

Go-mang Collected Topics

Nga-wang-tra-shi (*ngag dbang bkra shis*)

The Collected Topics by A Spiritual Son of Jam-yang-shay-pa

Great Eloquent Explanation Demonstrating for the Three Levels of Intelligence—Low, Medium, and High—the Meanings of (Dharmakīrti's) Commentary, the Great Treatise Commenting on the Thought of Valid Cognition, Collated into a Single Text: Necklace for Scholars, Fulfilling All Hopes of the Fortunate

tshad ma'i dgongs 'grel gyi bcos chen po rnam 'grel gyi don gcig tu dril ba blo rab 'bring tha ma gsum ston pa legs bshad chen po mkhas pa'i mgul brgyan skal bzang re ba kun skong; TBRC W1KG1940-11KG1942-3-384

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21. Presentation of Negatives and Positives

Translation by Jeffrey Hopkins, utilizing a new style and a now available Tibetan text^a and making liberal use of Anne C. Klein's earlier translation (done with his guidance and approval for her Ph.D. dissertation at the University of Virginia) which was published in her *Knowing, Naming, and Negation* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 1988), 88-113. The new translation includes oral comments by Jam-pal-shen-pen^b drawn from Klein's translation. See also Anne C. Klein, *Knowledge and Liberation: A Buddhist Epistemological Analysis in Support of Transformative Religious Experience* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 1986).

In the refutations:

blue = true statement

red = untrue statement

Refutation of others' systems

REFUTATION #1 (451.18/131b.5)

Incorrect side: **Whatever is an effective thing^c is necessarily a positive.^d**

Correct side: It [absurdly] follows that **the subject, impermanent sound, is a positive** because of **being an effective thing**. You have accepted the entailment [that **whatever is an effective thing is necessarily a positive.**]^e

If you accept [that **impermanent sound is a positive**], it follows that **the subject, impermanent sound, is not a positive** because of **being a negative**.

It follows [that **the subject, impermanent sound, is a negative**] because of (1) **being a phenomenon that must be realized through an explicit elimination of its own object of negation by the awareness explicitly realizing it** and (2) **being a phenomenon that must be expressed through an explicit elimination of its own object of negation by the term expressing it**. The

^a TBRC W1KG1940-I1KG1942-3-384 edition which is a reproduction from the *bkra shis 'khyil* blocks in 1984, 131b.5-136b.2; this corresponds to the (error laden) green codex edition in India, *The Collected Topics by a Spiritual Son of Jam-yang-shay-pa Sras bsdus grva* (n.p., n.d.), 451.18ff.

^b Jam-pal-shen-pen (1919-1988) received his ge-she degree from Gan-den Jang-tse College, entered the Tantric College of Lower Lhasa, became its Abbot, and eventually became the ninety-eighth Throneholder of Ganden, the head of the Ge-luk-pa order.

^c *dngos po, bhāva*.

^d *ma yin dgag, paryudāsapratishedha*.

^e Jam-pal-shen-pen in oral commentary says (adapted from Klein, *Knowing, Naming, and Negation*, 93):

Most other Ge-luk-pa texts say that impermanent sound is a positive. According to this text, however, impermanence itself as well as impermanent sound are negatives.

second reason [that is, that impermanent sound is a phenomenon that must be expressed through an explicit elimination of its own object of negation by the term expressing it,] is established because of being that which is expressed in the verbal reading as impermanent sound upon explicit elimination—by the term expressing impermanent sound—that sound is permanent. The case is similar also with respect to an awareness apprehending impermanent sound.^b

REFUTATION #2 (452.14/132a.2)

[This debate revolves around the way negatives are expressed in Tibetan.]

Incorrect side: Whatever is a phenomenon whose actual name^c ends in the [Tibetan] word “med”^d is necessarily a nonaffirming negative.^e

Correct side: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, Buddha-Whose-Life-Is-Limitless^f is a nonaffirming negative because of being a phenomenon whose own actual name ends in the syllable “less.” You have asserted the entailment [that whatever is a phenomenon whose own actual name ends in the syllable “less” is necessarily a nonaffirming negative].

If you say [that the reason, that is, that the Buddha-Whose-Life-Is-Limitless is a phenomenon whose actual name ends in the syllable “less,”] is not established, it follows [that the subject, the Buddha-Whose-Life-Is-Limitless, is a phenomenon whose actual name ends in the syllable “less”] because (1) the term expressing “Buddha-Whose-Life-Is-Limitless” is his actual name and (2) it is manifestly established that the syllable “less” is affixed at the end of that term.

If you accept [the root consequence] that the Buddha-Whose-Life-Is-Limitless is a nonaffirming negative, it follows that the subject, the Buddha-Whose-Life-Is-Limitless, is not a nonaffirming negative because of being an effective thing.

If you say that there is no entailment [that whatever is an effective thing is necessarily not a nonaffirming negative], it follows that there is such entailment because whatever is a

^a *tshig zin*.

