever is the reverse of that which is able to perform a function is necessarily it, then it is necessarily coextensive with the reverse of that which is able to perform a function.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that it is not so. Posit something which is a definition but is not coextensive with the reverse of that which is able to perform a function.

D: There is such. The subject, suitable as an object of an awareness..

C: It follows with respect to the subject, suitable as an object of an awareness, that it is a definition.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, suitable as an object of an awareness, why is it a definition?

D: Because it is the definition of object of knowledge.

C: It follows that if something is the definition of object of knowledge, then it is necessarily a definition.

D: I accept.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, suitable as an object of an awareness, that it is not coextensive with the reverse of that which is able to perform a function.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, suitable as an object of an awareness, why is it not coextensive with the reverse of that which is able to perform a function?

D: Because it is not synonymous with the reverse of that which is able to perform a function.

C: It follows that if something is not synonymous with the reverse of that which is able to perform a function, then it is necessarily not coextensive with the reverse of that which is able to perform a function.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, suitable as an object of an awareness, that it is not synonymous with the reverse of that which is able to perform a function.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that if something is not synonymous with the reverse of that which is able to perform a function, then it is necessarily not coextensive with the reverse of that which is able to perform a function.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, suitable as an object of an awareness, that it is not synonymous with the reverse of that which is able to perform a function.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, suitable as an object of an awareness, why is it not synonymous with the reverse of that which is able to perform a function?

D: Because there is not common locus of being suitable as an object of an awareness and also being the reverse of that which is able to perform a function.

(LR: Oh, there is no common locus of being suitable as an object of an awareness and also being the reverse of that which is able to perform

a function? It follows that there is a common locus because that which is able to perform a function is such. Okay? If someone says there is no common locus, if someone says that there is nothing which is a common locus of the reverse of that which is able to perform a function and suitable as an object of an awareness, then what is there? Is there a common locus? The common locus is that which is able to perform a function. That which is able to perform a function, right? That which is able to perform a function is necessarily suitable as an object of knowledge, right? Do you understand? He said that there is no common locus. You have to say, "It follows that there is a common locus because the which is able to perform a function is such.")

C: It follows that there is a common locus because that which is able to perform a function is such.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that there is a common locus of the reverse of that which is able to perform a function and suitable as an object of an awareness.

D: I accept it.

C: Now it follows with respect to the subject, suitable as an object of an awareness, that it is not synonymous with the reverse of that which is able to perform a function.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, suitable as an object of an awareness, why is it not synonymous with the reverse of that which is able to perform a function?

(LR to Defender: You have to think about it. Why aren't they synonymous?)

D: Because it is not coextensive with the reverse of that which is able to perform a function.

C: It follows that those two are not coextensive.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that whatever is the reverse of that which is able to perform a function is not necessarily suitable as an object of an awareness.

D: I accept it.

C: Posit it. If whatever is the reverse of that which is able to perform a function is not necessarily suitable as an object of an awareness, then posit it.

D: The subject, that which is able to perform a function.

C: It follows that the subject, that which is able to perform a function, is not suitable as an object of an awareness.

D: Why?

C: Because of being the reverse of that which is able to perform a function.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, that which is able to perform a function, that it is not the reverse of that which is able to perform a function.

(JH: You follow? You should be giving honest answers in here. Don't purposely make trouble.)

It follows with respect to the subject, that which is able to perform a function, that it is its own reverse because it is an established base.

(LR: This was in the colors section earlier, wasn't it? It carries over.)

D: I accept it.

C: Amazing! It follows with respect to the subject, that which is able to perform a function, that it is the reverse of that which is able to perform a function.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, that which is able to perform a function, that it is not suitable as an object of an awareness.

D: Why?

C: Because of being the reverse of that which is able to perform a function.

D: Did you say that it is not suitable as an object of an awareness?

(LR: Yes, you said that whatever is the reverse of that which is able to perform a function is not necessarily suitable as an object of an awareness for there is the subject, that which is able to perform a function. Didn't you?)

Then "Why?" was the right answer. Don't think that just because a reason is given that you then say the wrong thing. Then she gave a reason. Now you have to respond to the reason, and that is where you will find out where your trouble is. The reason happens to be true.)

OH, I see. Okay. Why?

C: It follows that the subject, that which is able to perform a function, is suitable as an object of an awareness.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that whatever is the reverse of that which is able to perform a function is necessarily suitable as an object of an awareness.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that whatever is the reverse of that which is able to perform a function is necessarily suitable as an object of an awareness.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, suitable as an object of an awareness, is coextensive with the reverse of that which is able to perform a function.

D: Why?

C: It follows that it is so because of being synonymous with the reverse of that which is able to perform a function.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, suitable as an object of an awareness, that it is not synonymous with the reverse of that which is able to perform a function.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, suitable as an object of an awareness, why is it not synonymous with the reverse of that which is able to perform a function?

(LR: What is the fault? Those two are not synonymous because of what fault? You have to think about it. You have to say that if they were synonymous, then there would be such and such a fault. Thus, they are not synonymous.)

Let's see, a common locus of the two...

(LR: There is a common locus of them, isn't there? Isn't there? The common locus is that which is able to perform a function.)

(JH: You see, that was your wrong answer to begin with. You said there was no common locus. So they have just proved to you that there is a common locus of that which is suitable as an object of an

awareness and the reverse of that which is able to perform a function. That is that which is able to perform a function. That which is able to perform a function is suitable as an object of an awareness and it is the reverse of that which is able to perform a function. So that just shows you that answer was wrong. You cannot say that they are not synonymous because there is no common locus.)

(LR: She said, "Why are they not synonymous?" If they were synonymous, then what would the fault be? Now the meaning of being synonymous...)

From 23.401 to 23.431 the tape is completely inaudible. Then the class picks up from there. The same debate is continuing with the Defender now positing something which is neither coextensive with the reverse of that which is able to perform a function nor a definition.

C: The subject, the horn of a rabbit.

(LR to Defender: If there is an existent to posit, then you have to put that.)

D: The subject, a pot.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, a pot, that it is not coextensive with the reverse of that which is able to perform a function.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, a pot, why is it not coextensive with the reverse of that which is able to perform a function?

D: Because it is not synonymous with the reverse of that which is able to perform a function.

C: It follows that if something is not synonymous with the reverse of that which is able to perform a function, then it is necessarily not coextensive with the reverse of that which is able to perform a function.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, a pot, that it is not a definition.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, a pot, why is it not a definition?

D: Because it is a definiendum.

C: It follows that if something is a definiendum, then it is necessarily not a definition.

D: I accept it.

C: Now there are four possibilities.

Debate C.3

(LR: This is the same as the last one. It is a bit long. If you only do it once,...)

C: Is whatever is coextensive with the reverse of that which is able to perform a function necessarily a definition?

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that whatever is coextensive with the reverse of that which is able to perform a function is necessarily a definition.

D: I accept it.

C: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, the definition of actuality, is a definition because of being coextensive with the reverse of that which is able to perform a function.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the definition of actuality, is not a definition because of being a definiendum.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that the subject, the definition of actuality, is a definiendum because of being the definiendum of the triply qualified substantial existent of actuality.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, actuality, that its definition is the definiendum of its triply qualified substantial existent because it is a triply qualified imputed existent.

D: The reason is not established.

C: The subject, actuality,...

(Skip in class time to new debaters.)

C: It follows with respect to the subject, that which is able to perform a function, that whatever is its reverse is necessarily the triply qualified substantial existent of actuality.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the third reason is established.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, actuality, that whatever is its triply qualified substantial existent is necessarily the reverse of that which is able to perform a function.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the second reason is established.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the triply qualified substantial existent of actuality, is different from the reverse of that which is able to perform a function.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the first part of the reason is established.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, the triply qualified substantial existent of actuality, that (1) it is different from the reverse of that which is able to perform a function and (2) whatever is it is necessarily the reverse of that which is able to perform a function and whatever is the reverse of that which is able to perform a function is necessarily it.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, the triply qualified substantial existent of actuality, that it is coextensive with the reverse of that which is able to perform a function.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the triply qualified substantial existent of actuality, is a definiendum because of being coextensive with the reverse of that which is able to perform a function.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the triply qualified substantial existent of actuality, is not a definiendum because of being a definition.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that the subject, the triply qualified substantial existent of actuality, is a definition because of being the definition of the definition of actuality.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, actuality, that its triply qualified substantial existent is the definition of its definition because it is a triply qualified imputed existent.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that if something is a triply qualified imputed existent, then its triply qualified substantial existent is the definition of its definition.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, actuality, that its triply qualified substantial existent is the definition of its definition.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the triply qualified substantial existent of actuality, is the definition of the definition of actuality.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the triply qualified substantial existent of actuality, is a definition.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the triply qualified substantial existent of actuality, is not a definiendum because of being a definition.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the triply qualified substantial existent of actuality, is a definiendum because of being coextensive with the reverse of that which is able to perform a function.

D: There is no pervasion.

C: It follows that whatever is coextensive with the reverse of that which is able to perform a function is not necessarily a definiendum.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that whatever is coextensive with the reverse of that which is able to perform a function is necessarily not a definiendum.

D: Why?

C: It follows that it is not the case that whatever is coextensive with the reverse of that which is able to perform a function is necessarily not a definiendum.

D: I accept it.

C: If there is no pervason, then posit it.

D: The subject, the definition of actuality.

Debate C.5 (in part)

D: I accept that it is that. The third part of the reason is not established.

C: It follows that whatever is actuality's reverse is necessarily actuality which is one with actuality because (1) whatever is that is necessarily one with actuality and (2) whatever is actuality's reverse is necessarily one with actuality.

(LR: Because whatever is actuality's reverse is necessarily actuality which is one with actuality and whatever is actuality's reverse is necessarily actuality which is arisen as one with actuality.)

D: I accept that.

C: It follows that whatever is actuality's reverse is necessarily actuality which is one with actuality.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the third part of the reason is established.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that whatever is actuality which is one with actuality is necessarily actuality's reverse.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the second part of the reason is established.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, actuality which is one with actuality, is different from actuality's reverse.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the first part of the reason is established.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the first part of the reason is established.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, actuality which is one with actuality, that (1) it is different from actuality's reverse and (2) whatever is it is necessarily actuality's reverse and whatever is actuality's reverse is necessarily it.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, actuality which is one with actuality, is

coextensive with actuality's reverse.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, actuality which is one with actuality, is a permanent phenomenon because of being coextensive with actuality's reverse.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, actuality which is one with actuality, is not a permanent phenomenon because of being an impermanent phenomenon.

D: The reason is not established

C: It follows that the subject, actuality which is one with actuality, is an impermanent phenomenon because of being a caused phenomenon.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, actuality which is one with actuality, is a caused phenomenon.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, actuality which is one with actuality, is an impermanent phenomenon.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, actuality which is one with actuality, is an impermanent phenomenon.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, actuality which is one with actuality, is not a permanent phenomenon.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, actuality which is one with actuality, is a permanent phenomenon because of being coextensive with actuality's reverse.

D: There is no pervasion.

C: It follows that whatever is coextensive with actuality's reverse is not necessarily a permanent phenomenon.

D: I accept it.

C; Amazing! Now what is the difference between the two, the phenomena coextensive with actuality's reverse and permanent phenomenon?

D: there are four possibilities.

C: It follows that there are not four possibilities. Posit something which is both.

D: The subject, one with actuality.

C: It follows that the subject, one with actuality, is a permanent phenomenon.

D: I accept it.

C: Why is the subject, one with actuality, a permanent phenomenon?

D: Because of being a common locus of being a phenomenon and being non-momentary.

C: It follows that whatever is a common locus of being a phenomenon and being non-momentary is necessarily a permanent phenomenon.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, one with actuality, is coextensive with

actuality's reverse.

D: I accept it.

C: Why is the subject, one with actuality, coextensive with actuality's reverse.

D: Because of being synonymous with actuality's reverse.

C: It follows that whatever is synonymous with actuality's reverse is necessarily coextensive with actuality's reverse.

D: I accept it.

C: Now posit something which is a permanent phenomenon but is not coextensive with actuality's reverse.

D: The subject, uncaused space.

C: It follows that the subject, uncaused space, is a permanent phenomenon.

D: I accept it.

C: Why is the subject, uncaused space, a permanent phenomenon?

D: Because of being a generally characterized phenomenon.

C: It follows that whatever is a generally characterized phenomenon is necessarily a permanent phenomenon.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, uncaused space, is not coextensive with actuality's reverse.

D: I accept it.

C: Why is the subject, uncaused space, not coextensive with actuality's reverse?

D: Because of not being synonymous with actuality's reverse but is not a permanent phenomenon.

D: The subject, actuality which is one with actuality.

C: It follows that the subject, actuality which is one with actuality, is coextensive with actuality's reverse.

D: I accept it.

C: Why is the subject, actuality which is one with actuality, coextensive with actuality's reverse?

D: Because (1) it is different from actuality's reverse and (2) whatever is it is necessarily actuality's reverse and whatever is actuality's reverse is necessarily it.

C: It follows that if something (1) is different from actuality's reverse and (2) whatever is it is necessarily actuality's reverse and whatever is actuality's reverse is necessarily it, then it is necessarily coextensive with actuality's reverse.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, actuality which is one with actuality, is not a permanent phenomenon.

D: I accept it.

C: Why is the subject, actuality which is one with actuality, not a permanent phenomenon?

D: Because of being an impermanent phenomenon.

C: It follows that whatever is an impermanent phenomenon is necessarily not a permanent phenomenon.

D: I accept it.

C: Posit something which is neither.

D: The subject, a pot.

C: It follows that the subject, a pot, is not a permanent phenomenon.

D: I accept it.

C: Why is the subject, a pot, not a permanent phenomenon?

D: Because of not being a generally characterized phenomenon.

C: It follows that whatever is not synonymous with actuality's reverse is necessarily not coextensive with actuality's reverse.

D: I accept it.

C: Now there are four possibilities.

(Lati Rinbochay laughs at this. Perhaps it is because the Challenger is affirming that there are four possibilities.)

From 23.633 to 23.708 two students repeat the same debate that has just been completed, C.5. Any differences from the last are insignificant. At 23.660, however, Lati Rinbochay discussed the reasons justifying why whatever is actuality and why whatever is actuality which is one with actuality is necessarily actuality's reverse.

Whatever is actuality which is one with actuality is necessarily actuality's reverse because (1) whatever is actuality which is one with actuality is necessarily one with actuality and (2) whatever is one with actuality is necessarily actuality's reverse. Whatever is actuality's reverse is necessarily actuality which is one with actuality because (1) whatever is actuality's reverse is necessarily one with actuality and (2) whatever is one with actuality.

Yes, those two (reasons) together. Whatever is actuality's reverse is necessarily actuality which is one with actuality because whatever is that is necessarily one with actuality and whatever is actuality's reverse is necessarily one with actuality. This is what is in

the book right? These two are put together, right?

There are two sides to this. When you are establishing the pervasion going one way, it follows that whatever is actuality which is one with actuality is necessarily actuality's reverse because (1) whatever is that is necessarily one with actuality and (2) whatever is one with actuality is necessarily actuality's reverse. This is one side.

Now whatever is actuality's reverse is necessarily actuality which is one with actuality because (1) whatever is actuality's reverse is necessarily one with actuality and (2) whatever is one with actuality is necessarily actuality which is one with actuality. You put two for each of them.

This is the reason. There is the establishment of the second and third parts of the reason, right? There are two parts to it. There is the establishments of the pervasion such that whatever is actuality which is one with actuality is necessarily actuality's reverse. You think of that part for one. Then there is the pervasion going the other way, whatever is actuality's reverse. You think of that part for one. Then there is the pervasion going the other way, whatever is actuality's reverse is necessarily actuality which is one with actuality. Do you understand? Whatever is actuality which is one with actuality's reverse is necessarily actuality which is one with actuality. These are established individually.

Debate C.6

C: Is whatever is actuality's illustration-reverse necessarily actuality's reverse?

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that whatever is actuality's illustration-reverse is necessarily actuality's reverse.

D: I accept it.

C: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, sound, is actuality's reverse because of being an illustration-reverse of actuality.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that the subject, sound, is an illustration-reverse of actuality because of being an illustration of actuality.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that whatever is an illustration of actuality is necessarily an illustration-reverse of actuality.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, sound, is actuality's reverse because of being an illustration-reverse of actuality.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, sound, is not actuality's reverse because of being different from actuality.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, sound, is different from actuality.

D: I accept it.

(JH: That is off isn't it? No, I am saying that we don't need to record the debates at all.)

Earlier when we talked about established bases, we referred to objects of knowledge the being of which is possible. There is something called "the being of which is possible." There are two, that the being of which is possible and objects of knowledge the being of which is possible. That was there, right? And there are two, that of which the being is not possible and objects of knowledge the being of which is not possible.

Now if someone asks, "What is the difference between the two, that of which the being is possible and object of knowledge the being of

which is possible?" Whatever is an object of knowledge the being of which is possible is necessarily something the being of which is possible, but whatever is something the being of which is possible is not necessarily an object of knowledge the being of which is possible. (This is so because) only a permanent phenomenon, only an actuality, only a generality, only an instance, and non-existent are things of which the being is possible. They are not objects of knowledge the being of which is possible. For example, the being of only a permanent phenomenon exists, the being of it is possible. It is said that object of knowledge is only a permanent phenomenon. Established base is said to be only a permanent phenomenon. They are things which are only permanent phenomena. Since its being exists its being is possible. For example, the being of non-existent exists. If you are asked to posit the being of non-existent, posit the subject, the horn of a rabbit; the subject, the child of a barren woman; or the subject, the flower of a dry tree. The being is possible. The being exists. Even so, these are not objects of knowledge the being of which is possible. Got it?

Now there are three possibilities between the two, object of knowledge the being of which is possible and that of which the being is possible. For something which is both posit these-the objects of knowledge. They are things the being of which is possible and they are objects of knowledge the being of which is possible. Which is necessarily the other? Which is not necessarily the other? Whatever is an object of knowledge the being of which is possible is necessarily something the being of which is possible. Whatever is something the being of which is possible is not necessarily an object of knowledge the being of which is possible. You can say the subject, non-existent. For something which is neither you can posit the subject, the two-pillar and pot. You can posit the objects of knowledge the being of which is not possible. They are not something the being of which is possible and they also are not objects of knowledge the being of which is possible.

In the same way, there are three possibilities between the two, that the being of which is not possible and object of knowledge the being of which is not possible. Something which is both is the subject, the two--permanent phenomenon and actuality. It is something the being of which is not possible and it is also an object of knowledge the being

of which is not possible. Now, which is necessarily the other? Which is not necessarily the other? It is something the being of which is not possible because something which is it does not exist. It is something the being of which exists because there is something which is it. You can say like that. Got it? Now something is an object of knowledge the being of which is possible because (1) there is something which is it and (2) it is suitable as an object of an awareness. Something is that the being of which exists because something which is it exists. You have to say that something is an object of knowledge the being of which does not exist because (1) there is nothing which is it and (2) it is suitable as an object of an awareness. When you say that something is that the being of which does not exist, it is because something which is it does not exist. You can say it more briefly. Why is it that something is that the being of which does not exist? Because something which is it does not exist. There are three possibilities between the two, that the being of which is not possible and object of knowledge the being of which is not possible. Something which is both is the two--permanent phenomenon and actuality. When you say which is necessarily the other, which is not necessarily the other, and posit something which is one and not the other, then whatever is an object of knowledge the being of which is not possible is necessarily that the being of which is not possible, whatever is that the being of which is not possible is not necessarily an object of knowledge the being of which is possible. You can posit these: the subject, the horn of a rabbit; the subject, the child of a barren woman; the subject, a self of persons; the subject, a substantially existent independent self. There are two, a selflessness of persons and a self of persons. What is called a selflessness of persons is an existent. The self of persons is a non-existent. These are what? They are that the being of which is not possible. They are not objects of knowledge the being of which is not possible. Okay? Something which is neither is a pot, or a pillar. They are neither that the being of which is not possible nor objects of knowledge the being of which is not possible. They are neither. Do you understand?

Now with respect to identifying reverses, there is something to be posited with respect to definition and definiendum. For example, there are four phenomena coextensive with the reverse of definiendum. When these are posited, what are they?

1. one with definiendum
2. definiendum which is one with definiendum
3. the definiendum of the triply qualified imputed existent
4. the triply qualified imputed existent of the triply qualified
imputed existent

They are posited in this way. Got it? Similarly, there are four phenomena which are coextensive with the reverse of the triply qualified imputed existent:

1. one with the triply qualified imputed existent
2. the triply qualified imputed existent which is one with the
triply qualified imputed existent
3. the definition of definiendum
4. the triply qualified substantial existent of definiendum.

They are like that. Got it, right? You know how to posit these right? If you don't ascertain these well, then when you apply it to others you will be mistaken. You have ascertained this well, right?