^b Jam-pal-shen-pen in oral commentary says (adapted from Klein, *Knowing, Naming, and Negation*, 94):

The monastic colleges other than Go-mang maintain that even though the literal phrase “impermanent sound” does explicitly eliminate permanent sound, when impermanent sound is realized, permanent sound is not explicitly eliminated. Rather, momentarily disintegrating sound is explicitly established but permanent sound is not explicitly eliminated by an awareness realizing impermanent sound. Momentary disintegration is mainly what appears. Hence, for these colleges impermanent sound is a positive. According to all colleges, whether something is positive or negative does not depend on the literal words expressing or naming that thing, but on how the phenomenon appears to the mind. Even if the term expressing a phenomenon does not contain negative words or syllables such as “not,” “less,” “im,” and so forth, if the way that object appears to the mind is through the explicit elimination of an object of negation, it is a negative. All colleges, including Go-mang, agree on this. Therefore, although according to Go-mang whatever has a negative particle necessarily expresses a negative, all negatives are not necessarily expressed by terms having negative particles.

^c *dnogs ming* as opposed to imputed name (*btags name*) such as calling a dog “lion.”

^d Analogous with “nonexistent” in English or “less” in the English words “selfless” or “hatless.”

^e *med dgag, prasajyapratishedha*.

^f *sangs rgyas tshe dpag med, amitāyus buddha*.

nonaffirming negative is necessarily permanent.^a

REFUTATION # 3 (453.10/132a.4)

Incorrect side: Whatever is a negative necessarily is a phenomenon in whose actual name a negative word is affixed.

Correct side: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, space,^b is a phenomenon in whose actual name a negative word is affixed because of being a negative. You have asserted the entailment [that a negative necessarily is a phenomenon in whose actual name a negative word is affixed].

If you say [that the reason, that is, that space is a negative,] is not established, it follows that the subject, space, is a negative because of being a nonaffirming negative.

If you say [that the reason, that is, that space is a nonaffirming negative,] is not established, it follows that the subject, space, is a nonaffirming negative because of being a nonaffirming negative that is a mere lack of obstructive contact. It follows [that the subject, space, is a nonaffirming negative that is a mere lack of obstructive contact] because of being un compounded space.

If you accept the root [consequence that space is a phenomenon in whose actual name a negative word is affixed], it follows that the subject, space, is not a phenomenon in whose actual name a negative word is affixed because there is no negative word that is affixed as part of its actual name.

If you say [that the reason that is, that there is no negative word that is affixed as part of its actual name,] is not established, it follows with respect to the subject, space, that there is no negative word that is affixed as part of its actual name because (1) the term *nam mkha'* (“space”) is its actual name and (2) the two *nam* and *mkha'* are neither negative words.

Furthermore, it [absurdly] follows that the subject, the noumenon,^c is a phenomenon at the end of whose actual name a negative word is affixed^d because of being a negative. You have

^a Jam-pal-shen-pen in oral commentary says (adapted from Klein, *Knowing, Naming, and Negation*, 95):

The Buddha-Whose-Life-Is-Limitless is an affirming negative, not a nonaffirming negative. Even though in general Buddhas, like other persons, are positive phenomena, the Buddha-Whose-Life-Is-Limitless is a negative phenomenon because when one understands Buddha-Whose-Life-Is-Limitless, one understands a person qualified by a lifetime that has no limit—not a hundred years, six hundred, or a million years. That his life-span has a limit is explicitly negated; by way of this negation one understands a person whose life is measureless. Thus, this person of limitless life appears by way of a negation of limited life and a projection of a person of limitless life in its place. Because a positive phenomenon—a Buddha—is implied in place of the object negated, this is an affirming negative, not a nonaffirming negative which would not project any positive in place of what is negated.

Similarly, an empty wallet is an affirming negative because the statement “empty wallet” projects the wallet—a positive phenomenon—which is qualified by being empty. However, “There is no money in an empty wallet” expresses a nonaffirming negative because nothing is projected in place of the money that is negated.

^b *nam mkha'*, *ākāśa*.

^c *chos nyid*, *dharmatā*; the basic dictionary meaning of “noumenon” is “reality.”

^d The vocabulary has switched either intentionally or unintentionally from “as part of its actual name” (*dnegos ming gi zur du*) to “at the end of whose actual name” (*dnegos ming gi mthar*).

asserted the entailment [that whatever is a negative necessarily is a phenomenon at the end of whose actual name a negative word is affixed].

The reason [that is, that the noumenon is a negative] is established because of being a nonaffirming negative.

You cannot assert [the converse of] the root [consequence, that is, that space/noumenon is not a negative] because even though there is no negative word at the end of its actual name, it is a phenomenon that must be realized through an explicit elimination of its object of negation by the awareness explicitly realizing it.

There is entailment [that whatever is a phenomenon that must be realized through an explicit elimination of its object of negation by the awareness explicitly realizing it even though there is no negative word at the end of its actual name necessarily is a negative] because any phenomenon that must be realized by way of the explicit elimination of its object of negation by the awareness explicitly realizing it necessarily is a negative.

REFUTATION #4 (455.5/132b.4)

Incorrect side: It follows that the subject, a form, is a negative because of being a phenomenon that must be realized by way of an explicit elimination of its own object of negation by an awareness explicitly realizing it.

If you say that [the reason, that is, that a form is a phenomenon that must be realized by way of an explicit elimination of its own object of negation by an awareness explicitly realizing it,] is not established, it follows that the subject, a form, is [a phenomenon that must be realized by way of an explicit elimination of its own object of negation by an awareness explicitly realizing it] because of being a phenomenon that must be realized by way of an explicit elimination of its own object of negation by the conceptual consciousness explicitly realizing it.

If you say that [the reason, that is, that a form is a phenomenon that must be realized by way of an explicit elimination of its own object of negation by the conceptual consciousness explicitly realizing it,] is not established, it follows that the subject, a form, is [a phenomenon that must be realized by way of an explicit elimination of its own object of negation by the conceptual consciousness explicitly realizing it] because of being a phenomenon that must be realized by way of the elimination of what is not itself by the conceptual consciousness apprehending it.

Correct side: There is no entailment [that whatever is a phenomenon that must be realized by way of the elimination of what is not itself by the conceptual consciousness apprehending it necessarily is a phenomenon that must be realized by way of an explicit elimination of its own object of negation by the conceptual consciousness explicitly realizing it].

If someone says that the reason [that is, that a form is a phenomenon that must be realized by way of the elimination of what is not itself by the conceptual consciousness apprehending it,] is not established, it follows that the subject, a form, is a phenomenon that must be realized by way of the elimination of what is not itself by the conceptual consciousness apprehending it because

of being an established base.^a

REFUTATION # 5 (456.1/133a.1)

Incorrect side: It follows that **the subject, a pot, is not a positive** because of **being a negative**.

If you say [that the reason, that is, that **a pot is a negative,**] is not established, it follows that **the subject, a pot, is a negative** because of being a phenomenon that must be realized by way of the elimination of what is not it by the conceptual consciousness explicitly realizing it.

Correct side: There is no entailment [that **whatever is a phenomenon that must be realized by way of the elimination of what is not it by the conceptual consciousness explicitly realizing it is necessarily a negative**].

If someone says that the reason [that is, that a pot is a phenomenon that must be realized by way of the elimination of what is not it by the conceptual consciousness explicitly realizing it,] is not established, it follows with respect to the subject, a pot, that it is a phenomenon that must be realized by way of the elimination of what is not it by the conceptual consciousness explicitly realizing it because it is an established base.

If someone accepts the root [consequence that **a pot is a negative**], it follows that the subject, a pot, is not a negative because of being a positive.

If someone says that the reason [that is, that a pot is a positive,] is not established, it follows that **the subject, a pot, is a positive** because of being one with pot.^b

REFUTATION # 6 (456.16/133a.3)

Incorrect side: **Whatever is an affirming negative necessarily is a phenomenon expressed by a term explicitly projecting another phenomenon—either an affirming negative or a positive—in place of the negation of its object of negation.**

Correct side: It [absurdly] follows that **fat Devadatta's not eating during the day is expressed by a term explicitly projecting another phenomenon—either an affirming negative or a positive—in place of the negation of its object of negation** because of being an affirming negative. You have

^a Jam-pal-shen-pen in oral commentary says (adapted from Klein, *Knowing, Naming, and Negation*, 98):

All established bases—all phenomena that exist—are realized through the elimination of what is *not* that phenomenon by the respective conceptual consciousnesses realizing them. Although what is not that thing is eliminated, it is not necessarily *explicitly* eliminated. For example, the conceptual consciousness explicitly realizing the presence of money implicitly realizes the nonexistence of a lack of money and implicitly eliminates a lack of money, but this implicit elimination does not mean that money is a negative phenomenon. For although there is no conceptual consciousness that is an explicit realizer of something without also being an implicit realizer of something else, this does not mean that whatever is realized by a conceptual consciousness is a negative phenomenon.

^b Jam-pal-shen-pen in oral commentary says (adapted from Klein, *Knowing, Naming, and Negation*, 99):

A conceptual consciousness explicitly realizing pot realizes it by way of eliminating non-pot, but does not realize it by way of *explicitly* eliminating such. Therefore, it does not follow from this reason that a pot is a negative. For example, if one has a conceptual consciousness realizing “I have money” this conceptual consciousness realizes its object by way of eliminating the lack of money but does not do so explicitly.

accepted the entailment [that **whatever is an affirming negative necessarily is expressed by a term explicitly projecting another phenomenon—either an affirming negative or a positive—in place of the negation of its object of negation**].

If you say [that the reason, that is, that fat Devadatta's not eating during the day is an affirming negative,] is not established, it follows that the subject, fat Devadatta's not eating during the day, is an affirming negative because the term expressing it projects another phenomenon—either an affirming negative or a positive—upon explicitly negating its own object of negation in its verbal reading. It follows [that the term expressing fat Devadatta's not eating during the day projects another phenomenon—either an affirming negative or a positive—upon explicitly negating its own object of negation in its verbal reading] because (1) the term expressing it, upon explicitly negating eating during the day, implicitly projects eating at night and (2) eating at night is a positive.