Now there are four phenomena coextensive with the reverse of definition:

1. one with definition
2. definition which is one with definition
3. the definiendum of the triply qualified substantial existent
4. the triply qualified imputed existent of the triply qualified
substantial existent

Then there are four phenomena coextensive with the reverse of the triply qualified substantial existent:

1. one with the triply qualified substantial existent
2. the triply qualified substantial existent which is one with
the triply qualified substantial existent
3. the definition of definition
4. the triply qualified substantial existent of definition.

This is how they are to be posited. Don't get confused.

Now if we apply this to actuality a little it will be okay. Think about it. If you do not think about it well, you will get confused. If you knew the other one well, you would not get confused. Now, it follows that there are not four phenomena coextensive with the reverse of the definiendum of that which is able to perform a function. (Confused student) Think about it. There is this, right? (The four phenomena coextensive with actuality's reverse are:)

1. one with actuality
2. actuality which is one with actuality
3. the definiendum of that which is able to perform a function
4. the triply qualified imputed existent of that which is able to perform a function.

There are these four, right? Is the definiendum of that which is able to perform a function a definiendum? It is a definiendum, right? Thus, there are four phenomena coextensive with the reverse of the definiendum of that which is able to perform a function. Now posit the four phenomena coextensive with the reverse of the definiendum of that which is able to perform a function.

1. one with the definiendum of that which is able to perform a function
2. the definiendum of that which is able to perform a function which is one with the definiendum of that which is able to perform a function
3. the definiendum of the triply qualified imputed existent of that which is able to perform a function
4. the triply qualified imputed existent of the triply qualified imputed existent of that which is able to perform a function.

Now posit the four phenomena coextensive with the reverse of the triply qualified imputed existent of that which is able to perform a function.

1. one with the triply qualified imputed existent of that which
is able to perform a function
2. the triply qualified imputed existent of that which is able
to perform a function which one with the triply qualified
imputed existent of that which is able to perform a function
3. the definition of the definiendum of that which is able to
perform a function
4. the triply qualified substantial existent of the definiendum
of that which is able to perform a function

Now posit the four phenomena coextensive with the reverse of the definition of actuality. There are these right? (The four phenomena coextensive with that which is able to perform a function are:)

1. one with that which is able to perform a function
2. that which is able to perform a function which is one
with that which is able to perform a function
3. the definition of actuality

4. the triply qualified substantial existent of actuality.

Now there are those four, right? Now posit the four phenomena coextensive with the reverse of the definition of actuality.

1. one with the triply qualified substantial existent of actuality

2. the triply qualified substantial existent of actuality which is one with the triply qualified substantial existent of actuality

3. the definition of the definition of actuality

4. the triply qualified substantial existent of the definition of actuality

It is like that. Then you can apply this over to object of knowledge, permanent phenomenon, and so on. You must apply it to all them. Then you will know it, right? Okay?

Now then there is another (dza). There are the four phenomena coextensive with the reverse of the definition of the definition of actuality. Such ones are limitless. there are a lot of these. There are the four phenomena coextensive with the reverse of the definiendum of the triply qualified imputed existent of that which is able to perform a function. Like that. You can get a lot of them. Okay?

Now there is this. For example, when you posit an illustration-

reverse (ghzi idog) of object of knowledge, you can posit a pot, a pillar, actuality, and so on. When you posit an illustration-reverse of actuality, you can posit a pot, a pillar, and so on. You can posit these. When you posit an illustration-reverse of actuality, you can posit a pot, a pillar, and so on. You can posit these. When you posit an illustration-reverse of pot, you cannot posit a golden pot. If you are asked to posit an illustration-reverse of pot, it is not suitable to posit the subject, a golden pot. You have to say, "The subject, a bulbous flat-based phenomenon which is made from copper and is able to perform the function of holding water; the subject, a bulbous flat-based phenomenon which is made from silver and is able to perform the function of holding water; the subject, a bulbous flat-based phenomenon which is made from wood and is able to perform the function of holding water; the subject, a bulbous flat-based phenomenon which is made from metal and is able to perform the function of holding water; the subject, a bulbous flat-based phenomenon which is made from earth and is able to perform the function of holding water; the subject, a bulbous flat-based phenomenon which is made from brass and is able to perform the function of holding water; the subject a bulbous flat-based phenomenon which is made from precious substances and is able to perform the function of holding water, and so on. For illustrations of pot, you have to posit these.

For instances of pillar, if you posit a sandalwood pillar, a juniper pillar, or a metal pillar, it will not work. When you posit an illustration of pillar, (you must posit) sandalwood which is able to perform the function of holding up, juniper which is able to perform the function of holding up, a precious substance which is able to perform the function of holding up, concrete which is able to perform the function of holding up, stone which is able to perform the function of holding up.

If you ask why it is so, it is like this. In the same way there are many others that this is to be applied to. Probably oxen, persons, like that. For example, whatever is a realization of a golden pot is necessarily a realization of a pot. Having realized a golden pot, one has realized a pot. If you have realized a golden pot, you have already realized a pot. It is not suitable as an illustration. It does not obtain as an illustration-reverse. If a golden pot were an illustration-reverse of a pot, then a golden pot would have to be an illustration of

pot. If a golden pot were an illustration of pot, then there would have to be an ascertaining of golden pot by a valid cognizer which is not an ascertaining of pot. This does not exist. a golden pot is a basis of emanation of pot. This does not exist. The subject, a golden pot, is a pot because of being a bulbous flat-based phenomenon able to perform the function of holding water. If you say this, there is no basis of emanation. (grul sku sa).

(JH: If something is going to be an illustration of something, it has to be such that if you understand the illustration you do not necessarily understand it. Whereas if you ascertained a golden pot with valid cognition, you would ascertain pot with valid cognition. Therefore, if you are going to posit an illustration of pot, you cannot say golden pot. You have to say a bulbous flat-based phenomenon which is made from gold and is able to perform the function of holding water.)

Having ascertained a golden pot with valid cognition, there is no non-ascertaining of pot, by a valid cognizer, right? Having ascertained a human by a valid cognizer, there is no non-ascertaining of human by a valid cognizer. It is not suitable to say that one has ascertained an American human by a valid cognizer, but has not ascertained a human by a valid cognizer. It is not suitable to say that one has realized a wooden pillar but has not ascertained a pillar. One has ascertained a wooden pillar, right? This is not quite like it. Probably there are a lot of this type. Human is like this, cow is like this, table is like this. For example, having ascertained a wooden table, one has ascertained a table. There are probably a lot like that. For example, these actualities are illustration-reverses of object of knowledge. Having ascertained actuality by a valid cognizer, there is a non-ascertaining of object of knowledge by a valid cognizer. Actuality is a basis of emanation of object of knowledge. The subject, actuality, is an object of knowledge. The subject, actuality, is an object of knowledge because of being suitable as an object of an awareness. Actuality is a basis of emanation of object of knowledge. There is a non-ascertaining of object of knowledge by a valid cognizer after having ascertained pot by a valid cognizer. There is such a thing.

(JH: This holds true between golden pot and pot, but not between pot and actuality or between actuality and object of knowledge.

Having ascertained a golden pot by a valid cognizer you have ascertained pot by a valid cognizer. When you have ascertained pot by a valid cognizer, you have not necessarily ascertained object of knowledge by a valid cognizer.

For example, it is not suitable to say that having ascertained a white cow by a valid cognizer, one has not ascertained a cow by a valid cognizer. It is not suitable to say that having ascertained a spotted ox by a valid cognizer, you had not ascertained an ox. Probably the ascertainment by a valid cognizer or non-ascertainment with respect to pots and so forth is an eye consciousness. No, probably the ascertainment of a golden pot by a valid cognizer is something that appears to a thought consciousness. Yes. Yes. For example, if there is a person who does not know the conventionality of a pot and sees a golden pot, he ascertains (by the eye consciousness) a bulbous flat-based phenomenon which is made from gold and is able to perform the function of holding water. He ascertains that it is gold, that it is bulbous, that it is flat-based, that it is able to carry water. These are things which are seen by a valid cognizer which is an eye consciousness. Even so if one says "pot" to him he does not understand the conventionality. He does not know what a pot is. So if you say to him, "Isn't this a pot?" (he understands). You have to designate the term. When he first came his eye consciousness ascertained all of this, but he did not know what it was (in the sense of not knowing the name). And then when he poured tea into it, he then understood that it was a thing for holding tea (?mo). He understood that it was a mo, a thing for drinking tea. You have got it, right? It is like that. Realizing by a valid cognizer is like that. When he first ascertained it, he wondered what it was. He thought, "I wonder what this is for." Then he poured some tea into it and then he understood that it was a mo for drinking tea. This is realization by a thought consciousness. First he understood by the eye consciousness that it was

He did not realize what it was. If there were a golden pot there and he saw it, the eye consciousness would realize that it is bulbous, flat-based, able to carry water. He would not realize what it was. Then another person would ask, "Isn't this a pot?" It is a pot. He is designating the conventionality. Got it? Then having ascertained it by the eye consciousness, he has realized a pot, he has thoroughly

realized a golden pot, he has also thoroughly realized a pot.

For example, a person who has never seen an ox at all upon seeing a black ox will think, "What is this animal?" His eye consciousness realizes the form and so forth and he thinks, "What is this?" When another says, "This is an ox isn't it?" he will understand that it is an ox. It is like this. The realization by thought is like this.

Probably (the section on) identifying reverses is finished now. After this it appears that we should do the limits of pervasion between (those topics). If we do not do the three possibilities and four possibilities, you will not understand.

Now posit these. Posit one with definiendum.

D: The subject, the triply qualified imputed existent.

C: Posit one with pot. Posit one with actuality.

D: The subject, that which is able to perform a function.

C: It follows that the subject, that which is able to perform a function, is one with pot.

D: Why?

C: Amazing! Posit one with pot.

D: The subject, a bulbous flat-based phenomenon which is able to perform the function of holding water.

C: It follows that the subject, a bulbous flat-based phenomenon which is able to perform the function of holding water, is one with pot.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, a bulbous flat-based phenomenon which is able to perform the function of holding water, is not different from pot.

D: Why?

C: Amazing! Posit one with pot.

D: The subject, pot.

C: Oh! This is what you have to posit, right? Posit one with actuality.

D: The subject, actuality.

C: Posit one with object of knowledge.

D: The subject, object of knowledge.

C: This is not to be confused. Posit one with bulbous flat-based phenomenon which is able to perform the function of holding water.

D: The subject, bulbous flat-based phenomenon able to perform the

C: Oh, this is what you have to posit, right? Posit one with definiendum.

D: The subject, definiendum.

C: Posit definiendum which is one with definiendum.

D: The subject, definiendum.

C: Posit pot which is one with pot.

D: The subject, pot.

C: Posit the definiendum of a bulbous flat-based phenomenon which is able to perform the function of holding water.

D: The subject, pot.

C: Posit the triply qualified imputed existent of a bulbous flat-based phenomenon able to perform the function of holding water.

D: The subject, pot.

C: Before we applied it to actuality, didn't we? If someone asked, "Posit one with actuality," what did you posit? The subject, actuality, right? If someone asks you to posit actuality which is one with actuality...

D: The subject, actuality.

C: If someone asks you to posit the definiendum of that which is able to perform a function...

D: The subject, actuality.

C: If someone asks you to posit the triply qualified imputed existent of that which is able to perform a function...

D: The subject, actuality.

C: Except for that there is nothing to posit, right? Thus, posit one with pot.

D: The subject, pot.

C: Oh, posit pot which is one with pot.

D: The subject, pot.

C: Posit the definiendum of a bulbous flat-based phenomenon which is able to perform the function of holding water.

D: The subject, pot.

C: Posit the triply qualified imputed existent of a bulbous flat-based phenomenon which is able to perform the function of holding water.

D: The subject, pot.

C; Oh, it is that also. Now posit one with definiendum.

D: The subject, definiendum.

C: Posit definiendum which is one with definiendum.

D: The subject, definiendum.

C: Posit the definiendum of the triply qualified imputed existent.

D: The subject, definiendum.

C: Posit the triply qualified imputed existent of the triply qualified imputed existent.

D: The subject, definiendum.

C: Except for that there is nothing to posit, right? No matter where you are... Even if a Buddha came, he could not posit something else. There is nothing else to think about. Posit one with the triply qualified imputed existent.

D: The subject, the triply qualified imputed existent.

C: Posit the triply qualified imputed existent which is one with the triply qualified imputed existent.

D: The subject, the triply qualified imputed existent.

C: Posit the definition of definiendum.

D: The subject, the triply qualified imputed existent.

C: Posit th triply qualified substantial existent of definiendum.

D: The subject, the triply qualified imputed existent.

C: There is no reason to be doubtful about it. You have to posit the subject, the triply qualified imputed existent. There is nothing else to posit. Now posit one with definition.

D: The subject, definition.

C: Posit definition which is one with definition.

D: The subject, definition.

C: Posit the definiendum of the triply qualified substantial existent.

D: The subject, definition.

C: Posit the triply qualified imputed existent of the triply qualified substantial existent.

D: The subject, definition.

C: Do you understand? Posit one with the triply qualified substantial existent.

D: The subject, the triply qualified substantial existent.

C: Posit the triply qualified substantial existent which is one with the triply qualified substantial existent.

D: The subject, the triply qualified imputed existent.

C: Posit the definition of definiendum.

D: The subject, the triply qualified imputed existent.

C: Posit the triply qualified substantial existent of definiendum.

D: The subject, the triply qualified imputed existent.

C: There is no reason to be doubtful about it. You have to posit the subject, the triply qualified imputed existent. There is nothing else to posit. Now posit one with definition.

D: The subject, definition.

C: Posit definition which is one with definition.

D: The subject, definition.

C: Posit the definiendum of the triply qualified substantial existent.

D: The subject, definition.

C: Posit the triply qualified imputed existent of the triply qualified substantial existent.

D: The subject, definition.

C: Do you understand? Posit one with the triply qualified substantial existent.

D: The subject, the triply qualified substantial existent.

C: Posit the triply qualified substantial existent which is one with the triply qualified substantial existent.

D: The subject, the triply qualified substantial existent.

C: Posit the definition of definition.

D: The subject, the triply qualified substantial existent.

C: Posit the triply qualified substantial existent of definition.

D: The subject, the triply qualified substantial existent.

C: Except for these there is nothing else to posit. Posit one with permanent phenomenon.

D: the subject, permanent phenomenon.

C: Posit permanent phenomenon which is one with permanent phenomenon.

D: The subject, permanent phenomenon.

C: Posit the definiendum of a common locus of phenomenon and the non-momentary.

D: The subject, permanent phenomenon.

C: Posit the triply qualified imputed existent of a common locus of phenomenon and the non-momentary.

D: The subject, permanent phenomenon.

C: Posit one with a common locus of phenomenon and the non-momentary.

D: The subject, a common locus of phenomenon and the non-momentary.

C: Posit a common locus of phenomenon and the non-momentary which is one with a common locus of phenomenon and the non-momentary.

D: The subject, a common locus of phenomenon and the non-momentary.

C: Posit the definition of permanent phenomenon.

D: The subject, a common locus of phenomenon and the non-momentary.

C: Posit the triply qualified substantial existent of permanent phenomenon.

D: The subject, a common locus of phenomenon and the non-momentary.

C: Oh, this is not to be confused. Posit one with color.

D: The subject, color.

C: Posit color which is one with color.

D: The subject, color.

C: Posit the definiendum of suitable as a hue.

D: The subject, color.

C: Posit the triply qualified imputed existent of suitable as a hue.

D: The subject, color.

C: Posit one with suitable as a hue.

D: The subject, suitable as a hue.

C: Posit suitable as a hue which is one with suitable as a hue.

D: The subject, suitable as a hue.

C: Posit the definition of color.

D: The subject, suitable as a hue.

C: Posit the triply qualified substantial existent of color.

D: The subject, suitable as a hue.

C: Now there is no confusion. This is just right. The mode of procedure in identifying reverses is like that. There is nothing else to posit. If one posits something else, there is a lot of confusion. Okay? Now from among the four phenomena coextensive with the reverse of actuality, probably one with actuality is a definiendum. If someone says, "Even so, why is it? What is the definition of one with actuality?" what do you posit? A phenomenon which is not diverse from actuality. In the same way, one with pot is a definiendum, one with that which is able to perform a function is a definiendum, one with a bulbous flat-based phenomenon which is able to perform the function of holding water is a definiendum, all of them are done in this way.

If someone asks, "Is actuality which is one with actuality a definiendum?" it is not. Actuality which is one with actuality does not obtain as a definiendum. If this is a definiendum, one must posit as its definition that which is able to perform a function which is one with that which is able to perform a function. These two are different. That which is able to perform a function which is one with that which is able to perform a function refers to the reverse of that which is able to perform a function. Got it? On the other hand, actuality which is one with actuality refers to actuality's reverse. One with actuality. That which is able to perform a function which is one with that which is able to perform a function refers to the reverse of that which is able to perform a function. These two are different, right? That which is able to perform a function and actuality are different, right? It is different because of being a definiendum. You have to say like that. Thus, actuality which is one with actuality does not obtain as a definiendum, a definition of it does not exist. Got it? Actuality which is one with actuality is not a definiendum.

Now some debate like this, "It follows that actuality which is one with actuality is a definiendum because its definition is actuality which is a phenomenon which is not diverse from actuality." They debate that the definition of actuality which is one with actuality is actuality which is a phenomenon which is not diverse from actuality. It is not so. You can't point your finger at it. Actuality which is a phenomenon which is not diverse from actuality does not obtain as the definition of actuality which is one with actuality. They debate this. Do you understand? (Student: I don't understand.) (The debate goes like this:)

C: It follows that the subject, actuality which is one with actuality, is a

definiendum because there is a definition of it. It follows that there is a definition of it because the definition of actuality which is one with actuality is actuality which is not diverse from actuality.

(JH: This is wrong.)

C: So what is the beginning (of this debate)? It follows that actuality which is one with actuality is a definiendum because that which is able to perform a function which is one with that which is able to perform a function is the definition of actuality which is one with actuality.

(Having said that, what must you say?)

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that the subject, that which is able to perform a function which is one with that which is able to perform a function, is not the definition of actuality which is one with actuality.

D: I accept it.

C: Why is it not? It follows that it is because (1) there is an ascertainment of the eight approaches of pervasion of a definition and a definiendum and (2) the relationship of a definition and a definiendum is established.

D: The reason is not established.

C: What is not established? The coextensiveness of being is not ascertained, right? Whatever is actuality which is one with actuality is necessarily not that which is able to perform a function which is one with that which is able to perform a function. Whatever is that which is able to perform a function which is one with that which is able to perform a function is necessarily not actuality which is one with actuality. Do you understand? It is not necessarily that. It is necessarily not that. It goes over to contradictory. The two, that which is able to perform a function which is one with that which is able to perform a function and actuality which is one with actuality, are contradictory. Thus, it does not obtain as a definiendum. You have to say it is not. If it is not that, it follows that the subject, actuality which is one with actuality, is a definiendum because there is definition of it. It follows that there is because actuality which is not diverse from actuality is such. If someone says that, you want to say that it is not so. The word "actuality" is affixed right? One cannot understand the word "actuality" affixed to a definition of actuality. Having ascertained by a valid cognizer actuality which is not diverse from actuality, one has already ascertained actuality (which is one with actuality). The relationship of a definition and a definiendum is not established. Okay? That which is called the relationship between a

definition and a definiendum is not established.

(JH: Once the 1st word is "actuality" you are going to have to give a definition of that. It will not be sufficient just to give a definition of the "which is one" before it and then tack "actuality" on to the end of it. You are asking for the definition of actuality which is one with actuality, and that word "actuality" will have to have a definition. You cannot just repeat it itself in the definition. So it is not a definiendum. You will understand it when you listen to the tape.)

Now then, actuality is a definiendum, right? Actuality is a triply qualified imputed existent, right/ It follows that the subject, actuality, is a triply qualified imputed existent. I accept it. It follows that it is not a definiendum. Posit the way in which it fulfills (tshang tshul) the three qualities of an imputed existent. It follows with respect to the subject, actuality, that it is a triply qualified imputed existent because (1) it is a definiendum, (2) it is established in dependence on its illustrations, and (3) it is not referred to as the definiendum of any phenomenon other than that which is able to perform a function. The way of fulfilling the three qualities of an imputed existent is like that. The three qualities of an imputed existent are complete. These are the three qualities of an object of comprehension and the three qualities of an imputed existent. Okay?

Now that which is able to perform a function is a triply qualified substantial existent, right? It follows that the subject, that which is able to perform a function, is a triply qualified substantial existent. I accept it. If someone says that it is not a triply qualified substantial existent and asks you to posit the way in which it fulfills the three qualities of a substantial existent, there are such:

- 1) it is a definition
- 2) it is established in dependence on its illustrations
- 3) it is not referred to as the definition of any other phenomenon than actuality.

These three are the way of fulfilling the three qualities of a substantial existent. The three qualities of a positor are complete and the three qualities of a substantial existent are complete. You have got this, right?

Now we have applied this to actuality. Now you have to apply it to object of knowledge, pot, permanent phenomenon, and all. Is the subject, pot, a triply qualified imputed existent? Posit the way in which it fulfills the three qualities of an imputed existent. There is (a way in which it fulfills these three:)

- 1) it is a definiendum
- 2) it is established in dependence on its illustrations
- 3) it is not referred to as the definiendum of anything other than the bulbous flat-based phenomenon which is able to perform the function of holding water.

Now is the bulbous flat-based phenomenon which is able to perform the function of holding water a triply qualified substantial existent? I accept it. Posit the way in which it fulfills the three qualities of a triply qualified substantial existent. There is (a way in which it fulfills these three) because

- 1) it is a definition
- 2) it is established in dependence on its illustrations
- 3) it is not referred to as the definition of anything other than pot.

This must be applied to all the rest--pillar, object of knowledge, impermanent phenomenon, specifically characterized phenomenon, permanent phenomenon. It is to be applied to all of them. Now you understand, right?

Now is the subject, a definiendum, a definiendum? I accept it. Why is the subject, definiendum, a definiendum? Because of being a triply qualified imputed existent. It follows that the subject, definiendum, is not a triply qualified imputed existent. Posit the way in which it fulfills the three qualities of an imputed existent.

- 1) it is definiendum
- 2) it is established in dependence on its illustrations
- 3) it is not referred to as the definiendum of anything other than the triply qualified imputed existent

Now that is the procedure. Got it?

Is the subject, the triply qualified imputed existent, a definition? I accept it. It follows that it is a triply qualified substantial existent. Posit the way in which it fulfills the three qualities of a substantial existent. There is (a way in which it fulfills these three) because

- 1) it is a definition
- 2) it is established in dependence on its illustrations
- 3) it is not referred to as the definition of anything other than definiendum.

Oh, you understand, don't you? It is like that. The way of fulfilling the three qualities of a substantial existent are like that. Now you have to apply this to all others. It applies to absolutely everything. Whatever it is you can apply over the way of fulfilling the three qualities of an imputed phenomenon and the way of fulfilling the three qualities of a

substantial existent. (Also,) that thought and the coextensiveness of being that we did earlier are to be applied to all. The coextensiveness of being is to be applied to whatever basis.

Now the time is finished.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, pot's reverse, that there is a time when it does not exist.

D: Why?

C: It follows with respect to the subject, pot's reverse, that there is no time when it does not exist.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, pot's reverse, that there is no place where it does not exist.

D: I accept it.

C: Then if there is no place where pot's reverse does not exist, then it follows with respect to the subject, pot's reverse, that it is not a phenomenon which has a basis of refutation.

D: I accept it.

C: Amazing! It follows with respect to the subject, pot's reverse, that it is not a phenomenon which has a basis of refutation.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, pot's reverse, that there is no place where it does not exist.

D: I accept it.

C: Oh, it follows that there is no place where a pot does not exist.

D: Why?

C: It follows that there is a place where a pot does not exist.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that there is a place where a pot's reverse does not exist.

D: Why?

C: It follows that there is because there is a place where a pot does not exist.

D: There is no pervasion.

C: It follows that there is pervasion because the two, pot's reverse and pot, are coextensive with respect to existence (yod khyab mnyam yin).

D: There is no pervasion.

C: Oh, now it follows that there is a place where a pot does not exist but pot's reverse does exist. It follows that at a place where there is no pot there is pot's reverse.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that at a place where there is no pot there is pot's

reverse. It follows that at a place where there is no pot there is the definition of pot.

D: Why?

C: It follows that at a place where there is no pot there is no definition of pot. It is the same.

D: Why?

C: It follows that at a place where there is no pot there is the definition of pot.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that at a place where there is no pot there is a pot because there is the definition of pot.

D: I accept it.

C: You accept that/ At a place where there is no pot...

D: Oh, at a place where there is no pot? Yes.

C: What did you hear?

D: At a place where there is a pot.

C: At a place where there is no pot is being said. At a place where there is no pot is there the definition of pot?

D: There is not.

C: And isn't there pot's reverse? Is there a place where pot's definition does not exist?

D: Since it is a permanent phenomenon, there probably is (pot's reverse at a place where there is no pot).

C: Oh, probably. So probably there is pot's definition (at a place where there is no pot) because of being a permanent phenomenon.

D: Yes.

C: Therefore, isn't there a place where pot's definition does not exist?

D: There is not.

We got this in identifying reverses. All of these are permanent phenomena: the definition of pot, the truly qualified substantial existent of pot, one with pot, pot's reverse. What is called permanent phenomena must have existed between some earlier time and some later time. This is what is called permanent phenomena. From an earlier time to a later time it abides without disintegrating. It is something which does not disintegrate. Whenever it is, it does not disintegrate. Does it have to be this way? (Student: Well, there are the occasional or non-eternal permanent phenomena, right?) This is referred to here. Pot's reverse and pot's definition are occasional permanent phenomena. There are the occasional permanent phenomena. Thus, are they not like that (non-disintegrating)? Do't

they stay from an earlier time to a later time without disintegrating? Are they going to disintegrate? When a pot is disintegrating, does pot's reverse disintegrate? (Student: Well, there is a time when pot's reverse does not exist.) Oh, therefore, when a pot no longer exists, does pot's reverse then disintegrate? (S: There is a time when it does not exist.) It disintegrates, right? (S: No) Doesn't it? (S: Is whatever disintegrates necessarily an impermanent phenomenon? There is no pervasion. a permanent phenomenon is not something which disintegrates. There is also no cause of a permanent phenomenon, no cause and condition. a permanent phenomenon has no cause and also no condition. It does not depend on causes and conditions. Then does pot's reverse depend on causes and conditions? Is it that it exists at some time and not at another because of the power of causes and conditions? Isn't it something that exists when the causes and conditions come together and does not exist when those causes and conditions are not brought together? Is pot's reverse something which exists when the causes and conditions are brought together (shown) and does not exist when the causes and conditions are not brought together? Is it like that? (JH: Is it something which exists when the composite causes and conditions exist and does not exist when the composite causes and conditions do not exist?) Is it like that? (Student: Probably.) Probably? Does pot's reverse have causes and conditions? (S: It is like that.) It has something like a cause and condition? Is pot's reverse an impermanent phenomenon, an actuality? (S: The causes and conditions don't come.) Since they do not, it has no causes and conditions, right? It does not need to depend on causes and conditions. It does not depend on causes and conditions, does it? (S: It does need to depend on causes and conditions.) Oh, pot's reverse does not need to depend on causes and conditions because of being a permanent phenomenon. For example, the dependence or independence spoken of in the Prasangik system is not necessarily causes and effects. In the Sautrantika system, however, the dependence that is spoken of is nothing except the dependence on causes and conditions. The Madhyamika system also is to be known. The mode of abiding (gnas tshul) is different, right?

Now the time is finished. (Probably end of class on May 5.)

Class for May 12, 1976

If I explain the meaning with respect to color, then you will understand. At the beginning of color, what was the very first one?

Was it, "Is whatever is a color necessarily red? If one answers that there is pervasion, then there is a debate, right? Now say that there is no pervasion. You have to understand the reason. If you do not understand the reason, it will not be suitable. There is no pervasion. Now if someone says, "If there is no pervasion, posit it," then what do you say? The subject, the color of a white religious conch. (The procedure is as follows.)

C: Is whatever is a color necessarily red?

D: There is no pervasion.

C: If there is no pervasion, posit it.

D: The subject, the color of a white religious conch.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a white religious conch, is a color.

D: I accept it.

C: Why is the subject, the color of a white religious conch, a color?

D: Because of being suitable as a hue.

(LR: Usually, we can say "because of being suitable as a hue," but offer (trul) the one like yours. Even so is it "because of being suitable as a hue?"

Isn't it "because of being white?" In the very first one.)

Because of being white.

C: It follows that the subject, the color of white religious conch, is white.

D: I accept it.

C: Why is it white?

D: Because of being one with the color of a white religious conch.

C: It follows that whatever is one with the color of a white religious conch must be white.

D: I accept it.

C: Why must whatever is one with the color of a white religious conch be white?

D: Because the color of a white religious conch is white.

(LR: Whatever is one with the color of a white religious conch is necessarily white because whatever is one with the color of a white religious conch is necessarily the color of a white religious conch. Do you understand? If someone asks why it must be the color of white religious conch, the color of a white religious conch is what? If the color of a white religious conch is one with the color of a white religious conch, why must it be the color of a white religious conch? Because of being the definiendum of that which is suitable as a hue of

a white religious conch. If it is the definiendum of that, then it must be the color of a white religious conch. This is a little better. Do you understand?

JH: why is it that something is one with itself, that it has to be that? It is contained in this discussion on identifying reverses, right?)

C: It follows that the subject, the color of a white religious conch, is not red.

D: I accept it.

C: Why is the subject, the color of a white religious conch, not red?

D: Because of being white.

C: It follows that whatever is white is necessarily not red.

D: I accept it.

C: Why is whatever is white necessarily not red?

D: Because a common locus of the two, white and red, is not possible.

C: It follows that a common locus of the two, white and red, is not possible.

D: I accept it.

C: Why is a common locus of the two, white and red, not possible?

D: Because those two are contradictory.

C: It follows that the two, white and red, are contradictory.

D: I accept it.

C: Why are the two, white and red, contradictory?

D: Because (1) they are different and (2) a common locus of the two is not possible.

C: It follows that if (1) they are different and (2) a common locus of the two is not possible, then they are necessarily contradictory.

D: I accept it.

C: Why is there pervasion?

D: Because phenomena which are (1) different and (2) a common locus of them is not possible is the definition of contradictory phenomena.

C: Why is it that if something is the definition of contradictory phenomena, then it must be the case that whatever is it is necessarily contradictory?

D: It must be the case that there is pervasion because if something is the definition of contradictory phenomena, then it and contradictory phenomena must be ascertained as having the eight approaches of pervasion of a definition and its definiendum.

(LR: It has to go that way. Whatever you say brings on something else to say. It is the same for all. In the presentation of established bases

what is the very first one? Is it, "Is whatever is an established base necessarily a permanent phenomenon?")

C: Is whatever is an established base necessarily a permanent phenomenon?

D: There is no pervasion.

C: Posit it.

D: The subject, an actuality.

C: It follows that the subject, an actuality, is an established base.

D: I accept it.

C: Why is the subject, an actuality, an established base?

D: Because of being an existent.

C: It follows that the subject, an actuality, is an existent.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that whatever is an existent is necessarily an established base.

D: I accept it.

C: Why is whatever is an existent necessarily an established base?

D: Because existent, established base, and object of comprehension are synonymous.

C: Why are they synonymous?

D: Because (1) a common locus is possible and (2) there is ascertainment of the eight approaches of pervasion.

C: It follows that if (1) a common locus is possible and (2) there is ascertainment of the eight approaches of pervasion, then they are necessarily synonymous.

C: Now it follows that the subject, an actuality, is not a permanent phenomenon.

D: I accept it.

C: Why is the subject, an actuality, not a permanent phenomenon?

(LR: You have to say this. This is absolutely the way to go. If someone says whatever is an established base is necessarily a permanent phenomenon, then there is no pervasion. Then you posit the subject, an actuality, right? Now it is an established base, and it is not a permanent phenomenon. You have to say that right?)

D: Because of being an impermanent phenomenon.

C: It follows that the subject, actuality, is an impermanent phenomenon.

D: I accept it.

C: Why is the subject, an actuality, an impermanent phenomenon?

D: Because of being momentary.

C: It follows that whatever is momentary is necessarily an impermanent phenomenon.

D: I accept it.

C: Why is whatever is momentary necessarily an impermanent phenomenon?

D: Because the momentary is the definition of impermanent phenomenon.

C: It follows that the momentary is the definition of impermanent phenomenon.

D: I accept it.

C: Why is the momentary the definition of impermanent phenomenon?

D: Because the momentary must be posited as the definition of impermanent phenomenon, that which is able to perform a function must be posited as the definition of actuality, the disintegrating the definition of caused phenomenon, and the created must be posited as the definition of product.

Do you understand? It is like that. The earlier and the later are the same. From the beginning of the Collected Topics to the end the mode of procedure is the same. This is to be applied to identifying reverses or wherever you study. When you debate, you need to give reasons. Then a thought will come from that and having debated another thought will come. Then eventually you will understand the greater and lesser pervasions. You need to understand the reason. This is not that because it is not ... This is not that because of being... Why is whatever is necessarily that? If it is this why is it necessarily that? You have to think about and understand the reasons. Then again you debate. Think about it. Okay?

Now there is a little remainder in identifying reverses. What do you say? How do I do these? Did we calculate (di) the three and four possibilities between the phenomena coextensive with actuality's reverse and some other? We did calculate them, right? There are four possibilities between the phenomena coextensive with actuality's reverse and permanent phenomenon, aren't there? Then what is there? There are four possibilities between the phenomena coextensive with actuality's reverse and actuality. There are four possibilities between the phenomena coextensive with the actuality's reverse and definiendum, aren't there? There are four possibilities between the phenomena coextensive with actuality's reverse and definition, aren't there? We calculated four possibilities between each

of them, right?

Now what is the difference between the phenomena coextensive with the reverse of permanent phenomenon and actuality?

D: They are contradictory.

C: It follows that they are contradictory.

D: I accept it.

C: Why are they contradictory?

D: Because (1) those two are different and (2) a common locus is not possible.

For example, whatever is a phenomenon which is coextensive with the reverse of permanent phenomenon is necessarily a permanent phenomenon. This is it.

Now what is the difference between the phenomena coextensive with the reverse of permanent phenomenon and permanent phenomenon? There are three possibilities.

Now what is the difference between the phenomena coextensive with the reverse of object of knowledge and permanent phenomenon?

D: There are four possibilities.

C: Oh, yea. Now he has figured there are four possibilities. It follows that there are not four possibilities between the phenomena coextensive with the reverse of object of knowledge and permanent phenomenon. Posit something which is coextensive with the reverse of object of knowledge but not a permanent phenomenon.

D: The triply qualified imputed existent of suitable as an object of an awareness.

C: Oh, it follows that the subject, the triply qualified imputed existent of suitable as an object of an awareness, is not a permanent phenomenon.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, the triply qualified imputed existent of suitable as an object of an awareness, is an actuality.

D: I accept it.

C: Is it? It follows that object of knowledge is an actuality.

D: Why?

C: Object of knowledge is not an actuality, is it? It follows that the triply qualified imputed existent of suitable as an object of an awareness is an actuality.

D: Why?

C: Amazing. It follows that such is not something which is coextensive with the reverse of object of knowledge but not a permanent

phenomenon.

D: I accept it.

C: If it is not that, amazing. Now it is not an actuality. It is not a permanent phenomenon. It follows that it is a non-existent. It follows that the subject, the triply qualified imputed existent of suitable as an object of an awareness, is a non-existent.

D: Why?

C: It is not something which is a permanent phenomenon, and it is not an actuality, is it?

Do you understand? Thus, you have to understand what pervasions there are between these. Okay? For example, what is the difference between the two, the phenomena coextensive with the reverse definiendum and permanent phenomenon? For whatever is a permanent phenomenon, the phenomena coextensive with its reverse and permanent phenomenon will only have three possibilities. If it is an actuality, then what? The phenomena coextensive with its reverse and permanent phenomenon have four possibilities. Now this is ascertained. You've bot it. It is like that. Apply this to everything. Apply it and debate it back and forth.

Now posit the four phenomena coextensive with the reverse of the definition of object of knowledge.

1)one with the definition of object of knowledge

2)the definition of object of knowledge which is one with the definition of object of knowledge

3)the definiendum of the triply qualified imputed existent of object of knowledge

4)the triply qualified imputed existent of the triply qualified substantial existent of object of knowledge

Now posit the four phenomena coextensive with the reverse of the triply qualified substantial existent of object of knowledge.

1)one with the triply qualified substantial existent of object of knowledge

2)the triply qualified substantial existent of object of knowledge which is one with the triply qualified substantial existent of object of knowledge.

3)the definition of the definition of object of knowledge

4)the triply qualified substantial existent of the definition of object of knowledge

Now you must apply this to others: actuality, permanent phenomenon, everything. Okay? Apply it to the others. You

understand, right?

Opposite-from-Being-Something and Opposite-from-Not-Being-Something

Now the teaching out of which develops ('phral rten) opposite from being and opposite from not being... (JH: There are a few remaining debates in identifying reverses, a few left to be done, right?)

When I have finished teaching this, then we will debate them. What do you say? I do not remember those words (in the source quote). Char-har Geshay does not give the source quoted does he? Except for the Ra-do Collected Topics it is not anywhere else. In Char-har Geshay's Collected Topics does it say, "From such and such a chapter in Dharmakirti's Commentary on (Dignaga's) "Compendium of Valid Cognition"?" It is not there, right? It does not give the source quote, right? There isn't a passage from the root text of the Pramanavarttika is there? I have read it. There is one. Now even though we do not have this, it is okay.

Now it is like this. Now we will apply it to actuality. Opposite from being an actuality (dngos po yin pa las log pa) and non-actuality (dngos po ma yin pa) are synonymous. Opposite from not being an actuality (dngos po ma yin pa las log pa) and actuality are synonymous. Opposite from being a permanent phenomenon and non-permanent phenomenon are synonymous. Opposite from not being a permanent phenomenon and permanent phenomenon are synonymous. Have you got it? Now we can apply it to object of knowledge. Opposite from being an object of knowledge and non-object of knowledge are synonymous. Opposite from not being an object of knowledge and object of knowledge are synonymous. You will ascertain this. One thing to be ascertained is this. Opposite from not being a pot and pot are synonymous. Opposite from being a pot and non-pot are synonymous. Opposite from being a human and non-human are synonymous. Opposite from not being a human and human are synonymous. This is sufficient, right? Those two are synonymous. You have to ascertain this. Having ascertained this for opposite from being and opposite from not being, there is nothing left to ascertain.

Now then building on this, opposite from not being opposite from not being opposite from not being an actuality is to be understood as an actuality itself. You can put a hundred, a thousand, or ten

thousand of these (qualifiers "opposite from not being") and actuality itself is still what is to be understood. If you put just one (making it) opposite from not being an actuality, what is to be understood is actuality. If you add onto this opposite from not being, then an actuality is what is to be understood. If you add onto this opposite from not being, then it itself is to be understood. Okay? If you add on a hundred, a thousand, or ever how many to opposite from not being a permanent phenomenon, permanent phenomenon itself is still what is to be understood. No matter now many you add onto opposite from not being an object of knowledge, an object of knowledge is what is to be understood. It does not come to engage anything else. "Opposite from being" does engage other and they become different. When one is saying opposite from not being opposite from not being opposite from not being, then the thing itself is what is to be understood. Okay, right?

Now opposite from being actuality is non-actuality. When you add two, opposite from being opposite from being actuality comes back to actuality. Okay, right? Now it is like that. Opposite from being actuality is referred to an non-actuality. Now if one puts onto this another opposite from being, then it comes back to actuality. Okay? (Probably demonstrating the method for counting back and forth on one's finger in order to reckon whether it is the phenomenon itself or not, Lati Rinbochay said:) This is actuality. If one says opposite from being actuality, go here. If he also says opposite from being actuality you arrive back at actuality. If you do one, it is non-actuality. If you do two, you understand actuality itself. If three, then go back over. If four, then you come back here. If there is an even number of them, then you get just the thing itself. If there is an odd number, then you go over to arrive at non-it. There is a difference between the even and the odd.

(JH: Cha is a pair and ya is only one out of a pair. This whole business of counting on the knuckles is just crazy. You just do two things like this. You move it back and forth.)

Now you understand this, right? Now permanent phenomenon is the same. Opposite from being opposite from the being opposite from being permanent phenomenon is like when you say opposite from non-permanent phenomenon. If you add onto this one more opposite from being, then you arrive back here at permanent phenomenon. Then if you add onto this another opposite from being, you go back over to non-permanent phenomenon. If onto this you add another

opposite from being, you arrive back here. You understand, right? Now if you apply this to everything--permanent phenomenon, actuality, object of knowledge, and everything--it is the same. The mode of procedure is the same. Opposite from being a human is non-human. (If onto this you add) opposite from being, then it is human. If again you add another, it is non-human. It is like that . You do it individually. You have to go like this. When someone says opposite from being actuality, you move here to the second joint of the finger). When someone says opposite from not being you just stay there (on the same section of the finger). Opposite from not being it is understood as it. Opposite from not being actuality is to be understood as actuality. Then if onto that someone adds opposite from being you come back one (that is, change from the former position). When one says opposite from not being, then just stay there. Do you understand? Then if one says opposite from being then you go to the other (section of the finger). Then if one says opposite from not being on to this, then just stay. Then if he says opposite from being you go back. And if he then says another time opposite from being you then go once again to the other. It is like this. The procedure is this. You don't need any more do you? (He gives yet another example.) There is nothing you do not understand, right?