You cannot accept the root [consequence that **fat Devadatta's not eating during the day is expressed by a term explicitly projecting another phenomenon—either an affirming negative or a positive—in place of the negation of its object of negation**] because even though this phrase “Fat Devadatta does not eat during the day” does not explicitly project another phenomenon that is either an affirming negative or a positive upon explicitly negating its object of negation in its verbal reading, it does implicitly project such. It follows [that even though this phrase “Fat Devadatta does not eat during the day” does not explicitly project another phenomenon that is either an affirming negative or a positive upon explicitly negating its object of negation in its verbal reading, it does implicitly project such] because the phrase “Fat Devadatta does not eat during the day,” upon explicitly negating eating during the day, implicitly projects eating at night.^a

^a Jam-pal-shen-pen in oral commentary says (adapted from Klein, *Knowing, Naming, and Negation*, 100-101):

An affirming negative or a positive is projected *in place of* what is negated, like a person's getting up from a chair and someone else's sitting down on the same chair. Here, the object of negation is Devadatta's eating during the day. The locus of this non-eating during the day is Devadatta. For example, if someone says, “I have no money,” the locus of the lack of money is that person. In the same way, Devadatta here is the basis of the negation. In place of the eating during the day that is negated, it is projected that Devadatta eats at night. The implication arises because Devadatta is described as fat. If it were not specified that Devadatta is fat, his eating at night would not be implied. For example, if Diana is very busy and declines to eat when invited by others, and if a friend of hers reports that “Diana didn't eat during the day,” only non-eating is projected. There is no implication that she eats at night. Thus, this latter statement expresses a nonaffirming negative.

Context can alter whether a phrase expresses an affirming or a nonaffirming negative. For example, if someone says, “I have no money,” one way to understand this is as a nonaffirming negative but in certain contexts it could also be understood to mean, “Do *you* have any money?” Or even, “Do you have any money to loan me?” How much a given phrase projects depends to some extent on circumstances. Therefore, under certain conditions, the phrase “Devadatta does not eat during the day” could project that he eats at night. When it does so project, the phrase expresses an affirming negative. In general, however, “Devadatta does not eat during the day” expresses a nonaffirming negative.

REFUTATION # 7 (458.5/133b.2)

Incorrect side: It follows that the phrase “Fat Devadatta does not eat during the day” does not implicitly project another phenomenon—either an affirming negative or a positive—upon explicitly negating its own object of negation in its verbal reading because the phrase “Brahmins do not drink beer”^a does not implicitly project another phenomenon—either an affirming negative or a positive—upon explicitly negating its own object of negation in its verbal reading.

Correct side: [That the phrase “Brahmins do not drink beer” does not implicitly project another phenomenon—either an affirming negative or a positive—upon explicitly negating its own object of negation in its verbal reading] does not entail [that the phrase “Fat Devadatta does not eat during the day” does not implicitly project another phenomenon—either an affirming negative or a positive—upon explicitly negating its own object of negation in its verbal reading].

The reason [that is, that the phrase “Brahmins do not drink beer” does not implicitly project another phenomenon—either an affirming negative or a positive—upon explicitly negating its own object of negation in its verbal reading,] is established because the phrase “Brahmins do not drink beer” neither explicitly nor implicitly projects another phenomenon upon explicitly negating its own object of negation in its verbal reading. It follows [that the phrase “Brahmins do not drink beer” neither explicitly nor implicitly projects another phenomenon upon explicitly negating its own object of negation in its verbal reading] because the phrase “Brahmins do not drink beer” neither explicitly nor implicitly projects another phenomenon upon explicitly negating Brahmins’ drinking beer in its verbal reading. It follows [that the phrase “Brahmins do not drink beer” neither explicitly nor implicitly projects another phenomenon upon explicitly negating Brahmins’ drinking beer in its verbal reading] because Brahmins’ not drinking beer must be posited as a nonaffirming negative.^b

REFUTATION # 8 (459.7/133b.6)

Incorrect side: Whatever is an affirming negative necessarily is expressed by a term that projects

^a *bram ze chang mi thung ba.* This example is from Mīmāṃsā where Brahmins are merely prohibited from drinking alcohol without projecting any other activity in place of what is prohibited; see J. F. Staal, “Negation and the Law of Contradiction in Indian Thought,” *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* XXV, Part 1 (1962): especially 56-66.

^b Jam-pal-shen-pen in oral commentary says (adapted from Klein, *Knowing, Naming, and Negation*, 102):

The statement, “Brahmins do not drink beer,” merely negates that they drink beer; it does not project that they drink anything else. However, if you say “The wet-throated Brahmin does not drink beer” this does project that he drinks something else. Moreover, although the phrase “Brahmins do not drink beer” does implicitly project Brahmins—positive phenomena—Brahmins are not projected *in place of* the object of negation, drinking beer. Therefore, a positive phenomenon [drinking something else] is not projected in place of the negated object. Hence, Brahmins’ not drinking beer is a nonaffirming negative.

A term that expresses an affirming negative must project a positive *in place of the object negated*. Here, Brahmins are the locus or basis of the negation (*dkag gzhi*) of drinking beer; the statement simply posits a positive phenomenon that is the *locus* of the negation—Brahmins. The statement about Devadatta, on the other hand, projects a positive phenomenon—eating at night—*in place of* what is being negated, namely, eating during the day.

another phenomenon—either an affirming negative or a positive—upon explicitly negating its own object of negation in its verbal reading.

Correct side: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, a permanent,^a is expressed by a term that projects another phenomenon—either an affirming negative or a positive—upon explicitly negating its own object of negation in its verbal reading because of being an affirming negative. You have asserted the entailment [that whatever is an affirming negative necessarily is expressed by a term that projects another phenomenon—either an affirming negative or a positive—upon explicitly negating its own object of negation in its verbal reading].

If you say that the reason [that is, that a permanent is an affirming negative,] is not established, it follows that the subject, a permanent, is an affirming negative because of being (1) a negative and (2) and not a nonaffirming negative.

If you say that the first reason [that is, that a permanent is a negative] is not established, it follows that the subject, a permanent, is a negative because of being permanent.

If you say that there is no entailment [that whatever is a permanent necessarily is a negative], it follows that there is entailment because there is no permanent positive under its own power.^b It follows [that there is no permanent positive under its own power] because whatever is a positive under its own power is necessarily an effective thing.

You cannot accept the above [consequence that a permanent is expressed by a term that projects another phenomenon—either an affirming negative or a positive—upon explicitly negating its own object of negation in its verbal reading] because although the term expressing it does project either an affirming negative or a positive, it does not negate its own object of negation in its verbal reading. It follows [that although the term expressing it does project either an affirming negative or a positive, it does not negate its own object of negation in its verbal reading] because there is no negative word affixed to the term “a permanent.”^c

^a *rtag pa*.

^b *rang dbang ba*. Here “under its own power” means that a phenomenon is not merely imputed by conceptuality; thus, whatever is a positive phenomenon that is under its own power is necessarily an effective thing. Go-mang is unique among Ge-luk-pa colleges in asserting that whatever is permanent is necessarily a negative phenomenon. (Explanation adapted from Klein (n. 15, 212).

^c Jam-pal-shen-pen in oral commentary says (adapted from Klein, *Knowing, Naming, and Negation*, 104):

All Ge-luk-pa colleges agree that the term “a permanent” (*rtag pa*) expresses an affirming negative insofar as when you understand the meaning of “a permanent,” you understand a common locus of phenomenon and not being momentary (*chos dang skad cig ma ma yin pa'i gzhi mthun pa*, which is the definition or meaning of “permanent”). Even though there is no negative term in the phrase “a permanent,” when you understand its meaning you do so by way of explicitly eliminating an object of negation, momentary disintegration. Therefore, a permanent is necessarily a negative. However, Go-mang goes further and asserts that *whatever* is a permanent is necessarily a negative phenomenon. Therefore, unlike other colleges, Go-mang asserts that object of knowledge (*shes bya, jñeya*), object of comprehension (*gzhal bya, prameya*), and so forth are negatives. Go-mang asserts this because object of knowledge and so forth are not positive phenomena under their own power. This is due to the fact that such phenomena are merely imputed by conceptuality. According to Go-mang, once they are not positive phenomena under their own power, they cannot be positives at all. The other colleges disagree on this point, saying that there are positives merely imputed by conceptuality.

REFUTATION # 9 (460.9/134a.3)

Incorrect side: Whatever is expressed by a term that projects another phenomenon—either an affirming negative or a positive—necessarily is itself a negative.

Correct side: It [absurdly] follows with respect to the subject, a product,^a that it itself is a negative because the term expressing it projects another phenomenon—either an affirming negative or a positive.^b You have asserted the entailment [that whatever is expressed by a term that projects another phenomenon—either an affirming negative or a positive—necessarily is itself a negative].

If you say that the reason [that is, that the term expressing a product projects another phenomenon—either an affirming negative or a positive] is not established, it follows with respect to the subject, a product, that the term expressing it projects another phenomenon—either an affirming negative or a positive—because this expressive term [implicitly] projects its causes and conditions.

If you accept the root [consequence that a product is a negative], it follows that the subject, a product, is not a negative because of being a positive.

If you say that [the reason, that is, that a product is a positive is not established,] it follows that the subject, a product, is a positive because (1) an effective thing is a positive and (2) those two [a product and an effective thing] are similar [in being positives].^c

REFUTATION #10 (461.8/134a.6)

Incorrect side: It follows that the subject, a product, is not a positive because of being a negative.

If you say [that the reason, that is, that a product is a negative,] is not established, it follows that a product is a negative because product-sound (*sgra byas pa*) is a negative.

If you say [that the reason, that is, that product-sound (*sgra byas pa*) is a negative,] is not established, it follows [that product-sound is a negative] because of being a phenomenon that must be expressed by the phrase expressing “Sound is a product” (*sgra byas pa yin no*) upon eliminating nonproduct-sound (*sgra byas pa ma yin pa*).

Correct side: There is no entailment [that if product-sound (*sgra byas pa*) is a phenomenon that must be expressed by the phrase expressing “Sound is a product” (*sgra byas pa yin no*) upon eliminating nonproduct-sound (*sgra byas pa ma yin pa*), it is necessarily the case that product-sound (*sgra byas pa*) is a negative.