(He now reviews the third debate in opposite from being and opposite from not being. For the subject, it is not necessary to posit the reverse of pillar. One can posit object of knowledge, permanent phenomenon, and so forth. The review is not different from the translation of this debate. Ends 25.458. The mode of procedure in opposite from being and opposite from not being is for the reasons to get lesser and lesser (that is, shorter and shorter). This mode of procedure is to be applied to all. It is the same for all. You understand, right? Opposite from being and opposite from not being are like that.

(In the fourth debate it says:) Whatever is something which is only a permanent phenomenon is necessarily a permanent phenomenon. Actually, this comes. Since it comes, other people understand this. Since they understand it, except for going it will not be okay. If someone says, "Is whatever is something which a permanent phenomenon is necessarily a permanent phenomenon?" there is no pervasion. If he says, "Posit it," then the subject, only a permanent phenomenon. Okay? Only a permanent phenomenon (rdag pa kho na) is something which a permanent phenomenon is, but it is not a

permanent phenomenon. What is only a permanent phenomenon? It is something which a permanent phenomenon is. If someone says, "Is it a permanent phenomenon?" It is not. What is the reason that the subject, only a permanent phenomenon, is something which a permanent phenomenon is? It follows with respect to the subject, only a permanent phenomenon, that it is something with a permanent phenomenon is because of being both something which something is and a permanent phenomenon. Because of being both something which something is and a permanent phenomenon. When someone says "both something which something is and a permanent phenomenon," refers to "being because it is both something which is it and a permanent phenomenon" (khyod yin pa khyod yin pa dang rtag pa gnyis ka yin pa'i phyir). This is what is to be understood. (JH: You have to understand khyod put at the beginning of that reason. The play is all on the words. It refers to "because being it is both something which is it and a permanent phenomenon." If you do not say anything but something which something is (khyod yin pa) it is not easy to understand and it is not suitable. It is a debate on the words, on how one expresses things. (JH: It is just on your way of explanation, on the way you speak. the debate is on a mode of verbalization.) Because being it is both something which is it and a permanent phenomenon. For example, being only a permanent phenomenon obtains as both something which is only a permanent phenomenon and (also) as a permanent phenomenon.

This is what is to be thought about. Is there anything which is only a permanent phenomenon? It is this. Is whatever is a permanent phenomenon necessarily only a permanent phenomenon? There is pervasion. Is there something which is only a permanent phenomenon? There is. Is being only a permanent phenomenon an existent? It is. It is said like this. Isn't there something which is only a permanent phenomenon? There are objects of knowledge the being of which is not possible and objects of knowledge the being of which is not possible, right? That of which the being exists is this. You have to say that there are objects of knowledge the being of which is possible, objects of knowledge the being of which is not possible, that the being of which is possible, and that the being of which is not possible. You have to say that only a permanent phenomenon is something the being of which is possible, right? Since only a permanent phenomenon is something the being of which is possible you have to say that something which is it is possible, right? This "possibility" that

is said here means that it is possible among objects of knowledge. Since something which is only a permanent phenomenon is possible, something which is only a permanent phenomenon exists, right? Since it is an existent, it is either an actuality or a permanent phenomenon. It is a permanent phenomenon, right? Since it is that it is only a permanent phenomenon. Okay? What is referred to here is this, "It follows with respect to the subject, only a permanent phenomenon, that being it is both something which is it and a permanent phenomenon." Being only a permanent phenomenon is itself something which is only a permanent phenomenon, and it is also a permanent phenomenon. This is what is being referred to here. When it says that it follows that it is so, it says, "because something is both something which is only a permanent phenomenon and a permanent phenomenon," right? (It means) being it is both something which is it and a permanent phenomenon. If he says that the reason is not established, "It follows that it is a permanent phenomenon because of (1) being an existent and (2) not being an actuality." It follows that being it is a permanent phenomenon because of (1) being an existent and (2) not being an actuality. It follows that it is not an actuality because a cause of it does not exist. This is how it is established. Whatever is an actuality must have a cause. If a cause of something exists, then it must be established as related with its cause. If something is established as related (with its cause), then if there is no cause of it then it necessarily does not exist. If there is pervasion, then it will be said, "It follows with respect to the subject, object of knowledge, that it does not exist because there is no cause of it." Okay? Now probably having debated... (To JH:) I doubt that they can understand. (JH: They will not understand immediately. Perhaps if you put your explanation into the tape recorder, then we will think about it.)

(The text says,) "It follows that it is a permanent phenomenon because of (1) being an existent and (2) not being an actuality." If someone says that the second part of the reason is not established--if someone says that being it is an actuality, (it says) "It follows that it is an actuality." Being it is an actuality. When he says, "It follows that it is an actuality," it means, "It follows that being it is an actuality." It follows that it is an actuality because of being an actuality. If he accepts it, then, "It follows that there is a cause of it." What is to be understood is being it. "It follows that a cause of it (i.e., being it) exists because it is an actuality." If he accepts it, then, "It follows that it is

produced from its causes." It is produced from its causes. If a cause of something exists, then it must be produced from its causes because there is a cause of it. If it is fulfilled that there is a cause of it, then it must be produced from its causes. If he accepts it, "It follows that it is an effect of its causes because it is produced from its causes." If he accepts it, "It follows that it is related with its cause as that arisen from it." There is a relation. We say, "We are related," right? Connection. We say, "We have a great relationship," right? Those people who do not understand the religious language do not understand the explanation of relations. What is related and what is not related is something to be known, right? Thus, what is called relations are posited as two, phenomena which are related as the same essence and phenomena which are related as the arisen from that. The relation between causes and effects is referred to as the related as phenomena arisen from that. This is the relation of cause and effect. For example, you all are related with your mothers as that arisen from them. The two, smoke and fire, are established in the relation of that arisen from that. (JH: So there is a causal relationship and a relationship of the same entity. Cause and effect here, like smoke and fire, are causal relationship or you and your mother are causal, not the same entity relationship. There are two types of relationship.) This is the relationship of that arisen from that. Thus, now, "It is established in the relationship with its cause as that arisen from it." If this is established, if there is no cause of it, it necessarily does not exist. It follows that there is pervasion. If there is pervasion in this, then it follows with respect to the subject, object of knowledge, that it does not exist because there is no cause of it. This is just right, isn't it? If there is no cause of it, then it does not necessarily not exist, right? It follows with respect to the subject, a permanent phenomenon, that it does not exist because there is no cause of it. It follows with respect to the subject, established base, that it does not exist because a cause of it does not exist. One does not say that there is a cause of a permanent phenomenon, right? This is what is flung. If he says that the reason is not established, it follows that a cause of it does not exist because it is a permanent phenomenon. It follows with respect to the subject, object of knowledge, that a cause of it does not exist because it is a permanent phenomenon.

If he accepts the basic consequence--that only a permanent phenomenon is a permanent phenomenon, it follows that the subject, only a permanent phenomenon, is an existent because of being a

permanent phenomenon. If he accepts the consequence, it follows that the subject, only a permanent phenomenon, is not an existent because actuality exists. If he says that the reason is not established, it follows that actuality exists because of being selfless. You have to say that for whatever is selfless actuality necessarily exists. Because of being selfless. You have to say that for whatever is selfless actuality necessarily exists. Is it the case that for whatever is selfless, actuality necessarily exists? (If there is no pervasion) then posit it. Posit something which (counters the pervasion) for whatever is selfless actuality necessarily exists. (JH: This is existence not being.) Posit it. Is it the case that for whatever is selfless actuality necessarily exists? (Student: There is pervasion.) It follows that there is pervasion. (S: I accept it.) It follows that for whatever is selfless actuality necessarily exists. (S: I accept it.) It follows with respect to the subject, a basis of negation of actuality, that actuality exist. (S: Why?) Because of being selfless. (S: There is no pervasion.) It may not be best to give this debate. You have to say that for whatever is selfless actuality necessarily exists. This is said. Now probably I am not able to give them debates like this. Probably it will make their heads big (with confusion). Probably there is a little fault in it. I think so. Now the later ones are easy. I doubt we have to go over the later ones. Since they are easy, we will not do them.

Now there is no pervasion in this. For instance, there are the two, suitable as an object of an awareness which is something (yin par gyur pa'i blo'i yul tu bya rung pa) and suitable as an object of an awareness which is not something (ma yin par gyur pa'i blo'i yul tu bya rung pa). (See debate D.6) For example, definiendum is suitable as an object of an awareness which is it and also is something suitable as an object of an awareness which is it and also is something suitable as an object of an awareness which is not it. If someone asks why, it is because definiendum itself is suitable as an object of such an awareness--one which is a definiendum. There is an awareness which is a definiendum. This awareness is a definiendum, right? (JH: There is a mind which is a definiendum, right? That is what is being played on in this next one.) For instance, it is like this. Awareness and consciousness (are definiendums). They talk about Awareness and Knowers. In that (text) there are those called awareness, knower, and consciousness. Awareness is a definiendum. If someone asks what its definition is, it is knower. Knower is the definition of awareness. Thus, definiendum is suitable as an object of an awareness which is it

because of being suitable as an object of an awareness which is something which is it. Got it? Definiendum is suitable as an object of such an awareness. It is an object of such an awareness. Definiendum is also suitable as an object of an awareness which is not it because (1) an awareness which is not it is knower and (2) it is suitable as an object of an awareness which is a knower. Definiendum is an object of knower, right? It is an object of knower. Knower realizes definiendum, right? Thus, since definiendum is an object of knower, it is suitable as an object of a knower--an awareness which is not a definiendum. Thus, definiendum obtains as both suitable as an object of an awareness which is not it.

Now as usual if we carry this over, actuality is suitable as an object of an awareness which is it but it is not suitable as an object of an awareness which is not it. If we carry it to object of knowledge, it obtains as an object of an awareness which is it. Whatever is an awareness is necessarily an object of knowledge, right? Because there is pervasion, since there is no awareness which is not an object of knowledge, there is object of knowledge is not said to be suitable as an object of an awareness which is not it. What do you say? It is suitable as an object of an awareness which is it. All of these--object of knowledge, established base, existent--are things which are suitable as objects of an awareness which is any of them. Actuality, impermanent phenomenon, specifically characterized phenomenon, that which is able to perform a function, and so on are all things which are suitable as objects of awarenesses which are any of them. There is no awareness which is not an actuality, right?

Now what is consciousness itself? Consciousness is suitable as an object of an awareness which is it and it is not suitable as an object of an awareness which is not it.

Now what about matter, non-associated compositional factor, and those? For example, visible form, sound, odor, taste, and tangible object are suitable as objects of awarenesses which are not them. They are not suitable as objects of an awareness which are any of them. There is no awareness which is a form, right? There is no awareness which is a sound, right? There is no awareness which is an odor, right? They are suitable as objects of awarenesses which are not them. They are objects of awarenesses which are not themselves. Similarly, there is non-associated compositional factor. Non-associated compositional factor is suitable as an object of an awareness which is not it, but it is not suitable as an object of an

awareness which is it. Okay, right? (JH: Yin par gyur means which is the subject. An object of the mind which is the subject which was earlier stated. Take definiendum. there is a mind which is a definiendum, right? So if you said "the object of a mind which is a form," the mind wouldn't be a form. Yin par gyur pa was referring back to the subject, which is the subject.) Do they understand?

Now for permanent phenomena, permanent phenomenon obtains as something which is suitable as an object of an awareness which is it. Generally characterized phenomenon obtains as something which is suitable as an object of an awareness which is not it. The two--permanent phenomenon and actuality... Now whatever is an object of knowledge the being of which is not possible is necessarily suitable as an object of an awareness which is not them. Okay, right? The two--pillar and pot, the two, permanent phenomenon and actuality, the two--definition and definiendum, the two-- (deng 'or?), and so on are all things which are suitable as objects of an awareness which is not them.

Now if someone asks, "What is the difference between the two, that which is suitable as an object of an awareness which is it and that which is suitable as an object of an awareness which is not it?" there are four possibilities. If you are asked to posit something which is both, the subject, definiendum, or the subject, definition. Okay, right? With respect to something which is suitable as an object of an awareness which is it but is not suitable as an object of an awareness which is not it, you can posit the subject, actuality, or the subject, object of knowledge. With respect to something which is suitable as an object of an awareness which is not it but is not suitable as an object of an awareness which is not it, you can posit these--the subject, permanent phenomenon; the subject, form; the subject, matter; the subject, sound; the subject, non-associated compositional factor. For something which is neither you can posit the non-existents. Okay, right? Having reckoned the four possibilities, you will come to understand. What is the difference between the two, that which is suitable as an object of an awareness which is it and that which is suitable as an object of an awareness which is not it? There are four possibilities. Something which is both is object of knowledge, established base, existent, and their synonyms. You understand, right? Then actuality, impermanent phenomenon, specifically characterized phenomenon, ultimate truth, and there are a lot (of synonyms which

are both of these), right? You can posit these. What do you posit as something which is suitable as an object of an awareness which is it but is not suitable as an object of an awareness which is not it? Now do not get confused. It seems you are confused. Things that are both are definition, definiendum, and those. Also, you can posit (as both) object of knowledge the being of which is possible or object of knowledge the being of which is not possible. Now as something which is suitable as an object of an awareness which is it but is not suitable as an object of an awareness which is not it you have to posit actuality, established base, object of knowledge, existent, that which is able to perform a function, impermanent phenomenon, and these. As something which is suitable as an object of an awareness which is not it but is not suitable as an object of an awareness which is not it these are to be posited--permanent phenomenon, visible form, sound, odor, taste, tangible object, any of these. As something which is neither non-existents are to be posited. Having thought about the four possibilities with respect to this, then you will understand. Okay, right? It is like that.

Now this is opposite from being and opposite from not being. This is adequate for opposite from being and opposite from not being. If you memorize this debate, it will get better. This one: "If someone says, 'Whatever is something which a permanent phenomenon is is necessarily a permanent phenomenon...'" Memorize this to the point of where it says, "It follows that actuality exists because of being selfless." Just up to there, that part. Memorize that because it comes somewhere later. It is something to pay attention to, to take interest in. There were three Tibetans here the last couple days. When somebody comes like that they will ask this sort of question, "Is whatever is something which a permanent phenomenon is necessarily a permanent phenomenon?" (JH: I think we will understand at least the last part of it from the tape very easily.) Now opposite from being and opposite from not being are like that.

Introductory Causes and Effects

C: Now because there is no explanation of the presentation of cause and effect on the occasion of this passage which says, "Just as much as the nature of a cause/Does not exist, so does an effect not arise."

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that there is an explanation of the presentation of cause and effect on the occasion of this passage which says, "Just as much

as the nature of a cause/Does not exist, so does an effect not arise."

D: I accept it.

C: Now it follows that it is not so. Posit the definition of cause.

D: The subject, a producer. (Either a producer or a helper. Posit either the one or the other but not both. If you posit both, it is contradictory with the presentation of identifying reverses. We will debate on this tomorrow or the next day. If you gave both it would contradict what we learned in identifying reverses. Once we have done causes and effects we will mix it with the identifying reverses. A producer is the definition of a cause, or alternatively a helper.)

C: Posit the definition of effect.

D: The produced is the definition of effect. Alternatively, the helper is the definition of effect.

Now the three--cause, effect, and actuality--are synonymous. Whatever is an actuality is necessarily a cause. It is to be said that whatever is an actuality is necessarily a cause. It is to be said that whatever is an actuality is necessarily an effect. Those three are synonymous. Earlier we counted these in (among the synonyms of actuality), right? Cause, actuality, effect, specifically characterized phenomenon, ultimate truth, were counted, right? They are synonymous. Whatever is an actuality is necessarily a cause. Then, is the subject, you, a cause? You are. Are you an effect? You have to say that you are. Why is the subject, you, a cause? (You are a cause) because of being a cause of this effect which arises from you. There is you later arising, right? You say, "Because of being an effect of that." For example, you are a cause, right? For example, you have a child, right? You are a cause of that child. Because of being a father of that child, right? Now for example, we say that you are a child, right? You have to say, "Are you a father?" It is like this. (Student: I am a father.) Yes, because of being the father of your child. Are you a child? Yes, because of being the child of your father. Now, are you a father? Yes. Are you a child? Yes. Thus, it is like this. You are both a cause and an effect. You have to say that you are both. You understand, right? Generally, you have to say that the three--cause, effect, and actuality--are synonyms. In general. In general. However, if you apply it to a basis like a cause of actuality and an effect of actuality, then they are contradictory. The two, a cause of actuality and an effect of actuality, obtain as contradictory. For example, whatever is a cause of actuality must have arisen before actuality, it must be a prior arising of actuality. Whatever is an effect of actuality

ust be arisen after actuality, must be a subsequent arising of actuality. You've got it, right? Thus, they are contradictory. There is a difference of earlier and later time, right? Whatever is a cause of actuality must be established earlier than actuality right? It must be a prior arising of actuality. Whatever is an effect of actuality must be a later arising of actuality. Now whatever it is you can apply this to it. A cause of a pot and an effect of a pot are contradictory. The two, a cause of a human and an effect of a human, are contradictory. The two, a cause of a human and an effect of a human, are contradictory. The two, a cause of a pot and an effect of a pot, are contradictory. Got it, right? The two, a cause of a consciousness and an effect of a consciousness, are contradictory. The two, a cause of a non-associated compositional factor and an effect of a non-associated compositional factor, are contradictory. The two, a cause of matter and an effect of matter, are contradictory. The two, a cause of form and an effect of form, are contradictory. You understand, right? The two, a cause of sound and an effect of sound, are contradictory. The two, a cause of color and an effect of color, are contradictory. The two, a cause of a primary color and an effect of a primary color, are contradictory. The two, the cause of a secondary color and an effect of a secondary color, are contradictory. Now it is to be said like that.

Now if you are asked to posit the definition of a cause of actuality, it is a producer of actuality. Also, (you can posit) a helper of actuality. You cannot say "a producer with respect to actuality" (dngos po la skyed byed). You cannot say "a helper with respect to actuality (dngos po la phan 'dogs byed)." You have to say a producer of actuality (dngos bo'i skyed byed)." You have to say a producer of actuality (dngos bo'i skyed byed). Now whatever it is you can apply it this way. Posit the definition of a cause of a pot. The subject, a producer of a pot. Posit the definition of an effect of a pot. The subject, an object a producer of a pot. Posit the definition of a cause of a pillar. The subject, a producer of a pillar. Posit the definition of an effect of a pillar. The subject, an object produced by a pillar. Now you know how to apply this to all actualities, right? Posit the definition of a cause of a human. The subject, a producer of a human. Posit the definition of an effect of a human. The subject, an object produced by a human. It is like that. Now you've got it, right?

Now, for example, if you are asked to posit a cause of actuality, then what do you posit? The subject, a prior arising of actuality (dngos po'i snga logs su byung ba). It follows that the subject, a prior

arising of actuality, is a cause of actuality. I accept it. Why is the subject, a prior arising of actuality, a cause of actuality? Because of being a producer of actuality. Also, (you can say) because actuality is an effect of it. You can say that. Earlier we said that this phenomenon is a definiendum because this is the definition of it, right? For example, the subject, you (Dan), are the father of this child because this child is your child. This is that, right? Do you understand? You are the father of this one because this is your child. You say that, right? With respect to the subject, a prior arising of actuality, it is a cause of actuality because actuality is an effect of it. Also, because of being a producer of actuality. What is to be said is like that.

Now if you are asked to posit an effect of actuality, (posit) the subject, a later arising of actuality (dngos po'i phyi logs su byung ba). Now these are posited in general. When you posit something, you do not have to posit it in general. It follows that the subject, a later arising of actuality, is an effect of actuality. I accept it. Why is the subject, a later arising of actuality, an effect of actuality? Because of being an object produced by actuality is necessarily an effect of actuality. I accept it. Also, because actuality is a cause of it. It is an effect of actuality because actuality is a cause of it. There is not a lot to be understood by this. When you say a prior arising of actuality, an effect of actuality? Because of being an object produced by actuality is necessarily an effect of actuality. I accept it. Also, because actuality is a cause of it. It is an effect of actuality because actuality is a cause of it. There is not a lot to be understood by this. When you say prior arising of actuality, it is understood as actuality is a cause of it. There is not a lot to be understood by this. When you say a prior arising of actuality, it is understood as actuality in its earlier moments. You understand actuality in its earlier moments. When you say actuality's later arising, you understand actuality in its later moments. This is actuality in its later moments of its own continuum. For example, from the time that we are born through to the time when we die there is a continuum, being put together, right? There is a continuum of the person of yesterday with the person of today, right? So you understand in one direction the prior arising of actuality as actuality in all the earlier moments, and you understand the later arising of actuality as actuality in all the later moments. Now it is like that.

Now for actuality's causes there are two to be posited, direct cause

of actuality and indirect cause of actuality. Now with respect to actuality's effects there are also two to be posited, a direct effect of actuality and an indirect effect of actuality. Those two are to be posited and also two are posited as causes. Now this is to be applied to everything.