Well then, for you it [absurdly] follows that a form is a negative because of being a

^a *byas pa, krta.*

^b It projects the latter.

^c Jam-pal-shen-pen in oral commentary says (adapted from Klein, *Knowing, Naming, and Negation*, 105):

The main point here is that a product is not realized through an explicit elimination of an object of negation by the conceptual consciousness realizing it even though the term “a product” implicitly projects the causes and conditions that produced the effect, a product. However, these are not being projected in place of an explicit object of negation.

phenomenon that must be expressed upon eliminating non-form by the term expressing “form.”

If you accept [the consequence that **a form is a negative**], it [absurdly] follows that **positives do not exist** because [according to you] **a form is not a positive**.

If you accept [the consequence that **positives do not exist**], it [absurdly] follows that **whatever is an established base is necessarily a negative** because [according to you] **positives do not exist**. You have accepted the reason,] that is, that **positives do not exist**. You cannot accept [the consequence that **whatever is an established base is necessarily a negative**].^a

REFUTATION #11 (462.5/134b.3)

Incorrect side: **Form is not a phenomenon that must be expressed upon eliminating^b non-form by the term expressing “form.”**

Correct side: It follows that form is [a phenomenon that must be expressed upon eliminating non-form by the term expressing “form”] because of being a phenomenon that must be expressed upon excluding^c non-form by the term expressing “form.” It follows [that form is a phenomenon that must be expressed upon excluding non-form by the term expressing “form”] because the term expressing “form” is an exclusionary engager^d with respect to form.

[That the term expressing “form” is an exclusionary engager with respect to form] entails [that form is a phenomenon that must be expressed upon excluding non-form by the term expressing “form”] because the meaning of exclusionary in “exclusionary engager” must refer to excluding what is not that phenomenon.

Presentation of our own system (462.16/134b.5)

The definition of a negative exists because:

a phenomenon that must be realized upon the explicit elimination of its object of negation
by the awareness explicitly realizing it^e

is it. The four—negative (*dgag pa, pratiṣedha*), exclusion (*sel ba, apoha*), other-exclusion (*gzhan sel, anyāpoha*), and isolate (*ldog pa, vyatireka*)—are equivalent. When negatives are

^a Jam-pal-shen-pen in oral commentary says (adapted from Klein, *Knowing, Naming, and Negation*, 106):

Once it has been explicitly understood that I have a hundred dollars, it is *implicitly* understood that I do not lack a hundred dollars. Nevertheless, the statement “I have a hundred dollars” expresses a positive. Similarly, if one says “form,” it is *implicitly* understood that there is not non-form, or that there is not an absence of form. Nevertheless, the term “form” expresses a positive phenomenon.

^b *rnam par bcaḍ nas.*

^c *rnam par bsel nas.*

^d *sel 'jug*; in other places I have translated this term as “partial engager.”

^e Jam-pal-shen-pen in oral commentary says (adapted from Klein, *Knowing, Naming, and Negation*, 107):

Instead of saying that negatives are realized by the *awareness* realizing them, most texts say that such phenomena are realized by the *conceptual consciousness* realizing them. This is done in order to exclude direct perception because the direct perception in a Buddha’s continuum realizes that Brahmins do not drink beer without explicitly eliminating that they drink beer. Buddhas never cognize through an explicit elimination; everything is known to them directly.

divided, there are two: affirming negatives and nonaffirming negatives.

The definition of an affirming negative exists because:

a negative whose term expressing it projects another phenomenon—either an affirming negative or a positive—in place of the negation of its object of negation

is it. An illustration exists because impermanent sound is that.^a

The definition of a nonaffirming negative exists because:

a negative whose term expressing it does not project another phenomenon—either an affirming negative or a positive—in place of the negation of its object of negation

is it. An illustration exists because the selflessness of persons is that.^b

When negatives are divided, there are five because there are the five consisting of:

1. that whose verbalizing term explicitly projects another phenomenon—either an affirming negative or a positive—upon the explicit negation of its object of negation in its verbal reading
2. that whose verbalizing term implicitly projects another phenomenon—either an affirming negative or a positive—upon the explicit negation of its object of negation in its verbal

^a Jam-pal-shen-pen in oral commentary says (adapted from Klein, *Knowing, Naming, and Negation*, 107-108): Impermanent sound is an affirming negative because the term expressing it—“impermanent sound”—projects a positive phenomenon in place of the object of negation, permanent sound. Conversely, the statement “Brahmins do not drink beer” refutes that they drink beer and also projects Brahmins, which are positive phenomena, but does not project them in place of the object of negation. Therefore, the phrase “Brahmins do not drink beer” expresses a nonaffirming negative.

^b Jam-pal-shen-pen in oral commentary says (adapted from Klein, *Knowing, Naming, and Negation*, 108-109): If someone says “The self (*bdag*, *ātman*) of a person exists because the ‘I’ (*nga*, *aham*) of a person exists,” there is no entailment. The word “I” is a factually concordant word. Everyone uses it as in “I am reading,” “I am tired,” and so forth. Someone might think that if there is no self, there is no “I” because in general self and “I” are equivalent, but here, however, the term “self” has a different meaning from the term “I” or “person.” These latter two are factually concordant, corresponding to something that actually exists. The self of persons, however, refers to a self that is not merely imputed in dependence on the aggregates. Because no such self exists, the term “self” here is not factually concordant. Therefore, Buddhism teaches that the apprehension that such a self does exist must be abandoned.

Ordinary activities in the world are done for the sake of abandoning things that harm—such as fatigue and poverty—and taking up things that help. Thus, if one asks what is the thing to be abandoned by studying the Buddhist teaching, it is this: powerless travelling in cyclic existence, the sufferings of birth, sickness, aging, and death. You cannot just throw these away like old clothing. Because the sufferings of birth and so forth are established in dependence on the body, one will definitely continue to cycle in these sufferings.

On what do the sufferings of birth and sickness depend? On beginningless actions and afflictions (*nyon mongs*, *kleśa*). And the root of these is the apprehension of a self of persons. If you come to realize selflessness thoroughly, then the actions and afflictions of cyclic existence become nonexistent. Thereby, cyclic existence itself becomes nonexistent [for you].

Thus, all established bases—everything that exists—as well as what does not exist are without a self of persons. The enemies that a Foe Destroyer overcomes are birth, aging, sickness, and death. In order to abandon these, it is necessary to abandon the afflictions, the three poisons of desire, hatred, and ignorance. If one can abandon these, one is an Foe Destroyer.

reading

3. that whose verbalizing term both explicitly and implicitly projects another phenomenon—either an affirming negative or a positive—upon the explicit negation of its object of negation in its verbal reading
4. that whose verbalizing term contextually projects another phenomenon—either an affirming negative or a positive—upon the explicit negation of its object of negation in its verbal reading
5. that whose verbalizing term does not project another phenomenon—either an affirming negative or a positive—upon the negation^a of its object of negation in its verbal reading.

1. A negative whose verbalizing term explicitly projects another phenomenon—either an affirming negative or a positive—upon the explicit negation of its object of negation in its verbal reading exists because the existence of a pot’s selflessness of persons^b (*bum pa gang zag gi bdag med yod pa*) is that.

If you say that it is not established [that the existence of a pot’s selflessness of persons is a negative whose verbalizing term explicitly projects another phenomenon—either an affirming negative or a positive—upon the explicit negation of its object of negation in its verbal reading], it follows that the subject, the existence of a pot’s selflessness of persons, is a negative whose verbalizing term explicitly projects another phenomenon—either an affirming negative or a positive—upon the explicit negation of its object of negation in its verbal reading because the term expressing it (1) explicitly negates its object of negation in its verbal reading and (2) explicitly projects another phenomenon—either an affirming negative or a positive.

The first reason [that is, that the term expressing the existence of a pot’s selflessness of persons explicitly negates its object of negation in its verbal reading,] is established because the phrase expressing “A pot’s selflessness of persons exists” negates the self of persons of a pot in its verbal reading.

The second reason [that is, that the term expressing the existence of a pot’s selflessness of persons explicitly projects another phenomenon, either an affirming negative or a positive,] is established because (1) the phrase expressing “A pot’s selflessness of persons exists” explicitly projects the existence of a pot’s selflessness of persons and (2) the existence of a pot’s selflessness of persons is an affirming negative.

The first reason [that is, that the phrase expressing “A pot’s selflessness of persons exists” explicitly projects the existence of a pot’s selflessness of persons,] is easy [to establish].

If you say that the second reason [that is, that the existence of a pot’s selflessness of persons is an affirming negative,] is not established, it follows with respect to the subject, a pot’s selflessness of persons, that its existence is an affirming negative because it is an established

^a The text here (135a.4) simply reads *bkag nas* and not *dngos su bkag nas*, but below (136a.4) reads *dngos su bkag nas*, “upon the explicit negation.” I assume the latter to be correct.

^b A pot’s selflessness of persons is a pot’s nonexistence as an object of use by a substantially existent, or self-sufficient, person.

base.^a

2. A negative whose verbalizing term implicitly projects another phenomenon—either an affirming negative or a positive—upon the explicit negation of its object of negation in its verbal reading is positable because fat Devadatta who does not eat during the day (*lhas sbyin tshon po nyin par zas mi za ba*) is that.

It follows [that fat Devadatta who does not eat during the day is a negative whose verbalizing term implicitly projects another phenomenon—either an affirming negative or a positive—upon the explicit negation of its object of negation in its verbal reading] because (1) the phrase “Fat Devadatta does not eat during the day” upon explicitly negating its object of negation—eating during the day— implicitly projects eating at night, and (2) eating at night is a positive. It follows [that eating at night is a positive] because eating food is a positive.^b