Now we should debate on identifying reverses. So when we debate should you split up into pairs or all debate together? (JH: We have some qualms concerning the identifying reverses.) Well, let's debate them one by one. When we have qualms to settle, then we can go one by one debating. When we don't we can split up into pairs.

(Two students debate through C.7 just as in the text, and then:)

C: What is the difference between the two, actuality's reverse and actuality's meaning-reverse?

D: They are contradictory.

C: It follows that the two, actuality's reverse and actuality's meaning-reverse, are contradictory.

D: I accept it.

C: Why are they contradictory?

D: Because (1) the two, actuality's reverse and actuality's meaning-reverse, are different and (2) a common locus is not possible.

C: It follows that if the two, actuality's reverse and actuality's meaning-reverse, (1) are different and (2) a common locus is not possible, then they are necessarily contradictory.

D: I accept it.

C: Why is a common locus of the two, actuality's reverse and actuality's meaning-reverse, not possible?

D: Because (1) whatever is actuality's reverse is necessarily a definiendum and (2) whatever is actuality's meaning-reverse is necessarily a definition.

There is pervasion, right? Whatever is actuality's reverse must be a definiendum, right? Whatever is actuality's meaning-reverse is necessarily a definition, right?

(Two students debate through debate C.8 just as it is in the text and then:)

C: What is the difference between the two, actuality's general-reverse and actuality's illustration-reverse?

D: They are contradictory.

C: It follows that the two, actuality's general-reverse and actuality's illustration-reverse, are contradictory.

D: I accept it.

C: Why are the two, actuality's general-reverse and actuality's illustration-reverse, contradictory?

D: Because (1) they are different and (2) a common locus is not possible.

C: It follows that if (1) they are different and (2) a common locus of the two is not possible, then they are necessarily contradictory.

D: I accept it.

C: Why is a common locus of those two not possible?

D: Because (1) whatever is an actuality's general-reverse is necessarily actuality's reverse and (2) whatever is actuality's illustration. Isn't pot which is one with pot a pot?

D: No, it is not.

C: Then it follows that the subject, pot which is one with pot, is not a pot. It follows that this thing which is one with pot is not a pot.

D: I accept it.

C: Are you not the person who is one with yourself?

D: Yes, I am.

C: Thus, pot which is one with pot is a pot, right? Color which is one with color is a color, right? This is something which is one with color, right? When you say "which is one with color" (this means that it is one with color). Thus, it is not contradictory with pot. Now, what is the difference between the two, the phenomena coextensive with the reverse of pot and pot's reverse?

D: They are synonymous.

C: Huh? If they are synonymous, you are finished. They have not come together. He says they are synonymous. Now it follows that the subject, pot which is one with pot, is pot's reverse because of being a phenomenon coextensive with pot's reverse.

D: I accept it.

C: (Laughs.) Then it follows that the subject, pot which is one with pot, is one with pot.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, pot which is one with pot, that it is not different from pot.

D: I accept it.

C: Oh? Pot which is one with pot. Aren't the two, pot which is one with pot, and pot, diverse?

D: They are diverse.

C: If they are diverse, it follows that they are different. It follows that

they are not one.

D: They are different.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, pot which is one with pot, that it is not pot's reverse because of not being one with pot.

D: There is no pervasion.

C: (Laughs.) Whatever is pot's reverse must be one with pot, right? Aren't the two, one with pot and pot's reverse, synonymous?

D: They are synonymous.

C: Oh, since they are synonymous, whatever is pot's reverse is necessarily one with pot and whatever is one with pot is necessarily pot's reverse. Right?

D: Yes.

C: It follows that there is pervasion because pot's reverse and one with pot are synonymous.

D: I accept it.

C: Now it follows with respect to the subject, pot which is one with pot, that it is not pot's reverse because it is not one with pot.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that the subject, pot which is one with pot, is not one with pot because of being different from pot.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, pot which is one with pot, is not one with pot.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, pot which is one with pot, is not pot's reverse.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, pot which is one with pot, is pot's reverse because of being a phenomenon coextensive with pot's reverse.

D: I accept it. (Hesitates.) There is no pervasion. The reason is not established.

C: (Reacting to last answer.) It follows with respect to the subject, pot which is one with pot, that it is a phenomenon coextensive with pot's reverse because (1) it is different from pot's reverse, (2) whatever is it is necessarily pot's reverse; and (3) whatever is pot's reverse is necessarily it.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, pot which is one with pot, that it is a phenomenon coextensive with the reverse of pot.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, pot which is one with pot, that it is pot's reverse because it is a phenomenon coextensive with pot's reverse.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, pot which is one with pot, that it is not pot's reverse because it is not one with pot.

D: Please repeat what you said.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, pot which is one with pot, that it is not pot's reverse because it is not one with pot. (After long hesitation:) Give an answer.

D: (Hesitates.) What have I not said? (JH: Well, what do you think is true?) I don't know. (JH: Whatever is not one with pot is necessarily not pot's reverse, right? Then the reason is established. The pervasion is established and also the reason is established. The pervasion is established and also the reason is established, you have to accept it.)

C: It follows with respect to the subject, pot which is one with pot, that it is not one with pot because it is an instance of pot.

D: I accept it.

C: (Laughs.) It follows that the subject, pot which is one with pot, is not one with pot.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, pot which is one with pot, is not pot's reverse.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, pot which is one with pot, that it is pot's reverse because it is a phenomenon coextensive with pot's reverse. (JH: Oh, that is what you are doing wrong. This consequence is getting back to your original wrong statement.)

(S: So it is wrong to say that there is no pervasion?)

(JH: No, it is right to say that there is no pervasion. You were saying that there was pervasion before.)

D: I accept it.

C: Now what is the difference between the two, pot's reverse and the phenomena coextensive with pot's reverse?

(LR: Now we are getting confused at this point. We must practice this a lot.)

What is the difference?

D: They are contradictory.

C: Explain how it is that they are contradictory. Isn't it the case that whatever is a phenomenon coextensive with pot's reverse is necessarily pot's reverse? Isn't there pervasion?

D: There is pervasion.

C: If there is pervasion in that, then you are finished. Now he says that they are not contradictory.

D: They are not contradictory.

C: They aren't are they? If they are not contradictory, then you encounter again all of the faults. You think about this. What is this. What is the difference between the two, pot's reverse and the phenomena coextensive with pot's reverse?

D: They are contradictory.

C: What is the reason that they are contradictory? You have to have a reason why they are contradictory.

D: Because of (1) being different and (2) a common locus is not possible.

C: Why is a common locus not possible? You have to explain that whatever is pot's reverse is necessarily such and such and that whatever is a phenomenon coextensive with pot's reverse is necessarily such and such, right? Things which have no common locus are like that. The (nyen ka) of these two which do not have a common locus is like this. You will have to explain that whatever is pot's reverse must be such and such and that whatever is a phenomenon coextensive with pot's reverse must be such and such.

D: Because whatever is a phenomenon coextensive with pot's reverse is necessarily different from pot's reverse.

C: What is the purpose of that? It follows that whatever is different from pot's reverse is necessarily not pot's reverse.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, pot, that it is not pot's reverse.

D: There is no pervasion.

C: Amazing. It follows that whatever is different from pot's reverse is not necessarily not pot's reverse.

D: I accept it.

C: Now posit the reason there is no common locus of the two (pot's reverse and the phenomena coextensive with pot's reverse.)

(JH: So he did away with that. So now he wants a new reason.)

What is the necessity that there cannot be a common locus? (LR explains:) Whatever is pot's reverse must be one with pot. Whatever

is a phenomenon coextensive with pot's reverse is necessarily not one with pot. You have to put it to pot. Whatever is pot's reverse must be one with pot. Whatever is a phenomenon coextensive with pot's reverse must be different from pot. The reason for this pervasion is that one with pot is a permanent phenomenon. This is why it must be different from pot. The definiendum of a bulbous flat-based phenomenon which is able to perform the function of holding water is a permanent phenomenon. The triply qualified imputed existent of a bulbous flat-based phenomenon which is able to perform the function of holding water is a permanent phenomenon. Since they are that, they are not one with pot. Pot which is one with pot is something which is an instance of pot. It also is not one with pot. The reasons are like that. Okay, right? If you are asked why the subject, one with pot, is not pot's reverse, it is because it is different from pot; because it is a permanent phenomenon. You can say that it is different from pot because it is a permanent phenomenon.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, the definiendum of the bulbous flat-based phenomenon which is able to perform a function, that it is not pot's reverse.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, the definiendum of the bulbous flat-based phenomenon which is able to perform the function of holding water, why is it not pot's reverse?

D: Because of being different from pot.

C: It follows that the subject is different from pot.

D: I accept it.

C: Why is the subject different from pot?

D: Because it is a permanent phenomenon.

(It is not pot's reverse because of not being one with pot; because of being different from pot; because of being a permanent phenomenon.)

C: It follows with respect to the subject, the triply qualified imputed existent of the bulbous flat-based phenomenon which is able to perform the function of holding water, that it is not pot's reverse.

D: I accept it.

C: Why is it not pot's reverse?

D: Because it is different from pot; because it is a permanent phenomenon.

(Now there is one left, right?)

C: It follows that the subject, pot which is one with pot, that it is not

pot's reverse.

D: I accept it.

C: With respect to the subject, pot which is one with pot, why is it not pot's reverse?

D: Because it is not one with pot.

C: With respect to the subject, pot which is one with pot, why is it not one with pot?

D: Because it is an instance of pot.

Now you understand, right? Pot which is one with pot is an instance of pot. Actuality which is one with actuality is an instance of actuality. Pillar which is one with pillar is an instance of pillar. Color which is one with color is an instance of color. (Pot which is one with pot) is not a generality, it is only an instance. It is something which is not a generality. We will get to that later. Generalalities and instances come later, right? Oh, it is like that. Now you understand this, right? You understand the difference between pot's reverse and the phenomena coextensive with pot's reverse, right? Now all the rest are the same. The difference between actuality's reverse and the phenomena coextensive with actuality's reverse is the same.

Debate C.10

C: It follows that the subject, one with pot, is pot's reverse.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, one with pot, is not pot's reverse because of being different from pot.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that the subject, one with pot, is different from pot because of being a permanent phenomenon.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, a pot, that one with it is a permanent phenomenon because it is an established base.

(Oh, now you have arrived at the reason. It follows with respect to the subject, one with pot, that it is not one with pot because it is a permanent phenomenon. You have arrived there. It is there, right? One with pot is different from pot because of being a permanent phenomenon. This is it. This is the reason, right? One with pot is not one with pot, right? You are saying it from your mouth. You have to think about it. The subject, one with pot, is different from pot because of being a permanent phenomenon. It is not one with pot because of being a permanent phenomenon. It is not pot's reverse because of

being a permanent phenomenon. You have arrived here, right?)

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that if something is an established base, then one with it is necessarily a permanent phenomenon.

(JH: You see that is the point this is getting at, right? This pervasion is the big point.)

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, pot, that one with it is a permanent phenomenon.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, one with pot, is different from pot.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, one with pot, is different from pot.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, one with pot, is not one with pot.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, one with pot, is not pot's reverse.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, one with pot, is pot's reverse because of being a phenomenon coextensive with pot's reverse.

(JH: You see that is what is behind all of this.)

D: There is no pervasion.

C: It follows that whatever is a phenomenon coextensive with pot's reverse is not necessarily pot's reverse.

D: I accept it.

C: Now what is the difference between the two, pot's reverse and the phenomena coextensive with pot's reverse?

D: They are contradictory, are they not?

C: It follows that the two, pot's reverse and the phenomena coextensive with pot's reverse, are contradictory.

D: I accept it.

C: Why are they contradictory?

D: Because (1) they are different and (2) a common locus is not possible.

C: It follows that a common locus of the two, pot's reverse and the phenomena coextensive with pot's reverse, is not possible.

D: I accept it.

C: Why is a common locus not possible?

D: (LR: You have to understand this factor well. Discriminating this is the essential for identifying reverses. This is often confused. When

you speak of the phenomena coextensive with the reverse of pot, since it has a relationship with pot's reverse, if this is not confused then one will not have any trouble at all with pot's reverse and the phenomena coextensive with pot's reverse. This is debated a lot at the debating courtyard. When you speak of the phenomena coextensive with pot's reverse, you have to think of pot's reverse, right? Then they debate it and debate it. This essential is expressed in these debates. He did one. One was established, "The subject, pot which is one with pot, it is not one with pot because of being different from pot." Now you are doing one, right? (It says,) "It follows that the subject, one with pot, is not pot's reverse because of not being one with pot, because of being different from pot. It follows that it is different from pot because of being a permanent phenomenon." You established this one, right? Well, you have to understand the difference between a reverse and the phenomena coextensive with that reverse, right? Whatever is pot's reverse must be one with pot, but whatever is a phenomenon which is coextensive with pot's reverse need not be one with pot, it must be different from pot. There is no other way of establishing them individually, right? Pot which is one with pot is different from pot. It is an instance of pot. One with pot is not pot's reverse and not one with pot. It is a permanent phenomenon. the other two are the same (as this last one). The definiendum and the triply qualified imputed existent of the bulbous flat-based phenomenon which is able to perform the function of holding water are the same. This is it. (JH: Then, when someone asks why it is so, what do you say? Whatever is pot's reverse is necessarily one with pot. Whatever is a phenomenon coextensive with pot's reverse is necessarily not one with pot. Is it this?) LR: Whatever is pot's reverse must be one with pot, right? Whatever is a phenomenon which is coextensive with pot's reverse must not be one with pot, right? Because it must be different from pot. Well then, whatever is a phenomenon coextensive with pot's reverse is necessarily different from pot. This carries over to all the others as well. It follows that the subject, one with pot, is different from pot. I accept it. Why is the subject, one with pot, different from pot? Because it is a permanent phenomenon. It follows with respect to the subject, pot which is one with pot, that it is different from pot. I accept it. It is so because it is an instance of pot. Now this also goes for the definiendum of the bulbous flat-based phenomenon which is able to perform the function of holding water. This subject is different from pot. It is so because it

is a permanent phenomenon. Now it follows with respect to the subject, the triply qualified imputed existent of the bulbous flat-based phenomenon which is able to perform the function of holding water, that it is different from pot. I accept it. It is different from pot because it is a permanent phenomenon. This goes over to these as well. Okay?

Debate C.11

(Two students debate through C.11 just as it is in the text, then:)

C: What is the difference between the two, pot's reverse and pot?

D: There are three possibilities.

C: It follows that there are not three possibilities. Posit something which is both.

D: The subject, pot.

C: It follows that the subject, pot, is pot's reverse.

D: I accept it.

C: Why is the subject, pot, pot's reverse?

D: Because of being an established base.

C: Na, na, na. It follows that whatever is an established base is necessarily pot's reverse. It follows with respect to the subject, pillar, that it is pot's reverse because it is an established base.

(LR: There are a lot. The subject, pot, is pot's reverse because of being one with pot, because it is pot which is one with pot, because it is the definiendum of the bulbous flat-based phenomenon which is able to perform the function of holding water, because it is the triply qualified imputed existent of the bulbous flat-based phenomenon which is able to perform the function of holding water. It arises like that.)

D: Because it is the triply qualified imputed existent of the bulbous flat-based phenomenon which is able to perform the function of holding water. (LR: Oh, now you have understood.)

C: It follows that if something is the triply qualified imputed existent of the bulbous flat-based phenomenon which is able to perform the function of holding water, then it is necessarily pot's reverse.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, pot, is a pot.

D: I accept it.

C: Why is the subject, pot, a pot?

D: Because of being a bulbous flat-based phenomenon which is able to perform the function of holding water.

C: It follows that whatever is a bulbous flat-based phenomenon which is able to perform the function of holding water is necessarily a pot.

D: I accept it.

C: Which is necessarily the other? Which is not necessarily the other? Posit something which is one but not the other.

D: Whatever is pot's reverse is necessarily pot. Whatever is a pot is not necessarily pot's reverse. The subject, a golden pot.

C: It follows that the subject, a golden pot, is not pot's reverse.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that a golden pot is not the reverse of a golden pot.

D: Why?

C: It follows that the subject, a golden pot, is the reverse of a golden pot.

Because whatever is your head is necessarily a head of a human. Do you say that your head is your head but it is not a head of a human? Do you say that your hands are your hands but they are not the hands of a human?

D: Yes.

C: Do you? It follows that your head is your head but it is not a head of a human.

D: I don't understand.

C: Do our heads not exist? Don't you say that your head is an example of a human head?

Isn't Don's head a human's head?

It is okay to say that (a golden pot) is the reverse of a golden pot, but it is not pot's reverse?

D: The reverse of a golden pot is not pot's reverse.

C: Isn't Don's head a human's head? Aren't Don's hands the hands of a human? (This is probably enough.)

It follows that the subject, a golden pot, is not pot's reverse.

D: I accept it.

C: Why is the subject, a golden pot, not pot's reverse?

D: Because of being an instance of pot.

C: It follows that whatever is an instance of pot is necessarily not pot's reverse.

D: I accept it.

C: Now posit something which is neither.

D: The subject, a pillar.

Debate C.12

(JH: Rinbochay, if one put a golden pot alone as the subject, that would be okay, right? Is there any need for positing an object of knowledge the being of which is not possible as the subject? If one did a golden pot as the subject, that would be okay, right? It follows that the subject, a golden pot, is pot's reverse because of being turned away from non-pot.) LR: It would also be okay if he had said a golden pot.

JH: (Da 'tha la gcig 'duk)

LR: Is it that one can say "because this is contradictory with pot?" Now it is established as different, right? There is no fault in this. You can say of this, "This is a pot because of being an instance of pot." The subject, a golden pot. A golden pot is different from pot, right?

JH: It is different from pot, but if someone said that it was contradictory with pot.

LR: It does not come that way. No. You can say that the two--a golden pot and a copper pot--are different from pot because of being contradictory with pot.

JH: Aren't the two--a golden pot and a copper pot--contradictory with pot?

LR: The two--a golden pot and a copper pot--are contradictory with pot.

JH: And is a golden pot not contradictory with pot?

LR: No, it isn't.

JH: Oh, a le. Then is this the reason for putting an object of knowledge the being of which is not possible as the subject?

LR: Yes, it is.

JH: Then what is the reason that the two--a golden pot and a copper pot--are contradictory with pot?

LR: Now something which is a pot and also is the two--a golden pot and a copper pot--does not exist, right?

JH (to class): So the final reason he says is because of being mutually exclusive with a pot. This is because there isn't anything which is a pot and is a golden pot and a copper pot.

Student: Does the fact that the debate says that the two--a golden pot and a copper pot--is contradictory with pot contradict the fact that at the end of the route developing from saying "Why?" to the basic consequence the debate says that the two--a golden pot and a copper pot--is a pot?

JH: No. You have to have something that is a pot and is the other. Okay? Something that is a pot and is these other two things whereas

what you are talking about is these two things being pots.

JH (to LR): We have a qualm. (If asked) "It follows that the subjects, the two--a golden pot and a copper pot, are pots," then you accept it, right?

LR: Yes.

JH: If the two--a golden pot and a copper pot--are pots, then how is it that they are contradictory with pot? You have to have something which is both, right?

LR: Now from what is called contradictory and non-contradictory, if they are non-contradictory, then on one hand you must posit the two--a golden pot and a colden pot--and on the other hand you must posit a pot. Then you need a common locus of the two.

JH (to class): You need something that is a common locus of those two things. Not just the two--a golden pot and a copper pot--which are pot, right? But you need something which is a common locus with both of those, and there isn't anything. (Two students debate through C.11 as in the text, then:)

C: Now what is the difference between the two, that which is turned away from non-pot and pot's reverse?

D: There are three possibilities

C: It follows that there are not three possibilities. Posit something which is both. Because? Because?

(LR: Are you sleeping?)

D: The subject, pot.

C: It follows that the subject, pot, is something which is turned away from non-pot.

(LR: Now you have to think of this as with opposite from being and opposite from not being. Think about this: turned away from non-pot and opposite from not being pot. You can say it is turned away from non-pot because of being a pot, right? Usually, you can say that something is opposite from not being a pot because of being a pot, right? Right? This is the same. This is turned away from non-pot because of being a pot. If you say that it is turned away from non-pot because of being opposite from not being pot, that is okay. Even so, it is because it is a pot.)

D: Because of being opposite from not being a pot.

C: It follows that whatever is opposite from not being a pot is necessarily turned away from non-pot.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, pot, is pot's reverse.

D: I accept it.

C: Why is the subject, pot, pot's reverse?

D: (LR: There are four reasons you can give--because of being one with pot, because of being pot which is one with pot, because of being the definiendum of the bulbous flat-based phenomenon which is able to perform the function of holding water, and because of being the triply qualified imputed existent of the bulbous flat-based phenomenon which is able to perform the function of holding water. There are four things which are synonymous with it, right? All four things which are synonymous with it, right? all four are applicable as the reason. There are four which are synonymous with pot's reverse, right? There are the four coextensives, right? These four are applicable as the reason.)

Because of being one with pot.

C: It follows that whatever is one with pot is necessarily pot's reverse.

D: I accept it.

C: Which is necessarily the other? Which is not necessarily the other? Posit something which is one but not the other.

D: Whatever is pot's reverse is necessarily turned away from non-pot. Whatever is turned away from non-pot is not necessarily pot's reverse. The subjects, the two--a golden pot and a copper pot.

C: It follows that the subjects, the two--a golden pot and a copper pot, are turned away from non-pot.

D: I accept it.

C: Why are the subjects, the two--a golden pot and a copper pot, turned away from non-pot?

(JH, after getting the Challenger to speak loudly: It is funny how whenever we assert ourselves we drop off at the end as if we were ready to fall into a... You have to do it as if you were eager. I think this point is that if you are going to build up the power of wisdom, it has to be strong--we have to be strong. You are even quieter than normal. You do. It is like you turn the volume control down so that no one will hear you in case you are wrong. When you ask for a reason you whimper. You have to be like him.)

(LR: When you debate, you have to do it as if you were angry. You appear to others as if you were angry. Ko ra dang gyi 'dug. Now she said, "Why are the subjects turned away from non-pot? Have you gotten this? The two, turned away from non-pot and opposite from non-pot, have the same meaning.)

D: Because of being opposite from non-pot.

(LR: It is turned away from non-pot because of being a pot. You are to think of it that way.)

(JH: You see, he is giving you synonyms so that you will think of something else. He keeps giving you the synonyms and you keep giving them. He wants you to think on the basis of that. Turned away from non-pot means opposite from non-pot and that ought to be enough to clue you in as to what to say to her.)

Because of being a pot.

C: It follows that whatever is a pot is necessarily turned away from non-pot.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subjects, the two--a golden pot and a copper pot, are not pot's reverse.

D: I accept it.

C: Because of not being turned away from different from pot.

D: It follows that whatever is not turned away from different from pot is necessarily not pot's reverse.

D: I accept it.

C: Now posit something which is neither.

D: The subject, uncaused space.

C: It follows that the subject, uncaused space, is not pot's reverse.

D: I accept it.

C: Why is the subject, uncaused space, not pot's reverse?

D: Because of not being a pot.

C: It follows that whatever is not a pot is necessarily not pot's reverse.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, uncaused space, is not turned away from non-pot.

D: I accept it.

C: Why is the subject, uncaused space, not turned away from non-pot?

D: Because of being turned away from pot.

C: It follows that whatever is turned away from pot is necessarily not turned away from non-pot.

D: I accept it.

C: Now there are three possibilities.

(JH: Now it seems the time is finished.)

End of class for May 12, 1976.

Class on May 14, 1976

Now we talked about direct causes, right? For example, if the causes of actuality are divided, there are two: direct causes and indirect causes. If you are asked to posit the direct cause of actuality, (posit) the subject, the prior arising of actuality. It is a direct cause of actuality because of being a direct producer of actuality. A direct producer of actuality is the definition of a direct cause of actuality. Thus, the subject, a prior arising of actuality, is a direct cause of actuality because of being a direct producer of actuality. Whatever is a direct producer of actuality is necessarily a direct cause of actuality.

Now if you are asked to posit an indirect cause of actuality, (posit) the subject, a prior arising of a prior arising of actuality. The prior arising of a prior arising of actuality is an indirect cause of actuality. A prior arising of actuality is a direct cause of actuality. Now it follows that the subject, a prior arising of a prior arising of actuality, is an indirect cause of actuality, I accept it. Why is it an indirect cause? Because of being an indirect producer of actuality. It follows that whatever is an indirect producer of actuality is necessarily an indirect cause. I accept it.

Now this is to be applied to all--pot, pillar, matter, consciousness, non-associated compositional factors, and so on. It is to be applied to the complete collection of actualities (yongs tshogs). Whatever you say is an actuality is to be applied to this. This is to be applied to everything you say is an actuality. Okay?

Now there are two types of effect. Effects of actuality are the two, direct effects of actuality and indirect effects of actuality. If you are asked to posit the direct effect of actuality, (posit) a later arising of actuality. It follows that the subject, a later arising of actuality, is a direct effect of actuality. I accept it. Why is the subject, a later arising of actuality, a direct effect of actuality? Because of being an object which is directly helped by actuality. Because of being an object which is directly produced by actuality. Say it like that.

Now then if you are asked to posit an indirect effect of actuality, (posit) the subject, a later arising of a later arising of actuality. It follows that the subject, a later arising of a later arising of actuality, is an indirect effect of actuality. I accept it. Why is the subject, a later arising of a later arising of actuality, an indirect effect of actuality? Because of being an object produced indirectly from actuality. Because of being an object indirectly helped by actuality. It is like that.

Now this is to be applied to everything. For example, there are

pot's direct cause and pot's indirect cause. If you are asked to posit pot's direct cause, (posit) a prior arising of pot. If you are asked to posit pot's indirect cause, (posit) the subject, a prior arising of a prior arising of pot. If then you are asked to posit a direct effect of pot, (posit) the subject, a later arising of pot. If you are asked to posit an indirect effect of pot, (posit) a later arising of a later arising of pot. It is applied that way. Now this is applied in the same way to the others--matter, consciousness, non-associated compositional factor, whatever you say is an actuality. You've got it, right? They are the same.

Now for example, what is called a prior arising is probably not understood. For example, when you speak of a prior arising of actuality, it does not refer to just whatever came before actuality. For example, it is like this. For example, we do not say that whatever came before us is a cause of us, right? A lot came before us, right? Right? When you speak of a prior arising, it refers to what arose as a helper of it. (JH: You cannot take thing's prior arising as just everything that arose prior to it because there are things unconnected, but that which helped it.) When you speak of a later arising, it refers to that factor which is helped by actuality itself. (JH: What is helped by it, what is helped by thing--thing's subsequent arising.) That which follows after actuality itself and is helped by it. Now it's okay, right? It is like that. Now if you do it in general it is like that.

Now when you are asked to posit a direct cause of actuality, you do not have to posit a prior arising of actuality by itself. (You can posit) the subject, a pot which is a prior arising of actuality; the subject, a pillar which is a prior arising of actuality; the subject, a consciousness which is a prior arising of actuality; the subject, a person who is prior arising of actuality. You can posit these.

If you are asked to posit an indirect cause of actuality, you can posit the subject, a pot which is a prior arising of a prior arising of actuality; the subject, a pillar which is a prior arising of a prior arising of actuality; the subject, a consciousness which is a prior arising of a prior arising of actuality; and the subject, matter which is a prior arising of a prior arising of actuality. You can posit things like that. There are pots, pillars, and everything which are indirect causes of actuality.

In the same way, if you are asked to posit a direct effect of actuality you can posit the subject, a pot which is a later arising of actuality; the subject, a pillar which is a later arising of actuality; the subject, a human who is a later arising of actuality; and the subject, a

horse who is a later arising of actuality. You can posit things like that.

If you are asked to posit an indirect effect of actuality, you can posit the subject, a pillar which is a later arising of a later arising of actuality; the subject, a pot which is a later arising of a later arising of actuality. You can posit such things. Now you've got it, right?

(Da 'di kha dog la 'dan de yod pa red.) Whatever is a prior arising of something is necessarily a cause of it. For whatever is a caused phenomenon, a prior arising of it is necessarily a cause of it. For example, the meaning of htis is, "It follows with respect to the subject, actuality, that a prior arising of it is a cause of it because it is a caused phenomenon." You can say, "It follows with respect to the subject, a pot, that a prior arising of it is a cause of it because it is "an actuality." The meaning of this also comes to be that a later arising of it is an effect of it because it is an actuality. Now, it is okay, right? Now if you do this in general, for whatever is an actuality, a prior arising of it is necessarily a cause of it. For whatever is an actuality, a later arising of it is necessarily an effect of it. It is like that. The procedure for things like this is done this way.

There is a lot to be debated with respect to this. If the meaning is not appearing to you, then the meaning will come in the section that is called the greater presentation of causes and effects. This is better. There is something called the greater presentation of causes and effects. There will be a section of causes and effects which is greater. (Khyad rang kha dog la btang de tsam sgo sdas gyi na red.) Okay?

Now then there are two types of direct causes and again, there are two types of causes. There are also two types of causes of actuality and two types of direct cause of actuality. There are two for each. There are two dissimilar types of causes of actuality: substantial cause of actuality and cooperative condition of actuality. Do you understand? Cause of actuality has the two: substantial cause of actuality and cooperative condition of actuality. Now if we apply this to an example, if we apply it to a sprout, then a seed is the substantial cause of a sprout and the earth, water, air, sunlight, the person who brings the water, and so on are the cooperative conditions of a sprout. The seed itself is a substantial cause of the sprout. It is like that. You have got it, right?

Now if we apply this to ourselves or, rather, to bodies like ours, the substantial cause of this body is the blood and semen of the mother and father. The father and mother are cooperative conditions. Oh, it is like that. Do you understand?

Now when you speak of the substantial cause of actuality, then something which is a cause of the entity of actuality is the substantial cause of actuality. When this cause which is a cause of the entity of actuality produces actuality then those things which go along with it and help it are cooperative conditions of actuality. They assist it. It is like that. These are the substantial cause and cooperative condition of actuality.

Now if you are asked to posit a substantial cause of actuality, you can say actuality which is a prior arising of actuality. If you are asked to posit a cooperative condition of actuality, posit the subject, a person who is a prior arising of actuality, or the subject, a pillar which is a prior arising of actuality. Even so, these are debated a lot. There is something to be debated here. Oh, you can posit these. These are to be posited as cooperative conditions of actuality--a pot which is a prior arising of actuality and a pillar which is a prior arising of actuality. Now you understand that there are two types of causes of actuality: substantial causes and cooperative conditions.

Now there are also two types of direct causes of actuality. There is a direct cause of actuality which is a substantial cause and one that is a cooperative condition. This is for direct cause itself. There is a substantial cause of actuality which directly produces actuality. Actuality which is a prior arising of actuality is a direct substantial cause of actuality. A pot, a pillar, or so which is a prior arising of actuality is a direct cooperative condition of actuality, a direct helper of actuality. Actuality which is a prior arising of a prior arising of actuality is an indirect substantial cause of actuality. A pot, a pillar, or so which is a prior arising of a prior arising of actuality is an indirect cooperative condition of actuality. Now you've got it, right? There is no exception to this. Having applied it to actuality, you can then apply it over to the other. For example, if you apply it to something like a pot, there are the things out of which a pot is made such as mud, copper, iron, brass, silver, gold, and so forth. A prior arising of one of these which is a cause of pot is a substantial cause of pot. A person who is a cause of a pot is a cooperative condition of a pot. There is a person who prepares a pot. Now the direct substantial cause and the indirect cooperative condition of this as well as the indirect substantial cause and the indirect cooperative condition are to be done for these. When you have applied it to all the others, you will understand. Got it? There are two types of substantial causes of a pot, the direct substantial cause of a pot and the indirect substantial cause of a pot.

There are two types of cooperative conditions of a pot: a direct cooperative condition of a pot and the indirect cooperative condition of a pot. You have to posit such. You have to posit such as the indirect cooperative conditions. Now this is to be posited in the same way to pillar. It is something to be posited.

Now this sort of thing is to be posited for the effect. When you apply it to an effect, there are two types of direct effects of actuality: a direct substantial effect of actuality and a direct cooperative effect of actuality. You've got it, right? There are the two, the direct substantial effect of actuality and the direct cooperative effect of actuality. There are the two: the indirect substantial effect of actuality and the indirect cooperative effect of actuality. When you posit these, if you are asked to posit the direct substantial effect of actuality. Now think about the moments of actuality. When you speak of actuality which is a later arising of actuality, there is not limit to the later continuum of actuality. The subject, actuality which is a later arising of actuality, is a direct substantial effect of actuality. Now if you are asked to posit a direct cooperative condition of actuality, there is such a thing, for the subject, a pillar which is a later arising of actuality, (is such). You can posit such a thing. A pillar or a pot which is a later arising of actuality. You've got it, right?

Now if you are asked to posit an indirect substantial effect of actuality, (posit) the subject, actuality which is a later arising of a later arising of actuality. If you are asked to posit an indirect cooperative effect of actuality, there is such (for you can posit) the subject, a pot, a pillar, a consciousness, a non-associated compositional factor, or such which is a later arising of a later arising of actuality. Now in this way this is to be applied to pot, pillar, and everything. It is to be applied to the collection (yong tshogs) of actualities. Okay? You know it, right? Now if you think about it, apply it to the collection of actualities. You know it well, right?

Now a detailed explanation of the presentation of causes and effects will come later in the greater presentation of causes and effects. Now for example if you apply this to the various things, if you apply it to a sprout, what is the seed? It is a substantial cause of a sprout. The water, air, earth, and all those things are cooperative conditions of a sprout. Now think about this and apply it to others. You've got it, right? For example, if you apply it to fire, then the fuel is the substantial cause of fire. It is the substantial cause of fire. The stones which are at the place where the fire is are an example of the

cooperative conditions of fire. It is like that. Now fire is the substantial cause of smoke. The fuel and such is a cooperative condition of smoke. It is like that. Those things from which something is made are the substantial causes of that thing. For example, the substantial cause of this table is the wood which was a prior arising of this table. It was the substantial cause of this table.

Now let's do just a couple of the debates, then you will understand. Did we do the final debates in the section on established bases? We did not do the section dispelling objections did we? (Student: Yes, we did.) (JH: We did the first one.) Now in the chapter on causes and effects, if you debate it you will come to understand it.

JH: Is a direct cause counted by moments? Must one reckon it in terms of moments? Do you need to count it moment by moment? With respect to a direct cause, for example...

LR: The direct cause is like this: it and its direct cause do not abide but for one moment between them.

JH: So the direct cause is only for one moment.

LR: It does not stay for another moment.

JH: For example, when you speak of a prior arising in general, before this...

LR: Oh, for example, when you said that a direct cause is not for more than one moment, it is not like that. This is the complete collection of the direct cause (dngos rgyu tshogs pa tshang) (that is like that). For a complete collection of the direct causes, this has only one moment.

JH: Oh, for the complete collection...

LR: This is the direct cause which has all the number of the causes (dngos po'i grangs tshang). Having completed all of the number, its potency is unobstructed, right? It is something the potency of which is unobstructed.

JH: Having done this, how many moments are there for this? There is not just one is there?

LR: For a direct cause which has all the number, there is not but one moment, right?

JH: Is that right?

LR: Yes. When it produces the effect, now what do I say? That cause which is a direct cause which has all the number??? You have to have a direct cause which is complete with all the number, right? I don't know whether or not whatever is a direct cause is necessarily a direct cause which has all the complete number and a potency which is unobstructed.

JH: When you speak of having a complete number...

LR: No matter how many causes there must be, the complete number of them is complete. This is called a direct cause which has the complete number.

JH (to class): That which has all the number of the causes and its potency is unobstructed for bringing out the effect. That last moment is the direct cause.

(to LR): For example, when you speak of a prior arising, is it only the direct cause?

LR: It is the direct cause. It will refer to anything which is complete with all the number.

JH: For example, when you speak of a prior arising in general, it refers to all the prior arising, right?

LR: Yes, but even so when you speak of a prior arising, its own nature has many moments, from the point of view of its self-reverse it will be a direct cause. The prior arising itself is a direct cause.

JH: Having said that, then this thing called a prior arising of a prior arising is the second moment prior, right?

LR: It is the earlier one, right?

JH: If it is the third one...

LR: Now you have to put three, right? It is that called the prior arising of the prior arising. There are two after it.

JH: If you do it in general, the prior arising refers to all the earlier.

LR: Yes.

JH (to class): So in general prior arising is anything in the past. It seems the other way at first. But then it is specific once you specify. Then prior arising has to be the direct cause, the prior arising of the prior arising has to be the one just before that, and if you want to refer to one just before that you have to add on another.

LR: Now for example, it is like this. For whatever is a caused phenomenon such as a pot, its substantial causes are infinite. If you look at its continuum of causes, it is infinite.

JH: Are the moments of the direct substantial causes infinite?

LR: They are infinite. When you count up the substantial cause of this and the substantial cause of this and so on, the continuum is infinite.

JH: Is it infinite?

LR: There is no limit to them. Now this would not come, right? You could not understand an effect that did not have a cause right? So if you did not posit an infinite continuum of causes, you would have to posit an effect which did not have a cause. It is not suitable to say

that something does not have a direct cause, right? Oh, if you do not posit an infinite continuum... it is like ourselves. All of them. The whole collection is the same.

JH:(to class): Everything has an infinite series of substantial causes. The substantial causes of anything are infinite. It would have to be.

LR: For example, if you apply it to something like this, for the making of it you need a pile of clay. The cause of this is earth. Then there is a cause of the earth, and a cause of that, and a cause of that. There is no limit to the continuum. If you could (posit one without a limit), then a causeless effect would have to go. If there were a limit, then there would have to be one which was causeless, right? Now if they debate, they will get better.

(Two students debate through E.1 just as it is in the text, then:)

C: What is the difference between the two, established base and either of the two--cause and effect?

(LR: Before you debate you have to imply the meaning of the debate to her a little. It is not suitable to just have something to debate. You have to debate in a way that will put the meaning in mind. Do you understand? You have to think of the meaning as you debate it. If you do not understand, ask. Now do you understand?)

D: There are three possibilities.

C: It follows that there are not three possibilities. Posit something which is both.

D: The subject, an actuality.

C: It follows that the subject, an actuality, is an established base.

D: I accept it.

C: Why is the subject, an actuality, an established base?

D: Because of being an existent.

C: It follows that whatever is an existent is necessarily an established base.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, an actuality, is either of the two, a cause or an effect.

D: I accept it.

C: Why is the subject, an actuality, either of the two, a cause or an effect?

D: Because of being a prior arising of the later arising of an actuality and...

(LR: Oh, this is a general point. You do not have to state the prior arising. When it is a general point, you have to explain it in a general way. He said, "Why is it either a cause or an effect, right?" He is not asking why it is a cause or an effect. What do you say then? (Another student says: Because of being an impermanent phenomenon.)

(LR: Why is it what whatever is an impermanent phenomenon is must be either a cause or an effect?)

(Student: Whatever is an impermanent phenomenon is necessarily either a cause or an effect.)

(LR: Why is there pervasion? What is the thought? What is it? Whatever is an impermanent phenomenon is necessarily a cause. Whatever is an impermanent phenomenon is necessarily a cause. Whatever is an impermanent phenomenon is necessarily an effect. It comes to be both a cause and an effect. Is it not so. The subject, an actuality, is either a cause or an effect because of (1) being a cause and (2) being an effect. Because of being both a cause and an effect. You would be thinking of something entirely different if you said that it has a cause or it has an effect, this is asking is it a cause or is it an effect. When you speak of whether or not it is either a cause or an effect, this refers to being either a cause or an effect. It is a cause and it is also an effect, right?)

C: Why is the subject, an actuality, either a cause or an effect?

D: Because of (1) being a cause and (2) being an effect.

C: It follows that whatever (1) is a cause and (2) is an effect is necessarily either a cause or an effect.

D: I accept it.

C: Which is necessarily the other? Which is not necessarily the other? Posit something which is one but not the other.

D: Whatever is either a cause or an effect is necessarily an established base. Whatever is an established base is not necessarily either a cause or an effect. The subject, object of knowledge.

C: It follows that the subject, object of knowledge, is an established base.

D: I accept it.

C: Why is the subject, object of knowledge, an established base?

D: Because of being established by a valid cognizer.

C: It follows that whatever is established by a valid cognizer is necessarily an established base.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, object of knowledge, is neither a cause

nor an effect.

D: I accept it.

C: Why is the subject, object of knowledge, neither a cause nor an effect?

D: Because of not being an actuality.

C: It follows that whatever is not an actuality is necessarily neither a cause nor an effect.

D: I accept it.

C: Posit something which is neither.

D: The subject, uncaused space.

C: It follows that the subject, uncaused space, is not an established base.

D: ...(End of debate and end of tape side 27)

(Two students are doing the limits of pervasion between the two principles of debate E.2, cause and non-effect, which are contradictory. The debate picks up in the middle.)

C: It follows that a common locus (of the two, cause and non-effect) does not exist.

D: I accept it.

C: Why is a common locus of the two, cause and non-effect, not possible?

D: Because (1) whatever is a cause is necessarily also an effect...(LR: You do not need to say "also." Say, "Whatever is a cause is necessarily an effect.)

Because (1) whatever is an effect is necessarily an effect and (2) whatever is an effect is necessarily a cause.

C: It follows that if (1) whatever is a cause is necessarily an effect and (2) whatever is an effect necessarily a cause.

It follows that a common locus of the two, pot and actuality, does not exist.

D: Why?

C: Because (1) whatever is a cause is necessarily an effect and (2) whatever is an effect is necessarily a cause.