3. A negative whose verbalizing term both explicitly and implicitly projects another phenomenon—either an affirming negative or a positive—upon the explicit negation of its object of negation in its verbal reading is positable because fat Devadatta who does not eat during the day and has a nonemaciated body (*lhas sbyin tshon po nyin par zas mi za ba lus rid pa ma yin pa yod pa*) is that. It follows [that fat Devadatta who does not eat during the day and has a nonemaciated body is a negative whose verbalizing term both explicitly and implicitly projects another phenomenon—either an affirming negative or a positive—upon the explicit negation of its object of negation in its verbal reading] because the phrase “fat Devadatta does not eat during the day and has a nonemaciated body” (1) upon explicitly negating eating during the day implicitly projects eating at night and explicitly projects the existence of a non-emaciated body and (2) eating at night is a positive phenomenon and (4) the existence of a non-emaciated body is an affirming negative.^c

^a Jam-pal-shen-pen in oral commentary says (adapted from Klein, *Knowing, Naming, and Negation*, 110):

According to Go-mang, the existence of any phenomenon is an affirming negative because that existence is permanent; for instance, form is a positive, but the existence of form is a negative. [According to the Sūtra School Following Reasoning] a positive or impermanent phenomenon has its own power; it is not just imputed by conceptuality.

^b Jam-pal-shen-pen in oral commentary says (adapted from Klein, *Knowing, Naming, and Negation*, 110-111):

To say that “such-and-such exists” explicitly projects that the thing exists but does not explicitly eliminate the nonexistence of that thing. If it did, then a conceptual consciousness realizing the existence of a pot would also explicitly realize opposite-from-nonexistence of pot (*bum pa yod pa ma yin pa las log pa*), whereas it actually realizes this implicitly. If the nonexistence of a pot were explicitly eliminated, there would have to be an explicit realization of the lack of nonexistence of pot. Moreover, if the conceptual consciousness realizing that pot is a product realized it by explicitly eliminating that pot is a non-product, then pot would be a negative phenomenon. More significantly, an inferential consciousness explicitly realizing impermanent sound would also have to realize nonpermanent sound explicitly.

^c Jam-pal-shen-pen in oral commentary says (adapted from Klein, *Knowing, Naming, and Negation*, 111):

These two modes of projection, implicit and explicit, are not simultaneous but serial. They are projected by sub-phrases that occur serially in the statement. It can be said that as each part of the phrase is spoken, the corresponding mental image appears to thought. Another explanation is that the words together add up to a single meaning-generality [that is, a single image]. The two explanations are not contradictory because it is possible to build up to a complex mental image gradually, adding qualities serially.

4. A negative whose verbalizing term contextually projects another phenomenon—either an affirming negative or a positive—upon the explicit negation of its object of negation in its verbal reading is positable because at a time when one has ascertained that a person is either of royal or Brahmin lineage but has not ascertained the particular one, upon the explicit negation of being a Brahmin by the phrase, “This one is not a Brahmin,” being of the royal lineage should be understood by contextual projection.^a

[5.] A negative whose verbalizing term does not project another phenomenon—either an affirming negative or a positive—upon the explicit negation of its object of negation in its verbal reading is positable because Brahmins’ not drinking beer is that. It follows [that Brahmins’ not drinking beer is a negative whose verbalizing term does not project another phenomenon—either an affirming negative or a positive—upon the explicit negation of its object of negation in its verbal reading] because the phrase expressing “Brahmins do not drink beer,” upon explicitly negating Brahmins’ drinking beer in its verbal reading neither explicitly, implicitly, nor contextually projects another phenomenon—neither an affirming negative nor a positive phenomenon.^b

There is a way of condensing [the five types of negatives] into two—affirming negatives and nonaffirming negatives—because the first four must be posited as affirming negatives and the last one, as a nonaffirming negative.

With regard to whatever is a negative, the term expressing it does not necessarily negate its object of negation in its verbal reading because (1) this is not necessarily the case with respect to affirming negatives and (2) this is not necessarily the case also with respect to nonaffirming negatives. The first reason [that is, that with regard to whatever is an affirming negative the term expressing it does not necessarily negate its object of negation in its verbal reading] is established because although both a permanent^c and an object of knowledge^d are affirming negatives, the terms expressing them do not negate their objects of negation in their verbal reading.^e The second reason [that is, that also with regard to whatever is a nonaffirming negative the term expressing it does not necessarily negate its object of negation in its verbal reading] is established because although space^f and noumenon^a are nonaffirming negatives, the terms

^a Jam-pal-shen-pen in oral commentary says (adapted from Klein, *Knowing, Naming, and Negation*, 112):

In general the statement “He is not a Brahmin” does not indicate that someone is of the royal lineage, but in this particular context it does.

^b Jam-pal-shen-pen in oral commentary says (adapted from Klein, *Knowing, Naming, and Negation*, 112):

The statement, “Brahmins do not drink beer,” does project Brahmins which are positive phenomenon but does not project them in place of the explicit negation of its object of negation, Brahmins’ drinking beer.

^c *rtag pa*.

^d *shes bya*.

^e Jam-pal-shen-pen in oral commentary says (adapted from Klein, *Knowing, Naming, and Negation*, 113):

This assertion is unique to Go-mang. According to other colleges both a permanent and an object of knowledge are positives; according to them, when object of knowledge appears to the mind, only something positive appears—it is not necessary to get at it by eliminating an object of negation.

^f *nam mkha, ākāśa*.

expressing them do not negate their objects of negation in their verbal reading.

^a *chos nyid, dharmatā.*