LR: Oh there is this. You could say with respect to an uncaused phenomenon that its effect exist because a later arising of it is an effect of it. If he says that the reason is not established, (you can say) "It follows with respect to the subject, an actuality, that a later arising of it is an effect of it because it is a caused phenomenon." Usually it carries over that way. Also, it follows with respect to the subject, an actuality, that it is an effect because there is a cause of it. It follows

that there is a cause of it because its prior arising is its cause. It follows that its prior arising is its cause because it is an actuality. There is this, right? You have to apply it in this way to whatever there is. Now what is the next one?

(In relation to direct causes and indirect causes:) It is not said that (whatever is a direct cause is necessarily not an indirect cause). In general, cause and effect are synonymous, right? The two, direct cause and indirect cause, are in general synonymous. Whatever is a direct cause is necessarily an indirect cause. Whatever is an indirect cause is necessarily a direct cause. The two, direct effect and indirect effect, are in general synonymous. Whatever is a direct effect is necessarily an indirect effect, whatever is an indirect effect is necessarily a direct effect. The two, indirect effect and direct effect, are synonymous. This is in general now.

Now if you apply it to a basis, if you speak of them as applied to a basis, such as speaking of a direct cause of actuality, an indirect cause of actuality, a direct effect of actuality, an indirect effect of actuality, then they are contradictory. Now direct cause and indirect cause are not contradictory. Direct effect and indirect effect are not contradictory. They are synonymous. Whatever is a direct cause is necessarily an indirect cause. Whatever is a direct cause is necessarily an indirect cause. What is an actuality is necessarily a direct cause. Whatever is an actuality is necessarily an indirect cause. If someone asks what the thought is here, whatever is an actuality is necessarily a direct cause because whatever is an actuality is necessarily the direct cause of its own later arising. Whatever is an actuality is necessarily an indirect cause because whatever is an actuality is necessarily an indirect cause of its own later arising's later arising. You've got it, right? Whatever is an actuality is necessarily a direct effect because whatever is an actuality is necessarily the direct effect of its own prior arising. Whatever is an actuality is necessarily a direct effect of its own prior arising. Whatever is an actuality is necessarily an indirect effect because whatever is an actuality is necessarily an indirect effect of its own prior arising's prior arising. In general, those are synonymous. You will come to ascertain this. Now please debate it.

(Two students debate through debate E.3 as in the text, then:)

C: It follows that a common locus of the two, direct cause and non-indirect effect, is not possible.

D: Why?

C: Because that is your own position.

(JH: You said that they are (1) different and (2) a common locus is not possible, right?)

D: The reason is not established.

C: Now it follows that they are not contradictory.

D: I accept it.

(JH: You don't have to start lying now.)

(Student: I am not trying to lie.)

(JH: Oh, you think that is right, huh?)

C: It follows that on the way here today you drank a bottle of liquor.

D: Laughs.

C: It follows that the two, direct cause and non-indirect cause, are synonyms.

D: Why?

C: It follows that they are contradictory.

D: I accept it.

C: Why are the two, direct cause and non-indirect cause, contradictory?

D: Because of (1) being different and (2) a common locus is not possible.

C: It follows that a common locus of the two, direct cause and non-indirect cause, is not possible.

D: I accept it.

C: Why is a common locus of the two, direct cause and non-indirect cause, not possible?

D: (LR: This is the same as the other one, right? It is the same as that one in which it was said that whatever is a cause is necessarily not an effect, right? You have to say that it is because (1) whatever is a direct cause is necessarily an indirect cause and (2) whatever is an indirect cause is necessarily a direct cause.) Since this pervasion is complete, there will not come to be a common locus of the two, direct cause and non-indirect cause, right? There will not come to be something which is a direct cause and a non-indirect cause. Whatever is a direct cause is necessarily an indirect cause. Since there is this pervasion, is there something which is a direct cause and also a non-indirect cause? Is there?)

(Student: There is.)

(LR: What do you posit?)

(S: A later arising of actuality.)

(LR: It follows that the subject, a later arising of actuality, is not an

indirect cause.)

(S: I accept it.)

(LR: It follows that the subject, a later arising of actuality, is an indirect cause because of being an indirect cause of its own later arising's later arising.)

(JH: We're establishing that direct cause and indirect cause are synonyms, so how could anything be a direct cause and not be an indirect cause? You have been saying that all along.)

(S: So they are synonymous.)

(JH: Yes. Now that is direct cause and indirect cause that are synonymous, not direct cause and non-indirect cause. Okay? Direct cause and non-indirect cause are mutually exclusive. Why? Because direct cause and indirect cause are synonyms, are mutually inclusive.) Because direct cause and indirect cause are synonyms.

C: It follows that if the two, direct cause and indirect cause, re synonymous, then a common locus of the two, direct cause and non-indirect cause, is necessarily not possible.

D: I accept it.

(Two students debate through E.4 as in the text, then:)

C: What is the difference between the two, direct effect and non-indirect effect?

D: They are contradictory.

C: It follows that the two, direct effect and non-indirect effect, are contradictory.

D: I accept it.

C: Why are those two contradictory?

D: Because those two are (1) different and (2) a common locus is not possible.

C: It follows that if those two (1) are different and (2) a common locus is not possible, then those two are necessarily contradictory.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that a common locus of the two, direct effect and non-indirect effect, is not possible.

D: I accept it.

C: Why is a common locus of those two not possible?

D: Because (1) whatever is a direct effect is necessarily an indirect effect and (2) whatever is an indirect effect is necessarily a direct effect.

C: It follows that if (1) whatever is a direct effect is necessarily an

indirect effect and (2) whatever is an indirect effect is necessarily a direct effect, then a common locus of the two, direct effect and non-indirect effect, is not necessarily possible.

D: I accept it.

(Two students debate through E.5 as in the text, then:)

C: What is the difference between the two, a cause of actuality and a direct cause of actuality?

D: There are three possibilities.

C: It follows that there are not three possibilities. Posit something which is both.

D: The subject, a prior arising of actuality.

C: It follows that the subject, a prior arising of actuality, is a cause of actuality.

D: I accept it.

C: Why is the subject, a prior arising of actuality, a cause of actuality?

D: Because of being a producer of actuality.

C: It follows that whatever is a producer of actuality is necessarily a cause of actuality.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that whatever is a producer of actuality is necessarily a cause of actuality.

D: I accept it.

C: Why is the subject, a prior arising of actuality, a direct cause of actuality?

D: Because of being a direct producer of actuality.

C: It follows that whatever is a direct producer of actuality is necessarily a direct cause of actuality.

D: I accept it.

C: Now which is necessarily the other? Which is not necessarily the other? Posit something which is one but not the other.

D: Whatever is a direct cause of actuality is necessarily a cause of actuality. Whatever is a cause of actuality is not necessarily a direct cause of actuality. The subject, a prior arising of a prior arising of actuality.

C: It follows that the subject, a prior arising of a prior arising of actuality, is a cause of actuality.

D: I accept it.

C: Why is the subject, a prior arising of a prior arising of actuality, a cause of actuality?

D: Because of being an indirect cause of actuality.
C: It follows that whatever is an indirect cause of actuality is necessarily a cause of actuality.
D: I accept it.
C: It follows that the subject, a prior arising of a prior arising of actuality, is not a direct cause of actuality.
D: I accept it.
C: Why is the subject, a prior arising of a prior arising of actuality, not a direct cause of actuality?
D: Because of being an indirect cause of actuality.
C: It follows that whatever is an indirect cause of actuality is necessarily not a direct cause of actuality.
D: I accept it.
C: Now posit something which is neither.
D: There is something. The subject, an effect of actuality.
C: It follows that the subject, an effect of actuality, is not a cause of actuality.
D: I accept it.
C: Why is the subject, an effect of actuality, not a cause of actuality?
D: Because of not being a producer of actuality.
C: It follows that whatever is not a producer of actuality is necessarily not a cause of actuality.
D: I accept it.
C: It follows that the subject, an effect of actuality, is not a direct cause of actuality.
D: I accept it.
C: Why is the subject, an effect of actuality, not a direct cause of actuality?
D: Because of not being a direct helper of actuality.
C: It follows that whatever is not a direct helper of actuality is necessarily not a direct cause of actuality.
D: I accept it.
C: There are three possibilities.

(The two principals of debate E.6, a direct effect of actuality and an effect of what is produced directly from actuality, are contradictory.)

The two, a cause of actuality and an effect of actuality, are contradictory. The two, a cause of actuality and actuality, are not contradictory. The two, a cause of actuality and actuality, are

established as three possibilities. In the same way there are three possibilities between the two, a cause of actuality and a direct cause of actuality. There are three possibilities between the two, a cause of actuality and an indirect cause of actuality. There are three possibilities between the two, a cause of actuality and a substantial cause of actuality. There are three possibilities between the two, a cause of actuality and a cooperative condition of actuality. They are established as three possibilities, three possibilities, and three possibilities.

In the same way the two, an effect of actuality and actuality, are not contradictory. There are three possibilities. There are three possibilities between the two, an effect of actuality and actuality. There are three possibilities between the two, a direct effect of actuality and actuality. There are three possibilities between the two, an indirect effect of actuality and actuality. There are three possibilities between the two, a substantial effect of actuality and actuality. There are three possibilities between the two, a cooperative effect of actuality and actuality. It is like that. You understand the dissimilar types of effects, right? It is like that.

Now in the same way you have to apply this over to other things--pot, pillar, and so forth. The procedure is the same. All of the actualities the beings of which are possible are the same. The procedure is the same for all actualities the being of which is possible. Well, actuality-which-is-one-with-actuality is a little unlike the others. This is not so for the two, actuality-which-is-one-with-actuality and a cause of actuality-which-is-one-with actuality. There are not three possibilities. They are contradictory. Even though it is an object of knowledge the being of which is possible. Actuality-which-is-one-with actuality is an actuality the being of which is possible, right? Even though actuality-which-is-one-with- actuality is an actuality the being of which is possible, if you are asked whether it and its causes have three possibilities, it does not. They are contradictory. Whatever is actuality-which-is-one-with-actuality is necessarily one-with-actuality. Whatever is a cause of actuality-which-is-one-with-actuality is necessarily different from actuality. These will not come together. They are contradictory. In the same way the two, pot-which-is-one-with-pot and a cause of pot-which-is-one-with-pillar and a cause of pillar-which-is-one-with-pillar, are contradictory.

Now for actualities the being of which is not possible, the two, it and its cause, are contradictory. The two, the two--a pillar and a pot--

and the cause of the two--a pillar and a pot, are contradictory. The two, the two--a pillar and a pot and an effect of the two--a pillar and a pot, are contradictory. The two, the two--a golden pot and a copper pot--and a cause of the two--a golden pot and a copper pot, are contradictory. The two, the two--a golden pot and a copper pot--and an effect of the two--a golden pot and a copper pot, are contradictory. For example, there is nothing which is the two--a pillar and a pot--and also is a cause of the two--a pillar and a pot. There is nothing which is the two--a pillar and a pot. It is like that. Now posit this to the others.

Now for the permanent phenomena there is nothing to call their causes and effects. For example, there is nothing to posit as a cause of object of knowledge and there is nothing to posit as an effect of object of knowledge. There is nothing to posit as a cause of permanent phenomenon or an effect of permanent phenomenon. This that is called causes and effects is posited only for actualities. There is none for a permanent phenomenon. In the system of the Sautantikas such does not exist, but in the system of the Vaibhashikas there is something to be posited. In the system of the Sautrantikas there is nothing at all to posit. This is for the Sautrantikas and above. The Sautrantikas, the Chittamatrins, and the Madhyamikas do not posit a cause or effect of a permanent phenomenon, but the Vaibhashikas do posit one. We will forget about this and set aside the Vaibhashika system. For the Sautrantikas and above they do not explain a cause or effect for a permanent phenomenon. There is not one. Now this is a non-existent.

Now then the two, actuality and a cause of actuality, are different substantial entities (rdzas tha dad). There is a relationship between them, but they are different substantial entities. They are something which is related and they are different substantial entities. For example, there are two types of different substantial entities: those that have a relationship and those that do not have a relationship. There are the two, different substantial entities which are related and different substantial entities which related and different substantial entities which are unrelated. The two, actuality and a cause of actuality, are different substantial entities which have a relationship. They are different substantial entities and they have a relationship. Okay, right? The two, actuality and an effect of actuality, are different substantial entities and have a relationship. If someone asks what the relationship is, it is the relationship of being arisen from that (de 'byung 'brel). This is the relationship of causes and effects. It is called

"arisen from that." The two, actuality and a cause of actuality, have a relationship, the relationship of being arisen from that. The two, an effect of actuality and actuality, have a relationship, the relationship of being arisen from that. Now in the same way you can apply this over to other causes and effects. Okay, right?

For example, the two, you and your mother, have a relationship, the relationship of being arisen from that. The two, you and your father, have a relationship, the relationship of being arisen from that. You understand, right?

Now if someone asks whether or not the two of you (Don and Dan) have a relationship, there is none. This is the different substantial entities which do not have a relationship. This is the unrelated. It is like that. You two are different substantial entities. The two, a pillar and a pot, are different substantial entities. This is called unrelated and factually other ('brel med don gzhan). Factually other things which are unrelated. This is what is called different substantial entities which are unrelated. Something like the two--a pillar and a pot, the two--the eastern direction and the western direction, the two--the above and the below. These are all unrelated and different substantial entities.

This that is called the same substantial entity and different substantial entities are not said for permanent phenomena. What is called a permanent phenomenon is not established as a substantial entity. Whatever is established as a substantial entity is necessarily an actuality in the system of the Sautrantikas. This too is different in the system of the Vaibhashikas. In the Vaibhashika system there are two, impermanent phenomena which are to be posited as substantially established and permanent phenomena which are to be posited as substantially established. In the systems of Sautrantika and above since they assert substantial establishment they understand only caused phenomena in this way and it does not go to others. In the Prasangika system substantial establishment is not asserted. For those that do assert substantial establishment in the systems of Sautrantika and above, they understand only caused phenomena and do not understand others. Except for actualities there is nothing else to posit. When you speak of that which is substantially established, substantial establishment is not posited for permanent phenomena. Now okay, right? Being the same substantial entity or different substantial entities is not said for anything except actualities. Okay? There is nothing to be understood as permanent

phenomena which is the same substantial entities or different substantial entities.

For permanent phenomena when you are speaking of all phenomena, what must be explained is being the same essence or being the same entity. This pervades all phenomena. It is like that. If you apply this to the basis of caused phenomena, if they are the same entity, then they are necessarily the same substantial entity. In reference to the basis of caused phenomena, those which are the same entity are called the same essence. Those which are the same essence are called the same substantial entity. When these two, the same entity and the same essence, are applied to a caused phenomenon they become the same. If you apply it over to a permanent phenomenon, an uncaused phenomenon, they become separate. For instance, the two, permanent phenomenon and generally characterized phenomenon, are said to be the same entity, but they are not said to be the same substantial entity. They are not the same substantial entity because of not being substantially established. Now you've got it, right? It is like that.

For that which is called the same substantial entity, there is nothing except caused phenomena to posit. But that which is called the same essence is applied on to other things. That which is called the same entity is to be applied to all objects of knowledge. You've got, right? Now the same substantial entity and different substantial entity is not to be applied to anything other than this.

Now since they are causes and effects, they are necessarily different substantial entities. Since they are unrealized and factually other they are necessarily different substantial entities. For that which is unrelated, factually other, and actualities they are different substantial entities.

Now when you speak of being the same substantial entity, the two, product and impermanent phenomenon, are the same substantial entity. Now earlier we spoke of a lot of phenomena synonymous with actuality--actuality, product, impermanent phenomenon, the momentary, specifically characterized phenomenon, manifest phenomenon, ultimate truth, that which is able to perform a function. These are all the same entity. For example, the two, product and impermanent phenomenon, are the same entity, the same essence, and the same substantial entity. It is like that.

Now then there is this. This (product and impermanent phenomenon) is called the same substantial entities without there

being a greater and lesser pervasion. They are the same substantial entity without there being a greater and lesser pervasion. For things which are the same entity and things which are the same substantial entity, one must posit the two, those which have greater and lesser pervasions and those which do not have greater and lesser pervasions. The two, product and impermanent phenomenon, are the same substantial entity, the same entity, and the same essence which do not have a greater and lesser pervasion. There are all of those that are synonyms--product, impermanent phenomenon, actuality, right? These are all the same substantial entity, the same entity, and the same essence which do not have a greater and lesser pervasion. (JH: There is no difference in their extent. If you draw a circle, the circles would be of the same size.)

Now for example, pot is a phenomenon which is the same entity as actuality. Pot is a phenomenon which is the same essence as actuality, the same substantial entity as actuality, and the same entity as actuality. Do you understand? Actuality is a phenomenon which is the same entity as pot, the same substantial entity as pot, and the same essence as pot. They are phenomena which are the same substantial entity and have a greater and lesser pervasion. These are something which has a greater and a lesser pervasion. Okay, right?

There are those who assert that actuality is not a phenomenon which is the same entity as pot, but pot is a phenomenon which is the same entity as actuality. There are such asserters. Even though there are such persons when you debate this, if they accept this then what do you have to say? If you assert a generality which is factually other than its instances, then you have asserted a generality which is a substantial entity other than its instances, it is an entity other than its instances, and it is an object other than its instances. If you assert that there is a generality which is factually other than its instances, then the instances are factually other than the generality. (JH: If you say that pot is the same substantial entity as thing, but thing was not the same substantial entity as pot, then eventually you would have to say that it was a different substantial entity from all of its instances in which case it would then be like a non-Buddhist permanent, partless one.) Okay, right? Actuality is a phenomenon which is the same entity as pot, as pillar, as matter, as consciousness. You have to say that it goes down to them like that. Then matter, consciousness, pillar, the two--a pillar and a pot, and so on are phenomena which are the same entity as actuality. You have to say they goes up that way.

This is it.

Now for example, actuality goes up as a phenomenon which is the same entity as object of knowledge, but it is not the same substantial entity. Actuality is a phenomenon which is the same entity as object of knowledge, pot is a phenomenon which is the same entity as object of knowledge, pillar is a phenomenon which is the same essence as object of knowledge. When you go up, you say it like that.

Now there is something which comes later. Is it to be said that whatever is an instance of actuality is necessarily a phenomenon which is the same entity as actuality and a phenomenon which is the same substantial entity as actuality. Whatever is an instance of object of knowledge is necessarily a phenomenon which is the same entity as object of knowledge and a phenomenon which is the same essence as object of knowledge. It goes up like that. Now this will come later in generalities and instances. If you put this in mind, it will be good, right? They go up like that. You've got it, right? Now then that will come later.

Usually, the meaning of being the same substantial entity is posited this way. For example, blue appears to a direct perceiver and what does not appear as separate from the blue to a direct perceiver, that which appears to a direct perceiver and does not appear in this way, then those two are the same substantial entity. (JH: So we are talking of what is the meaning of one substantial entity. If a blue is appearing, from what I understood, if a blue is appearing to a sense direct perceiver--to the eye consciousness, are the things in question appearing like that or not?) It is like this, the meaning of being phenomena which are the same substantial entity, is that (1) they appear to a direct perceiver and (2) they do not appear separately. It must appear. Whatever does not appear separately to a direct perceiver is not necessarily the same substantial entity. There is the horn of a rabbit and the permanent phenomena, right? (JH: There is nothing said about blue. It appears to the senses and does not appear as separate. It appears to the senses--a sense direct perceiver--and does not appear as separate. He did not give any example.) This will not obtain as the definition of being the same substantial entity. It is not able to pervade. For example, it is to be applied to form, sound, and so forth. What is to be applied in general is this: that which (1) appears to a direct perceiver and (2) does not appear as separate. This is to be put in general. This comes as that which is to be posited as the definition of the same substantial entities. That which (1)

appears to a direct perceiver and (2) does not appear separately. It appears to a direct perceiver and it does not appear as separately. In general it is applied with respect to a direct perceiver. If you apply it to the sense direct perceivers, there are a lot of actualities which are not objects of the sense direct perceivers. It is not able to pervade.

(JH: So we might say that when explaining it, but when giving the definition we just say that which appears to a direct perceiver--not specifying a sense direct perceiver--and does not appear to be different.) Now if this appears to a direct perceiver, what is called the same substantial entity is produced from its causes and it is produced as the same entity, it is referred to as the same substantial entity. When it is produced from causes. (JH: So if when it is produced from its causes, it is produced as one entity then it is one substantial entity.) If two which are the same entity are produced from causes, these two which are the same substantial entity are produced from causes, then they are the same substantial entity. Thus, one posits a difference between the two, the same substantial entity and the same substantial type (rdzas rigs gcig ba). (JH: So they make a difference between one substantial entity and one type of substantial entity.) Whatever is the same substantial type is not necessarily the same substantial entity. For example, there are the two, a large and a small barley seed produced from a single head which is their substantial cause. The two, a large and a small barley seed produced from a single head which is their substantial cause, are the same type of substantial entity. The two, the substantial entity of the large seed and the substantial entity of the small seed, are the same type. These two are not the same substantial entity. It has arrived, right? These two are not the same substantial entity. These two appear as that, right? They appear to a direct perceiver and then the two, a large seed and a small seed, appear as that, right? Thus, this is the reason they are not the same substantial entity. They are produced from causes but they are not the same entity. They are the same type of substantial entity, but they are not the same substantial entity.

In the same way there is a difference between the two, the same type (rigs gcig pa) and the same essence (bdag nyid gcig pa). For example, we are the same type. Being humans we are the same type, right? The two, a black and a white horse, being horses are the same type, right? For example, whatever is an ox, these black and white oxen, being oxen are the same type, right? Even so they are not the same essence. They are the same type. They are not the same

essence. They are not the same essence. You've got it, right? There are a lot of things which you can say are the same type. For example, (gi rigs gyi mi) people of one caste and (trang gi rigs gyi mi) and people of another caste are the same type as being humans. Even though they are the same type as being humans they are not the same type as being caste members. One is one caste and the other is another caste. (JH: If you go up to people of different castes and ask them are they the same--it is the same word--caste, the same type, they answer yes as being humans but not as being of this other type of type.) With respect to being the same type, there are a lot to say--being the same type as being humans, the same type as being common beings, the same type as being sentient beings, the same type as having the same lot, the same type as not having the same lot, the same type as being dull, the same type as being bright. There are a lot of things which are the type. Whoever is a monk is the same type as being a monk. ~~Whoever is a Tibetan is the same type as being a monk.~~ Whoever is a layman is the same type as being a layman. It is said like that. For things which are the same type there must be several. There is nothing to posit that is one. You have ascertained it, right? This which is called the same type is like that. For example, we are all the same as being sentient beings--horses, oxen, bugs, and so on. If someone asks if we are all the same type, you have to say that we are not. We are the same as being sentient beings but we are not the same type. Now you've got it, right? When this is said, there is a slight harmer. For instance, if someone asks if you two are the same type and you say no, then he says the two, a black and a white horse, are not the same type. If you say that it is not, this was clearly said, right? Whatever is the same type is not necessarily the same essence. If you ask why, it is because of it says the subject, the two--a black and a white horse. In general, they are posited as the same type, right? If this is so, then you two are the same type. If this is so, then it may be said that the two separate castes are the same type. It is a little uncomfortable. What is the same type? If they are the same type, then what is the type? They are the same type as being humans. From one point of view you can say that they are the same type as being humans but in general the two separate castes are not the same type, but it is very difficult to give an answer. In the Abhidharmakosha such an answer is given. (LR recites quote from Kosha. Developing from this quote he speaks of four types of answers: go cik ba'i len, rnam pa dri nas len, dri ba'i len, shak pa'i

len) (JH: So the second one was differentiating type and if you ask, "Is this person superior?" then you have to ask in relation to whom. So it involves questioning, interagation. Answer upon interagation. (JH: In dependence on somebody above you, you are below. In dependence on somebody below you, you are above. So you have to ask what the frame of reference is.) For example, if someone asks whether you are great, (you have to ask) in relation to whom. Now there are many greater than you, right? There are those greater and taller in body, right? In view of them I am small. From their point of view they are large. You can give that sort of answer. Do you have it? (JH Translating: Another type of answer is not to answer. You just leave it. That is for the fourteen inexpressible views. These Buddha did not answer because there would be fault if he said yes and fault if he said no.) For example, such things come, right? For example, if a person had committed robbery and murder and we know who did it when it happened we were with him. When a policeman comes and asks if he is the thief, if we answer yes it is not suitable. If you say he is, it will bring harm to the person. If we say he is not, it is not suitable because it is a lie. He is the thief, right? Thus, you keep your mouth shut. (JH Translating: So one amongst us committed robbery and murder and the police came in and said, you know, is this the person is this the one. Even though you knew if you said the person is the one, then it would harm the person. If you said it wasn't, then it would harm the police. So you just remain quiet.) There a lot like that. There are a lot of that type. There are four ways of giving answers.

Now how did we start talking about this? Oh, having to do with the same type. When someone says it is the same type or not, you can give any of the four types of answers. (JH: The first type of answer was a direct answer. I guess when you immediately begin debating or something like that.) Now you got it, right?

Now if we do not reckon the three and four possibilities on causes and effects some, it will not be set in mind. You will remain confused. There are three possibilities between the two, actuality and a cause of actuality. You give the points. How do you give them? How do you give the possibilities between the two, actuality and a cause of actuality? What do you posit as both? How do you posit which is necessarily the other, which is not necessarily the other, and something which is one and not the other? What do you posit as neither? One of you do it. Say it. (JH: I hope someone can because I can't.) (Student: There are three possibilities between the two,

actuality and a cause of actuality.) LR: What do you posit as both? Go around and each of you posit a subject. Students: The subject, a prior arising of actuality; the subject, a prior arising of a prior arising of actuality; the subject, a substantial cause of actuality; the subject, a person who is a cause of actuality; the subject, a cooperative condition of actuality; the subject, mud which is a cause of actuality. LR: You are thinking of a pot. It is not pot, it is actuality. Is actuality made of mud? Student: Some are. There probably is. There is a pot which is a cause of actuality. There of a pillar which is a cause of actuality. There could be mud which is a cause of actuality. There could be. Now say what yours is. S: The subject, a pot which is a cause of actuality.

Now which is necessarily the other? Which is not necessarily the other? Posit something which is one but not the other. S: Whatever is a cause of actuality is necessarily an actuality. Whatever is an actuality is not necessarily a cause of actuality. Posit it. Posit it. Posit it. S: The subject, the flame of a butter lamp in its final moment. LR: What is this? Of course, it is okay. What is the need for positing the flame of a butter lamp in its last moment? What is your thought? It certainly is okay, but what is your thought? Are you thinking that since it is final it will not serve as a cause of actuality? Is it? If you posited a pot, would it be okay? Would it be okay or would it not? S: It would not be okay.

LR as Challenger: Oh, it follows that if one posited a pot, it would not be okay.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, a pot, is a cause of actuality.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, a pot, is not a cause of actuality because of not being a different substantial entity from actuality; because of being an instance of actuality.

(LR: Whatever is an instance of actuality is necessarily not a cause of actuality. Whatever is an instance of actuality is necessarily not an effect of actuality. It is the same essence as actuality, right? Earlier we spoke of that which is the same essence as actuality and that which is the same substantial entity as actuality, right? Because a pot is the same substantial entity as actuality; because a pot is the same essence as actuality. I thought when you said, "The subject, the flame of a butter lamp in its final moment," that you were thinking crookedly

and you were. Now what do you posit?)

JH: He is throwing a real curve at us, a huge curve.

LR: You can posit any of these--pot, pillar, golden pot, person, matter, or consciousness. Do you understand?

S: I do not understand.

LR: Oh, whatever is a cause of actuality is necessarily an actuality. Whatever is an actuality is not necessarily a cause of actuality. The subject, a pot. There is a pot which is a cause of actuality, but a pot is not a cause of actuality. You have confused this now. A pot which is a cause of actuality is a cause of actuality. A pot is not a cause of actuality. You have to split them that way. I wonder if you understand?

S: I understand.

LR: Oh, there is a pot which is a cause of actuality, there is a pillar which is a cause of actuality, there is a person who is a cause of actuality. A pot which is the cause of actuality is a cause of actuality. Is a pot a cause of actuality? It is not. A pillar which is a cause of actuality is a cause of actuality. Is a pillar a cause of actuality? It is not. There is a pot which is an effect of actuality. Is a pot an effect of actuality? It is not. A pillar which is a cause of actuality is a cause of actuality. Is a pillar a cause of actuality is a cause of actuality. Is a pillar a cause of actuality? It is not. Now it is to be posited in that way. Now is your head big? Do you have it? Now whatever is a cause of actuality is necessarily an actuality. Whatever is an actuality is not necessarily a cause of actuality. Now posit it. Then posit them one by one.

C: Now posit it.

D: The subject, a later arising of actuality.

(LR: Oh, if you say that, it too is okay.)

C: It follows that the subject, a later arising of actuality, is not a cause of actuality.

D: I accept it.

C: Why is it not?

D: Because of being an effect of actuality.

C: Oh, that is okay. Now you (another student) posit something which is an actuality but not a cause of actuality.

D: The subject, an effect of actuality. The subject, a direct effect of actuality.

(LR: You do not have to specify an effect. You can say the subject, a pot; the subject, a pillar; and so on.)

(JH: You are on the wrong track again, thinking that you have to specify an effect. None of us has understood why any of this is. None has, I doubt.)

LR: Explain your thought.

S: Whatever is a cause of actuality is necessarily an actuality. I understand this. Whatever is an actuality is not necessarily a cause of actuality. I do not understand this.

LR: Whatever is an actuality is not necessarily a cause of actuality. The subject, a pot. The subject, you. You are not a cause of actuality. You are not a prior arising of actuality, are you? Do you understand?

S: I understand.

LR: A pot is not a prior arising of actuality. A pot is not a cause of actuality. If a pot were a cause of actuality, then the two, a pot and actuality, would have to be different substantial entities. Then actuality would have to be a later arising of a pot. Do you understand? You have to say that a pot is not a cause of actuality. You have to say that there is a pot which is a cause of actuality. This is not to be confused. Now posit it.

D: The subject, a pot.

C: Posit something which is an actuality but is not a cause of actuality.

D: The subject, a chair.

C: The subject, a chair? (Laughs) Now you posit something which is an actuality but is not a cause of actuality.

D: The subject, a person.

C: What do you posit?

D: The subject, a table.

C: Now of you two one has posited a chair and one has posited a table. You will have to put the chair with the table. Now this is okay. There are three possibilities between the two, actuality and a cause of actuality. There are three possibilities between the two, actuality and an effect of actuality. What do you posit as both?

D: The subject, a later arising of actuality.

C: Now what do you posit as an actuality and an effect of actuality. Posit something which is both.

D: The subject, an effect of actuality.

C: That is also okay.

JH: Rinbochay, this pillar is a cause, right?

LR: Yes.

JH: It is the cause of an actuality, right? It is not the cause of a permanent phenomenon, right? (He specifies that it is the cause of a

or one actuality.)

LR: No it is not. It is not.

JH: It is the cause of an actuality, right?

LR: It is the cause of an actuality.

JH: Then is it not a cause of actuality?

LR: No, it is not.

JH: Why is this?

LR: It is a cause of that actuality which is called a cause, right? kyod rang (Rgyu yin ser gyi dngos po 'di gyi rgyu red gyi yod pa red pa.) It is not a cause of actuality. The two, actuality and it, are the same substantial entity, right? They are not different substantial entities, right? It is not established as a prior arising of actuality, right?

JH to class: That is all he keeps saying--is that actuality is of one entity

with this and that if it was going to be the cause of anything, then it would have to be a different entity from it.

LR: When you say that it is a cause of an actuality, you are thinking that it is a cause of an actuality which is a cause, right? If you asked if it is a cause of actuality, this refers to whether or not it is a cause of actuality.

JH: He says you are thinking of like actuality in general. Since this cup is one entity, one substantial entity, with actuality it cannot be the cause of that actuality although it can be the cause of an actuality.

C: Now posit something which is an actuality and is an effect of actuality. There are a lot. There are really a lot. Posit it.

D: The subject, a prior arising of actuality.

C: That has been posited.

D: Something which is an effect of actuality and is an actuality?

C: Yes. Like we posited as causes of actuality. There are a lot. The subject, a pot which is a later arising of actuality. The subject, a pillar which is a later arising of actuality. The subject, a person who is a later arising of actuality. The subject, a non--associated compositional factor which is a later arising of actuality. The subject, a consciousness which is a later arising of actuality. All of these are to be posited. The subject, a pot which is an effect of actuality. The subject, a pillar which is an effect of actuality. And also the subject, a pot which is a later arising of actuality. The subject, a pillar which is a later arising of actuality. Like these. These are all to be posited. Okay? Now do not be confused. That is okay. Now what is the difference between the two, actuality and a direct cause of actuality?

There are three possibilities. Now posit something which is both.

D: The subject, a prior arising of actuality.

C: Now you posit one.

D: The subject, a pot which is a prior arising of actuality.

C: Now you give one.

D: The subject, a person who is a prior arising of actuality.

C: Okay.

D: The subject, a pillar which is a prior arising of actuality. The subject, a flower which is a prior arising of actuality. The subject, a table which is a prior arising of actuality. The subject a path of seeing which is a prior arising of actuality.

...

C(LR): Whatever is a prior producer of actuality is necessarily a direct cause of actuality. Now how do you posit which is necessarily the other, which is not necessarily the other, and something which is the one and not the other?

D: Whatever is a direct cause of actuality is necessarily an actuality. Whatever is an actuality is not necessarily a direct cause of actuality.

C: Posit it.

D: The subject, a pot.

C: Now everyone posit their thoughts on this.

D: The subject, a person.

The subject, a pillar.

C: Now you only have one thought on this. You can also think of the subject, a prior arising of a prior arising of actuality. You can also think of a later arising of actuality. You can also think of that which is simultaneous with actuality itself. There are several dissimilar subjects. What do you posit?

D: The subject, a prior arising of a prior arising of actuality.

C: Oh, there is like that too. Now what do you posit?

D: The subject, a pot which is a prior arising of a prior arising of actuality.

C: What do you posit?

D: The subject, a rosary which is a prior arising of a prior arising of actuality.

The subject, a wisdom consciousness realizing selflessness which is a prior arising of actuality.

C: What is that?

D: The subject, a wisdom consciousness which is a prior arising of actuality.

C: It follows that the subject, a wisdom consciousness which is a prior arising of actuality, is not a direct cause of actuality.

D: Why?

C: Amazing

D: The subject, a wisdom consciousness which is a prior arising of a prior arising of actuality.

C: Oh, those like that work, right? Whatever is a direct cause of actuality is necessarily an actuality. Whatever is an actuality is not necessarily a direct cause of actuality. The subject, a pot. The subject, a pillar. The subject, a prior arising of a prior arising of actuality. The subject, a later arising of actuality. The subject, a later arising of a later arising of actuality. There are a lot of subjects.

Okay?

In the same way, there are three possibilities between the two, actuality and indirect cause of actuality. Posit something which is both.

D: The subject, I.

C: What do you posit?

D: The subject, the color of a white flower which is a later arising of a later arising of actuality.

C: Now you posit something which is both.

D: The subject, a person who is a later arising of a later arising of actuality.

C: Now which is necessarily the other? Which is not necessarily the other? Posit something which is one and not the other.

D: Whatever is an indirect cause of actuality is necessarily an indirect cause of actuality. The subject, a pot which is a prior arising of actuality.

C: Now then there are three possibilities between the two, a cause of actuality and direct cause of actuality. Posit something which is both. What do you posit as a cause of actuality and a direct cause of actuality?

D: The subject, the color of a ruby which is a prior arising of actuality.

C: What is that? It is a direct cause of actuality and it is a cause of actuality. Why is it a direct cause of actuality?

D: Because of being a direct producer of actuality.

C: Why is it a cause of actuality?

D: Because of being a producer of actuality.

C: Or you could say, "because it is direct cause of actuality." Which is necessarily the other? Which is not necessarily the other? Posit

something which is one and not the other.

D: Whatever is a direct cause of actuality is necessarily a direct cause of actuality. Whatever is an actuality is not necessarily a direct cause of actuality. The subject, the color of a white flower which is a prior arising of a prior arising of actuality.

C: Now that is okay. Now is the difference between the two, indirect cause of actuality and cause of actuality? Now you can do this, right?

D: There are three possibilities.

C: Oh, there are three possibilities. Posit something which is both. Now posit right away something which is both, which is necessarily the other, which is not necessarily the other, and something which is one and not the other.

D: The subject, a television which is a prior arising of a prior arising of actuality, is something which is both. Whatever is an indirect cause of actuality is necessarily a cause of actuality. Whatever is a cause of actuality is not necessarily an indirect cause of actuality. The subject, a television which is a prior arising of actuality.

Now it is like that. You can figure such as these for the effects of actuality. Think about them individually and figure the three possibilities and the four possibilities for each of them. Apply it to a pot. Apply it to a pillar. Apply it to actuality. Now there are three possibilities between

the two, substantial cause of actuality and cause of actuality. There are three possibilities between the two, substantial cause of actuality and actuality. There are three possibilities between the two, cooperative condition of actuality and actuality. There are three possibilities between the two, cooperative condition of actuality and cause of actuality. There are three possibilities between the two, substantial cause of actuality and direct cause of actuality (??). There are three possibilities between the two, substantial cause of actuality and indirect cause of actuality (??). There are three possibilities between the two, cooperative condition of actuality and direct cause of actuality (??). There are three possibilities between the two, cooperative condition of actuality and indirect cause of actuality (??). There are three possibilities, three possibilities, three possibilities. Think about these and figure them out. In the same way this is to be applied to pot, pillar, and whatever. Okay, right? Is it to be applied over to them.

Now you understood about substantial cause and cooperative

condition earlier, right? For example, if it is done for a sprout, what is a seed? The seed that is planted. It is the substantial cause. (JH: Answer if you know. If you do know, answer. Don't sit there ...) If we apply it to a flower, you will understand. What is the seed that is planted? It is the substantial cause of a flower. What are the earth, water, and air? They are the cooperative conditions. (JH: Answer as loud as you can.)

For example, if we apply this to ourselves. If it is posited for you, what is the substantial cause of your body? It is the semen and blood of your father and mother. The accumulated action in a former lifetime, the action which served as a helper for your body is a cooperative condition of your body. Now what do you posit as the substantial cause of your mind? The former mind. For example, the substantial cause of your mind of today is your mind of yesterday. When you posit the substantial cause of your mind of yesterday, it is the mind of day before yesterday. The substantial cause of your mind of this lifetime is posited as your mind of the former lifetime. The substantial cause of the mind of the former lifetime is the mind of an earlier former lifetime. The cooperative conditions of the mind of this lifetime are the action of a former birth the two--one's father and mother. The two--your father and mother--are cooperative conditions of your body. In this life there are the actions of mi che ya gyi las, right? These too are cooperative conditions of your body and cooperative conditions of your mind. It must be applied in this way. It is something to think about. Okay, right?

For example, for somebody who is going to become a Buddha before he is Buddhified he must establish the causes of producing a Buddha's body. This is the substantial cause of the body of a Buddha. There is a cause of establishing a Buddha's body. One must accumulate a great deal of merit. This is all a cooperative condition of the body of a Buddha. You've got it, right? For example, if we establish the altruistic attitude in our minds, that is a substantial cause of being able to become a Buddha. It goes up like that. It goes down too. From wherever it comes.

Now think about this and you can apply it anywhere. Apply these direct cause, indirect cause, substantial cause, and cooperative condition to wood, flowers, a house, and whatever. Think about it. Then you will understand well. Think about the three possibilities, and four possibilities one by one. Okay, right?

Probably that is that. Earlier we got the one about being and

permanent phenomenon, right? The one that said, "Because of being both something which something is and a permanent phenomenon." Have you ascertained it? It is at the end of opposite from being and opposite from not being. You debate it.

... (recorder stopped for a moment)

C: It follows that it is both something which something is and a permanent phenomenon because being it is a permanent phenomenon. It follows that being it is both something which is a permanent phenomenon and a permanent phenomenon because being it is a permanent phenomenon.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows that being it is a permanent phenomenon because of (1) being an existent and (2) not being an actuality.

D: The second part of the reason is not established.

C: It follows that it is an actuality because of being an actuality.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that there is a cause of it because it is an actuality.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that it is produced from its cause because there is a cause of it.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that it is the effect of its cause because it is produced from its cause.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that it is related with its cause as arisen from that because it is produced from its cause.

(You can say either "because you accepted it" or "because it is produced from its causes.")

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that if its cause does not exist, then it necessarily does not exist because it is related with its cause as arisen from that.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, object of knowledge, that it does not exist because its cause does not exist.

D: The reason is not established.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, object of knowledge, that its cause does not exist because it is a permanent phenomenon.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that if something is a permanent phenomenon, then its cause necessarily does not exist.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows with respect to the subject, object of knowledge, that its cause does not exist.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that it is not the case that if its cause does not exist, then it necessarily does not exist.

D: I accept it.

C: If there is no pervasion, then it follows that it is not related with its cause as arisen from that.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that it is not produced from its cause.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that it is not an effect of its causes.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that it is not produced from its causes.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that a cause of it does not exist.

D: I accept it.

it is an actuality because of (1) being an
and (2) not being a permanent phenomenon.

C: It follows that it is a permanent phenomenon because of (1) being an existent and (2) not being an actuality.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, only-a-permanent-phenomenon, is a permanent phenomenon.

D: I accept it.

C: It follows that the subject, only-a-permanent-phenomenon, is an existent because of being a permanent phenomenon.